21. Seeing the other, reflections on the we

Globalization and citizenship

Elisabeth Eide

Flashing for the warriors whose strength is not to fight
Flashing for the refugees on their unarmed road of flight.
(Bob Dylan: Chimes of Freedom, 1964)

In the course of my many years of journalism, academic research, and work-related travel, I have devoted considerable time reflecting on my “intersectional self” as a journalist, academic, writer, and as a privileged woman of the “West”. One of my major experiences has been learning to see the world from different places, by the “methodology” of changing lenses. Almost two years of residence in Peshawar, Pakistan in the late 1980s, living among Afghan refugees and a diversity of international actors with stakes in the still ongoing Soviet-Afghanistan war, taught me to question the notion of normalcy. Not that this normalcy is a fixed and stable entity, but that “it” is at least a far cry from the taken-for-granted social and material life in the small, modern and rich nation Norway. I also learned that people with very different backgrounds could cherish some of the same music, as when an Afghan who fought the Soviet occupation told me about his infatuation with Bob Dylan, or a British aid worker who loved Persian Sufi musical culture.1

This chapter addresses globalization, citizenship and diversity, drawing on research as well as travel experiences. It also includes experiences of war and humiliation, and addresses the refugee situation faced by the world today.
Being seen by the “other”, contrapuntal reading

One of the most revered travelogues published in Norway is “A Mouthful of Ganges” written by the Norwegian poet and novelist Paal Brekke (1962), following extensive travels in India. Brekke met with several people who doubted his ability to understand the Indian “backyard” of the world, as some expressed it, due to his having grown up in a rich, peaceful country. One social worker questioned his notion of “the world as one”, as she saw a diversity of worlds and difference everywhere (Brekke, 1962). Through narrating these encounters, he suggested a self-critical examination of the travelling Northerner. This “reflexive” way of travelling, seeing and being seen by others, contributes to what Said (1994) called “contrapuntal reading”: defined as

[…] simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominant discourse acts. [...] In the same way, I believe, we can read and interpret English novels, for example, whose engagement (usually suppressed for the most part) with the West Indies or India, say, is shaped and perhaps even determined by the specific history of colonization, resistance, and finally native nationalism. At this point alternative or new narratives emerge, and they become institutionalised or discursively stable entities. (Said, 1994: 59–60)

Said takes on Jane Austen’s “Mansfield Park” as one example, where it is tacitly and uncritically understood that one family has earned its riches through plantations in Antigua (Said, 1994: 100 ff). This long tradition in literature, both fiction and non-fiction, in historical accounts, science and travel writing, has been challenged by oppositional readings and writings, such as the work of The Subaltern Studies Group (Ashcroft et al., 1998; Spivak, 1988) – scholars in India who try to (re)write history from the perspective of the colonial subjects – or scholars and writers who oppose the traditional narratives on “Africa” (Achebe, 1995; Orgeret & Tayyebwa, 2016; Schipper, 1999). These and many others have contributed to an important, diversified post-colonial tradition in academia, as well as suggestions for “decolonizing of the mind” (Nandy, 1990; wa Thiong’o, 1986), as a source of liberating the intellects of former colonial subjects, as well as those of the former rulers.
21. Seeing the other, reflections on the we

Othering through history

Colonialism, from the perspective of the colonizers, involved extreme methods of othering and excluding persons unlike themselves. Othering has been defined as a process by which the empire can define itself against those it colonizes, excludes and marginalizes (Ashcroft et al., 1998); and indeed, it involves the process of defining an enemy, be it by racialization or other exclusionary practices. Othering is a way of defining a positive identity for the self, leaving little space for self-reflexing.

We are still – all over the world – deeply immersed in a world of othering, whether it is the spontaneous I-am-different-from-her self-definition, or more politically tainted discourses marginalizing other beings or groups, based on gender, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, disability or related characteristics. The European history of discrimination and isolation of such categories of people as the lepers and the “insane” (Foucault, 1999 [1973]), not least facilitated by clerical authorities are illustrative cases. So are the century-long pogroms against Jews in Europe. More recent, but much ignored in the history of the pre-war Western world, is the deeply shameful experiences of the Evian Conference in 1938, where nations of the world discussed “the Jewish question” and most countries refused to accept Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany. This refusal left most of them – together with other “deviants” – facing the dreadful fate of extermination under the Nazis. This may partly be explained by European leaders regarding Jews not as fellow citizens in need of protection, but first and foremost as Jews, others (Sartre, 1963). The lack of recognition opened the way for exclusion and extermination on a massive scale. While not a parallel to today’s refugee/migrant situation, the rhetoric of state leaders, concentrating on state interests and refugees as disturbing the national equilibrium, still share some of the same features.

The transnational

Transnational processes and mobilizations are of course nothing new arriving with modern media technology. Many conflicts and burning issues have been and are far from national. In the late 1970s, the man later to become Iran’s leader through gaining the upper hand/hijacking the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, recorded his speeches on
cassettes, later to be smuggled into Iran and broadcasted from many mosques there (Sreberny & Mohammadi, 1995). For decades, migrants and refugees have found ways to send remittances to their families “back home” (Tharmalingam, 2011), and these remittances globally by far exceed the total amount of development aid allocated for the “Global South” (Daramy, 2016).

Technological progress has of course facilitated transnational processes, both in organizational (finance, migration) and political ways (political alliances, insurgent networks, the “war on terror”). Not least has modern technology been of great importance to global surveillance, and thus to be used as facilitating obstacles to transnational migration (Eide & Kunelius, 2018; Eide & Lånkan, 2016; Greenwald, 2014; Harding, 2014; Thorsen, 2016). The Snowden revelations became a global story helped by journalists who did not see it as their duty to be loyal to the interstate surveillance regimes; such journalists were aware that interstate surveillance tends to contribute to the undermining of peoples’ democratic control over prevailing power structures.

**Travelling images**

Still internet does enhance the flow of ideas and cultural items/products, and not least, ways in which media expressions travel ultra-fast across borders. A pertinent example is the event of a rather insulting cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed (no doubt inspired by the cartoon crisis emerging in 2005–2006), which travelled via MMS in 2008 from an internal regional newspaper to a madrasa educating Taliban/suicide bombers in the tribal areas (FATA)4 between Afghanistan and Pakistan. A Norwegian reporter was there to investigate the recruitment to Taliban. As the MMS was shared between the students, they immediately began to threaten the reporter. He found himself in danger, not only because the people in this area suffer much from the ongoing war in Afghanistan and are deeply religious, but also due to the low (media) literacy rate (Eide, 2009). Images travel; discourses do not always travel with them, and contexts vary substantially – something strikingly clear in transnational studies of the cartoon crisis (Eide et al., 2008; Hahn, 2008). One expression, once it has been dislocated from its original context, and transported to a very different community of interpretation will stir reactions often amazingly different, and sometimes even
fraught with violence, from those in its country of origin. The long lasting “cartoon controversy”\(^5\) demonstrates to what extent this holds true: A situation where images intended for local or national debate, by way of an increasingly diversified citizenry (more individuals than before with “double belongings”/allegiances), may still end up quite far away. As Sreberny iterates, in a globalized world with “numerous cultural environments, it is frankly impossible to expect there to be shared meaning about them” (Sreberny, 2016: 3487).

More recent events such as the assassination in January 2015 of twelve cartoonists/journalists at *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris allegedly in connection with their critique of Islam (although they have also critiqued other religions), has contributed to increased tension and polarization in European societies, reviving narratives such as the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996). Others would suggest a “clash of extremisms”, as when Muslim extremists trigger responses from extreme right wing anti-Muslims (Berger, 2017). Apart from the special challenge of treating extremists, steadily inspiring new debates on freedom of expression and “no platforming”, many conflicts also demonstrate the need for transnational dialogues as a way of coming to terms with living together in a world made less spacious by travel and migration. These travels may enhance productive and inventive diversities, and freedom of expression seems to be the best way to guarantee minority rights.

Digital media connect people. Optimists speak of the rise of a participatory culture, of dialogue and the opening for individuals broadcasting or documenting events. This is particularly relevant in a war situation, as shown in Syria, where mainstream journalists did not travel to many of the worst affected areas (Al-Ghazzi, 2014).\(^6\) Digital media may be powerful ways of mobilization against oppression, as demonstrated in 2011 Tunisia (Breuer et al., 2015). Moreover, the modern cell phone has become both a strong navigator and connector, and a threat (regarding often-invasive surveillance) for refugees. Pessimists emphasize how digital media contribute to the fragmenting of public spheres, enable spaces where hateful speech and threats thrive, with consequences for vulnerable people, among them ethnic and sexual minorities as well as refugees, and contribute to the harassment of women in a particularly sexualized way (Landsverk, 2015). Research
on benefits and disadvantages is bound to continue as a larger part of the world’s population connect to the internet.

... on their unarmed road of flight

The world’s number of refugees has reached a preliminary peak (IOM, 2018) with almost 69 million people who are either living outside their country or are internally displaced (IDPs), (CBS news, 2018). This number is expected to rise, in spite of Europe and other developed nations opening border control posts on continents other than their own. Illustrating this phenomenon are the measures taken in Agadez, Niger, to block trans-Sahara flight by imprisoning smugglers and returning refugees and migrants back to their home countries (Documentary, NRK 09.01.2018), or European treaties with authorities in Libya and Turkey. This is all facilitated with the strong support from EU, by way of both funds and police/military trainers. Bøås (2017) writes of a hierarchy between refugees, the visible and the invisible ones, the latter being the ones who do not reach Europe and thus are not included in the European notion refugee crisis. He mentions that there are 2.6 million refugees around Lake Tchad, this situation having long been overshadowed by the war in Syria.

Low or middle-income countries are hosts to 86 per cent of all refugees, and IDPs represent a large proportion of this number (IOM, 2018). Thus, countries poorer than those traditionally thought to represent the “Global North”, are shouldering the overwhelming weight of responsibility for people fleeing. In the Global North, walls are erected (as between the U.S. and Mexico) and measures taken against further “influx”, while political parties critical or hostile to refugees/migrants have increased their support bases. The treatment of new-arrivals may also trigger this increase, since deteriorating conditions signal differing life standards and human values. In many cases, refugees/migrants are “’warehoused’ in detention centers” (Eriksen, 2016: 79) and remain “superfluous, unnecessary and inert, they are neither efficient consumers nor producers and can therefore be dispensed with” (ibid.). This rather cynical remark is written referring to the way in which “neoliberal ideology has become an integral part of the contemporary migration regimes” (Eriksen, 2016: 77). A corollary of this situation is that refugees’ options to establish early connection to the labour
market in the country of arrival are relatively few. Statistics for Norway show that a little less than half the refugee population (persons aged 15–66) are working, while for the population at large, the percentage is 71 (Olsen, 2018).

Technological gains have made it easier for refugees to be “updated momentarily and continuously about migration routes, job opportunities and the whereabouts of their relatives or contact persons in Europe” (Eide, 2019; Eriksen, 2016: 123.). In some cases, “contact persons” may be a euphemism for human traffickers or smugglers, who, on one hand represent a necessity for people in need of transgressing borders, and on the other a brutal and cynical exploitation of vulnerable refugees and migrants, by making their travels expensive, risky and in many cases even fatal. In 2017, 3,129 persons died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea, while in 2018 the number was 2,160.7

“Overheating”

According to Eriksen (2016), we live in an overheated world. The process of global warming demonstrates a total planetary interconnectedness, made increasingly clear by scientific reports as well as citizens’ actions, represented in the press to a varying extent (Eide et al., 2012; IPCC, 2018). Climate change invites us to realize that what we do/consume (including travel) in one part of the world, may have fateful consequences for people living in vulnerable regions. More directly, the “large-scale movements of rubbish from rich to poor countries have become common practice” (Eriksen, 2016: 109). Another contributing reality is population growth and the ensuing growth in energy use. The paradox is that the “most dramatic forms of overheating are in this respect produced by a few people who cannot bear to ‘feel the heat’” (Eriksen, 2016: 102). This paradox is emphasized by COP8 negotiations, where the poor nations continuously remind the rich nations of their historic responsibility and their obligation to be in the forefront of mitigation while also funding climate adaptation in the most vulnerable nations.

Global warming in vulnerable regions (such as the Sahel and South Asia) may also create new large numbers of ‘climate refugees’. So far, the UN does not recognize these as actual refugees (Midtflo, 2014). A fundamental dilemma is the politically predicted economic growth, which
will not easily enable the drastic measures recommended by the COP 21 (2015) Paris accord, a scenario, confirmed at COP 24 in Katowice. The fact that other concerns, such as ongoing wars and conflicts, seem to relegate climate to the background, will also make it harder to have climate mitigation steadily on top of the agenda. Suggested intersections between climate change and war, weapons production, and violent conflict are disputed (Selby et al., 2017). More emphasis seems to be put on the ways in which climate change may generate violent conflict, than how violent conflict and war in itself may contribute to climate change, through emissions for example, when oil fields are set on fire, or when warriors deplete or neglect forest resources in a war situation, such as in Afghanistan.

The “T” factor
Another symptom connected to “overheating” is transnational extremism and terrorism. While local issues drive some cases of insurgency, others are transnationally organized or interconnected, and groups inspire each other, even if rivalries frequently occur. Terrorism is in the context of this book much associated with Islamist extremism, with the exception of the 2011 terror in Norway, instigated by a right-wing extremist (See Chapter 14 in this volume).

Researchers discuss the extent to which the “terrorist” label is justified. There are numerous definitions of the word: from the old dichotomy, that one person’s freedom fighter is another person’s terrorist to an identification of 109 separate definitions made in more recent research (Freedman & Thussu, 2012: 7). Some of these involve the creation of fear through violent acts; others also include definitions of both subjects and objects. Then there is the discussion of whether the “targets” (objects) are legitimate (other warriors) or not (civilians). Some researchers adhere to the term “state terrorism” (Galtung, 2002).

Even so, a multi-causal approach to insurgency (the opposite of media simplification) pinpointing the local anchoring and social functions of certain groups, is still needed in journalism. Root causes of terrorism may be war/invasion and/or armed conflict, combined with poverty and lack of opportunity leading to recruitment; extremist religious streams; social humiliation/lack of recognition, and state neglect of citizens’ needs. Some insurgents, claiming to represent “true
Islam”, may hold large numbers of people hostage by threatening those who do not subscribe to their version of religion and labelling them as ‘un-Islamic, as during the siege of Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 2017. Social media recruitment to extremist groups has become an increasing challenge, in both Norway and elsewhere (see Chapter 4 in this volume).

**The other – besieged and humiliated**

Debates among international scholars on the consequences of the U.S. invasion in Iraq in 2003 are still ongoing, and much history is still unwritten. Some claim that this invasion is an important part of the explanation for the growth of extremism in the Middle Eastern region; others still legitimize the 2003 invasion by referring to Saddam Hussain's brutal dictatorship. Legacy media largely went along with the politicians insisting on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Media turning points occurred when it became clear – through the media – that Iraq did not possess such weapons, and not least when Seymour Hersch revealed the Abu Ghraib photos of torture and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in the New Yorker (2004).

Some of the images of humiliating torture scenes were explicitly gendered. One male prisoner is photographed having his head covered by female underwear; other images showed women soldiers/officers mocking nude, male prisoners, for example by treating them as dogs, estimated to be particularly humiliating in a Muslim culture.

A meta-narrative appeared with a photo showed a wife and a son studying an image from Abu Ghraib of their spouse/father under torture. This may serve as an example of how the “subaltern other” by way of a reporter may get access to parts of their own story. This move, and an award-winning photo from Marc Bojou (2003) showing a black-hooded prisoner trying to comfort his son behind barbed wire, demonstrates human compassion and resilience in the midst of the horrors of war.

Gayatri Spivak writes that “unless we are trained into imagining the other” no lasting peace will be achieved (Sanders & Spivak, 2006: 97). This training, as is one of the aims of this volume, is far from present among the soldiers who “do the war” on the ground. We may also question the contribution of journalism in this respect, as history
shows (Knightley, 1975) professional loyalty to national warring parties remains a strong tradition.

**Censorship and the need for translation**

The Abu Ghraib pictures are far from professional. They originate from “primitive” versions taken with cell phones. However, the revelations, which came to travel globally, would not have been the same without these devices. Cell phone technology has become more and more central to people’s lives in late modernity. Images travel more than ever before. Travelling is also about language barriers. Some may appear as amusing, as when a signboard observed in a restaurant in Seville, Spain told visitors, “We do not speak English, but accept your broken Spanish”; to remind travelers that English is not to be taken for granted and of the alternative option being to learn some of the language spoken in the countries they visit. At times, refugees on their way to Europe have to rely on Google Translator to find a safe route. In war situations, language deficiencies may be fatal. Iraqi journalist Burhan Fasa’a tells of the siege and the fall of Falluja (2004), that the U.S. troops were frustrated with Iraqis who did not speak English:

> Americans did not have interpreters with them, so they entered the houses and killed people because they didn’t speak English. They entered the house where I was with 26 people, and shot people because [the people] did not obey [the soldiers’] orders, even just because the people couldn’t understand a word of English. (quoted in Phillips, 2005: 42)

This and other critical stories from Fallujah were among those which did not travel far, as they failed to make it into the mainstream press. In spite of the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour and other prominent executives expressing concern for the civilians caught up in the fight over Fallujah, the American media seemingly “contributed to the subversion of truth in Fallujah”. Journalists were in many cases prevented from entering the city, but “corporate media showed little concern regarding their denied access” (Phillips, 2005: 43), and thus most of the published reporting came from journalists embedded with the U.S. troops. This is just one of many examples of reportage texts being subject to a “travel ban”, but also underlines
the importance of language as a crucial means of communication in situations of life and death.

**The journalistic field – enlarged and belittled**

The challenges faced by journalism and media are many. As the public spheres addressed by traditional (legacy) media remain largely national or local, the issues mentioned above and indeed other related ones are increasingly global, and demand knowledge of wider historical, social and political contexts and processes. As Jenny Erpenbeck writes,

> To investigate how one makes the transition from a full, readily comprehensible existence to the life of a refugee, which is open in all directions – drafty, as it were – he has to know what was at the beginning, what was in the middle, and what is now. (Erpenbeck, 2017: 39)

The main character in this novel, a retired professor, has the opportunity to indulge in studies of these three aspects. Journalists in a hard-pressed industry have lesser opportunities. Legacy media in many parts of the world face a dwindling audience while the digital multinationals (Amazon, Facebook, Google, Instagram, Twitter, etc.) help generate new ways of news generation, commercially tailored to individual news consumption. Simultaneously they have to face the “chronic tension between the universalizing forces of global modernity and the desire for autonomy in the local community or society” (Eriksen, 2016: 7).

The interplay between social and traditional media is substantial. Social media – in terms of quantitative reach but with no truth claims or guidelines – may penetrate traditional media and change their priorities. The processes are reciprocal: social media actors “graze” on traditional media, while traditional media increasingly use social media to enhance their product and outreach. Besides, powerful rulers try to marginalize traditional media in favour of social media such as Twitter. U.S. president Trump is but one example, Pakistan's ousted PM Nawaz Sharif harvested complaints from journalists since he would issue his statements through social media and stop arranging press conferences. Such attitudes from political leaders, combined with shrinking editorial staff in traditional media (online or offline) diminish journalistic opportunities for dialogue, for deliberation and for fact checking.
Moreover, political polarization combined with large-scale digital access have in many cases encouraged “echo chamber” activities; people seek websites that confirm and/or reinforce their convictions. This is far from new, since organizations, clubs and societies have, to some extent, for decades and centuries functioned in the same way, with their smaller, limited spheres (Gripsrud, 2017), or indeed “sphericules” (Gitlin, 2002: 168). On the other hand, those societies did not substitute/ background traditional media to the extent they tend to do now, also in terms of time-consuming activities. Among young people, the most likeable news consumption will be accessing news through Facebook or related platforms, whose commercially driven algorithms substitute the redactional functions of traditional media (Eide & Kunelius, 2018). Whistleblower Edward Snowden, through his careful co-operation with journalists Greenwald and Poitras emphasized the need for journalism’s redactional skills to secure that the information revealed did not put any individuals in danger (Kunelius et al., 2017).

Transnational Literacy

The digital seems to be at the core of discussions of both media development and education. However, while the digital revolution allows more people than ever access to news and stories from different corners of the planet, this does in no way automatically entail more transnational literacy. (Sanders & Spivak, 2006)

However unrealistic it may seem to you, I would not remain a teacher of the Humanities if I did not believe that at the New York end – standing metonymically for the dispensing end as such – the teacher can try to rearrange desires noncoercively […] through an attempt to develop in the student a habit of literary reading, even just “reading”, suspending oneself into the text of the other – for which the first condition and effect is a suspension of the conviction that I am necessarily better, I am necessarily indispensable, I am necessarily the one to right wrongs, I am necessarily the end product for which history happened, and that New York is necessarily the capital of the world. (Spivak, 2004, in Sanders & Spivak, 2006: 26)

Spivak rhetorically questions both Western academic supremacy as an individual “feeling”, as well as an institutionalized one (“the one to
right wrongs”). She strongly combines – or indeed associates – literary reading with ethics and responsibility, in an attempt to conceptually and ontologically “de-center” the world. If we substitute the literary reading for “reading the world” and understanding our “distant Others”, we may imagine another challenge for journalism and its ethical standards standing beside the digital revolution, but enhanced by it. This is one of the ways in which Gayatri Spivak, born and raised in Kolkata (Calcutta), and appreciated at institutions of higher learning in many countries, tries to reason with her own status as an academic celebrity and leading intellectual.

For journalists and journalism researchers, one of the ways in which to adapt Spivak’s recommendations and her perspective is working together, across borders (made more difficult to cross by visa regulations) and across professional divides between journalists and academics, and indeed between the “representing intellectuals” and the marginalized. Spivak has herself crossed borders when travelling to Adivasi (indigenous) areas in India, and promoting “indigenous” literature (Devi, 1995). In her preface to Mahasweta Devi’s book Imaginary Maps, Spivak writes that “ethical singularity” (Spivak, 1995: xxv) is a way of engaging profoundly with a person so that responses come from both sides, thus enhancing responsibility and accountability. The latter are key words in journalism ethics. This ethical singularity, Spivak writes, cannot be likened to the “exchange of radicals and the oppressed in times of crisis” or the “anthropologists claimed intimacy with their informants” (ibid.). Furthermore, she suggests that this “encounter can only happen when the respondents inhabit something like normality”, but that the full achievement of such an ethics is impossible, but worth aiming for (ibid. e.a.).

What do experiences of normality entail? My own experiences indicate that normality occurs more easily when sharing meals. In many countries, though, security regulations prevent both diplomats, NGO representatives and military personnel from doing so, with dire consequences. In journalism, spending time, not parachuting (sadly one of the endeavors of modern-day foreign reporting) in and out of a country during heated conflicts, also helps to gain a deeper understanding and a degree of transnational literacy.

Simultaneously the realization of being a privileged traveler remains an important and necessary point of reflection for journalists and
academics. As Kwame Appiah writes; we “may be able to learn about values from societies where science is less deeply implanted than in ours: if scientific method has not advanced our understanding of values, then its superiority offers no reason to suppose that our understanding of values is superior” (Appiah, 2006: 43, see also Nandy, 1990; Shiva, 1988). In some cases, the (spontaneous, unconscious perhaps) sense of superiority may be seen as a continuum of colonialist attitudes, as when former empires such as France consider it their task to interfere with migration regulation from/through the Sahel (see above), deploying military forces commanding/training local soldiers and police.

At home

Processes of developing transnational literacy may begin “at home”. Research has demonstrated that Norwegian citizens who live in areas where they are in contact with migrants/refugees and their offspring, are less skeptical towards “foreigners” than those who live in areas with few or no “foreigners” (Steinkellner, 2018). In recent years, Europe has experienced an increased influx of refugees from the Middle East and parts of Africa. Parallel to this (but not necessarily solely triggered by it) we witness an increased polarization in ongoing debates directly or indirectly defining what the nation should be and who may belong to it. On one hand, there are varieties of parties and groups hostile or critical to migration, as well as a rise of neo-Nazi movements, particularly in Eastern Europe, but also to an extent in the Nordic countries. On the other, there are initiatives such as “Refugees welcome”, with a plethora of groups across the country – and then all the in-betweens. As part of this polarization, accusations such as betrayal of the nation and opting for a Muslim/foreign majority are both repeated, and challenged.

Beyond these discussions, there are deeper conflicts as to how one defines a nation, belonging and nationhood. A nation’s ethics ought to be judged according to how that nation or country treats its minorities, but we easily realize that many nation states fail to adhere to this standard. Religious and ethnic minorities are persecuted, even killed in large numbers, in countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Myanmar and Pakistan. The number of Christians is diminishing all over the Middle East (Fossum, 2007). Moreover, in Europe, groups hostile to (Muslim) immigrants or refugees have attacked and killed people of
minority background. In Germany and Sweden, arsonists have set fire to asylum centers. At the level of political-ideological debate, discussions occur as to what it takes to be seen as a *citizen*, as belonging to the nation. Is it enough to obtain formal citizenship? Does one have to be born in the country to qualify? Will differences in exterior factors such as dress (hijab, turban), religious belief or even, in subsequent generations will skin colour relegate groups of people to the margins as still “not-Norwegian”, “not-French”, or not-Indonesian?

The debate was raised in Norway after a commission (Brochmann II) assigned to predict the consequences of high-level migration to the country, presented its report and revealed differing positions towards the question of belonging (Eide, 2018). National Statistics Norway (SSB) defines the “immigrant population” as people born in other countries, and includes those born in Norway, but whose two parents were born abroad. Some critics argue that this definition is too wide since it includes persons born in Norway, while others, by employing notions such as 3rd and 4th generation, seem to want it even wider.¹⁴

The debate may be analyzed as one of defining demarcation through emphasizing difference; ultimately, again, a question of *othering*. Journalist conventions imply dwelling by the poles in a polarized reality or debate, but also by contributing to polarization by, for example, focusing more on differences than similarities (Eide, 2011). In the debate on Brochmann II, quite a few voices belonged to young women, born and raised in Norway, who asked whether even their grandchildren would be considered to be *foreigners*. Throughout, they promoted a larger *we* in their ideas of Norwegian-ness, while simultaneously supporting a dynamic definition of the nation. This also represents a new step from the previously articulated *hybrid* or *hyphenated* identities such as “Norwegian-Pakistani” or “French-Lebanese” (Maalouf, 2000), which are still widespread. Young Norwegians with migrant backgrounds increasingly seem to adhere to a *discourse of defiance*, challenging many parents’ honor culture on one hand, and simultaneously defying aggressive claims that they should denounce their heritage and culture to qualify for inclusion. One powerful example of such youthful contradictions, are the “Shameless girls” (Bile et al., 2017), who assert themselves by taking for themselves an “in-between position” (Eide & Røsok-Dahl, 2019).
The *we* seems to be a fluctuating entity in today’s world. Media coverage of climate change, or global warming, at times suggests a global *we*, recognizing that there are certain crises that few of us can totally escape, even if the burdens are still unequally distributed. More limited *we’s* may occur as media accordions, playing both wide and narrow, mixing tunes both of harmony and dissonance.

**Coexistence, war and peace**

I stayed in Paris for a month visiting a university, just six weeks after the assassinations in Paris in 2015 at Charlie Hebdo and at a Jewish shopping center; I lived not far away from the Centre des Études Arabes (Center of Arabic Studies). To mark their view regarding the terrorist attacks, this center used the symbols of the three monotheistic and related religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) to shape the word *Coexist* outside their main entrance.

![Coexist sign at Centre des Études Arabes](image)

Such simple communication in times marked by crisis and antagonism opposes the “clash of civilizations” doctrine otherwise rather popular in present-day Europe. We may also consider this as stating that living together does not necessarily entail accepting all the ideas and practices...
of the other, but as a recognition of the need for some degree of coexistence. As Chantal Mouffe writes, “when democratic confrontation disappears, the political in its antagonistic dimension manifests itself through other channels” (Mouffe, 2009: 114). She addresses “the growth of other types of collective identities around religious, nationalist or ethnic forms of identification”, which emphasizes the need for democratic confrontation; it is “preferable to give them a political outlet within an ‘agonistic’ pluralistic democratic system” (ibid.). Agonistic pluralism entails both recognition of conflict and differences.

Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity, it is always concerned with the creation of an “us” by the determination of a “them”. The novelty of democratic politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the different ways in which it is established. The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. (Mouffe, 2000: 25)

Paul Gilroy’s concept of conviviality connects to Mouffe’s agonism, as it speaks to “how everyday multicultural practices rest on a radical and complex ability to be at ease in the presence of diversity but without restaging communitarian conceptions of the selfsame ethnic and racial difference” (Vallovan, 2016: 204). Gilroy himself emphasizes Britain’s “long experience of convivial post-colonial interaction and civic life has, largely undetected by government,” which has “provided resources for a functioning, even vibrant multiculture; although we do not always value, use wisely or celebrate it as we should” (Gilroy 2004, see also Gilroy, 2001).¹⁵

The utmost feature of antagonism is war, through which recognition of the other comes to a standstill and is replaced by military hostility, accompanied by simplistic and brutal enemy images, and by euphemisms such as “take out” instead of killing. National media feel the pressures of loyalty, and in many cases, they obey (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, 2014)

In 1962, Bob Dylan wrote “John Brown”, a ballad of mother and son. Mother praises her son who at a very early stage decided to enlist for the U.S. in Vietnam, to take part in “a good old-fashioned war”. Mother follows son to the railway station and predicts his successes and medals.
For a while, she receives letters regularly, but then John Brown stops writing to his mother. Half a year later, she receives a message that he is on his way home. When the train halts, he is the last one to leave, needing assistance by others to descend. His hands are gone, and his face is marked with injuries. At first, mother does not recognize him, but then tries to make him explain what had happened. He has a hard time responding, and while she turns away in disgust, he shares with her some of the lessons learned: “I thought when I was there: what am I doing here? […] But the thing that scared me most, when the enemy came close, I saw that his face looked just like mine.” (Dylan, 1962). This spirit was also featured during Christmas in 1914, as British, French and German soldiers came out from their respective trenches in Flanders to exchange food and music for a short while (Carion, 2008).

Such a recognition of the enemy as one being close to oneself, happened in some cities in Afghanistan in June 2018, as there was a ceasefire during the celebration of Eid-ul-Fitr. In Kabul and other cities, unarmed Taliban soldiers with their traditional headgear, joined celebration with the local population. Eyewitnesses report on embraces between supposed enemies, many taking selfies to document this extraordinary moment (Culbertson, 2018).

It did not last, though. However, it provides a hint of how realities might develop, if the other is something else and more than the name of the enemy.

Notes
1. This way of thinking about normalcy and the world was later reinforced by a one-year sojourn in India in the early 1990s, and half a year in Pakistan (Lahore), again in 2006.
2. The Evian conference was held in Evian, France in the first half of July 1938, and the main topic was the ‘stream’ of Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany. Only a few countries were willing to accept refugees unconditionally.
3. Norway refused a large group of Roma people from re-entering the country in the late 1930s. This led to many of them perishing in the concentration camps.
4. FATA = Federally Administered Tribal Areas, they are administered directly from Islamabad, the capital.
5. The controversy started in 2005 with the publication of 12 cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and harvested global protests after the news was spread among others by imams residing in Denmark (Eide et al. 2008).
6. This article presents a critical assessment of using the term “citizen journalism” for many different digital media usages during the war in Syria.
8. COP = conference of parties, parties are in this context governments.
10. An organization called Tehreek-e-Labaik held a siege around the capital Islamabad with a couple of thousand men, as a part of their protest against a new suggestion for parliamentarian oath. Later, the same organization was allowed to stand for national and regional elections (summer 2018).
11. Bengali writer Mahasweti Devi published three stories titled «Imaginary Maps», which were translated by Spivak, who also wrote a preface and the afterword to the volume. The book is dedicated to “all the indigenous people of the world”
12. Author’s experiences from Afghanistan represent one example.
13. The current main Norwegian opposition party has raised a critique of the tough migration policy of the government, and their formula: “strict, but humane” policy has been critiqued both by left and right-leaning politicians.
14. In 2017, there were 1,013 persons with four foreign-born grandparents and two Norwegian-born parents, most of whom were below 18 years of age.
15. Gilroy prefers to say “multiculture rather than multiculturalism, for there is in fact, in the UK, no such active ideology.”

References


21. Seeing the other, reflections on the we


London: Routledge.


