

Public Service Broadcasting Is Not Dead Yet

Strategies in the 21st Century

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Over the years a great deal has been written about the steady demise of public service broadcasting because of increasing competition from new commercial offerings via cable, satellite, digital transmission and, more recently, the Internet. Given growing opportunities to compile one's own entertainment menu from a smorgasbord of offerings, it is easy to conclude that the future outlook for broadcast television and public service television, in particular, is bleak. But I will take a contrary position, arguing that public service broadcast television as a specifically Western European phenomenon is very much 'alive and kicking'. Public service broadcasters have survived to date by reinventing themselves to meet the challenges of new technology, competition and regulatory change. These companies are past and present masters of justifying the grounds for their further existence.

But this reinvention has come at a price, often keyed to emulating commercial practices either through necessity, including political and/or financial pressures, or by choice (Steemers, 1999). Public service broadcasters have taken a 'pragmatic' approach, recognising that adherence to a 'purist', traditional ethos means marginalisation and the loss of public support in ratings and legitimacy for public funding (cf. Blumler, 1993: 403-4).

In the dual system of public and private television across Western Europe, no public service broadcaster is wholly isolated from the pressures of the marketplace – they must secure ratings with popular programmes and demonstrate economic efficiency. However true that ratings success underpins claims to public funding, there are problems in reconciling both the pressures and attractions of the marketplace with the more traditional principles of public service broadcasting. Those principles legitimate the case for 'special' funding in the form of the licence fee or other forms of public aid. So the contradictions hinge on the paradox that the competitive environment has encouraged some public service broadcasters to adopt a controversial range of expansionary and commercial strategies which, in turn, brings them

into conflict both with their traditional remit and with commercial competitors.

Using examples from Western Europe, this chapter considers the continued justification for publicly funded 'public service broadcasting' in an apparently converging multimedia environment. It then assesses how the public service remit is being recast to meet the challenges of a more competitive television market. Building on earlier work on the role of public service broadcasting and its justification in the digital age (Steemers, 1998, 1999, 2001), this chapter examines how different public broadcasters are responding to the challenges they face.¹

Why is such confidence in public service broadcasting merited? First the recent economic downturn that has shaken the commercial sector and resulted in declining advertising revenues has proven less problematic for those public broadcasters almost solely financed by the licence fee (e.g., BBC/UK, SVT/Sweden, DR/Denmark, NRK/Norway). Even if increases in the licence fee or other forms of public funding lag behind broadcasting inflation, the licence fee is at least sufficiently predictable to provide some insulation from the unpredictabilities of the market place.

The licence fee may not allow public service broadcasters to do everything they wish to participate in the digital revolution, but in most cases this income allows them to concentrate on programming rather than the pursuit of profits. The same cannot be said for those broadcasters with public service obligations that are also predominantly dependent on advertising income. For example, in November 2001 in the UK, David Liddiment, ITV's former director of programmes, was blaming its poor ratings performance on a reinvigorated BBC that had more licence money to spend and was, according to him, marginalising its commitment to news and current affairs (Liddiment, 2001).

Second, although channel proliferation has led to a fall in audiences for publicly funded broadcasters over the years, that has been mainly across services as audiences are redistributed. For the time being and in spite of the hype, broadband and interactive services have yet to catch the imagination of a broader public. In many countries, publicly funded broadcasters are still achieving respectable audience shares.² There are clearly limits to market segmentation in terms of both attractive content and the public's willingness and available time to spend on new services (Achille & Miège, 1994: 43). For big 'events', mainstream programming and major news stories, traditional 'generalist' broadcasters remain favoured sources. Even in digital television, one finds it has most often been larger public service broadcasters like the BBC or ARD and ZDF (Germany) in the forefront of providing new services which are publicly funded and therefore not subject to the vagaries of the commercial market place. So digital television, like analogue commercial television before it, has not signalled the death knell for public service broadcasters.

There remain future uncertainties about audience demand for PSB services, both old and new, and also about securing scarce content as the price of rights and talent rises, particularly in keen competitive areas like sport and fiction (Chalaby & Segell, 1999: 355-8). A further source of uncertainty stems from regulatory change at both national and EU levels that tends to favour a market-orientated approach. One also shouldn't neglect the unpredictable pace of technological change. But even if PSB is no longer the pre-eminent broadcasting service throughout Western Europe, it is by no means dead or dying. Public service broadcasters have learnt over the years how to deal with many competitive challenges, and in some cases it could be argued that competition has actually reinvigorated what were rather moribund monopolies.

What is the continued justification for public service broadcasting?

What constitutes the continued justification for publicly funded public service broadcasting in a largely multi-channel commercial environment? And if there is still justification for public provision, how far should it extend beyond traditional broadcasting activities into the realms of online distribution and multimedia content which appear so different from traditional broadcasting?

Historically PSB was justified on technical grounds (the lack of frequencies) and on the basis of an underlying philosophy grounded on normative values associated with western-style democracy, including especially diversity, pluralism, universal service, and the maintenance of cultural identity (Stemers, 2001: 73). It has been argued that these are still valid justifications for a public service role in the age of new technologies (cf. Barnett et al, 2000). In practice, PSB may not have always attained these ideals. For example, there have often been failings in public accountability, and also a susceptibility to party political or government interference, which raise doubts about the responsiveness of public broadcasters to public concerns (cf. Hibberd, 2001: 233-4; Humphreys, 1994: 176-87; Barnett & Curry, 1994: 19-20).

Since the 1980s the position of PSB has been weakened by arguments favouring market ideology and by increased competition in the marketplace. This has made it much harder to argue the case for public service broadcasting with the same degree of conviction and certainty. Public service broadcasting may still be performing respectably in terms of ratings, but the question of what it is for and how it should be defined is more loudly debated. For example, commercial competitors would prefer to see a more restricted definition of what constitutes public service broadcasting and resent what they perceive as the more 'commercial' and expansionary approach of some. They take such as an example of cross-subsidised and unfair competition

(cf. Steemers, 1999: 56-58). These concerns are reflected in the European Union's determination to ensure that public broadcasters do not infringe Community rules on state aid. So although Member States are free to define the public service remit and decide how PSB is funded (European Commission, 1997), the EU will use these definitions to assess whether public funding is always necessary for the fulfilment of the public service mission (European Commission, 2001).

Market failure is another key justification raised to support PSB's continuance. According to this argument, competition alone is no guarantee of audio-visual diversity because unregulated commercial broadcasting has tended to reduce the diversity, range and accessibility of television in order to appeal to the lowest common denominator (Graham, 2000: 93-99; Blumler, 1993: 405-6; Curran, 1991: 47). The argument suggests that under market conditions, audiences are targeted as consumers rather than citizens. This is construed as being detrimental to cultural communities and democratic society by reinforcing pre-existing inequalities based on factors such as age, education, geographical location, income and ethnic origin (Graham, 2000: 94; Murdock, 2000: 120-1; Hoffmann-Riem, 1996: 332).

Market failure is moreover compounded by commercial funding which tends to divert attention from programming and the needs of citizens to instead serve the financial priorities of others, especially advertisers, sponsors and shareholders (Steemers, 2001: 73). In this perspective, advertising-funded or sponsored programming prioritises 'mass' audiences or, at least, only those minority audiences that are financially attractive to advertisers. Meanwhile, subscription services restrict availability to those who can afford to pay. Proponents of PSB therefore premise its strength on purposes that are noticeably different from the profit-orientated objectives of the commercial sector. These purposes include high and independent editorial standards, investment in quality, support for democracy, and the dissemination of public information that contributes to the free marketplace of ideas and underpins democratic participation (Graham, 2000: 102-107; Hoffmann-Riem, 1996: 335).

These arguments about market failure are further extended to legitimate arguments for public service participation in online media. For example, freely available, broad-ranging and representative online public provision is said to function as a counterweight and trusted third party to the 'walled gardens' of vertically integrated conglomerates whose dominance in the marketplace is based on control of both content and distribution (cf. Shooshan and Cave, 2000). This view assumes that new media forms have the potential to become indispensable core services that merit public funding to help prevent the emergence of a two-tier society.

The belief that the market will ignore minority tastes or restrict access based on the ability to pay is not new, of course. In Germany such misgivings are reflected in a long series of Constitutional Court rulings since 1961 that clearly state that broadcast media can not be left to the free play of market forces

because of their vital contribution to informing and shaping public opinion (Steemers, 2001: 74). Indeed, German PSB's constitutional right to funding (mainly through the licence fee), continuance and further development is subject to meeting higher standards of programme diversity and plurality of opinion than its more loosely regulated commercial counterparts. For its part, the 'light touch' regulation of the commercial sector depends on PSB fulfilling its remit (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1986: 19-20; also Steemers, 1999: 48-49). But even with intervention by the Courts as in Germany, those arguing for a more restricted definition dispute the definition of the 'public service remit'.

It is crucial to observe that the justification of PSB rests on values and objectives that are hard to quantify and also complicated by technical and programming developments that go beyond broadcasting into other areas, such as online content. In justifying their continuation, public broadcasters concentrate on the same 'higher' order obligations and values they have always emphasised (cf. Holznagel, 1999; ARD, 2000; BBC, 1999). Any cursory examination of broadcaster statements quickly reveals commitments to universal access, impartiality, culture, information, creativity, education and citizenship. With regard to meeting market failure, their responses typically suggest the importance of taking risks and of appealing to a range of different audiences without always having to worry about ratings or advertising revenue.

While the 'higher' order values and arguments about market failure go some way toward justifying PSB's continued survival in a mixed media economy from a theoretical point of view, they do not address the longstanding and increasing impact of commercial pressures on public service broadcasters. There is no such thing as a 'pure' public broadcaster and the commitment to societal objectives outlined above is compromised if there is over-reliance on commercial income or commercial objectives. For example, many public broadcasters rely on advertising income. Even a modest amount, as in mixed PSB systems (like Germany), can be seen to affect the diversity of content while also eroding the legitimacy of the licence fee (Peasey, 1990: 440-1). Similarly, pressures to raise co-production funding in the international marketplace or to increase revenues via programme sales and ancillary rights exploitation can affect choices about what type of programmes get made and for what audiences.

Of course, no public service broadcaster is immune to commercial pressures, but there are obviously varying degrees of commercialism and dependency on commercial income. When taken to the ultimate degree these tendencies can weaken the 'market failure' case for public service broadcasting and render public service broadcasters too comparatively similar to their commercial competitors.

In 1986 McQuail outlined various degrees of commercialism within public service broadcasting (p. 640). An adaptation of this model allows these

degrees of commercialism to be ordered in the following way (Steemers, 2001: 75-76):

1. A gradual popularisation of programming on PSB's core channels, especially in peak periods, in favour of mass audiences to justify licence fee support or maximise advertising revenues – and the removal of information and minority content to niche services or more marginal slots in the schedule.
2. PSB tries to become more cost-conscious and efficient in its activities and output by externalising services and adopting management practices from the commercial sector.
3. Additional services are offered on a subscription basis according to economic criteria, breaching the principle of universal access.
4. PSB becomes more dependent on commercial income – subscription, advertising, sponsorship, co-production finance, programme sales and merchandising revenues.
5. Parts or the whole of PSB are sold off – distribution networks, commercial subsidiaries, whole channels.

Many of these developments can already be observed in Western Europe, although the extent of their proliferation depends on different competitive, political, regulatory, and organisational contexts. Not all aspects of commercialism are necessarily incompatible with a public service remit. But even so it is crucial to observe that public service broadcasters wanting to keep (or tap) additional commercial funding, or who wish to alter programming services to maintain audience share, need to clearly show how this accords with their public service remit and continued public funding (Steemers, 2001: 76). Although empirical evidence seems to suggest that public service broadcasters continue to offer a greater range of content than their commercial counterparts (see McQuail, 1998: 121-124; also Krüger, 2001),³ the perception of blurring boundaries, promoted by the commercial sector, is eroding the case for PSB.

At the same time, discussions about the future role of public provision are hampered by an inability to look beyond existing public service broadcasting institutions to address complementary alternatives (Steemers, 1998: 106-107). Of course the dominance of the commercial model since the 1980s has made it difficult to consider alternative forms of public provision by alternative suppliers because it is nearly always assumed that the market can best satisfy public demand for new services. But restricting debate about future provision to existing public service institutions leaves little room for discussion of other options that might be better suited to meet changing public

needs in regional, local and minority provision (than large public service institutions) in both on-line and niche programming (Steemers, 1998: 107).

Broadcasters can and do suggest their preferred solutions, but there must also be a broader public consensus on what should be provided within a public service framework (Steemers, 1998: 108). The burden of expectation regarding plurality and cultural diversity clearly rests with existing public service broadcasting institutions. But regrettably without adequate attention having been paid to the past deficits of these institutions in responding to public concerns and needs, as well as their susceptibility to commercial and political pressures that can diminish programme range and diversity.

Survival strategies

Policy debates focus on the normative expectations of public service broadcasting, but it is also important to examine the ways in which public service broadcasters have extended and amended the public service ethos in relation to a changing communications environment. Public service broadcasting institutions have been formulating and fine-tuning their strategies for many years in response to the loss of monopoly, budgetary restraints, political pressures and the onslaught of less heavily regulated commercial competition. These responses have variously included changes in *programming strategy* (competitive scheduling, extensions in broadcasting hours), *co-operation with third parties* (independent producers, co-producers, joint ventures), *the use of supplementary sources of revenue* (sponsorship, subscription, co-production funding, ancillary revenues from video, and the licensing of products and services associated with programming), *rationalisation strategies*, and changes in *working practices* (see also Achille & Miège, 1994: 33-39).

What is very clear, however, is that the mainstream services like BBC 1 (UK), ARD or ZDF (Germany), FR2 (France), RAI (Italy), and RTVE (Spain) are still important in attracting mass audiences. Their mainstream services are also vital for legitimating the institutions as a whole. These services indicate commitment to mainstream entertainment, event programming, and news, which still attract large audiences and constitute common experiences. At the same time there are clear commercial imperatives at work. It is noticeable that organisations including RTVE and RAI that are quite heavily dependent on advertising income appear to be less distinguishable from their commercial rivals when compared to their counterparts in North West Europe (Hibberd, 2001: 246; McKinsey, 1999: 21-22). ARD and ZDF in Germany, with advertising restricted to 20-minutes a day on television and before 8 p.m., nonetheless pursue a populist programming philosophy at these times to maximise advertising income (Peasey, 1990).

Even public service broadcasters with no reliance on advertising revenue have shown deepening commitments to entertainment, rightly recognising that it constitutes the link with a wider audience. The BBC's recent success with game show formats including the *Weakest Link* and *Dog eat Dog* have not only been hits in a genre more traditionally associated with commercial television, but have also opened a lucrative format/co-production business overseas, particularly on U.S. networks (Interview with Colin Jarvis, 2001). This stands in sharp contrast to an earlier and short-lived policy initiative that the BBC should retreat from 'formula' entertainment formats (BBC, 1992).

Similarly, with the high costs of original television production and increases in transmission capacity, some public service broadcasters have shown themselves to be as adept as their commercial counterparts at competitive scheduling and commissioning strategies. While they continue to make or commission high cost news and drama for peak time transmission, they are also (to varying degrees) increasingly reliant on:

- low cost original production – formatted game shows, talk shows, lifestyle/consumer/reality programming
- high cost co-productions for premium drama and documentaries to spread costs and risk
- increased use of acquired programming as filler in off-peak periods
- increased use of repeats

While at one level we have thus seen the continuous adjustment of existing services by all broadcasters in response to increased competition, at a second level we also find expansion through new technical possibilities and the launch of new services – especially digital services. Given the financial commitments involved, the more ambitious expansionary plans are typically limited to the larger and wealthier PSB institutions. For such organisations the response has been to re-purpose content and rights across multiple windows, including the Internet and niche channels, in anticipation of changing audience preferences. Niche channels also precisely target audiences and genres favoured by rival commercial operators – i.e., news, children's, arts programming and documentary. This fuels the commercial argument that public service broadcasters are unfairly using public funds to damage the economic survival of commercial competitors at no commercial risk to themselves.

The BBC offers licence-fee funded digital channels News 24, BBC Parliament, BBC Choice (which will become BBC 3 for youth audiences after Government approval in 2002), BBC 4 (arts), and since 2002 CBeebies (for the under 6s) plus CBBC for the 6-13 demographics. In addition to various repeats/time shift services (ARD Digital and ZDF Vision), German public broadcasters jointly offer publicly funded KiKa (children), Phoenix (documentary), 3SAT (cultural programming with Swiss and Austrian public broadcasters) and

Arte (a joint venture cultural channel with French public broadcasters). Since 1997, Spanish broadcaster RTVE has provided up to 7 niche channels under its TV Tematica bouquet. Since 1999, RaiSat, a separate division of Italian public broadcaster RAI, has offered seven subscription channels on the Telepiu digital satellite platform. These are Album (archive), Ragazzi (children), Cinema, Gambero Rosso (cookery), Art, Fiction and Show. Although separately operated, there is a dedicated news service, RAI News 24.

With the prospect of decline in generalist channels and changing viewer habits, some public service broadcasters claim they are building a more personalised relationship with the public through more targeted offerings. For example, the former Director of BBC Television, Mark Thompson, spoke about the decline of mixed television schedules and the growing importance of segmenting content into a 'suite' of channels, with each possessing a clear 'proposition or flavour' (2000). This targeting of niche audiences gives rise to suspicions that certain types of content could be removed or marginalised from mainstream services. For example, the launch of children's service Kinderkanal (Kika) in Germany has led to a reduction in children's output on the mainstream ARD and ZDF services. Similarly, in addressing the BBC's application in 2001 for new digital television services (BBC 3, BBC 4, Cbeebies, CBBC), the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, Tessa Jowell, emphasised that these must not result in a reduction of minority programming on the mainstream channels. Also stressed was the importance of not emulating what was already being provided by the commercial sector – the new services must be distinctive and encourage domestic production (Jowell, 2001).

Some broadcasters are also seeking a wider commercial role that could allow them to capitalise financially on their brands, and thereby complement or subsidise licence-fee funding and programming. The BBC stands out with respect to the global scale of its commercial activities, encompassing programme sales, co-productions, ancillary rights exploitation, joint ventures and international channels, undertaken by its commercial subsidiary, BBC Worldwide.

Of course the BBC enjoys considerable advantages over its public service counterparts in other countries. The BBC has been encouraged by successive UK governments to become an 'international multimedia enterprise' so that supplementary commercial revenues can be fed back into core domestic services. Indeed, the Labour government awarded the Corporation a lower licence fee increase in 1999 in the expectation that the BBC would fill the gap by increasing commercial revenues.

Second, the BBC enjoys 'the language of advantage' (Collins, 1989) in the most lucrative overseas market, the United States. There the BBC is involved in a global partnership with Discovery Communications for joint venture international channels (Animal Planet, People and Arts), factual co-productions (*Walking with Dinosaurs*, *The Blue Planet*), and the marketing of its

own channel, BBC America. This co-operation was extended for a further 10 years in 2002. Partnership with international partners also plays a role in Australia (UKTV) and Canada (BBC Canada, BBC Kids). International partnerships are also mirrored by joint venture subscription channels in the UK with Flextech Television, under the banner UKTV, signalling a break with universal access.

Commercial income from these activities is still small compared to the BBC's licence fee revenues, but it does raise questions about the degree to which this sort of income must fill gaps in inadequate licence fee funding, and at what cost.⁴ For example, an emphasis on international co-productions for fiction and high profile factual output dilutes editorial control and can lead to a neglect of programming aimed specifically at domestic audiences (see Sparks, 1995: 336).

But within Western Europe at large, the BBC's breadth of commercial activity at home and abroad is rather exceptional. In Germany joint venture channels with the private sector, and access to additional advertising or subscription revenues to fund additional channels and services, is subject to constitutional and legislative hurdles that thus far have restricted collaboration (Steeimers, 2001: 78). A previous legal 'grey area' that resulted in online collaboration with MSN for *ZDF.online* and with MSNBC for the *heute.online* news service was brought to an end in 1999 and 2002, respectively, with new legislation that prevents advertising on PSB online services. This subsequently made the ventures unattractive to commercial partners (ARD-Staatsvertrag, 2000). Efforts to launch a German television service in the U.S. appear to be motivated by political and cultural concerns rather than commercial imperatives (Kamman, 2001).

Unlike the BBC, international activities to garner financial benefits do not appear to be such a high priority for other European public broadcasters. Other PSB companies do conclude a limited number of annual co-productions and programme sales, often with same language neighbours (Tunstall & Machin, 1999: 199), but for many the sale of advertising airtime represents a far more important and lucrative commercial activity.

While international commercial engagement is limited for most, children's television offers a prime example of how a genre that has always been considered a key part of the public service remit is being adapted by public service broadcasters to fit a new multi-channel environment with commercial priorities. Traditionally, children's television has been rather less glamorous than other areas and has tended to be marginalised and underfunded. Public broadcasters typically rely on cheap animation imports from the U.S. or the Far East to supplement their children's programming output. But in the right circumstances children can constitute a valuable audience. ARD/ZDF (KiKa, Germany), the BBC (CBeebies, CBBC), RAI (RAISAT Ragazzi), NOS (*Z@ppelin*, Netherlands) and VRT (Ketnet, Belgium) were all launched in response to a perceived need for advertising-free children's programming. But they were also certainly launched in reaction to strong commercial com-

petition – including American providers like Nickelodeon, Disney, Cartoon Network and Fox Family.

Significantly, such channels also provide a useful outlet for screening productions that can prove profitable in other ways. For example, the BBC has established two major pre-school franchises, *Teletubbies* and *Tweenies*, which have been produced in volume and sell well overseas (*Teletubbies* have been shown on KiKa, RaiSat Ragazzi, and Z@ppelin). They also generate substantial merchandising revenues, domestically and abroad. For the BBC these programmes constitute a brand that has a value in ancillary rights and enjoy a long shelf life as each next-generation child audience emerges at regular intervals.

These programmes are also valuable to other public service broadcasters. On the basis of satisfying certain contractual obligations – e.g., that they air them regularly in an agreed slot and promote them in a particular way – they are allowed to participate in merchandising and licensing receipts in their respective territories. This obviously mirrors the practice of commercial broadcasters (Interview with BBC Worldwide Executive, November 2001). Of course children’s television within Western Europe has long been a key area for co-production and presales because of low domestic budgets. But there is a danger that pressures to find funding or the attractions of benefiting from ancillary rights could advantage certain types of children’s programming over others – for example character-based shows or animation series over a broader mix that would also include children’s drama or information programming.

Conclusion: Managing distinctions

At the beginning of this paper it was argued that public service broadcasting institutions in many countries have actually survived fairly well in today’s more competitive environment – they have learned to adapt. As is the case for all broadcasters, private or public, they face undoubted challenges in a future few can gauge with certainty. There is still a strong case for public provision unencumbered by the profit motive in the media entertainment and communication market to function as a safeguard for pluralism and diversity. Yet arguments about market failure are undermined if there is a perception (correctly or not) that public service broadcasters are becoming little different from their commercial rivals in strategies, objectives and programming output – be that heavier dependence on commercial revenues, or the pursuit of more ‘commercial’ scheduling and channel strategies.

Thus, failing to demonstrate both uniqueness and appeal across a broad range of output, the consensus surrounding public funding could conceivably dissolve. Moreover, with the current difficulties faced by commercial television, the questioning of public service broadcasting’s ‘distinctive’ role is quite

likely to increase. At the same time, greater thought needs to be given to alternative and complementary forms of public provision which may be better suited at meeting changes in communications needs, content, and delivery forms than the large-scale, public institution framework. Finally, if public provision in television is justified on the grounds of market failure, this strongly implies co-related justification for what may turn out to be the 'functional equivalents' of broadcasting in new media (Hoffmann-Riem, 1996: 342).

It is of course much easier to criticise public service broadcasters than to offer workable solutions. Public broadcasters must manage a difficult balance between redefining their remit in a rapidly changing communications environment and, at the same time, securing sufficient funding sources that do not compromise that remit. And in each country they must do this while dealing with the prevailing political climate. Increasing reliance on commercial sources of funding has been one response to budgetary pressures and inadequate allocation of public funding. But increasing reliance on commercial income can undermine the case for public funding altogether.

Some (like the BBC) are likely to survive in the multi-channel marketplace as a quality brand, but the 'purist' principles on which that brand is founded may recede as commercial priorities affect both its internal culture and its creative output. On the other hand, there is always a risk of marginalisation with the 'purer' form of public service broadcasting. And so what are we left with? Mainly we are left with commercial/public service hybrids that carry both the benefits and the disadvantages of each model. The difficult task for publicly funded public service broadcasters is therefore to ensure that the pressures and attractions of the marketplace do not overwhelm the public service profile that sets them apart from commercial counterparts.

Notes

1. Some of the research referred to in this chapter was made possible by financial support in 2001-2002 from The Leverhulme Trust for a project entitled 'Selling British Television'
2. For example, public broadcasters in Germany achieved a 40% share in 2000 (Darschin & Kayser, 2001, p.163). In 2001 BBC 1 achieved higher ratings than its rival ITV (Brown, 2001, pp.2-3).
3. In the case of Germany for example, ARD and ZDF still offer more information than their commercial counterparts and this information is qualitatively different with a greater emphasis on political and economic themes (See Krüger, 2001, pp. 326-344).
4. In 2001/2002 BBC Worldwide had a turnover of £660m and contributed £106m to the BBC in cashflow and £81m in programme investment compared to over £2.5 billion in licence fee revenues (BBC Worldwide, 2002).

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