Imagine a scene is in Kabatas, a neighbourhood in the middle of Istanbul. Between seventy and one hundred frenzied men come from the direction of Gezi Park, shouting and singing. They are drunk, their upper bodies are naked. They are wearing trousers, bandanas and leather gloves. They approach a head-scarved young woman who is pushing her baby daughter in a pushchair. They assault her, and go so far as to urinate on her, yes, literally to piss on her.

This was a bogus story first published in a Turkish pro-government newspaper (Karip 2014). The story was later proven false, but not before it had attracted the attention of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who used that story to provoke outrage over the violation of honor which this scene depicted. He aimed this outrage at his conservative followers so as to buttress his popular support base. He shouted that they, the violent group of men who came from the Gezi protests, had attacked his “headscarf wearing sister”. He added that this sister was a mother, and the daughter-in-law of one of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the Justice and Development Party) mayors, and that she was the victim of violence. Who was to blame? Obviously, the guilty were the Gezi protesters and the anti-headscarf-mentality of the Kemalists. Several columnists and journalists in the mainstream media followed Erdoğan (Karip, 2014). The alleged harassment was elaborated upon in a sexualized way by the media’s opinion personas, who did not refrain
from using “juicy” sexual innuendos with great relish, seemingly “to expos” the perversity of the putative attackers.

**Screenshot 1.** The photoshopped photo

![Screenshot 1](image1.png)

Headline: Sabah finds the evidence to Kabataş in 52 seconds. *Bianek*, 2015, March 11.

**Screenshot 2.** The real footage of the photoshopped photo from security cameras

![Screenshot 2](image2.png)

When footage from security cameras was eventually released, it turned out that the story was fabricated and completely bogus. However, the mainstream media carried on “framing” the gendered, sexualized and religious story as if it was true (Yüksel-Peçen, 2018). The main media went so far as to produce Photoshop visuals to add credibility to this bogus story (Bektaş & Somer, 2015).

During the current period of the AKP holding political power in Turkey, what is new is the way such bogus stories are owned and manipulated by leading politicians, public figures expressing themselves in a vivid, outspoken, sexualized way (Mutluer, 2019), mainly to polarize society. They persist with such messages even after they have been refuted and proven to be false. In its period, the AKP and its leader, President Erdoğan, reshaped the relationship between state, society, family and the market (Öztan, 2014) as well as the media (Çarkoğlu et al. 2014; Karadağ & Bulut, 2016; Yeşil, 2018) to pursue AKP’s neoliberal, authoritarian and hegemonic goals (Akça, 2014).

The aim of this chapter is to examine how embedded relations between the media and the government allow the AKP to pursue its socio-political agenda by utilizing gender, sexuality and ethnic issues. More specifically, I seek to show that news published in the mainstream media serve more than simply the cultural and political values which Erdoğan and the AKP endeavor to instill in the collective consciousness of the society. Not only do they manipulate the truth by using binary oppositions (e.g. secular versus Muslim, Turkish versus Kurdish, modern versus traditional), but they also produce new binary oppositional categories, above all, Erdoğanists versus all others. To analyze their aims, I focus on two particular issue areas: gender and ethnicity.

To reveal how the media construct a certain approach to conflict and/or peace, one normally analyzes media frames with local political history in mind, examining the repertoire of symbols and signifiers through which frames are constructed, and relates these to the local media structure of the specific locality (Yüksel-Pecen, 2018). Accordingly, in order to examine AKP’s outspoken way of framing identities and manipulating the truth, my first task is to present the change in power relations between the media and the state in Turkey. Then I focus on the continuation and novelties of two intersectional cases while seeking to discuss new socio-political dynamics on gender, sexuality,
ethnicity and nationalism. The first case is the debate around turbans and headscarves, and the second one is the issue of representation of the Kurdish spaces and guerillas’ bodies.

**Media and the state in Turkey**

Certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images and sources of information are constantly repeated and designed as tools of media frames to “provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993: 51–52). Such frames are also used in the coverage of ethnic and religious groups. Publishing gendered bogus stories or framing conflicting ethnic, religious issues in a gendered way are not new phenomena either in Turkish political history or in mainstream media (Çarkoğlu & Yavuz, 2011; Christen, 2007; Finkel, 2000; Karlidağ & Bulut, 2016; Yeşil, 2014, 2018; Yüksel-Peçen, 2018). Media commercialization and privatization in Turkey started in the 1980s as part of neoliberal policies, however this did not create a distance between government/state and media relations (Kaya & Çakmur, 2011).

There was a heavy pressure on the media, particularly in the form of censorship after the 1980 coup, a point in Turkish history when the so-called National Security Council and the army became oppressively dominant actors in the political scene. During the 1990s, media groups had the power to exert pressure on politics, but with rising economic problems and various legal needs (e.g. obtaining media licenses and maintaining them), the media groups became more dependent on the politics of the incumbent government and state (Christensen, 2007; Finkel, 2000; Kaya & Çakmur, 2011).

Existing embedded government/state and media relations became more pronounced when the AKP came to power in 2002 (Akser & Baybars-Hawk, 2012). During the AKP period, the media owner companies from the banking, energy, construction and tourism sectors, had strong relationships with the AKP and the power elite to “stimulate the agenda of the media and their news discourses” (Karlıdağ & Bulut, 2016: 12). During that period, independent media and objective journalistic activities came increasingly under pressure as a result of clientelist media ownerships. The media-owning companies, which are also bidders for state tenders, did not wish to create a conflicting atmosphere that would work against their interests. Facing a potential conflict of interests, the
media owned by these influential firms did not criticize government (Sözeri, 2015). Media owners challenged the government only when their interests were under threat (Akser & Baybars-Hawk, 2012).

The AKP’s repressive policies towards media organizations and journalists gained a significant momentum especially after the 2013 Gezi uprisings, which president Erdoğan regarded neither as an instance of civil disobedience nor a peaceful response to his increasingly repressive policies and polarizing discourse, but rather, as a direct coup attempt targeting himself and his government. In March 2015, the AKP majority passed two major sets of legislations, which enhanced police powers Law (No. 6638), and increased and tightened executive control over the Internet and Communication Law (No. 6639). The net effect of these new legislations was a shrinking civil space and severe restrictions on the freedom of speech, press and the right to assembly.

After the July 15 2016 coup attempt these restrictions on free speech were further expanded. During the state of emergency, which was declared after the coup attempt and which the AKP government claims to have been masterminded by Fethullah Gülen, a US-based cleric, tens of thousands of public servants, including judges, prosecutors, lawyers, teachers, academics, police and military personnel, were dismissed from public service. Moreover, a huge number of civil society associations, foundations, private universities and media organizations have been closed down or disbanded by invoking emergency decrees. Among those people and institutions who were hit by these decrees, were also names and organizations known to be politically and ideologically at odds with the Gülen Movement. Thus, the coup attempt gave Erdoğan, in his own words, a “god-sent” opportunity to crackdown on all possible types of political opposition to his rule.

In April 2017, a constitutional referendum, together with the subsequent general elections in June 2018, were both held in the repressive atmosphere of the state of emergency; this state of affairs introduced a system of executive presidency and consolidated Erdoğan's position as the strongman of Turkey. After the June 2018 elections, in words of Human Rights Watch, “the state of emergency ended, but not the repression” (HRW, 2019). In this repressive environment, with the overwhelming majority of opposition media outlets closed down, even the business-interests of the mainstream media owners were not
enough to motivate them to take a critical stance toward government’s policies. Thus “mainstream” and “pro-(AKP) government” became almost synonymous adjectives to describe the political positioning of media outlets.

**Turban-headscarf binary: the reconstruction of the “ideal woman”**

Gender, especially the female gender, is a very effective discursive area which may serve as a tool to transform sensitive messages that set the boundaries of both political and everyday life. Policies developed regarding women’s bodies, the womb and their reproduction go a long way to determine the political limits and values within the society. Women, as Ruth Miller argues, are regarded as citizens with a reproductive identity (Miller, 2007). Furthermore, what Ayse Parla calls the modern citizen’s body (Parla, 2000) and what Miller refers to as “the womb” (2007) is the biopolitical space shaping the process of citizenship formation in legal, political, biological and racial terms. Thus, the question of political belonging is an issue of reproduction far more than of rights (Miller, 2007). Biopolitical space situated in the modern citizen’s body or womb has always been used and framed as a political tool. In this regard, in addition to the policies and discourses developed around the reproductive identity of women, woman’s attire, gender attributes and conduct all have a symbolic value for instilling “ideal” values as the hegemonic norm within society.

When the AKP first came to power, the debate on the wearing or non-wearing of the headscarf by women was at the forefront. It was one of the main issues which caused discrimination against many Muslim women (Göle, 1997; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2014). There were two opposing representations of the ideal woman; one was espoused by the Kemalists, who regard themselves as the founding elites of the secular Republic, and the other was espoused by the AKP. These two political forces are in many ways incarnated over the issue of the headscarf (Mutluer, 2016). Adherents to the former are opposed to the wearing of the headscarf, and those of the latter are in favour. These positions reflect the different class dynamics and political affiliations of Turkish women. Until the 1980s, the non-headscarf- wearing women were regarded as educated and from the middle-class, whereas the head-
scarf-wearing women were presumed to belong to the uneducated “lower class”. With the rise of political Islam during the 1980s and 1990s, headscarf-wearing women started to be active in this movement. Furthermore, more headscarf-wearing women than before started to attend the universities. Thus, as their visibility in politics, education and everyday life increased, they began to be perceived as a political threat to secularism and secular values by Kemalists.

The founding Kemalist elites of the Turkish republic aimed to restrict religious political activities; they considered religious political activities and symbols to be against “modernity”. From this perspective, many Islamic practices were considered threatening and reactionary. Kemal Atatürk’s foundation of a secular state and his state-led secular society was designed as an ideological necessity, an imposition protecting the state against religious reactionary and anti-Turkish sentiments, and assisting the country’s entry into modernity (İnsel, 2001; Çelik, 2001). Therefore, secularism or laiklik – as it was called and supported by the Kemalist founders – was positioned as a shield protecting the country’s secular, Turkish, Muslim identity (Kara, 2004; Ünder, 2001; Öztürk, 2016). Adjectives like “secular” or “secular-Turkish” on the one hand and “democratic”, on the other, have been positioned from the very beginning as rivals, descriptive words, which mutually demarcate and restrict each other’s respective spheres of influence. Thus, those who identify themselves with secularism or with democracy found themselves positioned as each other’s “other” (Mutluer, 2016; Gülalp, 2017).

In 1984, following the 1980 coup, the self-styled “Kemalist” junta of the period, used its National Security Council to impose the ban on the headscarf. Thus, it was not the early Republicans, but the later adherents of a self-styled version of the Kemalist ideology, who in the aftermath of the 1980 coup came upon the idea of imposing a legally enforced public ban on the women’s attire.¹ The policy of banning the headscarf even so far that public (state) officials felt justified to establish “persuasion rooms” (ikna odaları) at the entrances of the universities to compel headscarf-wearing woman to unveil. Such measures dramatically discriminated against headscarf-wearing women as they were not only deprived of their rights to an education and to work, but they were also stigmatized in daily life (Akbulut 2008; Göle, 1997; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014; Şişman, 2009; Türkmen, 2006, 2007).
Since then, the meanings attributed to women’s head-covering became symbolic of political conflict between the Kemalists and Political Islamic groups. The Islamists called what they wore on their head “headscarves” [başörtüsü]. For Kemalists the headscarf was the traditional attire of Anatolian women, so they instead used the term “türban” to emphasize the political, anti-Kemalist and anti-secular aspect of a supposedly Islamic reaction (Mutluer, 2016). Thus, the “headscarf-türban” became the primary symbolic issue in the conflict between the secular Kemalists and Islamic groups.

The turban-headscarf dilemma has been employed by both Kemalist governments and the AKP as a tool polarizing the society, especially after the coup in the 1980s. The state/government-led media have framed the issue according to the needs of the powerholders and/or of the prevailing hegemony of the period. The above-mentioned bogus Kabataş story broadcast widely in the media is a distinct example. This example, as already noted above, allowed Erdoğan to utilize the symbolic “headscarf-turban” tension in his favor, in an impassioned, vocal and gendered way. With this story, Erdoğan was able to introduce his new, ideal-nationalist-religious woman as a role model for all other women. He went so far as to also introduce the binary opposition to that ideal, namely, introducing the participants in the Gezi uprisings as persons to be feared and hated. They were, after all, nothing but [Kemalist] headscarf-phobic men who—so the bogus story went—were incapable of controlling their sexual urges, basic instincts and bad temper when they saw a headscarf-wearing woman (Mutluer, 2019).

Six years later, in the now extremely marginalized opposition media, on February 16, 2019, another case of sexual assault against a headscarf-wearing woman by the name of Merve Demirel, made the headlines. Accompanying the news reports was a photo, clearly showing a police officer sexually assaulting Merve Demirel by feeling her up, while the police were taking a group of protestors from TAYAD (Tutuklu ve Hükümlü Aileleri ile Dayanışma Derneği [Association for solidarity with detainees’ and convicts’ families]). A few days later, a woman journalist, Derya Okatan from the news site Artı Gerçek, published an interview with Merve Demirel.

Unlike the bogus Kabataş story, this was an actual substantive case of sexual assault against a headscarf-wearing woman and Okatan’s in-
terview with her was a commendable piece of real journalism. In this real case of sexual assault, however, the victim was protesting against the AKP government, and the perpetrator was a policeman who was supposedly acting on orders to protect that government against such protests. In this instance, therefore, the might of the AKP government came down on the side, not of the headscarf-wearing victim, but on the side of the perpetrator. Minister of Interior, Süleyman Soylu, defended the perpetrator by declaring the victim’s family and by implication the victim herself, to be politically undesirable: “A project women,” said Soylu, “whose father has been expelled for being a FETO (Fettullah Gülen Terror Organization)² member, and whose brother is a member of DHKP-C” (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Parti-Cephe, [Revolutionary people’s liberation party-front], a left wing underground organization). The irony here was the fact that the two political organizations which Soylu implied Ms. Demirel to be affiliated with (through her father and brother) – FETO and DHKP-C – are actually positioned at opposite ends of the ideological (left-right) spectrum in Turkish political life.

In any case, the different political affiliations of the victim’s family members, or indeed her own political standpoint, cannot be used to justify the hard fact that she was sexually assaulted by a police officer. But this is Erdoğan’s new Turkey, and the person who “got it in the neck” was not the perpetrator, namely the police officer who assaulted Merve Demirel, but rather the journalist Derya Okatan, who had interviewed the victim. Okatan was taken into custody soon after Soylu declared the victim politically undesirable.

The question which the opposition MP Hüda Kaya of HDP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, [Peoples Democracy Party]) asked in the parliament, summed up the whole episode quite nicely: “Those who spin the lie of a headscarf-wearing women being sexually assaulted in Kabataş for years on end, my question to you is: where is that woman now? Can you still say ‘they have assaulted my headscarf-wearing sister?’” (T24, 2019).

**Disposable Kurdish bodies**

The Kurdish issue is perhaps the area, which witnessed the most visible and dramatic swing by the AKP from standing for freedom but moving to oppression, from life to death. The Kurdish issue, and the Kurds’ bodies became a problem area for the state especially after the
formation of the PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* [Kurdistan Workers Party]) in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the armed conflict between the state and the PKK started. This was also when the state’s “hegemonic control” became visible in the media (Ercan-Bilgiç, 2008). Since then, Kurdish demands or even any discussion of their ethnic identity or cultural rights, have been consistently framed as separatist or terrorist acts (Arsan, 2014; Yüksel-Peçen, 2018). The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was represented as “the head of the terrorists”, and referred to the “baby-murderer” (Ercan-Bilgiç, 2008), and the places and geographies where Kurds live were stigmatized as dangerous neighborhoods (Mutluer, 2011).

However, the AKP government took bold steps, which no other government in the republican era had done: Kurdish TV and radio channels were opened to broadcast by the state-owned broadcaster TRT (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu* [Turkish Radio and Television Institute]) in 2009. Öcalan’s letter calling on the PKK to declare a cease-fire and withdraw from Turkey’s borders was read out during the 2013 Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır and this event was broadcasted live throughout Turkey. The state started direct negotiations with Öcalan and the PKK and even mobilized public support by referring to these negotiations a peace process.

This was the closest that Turkey ever approached to securing peace and restoring normal life in this issue area, but paradoxically, it was also the point, which saw the beginning of the most radically oppressive policies being implemented by the state. (Çelik et al., 2015). Each step taken to ensure life and peace, was followed by a step in the opposite direction, and between 2009 and 2011 more than 2000 Kurdish political activists were arrested. With the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the relations between the state and the PKK, as well the pro-Kurdish political parties such as HDP (*Halkın Democracy Partisi* [People’s Democracy Party]) assumed a more international character and tensions deepened. One of the directly relevant incidents occurred between October 6 and 12, 2014, when, during the protests against IS’ (Islamic State) siege of the Kurdish controlled Syrian city, Kobane, a total of 49 people died in 40 cities of Turkey. Furthermore, seeing that the pro-Kurdish HDP and its popular leader Demirtas are serious rivals for Kurdish votes, and that with the support of the leftists and libertarians, HDP had the potential
to topple down the AKP majority in the parliament, Erdoğan put an end to the peace process as abruptly as he started it back in March 2015. After the June 7, 2015 elections, in which the HDP managed to pass the 10 per cent electoral threshold, armed conflict between the state and the PKK resumed, and a war of unprecedented ferocity raged in the Kurdish regions. It was as if the peace process had never happened. Prolonged curfews, demolition of entire neighborhoods and even cities and mass killings of civilians became commonplace in Kurdistan, that is, in the southeastern regions of Turkey.

The tension had a direct impact on the media newsrooms. Newspapers’ approaches to publishing the events and framing the PKK and Kurdish issue varied according to their relationships with the government. According to Yüksel-Peçen’s analysis, “the framing of the Kurdish issue shows that despite the emergence of a moderate media discourse on the PKK and the Kurdish issue during the peace talks in 2013, a significant lapse back to the old narratives of terror and national security occurred in certain media outlets following the change of discourse of the central government after March 2015” (2018: 3). In addition to old narratives of terror and national security resurfacing in the media, social media broke on to the scene and became one of the most prolific sources where hate discourse against the Kurds and the PKK members fermented.

The case of the PKK fighter Ekin Van, whose real name is Kader Keyser Ertürk, is perhaps the best example of this lapse back to the old narratives, as she is the first woman fighter whose naked body, in 2015, was exhibited on the social media. She lost her life in an armed conflict on 10 August 2015 in Varto. In the words of an İHD (İnsan Hakları Derneği [Human Rights Association]) report, “Two photos of Kader Kevser Ertürk (Ekin Van) were taken on the spot where she was shot – one clothed, and one naked, both showing her lying in the same position. The photos also show the legs of three different men. Before long, the photos of Kader Kevser Eltürk’s naked, dead body were circulated in the social media” (author’s translation) (İHD, 2015). The governorship of the province of Muş initiated an investigation into the event, yet the police gave no significant explanations.

A photo showing the naked body of a dead Kurdish woman fighter with three men’s legs near her, apparently taken right after an armed
conflict, is a direct assault on the honour and the virility of the enemy’s (the Kurdish man’s) masculinity and national values. Moreover, the timing of leaking this photo was not coincidental either. It was a moment when the female combatants who fought against ISIS were being glorified in the European media. As Mari Toivanen and Bahar Baser Öztürk argue:

[…] the juxtaposition of female combatants with IS [ISIS] fighters allows the depiction of the participation of the former as exceptional and heroic and as one that deconstructs the masculinity of its adversary. The role of female combatants in the ongoing conflict is represented in the British and French media through the construction of sexualized and modern-day heroine figures that are largely glorified (Toivenen & Başer Öztürk, 2016: 294).

Following Toivanen and Başer Öztürk’s argument, an assault against a woman fighter’s body and her honour, is an assault, which frames not only the woman fighters, but also all the other women who identify themselves with the Kurdish nationalist movement as well. In this context, it must also be noted that the Kurdish political movement puts a special emphasis on gender equality and the role of the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel [People’s Protection Unit]) women fighters’ involvement in the Syrian war, especially against ISIS.

Additionally, images of raided houses, damaged cities and buildings in the Kurdish provinces have also been served to the media in a language suggesting gender and ethnicity-based disparagement and misogyny. The photos of soldiers of special forces were taken either in the interior of the households or in front of the buildings with sexist graffiti, which were then publicized in the mainstream media.

The photo on the left is of a Special forces soldier in front of a graffiti “Bodrum/The basement, is where love is experienced the best”. The Turkish word Bodrum has a double meaning. It is firstly the name of a popular resort town in southwestern Turkey, which is famous for songs about summer love. But it also means “basement” – so the graffiti also refers to the killing and burning of more than 170 people, including children and civilians, in the basement of a building in the raided Kurdish town of Cizre, in which they had been trapped between 14 December 14, 2015 and March 2, 2016 (TİV, 2016). As such, the
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**Screenshot 3.** A photo of a Turkish special forces soldier in front of a damaged house

Headline: The corpses in the basements in Cizre disintegrated when they were handed to the families. *Artı Gerçek*, 2018, January 2.

**Screenshot 4.** Inside of one of the raided houses

graffiti intends to humiliate the Kurdish people, by referring to their violent loss in an ironic, sexually abusive way.

The second photo also has sexualized military connotations. It also belongs to a special forces soldier in front of a mirror on which there is a message written in lipstick: “Making Love in Yüksekova is something else” (Cumhuriyet, 2016). Yüksekova is another raided Kurdish town, and the photo shows, in the mirror, the master bedroom, most probably belonging to the mother and father of the family. As such, it represents a direct violation of what is considered the most private and intimate space in a family home in a traditional society.

Such sexually assaulting visuals intend to present how the state tends to dehumanize Kurdish lives, which are under siege and how it can spatially transgress borders of even the most intimate spaces where Kurdish people live. At the same time, both photos depict transgressions of the bodily borders of the Kurds as well. By invading the bedroom of the mother and the father of the family, it implies a direct threat by the state to the Kurdish nation, specifically to Kurdish women who, as mothers, represent the sexuality of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997) and who has the possibility and expectation of raising future generations of Kurds.

Throughout the conflict, security forces presented Kurdish opposition members and fighters as “disposable bodies” in the social media. Nagel points out that “racial, ethnic and national boundaries are also sexual boundaries” (Nagel, 2000). In the oppressive and colonial mindset, the oppressed are regarded as “bodies” rather than “minds” (Shohat & Stam, 1994). In times of war, such bodies become boundaries where sexual and ethnicized assault is possible (Enloe, 2000). Particularly at times when a state of emergency or exception is declared, the bodies of the ethnic, gendered, sexual and religious others can be regarded as out of the norm (Agamben, [1995] 2010). In such times, others’ bodies may be “abjected” (Kristeva, 1982; Young, 1990) by the power centers such that torture or sexual assault on those bodies or killing them may be treated as normative events. The old political nationalist, ethnicized, gendered, sexualized policy in the Kurdish issue has continued during the AKP era. As the Kurdish population is considered less than human and outside the law, their deaths, from this perspective, are not considered to be losses. They are merely “disposable bodies” (Mutluer, 2011).
To conclude
Analyzing media frames in recent Turkish political life, along with altering socio-political power relations in specific issue areas, reveals the continuities and novelties in state-media relations. Using gendered and sexualized symbolism for political purposes are not new practices in the history of Turkish politics. The issues examined here, as in the case of the Kabataş incident, or concocting sexual expletives to humiliate political opponents in the Kurdish case, are unfortunately part of a long tradition. Yet, in no other period of Turkey’s republican history, have such practices taken on the proportions of an officially embraced policy by the incumbent government. Previous governments have always been careful to publicly distance themselves from such practices or to officially deny that such things have ever happened. What is new in the AKP era, particularly in the post-Gezi period, is that discursive use of aggressive and divisive gendered and sexualized symbolism has become the norm, which is condoned and even encouraged from the highest echelons of political power. What this will lead to, particularly after the recent constitutional changes in the political system of Turkey, which introduced a model of strong executive presidency with Erdoğan as the president, defies imagination.

Notes
1. Sevgi Adak (2014) makes a compelling argument that Kemalists of the early republican era had a much more subtle approach to enforcing the “modern dress codes” for women, than did their descendants in the 1980s and 1990s. For one thing, the early Kemalists never officially banned the religious attire of women, and for another, even though there was a central policy in place to “encourage” and even compel women “to uncover,” the implementation of that policy was left to the discretion of the local agents of the central government, who took local sensitivities into consideration when goading women to uncover, and treaded carefully so as not to give the impression that they were attacking the honor of the women, or their families, or of the community in which they were operating. By contrast, the post-1980 Kemalist approach attempted to invade the bodily borders/limits of women, which was perceived as an attack not only the honor of the women’s, but also on the honor of society, or as Ruth Miller (2007) would have put, an attack on the society’s womb.
2. Fettullahist Terror Organization — the derogatory name the Government uses to refer to the Fethullah Gülen Movement.
3. Newroz is regarded as the spring festival and as the beginning of the Kurdish new year. Those celebrations have also become another debated issue between the state, the Kurdish people and the PKK.
4. Diyarbakır, or Amed in Kurdish, is a city which has a symbolic value for Kurdish people. It is regarded as the capital of the Kurds living in Turkey, at least by the Kurdish nationalist movement.


References


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