

The Journalist and "the Other"

A Normative Perspective on Respect for Privacy in the Ethics of Journalism

SVEIN BRURÅS

The Ethics of Proximity – or Ethics of the Other – is currently a focal topic among moral philosophers. The purpose of the present article is to discuss if and how the ethics of the Other can contribute to journalists' ethics concerning issue of privacy.

The problem is interesting also in light of the current uncertainty and inconsistency and a search for normative foundations which the Norwegian press has experienced when journalists encounter moral dilemmas of this type. A series of recent 'cases' has aroused disgust and public outcry, with accusations of lack of compassion and cynicism among journalists in the field.

My principal conclusion is that whereas the professional ethics of journalism are fundamentally incompatible with the ethics of the Other, the social-ethically founded professional ethics of journalism must under certain circumstances bow to the 'demand' imposed by 'the Other'. And this precisely in situations which both public and professionals experience as precarious from an ethical point of view. In such situations the ethics of the Other can afford a valuable and necessary perspective.

* * *

The ethics of the Other and mass communication seem to be two mutually exclusive

concepts. The ethics of the Other presumes a personal meeting, an individual I-you relation, which is the fundamental moral relationship. It takes its starting point in the meeting of two persons, face-to-face.

Mass communication, on the other hand, is anything but a personal meeting. It necessarily implies physical distance between the parties to the communication and represents a social operation in which there is no place for face-to-face encounters.

Nonetheless, in the current debate on press ethics – a debate among practitioners, but also among the public at large – there are signs of searching and an openness to aspects which the ethics of the Other may help define. What many people perceive to be an inherent cynicism in the practice of journalism leads to recognition of the inadequacy of rules and the inhumanity of consequence-ethics. A leading Norwegian journalist, Jo Bech-Karlsen recently urged his colleagues to apply what he calls "the empathic method". "We must mobilize our powers of empathy and rely on our gut feeling..."¹ Might the ethics of the Other be what he is looking for?

The relationship between mass communication – here confined to journalism – and the ethics of the Other can be described from different points of view. Journalism involves three parties, the sender/journalist,

the source/subject of reportage, and the receiver/public. We may therefore conceive of a 'meeting' occurring on three different axes:

- a. between the journalist and his/her sources/subjects;
- b. between the sender/journalist and the receiver/public; and
- c. between the sources/subjects and the public.

The following discussion will largely be confined to a), the meeting of the journalist and the source/subject. This is not primarily because this is the only one of the three axes where an actual physical meeting – a co-presence – takes place, but rather because this is where the ethics of the Other, in my opinion, can make an important contribution.

Toward the ends of the article I will make some few comments regarding axis c), the meeting between the sources/subjects and the public.

I. Concepts and definitions

The nature of mass communication

Mass communication is the conveyance of messages with the help of a technical medium from one (institutional) sender to a large number of receivers. This definition implies several factors which have a bearing on our topic:

- Mass communication is one-way communication. The direct response and cyclical structure which characterize interpersonal communication are absent.
- The sender is an institution, an organization of professional practitioners. The sender has no intentions to expose itself to, or to 'meet' the receiver on a personal basis.

- Messages are standardized, formalized with regard to format, genre, timing, etc.
- The receiver is unknown, an impersonal 'mass'; the constituent individuals are invisible, 'faceless'.
- The communication and the 'meeting' take place via technology, which in itself creates distance.²

The radical alternative

Here I should like to explain briefly what the 'Ethics of the Other' implies. I shall do so by means of reference to moral philosophers Knud E Løgstrup and Emmanuel Levinas.³

Both Løgstrup and Levinas represent an ethics which appears quite radical in relation to the models which have predominated in the media industries to date, be it in a deontological tradition or in the form of consequence ethics. Both focus closely on "the Other" and the I-you relationship, an essentially asymmetrical relationship, which also excludes all form of contractualistic reasoning.

Løgstrup: Communication is "daring to come forth in order to be received" (1956: 27). The meeting in which this occurs is fundamental to all ethical life.

Meeting one another in trust is a human trait. We expect to be taken seriously by the other. Thus, every personal meeting has an element of self-exposure in it, we 'lower our guard'. We can not develop a relationship with anyone without surrendering ourselves to some extent, in the expectation of being taken seriously. And this element of surrender is potential power in the other's hands. In 'meeting' we have a bit of the Other's life in our hands – much or little, "a passing feeling, a spirit ... but it can also be terribly much, so that one may be responsible for the success or failure of the other's life" (1956:25).

The Other's overture (thus in a literal sense, 'opening') may be responded to in many ways. It may be used to hurt, to despise, or to one's own advantage, but it can also be received – with trust. The 'demand' which meeting the Other confronts me with is, in fact, the very 'cradle' of ethics. Løgstrup presents the alternatives in drastic terms: a question of care or laying waste; one can either care for the other or ruin his or her life.

Central in Løgstrup's thinking is the demand, the requirement, which the meeting implies. It is *unilateral*. Løgstrup's approach is thus quite divorced from the contractual notion of mutual rights and duties and equal exchanges of services or 'sacrifices'. What is required of us is unselfishness. The demand is tacit, unexpressed. Its implication is nothing other than to care for the Other's existence. How this care is to be acted out is left to the individual in the concrete situation. The demand does not coincide with the Other's explicit wishes; on the contrary, it is up to me to decide what I can do for him.

The demand is 'radical', by which Løgstrup means that it is absolute, unqualified and infinite – regardless of who the Other is, friend or foe. This radical quality distinguishes the ethical demand from all manner of rule-ethics, from moral, legal and conventional norms (which, it should be noted, Løgstrup does not reject, but clearly considers 'secondary') (1982:109). The demand can only be satisfied by unselfishness, whereas norms may be satisfied, whatever one's motives.

In our context it is important to recognize that Løgstrup's ethics treats not only 'the Other', but ourselves, as well. Does my existence imply autonomy, i.e. a freedom to pursue goals of my own choosing? Løgstrup's answer is No. The most important thing in life is not oneself, but the

Other. By caring for the other I realize myself, my life is a success.

Years later, Løgstrup expresses the notion of "the sovereign manifestation of life". Examples of such 'manifestations' are compassion, trust, love, sincerity, pity, etc. The sovereign manifestation of life occurs and is acted out in the immediate circumstances. "The Other's presence evokes [my] trust and sincerity; the Other's misfortune, [my] compassion" (1972:24). Sovereign manifestations of life are spontaneous, that is, they arise freely without ulterior motives or designs. Such manifestations satisfy the radical demand.

Finally, I should like to say some brief words about a central principle in Emmanuel Levinas' thinking, as we shall return to it in the following discussion.

The wish to generalize represents control and oppression (Kemp 1992:39). When we regard our fellow Man in terms of categories, the Other disappears. The Other is reduced to the Same. But the Other is unique, a nonce phenomenon. The Other can only be met face to face. And it is the human face – the Other's face – which is the point around which Levinas' ethics revolves. The face strikes me, the face speaks to me, it forces itself upon me – and I become accountable to it. And so comes the 'demand' in Levinas' thinking: To be for the Other.

II. Discussion

The raison d'être of the press

In the ethics and self-understanding of journalism neither the individual nor the I-you relationship is in focus. Instead, the collective takes precedence. It is not the Other who occupies the foreground, but a 'third party'. As a social institution the press is the opposite of the personal meeting. It is

in essence mass communication, and it finds its *raison d'être* in addressing the group, "the masses", the collective.

To the extent the press – or the journalist – gives an individual's interests precedence over the many's it is guilty of partisanship, a transgression against its role and self-understanding and an abuse of its privilege. The press guards its freedom from vested interests jealously; all attempts to curry favour on the part of individuals or private interests are anathema.

(There is no contradiction between this posture and the fact that the press on occasion takes on a private cause or the fact that the Norwegian code of press ethics admonishes the press to "protect individuals against injustices or neglect, committed by public authorities and institutions, private enterprises, or others". This is an expression of distributive justice on the societal level, a social ethics far removed from the personal bonds on the micro-level which the ethics of the Other represents. It is, moreover, the sense of social justice which decides who gets media attention, not physical proximity, personal acquaintance, etc.)

* * *

Two specific features of the ethics of the Other as elaborated by Løgstrup make it definitely inappropriate as a basis for a professional ethics of journalism: spontaneity, and its origin in a basic trust in the meetings of human beings.

Spontaneity: 'Sovereign manifestations of life' occur without design; i.e., they are spontaneous. (Løgstrup also uses the term 'spontaneous manifestations of life', 1982: 105).

Is it possible to run an institution with societal responsibilities 'without design'? No, hardly. When journalists meet people

(sources, informants) professionally, their motives are definitely 'ulterior'. The journalist is out to get something out of the meeting. In fact, he/she is not the least bit interested in a personal relationship with the person, 'the Other', but only in the product the conversation results in – which, in turn, is intended for 'third parties', the general public. 'Ulterior motives' are in fact the journalist's sole interest.

The contrast is accentuated when we consider how categorically Løgstrup expresses his criterion: The manifestation is absolutely spontaneous "because the least deviation, the least calculation, the least reduction of it to a means toward some other goal, and it is ruined. Indeed, it becomes its opposite. . The least bit of calculation is ruled out" (1972:19f).⁴

Thus, there is no compromise or point of contact between the journalist's practices and the 'spontaneous manifestation of life'. The two are contradictory and mutually exclusive.

Trust: The personal meeting is born of trust. Løgstrup emphasizes that this is a prerequisite to a relationship of any kind. The journalist, however, meets his subjects with critical scepticism. He does not accept the Other's statements without critically examining them, and he presumes any source to be capable of serving up half-truths, hiding disadvantageous aspects of the story, expressing himself 'strategically', even lying. Such a professional mistrust is part of the essence and self-understanding of journalism as a critical, independent and truth-seeking endeavour.

To make myself clear: This is not to say that journalists view their sources as villains and liars. It is more a question of maintaining a personal distance vis-à-vis sources and interviewees, of methods which enable the journalist to evaluate his sources and what they tell him.

We should bear in mind that Løgstrup gives the word 'trust' a much more far-reaching meaning than a readiness to believe what another person is saying. Trust means lowering one's guard, making oneself vulnerable. One "dares come forward . to be received" (1956:19). The contrast with the practice of journalism could hardly be greater: Journalistic integrity requires the maintenance of a critical distance to sources and subjects. Closeness, a personal relationship, poses a mortal threat to journalists' integrity and to the credibility of the press.

The 'meeting' posited in the Ethics of the Other takes place in trust and without calculation. The journalistic encounter takes place without trust and with calculation. It would not be right any other way.

The conclusion so far is then: The Ethics of the Other is not only incompatible with, but actually threatens the ideals and objectives which constitute the press' *raison d'être*. But all has not been said. The argument so far has not addressed the question of news professionals' seeming cynicism vis-à-vis their subjects.

Role-ethics – and its limitations

Underlying the ideas about journalism I have expressed above are some assumptions about the role of the press and of journalists. The practice of journalism is role-play. All the parties involved are playing a role:

- *The reporter* performs his duties, asks the standard questions needed to make his product in accordance with standard forms and conventions.
- *The source* is a spokesperson – not for him- or herself, but for a company, an institution or organization, an interest group, or he/she belongs to a relevant

category: eye-witness, victim, participant, expert, etc.

- *The subject* of the reportage (not always identical with the source) falls into roughly the same set of roles or categories.

The interplay between these parties is governed by a social ethics, in which the social utility and collective benefit of the journalistic product is paramount.

Occasionally, it happens that the subject of the reportage takes a step forward, out of the frame of the role-play, so to speak. Suddenly the situation has changed; a human being's fate is at stake; a face becomes visible. This is the exception, but it does occur – and when it occurs, journalists find themselves on shaky ground, ethically speaking. As others find them, as well.

It happens when someone suddenly finds himself in the public eye as the victim of a crime, or as a criminal. It happens when an accident occurs. It happens when people's private lives are seen to have the makings of 'a good story'. In short, it happens whenever a person is displaced, thrust out of all the usual roles and categories and the person emerges, naked and in crisis.

It is in situations like these that journalists are brought to doubt their professional roles. He realizes that he is more than a professional performing a role, he is more than one in the category, 'journalist'; he is a person, spoken to as a fellow human being. He is confronted with Løgstrup's 'demand'; he encounters Levinas' 'face'.

He becomes conscious of 'the spontaneous manifestation of life': "The Other's misfortune evokes [my] compassion" (Løgstrup 1972:24).

In this situation the journalist, too, steps forth out of a category; he stands before the Other, not as a representative of his institution, not as a 'type' which just happens to

be him today, but as a unique individual, someone personally addressed. He can no longer perform his professional assignment untouched. And this means he faces a dilemma: Shall I fulfill my assignment on behalf of, and for the good of the public, or shall I respond to the demand emanating from the Other?

The journalist can respond in one of two ways:

- (1) I did not get into this situation in my capacity of private individual. I am here as a professional, a representative of a social institution; I am 'on duty'. It is my duty to follow the norms of my profession.
- (2) I will respond to 'the Other'. I will 'take his part' – which means that I leave the domain of professional ethics.

The first response is the so-called Eichmann reply: "What does this have to do with me? I was only doing my job." The second is the antithesis of the first. It is the *only possible response*, according to the ethics of the Other, an imperative.

It is in situations like these that conventional press ethics prove inadequate. All routinized conceptions of 'the Other' – as belonging to a category, a species, a role (source, subject) – dissolve. The Other stands before the journalist as a human being, a unique person.

Professional power – power over a 'thing', an objective situation, a theme – is replaced by another power-relation: The Other's life lies in my hands; I can kill, I can ruin the Other's existence.

Consider an example: Bjørg Nedregotten has done a study among the journalists who covered a dramatic traffic accident near Måbødalen (Norway) in 1988. Twelve Swedish schoolchildren and three adults were killed when a bus' brakes failed. Two of Nedregotten's respondents, both of

whom were on the scene of the accident quite soon after it happened, say they experienced a distinct role-conflict in this situation. As one of them tells it: "I felt that maybe I should have been more of a fellow human being there. But I decided I should stay a little aloof [so as not to be suspected of being out to get an exclusive – Author's note]. In a way it was too bad. I probably could have done some good – very little, really – for the people there. Just hold a hand or two. Like that." The journalist goes on to say that he subsequently regretted his decision and felt he misjudged the situation: "I should have been less concerned about the risk of being misunderstood and should have been more of a human being" (Nedregotten 1991:70).

The argument so far can be summed up in two points:

- (1) Journalists' role ethics do not allow for any 'demand' in Løgstrup's sense. The personal meeting does not exist in ordinary journalistic practice.

(This does not mean that journalism is without feeling and empathy, a dehumanized imparting of information and diversion. But that is another discussion.)

- (2) But role ethics have limited competence – even within the bounds of professional practice. When a situation arises in which the Other appears as himself, journalists are confronted with the 'demand'. The ethics of their profession are set aside; the 'demand' takes precedence.

Two questions arise:

When is the situation transformed from a professional assignment into a 'meeting'? There is no general answer. It is – in the spirit of Løgstrup – up to the individual in the concrete situation. The frontier between the sphere of the ethics of the Other

and that of professional ethics is quite fluid. It cannot be specified in the abstract. In the words of the anti-systematician Løgstrup: "The demands one complies with are quite incorporated in the situation at hand" (1972:28). "Sovereignty is due the phenomenon" (1972:57; see also 1982: 110).

Why does the demand – when it first arises – take precedence? The answer arises out of the conception of what it is to be human. The theory of the Ethics of the Other motivates the precedence of the Other quite convincingly, to my mind, taking its point of departure in a cognitive theory which not only recognizes the Other in general terms (given symmetry, as an alter-ego), but also grants or allows the (particular) Other his individuality. The I-you relationship would seem to be pre-moral in character, and the ethics of the Other implies (in radical contradiction of the historical mainstream of moral philosophy) that morals are *autonomous*, and the ego *heteronomous*. *This overturns any system. It is a question of a 'given' in all human interaction, an entity that cannot be denied, the given responsibility for the other.* The responsibility is definite, the demand sovereign. In contrast to this: social ethics and professional ethics – founded in ideals – can be denied, negated. Man exists for his own sake; social ideals exist for the sake of Man.

A point of divergence

In the following I have tried to make a case for the ethics of the Other, but I apply it to journalism in a way not entirely consonant with either Løgstrup's or Levinas' thinking. My application implies a *discontinuity* between the ethics of the Other and the professional ethics of journalism, and a frontier between the respective domains. The

professional ethics reach their limit at the point when a journalist encounters a 'face'. And conversely: the ethics of the Other reaches its limit in the meeting with a socially founded professional ethic. The notion of such a discontinuity would, I suspect, be foreign to both Løgstrup and Levinas. Now, how did they conceive of the transition from the micro- to the macro-level?

While intensely interested in the interpersonal relation, Løgstrup also discussed social ethics. He approached social conditions largely in terms of power relationships. In the relation between political, economic and technological power lies the challenge to social ethics. "Power is not Evil," he states (1972:142).

There is a principal distinction between the personal meeting and social ethics ("the social order"), according to Løgstrup. The manifestations of life cannot be rationalized, and they do not possess power in any organized form, but they do exist in the social order, where they have a specific purpose, namely, to serve as a touchstone for the ideas and ideals upon which all rationalization and organization is founded.

It would seem that Løgstrup's perspective on social ethics is essentially an extension of the ethics of the Other. "Inter-dependence, and with it the extent of solidarity, has increased. It ends up being global." As Svend Andersen puts it: "The content of the sovereign manifestations of life are transferred from the personal sphere to the societal" (1993:168).

Just how Løgstrup conceived of this transfer is a bit unclear to me, but it apparently takes the form of an analogy: "In the extension of personal interdependence one might speak of political interdependence." (Løgstrup 1987:8).

The transition from micro-level to a social ethics is not much clearer in Levinas,

either. Levinas seems to be saying: I have responsibility for the Third just as I have responsibility for the Second. There is no difference. This means that responsibility must be apportioned according to the principles of social justice. (If Levinas thereby ends up in a contractualistic reasoning on the macro-level shall remain unsaid.)

Does the fluid boundary between an individual/ interpersonal ethics of the Other and social ethics such as that Løgstrup appears to propose cause any problems? Why is it necessary – as I have tried here – to specify the limits of the ethics of the Other in relation to the professional ethics of journalism? The problem may be expressed like this:

As far as I can see, there is no place in Løgstrup's ethics for any meeting between two people without self-exposure. This means, then, that there is no place for any role-ethic whatsoever. It is difficult to accede to such a proposition. The difficulty is apparent in Andersen's rendering of Løgstrup:

Fundamentally, interdependence refers to the fact that we cannot relate personally to the Other – communicate with him, interact with him, etc. – without exposing ourselves. For example, approaching another person and saying something implies an expectation that the other person will take one seriously and answer. But an expectation means exposure, lowering one's guard. (1993:163)

When a journalist approaches a source, for example, he naturally has an expectation of being taken seriously and being given answers to his questions. But no self-exposure is involved because the journalist is playing a role; he is a professional, not a "naked, helpless" human being. Should he be rejected, it is not he, but his professional inquiry that is turned away.

By the same token, when a source addresses a journalist, it is (generally) in the role of spokesperson. He does not expose himself personally; 'the self' has not "dared forth". But, as we have seen, this is not always the case. Suddenly, the source can become 'unique', a soul – and the situation is radically changed.

Løgstrup would presumably protest wildly against all thought of suspending the manifestations of life and letting a socially founded role ethics take precedence. To that I would reply that the manifestations of life are not actually suspended, not as long as there is a possibility for them at any time to emerge and take precedence.

A conclusion: I should like to second Vetlesen & Nortvedt (1994:204) in their judgement that "an ethics of proximity, based as it is on empathy, has an inherent limitation which makes it inappropriate as a basis for either social morality or political morality". This is true within the realm of mass communication and within the press as a social institution. We cannot do without a social ethics founded on distributive justice, but – as we have seen – journalists will now and again encounter situations which challenge their professional ethics.

III. Subjects of reportage meet the public

So far, we have discussed the meeting between the journalist and his source/subject. As noted at the start, journalism also involves meetings on two other axes or dimensions: that between the journalist and the public, and that between the subject of reportage and the public.

As for the former, I shall simply say that it seems rather irrelevant to discuss it in the perspective of the ethics of the Other. The communication situation lacks the essential ingredients of a personal meeting. The au-

dience is a 'mass', a faceless, anonymous group, and neither does the journalist appear in his own person. In fact, his professional role is to direct our attention away from his person to something or someone else.

And so we have the third kind of meeting and the question of whether or not the media can bring the individual and his fate to light, present him to the public in a way that establishes a 'meeting' with the reader/listener/viewer. By 'meeting' I mean, of course, a situation which arouses the public so that readers are no longer spectators, but participants – a prime prerequisite for a relation in a moral sense.

Mass media and the 'media society' invite us to assume the role of spectator. As users of the media we are hardly unaware of the existence of oppression, of human suffering and death. But, to return to Løgstrup: "[It] doesn't move us, since we, consciously or unconsciously, write it off to 'the way things are'" (1956:181). But the situation can be more poignant; we *can* be moved.

As I see it, modern journalism has a strong potential to establish 'meetings' of the kind discussed here. Practically every day it shows us individuals as individuals, unique, with faces – and confronts us with moral appeals, and we are 'demanded', required, to respond.

- The category 'victims of accidents' is exploded; morally neutralizing statistics like "4,000 severely injured in traffic accidents each year" are put aside, and we meet a young man in the crisis of his life...
- The category 'refugees', with its aura of cultural and geographical distance, breaks down and "Norma, 5, from Sarajevo, dark eyed, curly haired and

fighting for her life" demands our attention. She moves us.

- The category 'alcoholic' acquires a face: "Anders, 42, divorcé and father of two, homeless, spends his days down by the river."

Although there is still no physical co-presence between the reader's I and the subject's you, the macro-perspective has been penetrated. The I is invited and challenged to see the Other, to moral involvement, emotional empathy, to a readiness to participate.

It is therefore surprising that effects like these are mainly regarded as (potential) *manipulation* of the reader. Vetlesen & Nortvedt warn, for example, against "intense focus on individuals" in the media on the grounds that "our emotional lives are generally vulnerable to manipulation of various kinds" (1994:31). They also point out that manipulation of an opposite sort is equally possible: "by creating distance and suppressing, people [in news stories] may be deprived of their faces and human traits, thereby rendering them out of reach of our moral senses." (1994:31).

It is not easy to find the narrow path between these two (alleged) pits. Taking a different position, I propose that we instead strive for a breadth of forms of expression in the media. Personification and emotional appeals in modern mass media are in keeping with Aristotelian ethics, waking "pity and fear" in the audience, just as Greek tragedy should do, according to Aristotle. Now, emotional reactions can, as we all know, be wrongheaded. Therefore, it is clear that items that arouse a human response need a tempering corrective in the form of factual, dispassionate and 'objective' stories and material that provide political and social context. All in all, a

broad spectrum of forms of expression in the media might be seen to correspond to the breadth of human cognitive capacity, which, after all, includes both emotions and intellect.

Finally, we should not allow ourselves to believe that this in any way solves existing social problems. The limitations are obvious. Very few people will ever appear as 'faces' – and the selection is serendipitous. There is always a danger that politicians

and the responsible authorities will take on these few causes célèbres – and let it go at that. That may happen, but the opposite can also happen (and does), and herein lies the value of 'mediated meetings'. They can elicit and support moral mobilization, an assumption of responsibility for the 'faceless' many and – at best – a political and collective response which benefits them in a substantial way.

Notes

1. A statement made in a debate on ethical aspects of news coverage of accidents, etc., as quoted in *Journalisten* (Norway) 1995:4.
2. The description is highly schematic, and the respective points imprecise. The communication is *primarily* one-way, but some feedback can and does occur. The sender is *generally* an institution, albeit the role of the individual in this context can (and should) be discussed. Etc., etc.
3. *Knud E Løgstrup* (1905-1981), a Danish philosopher and theologian. His most well-known work, *Den etiske fordring* [The ethical requirement], was first published in 1957, and most recently (the thirteenth edition) in 1991. *Emmanuel Levinas* (1906-1995) was born in Lithuania, but became a naturalized citizen of France in 1930. A Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, he is recognized as one of the foremost ethical thinkers of our time.
4. This theme is further development in *System og Symbol* [System and symbol] (1982:107), where Løgstrup asserts that "the spontaneous manifestation of life forbids all reasoning".

References

- Andersen, S (1993) *Som dig selv. En indføring i etik* [As unto you: An introduction to ethics]. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
- Kemp, P (1992) *Levinas*. Fredriksberg: Forlaget ANIS.
- Levinas, E *Collected Philosophical Papers*. London: Kluwer.
- Levinas, E (1985) *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press.
- Løgstrup, K E (1956) *Den etiske fordring* [The ethical demand]. København: Gyldendal.
- Løgstrup, K E (1972) *Norm og spontanitet* [Norms and spontaneity]. København: Gyldendal.
- Løgstrup, K E (1982) *System og symbol* [System and symbol]. København: Gyldendal.
- Løgstrup, K E (1987) *Solidaritet og Kærlighed og andre essays* [Solidarity and love and other essays]. København: Gyldendal.
- Nedregotten, B (1991) *Haier på desken og pirajaer i felten eller...* [Sharks in the newsroom and piranhas in the field, or...]. Hovedoppgave i massekommunikasjon og mediekunnskap, Universitetet i Bergen.
- Vetlesen, A & Nortvedt, P (1994) *Følelser og moral* [Emotions and morality]. Oslo: ad Notam Gyldendal.
- Aarnes, A (1994) *Den Annens ansikt* (The face of the Other), Vårt Land 10 januar.