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3. Three dimensions of the arm’s length principle in the subsidy systems

This section examines how the arm’s length principle is implemented in practice, focusing on the three mentioned dimensions: the organisational models of news media subsidies, the decision process, and mechanisms of oversight.
Photo: Skandinav Bildbyrå
As stated, the primary point of reference for this report is the situation as of early 2026. Nevertheless, news media subsidy policies have undergone significant changes over the past decades and are about to evolve further in the years ahead. To highlight this dynamic nature and the ways in which the arm’s length principle is translated into practice over time, the discussion is supplemented with a few historical examples and references to anticipated future developments.

3.1 Dimension one: The organisational models

The organisational and operational model – understood here as the organisation of the administration of the news media subsidy system – constitutes an initial and relevant dimension in assessing institutional distance from executive and legislative authorities. It represents one of the most visible manifestations of the arm’s length principle: Without institutional independence in the day-to-day administration of either the system itself or the decision-making body, policy outcomes risk being perceived as instances of cronyism or political patronage.
This also explains why this dimension is given comparatively extensive attention, as well as the inclusion of some historical retrospectives and accounts of the design of the subsidy schemes. However, already at a glance, it is clear that operational models vary with respect to this dimension across the Nordic countries.

3.1.1 A competence-based board in Denmark

In the Danish context, much of the framework for media policy is normally established through political media agreements negotiated between the government and one or more parties in the Danish Parliament. In short, a majority of the members of parliament must support the agreement. The current media policy agreement, presented in June 2023, covers the period 2023–2026 (Kulturministeriet, 2023).
The existing subsidy scheme was introduced in 2014, replacing an earlier distribution subsidy for printed newspapers. The subsidy scheme was amended in 2024 to facilitate a greater redistribution of support towards local and regional news media. In addition, content consisting of audio and audiovisual services can now qualify for support to a greater extent. Prior to this reform, all schemes within the media subsidy framework had been directed at traditional news media; from 2024 onwards, however, the editorial production subsidy may also be granted to two additional categories of media: magazines and weekly freesheets (ugeaviser). Most of the funding nevertheless remains within the principal editorial production scheme (Nordicom, 2026: 58–59).
The acts regulating these subsidies in force are the Act on Media Subsidies (Lov nr. 1604 af 26/12/2013) and the associated Ordinance (BEK nr. 127 af 05/02/2024). Under this legislative framework, the relevant support schemes are administered by a Media Board (Medienævnet). The Board consists of seven members, one of whom serves as chair. All members are formally appointed by the Minister for Culture, although one member is nominated by the industry association Danish Media and another by the Danish Union of Journalists. The chair is required to hold legal qualifications. All appointments are made for four-year terms. Collectively, the Board is expected to possess expertise in areas such as news production, media markets, the democratic role of the media, and related fields (Kammer & Blach-Ørsten, 2025: 11).
Although the emphasis is clearly placed on competence-based requirements, neither the Act nor the Ordinance contains explicit provisions that would preclude individuals with political affiliations from serving as members of the Board (Lov nr. 1604 af 26/12/2013). These possibilities are, nevertheless, constrained by the Public Administration Act’s rules on disqualification. These rules specify the circumstances under which a person is disqualified from participating in the processing or decision-making of an administrative case, including situations involving personal or financial interests or other factors likely to give rise to doubts about impartiality (LBK nr. 433 af 22/04/2014).
In addition to appointing the Board’s members, the Minister for Culture is also responsible for shaping its rules of procedure, which set out how the body conducts its work and makes decisions. Administrative support for the Board is in turn provided by the Danish Agency for Culture and Palaces (Lov nr. 1604 af 26/12/2013; BEK nr. 127 af 05/02/2024). The Agency is a government authority under the Ministry of Culture and contributes to the implementation of the government’s cultural policy objectives.
In the autumn of 2025, a government-appointed committee presented a proposal for a modernised media subsidy system. In brief, the proposal advocated coordinating the existing support schemes into a single unified system. However, it contained no new recommendations concerning the administration or organisation of the support system itself (Udvalg om fremtidens mediestøtte, 2025: 10).

3.1.2 Two separate subsidy systems in Finland

Unlike its neighbouring Scandinavian countries, Finland does not currently operate a comprehensive system of media subsidies. The former Finnish press subsidy scheme was largely dismantled over a period of approximately two decades from the early 1990s onwards. The process was driven by deregulation pressures from the Finnish Ministry of Finance and the European Commission, combined with a progressively constrained fiscal environment. The subsidy previously directed at smaller party-affiliated newspapers, which was formally abolished in 2008 (2007 was the last year the subsidy was in use), was instead incorporated into the general system of party funding as support for political parties’ information activities (Ds 2022:14, 2022: 128). The fact that Finland practically abandoned direct press subsidies and the traditional dual Nordic subsidy model (i.e., with both indirect and direct subsidies) in the 1990s has made it somewhat of an outlier in the context of the Nordic media welfare states (Grönlund et al., 2024).
At the beginning of 2026, two targeted and selective subsidy schemes were in place: a temporary distribution subsidy for printed newspapers, the larger of the two, and a smaller scheme aimed at supporting news media published in Finland’s minority languages.
The former scheme is intended for distribution companies that commit to delivering printed news media in sparsely populated areas of the country. It was introduced in response to amendments to the Postal Act that reduced postal delivery from five to three days per week. Accordingly, in 2022, the government proposed a new, time-limited state aid measure to ensure five-day newspaper delivery until 31 December 2027.
The distribution subsidy is administered by the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency (Traficom), which is also responsible for decisions on the allocation of support. No dedicated advisory or decision-making committee has been established within or outside the agency for this purpose. The scheme is instead managed within Traficom’s ordinary organisational structure in accordance with the Government Decree on Temporary State Aid for Newspaper Distribution (FFS 820/2023). Traficom operates under the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
The latter scheme, regulated by the Government Decree on Support for Newspapers (FFS 389/2008), is intended to support newspapers and online publications published in Karelian, Romani, Sámi, and Swedish, as well as publications in sign language. It also covers the production and publication of Karelian- or Sámi-language content in connection with newspapers published in Finnish or Swedish, in addition to Swedish-language news services.
The subsidy scheme is administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM). Preparatory work is carried out within the ministry by civil servants in the Ministry’s department for cultural and arts policy, while the formal decisions are taken by the Finnish government at its plenary session (FFS 389/2008).
The fact that the scheme falls under the Ministry of Education and Culture – a ministry responsible for matters relating to the national languages, minority languages, and cultural and language policy – indicates that the support is primarily conceived as a language- and culture-policy instrument rather than as part of a broader news media market support framework. This institutional positioning also largely explains why this form of support is administered separately from other media-related subsidies and why the associated decision-making processes differ.

3.1.3 Iceland, a newcomer to direct subsidies

As already noted, Iceland’s media system stands out in several respects in a Nordic comparison. Until recently, the state has been far less active in the Icelandic media market than in the other Nordic countries, and practices characteristic of the Nordic media welfare state model have, for all practical purposes, been absent. Consequently, private media in Iceland have been among the less regulated in Europe. One indication of this distinctive position within the Nordic context is that direct media subsidies – albeit temporary – were first introduced only in the early 2020s, with the aim of strengthening Icelandic media and ensuring public access to news and information in a digital and platform-dominated media environment. Prior to 2020, Iceland had no system of direct media subsidies (Guðmundsson & Jóhannsdóttir, 2024: 156–157).
Iceland’s temporary media subsidy scheme for private news media, both local and national, was extended to remain in force throughout 2025. The statutory basis for this temporary regime expired on 1 January 2026 (Lög um breytingu á lögum um fjölmiðla, nr. 38/2011 [stuðningur við einkarekna fjölmiðla]). Although a more permanent scheme has been announced, it had not yet entered into force at the time of writing (Icelandic Review, 2025; ESA, 2025). Iceland therefore constitutes a methodological exception to the report’s general early-2026 cut-off and is analysed based on the most recently applicable framework, namely the 2025 temporary regime.
Under that framework, Iceland established a three-member Allocation Committee (Úthlutunarnefnd) to be responsible for granting support to privately owned media. The members are formally appointed by the Minister of Culture, Innovation and Higher Education: one nominated by the Supreme Court of Iceland, one by a university collaboration committee, and one by the Icelandic National Audit Office. This last nominee must be an authorised public accountant. Alternate members are appointed in the same manner.
The Minister appoints the chair from among the members of the Committee. The chair must in turn meet the qualifications required for appointment as a district court judge. The other members and their alternates are required to possess specialist knowledge of media matters, as well as relevant professional experience and education (Lög um breytingu á lögum um fjölmiðla, nr. 38/2011 [stuðningur við einkarekna fjölmiðla]).
There is no provision in the media subsidy legislation explicitly stating that individuals with political affiliations may not serve on the Committee. However, as in Denmark, such possibilities are constrained by the rules on disqualification and requirements of impartiality set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (Stjórnsýslulög nr. 37/1993).

3.1.4 Administrative decision-making in Norway

Norway was the first of the Nordic countries to introduce direct subsidies for newspapers, doing so as early as 1969 (Bjerke & Halvorsen, 2023: 39). Over time, the principal subsidy scheme has been expanded to encompass both print and online news and current affairs media. As in Denmark, the production subsidy for news and current affairs media constitutes Norway’s largest form of direct media support. This scheme, together with the innovation and development grants, support for local broadcasting, and the subsidy for Sámi newspapers, is administered by the Norwegian Media Authority (Medietilsynet). The Media Authority operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Equality.
Until 2023, the Media Authority was supported in the preparation of decisions on production subsidies by a dedicated advisory committee (Tilskuddsutvalget), consisting of five members and an equal number of deputy members. All members were appointed by the Ministry for four-year terms. The committee’s primary task was to assess new applications for production subsidies and to submit recommendations for decision-making (Medietilsynet, 2021: 164).
Following this administrative change, decisions in this area are now made solely by the Media Authority. An advisory support structure nevertheless remains in place for innovation and development subsidies and subsidies for local audio and audiovisual news media. In this context, funding decisions are formally adopted by the Media Authority based on recommendations from specialist advisory committees, which are appointed by the Authority.
The Advisory Committee (Fagutvalget) for innovation and development subsidies comprises a chair, four members, and three deputy members, all appointed for terms of up to three years. Collectively, the members are required to possess broad and complementary expertise, including competence in media and media economics, innovation, technical and digital development, and local media. In the event of a tie, the chair holds a casting vote (FOR-2018-06-26-1033). The committee for local audio and audiovisual news media is organised in a broadly similar manner and performs comparable functions (FOR-2016-02-19-166).
Beyond the mentioned formal arrangements, the composition of these committees is further shaped by wider administrative norms. Accordingly, although the relevant regulatory framework does not explicitly prohibit political representatives from serving as members, Norwegian administrative practice – comparable to that in Denmark – together with the rules on disqualification, imposes constraints on such appointments (LOV-1967-02-10).
In this context, it should be noted that discussions have been held in Norway with regard to establishing a media subsidy council (mediestøtteråd). According to a proposal put forward by the Norwegian government in the late 2010s, the proposed subsidy council would determine the allocation of media support between different platforms and categories of publishers, while the industry itself would not be represented. The proposed body was envisaged as strengthening the principle of arm’s length distance, deciding the allocation of funds between support schemes, and formulating the regulatory framework governing them. The council was, among other things, intended to “counteract suspicions that political interests improperly influence the distribution of media subsidy” (Meld. St. 17, 2018/19, 2018–2019: 60; author’s translation). The proposal met with criticism, not least from significant sections of the media industry, and was never implemented (Bjerke & Halvorsen, 2023: 224–226). 
In November 2025, the Norwegian Media Authority published a review assessing potential modernisation of the existing media subsidy system. The review did not propose changes to the organisational structure of the support scheme, focusing instead on specific issues concerning selected subsidy categories and target audiences. The review aims to provide a foundation for the development of the four-year policy framework governing direct media support for the period 2027–2030 (Medietilsynet, 2025: 2).

3.1.5 No politicians in Sweden’s reformed subsidy council

In Sweden, direct press subsidies were introduced in 1971 with the aim of supporting newspapers in vulnerable market positions. With only limited modifications, this system remained largely intact for several decades. The core component of the former system, the operational subsidy, primarily targeted printed newspapers and so-called secondary newspapers, the smaller title in a local market (Ds 2022:14, 2022: 111–113).
In 2023, the Swedish media subsidy system underwent a comprehensive reform, and the restructured scheme was implemented for the first time in 2024. The current news media subsidy framework comprises four forms of support: a general editorial subsidy, an extended editorial subsidy, a transitional subsidy for newspapers that received operational support in 2023, and a newspaper distribution subsidy. The new system is platform-neutral and may be granted to general news media irrespective of distribution technology. It places a clear emphasis on local news provision and on areas with limited media coverage (Nordicom, 2026: 62).
Decisions on the allocation of subsidies are taken by the Media Subsidy Council (Mediestödsnämnden), a separate decision-making body operating within the Swedish Agency for the Media (Mediemyndigheten). The Agency is an independent administrative authority operating under the Ministry of Culture.
The Media Subsidy Council consists of a chair and between four and seven additional members. A corresponding number of deputy members is appointed, as determined by the government, which also formally appoints all individual members of the Council. At least one member or deputy member serves as vice-chair. Both the chair and the vice-chair are required to be, or to have previously served as, judges.
Individuals who are members of parliament, government ministers, or employees of the Parliamentary Administration or the Government Offices are ineligible to serve on the Council. The same restriction applies to individuals holding full-time or substantial part-time elected offices at the municipal or regional level (SFS 2023:664).
Under the previous subsidy system, the council included, among others, representatives of political parties. Their participation reflected an established practice whereby the government provided political parties with the opportunity to nominate members. That said, this took place at a time when the structure of the support scheme meant that allocation decisions were predominantly, though not invariably, formal (Ds 2022:14, 2022: 189).

3.1.6 Comparison of dimension one

Direct and selective news media subsidies are administered and organised differently across the Nordic countries (see Table 3.1). One key difference concerns institutional responsibility: In Finland, responsibility for direct subsidies is divided between two organisations, whereas in the other Nordic countries the schemes are administered by a single body. Nonetheless, one of the Finnish subsidies is primarily regarded as a language and cultural support rather than as a form of media subsidy.
Table 3.1 Organisational separation in Nordic news media subsidy systems (decision-making bodies and advisory structures)
Country
Designated decision-making body
Internal advisory structure
Organisational model
Denmark
Media Board
Specific body model with agency secretariat support
Finland
Authority and Government models – split across bodies
Iceland
Allocation Committee
Specific body model with administrative support via an agency
Norway
Expert advisory committees in parts of the system
Authority and advisory model
Sweden
Media Subsidy Council
Specific body model within an independent agency
Another difference, particularly relevant from the perspective of this report, concerns the arrangements for designated decision-making bodies. In Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden, specific bodies are entrusted with taking funding decisions – the Danish Media Board, the Icelandic Allocation Committee, and the Swedish Media Subsidy Council.
A clear distinction between the three decision-making bodies is that political representatives are explicitly excluded in the Swedish system, whereas this is not formally the case in the Danish and Icelandic systems. Other legislation nevertheless imposes constraints on such appointments. Iceland differs from the other two in that all members of the committee are nominated by external and neutral bodies, such as the Supreme Court of Iceland, rather than being directly appointed without a prior nomination procedure, or by a media-related party concerned.
In Finland and Norway, no such specialised decision-making bodies exist – although Norway retains advisory structures alongside administrative decision-making. These decisions are instead made by ministries and administrative authorities.
At the organisational level, the arm’s length principle therefore appears to be more visibly manifested in Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden than in Norway and, particularly, in Finland’s minority-language news media subsidy scheme.

3.2 Dimension two: The decision-making process

A closely related analytical dimension to the structure and operational model of the decision-making organisation is the examination of the allocation and decision-making process. Here, it is equally important to study the extent to which the executive and legislative branches of government are involved in the decisions, ranging from the framing of guidelines to the preparation of decision-making materials.

3.2.1 Danish decisions made by a media board

The Danish Agency for Culture and Palaces provide secretariat support to the Media Board. This includes, inter alia, the preparation of cases for the Board and the submission of formal recommendations prior to decision-making. The final and legally binding decisions regarding the allocation of media support are taken by the Board itself.
Furthermore, the Act on Media Subsidies stipulates that support under the scheme may not be granted to news media outlets that are wholly or partially owned by public institutions, publicly funded entities, or comparable organisations. This rule does not apply to news media addressing the Danish minority in Southern Schleswig or the German minority in Southern Jutland (LOV nr 1604 af 26/12/2013; BEK nr 127 af 05/02/2024).

3.2.2 Dual decision-making structure in Finland

In Finland, as previously noted, the administration of subsidies is handled by different organisations. For the temporary distribution subsidy, Traficom organises a selection procedure concerning state aid for newspaper distribution, in which one distribution company is chosen for each subsidy-eligible area. These areas are defined by Traficom, which also sets the maximum price that the subsidised distribution company may charge newspaper publishers. Thus, the entire subsidy process is managed within the organisation (Traficom, 2025).
The other subsidy scheme, the one for news media published in the country’s minority languages, is formally granted by the Finnish government in plenary session following a presentation by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Prior to the decision, the Ministry is required to consult both the Assembly of Swedish Finland (Folktinget) and the Sámi Parliament, in accordance with the applicable provisions governing the scheme. The administration of the subsidy is handled within the Ministry’s department for cultural and arts policy. In this case, individual funding decisions are not taken as delegated civil servant decisions but are adopted at the level of government (FFS 389/2008).
While the Finnish State Aid Act (FFS 688/2001) does not explicitly prohibit the granting of subsidies to state-owned entities, all public support must comply with EU state aid rules. In the media sector, this generally precludes selective direct subsidies to state-owned media. The exclusion of state-owned media in Finland is therefore implicit and system-based, rather than explicitly stipulated in media subsidy legislation.

3.2.3 Iceland’s allocation committee selects

The Icelandic Media Commission (Fjölmiðlanefnd) handles applications and provides expert support to the Allocation Committee under a separate agreement. The final decisions rest with the Committee.
The costs associated with the assessment of applications and other administrative expenses are met from the State Treasury (Lög um breytingu á lögum um fjölmiðla, nr. 38/2011 [stuðningur við einkarekna fjölmiðla]). As already mentioned, the subsidy is support for privately owned media.

3.2.4 Norwegian decisions made by a regulatory authority

For the Norwegian subsidy scheme, the Ministry for Culture and Equality makes a calculation of subsidies for each grant year, and in doing so determines the distribution between various categories by establishing subsidy rates and fixed amounts. These figures are based on the economic development of the industry and recommendations provided by the Media Authority (Medietilsynet, 2021: 164). Prior to a final decision, the proposed distribution of the subsidy appropriation is submitted to the media industry’s trade organisations for consultation. For the preparation of decisions concerning production subsidies, the Authority is supported by the dedicated advisory committees (Medietilsynet, 2021: 164).
Regarding the production subsidy, public institutions or public authorities may not exercise effective control, assume financial responsibility, or hold more than 49 per cent of the ownership shares in the company if support is to be granted (FOR-2022-12-08-2117). There is no explicit ownership prohibition with respect to the innovation subsidy (FOR-2018-06-26-1033).

3.2.5 Swedish decisions made by a council

The economic framework and expenditure ceilings of the Swedish news media subsidy scheme are determined by the state budget presented by the government. Applications for support are then processed by the Agency for the Media; as in Denmark, however, the formal and substantive decisions are taken by the Media Subsidy Council based on the documentation submitted to it. The Agency is also responsible, through its regulations on media subsidies, for clarifying how key requirements and stipulations are to be interpreted and applied (MEMYFS 2024:1, 2024). 
In Sweden, media subsidy legislation explicitly excludes state-owned, municipal, and regional media, as well as public service companies, from eligibility for direct media support (SFS 2023:664).

3.2.6 Comparison of dimension two

Finland diverges from the other Nordic countries in that it operates a subsidy scheme targeted towards media that is administered entirely at the ministerial level, in this case by the Ministry of Education and Culture and the government. By contrast, in the case of the Finnish distribution subsidy and the Norwegian subsidy schemes, the entire preparatory and decision-making processes are located within individual administrative authorities (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Decision-making process design (who prepares decisions, who decides, and where political steering is located)
Country
Preparation
Formal decision on individual grants
Location of framework steering
Denmark
Agency secretariat
Media Board
State budget + statutory/ordinance framework
Finland
Traficom and Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM)
Traficom and Government
State budget + decrees; scheme-specific steering varies
Iceland
Media Commission (administration)
Allocation Committee
State budget + statutory framework
Norway
Media Authority
Media Authority
Ministry sets system-level parameters (e.g., rates/categories)
Sweden
Agency for the Media
Media Subsidy Council
State budget + statute/ordinance; agency regulations clarify application
In Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden, the processes are more differentiated because of the institutional arrangement involving designated decision-making bodies within or close to the authorities. While applications are prepared by civil servants within the respective authorities, final funding decisions are taken by the decision-making councils rather than by the administrative staff. This suggests that the arm’s length principle appears more visibly present in this dimension within the Danish, Icelandic, and Swedish regulatory frameworks. 
However, before proceeding to the third dimension, it is worth returning to the question of who, in practice, makes the decisions – and to the fact that perspectives on this matter may differ. As noted earlier, a discussion took place in Norway regarding the introduction of a media subsidy council at the turn of the 2010s and 2020s. One of the reasons why such a body was not established was a perceived risk of politicised decision-making. The concern expressed was that a council appointed by the ministry could open the door to increased political control. More specifically, it was argued that such a solution could make it possible for the minister to appoint individuals loyal to him or her to the subsidy council. The risk of media capture in the service of political interests was thus considered to increase (Bjerke & Halvorsen, 2023: 227).

3.3 Dimension three: The mechanisms of oversight

The final dimension to examine concerns the possibilities for oversight of the support systems and the decisions that follow from them. The aim is to study whether decisions can be appealed to a higher authority or reviewed by another authority, for example, a ministry or the government.

3.3.1 Final decisions in Denmark

In Denmark, the decisions of the Media Board cannot be referred to another administrative authority (LOV nr. 1604 af 26/12/2013). Consequently, decisions can only to a limited extent be appealed by those who consider them to be incorrect.

3.3.2 Media appeals board in Norway

In contrast to Denmark, decisions in Norway may be appealed to the Media Appeals Board (Medieklagenemnda), an independent adjudicatory body, appointed by the Ministry of Culture and Equality, which hears appeals in media-related cases (Medietilsynet, 2021: 164). It considers, for example, appeals against decisions adopted by the Media Authority under certain provisions of the broadcasting legislation, the legislation on media ownership transparency, and the rules governing the collective management of copyright (Klagenemndssekretariatet, 2026).
After an appeal to the Board, the case may, in principle, be brought before the courts as an action against the state. Moreover, the legislation clarifies that the King may not instruct or alter the decisions of either the Norwegian Media Authority or the Media Appeals Board (LOV-2020-12-18-153).

3.3.3 Review procedures in Finland

Regarding the two Finnish support schemes, decisions by state aid authorities may not be challenged through appeals. Rectification of a decision by a state aid authority may be sought only by an involved party, and the request must be addressed to the authority that adopted the decision. The decisions are thus subject to reconsideration through a rectification request, which subsequently allows the authority’s rectification decision to be appealed before a court (FFS 688/2001).

3.3.4 Decisions stand in Iceland

As in Denmark, decisions of the Icelandic Allocation Committee under the Media Act are final at the administrative level (Lög um breytingu á lögum um fjölmiðla, nr. 38/2011 [stuðningur við einkarekna fjölmiðla]). The possibilities for appeal are therefore very limited.

3.3.5 Non‑appealable decisions in Sweden

The situation in Sweden resembles that in Denmark and Iceland, and the legislation clearly states that decisions made by the Media Subsidy Council may not be appealed. According to the applicable ordinance, decisions are not appealable under the ordinary administrative appeals procedure (SFS 2023:740).

3.3.6 Comparison of dimension three

The systems of monitoring and control differ in several respects across the Nordic countries. Norway is the only case in which a dedicated review and complaints body exists. In Finland, there is a clearly defined mechanism for reconsideration of state aid decisions; however, this body does not deal specifically with media subsidy schemes (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Oversight and review mechanisms (administrative appeal, reconsideration, and judicial review)
Country
Administrative appeal available?
Reconsideration / rectification route
Dedicated media appeals body
Judicial review (in practice)
Denmark
­
­
­
Limited
Finland
­
Rectification, which can enable court appeal
­
After rectification
Iceland
­
­
­
Limited
Norway
Yes
Not central, appeal is primary route
Media Appeals Board
After appeal
Sweden
­
­
­
Limited
The institutional arrangements in Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden are largely similar, as all three systems contain explicit provisions stating that decisions on media subsidy are not subject to appeal. Consequently, administrative decisions in these countries are final and may only be reviewed by courts in exceptional circumstances, for instance, in relation to their compatibility with other areas of legislation.
In contrast, subsidy decisions in Finland and Norway may ultimately be subject to judicial review. In Finland, this occurs following the reconsideration procedure outlined above, while in Norway decisions may be challenged through judicial proceedings against the state after an appeal to the Media Appeals Board. 
Taken together, this suggests that the presence of the arm’s length principle is more clearly reflected in the review mechanisms in Finland and, in particular, in Norway, where several layers of institutional protection are in place against potential political interference. In Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden, by contrast, the arm’s length principle is formally upheld, but without corresponding judicial corrective mechanisms.
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