Nordicom’s overriding goal and purpose is to make the media and communication research undertaken in the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – known, both throughout and far beyond our part of the world. Toward this end we use a variety of channels to reach researchers, students, decision-makers, media practitioners, journalists, information officers, teachers, and interested members of the general public.

Nordicom works to establish and strengthen links between the Nordic research community and colleagues in all parts of the world, both through information and by linking individual researchers, research groups and institutions.

Nordicom documents media trends in the Nordic countries. Our joint Nordic information service addresses users throughout our region, in Europe and further afield. The production of comparative media statistics forms the core of this service.

Nordicom has been commissioned by UNESCO and the Swedish Government to operate The Unesco International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen, whose aim it is to keep users around the world abreast of current research findings and insights in this area.

An institution of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordicom operates at both national and regional levels.

Journals, Books, Overviews
One of the prime purposes of Nordicom is to publicize Nordic research on journalism, media and communication. This is done on a continual basis through a variety of publications: journals, anthologies, overviews.

Nordicom-Information, a research journal in the Nordic languages, is published quarterly. (Subscriptions: SEK 200/year).

Nordicom Review, a research journal in English, is published twice annually.

Communication Contents. Current Contents of Mass Communication Journals lists the contents of some 60 international journals in the field of media and communication research. It is available via Internet.

The national Nordicom centres publish national newsletters and reports. Nordicom-Sweden publishes a series of book-length publications on themes such as popular culture, journalism, media rhetoric, women and the media, the meeting of different research traditions and perspectives and media effects.

Data Bases
NCOM is a bibliographic data base containing some 33,000 references (June 2002) from 1975 forward. Entries are books, chapters in books, journal articles, conference papers, academic research reports, etc.

NPROJ lists ongoing research projects in the field of media and communication research in the Nordic countries.

NINS is a database that lists research and educational institutions in the field of media and communication research in the Nordic countries.

Media Trends and Statistics
Recent years have seen far-reaching changes in Nordic media systems. Media scholars are continually consulted and asked to cast light on new and different phenomena.

Nordicom offers a Nordic information service covering media developments. A prime goal is the production of reliable comparative statistics.

Nordicom gathers and collates data on a variety of media in all the Nordic countries. These data are processed, analyzed and reported in a series entitled Nordic Media Trends.

Children and Media Violence
Nordicom has set up an international clearinghouse on children and violence on the screen. The Clearinghouse receives financial support from the Government of Sweden and UNESCO.

The Clearinghouse is to contribute to and effectively know on children, young people and media violence, seen in the perspective of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen informs various groups of users, researchers, policy-makers, media professionals, teachers, voluntary organizations and interested individuals, about:

- research on children, young people and media violence,
- children’s access to mass media and their media use,
- media literacy and children’s participation in the media, and
- regulatory and voluntary measures and activities in the area.

The Clearinghouse publishes a yearbook and a newsletter.

*   *   *

Nordicom on Internet:
http://www.nordicom.gu.se
# The 15th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research

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Foreword

The 15th Nordic Conference for Mass Communication Research was held on the 11th-13th August in Reykjavik, Iceland. Hosts of the meeting were the Icelandic media and communication researchers. More than 330 scholars from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden gathered to discuss current research and research findings. Some dozen colleagues from the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Russia, also attended.

As usual, the conference programme comprised working groups, plenary sessions and a number of social and cultural events. The unifying theme of this year’s conference was New Media, New Opportunities, New Communities, a question that particularly keynote speaker Professor Kirsten Drotner addressed in the first plenary session. The two other plenary sessions were dedicated to the themes New Generations – New Media, and Media History.

Working groups have been the meat of every Nordic conference to date, and the fifteenth conference was no exception. 170 papers were presented and discussed in 20 different working groups:

- Media and Global Culture
- The Structure and Economics of the Media
- Multimedia and Internet
- Local and Regional Media
- Media History
- Television: Institution, Production and Text
- Radio Research
- Political Communication
- Research in Journalism
- The Sociology and Aesthetics of News Reporting
- Reception and Audience Studies
- Children, Adolescents and the Media
- Media Education
- Popular Culture
- Fiction in Films and on Television
- Visual Culture
- The Language and Rhetoric of the Media
- Images of Gender in the Media
- Public Relations/Planned Communication
- Mediated Risk and Crisis Communication

A number of conference papers have been revised by their authors for publication in this special issue of Nordicom Review. The articles, which were selected with the advice of the working group chairmen, serve as indicators of the breadth and depth of inquiry in the field of media and mass communication research in the Nordic countries today. All addresses to the plenum are included here, as well.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank the authors for the time and effort they have put into making this anthology possible.
The Nordic conferences for media and communication research play an important role in the development of the research field in the Nordic countries. We hope that the contents of this anthology will also interest our colleagues abroad.

Göteborg in August 2002

Ulla Carlsson
Editor
Opening Address

President of Iceland
Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson

Ladies and Gentlemen

When we Icelanders began our struggle for independence some 150 years ago, we had no newspapers, no periodicals that regularly brought news – or even messages from our distant rulers – to the people. All we had was a simple, very simple, annual published by the Icelandic students in Copenhagen, who saw in the political developments in Europe of that day the chance that a small island-nation might be able to realize its right to self-determination.

The strength of the independence movement rested chiefly in the cohesion and solidarity of the Icelandic people, a consciousness of our common heritage and language, a feeling for the character of the nation that had its roots in the ancient sagas, put down in writing in the thirteenth century, and the settlements of the Vikings. But also the fact that our founding fathers and mothers were Vikings who left Norway to find better land and to be able to make their own decisions without the interference of any king who demanded their submission and allegiance.

Here in Iceland we often say, in jest more or less, that it was the most self-reliant and progressive Norwegians who decided to pull up stakes and leave their king to set off for Iceland. And on the way, they stopped off at the Faroes, where those who were too seasick to carry on were put ashore and left to their own devices. Our friends in the Faroes have their own version, of course: namely, that it was those wise enough not to sail on, who settled there.

It is our common heritage, our interlinked history embracing more than a thousand years, which has enabled the Nordic countries to establish in modern times wide-ranging cooperation that in many ways is unique when viewed from a global perspective.

Iceland shows us in this respect how a nation can at one and the same time be deeply conscious of ancient cultural traditions, profoundly affected by a strong sense of history and also one of the most connected hi-tech societies in the world with some of the highest levels of internet usage and personal computer and mobile phone ownership found anywhere on the globe.

The arrival of the new information technologies became so significant because they enhanced the opportunities already prevailing in a culture of communication
which has its roots in the settlement and the creation of the Althingi, the Icelandic Parliament, more than a thousand years ago, in the literary excellence of the sagas and the customs of storytelling, in the poems and verses which each generation gave to the next, and in the political traditions strengthened by the campaign for independence throughout the 19th century, and in modern times was given a broad presentation in the large number of newspapers, national, regional and local that have been published in Iceland for shorter or longer periods, and also in the numerous radio and television stations that dominate our society today.

It is indeed a challenging subject to study how a nation of 280,000 people, which until the year 1900 never exceeded 100,000, can find the resources, the manpower and the need to make such an extensive system of communications meaningful and relevant in both social and personal terms – especially when we bear in mind that over half of the 280,000 people we have here today are children and old-age pensioners, meaning that it is just over 100,000 people who are responsible for this extensive output of media material.

When we examine the nature and the effect of the new media, and study the new opportunities and analyse the creation of new communities, it is important not to forget that, despite the newness around us and the constant flow of innovations, we are still deeply moulded by history, by the cultural heritage, by the roots created by previous generations, by the identity which other eras, other ages made their legacy.

We can never escape the boundaries formed by our historical heritage nor can we avoid the philosophical and moral challenges involved in looking for the fundamental purpose of all this, of the media, new and old, of the available technologies, new and old, of the different communities, whether newly emerging or long established.

The evolution of our civilisation has been primarily judged by criteria inspired by democracy, human rights and the search for knowledge. We honour the philosophers and lawmakers of ancient Athens and Rome, and here in Iceland we still refer to the example provided by the establishment of the Althingi, the Icelandic Parliament at Thingvellir, more than a thousand years ago, which made the democratic rule of law the essence of the new community of settlers – and it is indeed striking that the populations of Athens, Rome and Iceland in these ancient times, when foundations were laid for our philosophical and democratic traditions, were similarly small. Perhaps that is a reminder for us today that unions of nations, creating a common market or common systems and measured in hundreds of millions of people, are not necessarily the best way to realise the lofty goals of human and social development.

Democracy, knowledge and human rights – these have been the cornerstones of the political system which the Nordic countries have proudly advanced and which in the 21st century seems to be the aspiration of nations all over the world.

These must also remain the criteria when we examine how the new media and new opportunities will affect our communities and how the new generations empowered with these new tools of communication will conduct their affairs.

How will democracy change? How will the political parties adapt? How will organisations dedicated to specific issues and pressure groups utilise the new opportunities to strengthen their influence? How will elections be affected? How will parliaments and the legislative process be transformed? How globalised will the impact be? How dominant will the market be in determining the relative influence
of different forms of participation? How will the free or cheap forms of expression created by the new technologies affect the powers of the established and financially strong media? How fragmented will society become? How will the individual be affected, the citizen, the voter, the activist – the thinking human being who in the tradition of western civilisation and democracy is supposed to be the cornerstone of our open society?

How will the youngest generation which now is using computer centres in its kindergartens become democratically active when, in twenty years time or so, it enters the political system with full force as the first generation in world history empowered to seek knowledge and establish allegiances entirely based on its own free will – unhindered by the boundaries of established associations or powerful institutions?

How can our scientific and scholarly endeavours help to predict the evolution of democracy in the 21st century or estimate how the transformation of the media and our social communications by these new technologies will affect the relationship between the individual and society and make the human rights we have inherited into a living experience of a more profoundly civilised world?

There will undoubtedly be great diversity in the answers given to these questions, and some participants will even claim that these issues are not even relevant at all. But Nordic scholars are above all fortunate in being at the same time citizens of the most open democratic societies in the world, the most highly interconnected communities in modern times, and also culturally empowered with a strong sense of history and tradition.

It is therefore highly appropriate that the 15:th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research should set itself the task to discuss some of these challenging issues and I hope that Iceland with its sense of ancient heritage and modern opportunities will serve as an inspiring location for your deliberations.

With these reflections it gives me great pleasure to declare the 15:e Nordic Conference on Media and Communication formally opened.
It is both pertinent and precise to have Iceland host a conference with the theme "new media, new options, new communities" which is also the daunting rubric under which I speak. For, as is well known Icelandic culture in many ways condenses processes of tradition and innovation. In terms of tradition, the sagas, of course, are the foundation of Norse mythology. And like Hollywood genre films and popular tv series, the sagas demonstrate a perfection of basic narrative conflicts and themes. So, the sagas also tackle essential aspects of the media, believe it or not. In saga times, runes, of course, were the primary media.

The god Odin, we are told, holds the power to chisel runes and control their uses. He acquires this power by sacrificing himself to himself, as it says: for nine days and nights he hangs, head down in a tree, without food or water, and thus he collects his strength inward and downward. Through this power he may decipher the runes so that he may quench fire, calm the sea and turn the wind as he pleases.

The myth addresses a fundamental aspect of media culture, namely the connection between print, knowledge and power, a connection that is still seminal to cultural discourses of contemporary societies. But, as we all know, the power of print has long been contested. And again, Iceland makes a good example in a Nordic context. For, in terms of innovation Iceland is one of the first of our Nordic countries to be heavily and continuously influenced by American popular music, television and film thanks to the military base at Keflavik. This complex constellation of old and new media, of transnational, or indeed global, and very local forms of mediated expression are the two main issues that I want to address in this opening lecture.

Big Brother: A Composite Format
As a preamble, allow me to take what some of you may deem an all too well-known example, namely Big Brother. The programme format was developed by the Dutch tv network Veronica in 1999 and soon overtaken by the network Endemol (four million out
of 15 million Dutch people saw final episode on 30th December 1999). The format has since been sold to most European countries and also to Argentine, Australia, South Africa and the USA. In all countries, it has been adapted to local cultural norms and production codes – with varying degrees of success.

In all these countries, *Big Brother* is developed as a composite media text that is constituted through an application of the entire range of media and ICTs: tv, the internet (official and unofficial love and hate sites), comments, interviews and rumours circulating in print media, on radio programmes and in other tv shows. Much of its content is used on several platforms – particular scenes, often the most juicy ones, are shown on tv (and with multiple repeats) and put on the internet. Moreover, producers seek to nurture audience loyalty and engagement through simple forms of interactivity via the phone-in popularity polls, just as they promote a transformation of at least some of the audience into a physical public in and outside the *Big-Brother* house/the studio location.

In many ways, *Big Brother* is an example of seminal trends in the emerging media culture. Few will dispute that media culture has become increasingly complex over the last two decades with the advent of a plethora of new media technologies and a concomitant reshuffling of media institutions, forms of expression and range of uses.

In such a complex field, it is by nature a hazardous experiment to attempt singling out empirical trends and theoretical issues of particular relevance. Yet, this is what I will attempt to do – and, as I hope to demonstrate, this endeavour to find what may be termed “unity in diversity” is one of the basic challenges facing media and ICT studies today and, by implication, tomorrow. Hence, my lecture is in itself a demonstration of the possibilities and pitfalls bestowed upon academics.

**What are the Seminal Trends that Big Brother Illustrates?**

First, we are witnessing a growing convergence of media technology and services, a gradual merging of our television and radio, our print media, computers and the internet. This is a process that serves to blur existing boundaries between what is often named new and old media. In tandem with convergence, we are witnessing a globalization of media distribution, formats and applications. This is a process that serves to question received notions of what we consider to be national media and local identities. Taken together, these processes enhance and enforce an intensified professional and practical preoccupation with media contents and with media uses. Based on these observations, I have two main contentions to make that are substantiated in the following:

- In empirical terms, media contents and uses offer dimensions of innovation that are as seminal to convergence and globalization as they are underresearched
- In theoretical and organisational terms, convergence and globalization are decisive catalysts in creating a media culture whose complexity is inversely proportional to our academic acumen: the more complex our media culture becomes, the less are we, as academics, currently prepared to meet the challenge of complexity.

**Convergence: Hits and Misses**

In recent years, most Nordic countries have published white papers on the prospects offered by convergence between media, telecommunication and ICTs (e.g. NOU 1999, SOU 1999, Nielsen & Weiss 2001). In these reports, convergence is defined in four ways:
A convergence of services: the same content is formed to suit several platforms – e.g. news may be distributed both via "ordinary" newspapers or radio slots and streamed via the internet.

A convergence of networks: the same platform may contain several types of content – e.g. telephone cables are used both for internet and telecommunication.

A convergence of terminals: terminals (e.g. computer, tv) are all multifunctional, although some are more feasible for certain types of services than others – e.g. we prefer to send mail or sms via our mobile phone rather than via our tv, while films are watched on the big tv or cinema screen rather than via the small display on the mobile phone.

A convergence of markets: we see transborder mergers and acquisitions between the media, telecommunications and ICT industries – e.g. the large-scale merger in 2000 between Time Warner and the internet provider AOL (America Online).

It is an issue of debate whether convergence is driven by technological innovation or by commercial market mergers (overview in Rolland 2001). But irrespective of the driving forces, the current debate and professional interest share a common top-down perspective focusing on technology and economy (Baldwin et al. 1996) At the same time there is a widely shared consensus that in the longer perspective, convergence will bring about developments that reach beyond such a perspective. These long-term developments include:

- A move towards content as providing perhaps the most important competitive element ("content is king"). Endemol’s copyright to Big Brother is a moneymaker far beyond the actual broadcasting of it in the Netherlands. Other examples are back lists of film archives and copyright on particular characters, all of which are primarily in the hands of "old" media producers in print media, film and tv.

- A move towards increasing differentiation, even divergence, of media uses, a differentiation that is routinely, but wrongly (Livingstone & Bovill 2001), conflated with increased individualisation as we get tv on demand, electronic programme guides to help scan, select and store our individual media menus.

- A blurring of boundaries between processes of production and processes reception, as virtually all types of media will facilitate varying degrees and forms of interactivity. If it was always a contentious division to make a clear distinction between passive reception of mass media and active interaction with computer media, then the development towards convergence will make such dichotomies untenable.

A simple comparison between immediate and long-term priorities in convergence discourses easily illustrate that in both a political, an industrial and a scientific sense, the black boxes of convergence are what may be termed a bottom-up perspective focusing upon the media content and form (what is to be carried on these many platforms and how?) and media uses (who will use what services? What competences are developed? And how will convergent mediation impact on the experience of communication?).
Globalization: Hits and Misses

Studies of mediated globalization share a similar top-down perspective as we see in studies of convergence, and, I would contend, harbour a similar need to intensify their interest in bottom-up perspectives on content and form and particularly on diversity of uses.

It is commonly agreed that today media are constitutive to cultural globalization: the accelerated global flows of signs and cultural commodities by communication technologies serve to increase what John Tomlinson calls “complex connectivity” (Tomlinson 1999: 2) – that is, global, or transnational, media accentuate the interconnectedness of distinct cultures and modes of existence. Even so, within media studies a top-down perspective on globalization prevails, a perspective that focuses upon the economic, technological, political and legal aspects of this complex connectivity. This focus is both aided and abetted by Giddens’ much-tooted, and very generalised, definition of globalization as implying “time-space distanciation” and “time-space compression” (Giddens 1990, see also Williams 1975/1990: 14-21, Harvey 1989).

In theoretical terms, a bottom-up perspective on processes of globalization, focusing on contents and uses, may serve to substantiate and nuance the often very generalised top-down theories about cultural globalization, theories that also tend to be formulated as dichotomies (either more homogenisation, or more heterogenization), overstating or understating the breadth and depth of globalization.

In empirical terms, we need comparative studies on media globalization that go beyond comparisons of single genres (especially news) or of particular media (especially tv) (e.g. Jensen 1998, Buonanno 1998, 1999, Agger 2001). Moreover, because globalization is so intimately bound up with processes of convergence where specific applications, formats and figures may traverse several media and forms of expression we need to make comparative studies that traverse geographical and temporal boundaries as well as encompassing a range of genres and media.

Pitfalls and Possibilities of Comparative Research

In order to illustrate both the possibilities and possible pitfalls of such a bottom-up perspective informed by the combined developments of convergence and globalization, let me briefly highlight some main results from a major study along these lines (European Journal of Communication 1998, Reseaux 1999, Livingstone & Bovill, 2001, Drotner 2001a). It is the first theory-driven empirical study of the emerging media landscape in Europe as seen from a bottom-up perspective (children aged 6-16). 12 countries were involved, the interactions between uses of new and old media were studied, and both domestic and public domains were included (fig. 1).

Throughout, our analytical focus has been to chart similarities and commonalities across national and regional boundaries as well as across the entire media landscape. Based on data from the survey database of the study, one may draw a map of ”media Europe” as it emerges when including all major media (fig. 2).

Issues of Convergence and Globalization

Seen from a media perspective, the focus in the study on all major media and their interrelations allow us to address issues of convergence – when media and genres interact. What we find is that access does not equal use. The closest fit between the two are seen with tv and music while the greatest gap between access and use is seen with the
internet and the computer. For example, in Denmark of the 6-16-year-olds with internet access at home only 44% make use of this option (Drotner 2001a).

Seen from a user perspective, what stands out is that most European children apply a variety of media, they are not a computer generation or a net generation – in the words of American Don Tapscott an ”n-gen” (Tapscott 1998: 3). In terms of time use, tv is still the primary medium, it has a close fit between access and use, as noted, and as such tv may be termed the most democratic medium. New media are integrated into an already pretty...
full media menu. Young users already tackle the beginnings of convergence through their mundane day-to-day combinations of and interactions with a multimedia environment of new and old media, an environment in which choices and combinations are made on the basis of social and textual relevance, not the media applied.

Turning from issues of convergence to issues of globalization, the study demonstrates that through the juxtaposition of cultural difference, global media constantly evoke for users what Giddens describes as "absent others" (Giddens 1990: 18-21). At a very basic level, media globalization both enforces and facilitates our encounters with symbolic expressions of otherness. In so doing, media globalization serves to accentuate users’ recognition of and reflection on local differences precisely because it is identified in relation to an understanding of the world as a "single place" (cp. Robertson 1992: 6). Through these encounters, media globalization is a catalyst for highlighting a central aspect of all sensemaking processes, namely our intuitive and continuous comparisons between what we know and what we learn, our mundane negotiations between the familiar and the foreign (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Johnson 1987).

Informants in our study, generally recognise and remark on visual signs of difference (e.g. different street signs, decor and dress, labels on food cans). But one thing is that children recognise traits of difference, another matter is what they make of these traits. Our results demonstrate that European children do not necessarily consider that domestic media products belong to the domain of the known while foreign media products belong to domains of the unknown.

For many youngsters, hugely popular tv series such as *Ally McBeal* or *Friends*, may be readily incorporated into a known everyday world: their genre concepts are so conventional as to be perceived as generic. And their conflicts are immediately recognisable. What Ien Ang has termed the emotional realism of soaps (Ang 1985) makes the seemingly exotic world of Australian beaches and American suburbs into a domestic norm. Conversely, domestically produced narratives demonstrating unusual formal traits or focusing upon characters and narrative modes not normally depicted in the media may seem more outlandish and strange to young audiences than a soap opera produced abroad.

Results such as these should caution against making simple analogies between domestic culture as a homogeneous and known domain of experience that may be neatly contrasted to foreign culture as an equally homogeneous unknown whose exoticism is defined and delimited through its complete difference from the domestic. The comparative, European study shows that mediated globalization may be as much about exoticising the seemingly well-known as about acculturation to the seemingly foreign.

So far, theories of otherness in media and cultural studies have focused primarily upon what is termed diaspora cultures, that is distinct, immigrant cultures and their symbolic and material collisions and collusions of the cultures they encounter. In the words of British media ethnographer Marie Gillespie these encounters of subaltern cultures nurture “the strategy of familiarising one’s ‘otherness’ in terms of other ‘others’” (Gillespie 1995: 5). The results of the European comparative study endorses such strategies. But it equally highlights the necessity to complement the notion of diaspora with conceptualisations of what, for want of a better term, I will call *mundane othernesses*, that is the often imperceptible processes of negotiating signs of otherness within seemingly homogeneous cultures.

In general, children, like many adults, favour fiction over fact. This has implications for users’ associations of media globalization. Remembering that tv is the dominant
medium in terms of time use, let us take a closer look on the origins of informants’ favourite tv programs (fig. 3):

**Figure 3.** Origin of 6-16-Year-Old Europeans’ Favourite Tv Programmes (per cent)

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In Denmark, Finland, Israel and Switzerland a solid majority of informants prefer tv programmes of foreign origin. These are all small countries and two of them – Israel and Switzerland – comprise quite separate language communities. And in small countries it is difficult to allow for, or prioritize, a varied domestic output of programs that appeal to the young of various ages and both genders. Unlike popular discourses of users’ "dumbing down" (to Hollywood), the European study demonstrates that young informants prefer foreign fiction, not because it is foreign, but because it appeals in style and content.

Foreign fiction is also commercial fiction. Conversely, factual genres such as news and documentaries are still a mainstay of national, public-service media. Thus, young European media users tend to develop a chain of associations in which the concept of media globalization is linked to fiction, which is fun, entertainment, while the concept of public-service media is linked to the nation – boring, but necessary facts. Naturally, such trains of association have wide-ranging policy implications that I will merely point to on this occasion (see e.g. Drotner 2001b).

While popular globalization discourses on old media such as tv often focus upon fears of Americanization, similar discourses on new media routinely focus on fears of identity fragmentation, of losing touch with real life in a maze of virtual realities (e.g. Turkle 1995). In theoretical terms, such distinction between offline and online existences are often based on an untenable distinction between direct, unmediated experience of situated experience vs symbolically mediated experience. We may heed Manuel Castells remark here that "all realities are communicated through symbols (...) In a sense, all reality is virtually perceived" (Catells 1996: 373). In empirical terms, the European study documents that identity play is mainly a question of netiquette, of not giving away one’s real name, age (and telephone number); it is a conventional part of flirting on URLs where it is applied as a strategy to control intimacy; and it is integral to role playing. But
when it comes to contents, what children chat about, what they relate to and engage in, virtual and real identities are one and the same.

The ubiquitous presence of global and increasingly convergent media in everyday life does not imply a dissolution or radical upheaval of social relations. Rather, two other interesting trends stand out: one is that media are catalysts in the formation of social networks and interaction. In Denmark, for example, media account for 40% of youngsters’ (9-16 years old) interaction with friends: videos top the list closely followed by computer games (Drotner 2001a: 164). The other trend is that, in the Nordic countries, the contexts of media use tend to bifurcate: they become at once more individualised and more ritualised. During weekdays, media use is often an individual pastime (this is particularly true for children who have a tv set in their room). And during weekends, media are pivots of social encounters and engagements.

The Future of Media Studies
Media research, by being defined through its object of study, has always found itself at the crossroads of several disciplines and traditions of research. At times and depending on local traditions, only few streets have seemed safe, while at other times and in different locales, byroads and sidetracks have seemed plentiful. As the international academic communities face the joint challenges of media convergence and globalization, few doubt that we need theories, concept-building and empirical studies geared towards analysing and seeking to understand developments of increasing complexity. To meet these needs, we do not merely have to form interdisciplinary research, since this was always an option. But, as I will argue, we face a challenge of practicing interdisciplinary research in qualitatively different ways.

From Interdisciplinary to Integrative Research
In the international scientific community of the 1980s and 1990s, there was much debate on the possible fusion of social-science and arts perspectives, on the relative benefits of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and on top-down and bottom-up epistemologies. I would wish on this occasion to remember the late Kjell Nowak, professor of communication and media studies at Stockholm University. At an intervention at Nordicom’s anniversary conference in Trondheim in 1993 Nowak stressed the need for an intensified interaction between the arts and social-science traditions in media studies; and in his own research and professional work, not least with students and young scholars, he, himself, epitomised that endeavour. But in Trondheim Nowak also had foresight enough to project that in times ”when crowding magnify around the fleshpots” as he said (Nowak 1994: 41), that dialogue would remain superficial and short-lived. Others, including myself, have argued for a caleidoscopic or dialogic research perspective in media studies – open to different views – as a way to retain and develop scientific diversity and nurture scientific milieus that are enabling for young scholars (e.g. Ganetz 1994, Drotner 2000).

These are laudable aims, and some interdisciplinary research centres over the years have succeeded in turning aims into exciting, scientific practices. But the lofty aims are rarely attained under the day-to-day pressures and nitty-gritty work conditions most of us live with and help shape. Under these conditions, scientific interaction between traditions and paradigms all too easily materialises as what may be termed additive science: I do my thing, you do yours, and scientific consensus is maintained through processes
of non-interference, willed neglect or simple oblivion. The easy answer in the face of increasing theoretical and empirical complexity is relativism and retrenchment.

Today the debates on a scientific fusion between different disciplines within media studies are overshadowed by a more radical challenge. This challenge is often conceived as the challenge posed by the ICTs – the information and communications technologies (see e.g. Rogers 1986). As I see it, the fundamental challenge that we face today are not the ICTs as such. Rather it is the convergence between traditional mass media and more or less interactive ICT’s, between new and old media. The empirical moves towards convergence (and the concomitant developments of divergences, as witnessed by the examples from the European study) calls not only for a quantitative extension of the issues to be considered (media and ICTs), nor for a mere extension of interdisciplinary research as it is. What we need is a shift in the order of magnitude: increasing empirical complexity should be matched by increasing acumen in the academic community to tackle this complexity.

More specifically, we need to develop what I will call a convergent media research. Let me list what could be some of its important ramifications: it is certainly more than mere additive research (I do my thing, you do yours, and at best we meet in neutral talks over coffee). It is also more than interdisciplinary dialogue at intermittent research seminars whose discussions have no repercussions on members’ continous concept-building or day-to-day research activities. Conversely, it is less than attempts at forming a master discourse, or a single canon, where only one truth holds sway. That strategy, as most of us know, is as excellent for power-building as it is poor for innovative science.

Between the extremes of relativism and essentialism, a more promising route may be opened by considering Wittgenstein’s notion that coherence in conceptual use need not be due to a unitary essence, but can come about through semantic overlap between one usage and the next. Wittgenstein called a semantic structure of this type ‘family resemblance’ (see Welsch 1997), and, perhaps somewhat dauntingly, one may speak of conceptual convergence. What I suggest, then, is that complex concepts are developed and defined through a continuous process of defining overlapping uses – it is crucial to clarify when overlaps are found and applied.

In reference to Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, or conceptual convergence, one may define the challenges facing current and, indeed, future media science, as the challenges to enhance our efforts at defining and developing such joint sets of discursive convergencies.

**Ramifications of a Convergent Media Studies**

What, then, does convergent media studies imply? First and foremost, it implies a fusion of “old” and “new” media research, or media and ICT studies. ICT-studies have traditionally focused upon the computer as a specific medium (or, a meta-medium, cp. Kay 1999) and studied screen-based human-computer interaction within often rather specific contexts of use. This approach is clearly challenged by ubiquitous and mobile media and ICTs. Similarly, media studies have traditionally focused upon investigating single mass media or single genres and have done so by applying either a material or symbolic perspective (Williams 1975/1990, Carey 1989/1992). Such approaches are clearly challenged by intermedia crossovers, by media that focus upon point-to-point communication and by media that allow various degrees of interactivity turning receivers into (potential) producers.
For both ICT studies and media studies, the move towards convergence, the immediacy of media globalization and the mobility of communication together demand new ways of approaching the temporal and spatial dimensions of communication.

Methodological Challenges: Processual Approaches

Centrally, a convergent media and ICT research implies an integration of deductive approaches and methodologies, traditionally nurtured by the natural and parts of the social sciences, and inductive approaches and methodologies, traditionally favoured by the humanities and (other) parts of the social sciences. Concepts may be developed inductively from case studies, but cases are also part of larger patterns that it needs deduction to perceive and explain. An integration of deductive and inductive approaches is more than a methodological integration, it also and just as importantly, involves healing very basic theoretical and, indeed, epistemological divergences between ideographic and nomothetical perspectives that it would be unwise to overlook.

More specifically, the increase in online and mobile forms of communication necessitates an intensified focus upon the development of what may be termed more "processual methodologies". These methodologies allow us to study often ephemeral forms of communication as they evolve – e.g. the intricate interplay between different discourse levels or "universes" in chat communication, or the exchanges made between physical and virtual interlocutors in mobile phone communication. It is evident that, in a methodological sense, ICT and media scholars may draw on the long tradition established within ethnography in studying processes rather than structures (Hine 2000, Mann & Stewart 2000).

Organizational Challenges: Beyond Professional Boundaries

Last but by no means least, the Challenges brought about by the complexities of convergence, make it important that we reach beyond professional boundaries both within the academe and between academic and more applied forms of research. Drawing on an analogy from biology where one speaks about biological diversity as a resource for survival, one may speak of the necessity of professional diversity as a resource, if not for survival, then at least for our continued ability to make proactive research by which we may not only sustain the development of a convergent media culture but through which we may also retain impartial study and critique as a necessary base to make political, educational and aesthetic distinctions and informed choices.

More specifically, professional diversity involves intensified cooperation between scholars from the arts (including history, design, linguistics, literary studies), the social sciences (including anthropology and economy) and the natural sciences (including soft engineering and interaction design). All of these hold decisive stakes in the development of media convergence but none of them hold the key to a full understanding of its implications. In order for such a cooperation to succeed, a lot of bridge-building is needed. Drawing on my own recent experiences at the University of Southern Denmark of creating a new centre of convergent media studies, I can testify that it takes time, interest and energy from all parties involved – from the technical and administrative staff to teachers, students and university directors – to move beyond established administrative, intellectual and practical cultures.

Based partly on these experiences, let me just list a few of the organizational "pillars" that we need to establish and strengthen. In immediate terms, there are already good
examples of successful cooperation between academics and media and ICT partners, but so far, with a bias towards either a technical, a social or, less often, a cultural/symbolic perspective and with rather few examples of an integration of the ICT and media perspectives in continuous forms of theoretical and empirical cooperation. Here, we need more longterm projects and partnerships that integrate the ICT and media perspectives and do so by involving researchers and developers from a diversity of professional backgrounds. Allow me to stress that successful cooperation need not be a question of size. Also very small groups, even individual scholars with a solid research network, may develop convergent research. It is the nature of the scientific object at hand that should guide our organizational frameworks, not the other way round.

In the longer term, new forms of training are needed in universities, colleges and high-schools in which the technical, symbolic and social dimensions of communication and ICT are integrated, and such a development involves new forms of cooperation between faculties that today often stand divided within the academic community in an attempt to gain critical advantages in an increasingly competitive academic culture. In my own experience and counter-intuitively, convergent curriculum development is a more profound challenge to the scholars involved than is convergent research, because it involves questioning the very basis of established paradigms and discipline traditions: which professional skills and competencies do we really think students need to navigate successfully in tomorrow’s media culture? To answer questions such as these strike at the core of every discipline and hence demands more openness and reflexive dialogue in the formation of new platforms.

**Beyond Big Brother in the Academe**

By way of conclusion, I would like to make the conjection that, given our objects of research, media and ICT scholars will never want new challenges and new chances. I would also like to express the wish that we may be able to meet these challenges and chances so as to facilitate the formation of new options and communities such as the title of this conference suggests.

As we all know, the programme *Big Brother* has its name from George Orwell’s novel *1984* in which all inhabitants are surveyed electronically by “big brother”. Luckily, such a panoptic perspective is neither feasible nor possible as a research perspective on our complex media culture in the years to come. A modest step towards forming professional options and communities, I would suggest, is for us to generate theoretical and methodological tools so that we may teach our students why is is possible today to form a global concept such as *Big Brother* without holding the stakes to fulfill the original implications of the title.

**References**


NOU (1999) Konvergens: sammensmelting av tele-, data- og mediesektorene. See odin.dep.no/sd/


Why another study? Indeed, why a study about studies? Any why now?

Because of questions like these, the Markle Foundation set out to discover how much we grown-ups really know about growing-up digital. And the startling answer from experts in the field is: very little. In fact, there are far more questions than there are answers about what computer and video games and Internet use mean to the social, intellectual and physical development of children today. As a result, we risk losing an extraordinary opportunity to help shape a robust environment that rewards editorial quality and educational value – an environment in which new media producers can thrive by understanding children as more than just a commercial market.

We all share a powerful interest in finding out more: Children’s content developers who could learn more about how to create engaging, educational interactive experiences; parents who could learn more about what media products might be helpful or even harmful to their children; policymakers and advocates who could build future policies on a firm foundation of empirical knowledge; and finally, researchers themselves, who might learn a great deal more by bringing together across academic disciplines work that often goes forward on autonomous tracks.

In a 200 page review, my colleagues and I examine the extant literature in a discussion of existing research on children and interactive media.

The report focuses on how children use emerging communications media – video games, CD-ROMs, the Internet and other computer software – outside the classroom, in their homes. It is organized into four sections: (1) interactive media use and access; and its impact on children’s (2) cognitive development, (3) social development, and (4) health and safety. Finally, we have a series of questions and proposals rooted in the understanding that the medium alone is not the message; that creative ideas and human values will ultimately determine whether communications technologies fulfill their enormous potential to educate, inform and inspire.

I want to recognize my colleague for their contribution to this review. Barbara O’Keefe from Northwestern University and Ronda Scantlin from the University of Pennsylvania and I worked diligently to produce this review which I will attempt to summarize this morning.

I can’t review it all here, but here are some tidbits.
Today we are in the middle of a new revolution in both technology and culture; a revolution in which our children are often in the vanguard. For they are the first generation that is truly “growing up digital.” In 2000, among American households with children ages 2-17, 70% have computers and 52% are connected to the Internet (Woodard and Gridina, 2000).

The typical American child lives in a household with 3 television sets, 2 VCRs, 3 radios, 3 tape players, 2 CD players, a video game player, and a computer (Kaiser Study, 1999).

Of course, interactive media for young people is not entirely new. Video games were introduced more than two decades ago – digital content explosion (huge growth and technological sophistication) In recent years – home computing more affordable, expansion of Internet and high-speed connections, etc. – lead to increased value and use of interactive media.

Concerned parents, teachers, content producers, child advocates and policy-makers want to understand much more about how such a pervasive experience can contribute to – or at very least, not detract from – our children’s intellectual, social and physical development. We sense that, because of their unique properties, well designed interactive media have an extraordinary potential to not only help young people learn, but also engender a true love of learning. At the same time, our experience with television suggests that digital content may also have potential to affect children’s social and intellectual development in far less desirable ways.

But are our assumptions borne out by the facts? What kind of evidence do we already have about the power of digital media to influence children’s health and well being? What sort of new research do we need to better understand the role of these media in children’s lives? And how can we as researchers, media producers, policy-makers and parents better shape that role from knowing the answers?

Figure 1. Average Daily Minutes Children Spent with Media by Age

* Differences significant at the p<.05 level.

Children who are heavier television viewers are heavier media users overall. Children who spend more than two hours watching television daily also spend significantly more time watching videotapes, playing video games, and talking on the telephone. There are no statistically significant differences in time spent using the computer, browsing the Internet, reading books or periodicals by the amount of time the child spent with television.

Media use varied among children of different ages. There are statistically significant differences in media use across all of the media except television viewing. Preschoolers spend the most time watching videotapes, elementary school age children spend the most time reading books, and adolescents spend the most time using the Internet, playing video games, talking on the telephone, reading periodicals, and generally using the computer.

(Directly quoted from Media in the Home 2000 – Annenberg Study)

Figure 2. Average Daily Minutes Children Spent with Media by Gender

* Differences significant at the p<.05 level.


The gender of the child corresponds with the use of several media. Boys spend more time watching television and playing video games while girls spend significantly more time reading books and talking on the telephone. There are no significant gender differences in Internet or computer use.

(Directly quoted from Media in the Home 2000 – Annenberg Study)

**Interactive Media Use and Access**

Researchers have found that playing games is the most common way young people of all ages 2–18 use computers.

Boys reported significantly more time commitment than girls in playing computer and video games. Wright et al. (in press) found boys spent significantly more time per week playing sports games than girls (boys = 62.43 min; girls = 7.54 min).
Boys generally preferring sports, action adventure and violent action games; while girls generally prefer educational, puzzle, spatial relation and fantasy-adventure games. What’s more a March 2000 survey by the National School Boards Foundation (NSBF) found that boys & girls are equally involved in using the Internet, albeit in different ways. Girls were more likely to use the Internet for education, schoolwork, e-mail, & chat rooms, while boys were more likely to use the Internet for entertainment & games.

However, research indicates that interactive gaming decreases with age, from 5.6 hours per week to 2.5 hours per week from fourth to eighth-grade for girls, and from 9.4 hours per week to 5 hours per week for boys at the same grade levels (Buchman and Funk, 1996).

Preference for educational games also decreased as a function of age for both girls and boys. Younger children were more likely to prefer educational games than older children (Buchman and Funk, 1996). This preference for educational games decreased as a function of age for both girls and boys alike.

But there are several gaps in our knowledge about age and new media use. For example, there is little research exploring variations in interactive media use among children of different ethnic groups and among children less than eight years old. We are especially limited in our understanding of how and why children use networked services from their homes.

Figure 3. Percentage of Home Computers and Internet Penetration by Income

![Graph showing percentage of home computers and internet penetration by income.](image.png)


Not every American family and child has access to computers, the Internet and interactive media. Persistent differences across socio-economic and ethnic lines have rightly generated an important public policy debate about possible implications and solutions to this inequality.

Stanger and Jamieson (1998) reported 32.5% of families with annual household incomes below $30,000 reported owning a home computer, while 61% of those between $30,000 and $50,000, 73.8% between $50,000 and $75,000, and 88.1% above $75,000
reported home computer ownership. Online access for families in each income level was 12.9%, 24.6%, 39.9%, and 61.1%, respectively (Stanger & Jamieson, 1998).

**Figure 4. Percentage of Home Computers and Internet Penetration by Ethnicity**

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<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Computer penetration</th>
<th>Internet access</th>
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<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
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*Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (1999).*

Furthermore, Seventy-eight percent (78%) of White youth came from homes with at least one computer, which is considerably more than African American (55%) or Hispanic (48%) youth (Roberts et al., 1999).

But the most recent research suggests that access to computers and the Internet is rapidly spreading in the United States and that closing the “digital divide” will depend less on technology and more on providing the skills and content that are most beneficial.

For example, video game consoles and software, which are less expensive than computer systems, are widely spread across all socio-economic levels. In fact, ownership of video game equipment was more common in lower-income households than in higher-income households. Unfortunately, even though similar entertainment content is available for both computer and video gaming systems, the vast majority of educational software is available only for those who have access to a computer or perhaps a net appliance.

Research indicates that children who own or have access to home computers demonstrate more positive attitudes toward computers, show more enthusiasm, and report more self-confidence and ease when using computers than those who do not have a computer in the home.

Furthermore, Hoffman and Novak (1999) report that individuals who own a home computer are much more likely than others to use the Web.

However, ownership does not mean effective use, and it may be a lack of knowledge and experience that are the real barriers to using computers.

We need to know whether and how children may be affected by living on the wrong side of the “digital tracks.” Our specific concern focuses less on the details of a “digital
divide” and more on what children learn from the interactive content they do experience— that is, on how the marriage of content and the use of technology affects children.

Much of the research on children’s use of media has focused on the uses of particular media (e.g., books, television, computers, Internet) and not on the whole media environment. The literature on print literacy has virtually no overlap with the literature on children and television, and these in turn have little connection with literature on children and computers. While this may have been a useful simplifying strategy in the past, it appears increasingly less useful in an age of media convergence, when children are surrounded by an increasingly seamless web of multiple media experiences.

Future research needs to study not just the level of media use, but specific media content and its various platforms. For instance, rather than just studying children’s use of the Internet, we should consider the genre of the content involved, the kind of interaction it provides; whether it uses audio, text, or audiovisual messages; and whether the user is involved in networked activities and how children use these experiences in their social lives.

Overarching Theoretical Approach

The core concern of research on children’s exposure to, and use of, media has been with the effects of media on their learning and social development, in short, with the role of media in socialization. Socialization is the process of acquiring roles and the knowledge and skills needed to enact them. One important framework for understanding the role of media in socialization is grounded in thinking about the nature of language socialization (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986), the nature of education and learning (Pea, 1994), mind, self, and society (Mead, 1934), cognitive development (Piaget, 1964), social cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1962) and dialogue (Bakhtin, 1990).

Within a media socialization perspective, the core socializing process is dialogue. Dialogue, an interchange with a human or mediated interlocutor, creates a structure for children to articulate and organize their emerging understandings as well as build on what others communicate to them (Wartella, et al., 2000). Dialogue is a relational idea, referring to the ways in which attention and mental activity are engaged and structured by the presence and presentations of others.

Theories of dialogue, especially the work of Bakhtin (1990) and Goffman (1981), provide a framework within which to understand the role of communication and social interaction in learning. In their work, two concepts are critical to a theory of dialogue: interaction and identity.

Dialogue is an activity involving at least two agents, and it is carried out through a process of interaction (Jonassen, 1988). In its simplest form, interaction is an exchange of actions or ideas that build on previous exchanges (Rafaeli, 1988). A medium is interactive, then, when it creates the possibility of dialogue, i.e., gesture and response.

We can define the quality of interactivity in media as their ability to sustain a rich conversation of gestures. In this sense, interactivity is a function of the range/multimodality of display possibilities, the nature of response options (and especially the degree of synchronous responding that is possible), and the ability to sustain a chain of interaction. Following Wartella et al. (2000), Wartella and Jennings (2000) and Sims (1997), we hypothesize that interactivity fosters children’s engagement with content and consequent learning due to: (1) control over the learning environment (the degree to which
children’s actions make things happen); (2) responsiveness (contingent replies to children’s actions); (3) production values (system performance, aesthetic qualities, and video and audio quality); and (4) personal involvement with the content (motivational elements that inspire children to participate in certain activities).

Identity refers to the social self, as constituted and negotiated within particular activities and contexts. It incorporates and builds on an understanding of personhood and agency and guides not only the ways in which people organize their actions but also the ways in which they interpret the actions of others, including non-human others (e.g., Reeves and Nass, 1996).

There has been a good deal of attention already to the ways in which children and adolescents explore their sense of self via online interaction with others. Examples include Turkle’s (1995) research on adolescent’s adoption of characters in MUD’s (multi-user role-playing games) and Gross, Juvoen, and Gable’s (in press) study of the use of email and Instant Messaging to build identities and relationships with peers. Our surveys of children’s use of online technologies for communication with significant others will contribute systematic, empirical data to help us understand how media contribute to a child’s emerging sense of self and relationship.

However, what remains to be explored is how children develop and use a sense of their own agency and the agency of others to frame their experiences with interactive media. This is a more fundamental question about the ways in which the presentation of content shapes its acquisition and impact. In particular, we need to know whether there are differences in the way information is received from or given to different kinds of dialogue partners, including real people, fictional characters, computers, and intelligent computer agents.

**Cognitive Development**

We have long understood that children learn and grow, socially, intellectually and even physically from playing games. They also learn skills, information and behavior from their parents, siblings and peers; from television, music, movies and comic books. But how much do we understand about whether the introduction of interactive media into the equation affects how and what children are learning? Is the very interactivity of newer technology a distinction that makes a real difference in what children learn? In simple terms, does playing collaborative learning games make children more likely to act collaboratively? Or playing violent video games make children more likely to act violently?

And as prior media research has shown, it is not the medium itself that affects children’s perceptions, attitudes, or awareness. It all depends on the specific kinds of content with which they carry out specific kinds of activities, under specific kinds of external or internal conditions for specific kinds of goals.

For example, in research on what children learn from playing video games, skill gained in learning to play a video game generalized to very closely related visual and spatial reasoning tasks (Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, 1996; Okagaki & Frensch, 1996) but not to less closely related tasks (Greenfield, Brannon, & Lohr, 1996).

In order to understand the impact of interactive media, researchers will have to focus on the details of that interactivity, on whether and how it allows children to engage the content in a truly responsive way.
Findings

We know that in a traditional “analog” environment, interactivity in the form of collaboration is a proven learning strategy. Studies have shown, for example, that children’s communication with peers about how to solve a science problem can improve science learning. Others demonstrate that stimulating collaboration in young children’s storytelling play lead to improved writing skills. In another study examining collaborative learning in 4th grade children using an educational software program showed that pairs of children who could play together got more right answers than the pairs who had to play against one another (Strommen, 1993). Other findings provide encouraging evidence that informal, collaborative experiences with quality educational software can help develop skills that are not only content-specific, but that can also be transferred to new situations.

In general, research suggests that where interactive video games have been designed to teach certain skills, they can be highly effective learning tools. But there has not been enough research on games that are already in the marketplace to determine what their effect is on other cognitive skills. And until there is more research, we simply don’t know enough to say whether children’s access to and use of computers at home significantly influences their achievement in school. While early studies have suggested that home computer access may be associated with higher test scores, a variety of other factors in the home and family environment could also be relevant.

In relation to academic achievement, home computer use & the ways in which computers are used can be attributed to several forms of social inequality beyond access (gender, SES, & ethnicity) which may subsequently influence the educational benefits derived from home computing.

One possible explanation for these findings is the level of parental involvement in children’s computing activities. Children who engage in beneficial computing activities have parents who interact with them or communicate about those computing activities.

Given the fact that the primary reason cited by parents for purchasing a home computer and connecting to the Internet is education, we have very little research to document whether using interactive media at home actually contributes to achievement at school.

Social Development

A decade before the first digital computer was conceived, Margaret Mead pointed out that playing games provides a critical opportunity for children to acquire the distinctive perspectives of social identities and voices. And more recent research has shown that children’s fantasy play – like having an “imaginary friend” – can be a productive strategy in their own social development.

Some researchers suggest that online interaction through chat rooms and game-playing can have a similar function, allowing young people to take on identities they wish to explore and even helping them deal with difficult issues in their “real” lives. Conversely, some young people may use these media to “act out” in hostile or unhelpful ways both online and off. While a few studies have examined the formation of online personal relationships and their ability to satisfy social needs of adults, we know much less about the nature of those relationships, particularly for children and teenagers.

Online communications lack many of the characteristics of traditional relationships such as geographic proximity and physical appearance, cues about group membership and the broader social context. But the very absence of some of these qualities in online
communication may have great advantages, especially for children and teens. The emphasis on shared interests rather than social or physical characteristics can be empowering for all people, and especially for members of disadvantaged social groups, those who may be geographically isolated, or physically disabled. One extraordinary example of this is the Junior Summit, an online community of children from 139 different countries.

Can the Internet enable awkward teens to find social niches that might otherwise elude them in their real world? Or may it lead them to withdraw and become isolated? (Certainly, parents also have legitimate safety concerns about child predators who seek to have socially inappropriate interactions with children both online and off.) In short, we have much more to learn about consequences – both positive and negative – of networked relationships and communities for children’s healthy social development.

Interactive environments, particularly networked technologies can have a positive influence on social behaviors and intellectual development. There has, for example, been a popular – but still understudied – boom in communities of young media users who create their own web pages. Such personal online publishing offers a sophisticated way for young people to connect with their peers and others interested in the same topics. And many are seizing that opportunity with enthusiasm and creativity.

But the use of interactive technologies is not necessarily an isolating event for young people. For many, it has become an important social activity. Recent research with children and families suggests that rather than being isolating, the Internet helps connect children (and parents) to others.

36% of the adolescents who played video games reported playing them with peers or siblings (KFF, 1999).

Interactional skills, verbal facility, social identity formation, and group adjustment (particularly for the boys) were all positively associated with computer activity (Orleans & Laney, 2000).

History of concern about violence and media, but does the interactive, repetitive nature of electronic games have a different role than traditional media?

First, identification with aggressive characters, particularly in games that allow children to not only choose their character but also select particular traits. Second, game players are active participants whose own behaviors lead to success or failure. Third, children receive constant reinforcement of aggressive choices by acting them out, and then being rewarded (with points, sound effects and access to new game levels) for doing so.

Theoretically, these qualities should increase the power of interactive games to teach and reinforce aggressive behavior. But there is only recent and very limited empirical evidence to substantiate this claim.

Short-Term Impact of Violent Video Game Play

1) children from 4–10 years old’s – research suggests that playing violent video games encourages relatively immediate increases in aggressive behavior, attitudes and thoughts

2) One recent study examined the effect on 3rd and 4th grader’s after playing a violent video game (Mortal Kombat II) or non-violent one (NBA Jam:TE). Steps were taken to “rig” the Mortal Kombat II game so that the young subjects would not experience its graphic violence in full; for example, no mutilation moves or spurting blood. Even
relatively brief exposure to this “tamed-down” version of the game elicited aggressive responses by the children

**Long-Term Impact (very little evidence)**

There has been little systematic research on the long-term influences of interactive game play, and especially limited attention given to young children. Need for more research

**Ratings:**

**ESRB:** Started in 1994, the U.S. Congress required the computer and video game industries to develop some type of parental advisory label to be placed on game packaging. Entertainment Software Rating Board labeled game content based on five age-based categories: Early Childhood (EC), Everyone (E or K-A), Teen (T), Mature (M), and Adults Only (AO). There may also be specific content descriptors like mild animated violence, realistic violence, mild language, and suggestive themes.

**RSAC:** Recreational Software Advisory Committee, now reconceived as the Internet Content Rating Association, derived from manufacturers’ responses to a series of questions about violence, nudity, sex, and offensive language. Classification icons on game packaging or in advertisements appear as thermometers with four “temperature” readings. The temperature readings represent the level of intensity for these four behavioral categories and may also be accompanied by content descriptors.

Do ratings really provide useful information? Do parents even pay attention to them?

Of the thousands of products rated by the ESRB, 71% of those products are rated “E” for everyone. That one category can include everything from games that provide challenging, skill-building adventures to those that include violence or other undesirable content raises serious questions about the usefulness of such ratings. At the same time, researchers, parents, children, and commercial game raters have very different definitions of violent content, especially cartoon-type or fantasy violence.

Parents evaluations of game content were more strict than industry ratings (Walsh, 1999).

In any event, there is little evidence that parents even use these rating systems when making purchases. Surveys indicate that after the first two years of being in effect, consumer awareness and use of the ratings was extremely low (Fallas, 1996).

**Health and Safety**

Interactive media have the potential to promote health and positive behaviors. Approximately 17 million consumers use the Internet to search for medical and health information (Vozenilek, 1998), and that number has likely increased. Due to the recent growth in Internet use to obtain this type of information in homes, libraries, and community centers, it is important for professionals to be aware of these sources and validate the accuracy of the information available to the public. Hertzler, Young, Baum, Lawson, and Penn-Marshall (1999) recently identified and evaluated Internet sites providing nutrition and exercise information for children. The exercise demonstrated that there are a number of reputable sites providing nutrition and exercise information relevant for children (e.g., FDA Kids Home Page, The Kids Food Cyberclub, and The Pyramid Tracker); however, keyword searches will often identify sites that are not useful or relevant.
Interactive media, both online and off, has demonstrated an extraordinary potential to help children live healthier, safer lives. Interactive programs such as the Life Adventure Series: Diabetes CD-ROM or Starbright Explorer Series: Exploring your Incredible Blood are extraordinarily effective tools for helping children understand and manage their health conditions, and are developmentally appropriate tools for children to better understand their medical treatment (Bearison & Brown, 2000).

Click Health’s action-adventure computer and video games – like Bronkie the Bronchiasaurus for asthma or Packy & Marlon for diabetes – demonstrably improve children’s self-care for chronic illness. A clinical trial of Packy & Marlon found that diabetic children and adolescents who had access to the game at home for six months experienced a 77-percent decrease in diabetes-related emergency and urgent care clinical visits, compared to a control group of youngsters who had an entertainment game at home.

**Description of Bronkie**

For example, in the asthma self-management game Bronkie the Bronchiasaurus players must make sure that dinosaurs Bronkie and Trakie, who have asthma, take their daily asthma medicine; avoid contact with environmental asthma triggers such as dust, pollen, smoke, furry animals, and sneezer characters who emit cold viruses; and use emergency medicine or sick-day medicine when their peak flow (breath strength) goes down. To win the game players must make sure their character carries out daily asthma selfcare and keeps peak flow high, throughout dozens of simulated days. Research has found that players then transfer to their own daily lives the selfcare skills and habits they learned in the game (Lieberman, 1997).

**Description of Packy and Marlon**

Another example of how interactive media can aid children’s health care needs is the Click Health diabetes self-management game, called Packy & Marlon. The game uses the character’s blood glucose level as one of the game goals. Players must balance the character’s intake of food and insulin throughout several simulated days in order to keep blood glucose in the OK zone, neither too high nor too low. When blood glucose strays too far from the OK zone, the character must remedy the situation or else will not be robust enough to meet other game challenges and will therefore be more likely to lose the game.

In addition to offering rehearsal in a simulated environment, Click Health games improve health behavior by providing (1) attractive role-model characters who demonstrate desirable selfcare behaviors and help de-stigmatize those behaviors for children who are afraid of being different from their peers (Lieberman, 1997); (2) customizable selfcare regimens so that the character will be using a daily regimen that is most similar to the player’s; (3) dynamic databases that allow players to look up essential health-related information to help them win the game; (4) supportive and informative performance feedback and unlimited opportunities for rehearsal of skills, to foster in players a stronger sense of self-efficacy (see Bandura, 1997) for health behaviors rehearsed in the game; (5) cumulative records of the characters’ health status; and (6) two-player options that foster communication about the health topic with friends, family, and caregivers.
**Life Skills Training**

While not part of our report, I have recently become aware of a software program called *Ripple Effects* that teaches life skills and coping behaviors to children and adolescents. The program targets issues that youth encounter in their everyday lives, including violence, substance use and abuse, depression, bullying, and character education.

**Areas of Concern**

*Physical Effects.* Many adults who work constantly with computers have experienced a range of physical and ergonomic problems, from eyestrain to Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. But could the mouse and joystick prove to be as dangerous to young wrists as the curve ball proved to be on young Little Leaguers or repetitive workouts for young gymnasts? There is little existing research on how interactive media can affect children’s physical health and development. Although many adults have experienced physical ailments from excessive computing, little research has been conducted relating to children’s physical health and development and computing.

*Addiction.* A 1995 survey of 868 adolescents found that 50%, the majority of whom were boys, reported behaviors that would score high on an addiction scale. They reported playing on six or more days per week, playing for more than one hour at a time, feeling they play longer than intended, and neglecting homework to play. Other researchers, using criteria similar to those for pathological gambling, found that of 387 teens between 12 and 16 years-old, 20% were currently dependent on game playing and 25% had been so at some point in their lives.

*Weight and Lifestyle.* American children are more over-weight, slower and weaker than their counterparts in other developed nations and seem to be developing sedentary lifestyles at an earlier age. It may be that interactive game use and television viewing are displacing involvement in sport and other physical activity. While amount of television watching seems to predict whether children may be overweight, viewing behavior has not been shown to cause decreases in physical activity. Surprisingly, we found no published research exploring causal relationships between interactive media use and obesity. Only future research can tell us whether there is a connection between how much children watch TV or play interactive games and other sedentary behaviors that can affect their long-term health.

**On-line Advertising and Privacy**

Online privacy is developing into a major public policy issue as more and more Americans spend their time and money on the Internet. From advertisers whose “cookies” silently track surfing behavior to the potential for disabling viruses and credit card fraud, computer privacy and security presents a range of sensitive new issues. Questions of privacy and deceptive online advertising are especially significant with respect to children.

Web sites often ask children and adults alike to provide personal information such as name, age, gender and e-mail address. Researchers have found that children and teenagers ages 10-17 are much more likely than parents to say it is OK to give sensitive information to commercial Web sites in exchange for a free gift.

We don’t know much about how children perceive advertisements on the Internet, although past research on television suggests that a great deal depends on age. But un-
like television and print media, online advertising is often subtly integrated within the content itself. Entire web sites provide an opportunity for children to interact with product brands and characters. A small exploratory study suggests that even children 9 – 11 years may not be aware of the commercial intentions of many web sites.

In 1998, Congress recognized the need to regulate online marketing to children and passed the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which provides safeguards against the collection of personal information from children under age 13. COPPA authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to develop and enforce data collection rules for commercial Web sites targeted at children, and requires advertisers to disclose how they collect and use such data.

*NYTimes Article*

Children and the Web – In another First Amendment case, the justices today accepted an appeal by the Bush administration and agreed to decide the constitutionality of a federal law barring the use of the Web for “commercial purposes” in a way that makes sexually explicit material that is “harmful to minors” available to those under 17.

In a ruling last year, the Third Circuit barred enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act on the ground that the 1998 law’s reliance on “contemporary community standards” to identify harmful material placed an impermissible burden on the operators of Web sites. “The Web is not geographically contained,” the appeals court said, and once material is published on the Web it is available all over the world.

The law was Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, a less precise legislative attempt at the same goal. The American Civil Liberties Union and a coalition of booksellers and Web publishers argue that the new version has the same constitutional flaws.

*A Research Agenda for Quality Interactive Media*

We believe that the content industry, academic and market researchers, producers and parents, advocates and policy-makers all share an interest in doing the kind of research that can result in high-quality interactive media that provides not only successful, engaging entertainment, but also promotes healthy, happy and better educated children. To that end, we propose a potential national research agenda that includes:

- Building common ground among researchers – benefit from collaboration among scholars in different fields and between academic and market researchers

*Research that is Useful to Content Producers*

- Provide funding to support developmentally based research on the uses, design, and effects of interactive media;

- Create a multidisciplinary research infrastructure that will provide a diverse pool of scholars the opportunity to study new media and children’s issues systematically;

- Facilitate the exchange of ideas among a community of scholars, educators, and producers so they can translate current knowledge into entertaining and educational interactive media products for children;

  - Sponsor regular multi-disciplinary & multi-industry conferences generating high profile, peer-reviewed publications of academic and industry-based research.
– Disseminate research findings and, in clear, understandable language, interpreting the practical implications for parents, educators, children’s media producers, policy-makers & the press.

**Conclusion**

We know we can help foster an enlightened and successful generation of interactive producers and products through research on children that is developmentally based, multidisciplinary, cumulative, useful to content developers and responsive to the concerns of the public and policy-makers. But we cannot do so without first understanding much more than we do today about how these new media affect children – their thoughts, emotions, social relationships, and even their health. By generating an ongoing flow of credible, useful, systematic research, we can profoundly affect the lives and futures of next generation of Americans who are “growing up digital.” We believe producers who know their audience better through research 1) will be more successful at targeting their program to reach that audience and 2) will better address children’s developmental growth needs and interests.

I invite you to visit www.markle.org to read what we do know about interactive media’s influence on children and I hope you will find it of interest.
A Swedish Perspective on Media Access and Use

ULLA JOHNSSON-SMARAGDI

During the last two decades of the 20th century, we have witnessed radical changes in the media world. While in the 70s traditional print and audio-visual media were still dominating, several new screen media entered the scene in the beginning of the 80s and became increasingly prevalent in people’s lives. The 90s bear above all the impression of the new information and communication technologies (ICT). This development has opened the doors towards greater individual freedom and facilitated the prospects of adopting specific styles of media use to suit one’s preferences and circumstances.

The changes in the media area are not uniform, nor do they progress at an even rate. There are great variations in access to the new media across cultures and societies as well as within them. In an international perspective, the Nordic countries are in many respects pioneers of new media technology and the appropriation of such technology by ordinary people. Many media have become familiar equipment in the homes, their use intertwined in everyday routines. Still, homes differ substantially in their access to media. Many homes are media saturated, while others are comparatively media poor. Some families are eager to acquire the new media equipment, others bide their time. Education and socio-economic status, family composition, age, gender and personal interests are among the factors regarded as influential for the acquisition of various media. The same factors also influence the use made of the media.

The question of media access is a basic one, as the accessibility of a medium limits the use made of it. Naturally, physical access is a fundamental prerequisite for use, though not a sufficient one. Naturally, media can be used not only at home, but also in friends’ homes, in school, sometimes at parents’ workplaces or in public places. Compared to other European countries, the Nordic countries seem to provide superior public access to media (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001a).

Availability at home facilitates use, and even more do personal access. Yet, using or not using a medium is not entirely a matter of easy physical access, which is only the first step. It is also a matter of social, cultural and psychological accessibility or desirability. These factors are related to the degree of social acceptance of a medium in a culture, to the social context in which it is used and to personal interests, habits and attitudes. To reduce inequality and information gaps between social groups and individuals, it is thus...
not sufficient to reduce differences in access. For a medium to be accepted and used, it is equally or more important to enhance its social and psychological desirability.

The questions I will address concern different aspects of

- media access – both home access and personal access
- use or non-use of single media or groups of media
- time with media – overall time and time with single media
- media combinations and individual styles of use – media menus
- questions of social differences and gender gaps

I will discuss and reflect upon these aspects with reference to both longitudinal and comparative empirical data.

Media Access at Home

Media access in Swedish homes has increased rapidly in recent years. At the end of the 90s, TV and video, radio, some form of audio equipment and books were found in most Swedish homes. These more established media have long been familiar to and integrated into the households, especially among families with children and teenagers. The more recent ICT media have gained growing acceptance during the 90s and are rapidly diffusing into a clear majority of the households, the speed of diffusion being most pronounced among families with teenagers. Between 80 and 90% of these families had home access to a computer at the end of the 90s; about 75% had a mobile phone and about 60% Internet access (Johnsson-Smaragdi & Jönsson, 2001b). These figures are rapidly changing, however, due to the diffusion process, giving an indication of media saturation at the end of the decade.

Homes may differ substantially in their overall access to media at a given point in time. When summarizing home access to nine different media in 1997, in families with children aged 7-16 years, the mean access was almost 6.5 media. Almost 15% of these households could be characterized as media poor, having at most four out of the nine media in question. About 30% was media saturated, having access to at least eight of the nine media. Socio-economic differences were evident here: higher occupational level, higher education and higher income meant greater access to new digital media in the home (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001c).

Over time, overall media access clearly increases in the households. Summarizing the changes in overall access to the same six media in 1997, in families with teenagers, the average access rose by about one medium every fourth year: from 2.7 media items in 1985, to 3.6 in 1989, to 4.6 in 1994 and then to 5.3 in 1998. If eight media items are included in the calculations for 1998, the average is 6.6 items. There are no or only slight indications of demographic differences in overall access to media at home: parents’ socio-economic status makes a significant difference in overall media access only in 1985. Families with lower SES had in 1985 on average access to more media in home (2.7 media compared to 2.4 media for the low and high SES groups, respectively).

Some crucial points may be worth stressing as concerns analysing socio-economic differences in home access. The observations are made in relation to access in families with children, from the middle of the 80s until the end of the 90s.
First, access to new media equipment among different social groups could not be stated generally. The type of medium must be specified. Some media tend to first attract certain socio-economic groups. When video began to spread among the population in the first half of the 80s, a greater proportion of the low SES group accepted it, while the high SES group was more reserved. In addition, access to TV game consoles is higher throughout the years in the low SES group. Computers, on the other hand, were viewed very differently already upon their introduction. In this case, the high SES group acquired more access from the outset, and continues to do so, even if the difference diminishes and is no longer significant. The high SES group also has greater access to Internet, while there is no significant difference in access to mobile phones (Johnsson-Smaragdi & Jönsson, 2001b).

Second, existing socio-economic differences are likely to diminish over time as the diffusion process continues and the media become available in most homes. Naturally, when media are found in most homes, as in the case of TV, radio, stereo or other audio equipment, there are no SES differences. Differences tend to be most pronounced in the beginning of the diffusion process, and thereafter level out relatively rapidly. As for video, in 1985, 44% in the low SES group had home access, compared to only 16% in the high SES group. Since 1989, there has been no difference in access across social groups. For computers, the social differences level out more slowly: the high SES group kept their advantage in access for more than ten years, and it ceased to be significant first in 1998, when between 80 and 90% of the families with teenagers had home access to a computer (ibid).

**Personal Access to Media**

Young people’s bedrooms are increasingly well equipped with media. Personal access to new communication media, like mobile phones, is also increasing. This development makes room for more individual and privatised use of the media. Bovill and Livingstone (2001) conclude that a media-rich bedroom may contribute to the shifting of the boundary between public and private spaces. With private access you gain control over the medium, using it more extensively, both in terms of frequency and in terms of time. It is clear that personal access has consequences for how the media are used.

The most common media items in bedrooms are radios and other audio equipment. A majority of youth has a TV set. In 1998, about a fourth each also had a video and a computer. The bedrooms thus tend to be increasingly media centred, equipped with diverse audio items, TV, VCR, TV games consoles, computers and sometimes even with Internet connections. The average number of media items in 1994 was about three out of six, and in 1998 four out of eight. Calculated as a ratio between current access and maximum number of media items, it turns out that average access is about the same in 1994 and 1998.

There are no significant differences in personal access with reference to the SES of the family. From a socio-economic perspective, thus, equality reigns between Swedish teenagers. On the other hand, there are considerable gender differences in personal media access (Table 1). Generally, teenage boys have greater access than do teenage girls to most media in their rooms. The greatest differences between genders appear in access to computers and games. Further, these gender differences exist irrespective of the SES of the teenagers’ families. In all SES groups, girls generally have less access to screen and digital media in their rooms. On average, boys with low SES have the highest access to
media, girls with high SES the least. Gender and SES thus interact, creating more pronounced differences between boys and girls from different social backgrounds. No equality exists between the genders in access to personal media (Johnsson-Smaragdi & Jönsson, 2001b; cf. Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001c).

**Table 1. Teenagers (15-16 years) Access to Media Items in Bedroom 1994 and 1998 (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All (463)</th>
<th>Boys (245)</th>
<th>Girls (217)</th>
<th>All (434)</th>
<th>Boys (231)</th>
<th>Girls (203)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiFi</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>42&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC/TV-games</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean no.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media quota</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Significant differences are denoted as a = .05; b = .01 level; c = .001

An explanation for gender inequality in media access may be differences in interest in and different attitudes towards technical innovations. Girls may have other priorities and not see the same value in owning media items. For boys, the computer is often interesting in itself and boys tend to take an interest in the technical aspects, while girls accentuate the uses to which computers can be put. More girls than boys are among the later adopters of new media. In the end, this may result in increased interest and knowledge gaps.

**Non-Users of Media**

Children and teenagers nowadays have access to a range of readily available media. Media use is interwoven into their everyday life; they fit it into their other leisure-time activities. The extensiveness of use may differ, depending partly on the medium’s availability and the degree of control that may be exerted over it.

The availability of media is important, but as mentioned above, to actually make use of a medium, it must also be socially, culturally, and psychologically accessible or desirable (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001a, 2001b). The degree of social acceptance of a medium in a specific culture, the social context in which it is used, as well as personal motivation, shaped both by past experiences and expected rewards, are of major importance – as are the habits, attitudes, and overall lifestyle of the individual and of the group(s) to which he or she belongs.

There are always individuals and groups who seem to discard some media. The non-users of a medium are interesting in that they provide evidence of the exercise of individual choice. A low proportion of non-users means that most young people use that
medium at least sometimes; a high proportion of non-users means that large groups tend to avoid certain media altogether. Evidently, varying proportions of the young choose not to spend time with certain media. Using them does not seem to be an option for these teenagers. Table 2 displays the proportion of young people, at different points in time, claiming they spend no time at all with audio, audio-visual, ICT’s or print media, respectively (Johnsson-Smaragdi & Jönsson, 2001b).

Table 2. Proportion of Young People Not Using Media in Leisure Time (%)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comics</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC/TV-games</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1976 to 1985 the question concerned number of books read (during the past three weeks or, in –85, the past month), in 1989 to 1998 the question concerned how frequently they used to read books (in days a week or month).

Practically all of the teenagers watch TV at least sometimes; during the 25 years in question, almost no one indicates that they never watch. Also, only a few percent of respondents do not use the video. Further, a growing majority uses the new ICT media in their leisure time. They turn on the computer, connect to the Internet and play computer games. As for print media, there is a comparatively large, and growing, proportion stating that they never read in their spare time. They do not care for reading books, newspapers or magazines. In a comparable investigation among teenagers of the same age conducted in 1997, 22% stated they never read books (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001c).

For most media, availability at home makes a real difference. Availability at home is important as most of the non-users are found among those without home access, both in Sweden and in other European countries. The sizes of the nonuser groups vary across countries depending on the specific medium in focus (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001a, 2001b). A great majority of Swedish teenagers use media if they are available. Nevertheless, apparently there are other barriers to overcome, since some with home access still never use a given medium. About one sixth of those with home access to a computer do not use it at all, and one tenth do not care about using the Internet even if they have a connection. On the other hand, it is also evident that many young people use a medium despite its non-availability at home. Young people find means of overcoming the barrier of no home access when the social obstacles are low and the media are socially or psychologically attractive in their view.

Different options created by combining the dimensions of access to, and use of, media may be visualized in a typology as in figure 1.
Figure 1. Typology Over Media Access in Home and Media Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium Available in Home</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes Available and Desirable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available/ Desirable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Available/ Not desirable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not desirable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001a.

Time with Media

The media are an essential and integral part of most young people’s lives. Much of their leisure time is devoted to media. Today, Swedish teenagers spend more time with media than any earlier teenage generation. Most time is spent with TV and music, but also on video, computer and games as well as on print media. The individual variations in time spent on media are considerable, however, depending on the medium’s accessibility in various respects and on personal interests.

Despite the new digital media recently available, television is still the dominant medium, in terms of both number of users and amount of time spent. Everyone, everywhere watches television, and television viewing – along with listening to music – makes up the main part of his or her media time. Time in front of the TV screen has increased gradually during the past three decades, from on average ten hours of habitual viewing a week in the 70s to 21 hours in the 90s. Gender and social background, separately and in combination, affect viewing time. Boys with low SES spend more time before the screen than do girls with high SES. The variation in viewing time is considerable. In the 70s and early 80s, 35-40% viewed for an hour or less a day; in the 90s, this figure is only 12-15%. Teenagers viewing for three hours or more a day constituted less than 10% of the teenagers in the 70s and early 80s, but 25% in the 90s (Johnsson-Smaragdi & Jönsson, 2001b). In the European comparative study from 1997, an equal amount of time before the screen is reported for Swedish teenagers (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 1998; Beentjes et al., 2001).

Nowadays, more TV-channels are available through cable or satellite broadcasting, and the broadcasting time has increased in all channels. Furthermore, in the 90s the supply of program genres that attract adolescents has greatly increased. At the same time, the VCR has become available in the home to over 95% of the teenagers, and is used both as a home movie player and as a time shifter. Many teenagers have both a TV and a video in their bedroom. A rise in access and choices seems to increase the time before the screen among teenagers.

Compared to TV viewing, the average time spent with computers is still low, though it has increased steadily during the 90s. At the end of the decade, a teenager spent on average four hours a week on the computer. Almost half of the users use the computer for less than an hour a week. Only one fifth use it for more than an hour a day. The gender differences are considerable, with boys spending twice as much time as girls. The com-
mon apprehensions about growing social inequalities in relation to computer use gain no support in our time data. Irrespective of socio-economic background, an equal amount of time is devoted to computers, both in total and among the users. Our attention must focus more on the very real gender differences instead of on the insubstantial social differences (Johnsson-Smaragdi & Jönsson, 2001b).

Time with a computer may be devoted to a range of activities. Computers may of course be used both for entertainment and for information. Most teenagers use the word processor, play games, surf on the Internet, and send e-mail messages. Usually they combine several applications, some being used more frequently than others. Due to the combination of applications, the teenagers can be divided into three broad groups:

- The restricted, who use the computer mainly to play and to write
- The communicative, who besides playing and writing concentrate on the communication potential of the Internet, like chatting and e-mail
- The versatile and diversified, who engage in a host of different activities

In the first two groups, the number of boys and girls is about equal, but in the third, the boys are four times as many as the girls. With more applications to work with, more time is spent on the computer. In the restricted group, the average time is about one hour a week; in the communicative, it is 4 hours and in the versatile, it amounts to 8 hours a week. In all three groups there are considerable differences between boys and girls in time spent (ibid). What will this mean for the future?

It is sometimes feared that the screen media and the new digital media will outrival reading as a leisure time activity, especially the reading of books. The data are somewhat equivocal in this case. Longitudinal data indicate that the group of teenagers (15/16 years old) not reading at all has increased towards the end of the 90s, from about 15% in 1985-1994 up to 24% in 1998 (see Table 2). The group of non-readers among 11- to 12-year-old children has also increased, from less than 5% in 1989-1994 up to 10% in 1998. Comparable data from 1997 show the proportion of non-readers among 9- to 11-year-olds to be 18%, among 12- to 14-year-olds 15%, and among 15- to 16-year-olds 26% (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001a). It is, thus, above all among teenagers that we find an increasing proportion of non-readers.

There are, however, no signs that the time devoted to reading has decreased, despite increasing time with other media. The time for book reading among teenagers in general has been stable at an average of 2 hours a week since the end of the 80s, despite the growing group of non-readers. Among those still reading books, the time spent on reading has on the contrary increased, from an average of 2.3 hours in 1989 to 2.8 hours in 1998. About half of those reading books could be characterized as light or infrequent readers, devoting an hour or less a week to books. Only 10% read for more than an hour a day. Gender differences are pronounced: teenage girls spend more time reading than do boys, 2.5 hours compared to 1.5 hours a week, respectively.

Figure 2 displays the average habitual time devoted to books, screen and digital media between 1989 and 1998. Clearly, teenagers devote most of their media time to TV; time with computers and digital games has increased but is still considerably lower, while time with the video and books has not changed during the 90s.
Media Combinations and Styles of Use

With access to a host of different media and media types and an increasing degree of control over the location, timing, purpose and length of use, people’s ability to compose an individual media diet is facilitated. The individual media choices and combinations are the products of a dynamical process, which depends on social, cultural and personal factors as well as on the alternatives available.

Current research indicates that more specialised user groups are developing. At the same time, media use tends to be more additive and integrated, causing the total media time to rise. Several user groups are discernable that combine media in varying ways and spend various amounts of time with them. The low users are the largest of these groups, not spending very much time with the media. Other groups favour a certain medium above other media, for instance the TV-specialists, the computer specialists and the book fans, or certain types of media, such as those favouring TV and video, TV and TV-games or computer and PC-games (Johnsson-Smaragdi, 2001a). There is considerable variation among those groups in the time devoted to media. The low users spend 2.5 hours a day with media on average, while the groups favouring the computer or combining games playing with computer or TV use spend up to 7 hours daily with the media.

The Present and the Future

Today, Swedish teenagers spend more time with media than has any previous teenage generation, and there is every reason to assume that their media use will continue to in-
crease. Their homes and bedrooms are filled with media of all kinds. But there are vari-
ations in media access and use that are related to various indicators.

Acquisition of new media equipment in general is seldom explained by the families’
socio-economic background. When comparing access to specific media items, however,
the picture changes. Different media tend to first attract different SES groups. Thus, the
type of medium must be specified. There are further substantial gender differences in
personal access to media in one’s bedroom, but no such differences as regards access at
home. Teenage boys have greater personal access to media than do teenage girls.

The habitual time spent before the television screen has increased during the past 15
years. Considerable variations in viewing time exist. Boys spend more time before the
screen than do girls, and teenagers from families with low SES spend more time than do
those with high SES. Furthermore, the categories of gender and social background inter-
act, such that boys from low SES families spend the most time before the screen, and
girls from high SES families the least.

Time spent with computers and computer games has doubled during the last half of
the 90s. Boys spend considerably more time than do girls with the new ICT media:
computers, computer games and Internet. The teenager’s social background makes no
difference in this respect. The variation between computer users is considerable: while
some spend less than an hour a week using it, others spend more than an hour a day.
There are different types of computer users that can be categorized in terms of the ac-
tivities they perform. These groups are engaged in activities ranging from one main ac-
tivity to many different ones. The time spent with the computer varies considerably be-
tween these user types.

There has been no decline in average reading time among teenagers in general dur-
ing the past decade. On the contrary: the readers read more towards the end of the 90s.
The proportion of non-readers has increased, however. There are gender differences, but
no significant social differences in reading time: girls read more than boys.

Our findings call into question some common stereotypes concerning teenagers’ me-
dia use. The common opinion that teenagers have left the TV screen in favour of the com-
puter does not receive any support, nor does the claim that TV or the new ICT media
have driven reading out of the market.

An interesting outcome of this study is how little support it provides for the displace-
ment hypothesis, that is, the idea that when new media come along and young people
begin to adopt them, they will necessarily reduce the time they devote to old media. In-
stead most teenagers seem to increase the total time they spend with media.

The gender-related digital divide shown to exist among young people might be a
potential problem. Girls have lower personal access to the new ICT media; they spend
less time with them and also use them differently. We may identify this as a problem, but
must also ask why and for whom. Will this cause knowledge and information gaps, or
perhaps entertainment gaps? Is it a problem for the girls who may actively have chosen
not to acquire or spend much of their time with some media? Or might it be a problem
for boys who fill their bedrooms and their time with media, choosing screen and digital
media instead of other activities? Alternatively, is it a problem for adult society or for
our future society? The concerns may be real and this may be an important question to
discuss, but it must be remembered that our freedom and ability to choose our own life-
styles and compose our own media mix also involves the option of not choosing a certain
thing or activity – may it be reading or computer use. Perhaps the girls are not to be
pitied.
Notes
1. References are made to two empirical data sets: the longitudinal Media Panel Program, where more than 5,500 children, teenagers and young adults have participated in longitudinal and cohort studies conducted between 1976 and 1998; and the Swedish national study forming part of the multinational comparative research project. "Children, Young People and the Changing Media Environment" directed by S. Livingstone at LSE. More than 1,600 Swedish children and teenagers between 7-16 years participated in this study conducted in 1997.
2. The media in question were TV, satellite-TV, VCR, TV-console games, radio, stereo/HiFi, computer, CD-Rom and Internet access.
3. The media counted in 1985, 1989, 1994 and 1998 were radio/HiFi, TV, satellite-TV, VCR, TV-console games and computers. In 1998, both six and eight media were included, adding Internet access and mobile phones.
4. Occupational, or socio-economic, status (SES) here refers to the parent with the occupation ranked highest according to the Swedish socio-economic classification (SCB, 1989:5). Low SES includes working class and lower professionals, middle SES middle professionals and high SES higher professionals.
5. In these figures, listening to music and radio are not included.

References
‘More Research Needs To Be Done’

Problems and Perspectives in Research on Children’s Use of Interactive Media

GITTE STALD

“Does using a computer or playing video games help or hurt?” In a number of studies on children’s and young people’s uses of computer media, this simple dichotomy serves as a point of departure for the thesis guiding the research process, for the formulation of research questions as well as for the design of research projects. But is it useful or actually possible – even for analytical purposes – to narrow down a complex problem to either-or questions with a built-in expectation of conclusive answers? The critical answers to these questions are obvious to me, but they are followed by other questions, the primary one being: How can we study the complex relations between a specific group of users, computer media and society and what are our purposes in doing so? In order to approximate any answers, we should consider our efforts as constituting an ongoing process and critically evaluate our epistemological as well as methodological approach as well as what we aim to reveal, explore, explain, and describe. We could commence by discussing whether there are hidden – perhaps unrealised – agendas behind our framing and design of research projects and aims for our studies, such as normative conservation of cultural, social and ideological standards or perhaps promotion of biased utopian optimistic expectations for potential benefits from using computer media. Second, we should ask ourselves how we can innovate theory and research development in a new area of media research – trying out new views, new methods, crossing borders between paradigms, traditions and methods, combining innovation with experience.

* * *

The aim of the following comment is to discuss how we, from the perspective of media studies, develop, frame and understand research within one specific research area.

In her keynote address, Professor Wartella outlined the main findings from a report to the Markle Foundation, Children and Interactive Media. A compendium of current research and directions for the future, and framed the results in a discussion of a number of general perspectives regarding children’s uses of interactive media as well as research within the field. The discussion in the report, and hence in Professor Wartella’s presen-
tation, is based on an impressive tour de force through a vast number of research reports, supplemented with an extensive selected annotated bibliography.

The writers of the report are of course committed to the assignment from the Markle Foundation: “A review of all publicly available research to see how much is known about the role of interactive media in children’s lives” (Wartella et al. 2000a: 5). The answer based on the review of research reports is that “very little” is known and a general conclusion seems to be that “more work needs to be done”. This line is prominent throughout the report, which is evident in the design of the text, in that the authors primarily point to a number of questions at a general level as well as in detailed discussions. In the last part of the report, this framing is concluded by a number of suggestions for future research.

It is of course not possible – or necessary – to know the hundreds of reports, articles and books that make out the fundament of the report. But by looking over the listed titles and annotated bibliography, and especially by going through the discussion of research results to date and perspectives for future research, it becomes obvious that there is a strong focus in the report on developmental and learning outcomes of children’s uses of interactive media. This points towards one of the differences between the perspective of much US research and that of much European research – a difference that perhaps also shows in the ways in which we address the questions and the focus and theories guiding our research. Though some European research results are included in the report, I would like to point out a few examples of recent research that is absent. One example is the report from a comparative work on childhood and socialisation, Growing up in Europe, edited by Lynne Chisholm. Another example in which young people’s uses of new media are discussed is the anthology Digital Diversions. Youth Culture in the age of Multimedia, edited by Julian Sefton-Green (1998). The anthology represents a number of diverse and very interesting research projects. Third example is Paul Löhö and Manfred Meyer’s Children, Television and the New Media from 1999; a collection of articles from TeleVIZIon, which present a number of approaches and findings regarding children’s uses of media – especially TV – in the perspective of computer media. Primarily, however, I wish to point out the results from the European comparative research programme, Children, Young People and their Changing Media Environment. During the period 1996 to 1999, research teams from 11 European countries and Israel conducted a comprehensive, comparative study of 6- to 16-year-old children’s media uses. The final report was published in 2001 (Livingstone and Bovill 2001), but an extensive and informative interim report was published in 1998 in the European Journal of Communication (Livingstone 1998), and could possibly have informed the authors of the Markle Foundation Report. This study discusses the need to carry out research on children and young people’s media uses in context and with a holistic perspective on the understanding of relations between childhood, child, media use and society. The priority of the project was “to understand the meanings, uses, and impacts of the screen in the lives of children and young people, first by placing it in its everyday context. … and second, by viewing the screen where possible from a child-centred perspective” (Livingstone 2001:6).

There are, however, some US studies on children and media that have the ambition of covering more media in a contextual framework. A recent report from The Kaiser Foundation, Kids & Media @ the New Millennium (Donald F. Roberts, Ulla G. Foehr, Victoria J. Rideout, Mollyann Broadie 1999), which is briefly reviewed in the Markle Foundation Report, is probably the most comprehensive study of American children’s and young people’s media uses. It is an interesting and informative work, which espe-
cially illustrates the patterns of media uses and discusses relations between access, use and social and cultural background. It also combines multiple methods in the respective studies comprising the empirical basis of the study. In their introduction to the field of interest for their own report, Professor Wartella and her colleagues take a starting point in the Kaiser Foundation Report’s findings; they do so, however, with a specific conception of the report as a tool to understand “how such a pervasive experience affects their [children’s] development” (Wartella et al., 2000a: 6). The focus of the Markle Foundation Report mirrors partly the assignment from the Markle Foundation, partly the general point of departure of the available research results that are reviewed, and partly the approach through which Professor Wartella and her colleagues have chosen to read the research reports. Altogether, the report reflects a rather strong focus on the effects and impact of interactive media experience on academic performance, and the question opening this contribution “Does using a computer or playing video games help or hurt?” is a main thread through the report (Wartella et al., 2000:5). The report’s general focus on development and effects illustrates, on the one hand, the persistent nature of the traditional dichotomous understanding of children as either innocent and vulnerable or as sinners and aggressive; on the other hand, it is an example of the still emerging con- dictionary understanding of children as either beings or “becomings”. Both dichotomies obstruct approaching the research field of new media with a mind open to the complexity of factors that form the reality of the relation between media, users and society. The report does discuss cultural and social aspects of interactive media, but in the respective chapters the discussions eventually ebb away into notions of developmental perspectives and learning aspects of new media. The latter is obviously an important aspect of child media research, but if the focus on learning potential as defined in the report becomes predominant in the study of interactive media, it limits the perspective and prohibits the broader view into new areas of research, theory and analysis.

**Media Revolution or Another Period of Change, Experiment and Experience?**

The Markle Foundation Report starts out by stating that: “Today we are in the middle of a new revolution in both technology and culture; a revolution in which our children are often in the vanguard. For they are the first generation that is truly ‘growing up digital’.” (Wartella 1999:5). I suggest, however, that this ‘revolution’ is experienced much more by researchers trying to catch up with reality in their research and by parents and teachers trying to catch up with the changes in children’s and young people’s cultural and social practices than by the youngsters in question themselves. Generally, young people adapt to and integrate ‘digital media’ such as computer, Internet and mobile phones into their everyday lives in a constant process of testing usefulness, experimenting and adaptation. They focus on usefulness, experience and need in the situation. They practice both technical and symbolic convergence of media as well as, not least, convergence of media content across media types, genres and texts. It is perhaps more adequate to put it as Sonia Livingstone does: “researching “new media” means studying a moving target” (Livingstone 2001:6).

‘Revolution’ usually means radical changes, that something is turned upside down, or the upheaval of power structures as well as economical and social systems. When we are studying media on the level of access, uses and meaning, I do not find the concept of ‘revolution’ adequate. On the basis of my own studies, I claim that the basic uses of media, which correspond with basic cultural and social needs also for children, are un-
changed through decades of introduction of new media as well as through the present period of digital, interactive, converged computer media technology. The basic uses are still guided by people’s needs to be entertained, to communicate and to receive and exchange information. Specific aspects of innovation or breaking of traditional patterns of use in social and cultural practices could be discussed, however.

The reader might find this discussion of a seemingly inferior comment in the report out of proportion. I have included the discussion, however, because it mirrors one of the general viewpoints in the report, namely that even if new media give certain advantages to young generations, they also constitute a potential threat to children’s well being and development and, essential in this context, new media consequently constitute a threat to established norms and values. I suggest that what is perceived by Professor Wartella and her colleagues as a revolution should rather be understood as a clash between, or perhaps more adequately a balance of, normative and moral codes, rules, behaviour, on the one hand, and experiment, experience, innovation and provocation, on the other. Even if some of the social and cultural practices that arise in youth media cultures apparently reject what could collectively be described as conventional ways of behaviour and values, they are more a scratch on the surface of modern society than a revolutionary movement. Young people are, at the same time, provocateurs trying out new possibilities and social beings collectively and individually looking for values, trust and safety in their search for footing and identity. I found in my studies that children and young people reflect and listen much more to adult experience and attitudes than adults would believe and adolescents would admit. Without starting a debate, I shall air this as a possible effect of a general emergent situation of stronger mutual respect between adults and children/adolescents. This could partly result from a dialectic process of changing relations between generations and of a changing view of children and childhood in Europe, perhaps most strongly seen in the Nordic countries.

The Responsibilities of Adults – and Those of Children?

It is striking that much research done on children and young people’s media use underlines – and to a degree rightfully so – the role of adults in examining, evaluating and regulating children’s and young people’s media use. The report also mentions the responsibilities of content developers, parents and policymakers and researchers to study the numerous aspects of growing up with media by bringing together work across academic disciplines.

The responsibility of adults is obvious, but I would like to draw attention to the need to study much more closely and to rely on young people’s own experiences, own creativity and their abilities to converge and explore the possibilities of interactive media. Of course, we do interview children and young people about their uses and experiences, and some studies, such as the European comparative study mentioned above (Livingstone and Bovill 2000), strive to take the perspective of children and adolescents. But I propose that we look much more closely, much deeper at active creativity, interactivity, textual uses and the transformation hereof into children’s and young people’s social and cultural practices, and hence into the formatting of collective as well as individual identity. I refrain from taking up a discussion on methodological issues here, even if a major discrepancy between different approaches to child media research does have bearing on the reliability and validity of analyses based on children’s own accounts and interpretations. I merely wish to point to some general observations from the Danish part of *Children, Young People and the Changing Media Environment*. They show that young Danes are
generally accustomed to reflective and critical thinking. In relation to their own media use and understanding of media, they generally look upon influence and meaning both from a rational, sensible position and from the position of pleasure. This, I think, supports an argument for leaving some responsibility for their own uses and development of use to the young people themselves. In our research, we credit them for being critical and engaged users by acknowledging their own experiences and accounts thereof.

One example of an area that could be studied much more closely is online multi-player computer games where participants meet, play, interact, and communicate in virtual worlds. Simultaneously a continuous transcendence between the virtual and the physical worlds takes place, and experiences, norms and emotions travel between the two versions of reality, which constitute the life worlds of young people today (Stald 2001, 2002 a and b). The users develop new variations of language in their ways of communicating – e.g., in discussion groups where specific language, codices and norms are developed disregarding the norms of adult world. Complex procedures are explored in relation to the gaming situation; self-developed contributions are added to the multitude of creative challenges. Social relations are formed and tried out in several contexts and across cultural, geographic and age borders. A first look at these environments and communities would probably identify them as rather anarchistic and in opposition to other sorts of communities. A closer analysis, however, identifies the virtual environments as training fields for social and cultural interaction, for development of specific skills, for intellectual, emotional and social experiences. An interesting observation is that the self-established gaming communities, which form around the most popular online multiplayer games, are at the same time characterized by open access to those who understand the world and – partly following the first characteristic – by quite restrictive settings regarding normative behaviour. Patterns similar to these can be found in relation to other areas of youth media culture such as chat and use of mobile phones/sms.

**The Question of Addiction – An Example of Normative Thinking**

My next comment relates to the question of addiction. Professor Wartella downplayed this theme in her presentation, and the report deals with the theme as one of several questions related to health and safety – also it is indirectly asked whether the research projects are ‘measuring preoccupation rather than dependence’ (Wartella et al., 2000a: 84). Still, I have chosen to take up the discussion here as an example of how normative thinking may influence the questions we ask and the way we frame our research. As such this paragraph is more a discussion of the research projects reviewed in The Markle Foundation Report than of Professors Wartella’s and her colleagues’ approach and conclusions in this area.

The report mentions a 1995 survey showing that half of the respondents reported behaviours that would score high on an addiction scale, addiction defined as playing six or more times a week, playing for more than one hour at a time, feeling that they play longer than intended and neglecting homework in order to play. The report also refers to other results showing 20% of a group to be dependent on game playing and 25% who had been dependent. I do not question the fact that tendencies of excessive game playing or Internet use occur among children and young people. Obviously some have problems with organising their time and with leaving the virtual world for everyday life.

But I would like to discuss the criteria for what in the report, based on the reviewed reports, is defined as addiction and compared to a pathological condition. I am aware that the report sums up the total of indications, such as time use and neglect of homework,
but still these criteria are discussed individually. I would, however, like to point briefly to some issues of definition of addiction. First, regarding time use: six or seven times a week and more than one hour at a time — well, that could be compared to the use of a range of other media as well. On this scale, most are addicted to television, music and some even to books or news media. One or even two hours time is not very much when you are engaging yourself in a game or trying out new things.

Regarding the question of neglecting homework in order to play: I am sure that this is true – much could be read and written in the hours spent at the computer. Apart from a notion completely different in nature – that computer games and Internet might also contribute to intellectual and personal development – I should like to point to a finding from a study I did in 1996. I interviewed a number of teachers who mentioned a rather serious problem of children being very tired at school and neglecting homework because they watched satellite television at night and videos in the mornings and afternoons. Obviously, a reference to problematic uses of one medium does not eliminate the potential negative effects of another, in this case interactive media. It is, however, possible that new media are objects of ‘reinforced alert’ because we find it difficult to overlook the potential negative effects and to see positive barrier breaking uses of new media. Children’s uses of computer and Internet have to be seen in the context of the way we organise daily life and the positive attention we give to the media use of our children concerning access, time use and content – in general. However, in relation to upbringing and pedagogical alertness, it is easier to focus on certain isolated aspects of media uses than to analyse media uses and the effects on our social and cultural practises and normative formation as integrated into and resulting from our modern lifestyle. In short, and transformed into an example in practice, it is easier to forbid a certain computer game or one hour of playing seven days a week than to break daily patterns, take up game playing yourself, or shut your own screen down – be it TV or computer – and propose to play a game and talk about it with your child, read a story, bake some cookies or whatever is perceived as worthwhile activities in everyday life.

Another perspective on this particular issue is that it is problematic to look upon media uses as fixed categories. One example is the finding from one of the research projects reviewed in the report. It states that 25% of a group of 12- to 16-year-olds had been dependent on game playing at some point in their life (Wartella et al., 2000:84). This could, in my opinion, be read as showing that the 25% in question are no longer dependent. It is, in other words, problematic to draw dramatic conclusions on the basis of an ongoing process.

**Time Perspective and Processes of Change**

Somewhat contradictory to the presentation of a number of singular findings, the authors of the Markle Foundation Report draw the general conclusion that media use and media preferences change over time and quite rapidly among children and young people. Again, however, this important notion is discussed primarily in a developmental and learning perspective. One specific notion is that early use tends to predict later use. On the one hand, this seems to be true in relation to patterns of use and the meaning of parents’ educational and economic background. On the other hand, recent research results within the specific area of this debate indicate that some patterns and perceived traditional attitudes do change with technological, social and cultural change and with age. A striking example is the way in which girls’ attitudes towards and uses of computers have
changed over a short period of time. When I conducted my first large-scale qualitative research in 1998, many girls between 12 and 15 years were uninterested or even sceptical to their own uses of computers. In 2000, when I did my second study, almost all girls used computers and Internet regularly. First it is a question of access, second of usefulness that overcomes potential scepticism towards technology and what might be perceived as primarily a medium for boys’ culture. The girls simply found something to use the computer for in their cultural and social practices, and this triggered the integration of computer media as obvious choices on more levels in daily life. It must be said that the studies are not longitudinal, that is I have not followed the same girls, but the patterns are rather clear and the stories told by my informants support my analytical point. I also found that, for example, the 12-year-old boy who spends hours playing rather violent action games does not necessarily do this at the age of 16; that those who have spent hours in their favourite teen-chat room at the age of 12 most likely find other ways of establishing relationships and communities, online or offline, at the age of 16 and so forth.

With reference to the above examples, I would like to propose that we aim to study media use over time in order to follow its processes as well as the meaning of media within groups and for individuals. We should do so by looking not solely at statistics, but by holdings these up to focused studies of individual life stories.

Another suggestion is to study the group of young adults between 18 and 25 years who, to various extents, have grown up with interactive media. In fact some members of this group were the first to ‘grow up digital’ (cf. the above quote). Comprehensive studies of patterns of uses, experiences, integration in everyday life and meaning in relation to formatting of social, cultural and psychological identity within this age group could bring new perspectives to the analysis of children’s and teenagers’ uses of interactive media.

**Focus on Content**

The report points towards a number of general conceptions and conclusions, which are useful to keep in mind in an ongoing evaluation of much European research within this field. One example is the emphasis on the need to study the role and effect of content in interactive media. In the Markle Foundation Report, content is actually primarily understood as good or bad, harmful or useful and less as aesthetic, narrative, thematic experience and creative challenge, but still the notion of the meaning of content should be a reminder to some European researchers. Sometimes in our efforts to analyse and comprehend the context, we seem to forget to analyse the texts. Seen from my position, understanding the complex of textual, intertextual and contextual meaning should be the ambition. There is, however, a progressive tendency towards innovative research in the field of computer games, computer-mediated communication and mobile phones/sms-messages that indicates a revival, within youth media research, of textual analysis in context.

Another core conclusion in the report is that it is not the medium itself that affects children’s perceptions, attitudes, or awareness. “Rooted in the understanding that the medium alone is not the message; that creative ideas and human values will ultimately determine whether communications technologies fulfil their enormous potential to educate, inform and inspire” (Wartella et al., 2000b: 2). Apart from my opinion that McLuhan’s famous statement is somewhat misunderstood – also in its new wrappings – in this context I support the idea that we should analyse the potentials of new media in
light of human interaction with media and media content. The simultaneous challenge, however, is to acknowledge uses and meanings that transgress traditional perceptions of positive potentials.

Finally, Professor Wartella and her colleagues stress the importance of dealing with commercial aspects of children’s uses of interactive media. It is mentioned in the paragraph on the potential (in American terms enforced) collaboration between the content industry and academia in order to shape an environment ‘in which new media producers can thrive by understanding children as more than just a commercial market’ (Wartella 2000a: 5). Market, commercial interest, media access, uses and preferences are closely related, and with a somewhat wider perspective than that suggested in the Markle Foundation Report, I support a reinforced research interest in this area.

**Methods and Methodology**

The report states, as described in a few words in the summary, that “We – and our children – could all benefit from a more robust collaboration among scholars in different fields and between academic and market researchers” (Wartella et al., 2000b: 11, elaborated in Wartella 2000a: 94-97). This is an important recommendation, especially because the report put forward a number of suggestions for how to enable such a mutual exchange of results, experiences and theories with reference to developing the field and transforming the results for use within the relevant groups of ‘purchasers’. I have one comment, however. I suggest certain caution regarding collaboration between industry and academia. No doubt exchange of results and ideas can be mutually useful, still, it would be wise to realise that the starting points, purposes and expectations of industry as compared to those of academia may differ considerably. This notion might reflect my training within the humanities in Denmark, where we have little experience of research funding from private enterprise. There is, though, much sense in working together on content development, in conducting repeated surveys and describing patterns of access, use and preferences.

The report underlines enhanced cross-disciplinary approaches and exchange on different institutional levels as an essential strategy for understanding the meaning of interactive media in children’s lives (Wartella et al., 2000a: 96). This is, however, primarily understood as bringing together researchers, exchanging results, etceteras. The possibility, or some would claim necessity, of taking a cross-disciplinary approach within a given research project is not described, even if the recognition of using multiple methods is mentioned in a few lines: “Multiple methods of study are required to answer the complex sets of questions posed in the area of children and interactive media” (Wartella et al., 2000a: 95). My suggestion is that we do both, and furthermore that we try out new ways of studying and analysing the research area using general as well as specific questions. In short, we should aim to combine our well-proved and well-considered theories and methodologies with a bit of ‘wild thinking’.

Another suggestion would be to take a step back from child-orientated research – which is not the same as research from a child perspective – and combine the results from this area with studies of theories on new media at a general level. Closer attention to high-level theories of visuality and of the relation between reality and virtuality, theories of interactivity, narration, time and space relations, and of aspects of communication could probably inform child media research and inspire new theoretical framing of the research questions that have to be studied.
Concluding Remarks

In this comment on the Markle Foundation Report and on Professor Wartella’s presentation, I have discussed a small selection of problems in order to question some of the main themes on multiple levels. I am aware that many of my comments could be discussed and developed further. The rather categorical queries I put forward should not, however, be understood as a one-sided emphasis on the virtues and potentials of European, or rather Scandinavian, child media research. The intention has been to accentuate the constant process of questioning epistemological and methodological approaches to our research – and to keep alive and kicking the ongoing debate on aims and means within this particular research area.

During my reading of the Markle Foundation Report, I was reminded of a general experience drawn from the European comparative research programme (Livingstone and Bovill 2001) in which I participated. It becomes quite obvious that children as well as researchers in the Western world do in fact live in different societies with major cultural and social differences that influence our experiences and approaches to research. We might have common values regarding our way of living in general as well as research in particular. But at the same time, we must realise that different social and cultural practices should be put into perspective as well as considered as different normative influences on concepts and approaches to research and evaluation of research results. For example, the potential difference between the US and Scandinavian concept of childhood and children in child media research may not only derive from determined adherence to traditional positions, but more profoundly from deeply rooted moral and ideological codices, which are much more influential than we as independent researchers usually care to realise.

To conclude, I shall have to repeat Professor Wartella’s and her colleagues’ often mentioned general finding and agree that, “yes”, more research needs to be done. But my conclusion is not drawn because research thus far has failed to include comprehensive and in-depth studies of children and young people’s uses of interactive media, nor because research thus far has followed the wrong track altogether. We should not expect to ever obtain the divine overview that will enable us to register and understand all processes and problems and to act accordingly. The need for more research is a constant factor of the dialectic process of historical progress, of our need to understand the time and society in which we live, and to comprehend, evaluate and influence our lives on a meta- as well as individual level.

This might appear rather dramatic and pompous in print, but a little overkill might also promote my point in the above discussion: The day no more research is needed, history has ended.

Notes

1. Many are reviewed in The Markle Foundation Report (see list of references). They primarily represent studies within developmental child psychology and pedagogical theory, but also certain traditions within social theory.
2. The countries were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
3. ‘Growing up Digital’ refers to the book of the same title by Don Tapscott.
4. The only one I can think of in relation to child media research is a large-scale collaboration between Lego and the University of Southern Denmark on children and playing cultures.
References


Roberts, Donald F., Ulla G. Foehr, Victoria J. Rideout, Mollyann Brodie (1999) *Kids & Media @ the New Millennium*. The report can be downloaded from http://www.kff.org/content/1999/1535/


Thanks to Ellen Wartella for a most informative and interesting presentation. The purpose of her project is said to be “to increase our knowledge about what the new media mean to the social, intellectual and physical development of children today”. Indeed an overwhelming wide and complex problem area, but I think her presentation has given all of us a lot of inspiration.

She has told us about what we know and what we need to know more about. The presentation gives an overview of results and plans for further questions to address. I think it will be useful as a platform for new projects in many research milieus interested in children and new media. I shall now comment on just a few issues. My main interest concerns the overall perspective and approach, but a few words will also be said about the methods.

Her focus is on the influence of the new media, and at the same time on the use of them. By this approach – a combination of research on uses and research on influences – she does exactly what I think needs to be done, but what to a large degree has been missing in the research on children and media during the past years. There are many interesting studies about either the influence or the uses or reception of a medium, but seldom combinations of the two.

Too many researchers on children and media still see the two perspectives – use or influence – as disparate and almost conflicting perspectives. They think that only studies of use and reception see children as active participants in communication, whereas studies of influences or effects view the children as passive receivers. The misunderstanding is astonishing when we think of what Wilbur Schramm wrote already in 1961 (!):

In a sense ‘effect’ is misleading, because it suggests that television ‘does something’ to children. The connotation is that television is the actor; the children are acted upon. Children are thus made to seem relatively inert; television relatively active. Children are sitting victims; television bites them. Nothing can be further from the fact. It is the children who are the most active in this relationship.

Newcomers are not aware of the real relationship between the two concepts, use and influence. Today we know that different ways of using a medium or a content lead to different influences, and vice versa. Children using a medium with the intention to learn
about a specific technical detail will for instance learn this, while others don’t. And on
the other hand: different influences of media at one point in time may lead to different
use at another point in time. It has for instance been documented that heavy TV view-
ing in early childhood often lead to a higher viewer competence among children, they
‘read’ TV in a more sophisticated way and may also have a better understanding of the
difference between fiction and reality.

The most important factors behind the use as well as behind the influence lie in a
complexity of structural and cultural conditions of social and individual character. There
is an ongoing interaction between uses and influences of media, throughout the years of
childhood and youth. By studying this dynamic relationship we will have the best to learn
more about “what the new media mean to the development of children today”. The so
called circular or spiral model is thus a more adequate model for the relationship between
the child and the medium than the linear model.

An important reason for the lack of insight is that newcomers to research on this area
today often come from other disciplines than media studies, for instance pedagogy, lit-
erature, cultural studies, anthropology etc. The researchers and their supervisors have
their competence built on other theories than theories of media and communication. The
researchers intend to use a multidisciplinary approach, but what they present as the media
theoretical part of it usually is a stereotyped version of “the two competing traditions”: studies of influences vs studies of uses of media.

On this background I welcome the work of Ellen Wartella as a good example of a
project which combines the interest in influences and in uses of media (as well as in
content).

The crucial question in this project is in my opinion the question about the ways in
which the presentation of content shapes its acquisition and impact. You say: “In particu-
lar, we need to know whether there are differences in the way information is received
from or given to different dialogue partners, including real people, fictional characters,
computers, and intelligent computer agents”.

To me it seems obvious that there are differences; the question is what are the differ-
ences? What does these differences mean to the way we communicate, to what we com-
municate and with whom we communicate? As a parallel to the changes (social, cultural etc.) related to other technological communication revolutions (printing machine, telegra-
phy etc.) the new interactive media change the communication pattern of today –
among children and youth as well as in the society as a whole. Already now we register
what seems to be an increase in total communication between many youngsters because
of the mobile telephone. It has also been said that the emotional and social aspects seem
to increase more than the informative part of the messages through these telephones.
There is much speculation, and so far little knowledge. Probably the total communica-
tion pattern in society will be more differentiate, and we will see that the new media will
replace the old ones on some areas but not on all. The old media won’t disappear but
change their functions.

To get knowledge about this many different approaches must be used. The presenta-
tion by Wartella of her project doesn’t tell us much about methods. Many of us would
have liked to get at least some tentative information about to which degree she plans to
use different methods. Her overarching theoretical approach – with reference to Mead,
Vygotsky, Bakhtin and other relevant theoreticians – show that she is aware of the ex-
tremely complex interactive processes she will have to analyse. She must focus on con-
tent, as well as use, reception and influence. It also shows that it will be necessary to use
qualitative methods, as well as quantitative. In line with this her reference to socialization theories points to the need for analysing the contexts of the communication acts, as well as the different subcultures of the youth. Communication doesn’t take place in a vacuum – even as regards the new interactive media the old saying holds true: the context is as important as the text.

In many ways the project by Wartella is in accordance with the ideas of Kirsten Drotner, whom we heard earlier on this conference. She suggested we should undertake more integrative media research, and work more on conceptual confluence. She pointed to the need of including analyses of content as well as analyses of uses. Wartella includes not only the two, but all three elements – in her project. They all are important. It will take an enormous amount of heavy work until we reach a point we could call integrative research on children and media, but Wartella’s project is to be seen as an extremely valuable contribution towards this goal.
It seems that Scandinavian media research over the past 10 years has finally reached a stage at which the construction of media histories has become important. There has, of course, always been a historical dimension in media studies, and some of the early studies were in fact very historic, dealing with the rise of the press and democracy. And in every Scandinavian country we have also seen a number of historical monographs on both print media and audiovisual media and film. But what we are talking about here is not just the work of individual scholars or research on single media, but the nearly simultaneous projects in all countries to construct a more coherent national media history with a broader coverage of all or at least important aspects of several media. The construction of a separate, national media history is a convincing sign of a mature media discipline.

The Nordic countries have many social and cultural similarities and constitute a perfect area for a more regional media history: a regional history of media in a part of Europe that has been greatly influenced from the outset not just by ideals and programs from other European countries, but also by those from the much earlier developed and much more powerful American media and culture industry. Nevertheless what we have seen is a development of national media history projects in Scandinavia, very much focused on finding the specificities of each national media culture, specificities that are certainly there. This is not surprising since the media thus far have been very important for the construction of the early quite socially divided nation state (especially through newspapers) and for the stronger democratic and intentionally more homogenized and interconnected modern national welfare states (especially through radio, TV).

The media have helped to construct a modern nation state and create a public, national forum and in fact also to circulate cultural traditions and democratic values and debate. They have also created strong confrontations among different social and cultural classes and different forms of cultural taste, and the media have been caught between groups of society experiencing media as the cause of cultural and democratic decline and other groups seeing media as the expansion of democracy and a common culture. But in this
media melting pot of lifestyles and cultural forms – this mixing of traditional local communities and bigger urban communities in front of the same transmitter, the same screen – the mass media have certainly had an important role in the construction and transformation of national spaces.

But from the very beginning, this construction of a national media culture, a common cultural space of different traditions and lifestyles, has also been influenced and deeply connected to a global space. Even if the concept of a national media history may still be valid, it is also increasingly problematic: The digitalization and convergence of media and the strong moves towards a globalized network society are changing both our conceptions of the old media and the reality and structure of a new media culture. The nation state as a historical construction is losing many of its essential functions and boundaries. The very object of a media history is thus being transformed at the precise point at which the first wave of Nordic media histories has been published.

However, as I have already stated, national media histories must be written first, the empirical data must be collected and interpreted, before we can move on to media histories that are in a more direct sense conceived as part of a global media history. But although the concept of a national media culture is institutionally important, the Nordic audiences have for many decades been living in a culture extending beyond the national: they are also Scandinavians and Europeans, though sometimes reluctantly or even in a hostile way, using the dissociation from the already incorporated Other to try to define a national essence. In all Scandinavian countries, we also know that Anglo-American culture on all levels is the ‘lingua franca’ of globalization, especially as concerns music, films, TV fiction, etc. But although this may be conceived by some as a threat to a national, cultural identity, globalization is in fact as old as the Bible. From the beginning of time, all cultural processes have involved a generic mix of ‘us’ and ‘them’, whereby things once belonging solely to the Other become genuinely ours over the span of a few centuries. And this phenomenon is not only tied to popular culture: the print and music cultures of the 17th and 18th centuries tell a story of globalization and cultural formats that travelled rapidly across borders. What may characterize the late 20th and 21st centuries is the technologically that increased the ways by which and speed with which cultural globalization takes place.

As I will point out in the following, although the now already publish Nordic media histories are to varying degrees focused on national media history, the Scandinavian theories and models underlying the writing of media histories have been open to an alternative model. Many researchers behind these media histories have tried, at least conceptually, to dissociate themselves from: a) a very national concept of media; b) a very traditional institutional and top-down concept of media; and c) a very static and traditionally literary concept of media texts. The ideal has clearly been to develop a more integrated and interdisciplinary writing of media history. But an ideal conceptualization is one thing, and the actual strategies, narratives and models used in the writing of the ‘national’, Nordic media histories another. The Nordic countries have much in common, and the basic developments in the Nordic media culture are very redundant from one country to another, as becomes clearly visible when comparing their national media histories. In the writing of the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish media histories, however, this similarity is not mentioned, and each national media history is often written as if the national development were unique. At the same time, the Scandinavian media histories are also very different in terms of both the theories and methods used and the dominant perspective.
Culture, Genre, Reception

In 1990, before the national, Scandinavian media history projects took off, SMID in Denmark discussed media history at their annual meeting. Hans Fredrik Dahl (later a prominent figure in the writing of Norwegian media history) was there and spoke in favour of a media history concept separate from the literary tradition of the aesthetic history of the single autonomous work. He also rejected technological and institutional history as the main perspective of media history, and instead argued for a social and cultural history of mentalities as a model for media history. (Dahl 1990: 12)

Dahl’s 1990 model of media history

- Social and cultural history of mentalities
- Aesthetics of habits and everyday life (ritual, repetitive)
- Culture of reception
- Nation in global framework

In his article, Dahl correctly points to the need for a media history as cultural history, rather than literary history. His understanding of mass media and mass communication is founded on an aesthetic of habits and everyday life rather than the aesthetics of the singular work and the high culture art concept. Dahl makes two additional important points in his article: a national history cannot be written unless it is clearly imbedded in a global framework, because a large part of media history is based on repetitive, serial formats that appear in all countries. He also points to the need to conceptualize reception not just as a national phenomenon, but as a phenomenon related to a large number of transnational phenomena. He therefore at least partially opposes the idea of media as an important factor in the construction of national, cultural identities, rather seeing it as a mediator between the global, the national and the local.

In his theoretical model for the writing of media history, Dahl clearly makes a polemic demarcation concerning the literary aesthetic model of historical development and the general moral rejection of mass media and popular culture to be found in many traditional literary histories. However, in his polemic eagerness, he almost ends up in the opposite position concerning the textual side of media history: that everything in mass media can be described as repetitive, serialized and basically mainstream, everyday culture and aesthetics. It would be wise here to remember Umberto Eco’s famous attack on the modernist notion of innovation and repetition, and the general understanding of popular culture as merely repetitive and high culture as always innovative (Eco, 1985). The interaction between repetition and innovation is just as crucial for media as for film and literature, for popular culture as for high art, but we tend only to see it in the field of media, whereas film and literature tend to stand out as more autonomous aesthetic sectors. High culture and art are institutionally defined in opposition to each other, but in fact very often interact and respond to the same basic developments. There should be no difference between a media aesthetic and a literary aesthetic – there is only one aesthetic.

If we look at the three main generic super genres of radio and television: Fiction, Non-fiction and Entertainment, it is easy to point to very long-running formats and series in all three areas: news-programs, soaps and quiz shows, for example. But even when there seem to be many basic repetitive patterns, it is also easy to find very important historical shifts and innovations as well as to point to how national products differ from glo-
bal formulas, though there is heavy influence from global media and interaction between
global and national in media. The global formula *Big Brother*, for instance, clearly de-
veloped very differently in Denmark and Germany, in terms of both the filling out of the
formula, the casting, the unfolding of the narrative, and the reception. The German ver-
sion focused much more directly on the sexual taboos and games, whereas the Danish
version turned into a meta-play for and against the program (Bondebjerg, 2002). And if
we take a closer look at other program genres: documentaries, TV-theatre and miniseries
and programs for children and youth, for instance, we find not only exceptionally inno-
vative programs, but also national formulas that contradict the notion of a global media
culture without any particular national specificity and solely based on a few repetitive
transnational formulas. In fact the nature of the global is misunderstood if it is only in-
terpreted as the same global formulas existing everywhere, just as the national is misun-
derstood if it is conceived as only essentially national. What we are facing is an increas-
ingly messy melting pot of globalization involving a great deal of cross-fertilization, a
phenomenon often called ‘glocalization’.

I will argue, therefore, that what is needed in the construction of a national media
history is a combination of elements of a more institutional history, *a history of the aes-
thetic of programs and genres* and *a cultural history of media reception*. This can, of
course, never be merely a national history, as indeed no other history of art, literature and
communication can be: the global, the national and the local are intimately connected,
not just in our era of intense globalization, but also in earlier historical periods (Held et
al., 1999). But as we shall see in my analysis of the historical models used in
Scandinavian media histories, the national has a prominent place, although with differ-
ent emphases across different histories. To mention just one example: Dahl and
Bastiansen’s work on NRK, *Over til Oslo* (Dahl & Bastiansen, 1999), especially the third
volume on the monopoly period from 1945-1981, is a rather closed, national, institutional
history of radio and TV including some important aspects of program and genre history,
but greatly focussed on institutional history. In opposition to this, the other Norwegian
project on both film and TV – the popular ‘coffee table edition’ *Kinoens Mørke – Fjernsynets Lys* (Dahl et al., 1996) – takes a much closer look at national TV and film
history in terms of reception and genre, and in doing so stresses the global aspect of
reception and its influence on the national and the local.

**Models of Media History: A Theoretical Outline**

Although media history is clearly an area demanding a broader framework of mentality
history, of cultural and social contexts and a strong dimension of reception, this does not
undermine or contradict the need for an aesthetic genre perspective. On the contrary, I
would put it very strongly and say, that any cultural and social history of the media is
invalid if it doesn’t include the content aspect and the general and specific aesthetic,
discourse and rhetoric of the main genres. It is, of course, completely acceptable to write
special monographs focusing on more specific and narrow aspects of media history. But
when we construct and write an authoritative, national media history, we need to develop
a cross-disciplinary theoretical and methodological approach and we need to combine the
different aspects of institutions, genres and audiences in a context of broader cultural and
social history.

It is, of course, no easy task to write such a comprehensive and broad media history,
not least because the empirical data on audiences, the programs themselves and even the
more institutional dimensions are difficult to obtain. Especially when trying to write not
just the history of radio and television, as Swedish media historians have done, or TV, film and radio history, as the Norwegians did, but all types of media from print to computer, as the Danish boldly set out to do, one must have a fairly broad scope of investigation and a vast ocean of empirical data, often difficult to access and analyse (see also Klinger, 1997). Research in media history is a broad area linked to social, technological as well as economic forces, imbedded in power structures and institutions; media are related to cultural domains both on an institutional level and on a more content- and product-oriented aesthetic level; and media are certainly tied in many ways to everyday life through the reception and use of them in different segments of society. In the following presentation of theories and methods in media history, I will follow a rough trisection of dimensions:

- The social and institutional dimension
- The cultural-symbolic dimension
- The everyday culture dimension

I will return to the specification of these dimensions, but let me first make a short reference to the writing of film history, a tradition that for obvious reasons is much more developed and institutionalised than a broader media history. In Allen and Gomery’s definition of basic forms of film history (Allen & Gomery, 1985), they identify at least four different forms of focus in film history:

- **aesthetic history** (auteur, individual works, genres, etc.)
- **technological history** (sound, film cameras, digitalization, etc.)
- **economic history** (the market vs. public funding, studio system, etc.)
- **social history** (production structures, audience studies, cinema as social and cultural mentality history)

Now we can find prototypical examples of works on film history that focus narrowly on one of these aspects or combine several or all. But if we look at the international standard textbook by David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, *Film History. An Introduction* (1994 and later editions), we find an expanded theoretical and methodological statement on writing film history that argues for an integration of dimensions, although with emphasis on a special understanding of aesthetic forms.

Bordwell and Thompson identify three types of motivations and principal questions underlying the writing of their film history:

- **The change in normalization of dominant film uses**: combinations of film form, film style, film modes becoming global or national standards (the Hollywood system, the European art cinema, etc.)
- **The influence of structures of film industry**: modes of production and distribution (industrial, artisan, other forms)
- **Cross-cultural processes**: national and international influences on film form, production

Now Bordwell and Thompson clearly take as their starting point an aesthetic-formal perspective, a perspective, however, which doesn’t just reflect history as a string of works, but as a process of interaction among dominant and emerging modes, genres and
types of films. They therefore see films as imbedded in a broader institutional and social perspective of production, distribution and use. Their film history tries to describe how things were, to bring forth hard evidence and facts, as well as to explain and interpret – to confront history with how and why questions. The explanatory frameworks are many: chronology, periodization, causality (individual, collective and structural) and influence/significance (intrinsic-artistic, influence, typicality). The narrative presented in Bordwell and Thompson’s book is the counter-argument to the rejection of media history as aesthetic genre history: it is in fact a formal-aesthetic history with a broad, social and cultural context. One could argue, however, that the formal-aesthetic perspective results in the narrowing and near disappearance of reception as a more concrete cultural and empirical phenomenon.

But let me now return to a more specified segmentation of the three media historical dimensions outlined above:

- **The social and institutional dimension**
  - Technology (traditional technologies – digitalization and convergence)
  - Economic conditions: market vs. public sphere
  - Institutional structure and political and ideological ‘contract’
  - Production practices: individual – group – management
  - Interaction between media sectors and other sectors
  - National, local and global dimensions

- **The aesthetic, cultural-symbolic dimension**
  - Media as part of ongoing development (modernization, democratization, etc.)
  - Change in mentality over time: periodization
  - Genres as cultural-symbolic discourses reflecting and negotiating fundamental stories and values
  - The text-category: singular works – works as prototypes of generic corpus – the super-text (flow and schedules)
  - Quantitative and qualitative textual analysis
  - Intertextuality and intermediality

- **The everyday culture dimension**
  - The everyday contexts of media use (ethnography, memory)
  - Relation between use of different media
  - Quantitative, demographic data – lifestyles
  - Qualitative data on specific programs
  - Reviews and public media critique and debate
  - The global in the local

Thus, media historians must see media as part of the institutional infrastructure of society and culture. The media produce and communicate under the influence of technological conditions and development. They act inside a framework of a certain general contract with society and through interaction with other media, other social and cultural institutions and under the influence of local, national and global forces and traditions. The public service ideology or the Hollywood code constitutes such a contract, trans-
formed during the course of historical development. The public service ideology has undergone drastic changes in the past few years, for instance under the influence of digitalization, media convergence and increased globalization. The institutional dimension can be used as a more generalized framework of the media history narrative, but will often result in a very concrete, personalized approach as well. Leading producers and figures in media history will be used as important 'characters' in this kind of narrative, just as political dimensions of regulation or market forces will be important elements in the search for causality and explanations. Examples of media histories with a clear institutional main focus and perspective are Dahl and Bastiansen's NRK-history and Stig Hadenius's volume in the Swedish media history, *Kampen om monopolet* [The Struggle for Monopoly](1998). Both these media histories combine structural institutional explanations with detailed accounts of political and institutional conflicts and negotiations between main characters that have influenced the development.

Media historians must secondly see media as part of an aesthetic, cultural symbolic universe, a network of discursive structures that reflect and influence historical development and the mentality of specific periods. All media histories search for systematic criteria for periodization, whereby a number of important determining factors interconnect and provoke a slow or fast change in the whole media culture. These are usually based on either institutional factors, important shifts in the generic system and the discursive regimes or on a combination of external factors and media developments. As regards newspapers, radio and television, the design or composition of the flow or the schedules is often an important empirical data element in these kinds of explanations.

In their eye-opening book *The form of news*, Kevin Barnhurst and John Nerone tell the history of American newspapers based on the design of the newspaper-page, from which they generate a special social meaning and relation between newspaper and reader. They combine a history of form (technique and aesthetic) with social and cultural history (meaning and ideology). The periodization and social meaning and form develop through *stylistic regimes* from the traditional to classicist and high and late modernism, *types of production* from industrial, via professional to corporate form and with three different ideals of *communicative relations or communication metaphors*: Department store, Social map and index (Barnhurst & Nerone, 2001: 20).

**Barnhurst & Nerone**

**The Form of News**

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Another recent and good example of this form of aesthetic, cultural-symbolic and discursive history is Stig Hjarvard's *Tv-nyheder i konkurrence* [TV-news in Competition], which explicitly combines the sociological theories of institutions and structuration (Giddens) as a material and mental resource and the study of aesthetic and discursive structures and their development over time. Qualitative analysis and case studies of selected news programmes are combined with more quantitative content analysis. The periodization of the news discourses is partly based on the shift in dominance and com-
bination of basic news elements and themes and on a parallel shift in relations between TV-news and the symbolic concept of the audience (Hjarvard, 1999: 175).

Three Phases of Political TV-News in Denmark

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<th>Late monopoly</th>
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It is interesting to note that a similar approach has been adopted by Monika Djerf Pierre and Lennart Weibull in the third and last volume of the Swedish media history, *Spegla, granska, tolka* [Mirroring, Interrogating, Intepretation] (2001), in which they see the development of news and topicality as a story of the relation between society, the political institutions and the media, on the one hand, and the relation to the audience, on the other. The four periods identified produce a very different journalistic rhetoric and discourse and very different concepts of society and the audience: ‘upplysning’ [information], with a very passive concept of the audience and a very strong sense of society’s responsibility and the media’s role subordinated to that responsibility; ‘spegling’ [mirroring], with a more passive search for reality and facts; ‘granskning’ [interrogate], in which the media became more independent and critical towards society, a kind of watchdog for the audience; ‘tolkning’ [interpretation], indicating a more popularized and user-oriented form of journalism.

In the aesthetic, cultural-symbolic approach to media, the question of what constitutes a text in media history is also a much debated and multifaceted issue. Following Dahl’s attack on the overly single-work-oriented aesthetic approach, another historical tendency is not to deal with individual programs and more qualitative, deep-textual analysis of prototypical examples, but instead to focus on programming, flow and thus the ‘super-text’ of media. The relation between generic categories on a schedule, the themes taken up over a longer period, the relation between fiction, non-fiction, and between information, culture and entertainment etc. can be studied in order to find the ‘institutional text’ of a specific media. The difference between for instance a public service channel and a commercial channel is usually quite clear on this super-text level. But also the way the programming schedule is structured in specific time-slots and directed towards specific segments of implied audiences can lead to more general conclusions concerning the symbolic-cultural level of media. One recent Scandinavian example of this is Henrik Søndergaard’s *DR i tv-konkurrencens tidsalder* [DR in the Age of TV-Competition]. The structure and organization of flows and programming are important parameters in media research and can help identify and corroborate periodization and major shifts. But they cannot replace the analysis of more qualitative element of genres and typical programs: programs or at least types of programs constitute the core of the cultural history of both production and reception. Programs and the experience and influence of programs are what media history is centrally about: we don’t experience technology and media institutions as such, we experience and use programs or content of any kind.

The last dimension of media history research is the level of everyday culture and reception, which involves studies taking their point of departure in either the way people use and talk about media and specific types of programs in a qualitative reception per-
spective or through ethnographic studies of contemporary audiences or memories of older forms of media use. This approach can also be combined with more quantitative data, not always available in older periods, but especially interesting if they reflect demographic differences in regions, education, social status, cultural habitus and lifestyle, gender, generation, etc. Two recent examples in Scandinavian media history come to mind: Birgitte Höijer’s *Det hörde vi allihop. Etermedierna och publiken under 1900-talet* [We all heard it – broadcast media and the audience in the 20th century] – a sub-study of the large Swedish Media History Project. Here Birgitta Höijer consistently illustrates not just the empirical facts, but the cognitive structures of media use and the relations media established between public and private life. A cultural and social cognitive approach to reception of media content has the potential to fill the gap between more reception aesthetic approaches, on the one hand, and qualitative empirical reception studies, on the other.

Another way of approaching the reception and audience perspective is to search for relations between the way different media reflect everyday life and family norms. Leif Ove Larsen does this in a very convincing way in his study of romantic comedies in Norwegian film between 1950-1965, *Moderniseringsmoro* (1998). A popular discourse and narrative in one medium (the weekly magazines) is connected with the discourse of another popular medium and discourse (romantic comedies). Leif Ove Larsen’s study clearly indicates that films reflect, interpret and interact with transformations in everyday life and with modernization processes and problems the audience can recognize and identify with.

**The Rise of Media History Projects in Scandinavia: Differences and Similarities**

In Dahl’s previously mentioned article from 1990 he notes that, when he was preparing his own NRK-history, he read a number of international broadcasting histories and was struck by the similarities in periodization, explanations and textual forms. His conclusion was, as already mentioned, that in media history the national dimension is substantially less interesting than the international dimension. There is probably some truth to this statement, but as we have seen Dahl himself returns to national specificity and explanations when writing his Norwegian radio-TV history. But at least when considering the Western world, we do often recognize the same kinds of periods, the same kinds of conflicts (between for instance the elite and the popular), the same main genres and the same kind of general development from a public service monopoly, or public service dominance with a few commercial stations, to a multi-channel culture. But at the same time we find striking differences.

Why did England move so rapidly into a duopoly of public service and commercialism before some Scandinavian monopolies where even established? Why did the Americans choose an almost pure commercial and only structurally regulated model? Why has France been characterized by such a strong national bias and control? Why is Germany characterized by regionalization unseen in any other country in Europe? Why is Holland so religiously pillarized? We may be able to talk about periods and tendencies that are cross national and influenced by, for instance, the strong transnational influence from American television and lifestyle, but at the same time it is clear that the explanation for the differences among national media systems observed throughout the past century are to be found outside the media themselves. The national culture and its political and social traditions strongly influence the basic structure and development of the media. Thus
the media are simultaneously profoundly national and profoundly international, and have lately become more globalized at the institutional level as well.

The Scandinavian countries however share many social and cultural structures and values, and therefore it might be expected that the national media histories are variations of the same prototype: strong, monopolized public service institutions that still hold a firm grip on the audience in a globalized network society and that have experienced a number of fairly similar periods of dominant production and institutional ideology. The book I edited in 1996, in which the development in each Scandinavian country is analysed, confirms this (Bondebjerg, 1996). In my own article on Danish TV, I proposed a periodization based on both the programming structure and the relation with the audience: Paternalistic period (1951-1964), Classic public service (1964-1980), Mixed culture period (1980-). In articles by Henrik Bastiansen and Madeleine Kleberg on the Norwegian and Swedish development, respectively, these three periods, with small differences and some shifts in end-point years, are basically confirmed. However Finland and Iceland reveal somewhat different developments based on specific national differences.

But even though the historical developments of the Scandinavian media cultures have great similarities, the models for writing media history and the theories and methods underlying the Scandinavian media history projects are very different, although a mainstream tendency towards traditional institutional history is very prominent. In Sweden, Stig Hadenius, Lennart Weibull and Dag Nordmark in 1991 launched the project *History of Swedish Broadcasting Media* (Hadenius et al., 1992), in which the focus is only on radio and television. The project on broadcasting media is based on a number of specific sub-studies, separately published (Bokförlaget Prisma, Stockholm), and three volumes that summarize the individual studies. The first volume (Stig Hadenius, 1998) focuses on the institutional history of broadcasting, the development of media in relation to questions of technology, economy, the state, popular movements, political parties and other institutions in society. The questions address which forces have influenced the organization, economy and policy of broadcasting media. The focus is not just national but also on comparative studies of influences from other broadcasting systems in Europe in particular. The two subsequent volumes focus on program production: one volume focuses on cultural programs, entertainment, fiction, children’s programs and documentaries (Dag Nordmark, 1999); the second volume is dedicated to news, information and factual programming (Djerf Pierre & Weibull, 2001) in a broader sense, including sports programmes.

In his introduction to the volume on fiction, culture and entertainment, Dag Nordmark, who has a background in literary studies, clearly states that the focus of the book is “the composition of programming and the gradual change over 70 years” (Nordmark, 1999: 18, my translation). The focus is on genres and the super-text of television, the programming within a certain main area. He also underlines his special interest in genres specific to TV. However he also addresses the ongoing cultural conflict between “education and entertainment and how these have influenced each other” (Nordmark, 1999: 18, my translation). In other words, this is a media history based on genre and cultural history. It is clearly different then from the first and very institutional volume. Nordmark does take reception into consideration, partly in the cultural sense by looking at the conflict between the elite and the broad audience, partly through analysing more quantitative data on listeners and viewers. But the main focus is on genre and culture.

In their introduction to the volume on news and topicality, Monica Djerf Pierre and Lennart Weibull also indicate a clear genre and culture approach, but they focus much
more on the relationship between discourses in news and topicality and a more general dimension of mentality history: “Our perception of the world, our mentality is largely formed by sounds and images from radio and t.v.” (Djerf Pierre & Weibull, 2001: 11, my translation). They raise four issues: the relation between journalism and other social institutions; the reaction to and reception of journalism; why journalism has changed and what caused this change (institutional, international influence, individuals) and finally the influence of journalism on changes in society and the development of democracy. This is a rather traditional approach it seems, but their periodization is pretty daring, since it is based on discursive arguments, or as they say: “the fundamental ideas in journalism, the journalistic logic that characterizes a period.” It is a discursive point of view not only found in journalistic genre-structures and rhetoric, but also in the implied audience of the journalistic discourse. Thus the periods are defined according to how the journalistic discourses position themselves towards the audience and the social and political institutions, which is clearly visible in the metaphoric title of the four periods identified: Upplysning [Information], (1925-1945), Spegling [Mirroring], (1945-1965), Granskning [Interrogation], (1965-1985) and Tolknings [Interpretation], (1985-1995).

Much more traditional and also cautious is Henrik Dahl’s impressive three-volume work on NRK’s history (Volume 3 written together with Bastiansen). In the first volume on the years 1920-1940, Dahl spells out his theoretical position and method. He defines his approach as a special point of view, looking for the connection between technology and culture, economy and administration. He focuses on broadcasting as a system of independent but connected parts. Dahl, however, makes a very clear demarcation: he is studying the institution, not primarily programs and not primarily audiences and reception. Both have a role to play, but the main focus is: “The radio sends out the programs, but only some of them come back to the institution as reactions through debate or political demands. That is what this book is about, not how broadcasting has formed society, but how society has formed broadcasting and how broadcasting has formed itself.” (Dahl, 1999, bd. 1: 11, my translation). Being a more traditional historian, Dahl – quite different from the scholars writing the Swedish media history questions both the value and status of program analysis and reception. The sources are difficult to obtain and evaluate, Dahl states, and the programs are so numerous that it is difficult to determine what should be selected and analysed as typical. Thus Dahl’s media history is quite a clear example of institutional media history in which some aspects of programs and reception are presented, but mostly it is, as he also states in the third volume, an institutional history and a history of political opinions, influences and debates on media institutions.

This Norwegian NRK-history stands quite sharply in contrast to the other Norwegian media history, the project Moving Images in Norway, which ran from 1990-1993 as a joint project between departments in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Volda, Lillehammer and Stavanger. This project, like the Swedish, involved the cooperation of around 70 people, senior researchers, doctoral students and masters students. The results were reported in 18 separate studies covering different aspects of film and television history, and besides these academic reports, five of the senior researchers (Jostein Gripsrud, Hans Frederik Dahl, Gunnar Iversen, Kathrine Skretting, Bjørn Sørensen) published a more popular version of the main results called Kinoens mørke – Fjernsynets Lys. Levende bilder i Norge gjennom hundre år [The darkness of cinema – the light of television: moving images in Norway through one hundred years], Dahl et al., 1996.

The main characteristics of this Norwegian project is that it definitely takes the point of view of the audience and at the outset belongs to the model of an everyday culture
media history. But the project very strongly leans towards the aesthetic symbolic model, since its focus is on text and context as part of reception history. Jostein Gripsrud indicates in his presentation that, in reception history, there is a necessary focus on typical texts so that reception studies do not “lapse into general social and cultural history” (Gripsrud, 1994: 17). In the Norwegian project, the focus is on the text in its institutional contexts and its meeting with a historically situated audience. As a consequence, the project, among other things, not only systematically analyses the primary texts of the films and TV-programs, but the secondary texts as well (fan magazines, popular weeklies, studio publicity, film reviews, etc.). The project not only used quantitative data on the audiences and their viewing preferences and behaviour (cinema-TV audience statistics and top-lists of the most popular films and programs), but they also included and called forth tertiary texts. This was done through a national campaign asking people in Norway to send in memoirs concerning cinema and early programs in general as well as particular films, programs and stars.

This focus indicated that, for instance, American films and TV-programs are given as much space as national programs, because – seen from an audience point of view – American products have made up between 50-80% of the viewing experience for Norwegian audiences. The construction of a national visual culture is not neglected and underestimated, but seen through the eyes of the audience, it is integrated with or related to global cinema and television. Visual culture formations are part of a wider realm of identity and modernization, as Gripsrud formulates it:

Through the institutions of cinema and television, filmic texts have in particular worked in relation to the desires and anxieties of highly complex audiences, immersed in the process of modernization. That audiences have been complex, divided along lines of gender, social class, national and regional cultures is of course extremely important. Reception history must try to account for the ways in which these audiences have experienced and made use of films in their attempts at defining their identities, formulating their aspirations and anxieties, in different socio-historical situations. (Gripsrud, 1994: 22)

The Finnish media history is found in both a more thorough three-volume publication and a more condensed one-volume version. My remarks in the following are only based on the condensed volume. It has a certain likeness with the Norwegian NRK-project; it is an institutional history of the development of radio and television from 1926-1996. And it follows a fairly traditional historical narrative from early radio, through radio during the Second World War and the late 40s, finishing with an approximately 120-page-long description of the period from 1949-1996, called a “changing society”. The periodization indicates the major role of television and the “image” of radio and TV in society: the outsider (1949-1964), a pioneer (1965-1969), “captivated by politics” (1970-1981) and finally “one among many on the market” (1982-1996). Finally about 50 pages are devoted to technological history.

Within the individual periods, we find first a systematic account of institutional factors and political framework and then aspects of program history with reference to both program structuring and individual genres. There are also few, but unsystematic, references to reception – both qualitatively and quantitatively defined. And it is altogether a more political, institutional media history than a history of culture and everyday life.

The Danish project (in which I myself played an important role as editor of Volume 3 (1960-1995, Jensen, 1996-97) is, compared with the Swedish and the Norwegian, much broader in terms of scope, the historical period and number of media covered, and it
might be characterized as a pragmatic combination of several perspectives in media history. The project covers the period from 1840-1995 and is subdivided into four main periods, 1840-1880, 1880-1920, 1920-1960, 1960-1995. The Danish media history, as regards its theories and methodologies, relies on cultural studies and qualitative textual analysis, on the one hand, and a focus on audiences and consumption as in the Norwegian project, on the other.

The intention of the Danish media history was to inscribe media in a broader socio-cultural context, to see the media and their content in relation to other cultural and aesthetic forms. The intention was also to focus on both those media and forms of media use that were sanctioned as legitimate and culturally superior by the establishment and the cultural elite and those forms that were given new and stronger circulation by the development of modern technologies and the broader mass public. In his foreword to the Danish media history (Jensen, 1996: 9ff), Klaus Bruhn Jensen also stresses the ongoing dialogue between the local and the national, on the one hand, and the national and the global, on the other. Media history is basically linked to the technological development of mass production and distribution and to the rise of the nation state. The development of modern media is therefore, as Klaus Bruhn Jensen points out, closely related to processes of industrialization, democratization and secularization. The overall historical development moves through three technological changes: printing culture, the traditional audiovisual culture of film, photo and broadcasting media, and the present and future multimedia culture based on computing, convergence and digitalization.

In this process, the media surely contributed both to the forming and construction of a national identity and a national public sphere with new relations between centre and periphery and to the expansion and transformation of national and local spaces in light of trans-nationalization and globalization. The Danish media history unfolds as a story of how the media interact with the construction of this national and global space and how they interact with the general democratization and spreading of information, in relation to which we also see the conflicts between local cultures and the centrally constructed and institutionalized culture and between elite cultures and mass cultures.

To study and clarify these relations, the Danish media history and the Norwegian film and TV-history both use particularly rich case studies, from which more general perspectives can be drawn. Volume 1, called the “Prehistory of media 1840-1880” mainly deals with the printed media of that period, and earlier, and it role as part of a growing political democracy. On the one hand, we have print media related to a popular taste in one kind of book and periodical, on the other, we have the rise of the educational and informative magazines and newspapers linked to a new political and cultural public sphere. The analysis of these print media thus leads to the description not just of different types of print media and different genres, but also of different audiences and cultures within one developing national culture, which has not yet become a modern democracy. Another aspect is linked to the new and dominant media, the newspaper and the weeklies, and their combination of textuality and visuality. In these print media, a growing number of drawings and later photos spread the national and global world to increasingly larger parts of society. The development of railways and telegraphs and the development of newspapers and pictures/photos knit the nation state more closely together and bring the world to formerly isolated and separate local cultures. But as a case study of one provincial and one Copenhagen newspaper shows, these cultures are still worlds apart. The strength of the combination of a more general historical presentation and case studies is, therefore, that case studies give concrete insight into different worlds. They illustrate the heterogeneity of media developments: the analysis of a national big city newspaper and
a local and regional paper tells us about two worlds and two audiences in one and the same nation (Jensen 1996: 91ff)

Another case study (in Volume 3) show how the moon landing in 1969 and the first global live satellite transmission of Elvis Presley’s Hawaii concert influenced the Danish audience and created a new feeling of global simultaneity. The first in a series of movements towards a more global media culture later developed to the Internet and its interactive kind of specialized global communication system. The point made in the analysis is that this globalization is just a continuation and shift in degree and technology, but not necessarily in nature from earlier mediated forms of the local, the national and the global, and that globalization certainly does not equal homogenisation, but that the local and national levels are still very important and have new possibilities created by technology (Jensen, 1997: 44ff).

**Media History: The Vertical and the Horizontal Axes**

As is probably clear from what has already been said, the Danish media history and in fact all the Scandinavian media histories are fairly chronological narratives of the medium in focus, set in a particular period and described in its broader, cultural context. Only the Danish media history, however, provides a fairly systematic account of the following media: books (although mostly the popular mass literature), newspapers, weeklies and other periodical print media, cartoons, advertising, radio, television, film and new media and in some periods aspects of popular entertainment like circus, music hall, rock and pop culture. The analysis of each of these media takes into account both institutional aspects, important genres and aesthetic forms as well as cultural and social aspects of representation and use.

In each of the organizing periods, the relation between old and new media is clearly indicated in the sense that new dominating media are given priority over older media. At one level then, this narrative is organized as a vertical, chronological story of the development of new technologies and new media, in relation to which other media find a new place in the national media culture. It is a well-known fact that radio and television together changed the use and form of newspapers, that television challenged the traditional cinematic culture, and that the whole system of media since the Second World War has changed the time structure and organization of daily life and the traditional cultural patterns of consumption.

Therefore the vertical story of the different media is also a story about a horizontal context in which media interact with each other and with culture and the life of the audience. From the beginning, the writing of the Danish media history was therefore also defined through a series of more thematically organized descriptions of phenomena that horizontally connect different media, and in each volume there are five identical paragraphs allowing comparison of topics over time: “Danish Media” (dealing with the relation between national products and international import: Literature in Volumes 1 and 2 and the number of domestic and foreign channels-channels in Volume 3) ; “Cultural Places” (indicating typical historical places of cultural consumption in each period: “Literary saloons” in Volume 1, “Public places with illuminated news” in Volume 2 and “Rock festivals in Volume 3”); “Beer for sale” (showing how a popular national product was advertised over time in different media); “Posters” (giving a short history of the poster as medium) and “How is the nation” (which deals with the relation between local and national culture: the number of provincial newspapers in Volumes 1 and 2 and the distribution of different kinds of television technology in Volume 3).
Apart from these perhaps more entertaining glimpses of horizontal lines through history, the chapters dealing with the individual media do, of course, take into consideration the relation between different media and the ongoing inter-medial dialogue or struggle — the struggle and relation between print media and visual media, between radio and print media, between radio and television, and between television and cinema, just to name a few. In the other Scandinavian media histories this principle of a combined horizontal and vertical perspective is also visible. Especially the Norwegian “coffee table version” interrupts the chronological narrative with cases that break the causal more single media-oriented narration. And the Swedish media history also lapses into such illustrative cases. But this approach is clearly strongest developed in the Danish version.

The Watershed of the 1960s According to Nordic Media Histories

My comparative remarks on the overall structure and perspective of the Nordic media histories have identified a very dominant focus on social and institutional media history. This dominates both the Norwegian NRK history, parts of the Swedish radio-TV history and the Finnish media history. Only the Norwegian film and television history and the Danish media history tend to take the aesthetic cultural-symbolic point of view as well as the everyday reception point of view, the Danish in a weaker sense than the Norwegian and mostly using rich case studies. Only the Danish work looks at the more or less total media history, but because of this it doesn’t delve as deeply into institutional history as do the other Nordic books focusing on just radio and TV. The national level plays a very dominant role, again with the Norwegian film and TV history as radically different, and also with the Danish containing a more global focus than the dominant models.

This characterization is, of course, unfair if we take a closer look, because although one of the three dimensions I have defined clearly establishes itself as the main paradigm and main narrative, ‘the national, institutional narrative paradigm’, we have seen for instance a much more differentiated strategy and model in the Swedish media history (with a discursive-symbolic dimension very strongly present). And even in those Norwegian and Finnish presentations where the institutional paradigm is most dominant, the concepts of text, genre and audiences play an important role. Moreover, though the focus tends to be national, the global is not totally absent. But my main point here is that we could still benefit from joint Nordic collaboration on a much more cross disciplinary and integrated media history, with all three main dimensions more strongly represented and with a shift away from national specificity to the regional in a more European and global perspective.

This becomes clear when we enter the narratives and explanations used in the different national versions of the media history of the 60s. If we look at the dominant paradigm first, the NRK and the Finnish Broadcasting history enter this period from a clear institutional point of view. In the Norwegian version, most of the 100 pages devoted to the period 1960-1968 deal with institutional conflicts related to the emerging strength of television and a transition for radio as regards its new functions and relations with the audience. Internal documents and debates, the role of key persons, the conflict about the public service contract are explained with many illustrative details; economic, political, technological and quantitative data on programming and the rise in national coverage are combined into a convincing story of institutional transformation. However another angle is also important in Bastiansen and Dahl’s narrative here: the transformation from a more paternalistic and controlled broadcasting system to a more independent system and the controversies this historical change created. The cases presented are the question of
sexuality on TV, the conflict between modern TV-theatre and popular taste, and the more active role of news broadcast and in relation to the political system. Bottom up broadcasting with a more open attitude towards listeners and viewers and with the integration of ordinary everyday life becomes another trend. The more independent and critical position is continued in the period after 1968, and the more audience-oriented position is also a first step towards tendencies that are becoming much stronger as deregulation sets in. Bastiansen and Dahl in their analysis only have very few hints of globalization. On the contrary they tend to stress that even when a global crisis enters broadcasting media, radio and TV’s function as a national arena.

The Finnish story of the 60s also starts in institutional conflicts, not just between radio and TV, but also between the commercial MTV and the public Finnish broadcasting. But again, although this institutional perspective fills more than half of the pages, the Finnish media history also follows the same kinds of changes as the Norwegian: the transformation from a strong paternalistic paradigm and a television reflecting middle class values to a broader audience orientation, and the move away from a restricted ideology of objectivity and neutrality to more active forms of news and journalism. The relation to the global situation is somewhat more present here, since the special Finnish situation close to the Soviet sphere makes it more salient. Also in the Finnish narrative the struggle between popular entertainment and culture and the TV-theatre and between the new youth culture and the traditional culture are used as inroads to the transformation of the general public service programming philosophy. As in the Norwegian version, however, there is practically no reference whatsoever to the influence of American culture and TV-series and programs. The national is a rather enclosed, institutional world and there is no general reference to the broader cultural and social history.

The Swedish media history cannot directly be compared with the others, since the 1960 watershed is described in each of the three volumes in relation to fiction-entertainment, institutional aspects and factual programs. But if we look at the volume on news and factual programs (Djerf Pierre & Weibull, 2001), the main explanatory framework is globalization and the 1968 movements, which influenced the media and led to a move from paternalism and objectivity to involvement. The concept of authority was changed and with it a new phase (interrogation) in journalism started in which television became part of a more polarized society. This development is followed through a study not just of certain new programs and institutional changes and the people behind them, but also studies of how people understood and related to television and news. Although this story is mostly told as an institutional history, it is a type of media history much more dedicated to broader social history and a genre and reception perspective.

Nevertheless, the approach found in both the Danish media history and the Norwegian film and TV history is much more contextualized. The Danish Volume 3 opens with a broader social and cultural profile of the changes taking place in the development of a modern welfare society, setting the scene from the perspective of everyday life. From that perspective it gives a general overview of tendencies, moving between the construction of a national space and an increasingly globalized space. And finally enter the basic quantitative and qualitative data on both print media and audiovisual media as well as on the changes in social, cultural, generational, geographical divides and lifestyles. Using case studies to enter the world of mediated communication, the Danish media history takes up the rise of advertising and the welfare society, sexual liberation, the globalization of the national space and the cultural divide between popular culture, media culture and the cultural and intellectual establishment. The themes and tendencies are much the
same as those observed in the other Nordic media histories, but the focus and the number of media involved make a difference. After this broader opening, presenting the general development and media culture, the narrative then moves first into a more detailed story of the important youth culture and its relation to music and other media, into advertising, the basic trends in television and radio and on to film and print media.

Also the Norwegian film and TV history takes the broader cultural context as a starting point and uses cases related to some of the basic media genres as a fundamental narrative principle. Like the Danish, it tries to synthesize general tendencies in media culture and view changes from a perspective of changes in the everyday life of the audience. Media discourses and media culture are not so much related to a social and institutional dimension as to a cultural symbolic and an everyday culture. However, once again we see that the main tendencies and cases used to define the 60s are the same: the cultural divide and the challenges to the more normative pre-60s culture exemplified by the quiz genre, James Bond movies and the youth culture in general; the creation of both a national arena or forum (with a royal wedding as the main example) and a global ‘village’ (the televised moon landing); and the youth rebellion, the growth of a more global consciousness and mentality related to, for instance, the role of the Vietnam war.

The explanatory framework used in the Scandinavian media histories to analyse the 1960s shows an obvious similarity in the fundamental changes taking place and refers to the same kind of global-national trends and conflicts. However the media histories taking the national and institutional point of view get into detailed accounts of events and processes that somehow are not genuinely national and they tend to ignore the relation between media genres and the everyday lives of audiences. The dominant paradigm in Scandinavian media history moves the history of media too far from the social and cultural context and too close to a world of only nationally produced TV culture. Of course, only national media research can study national media production, and this work is extremely important. However, when the national media histories have developed a more solid ground, a comparative media history becomes more necessary and possible. But even in the study of a national media culture, the broader global perspective is important, both because global media products have taken up the major proportion of audience use and because global products have heavily influenced national products and production culture.

Towards a Scandinavian and European Media History?

Scandinavian media history research has taken a giant leap from the 90s until today, trying to develop a more comprehensive national media history. There is, however, a great deal left to be done:

• more basic research on individual media
• based on this research, also a future integrative media history focusing more strongly on the social and institutional dimension, the aesthetic, cultural-symbolic dimension as well as the everyday culture.
• comparative global studies of media, media genres and media use

What we have thus far is not even the national media history including all the major media. Apart from the daring Danes trying to cover a long period and many media, most other Scandinavian media histories are divided into radio-TV histories, press history and
film history. And only in Norway have scholars tried to combine film and television, which in many parts of international research are worlds apart.

We therefore are still lacking a broader media and cultural history aiming at what Hans Fredrik Dahl in 1990 called a broader social and cultural history of mentalities and the aesthetics and habits of everyday life. We are also in great need of a media history in which the relation between the national, local and regional inside the individual nation state is more strongly and directly related to the interaction between the different national levels and processes of globalization. To end on perhaps a somewhat lofty note: the way we conceive and construct our national stories and narratives is extremely important for the ways in which we prepare ourselves to understand a future world in which the national dimension of the past century will most certainly change even more dramatically. Media historians will have enough to do to last more than one generation!

Notes
2. This article does not deal with all Scandinavian media histories. The focus is on TV-radio history. Several national film histories have been written and especially press history is a major area not taken into consideration here. Sweden has recently produced a very impressive press history in seven volumes, as well as a shorter and more popular four-volume edition. But the rich field of press history in all Scandinavian countries is not dealt with here.

References


The Nordic peoples, creators of ancient sagas, are fond of history – and also of media history. A number of recently completed research projects have appeared in the shape of multi-volume studies of media history, projects which in other countries probably would have ended up being published as monographs. It is not easy to explain this particular Nordic love for large-scale series. Maybe it has something to do with the size of these countries – maybe small nations harbour favourable conditions for overview and transparency, leading them to prefer grand, national syntheties rather than single-volumed studies.

Or what do you get out of the following facts:

The Finns have just put out nothing less than a 10 volume history of the Finnish press, while the standard history of the British press covers a modest two volumes (Koss 1981/84). In addition, the history of Finnish broadcasting covers three volumes plus an additional volume in English. The recent Danish Media History adds up to three handsomely produced volumes. A Swedish press history is out just now, with two out of altogether four volumes in print. Very delicious, very large scale. To be completed in a couple of months is a fifteen or so volume series of studies covering the history of Swedish broadcasting. Indeed, within a remarkable short span of years, “media history” has definitely made itself felt as a heavy contribution to media studies in this part of the world.

And this seems to go on, as I can demonstrate through a short glance at the situation in Norway. A three-volume history of Norwegian broadcasting was completed two years ago. A projected 4-volume history of the Norwegian press is scheduled to be launched in 2010; preparations are just now being made within a planning committee. And a two volume history of cultural & media politics has just been commissioned, to be completed as a collective research project at the Institute of media & communication in Oslo.

The love of history in the Nordic countries is all the more remarkable as the sheer concept of “media history” is a fairly recent one. When the Nordic media research conferences started to convene in the 1970s, there was no such thing as “media history”, in fact the term itself was not yet coined. A study group of that name came into being in the late 1980s. Today, the Media History Conference Group is the largest one in work, encompassing none less than 21 research papers.

We may wonder a bit about this, as the turn to history has occurred at a time when the media situation in general has changed deeply. Indeed, as all these huge volumes have
been written, the media scenery has transformed almost beyond recognition. The computer/network media, the mobile phone phenomenon, the growth of games and of “palm” media – all these are introducing completely novel issues into media studies. The two plenary lectures we have enjoyed listening to at this conference, the one on new media by Kirsten Drotner and the other about “new media, new generations” by Ellen Wartella, could simply not have been delivered only ten years ago. What catches our imaginations today are totally novel issues as seen from the horizon of the 1970s and even the 1980s.

You may understand what this leads up to: We do not escape the awkward question of whether all those history volumes of which we are so proud, may have been more or less in vain – provided we regard them as volumes of living research, addressing the whole breath of media sciences and relevant to us all. Maintaining such ambitions – would we not suspect that the large-scale studies of the past have been a bit overrun by media history itself?

You will expect that I for one, as responsible for some of these volumes, would hesitate in front of such a statement. Indeed I do. To the best of my judgement, there is such an amount of valuable empirical research laid down in these volumes that compared to the situation twenty years ago we have attained a higher level of knowledge and even of research culture. Still, media researchers in the field of history have got to ask themselves the same question as all other working in the field must encounter due to the changing media situation: whence to we go from here? Indeed, what will be expected from the media historian in the future?

We – the media history researchers – have received a couple of suggested guidelines from the panel here this morning. We have been advised to turn to a more comparative approach in our studies, leaving the narrow, national perspective of our studies aside in favour of cross-national investigations. We have also been asked to take up studies in the aesthetic and symbolic field of media, and to indulge in true global perspectives rather than geographically defined ones. Then we have been confronted with the suggestion from Klaus Brun Jensen to move into communication rather than into media studies.

I am personally in favour of most of these suggestions. Indeed, I think they are inevitable in the sense that media research in general – all research that is – will move on in these directions. The reason is that such ideas as those presented here at the panel are in profound accordance with the way we are today, the way we think about the media in the present situation. The questions we pose to history, I need not remind you, will of course always be those suggested by the present.

That our future studies of history should be more comparative than national, goes without saying, if only for the reason that with the present volumes there on the table, a level is now reached from where we can proceed less narrowly, more openly. The quest for comparative research follows so to say form the tendency of the media themselves towards national transgressions. We would all be in favour of – say – a joint Nordic history of media adaptation: a cross-country study of how the various media companies have taken up and adapted international formats & programme solutions to their own audiences. A comparative study of integrated high & low cultural history would also be of considerable interest. Even a Nordic comparative version of the parameters set forth by John D. Peters in his extremely imaginative history of the idea of communication (Peters 1999), would be welcome.

The next suggestion, that we divert our interest toward the aesthetic and symbolic representations of the media, is perhaps an idea with a more subtle implication. I take the accompanying criticism which has been voiced here against “the narrow institutional approach” to mean that we historians should turn to what we once used to all the media
content and its formal sides, rather than stick to the more institutional approach which we have been following in those volumes of history so far. And indeed we will. In fact, we have already started doing so, as we are all part of the general “rhetoric turn” and the equally general and inevitable “linguistic turn” which have swept though the humanities all over the world. For this reason you will find that more recent volumes of media history are pursuing aesthetic elements of history more energetically than former studies. I can testify to this with my own work of broadcasting history, which certainly have been object of this general turn. An additional reason that future studies in history will be less institutional, more aesthetic, is the fact that media institutions generally seem to have lost in importance during the last 30 years. There are no such powerful entities as telecom monopolies or broadcasting monopolies around; there is extended competing and increasing decentralising all though the media field. Our objects of study, formerly dominated by large colosses, find themselves nowadays transformed to combinations of larger firms and tiny, highly potential dwarfs.

And then we will go global – certainly we will. In fact we are in tune already. May I direct your attention to the Conference Group of news dissemination, headed by Jan Ekekrantz. In this group, two papers about the history of news are devoted to “globalisation in news presentations” and in “cross national diffusion of journalistic norms” respectively. Let that be sufficient to show that in these days of globalisation, media research as well as the more specific media history is ready to take its share.

And now to the suggestion that we should devout ourselves to “communications” rather than to “the media”. In a sense I agree, to the extent that we all have undergone a certain “communicative” turn during the last years. Allow me to bear witness myself. When I wrote that part of the Norwegian broadcasting history which covers the 1950s during the summer 1998, I particularly enjoyed working with the history of children’s programmes, as those programmes in the 1950s developed a highly sophisticated level of what we today understand as interactive programming. It was impossible to write this without taking my own grandchildren playing with their Nintendos that summer into account. One could hardly avoid being captured by their intense eagerness, comparing that to one’s own engagement with the “uncles” and “aunts” of the radio studio fifty years back. Communication matters more than before, indeed it does. So of course does the growth of the network media, and the present new interest in the history of the telephone as a precursor of the Internet – it is the same net, actually, which binds these two media together.

But should “media history” therefore be transformed to “communication history”? I doubt. To me, the object of our scientific interest should be the media as institutions. Not institutions defined as companies and firms, certainly, but as social institutions – arenas where roles and modes of activities develop through the mechanism of repetition into growing professionalism. Communication itself is a much less substantial, much more elusive object of study, according to my experience. Consider one particularly impressive but also rather futile contribution to media history through the “communication” approach: Twenty years ago the venerable sages of our science Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier published an extensive collection of studies covering no less a theme than Propaganda and communication in world history (Lasswell et al. 1980). The three volumes obviously aim at a refinement of the communication approach, as media issues and media institutions are left out more or less completely, so as to sharpen the focus on (mainly political) messages throughout the ages. I do not think that such a publication, indeed such an approach, pays tribute to the idea that communication itself is worth studying – that is, studying within one, theoretically unified scope. Indeed these
volumes bear witness of the opposite, as I have argued elsewhere (Dahl 1994:558f.). For this reason I think we should still stick to the study of media as a cultural form *sui generis*.

**References**


“Does Media History have a future?” Two Norwegian media researchers posed the question in a monograph from the Norwegian Association of Media Researchers over a decade ago (Myrstad & Rasmussen 1990:1). In the ensuing years it turned out that historical research on the media most definitely did have a future, not least in the Nordic countries. Major programmes of historical research have since been launched and completed in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and Media History workshops continue to draw large numbers of participants at Nordic media research conferences.

The question today is how to proceed. What next steps should we take in the decade to come?

Any attempts to answer this question should start with a critical evaluation of the research done to date, particularly the research done within the framework of the above-mentioned programmes. The present article represents an attempt at such a critical – and self-critical – perspective on the area, but also an attempt to pinpoint some possible areas for future historical inquiry. In doing so I wish to ally myself with those scholars who emphasize the need, not just to write the history of one or another media corporation or personage, but to analyze media and journalism in the context of the broader process of communication in society. I also think that it would be fruitful to join the research tradition that is commonly described as “a social history of the media” and, from that platform, to develop an institutional and comparative perspective on the history of media and journalism.

I take my starting point in reflections on the Swedish research programme on the history of broadcasting that started in 1990 and was completed in the Fall of 2001. About twenty researchers were involved in the programme, which has produced seventeen volumes. My own experience relates primarily to the project entitled, “Broadcast Media and Society”, for which Professor Lennart Weibull and I were jointly responsible.¹
Studying Journalism as a Social Institution

There are many ways to go about writing media history. The most common approach, in the Nordic countries as elsewhere, is to trace the histories of media organizations, whether individual newspapers or radio and television companies. This approach is often referred to as “institutional histories” (Bondebjerg 2002; see also Weibull 1997, Dahl 1994, Hoyer 1990). But “institutional histories” is a bit of a misnomer in that it implies that an institution is synonymous with an organization. This conception of ‘institution’ is, to my way of thinking, too narrow. In modern institutional theory institutions are often conceived of as sets of norms and practices (patterns of social behaviour) that cut across the organizations in a given social field. They have an extent in both time and space, and one may expect the members of the organizations that maintain an institution to perform certain specific tasks or to satisfy specific needs in society.

In the project, “Broadcast Media and Society” we chose to analyze news journalism as a social institution in this broader sense of the word. Thus, it was important to maintain a distinction between broadcasting organizations and the institution of broadcasting and instead attempt to write a “social history of the media”.

The research approach that produces “social histories of the media” is far from homogeneous, however. Michael Schudson’s seminal book, Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers (1978) and Scannell and Cardiff’s A Social History of British Broadcasting (1991) are both important, but also very different with respect to approach and perspective. None of these writers has discussed his theoretical premises at any length; they remain implicit. In Schudson’s case only a few lines in the entire book:

Where standard histories of the American press consider the social context of journalism only in passing, this work takes as its main subject the relationship between the institutionalization of modern journalism and general currents in economic, political, social and cultural life (10-11).

Nor do Scannell and Cardiff elaborate particularly much, noting only in their introduction:

[A]lthough this book is all about the BBC it is not a history of the British Broadcasting Corporation. ... It ... attempts to account for the impact and effect of broadcasting on modern life in Britain. There are two parts to this project: the first is to describe the actual ways in which broadcasting developed and interacted with the society it was intended to serve; the second is to reflect on those accounts and their wider political, social and cultural implications.

A theoretical starting point that appears to be common among studies of this kind is that they view media and journalism as social institutions that both mould and are moulded by the society of which they are a part. Whatever the case, the above-cited works share this view. Thus, writing “a social history of the media” means abandoning the traditional focus on the history of media organizations in favour of analyzing the media and journalism in a broader institutional perspective. The media are upheld by specific, enduring norms and practices that are reproduced within and among different media organizations. These norms and practices are reflected in the expectations and demands on the organizations on the part of actors outside the organizations and the public at large. It is on these norms and practices that the focus of our project, “Broadcast Media and Society”, rests. They also form the basis of the periodization of Swedish journalism we arrived at.
Historians of the media – be they historians proper, scholars in other branches of the Humanities, or social scientists – commonly structure their material chronologically, dividing it into periods. The bases for the periodization vary widely, not only between researchers, but even within one and the same historical narrative. Sometimes, periods are defined with reference to organizational factors, in other cases according to changes in the surrounding political ‘climate’ or different journalistic practices, etc. In many cases, periodization seems to be primarily a narratological strategy intended to help readers grasp the whole so as to better comprehend its parts. As a consequence, the periodizations are not always systematic or well-founded in theory (Høyer 1998).

If we adopt an institutional perspective, however, periodization is necessarily more than a narratological tool. It becomes an analytical tool that helps us to interpret historical processes. Unlike researchers in the Humanities, who often focus on the distinguishing characteristics of a given period or event, social scientists commonly seek to identify the fundamental motor forces behind long-term social change. Unfortunately, many such histories are imbued with a presumption – implicit or explicit – of “progress” in one or another direction, i.e., they see epochs as representing stages of development in a “natural” (unquestioned) progression toward a higher and better order.

One of the principal conclusions we reached in our project is that it is virtually impossible to speak of trends or “stages” in the history of journalism. We found it more fruitful to discuss various periods that are defined according to the posture journalists assume vis-à-vis the public, on the one hand, and other social institutions, on the other. Thus, the bases for periodization in the study of Swedish broadcast journalism are the dominant characteristics of the logic and practice of journalism. We have identified and characterized four main periods in the history of news journalism in Sweden:

- Enlightenment 3 1925-1945
- Mirroring 1945-1965
- Scrutiny 1965-1985
- Interpretation 1985-

We have chosen to label the first period in the history of radio, 1925-1945, Enlightenment. Radio at this time was very definitely in the service of public authorities. Radio journalism explicitly sought to influence its listeners. The notion of “betterment” was fundamental and pervasive: by listening, the public would become more knowledgeable and well-versed. Radio, however, actively avoided taking part in discussions of politics. The closest to politics that radio came in this period was to define what was “Swedish” and to defend democracy and Swedish institutions. Thus, the task was dual: to disseminate culture and knowledge, and to impart notices from official sources and what, years later, would be known as “pro-social” information.

During the second period, 1945-1965, which we label Mirroring, the posture of journalism vis-à-vis listeners and society gradually changed. What emerged was a greater orientation toward the audience; programming should to a greater extent cater for public tastes and interests. The shift meant that Swedish radio gradually abandoned its earlier paternalism and allegiance to authorities, and programming more and more sought to strike a balance between listeners’ interests and the public good. The ideal of mirroring – to reflect phenomena and events in an objective manner – that news journalists adopted in this period was actually a strategy on the part of radio to neutralize conflicts. All points of view should be represented, and all facets of a problem brought to light. But journal-
ism continued to operate within an established democratic consensus, the community of values shared by all concerned. The norms for good journalism in this period led to the suppression of hostile and provocative viewpoints.

In the ensuing period, Scrutiny (1965-1985), ‘good journalism’ was no longer based on consensus. A radical turnabout occurred, both in the manner in which journalists related to their audiences and in their posture vis-à-vis dominant social institutions. Once again, the ideal of active influence, toward the public and society alike, came to the fore. The task of journalism took a turn toward social criticism: on the one hand, radio and television should help bridge knowledge gaps and encourage people to take active part in politics, on the other, journalists should critically scrutinize holders of power and cast light on the shortcomings and injustices in society. New genres offered platforms for new, confrontative and polarized forms of journalism. News desks gave priority to significance and ‘depth’ rather than eye-witness coverage; the consensus perspective on society was replaced with a conflict perspective.

In the fourth and present period, Interpretation (1985 – ), we note a change in how broadcast journalism relates to audiences. The orientation to the audience has increased. The task of journalism is now to interpret reality for viewers and listeners and to serve as their agent vis-à-vis holders of power. The ideal of active influence on viewers and listeners has receded: instead, journalism has tried to adapt to public tastes. We note increased popularization, with an emphasis on news that has bearing on viewers’ and listeners’ everyday lives, and on sensational aspects. Newscasts are now accessible around the clock on multiple channels, and both audiences and programme output are split up among a growing number of channels, genres and programmes. Genres are blending; new genres like ‘docu-dramas’ and ‘reality soaps’ even blur the fundamental distinction between fact and fiction.

The Reproduction and Processes of Change in Media Institutions

If there are no given stages and directions of development in the history of journalism, how are we to explain why journalism changes? Our starting point in the project was the conviction that an institutional perspective on media history is vital if we are to understand how and why journalism is the way it is, how it reproduces itself, and how it changes over time.

The institution of journalism both moulds and is moulded by the society in which it operates. The relationship between journalism and society is actually many different relationships – to the general public as well as to other social institutions. Unfortunately, audiences have not been given very much attention in Swedish media histories to date. In our project, we considered it important to include the reception of journalism, both to gain a better understanding of the importance of journalism in society and to gain insights as to how conceptions of the audience mould the journalistic institution. We were not able to include all the relevant aspects of the relationship between journalism and its audiences, but we have tried in a systematic fashion to describe how audiences, on a collective level, react to programm output and how they view and listen to programmes. Also, the audience was the explicit focus of a study by Birgitta Höijer, who in the report, “We all tuned in” [Det hörde vi allihop] (1998), probed audience perceptions of radio and television in the 1900s. The audiences of journalism are, however, one of the areas that should be given more attention in future historical studies of broadcasting.
Often, the features of the surrounding society that are assumed to mould the media system and its institutions are referred to as the “context”. Everyone agrees that the context is crucial to an understanding of changes in the media, but exactly what the context consists of and how it should be studied? There the agreement ends. Scholars who have focused on societal forces and their impacts on broadcast media have tended to concentrate on the media’s relations to the powers of state and to political institutions. It is, however, important to broaden the focus to include how other powerful institutions – e.g., the so-called popular movements (trade unions, adult education associations, temperance unions, etc.), other media, and private enterprise – have influenced journalism. Not least the latter. For example, the Swedish broadcasting monopoly was able to prevail more than a half century thanks to an alliance in support of public service broadcasting that united such diverse partners as the broadcasting organization, Sveriges Radio, a bourgeois-dominated newspaper industry, and the labour movement. Thus, institutions that normally had little in common were joined by a common opposition to the introduction of commercially financed television.

We took our point of departure in the assumption that journalism is moulded both by internal, organizational factors and external, social influences. That is to say, it is moulded by circumstances outside the programme companies (e.g., the climate of opinion, political and economic conditions, media technology) and factors and relationships within the organizations (staff, chains of command, and so forth).

As noted above, we defined the different periods of Swedish broadcast journalism according the norms and ideals of journalistic practice that prevailed at the time. As a result, there is a risk that the periods will be static inasmuch as the method emphasizes the dominant ideology, not the forces that militate for change. But as is particularly evident in the history of broadcasting, there has never been total consensus concerning the logic of journalism, either within the broadcasting organizations or in society as a whole. On the contrary, there has almost always been some measure of controversy surrounding what radio and television journalists should and should not do, concerning what constitutes “good journalism”, and the qualifications required to call oneself a journalist. There are always some principles (logics) and practices that are dominant, but they are never universally accepted. Dominance elicits resistance, even in journalism. Resistance gives rise to conflicts, which result in change.

An institutional perspective on journalism is well suited to analyze how institutions arise, are maintained and change as a consequence of, among other things, conflicts. Høyer (1998) advises analysts to “take the fault-lines of conflict into account, between media and other social institutions and between groups within media” as forces for change. We in our project identified five phases of change in Swedish broadcasting history, each characterized by a particular pattern of conflict.

- Centralization 1920-1937
- Emancipation 1937-1955
- Professionalization 1955-1977
- Decentralization 1977-1987
- Commercialization 1987-

In the centralization phase (1920-1937), an ongoing conflict between local and central was very important. Radio had started as a local medium, only a couple of decades later
it had become totally centralized. The prevailing ideology of the time presumed that technological advances would be used to create a modern society. Use of broadcasting in the modernization process presumed centralized management, i.e., on a national basis. Modernization was also centred around the nation’s centre, the modern metropole. Consequently, many sectors of society experienced centralization and nationalization, radio among them.

The emancipation phase (1937-1955) saw a process whereby radio as an institution gradually freed itself from the requirement of always serving the public sector. The first step toward emancipation was taken with a growing awareness that radio was a medium with unique powers and potential. Radio in early days was seen more as a megaphone that made it possible for messages and lectures to reach out to many more people than could ever assemble in an auditorium. Technological progress – especially recording technology – made it possible to free programming from the confines of time and place. Radio could now be more “radio-like” and develop its own discourses. The second step concerned the relationship between radio and the press. The first decade, up to the mid-1930s, the publicly owned radio company was managed by the managers of the Swedish Central News Agency (TT), which was collectively owned by the press. At this juncture, the radio company (AB Radiotjänst) acquired a management of its own.

Whereas the emancipation phase refers to a change in the relationship of the radio company to the powers of state, the professionalization phase (1955-1977) refers to a demand for greater autonomy on the part of programme producers. Significance successively supplanted suitability as a criterion for programme content. Professional news criteria came to be equated with independent, critical scrutiny. Gradually, radio and television emerged as independent social forces. Meanwhile, their claims to power provoked a reaction. Several of the conflicts within Swedish public broadcasting, Sveriges Radio, in the 1970s and 1980s were symptoms of a power struggle in which those outside the arena of professional journalism protested against the dominance of the logic of journalism and the power structure in the company. Women protested against male-dominated conflict-oriented journalism and a masculine editorial culture; branch offices in the provinces complained of centralization and a preoccupation with news and other content that originated in the capital, Stockholm. The critiques activated media policy-makers in the Cabinet and Parliament. Politicians saw a link between the centralization of radio and television and journalists’ claims to power. As a consequence, Parliament voted to decentralize the companies, which marked the start of the decentralization phase (1977-1987).

During the commercialization phase (1987 -), in which we find ourselves today, the play of political forces around public service broadcasting subsided somewhat; instead, a new issue took the stage: the question of what role the public service companies should play in relation to the new, competing, commercially financed radio and television channels. The prime factor for change was the advent of commercial television, distributed via satellite and cable in the late 1980s. Journalistic norms and the journalists’ role have changed in response to an increasing differentiation of the media landscape. Different “journalisms”, adapted to different market segments, have emerged: the homogeneous conception of journalism that had prevailed during the professionalization phase has grown increasingly heterogeneous. The conflict and debate about what constitutes ‘good journalism’ and the question of journalistic credentials has sharpened.
Comparative Media History

Interest in journalism as a social institution implies an assumption that journalistic practices and logics are enduring. The institution of journalism undergoes change, sometimes rapid, sometimes slow, but it does not live a life of its own, in isolation from the rest of society. Instead, it evolves in interaction, both positive and negative, with other social institutions. To examine how different institutional conditions and relationships give rise to different kinds of journalism and how the institution of journalism in turn contributes to reproduce or change other social institutions — politics, private enterprise, organizations in civil society — is, in my opinion, one of the most important tasks before media historians today. In undertaking this task, it would be fruitful, I think, to start with and further develop the theoretical foundations of the broader institutional perspective on media history, and not least journalism history. One possible course might be to establish links with the very productive international research in the area of institutional theory. The relationships between organizations and institutions (norms and practices) and institutional change are frequently in focus in this area, which analyzes how institutions are moulded, reproduced and changed, asking what factors are necessary and/or sufficient to bring about change. Research in the area often takes a comparative approach.

In future historiographic projects on the media I think it will be necessary to consider national developments in an international perspective. The research to date has tended to explain changes in the media in terms of individuals’ enterprising genius or editorial courage, internal administrative policies and decisions and, less frequently, as reactions to social changes on the national level. But, as we all know, the media sector is becoming increasingly international, not to say global. Programme genres and concepts spread like wildfire from country to country, and the changes noted in domestic journalism generally have their counterparts on several continents. Within the Nordic community the parallels are striking when we consider the development of broadcast media, and particularly broadcast news. Our project included attempts to identify the foreign models that inspired developments in Swedish radio and television programming, and we have consistently sought to study developments in Sweden in the light of international trends and developments in other countries. What features of Swedish radio and television are peculiarly Swedish, and what features reflect developments abroad? Is there such a thing as a “Swedish model” of news journalism?

We found many parallels between Sweden and other countries having similar social, cultural and political patterns of development, particularly within the Nordic region. We also found several uniquely Swedish characteristics and phenomena, such as the more or less corporatist relationship between the labour movement, the newspaper industry and the public service broadcaster, Sveriges Radio, and the extensive influence the company was allowed to exert on political policy decisions relating to radio and television. Another more or less specifically Swedish feature was the radical movement in the 1970s to democratize Swedish workplaces, with legislation requiring procedures for extensive staff participation in corporate and organizational decision-making. In the broadcast media Swedish producers acquired a unique degree of leeway which is a key factor behind the, by international standards, intense social criticism that characterized programming during the period.

It is when one tries to make international comparisons that the lack of a comparative perspective becomes painfully apparent. Even though most of the Nordic countries have produced national media histories, few areas permit systematic comparisons. The problem is that the existing Nordic historiographies are national in multiple senses of the
word: they are about national programme companies; the explanatory factors proposed are national; and the results are described and interpreted in national contexts. In historical narratives that are intended for domestic consumption many national idiosyncrasies remain tacit, are taken for granted. But social, political and cultural institutions, traditions, etc., that are common knowledge in, say, Norway are not necessarily known, even to the Norwegians’ closest neighbours. Phenomena like the position of the Lutheran Church in Norwegian society, the epochal, national “language dispute”, the relationship between metropole and the provinces (and vice versa), the political culture, etc., etc.

There is, in other words, a great need for systematic comparative historical media research. The prospects of such research are good – in the Nordic region at least. Obviously, comparative projects will reveal historical similarities and differences between our countries with regard to the media, but even more important, they promise to give us a better understanding of the social conditions (institutional arrangements) that underlie these similarities and differences. They can give us a better understanding of the relationship between media and society in an internationalized world.

Although I share the vision of a comprehensive comparative exploration of media, or perhaps communication, history, I feel that it may not be wise to start out on such a broad front, but instead go into greater depth in selected areas – themes, periods or genres – with a view to developing a systematic comparative approach, with analyses that take their starting point in a common theoretical framework and the same set of research questions.

A study of the professionalization of journalism in the Nordic countries is one interesting possibility. Another might be to explore the points of similarity and difference in the changes in journalism noted during the “commercialization phase” in the 1990s. Both projects have the potential to cast light on interesting differences between the countries with respect to the logic and structure of the field of journalism and the prevailing power structures within the field.

The map that the various historiographic projects have charted to date are not very detailed; there are many blank spaces, i.e., themes, genres and issues that none of the Nordic projects has managed to explore in depth. Each blank spot represents a task for future research.

Meanwhile, it is important for us to continue to examine and discuss the histories already produced – not only their approaches and methods and the research questions they address, but also their findings. What narratives have we spun, and what “truths” about the role and importance of the media in Nordic societies has our research revealed? Any history is a product of the historian’s theoretical perspective and points of departure. That is why it is important for other researchers to be able to analyse our histories anew, from new and different points of view. There is no end to the interpretations a history can lend itself to.

One example of a critical re-reading – in which I am involved – applies a gender perspective to news journalism. In all the Nordic countries, men have long dominated and predominated in broadcast news. There is a tendency for media histories to be devoid of feminine life, and for the void to pass without comment, let alone problematization. In the new project, entitled “Women in the Culture of Journalism”, we are re-reading history through gender lenses.

A greater emphasis on multidisciplinary approaches that can generate new perspectives ought therefore to be very beneficial. The overall vision at the start of the Swedish broadcast media history project was strongly multidisciplinary. In order to stimulate
thinking across academic frontiers, a good number of Swedish scholars from a diversity of disciplines and research traditions – literary criticism, media studies, history, political science, art history, etc. – were invited to take part in a series of roundtable discussions. These discussions resulted in the creation of a research project group. Three comprehensive projects were formulated. But, despite the commitment to multidisciplinarianism at the outset, a researcher from the Humanities was assigned responsibility for culture and entertainment, the social scientists took news and current affairs programming, and the political scientist and historian, broadcast media policy. In retrospect, it would have been interesting to see what might have resulted if the cards had been shuffled. Perhaps the next time around?

Notes

1. The Swedish history of broadcasting programme consisted of three main parts. The first project took an “outsider” perspective and examined the political maneuvering around radio and television. Project leader for this part of the programme was Professor Stig Hadenius at the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication (JMK) at Stockholm University. The project was summarized in a volume entitled “The Struggle for Monopoly” (Kampen om monopolet, 1998). The second and third projects focused on radio and television programming, each treating its own set of genres: the one, drama and dramatic genres, music, culture and entertainment, plus programmes for children and youth, under the leadership of Dag Nordmark, now at Karlstad University, was summarized in the book, “Living Room and Rumpus Room” (Finrummet och lekstugan, 1999). The other project was given the working title, “Broadcasting and Society”. The project leader was Professor Lennart Weibull at the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at Göteborg University. I subsequently signed on to this project as assistant project leader with particular responsibility for certain documentary genres, with an emphasis on news and public affairs. We were also responsible for studying the reception of radio and television. Two studies of the radio and television audiences were initiated in this part of the programme, which was conducted by Birgitta Höijer and Cecilia von Feilitzen. The project was summarized in the volume “Mirror, Watchdog, Interpreter – News and Current Affairs Journalism in Swedish Radio and Television in the 20th Century” (Spegla, granska, tolka – aktualitetsjournalistik i svensk radio och TV under 1900-talet), published in September 2001. This was the third and final book produced by the programme.

The respective project leaders formulated a series of component studies that other scholars were commissioned to execute. Some of the studies were performed by doctoral candidates and were reported as dissertations; others were carried out by senior researchers. The three branches of the programme proceeded independent of one another, without a unifying theoretical framework. The lack of a common framework is also apparent in differences in the studies’ design, choice of approach, theoretical frameworks and, not least, the form of presentation.

2. See, for example, Peters (1999) and March and Olsen (1989); see also Allern (2001) who, based on Cook (1998), discusses how news media may be studied using an institutional perspective.

3. Translator’s note: The Swedish word, upplysning, has a broad range of meanings, from “information/notification” to “enlightenment” (as in the age of Enlightenment). Here, “enlightenment” should be understood dually as “the act of informing” and “education”, “edification”.

4. In the present article I shall not discuss the conceptual and epistemological pros and cons concerning whether our task should be to describe, explain, interpret or understand history, or the debate concerning the potential of historical research to fulfil these tasks. The interested reader is referred to Kjørup (1990), Høyer (1990) and Dahl (1994), among many others.

5. Sveriges Radio was the name of the parent company for both public service radio and television, which in the 1970s were operated by two subsidiaries: Sveriges Riksradio and Sveriges Television, respectively. The parent company was dissolved in 1993, at which time sound radio assumed the name, Sveriges Radio.
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From Media History to Communication History

Three Comparative Perspectives on the Study of Culture

Klaus Bruhn Jensen

Looking Back

Most of the Nordic countries today can boast national histories about most media (for overview, see Bondebjerg, this issue). The available histories allow the authors and the field as such to look back as well as ahead, asking not only ‘how well did we do?’, but also ‘how should we write the second editions?’, and even ‘will there be such a thing as ”media histories,” say, 20 years from now’? My presentation focuses on questions concerning such future perspectives (for a review of past research and a research agenda, see Jensen, 1998, 1999a). My argument suggests that if media and communication studies, as a field, do really well, we will not have to write second editions of our media histories, but can turn to the writing of communication histories. In doing so, we may also advance the interdisciplinary and inclusive study of culture.

Compared to the published volumes from several other countries, the history of the Danish media (Jensen, 1996-7) emphasized the inclusion of all media – from books and pamphlets to television and computers – in a synthetic format. On the one hand, this ambition meant that only a certain measure of detail and depth could be provided in the text itself, leaving additional information to be provided in notes, other references, and, not least, future research. On the other hand, the synthetic ambition paved the way for a variety of comparative points – between single media, and between the media and other aspects of culture and society. Similarly, it is a comparative approach which informs this presentation (see also Blumler, McLeod, & Rosengren, 1992; Jensen, 2000 a), and which points beyond the media as such. In outline, the presentation compares:

• national cultures as exemplified by the Nordic countries;
• popular and elite conceptions of culture and media;
• technologically mediated as well as face-to-face communication.
Comparison Between National Cultures

In the Nordic countries, which are so similar and yet so different, it seems almost inevitable that we should consider comparative studies of media history – the question is how, and at what level of ambition. Most ambitiously, the Nordic region can be seen to constitute a cultural laboratory of sorts, in which the media system of each country may be juxtaposed with those of the rest, and which, in addition, may be compared as a whole with the media environment of other regions in the world. Such analyses could, among other things, serve to qualify reflections on the very category of ‘national cultures’ at a time when these are often said to be in decline (for overview, see Tomlinson, 1999). More modestly, the various Nordic projects of recent years have identified research questions regarding individual media and genres which lend themselves to comparison between the countries. The examples are legion, from the different and changing structures of the newspaper press to the shifting forms of distribution for popular narratives – print, audiovisual, and digital.

A natural first step is for comparative research to piggyback on existing evidence, performing a secondary analysis of the various national data sets and interpreting findings with reference to a common theoretical framework. For this purpose, case study suggests itself as a model (Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000; Yin, 1994). Importantly, case studies are not restricted to single events, settings, or organizations, but can be performed of historical periods or nation states, relying on quantitative as well as qualitative methodologies. Moreover, case studies commonly seek to resolve the tension between interpretation and measurement, and between the meanings and the causes of events – a tension which is as familiar in historiography as it is in media and communication research. One application of this general idea has been developed by Charles Ragin (1987; 1994) with reference to the presence or absence of specific social factors in a given period or region, which might explain a particular course of events or the dominance of certain cultural forms.

Most concretely, there is a market, both intellectually and commercially, for a volume which summarizes findings and insights from the Nordic projects for an international audience, and which outlines avenues for further studies. Research interest in historical issues is clearly growing together with the maturity of the field, and there have begun to appear what Paddy Scannell (2000) has called ”second-generation histories,” addressing questions beyond the basic organization and output of a given medium. A collaborative effort by the Nordic countries would no doubt be appreciated in the international research community at the present juncture, also as an input to theory development in the area, which can be said to lag behind the efforts at documentation. The process of collaboration would, in addition, provide an opportunity for the Nordic research community to compare and discuss, once again, the quite diverse cultures of research that have, in part, shaped the media-historical accounts in each national context. National media histories are the product of national research cultures.

Comparison of 'High' and 'Low' Cultures

Despite attempts to contextualize the analysis of media, the various Nordic histories have, not surprisingly, been informed by the divide between ‘high’ and ‘low’ forms of culture. Media histories predominantly cover ‘low’ culture, or at least the sector and institutions that are responsible for circulating these cultural forms throughout society. This is clear, for instance, in the Danish media history, even while it makes a point of
covering the debate between the two sides of the cultural divide (e.g., Jensen, 1996-97, vol. 3: 56-60). Such a division of labor is far from innocent, and remains to be addressed much more comprehensively, not merely in theoretical terms, but by an empirical effort that would result in an integrative and non-sectarian cultural history.

But, can this be done? And, who could do it? The answer to the first question is that it is already being done on a limited scale. An answer to the second question is that media and communication researchers are perhaps the most natural candidates for the large-scale job. To name two recent examples, Richard Butsch (2000) has written a broad cultural history of American audiences, from popular theater in 1750 to television in 1990, and Michael North (1999) has revisited a wide range of 'high' as well as 'low' publications from the focal year 1922. While 1922 is traditionally thought of as an annus mirabilis of western culture because of works such as James Joyce’s *Ulysses* and T.S. Eliot’s "The Waste Land," North demonstrates in detail the varied ways in which such high-cultural masterpieces relate to and resonate with the wider contemporary culture. In particular, he suggests that, contrary to some theories of modernity which argue that high and low varieties of modern culture came to define themselves, above all, in opposition to each other (e.g., Huyssen, 1986), both forms in fact participated in an aestheticization and formalization of both cultural expression and social interaction. In short, selfconscious formalism in high arts can be seen to have much in common with commodified and mechanically reproduced entertainments.

North’s home field is literary studies, Butsch is a historian; they represent traditional disciplines looking for stronger interdisciplinary perspectives. So far, media and communication researchers have rarely taken up such invitations in practice, perhaps because the first generation of media researchers had to fight so hard to legitimate their own field of study. (For other attempts at comparing ‘art’ and ‘media,’ see, e.g., Pelfrey, 1985; Rush, 1999; Walker, 1994.) It may be time for us to rejoin traditional disciplines after the ‘culture wars,’ this time as the fugitive field which is welcomed back, if nothing else for providing the better explanatory frameworks.

**Comparison of ‘Mediated’ and ‘Non-Mediated’ Communication**

With the increasing centrality of computer-mediated communication in the media environment as a whole, the field of media research has come full circle, returning to basic questions concerning the similarities and differences between ‘mass’ and ‘interpersonal,’ ‘mediated’ and ‘non-mediated’ communication. In other contexts, I have suggested that we speak of media of three degrees (Jensen, 1999b; 2000 b):

- **Media of the first degree** – verbal language and other forms of expression which depend on the presence of the human body in local time-space;
- **Media of the second degree** – technically reproduced or enhanced forms of representation and interaction which support communication across space and time, from print to telegraphy and broadcasting;
- **Media of the third degree** – the digitally processed forms of representation and interaction which reproduce and recombine all previous media on a single platform.

The computer helps to suggest a reconceptualization, not just of the current media environment, but of cultural history, as has often been the case with new technologies. The general point was driven home by the first comprehensive history of the idea of commu-
nication, by John Durham Peters (1999), who found that the very notion of communication only became an explicit and problematic category in response to the growth of mediated communication from the late nineteenth century. Other research similarly has suggested how the fundamental categories of time and space were thematized and rearticulated in the decades around 1900, under the influence of new means of communication as well as transportation (e.g., Kern, 1983).

In retrospect, it appears increasingly necessary to return to the sources, not just of media history, but of communication and cultural history in order to account for the specific difference that media technologies make in different periods. The comparison of, for instance, face-to-face conversation and chatroom interaction in both public debate and research, is only the empirical tip of a theoretical iceberg. The nexus between technological media and oral story-telling, which continues to flourish in many cultures and settings (MacDonald, 1998), is a case in point. The book is another medium which, first, was taken for granted as the norm by most traditional scholarship, and which, next, has been largely neglected by media and communication research.

Looking Ahead

In summary, media and communication research is poised to take a central role in a redefinition of the study of communication and culture. Beyond turf wars with other disciplines, there are good intellectual as well as historical reasons, as outlined here, for taking on this role at present and for exploring new ways of conceptualizing the study of both mediated and non-mediated communication. Together, these communicative practices are sedimented both as aesthetic artefacts and as ways of life – as culture in a descriptive and non-denominational sense, and with important variations across nation states. In addition to interdisciplinary theory development, such an enterprise will require new institutional frameworks, probably a reformation of the university and the establishment of Faculties of Media, Communication, and Culture (Jensen, 2000).

In the short term, then, the field is likely to witness interesting comparative spin-offs from the projects in Nordic media history. In the slightly longer term, the field has an opportunity to revisit its source disciplines, and to reassert an expanded, democratized concept of culture, also in the context of historical studies. In the long term, I suggest that we will have move definitively beyond media history, to communication history, in order to produce a record of how diverse communicative practices accumulate as culture.

Presumably, we can look forward to visiting Iceland again for a Nordic research conference in the year 2021. For that event, I propose a session taking stock of communication history.

References


During the Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research in 1995 in Helsingør, Denmark, a group of researchers sat together to discuss what they should do collectively to continue the work started by various national press history and broadcasting history projects. In 1995, some project results, most notably the Finnish press history project, were already available in book form, quite a few were in progress, while some were just being planned. The most notable project in the last-mentioned category was the Swedish press history project, which, at the time of completion of this piece, had published its four-volume final product. The most recent of the national projects, the Norwegian press history, was probably no more than vague ideas at that time, but is now in progress.

The result of the above meeting was a seminar in Finland in May 1996, which in turn produced the book “Writing Media Histories. Nordic Views” (1997). The foreword of the book ended with the following statement: “Our future aims are reflected in the title of one of the articles: ‘The Need for Comparative Approaches’.” Material was being accumulated on the media systems and different media in the individual Nordic countries, and the next step would be to look at it systematically.

In that article, Lennart Weibull (1997) made a distinction between two kinds of comparisons. The more conventional kind focuses on comparative descriptions, and the more demanding on what he called explanatory comparisons. Comparative descriptions imply applying the same questions to materials from different countries, thereby identifying similarities and differences, and enabling researchers to assess, to use Weibull’s example, the extent to which radio development in Sweden, or in any other country, really is unique. Explanatory comparisons, on the other hand, give insight into the more general patterns in historical development of media, focusing on the social forces underlying this development.

The need for comparative approaches still exists today; we have not yet met the challenge we put to ourselves. Our time and energy has been occupied by other tasks; much remains undone, although bits and pieces have been produced here and there. Of the bits
and pieces I will mention just one, the *Nordicom Review* (1999) four-article theme section on press development in the Nordic countries, a project initiated by Sigurd Høst already in 1993. The time required to publish results reflects all the logistic, financial and other difficulties associated with finishing a multilateral project.

Material for Nordic comparison is accumulating, but there is also a need or temptation to go further on a national basis, or – and perhaps rather – with national materials and international or general frames of reference. As the phrase goes, theorising is general, but the cases and source materials are (often but not always) national.

Taking a national point of departure, I will briefly introduce the two major Finnish media, or medium, history projects: The History of the Finnish Press (SLH), published between the years 1985 and 1992, and the history project of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), published in 1996.

The 10-volume press history, amounting to about 4400 pages, consists of seven volumes on newspapers and three on magazines. The seven “newspaper” volumes, furthermore, can be divided into three groups: volumes 1-3 comprise the history of the “daily” press, 1771-1985, volume 4 the history of the “local” press, 1894-1985, and volumes 5-7 are “reference books” presenting all the daily and non-daily newspapers from the whole period in alphabetical order. Volumes 8-10 deal with magazines and other periodicals for the most part by genre. Simultaneously, the Helsinki University Library published a bibliography of periodicals. A condensed version on Finnish press history was published in 1998 and was also translated into Swedish (Tommila & Salokangas 2000).

The structure of the 10-volume work results from a mix of theoretical and practical factors. The most important common denominator is Professor Päiviö Tommila (professor of Finnish history first in Turku, then in Helsinki, later Rector of the University of Helsinki), who initiated the project, managed it and pieced together financing from various sources. The main financier was the Academy of Finland. The Finnish Newspapers Association established a fund within the Finnish Cultural Foundation, which mostly financed printing of volumes 1-3 and 5-7. The then-independent Association of Local Newspapers financed volume 4, and the Association of Magazines financed volumes 8-10.

In Finland it has been customary to make a rather sharp distinction between “newspapers proper” (general dailies) and “local papers” (non-dailies, concentrating on their own circulation area). The newspaper types had two separate organisations up until the early 1990s, and also we, the researchers involved in the project, took the distinction for granted. It was even more “natural” to treat the magazines separately – but there was also a practical factor involved: this part of the project was a later expansion of the initial newspaper history project.

The broadcasting history project was commissioned by YLE, and within an intensive period it produced three volumes and over 1000 pages on YLE, from its establishment in 1926 to the mid-1990s. A condensed edition was also published in English (*Yleisradio* 1996) and Swedish (*Rundradion* 1997).

Significantly, both projects were conducted by historians, not media and communication researchers; in the newspaper history project only one of the authors, contributing a minor chapter, was a media researcher. This was also reflected in the researchers’ approach, and later in the other tribe’s response to their work.

The Finnish press history and the broadcasting history are both institutional histories, which was a “natural” approach for historians, and critique has been directed towards this
choice. However, it was also a deliberate and conscious choice, for which there were “theoretical” motivations and foundations.

“The research scheme for party press”, originally presented in my doctoral dissertation in 1982 (reprinted in an English language environment in Salokangas 1997), became almost the official policy of the press history project. The initial context of the approach was the Finnish party press in the early 20th century, and it was greatly influenced by research on the Swedish party press of the same era. Almost every newspaper was a committed party organ, the newspaper market was politically divided, and in the relation party-newspaper, the party was the primary actor. As a consequence, the contents of the newspaper did not seem so interesting, because they supposedly followed the party line. Reconsidered from the present position, this approach does not lead many thoughts to journalism, be it political or not.

The scheme had varying degrees of influence on the authors, a dozen altogether, of the volumes on newspapers. The volumes were intended as overall accounts, with the emphasis on the (political) structure of the press and the press system, while journalism as an object of empirical research was secondary, with the exception of the contribution dealing with the earliest decades of the Finnish press.

The same approach was quite evident also in the largest contribution (written by myself) to the YLE volumes. I wrote (quoted from Yleisradio 1996, 225): “In the published works used as a basis of this book, the object is explicitly and primarily the phenomena attendant to the product (programmes) and serving as its preconditions, and only secondarily the programmes themselves or programming as a whole. The programmes more often come forth via the reactions of the public than as programmes themselves. This choice of approach derives from experiences in treating the history of another mass media institution – the press. These experiences have reinforced the view that the main focus of histories of the ‘first generation’ has to be the background and context, in order that the ‘second generation’ can explain the content.”

Although the basic point of departure was to study the relation between YLE and Finnish society along institutional lines, programming was by no means absent in the treatment. The said relation, however, was not studied by means of reading it out from “texts” (programmes), but instead YLE was placed in society mainly by analysing the functioning of its administrative structure – which was political due to parliamentary control of the state-owned public service company – and studying the reactions to programming.

Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff’s (1991, xi) statements support this approach, although their book also deals more directly with the programmes. They wrote: “But broadcasting is not simply a content – what this or that programme is about, or might mean. It embodies, always, a communicative intention which is the mark of a social relationship. Each and every programme is shaped by considerations of the audience, is designed to be heard or seen by absent listeners or viewers. Programmes are highly determinate end-products of broadcasting, the point of exchange between the producing institutions and society. In their form and content they bear the marks of institutional assumptions about the scope and purposes of broadcasting and about the audiences for whom they are made. Judgements about the adequacy or otherwise of broadcasting are always based on assessments of the character and quality of output.”

I also refer to Scannell’s ideas about first and second generation histories, but with my own emphasis on a seemingly logical marching order: knowledge about how the institution works (first generation) makes the necessary basis for explaining the output of that
institution (second generation). Elsewhere in this volume, Klaus Bruhn Jensen (2002) refers to Scannell calls “second generation histories” research addressing questions beyond the basic organisation and output of a given medium.

Jensen’s suggestion, which I very much support, is that we should advance from medium histories to media history and further to communication history. With my background in the Finnish research community, as a historian turned journalism studies professor, and having very strongly promoted the contextualising approach, I still think that there is a logical marching order: Medium histories are in-depth studies that set the context, elucidate how the institution works, and may use limited materials in researching the output. Media history also takes up media systems in addition to what is done in the first phase. Communication history comes close to general cultural history, with media and communication as its point of departure.

As my task in this context is to present the Finnish perspective, I will roughly sketch an account of where Finnish research on media history now stands. In the 1980s, the media history scene was still dominated by “traditional” historians, but presently there is only a handful of “real” historians for whom media is the main area of research, and the younger generation of media historians come predominantly from media/journalism studies – or cultural history. As a consequence of the fact that certain basic research “has already been conducted”, and because the academic background of the new generation is different, there has been a change of emphasis from the background to the output and beyond. Moreover, broadcast media seem to have become more interesting than the press, despite the difficulties in obtaining and using the taped materials.

An example of studies focused on radio and television programme genres is the project “A Common National Culture – A Mission Impossible? Information and Entertainment in the History of Finnish Radio and Television Programmes, 1945-2000”. The project was financed by the Finnish Academy and part of its research programme on media culture. The project comprises a number of case studies on “information”, “entertainment”, and programmes falling in between: one on the treatment of some key areas of life in radio and television news; one on current affairs programmes on television; one on programmes mixing elements of current affairs and entertainment and another focusing on a major case of that genre; one on radio entertainment from the late 1940s to early 1960s; one on the television theatres from the early 1960s to 1990s; and one on the Eurovision Song Contest as a television spectacle.

Through these cases the group hopes to say something more general about how Finnish radio and television addressed its audiences in the latter half of the 20th century, and through these studies the group also attempts to outline how national radio and television dealt with “a common national culture?” (emphasis on the question mark) and its diversification. The resulting doctoral dissertations and other studies may not yet be communication history, however some of them are certainly not merely media history but also cultural history in a broader sense.

Klaus Bruhn Jensen’s suggestion that we should move from media history to communication history is extremely appealing; actually he formulates and articulates an idea that has been around for a while. In his comparison of “mediated” and “non-mediated” communication, Jensen speaks of “media of two degrees”. Using, and maybe twisting, his thoughts, I ask whether they would justify extensive studies of the type “a history of country/region X from the point of view of communication”, or more conventionally “a history of media and communication in country/region X”? National/regional commu-
communication history might perhaps be structured chronologically around the “dominant” medium of each era.

In this case, the first phase would focus on communication and power structures prior to the era of newspapers, the dominant “medium” (beside the consolidating state structure) being the mouth. The second phase would be the newspaper era, the third the broadcasting era, and the fourth the digital era.

But, as pointed out by “media ecologists”, such phases are only marked by the “dominant” medium, and as new media appear, the earlier forms of media and communication do not disappear. The forms of communication and media simply accumulate, and as new media appear, the existing structures have to adjust. Finally, in the digital era the circle closes, as mediated communication becomes interpersonal interaction.

Bibliography
Articles

based on papers presented at the 15th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research
Unmasking the Net

When Technology Communication Turns to the Public

Per Hetland

The story of how Internet is communicated in order to promote particular individual and societal priorities leads to a re-evaluation of science and technology communication. Producers and consumers of new technological knowledge take part in complex and constantly changing relationships with one another. Their relationships have important social and cultural undertones. Here, with my starting point in the traditional media’s communication of the Internet, I shall therefore focus on two interrelated research questions: (1) How do the traditional media and the public interact to understand new media technology and (2) How do we understand this type of interaction in science and technology communication?

Traditionally a lot of science and technology communication has been understood by more or less linear communication models. To answer the second question we therefore need models that explain complex situations. As part of such model building I shall here argue that science and technology communication takes place in accordance with three different communication routes: (1) the direct route, (2) the middleman-route and (3) the bazaar-route. The direct route is associated with a clear definition of who is the sender and who is the public. It is the expert who popularises the scientific and technological knowledge for the general public. The middleman-route is associated with a notion that the expert does not understand the media’s possibilities and limitations, or does not have time, or does not see the news value of the research material. Professional communicators therefore become necessary. The bazaar-route is an expression for a complex communication situation. What is relevant knowledge and how this is understood by different actors, is the object of a dialogue. This dialogue is of special significance in what Callon calls hot situations (Callon 1998:260-262). In cold situations it is easy to identify actors, interests, preferences and responsibilities. One can therefore call in the experts and their laboratories. In hot situations most things are the subject of controversy, and those who are laymen want to have their say. These controversies are an expression of the fact that one does not have a stable basis of common knowledge and insight that one can agree on. Therefore technology producers, politicians and the media all see it as important to open up the way for feedback from the public in the diffusion process. Furthermore, an interplay with the public will make it easier to apply the new technology and thereby promote social change.

The basis of common knowledge and insight that people formerly agreed on is constantly undergoing more frequent change. The establishing of common frames of reference is therefore a complicated process, particularly in hot situations. In such situations the way is also opened up for what Callon calls overflow. Overflow is an expression for
the fact that complete framing is in many ways impossible. The degree of overflow is therefore an indication of how stable the frames are. Callon intimates two different ways of understanding the relationship between frames and overflow. In the first case establishing frames is the normal thing and overflow is leaks. In the second case overflow is the normal thing and the constituting of frames has high costs and will always be deficient. All the three communication routes are in this connection important for enrolling the public and users in specific, yet changing, understandings of frames.

Three Principles in Science and Technology Communication

I have earlier described the three faces of the net by means of the media package model (Hetland 2001). The media package model stems from William A. Gamson and his studies of political themes such as social welfare policy, affirmative action, nuclear policy, the Palestinian conflict and industrial crisis (Gamson and Lash 1983, Gamson and Modigliani 1987, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Gamson 1992). In connection with such themes, a particular use of concepts is established. From a large inventory of possible reference frames, expressions, metaphors, paradoxes and so forth, a smaller repertoire is picked out. This repertoire is picked out in a process in which construction and weighting are central. The purpose of the model is to enable the systematic description of how this repertoire is used to describe particular aspects of a phenomenon. It is usual to say that the media packages consist of two main constituents: frames and positions. According to Gamson and Lasch, metaphors, exemplars, catch-phrases, depictions, and visual images are framing devices. While roots, consequences and appeals to principle are reasoning devices for a more general position (Gamson and Lasch 1983).

When it comes to the communication of the Internet, I have identified three global media packages. To describe and analyse the three global media packages I have made use of three metaphors: the Internet as (1) a prosthesis, (2) the wilds of nature or (3) a Trojan horse. Narratives that take their point of departure in the prosthesis metaphor regard technology as an extension of the human body; we create new action space and new possibilities for action. These stories are the ones that come closest to what we often call utopias. I have therefore called this global media package Net utopias. The narratives that take their point of departure in the metaphor of the wilds regard the Internet as wild nature that it is necessary to domesticate in order that media technology shall serve the best interests of the community. I have therefore called this global media package Net wilds. Narratives that take their point of departure in the metaphor of the Internet as a Trojan horse do not distinguish between the Internet and the context into which the Internet fits. In these stories the Internet is presented as a technology that penetrates so deeply into the social fabric that it is a threat to central cultural values. These narratives are the ones that come closest to what we often call dystopias. I have therefore called this global media package Net dystopias.

The three global media packages are accompanied by three positions at large that constitute the moral of the stories. These three positions have been concretised in three principles (1) the pro-innovation principle, (2) the domestication principle and (3) the anti-diffusion principle. The pro-innovation principle implies that an innovation ought to be diffused and adopted by all the members of a social system. Often this new benefit ought to be diffused more rapidly than is already the case. In contrast to the pro-innovation principle we find the anti-diffusion principle. This principle takes its point of departure in the fact that there is an innovation (or invention), but says that for different
reasons this innovation (or invention) ought not to be either diffused or taken into use by particular user groups or by society in general. The principle in between I shall call the domestication principle. This principle is a variant of the pro-innovation principle. That is to say that one does not reject the innovation, but takes as a starting point the idea that new technology entails great and important problems that must be solved before the media technology is taken into use in full. In other words the technology must be domesticated. Table 1 summarises the three global media packages with respect to frames and principles. If one restricts oneself to one of the three global media packages, Net utopias include 69% of the articles, Net wilds 29% of the articles and Net dystopias 2% of the articles.

**Table 1. Three Global Media Packages**

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<th>Global media package</th>
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<td>Net utopias</td>
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<td>Net wilds</td>
<td>Internet as the wilds of nature</td>
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<td>Net dystopias</td>
<td>Internet as a Trojan horse</td>
<td>The anti-diffusion principle</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The three principles: 1) the pro-innovation principle, 2) the domestication principle and 3) the anti-diffusion principle, are probably central in all science and technology communication. In his book *Technoromanticism* Richard Coyne takes us on a thorough exploration of how information and communication technology has been understood by both central ideologists and the Arts and Natural Sciences (Coyne 1999). He attempts to draw a family tree between the different understandings with the theme of *holism and fragmentation* as the connecting link. What distinguishes his project from mine, is that while Coyne takes his point of departure in ideologies and explanatory models, I take my starting point in the more popular interpretations. This difference is at least of great empirical significance, since the popular discourse weights the problematic issues differently from what is the case in the more ideological and academic discourse. Both the scientific and the popular interpretations meet in a rich supply of utopian descriptions. It is true that the utopian descriptions are never far from the dystopian descriptions. While the global media packages Net utopias and Net wilds have a wealth of empirical data in the popular discourse, the Net dystopias have a far more modest supply of empirical data. On the other hand, in the ideological and academic discourse the net dystopias have a number of prominent spokesmen.

The mass media are a meeting place for the agenda of the public, the politicians and the technology producers. Here the other agendas are both promoted and problematised. Thus there comes into being a co-construction of new understandings, new forms of expression and new structures in society with the mass media as the arena in common. This process of co-construction includes first and foremost those we perceive as the innovators when it comes to adopting the new media technology. These innovators make the Internet narratives real through their own experiences and interpretations. I shall therefore first introduce the narrators and their public before taking a closer look at their co-action.
The Narrators

In the light of the first newspaper articles one might think that the typical communicator of the Internet was a man and a technology enthusiast describing all the new possibilities in the language of a visionary. The picture is, however, somewhat more complex. In the three newspapers in the three-year period there were 1517 articles about the Internet, 44% of these were unsigned articles or pieces, 4% were contributions from experts of various kinds, while 52% were signed by one or more journalists (36% men, 14% women, 1% both men and women, while 1% was not possible to identify). Behind the signed articles there were as many as 263 journalists, which means that each journalist published on average roughly 3 articles in the newspapers in question during the period 1995-1997. A few journalists published a larger number of articles. Six of the most active journalists, distributed over the three newspapers, were selected for detailed interviews. On average the six journalists interviewed had published roughly 22 articles, all in all 17% of the signed articles. Common to all six journalists was the fact that the Internet is only one of the many subject areas they cover. Even for the journalist who had written most about the Internet, the Internet represented only about 10% of his production.

Common to all six is the fact that they were active on the Internet in an early phase. They were active in order to find out what the net was and how it could be used in the context of journalism. Several of them can tell stories about early reports or projects that resulted in their being encouraged to continue with the Internet. Others rather followed their “nose” in spite of their surroundings. The latter can tell stories about how the management and colleagues “went around bawling at me when I sat here hour after hour on the Internet – they said I must get myself out into the field and do some proper journalism.” Not until everybody in the newspaper got access to the net, did the Internet become fit and proper. All six keep up to date in relevant magazines and newspapers. “Wired” is the magazine that is mentioned by most of them. However, their attitudes to Wired vary from enthusiasm to critical distance. Only one of the journalists has an active homepage. There he puts out material relating to journalism and hobbies. A third of those who visit his homepage are journalists.

The Internet narratives have many sources. Not least the Internet in itself is a central source. The journalists are on the Internet every day, they check their regular web pages and are possibly members of some mailing lists and news groups, even though the news groups may be “simply babble and light-hearted Ping-Pong between net users”. On the other hand a number of the journalists use news groups to find sources. Otherwise search engines, newspaper archives, news services and other archives are used regularly. It is seldom that any of them use services like Internet Relay Chat (IRC) today. Criticism of sources has been an important theme in the discussion about journalistic use of the Internet. Three questions have been central: (1) Does the material come from an authoritative source? (2) Is the material authentic? (3) Can one be sure of the identity of the source with which one is in contact? The general attitude is that the Internet does not represent anything new in principle in this connection. There is therefore no point in introducing a form of source criticism of its own for material that is taken from the Internet. On the net there are many sources with great authority, but as one of the journalists says: “… the moment you leave the main highway I must say that practically everything must be double-checked.” The Internet has received a great deal of attention on account of the possibilities for manipulating identity. Everybody knows about this possibility, but use of it can be difficult to identify if the content does not give a clear sig-
nal. A story will illustrate the identity problem in an interview situation: The journalist was interviewing a source via the Internet. Suddenly the language, pace and meaning changed. The person being interviewed had handed the keyboard over to somebody else.

Most of their use of the Internet now takes place at work. This is due both to the fact that they want to protect their private lives and also to the fact that they have better and faster access at work than at home. Several say that earlier they used the Internet far more outside working hours. As veterans on the net several of them make statements in which they emphasise that it is terrible to see all those “people sitting in front of their computers messing about, clicking and tapping, scrolling and searching and … there are so many other fantastic things one could have been doing.” In other words they do not look upon net activity as a lifestyle. The journalists interviewed span a wide area of material. They therefore cover very different parts of the Internet. For example, one of them had worked on covering the groups on the extreme right and criminal cases. He therefore comments on the criticism that the newspapers only wrote about “child pornography and Nazis”. Those who utter this type of criticism lack a complete picture of the media coverage, according to the journalist. Another of the journalists had covered new technology and research material. He comments both on the black and white depiction that the media had a tendency to promote, and also on the fact that he himself was perhaps in the beginning “far too positive in a way. I sort of went over the top a bit in the first period.” One reason that they are fascinated by the Internet is that in addition to being a part of the area of material they cover, it is also a part of their box of tools. One of the journalists puts it this way: “Many doors have been opened when it comes to the futile search for the crock of gold where the rainbow ends, the road has become much shorter because of the Internet.” The Internet has therefore become important both in the task of finding sources and in interacting with the sources. On the other hand, the net is only to a limited extent replacing earlier forms of working. Several of the journalists had tried to conduct interviews via the net, but with mixed experiences. Nevertheless, it is easier to get experts to speak. They can formulate their answers in writing. Yet, texts of this kind cannot be used directly. The language is usually too difficult.

To sum up, one can therefore say that even for the most active journalists in the daily press, the Internet constitutes a small part of the area of material they cover. All have an active user relationship to the net. It seems as if the first enthusiasm about the net has calmed down and given way to a more sober view of the net’s possibilities and problems. On the other hand the reading public has increasingly started using the net. These people have therefore gained their own experiences of the net’s possibilities and problems. This also has consequences for what sorts of stories capture the minds of the public.

The Public

Normally we use the term the public when we are talking about the mass media, while we have users as a central category when we are talking about communication media. This distinction is linked to the fact that mass media and communication media were originally perceived as being very different. Today this boundary is in the process of crumbling, something which also marks our day’s different understandings of the mass media’s public. Abercrombie and Longhurst have made an attempt to clarify different understandings of the public, which will be useful in our context too (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998). They divide the understanding of the public into three paradigms. The first paradigm is strongly marked by behaviourism. Central to this is stimulus-response
thinking, which also put its stamp on many of the early communication models. In central approaches the focus is on effects and use/advantage. The second paradigm, also called incorporation/resistance, has had text in a broad sense as its focus. Stuart Hall represents a central approach with his encoding-decoding model. The sender encodes into the text a selected message, while the recipient decodes this message. If the message is to have any effect, satisfy a need or be put to any use, it is important for the recipient to understand the message as meaningful in its own context. Some writers therefore prefer the term “reader” instead of “public” in order to stress that a decoding process takes place in which the public does not constitute a homogeneous, but rather a heterogeneous group of readers (Fiske 1987). This means that texts may also be read in many ways. They have great interpretational flexibility even though attempts will be made to limit this flexibility in various ways. The third paradigm Abercrombie and Longhurst called spectacle/performance. The point of departure is that modern man lives in a media landscape that is used by the members of society to form and reform identity in everyday life. According to available statistics Norwegians spend on an average day between 6 and 7 hours in company with “mass” media. In addition come media that are not defined as mass media in the statistics. Here we may mention games, many forms of advertising as well as the telephone, fax, work PC and so forth. In other words we are living in a media landscape in which a constant flow of new media hybrids is extending the repertoire of mediated forms of expression. For the sake of simplicity, I shall allow the nuancing that lies in emphasising the public’s active interpretational and constructional work and not least the heterogeneity of the public’s composition, to remain implicit in the concept of the public. I shall therefore take a closer look at the interplay between the use of a given technology and the understanding of this technology.

The public’s interpretations of the Internet are closely connected with the degree to which they themselves use the Internet. Their own practical experience of the Internet is important for the designing of interpretive repertoires (Hetland 1999). Here I shall content myself with taking a closer look at three technological repertoires we find among the public. Against the background of the users’ practice I have chosen to divide the public into three rough technological repertoires. Having access to a computer means that one has access to an installed base. Let us start with a dichotomy based on access to an installed base: (a) those who have access to computers at home, at work, at school or in other places, (b) those who have no such access. So far the installed base of personal computers is an expression of how many can relatively easily gain access to the Internet. This group may again be divided into two: those who use the Internet actively and those who are hesitant. Now it is not the case that new technological repertoires replace earlier technological repertoires; elements from earlier technological repertoires will as a rule be included in more recent technological repertoires. With this reservation I shall outline three technological repertoires for the management of information and communication:

**PT-repertoire.** The relationship to the “information society” is linked to the mass media as an information channel and well known media such as post and telephone for interpersonal long-distance communication. They do not use personal computers.

**IT-repertoire.** The relationship to the “information society” is linked to the mass media as an information channel and well known media such as post and telephone for interpersonal long-distance communication. The central information technology is the computer as an advanced calculator and typewriter.
**ICT-repertoire.** The relationship to the “information society” is linked to integrated information and communication technologies in play and/or work.

The public were asked about both what attitude they had to the Internet and to what extent they read Internet news in the papers (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Attitudes and Reader Interest**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repertoire</th>
<th>%-distrib.</th>
<th>Attitude*</th>
<th>Reading**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total/average</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 4=very positive, 1=very negative
** 4=always read, 1=never read

The attitude to the Internet is most positive within the ICT repertoire, while it is most negative within the PT repertoire. The public were also asked whether they read material about the Internet in the daily papers when there was such material. The ICT repertoire read material about the Internet in Norwegian daily papers far more often than the PT repertoire. If we take a closer look at the significance of different sources of information about the Internet, the mass media in fact mean least to the ICT repertoire in spite of the fact that these are the keenest readers of the mass media. Within a technological repertoire particular information and communication systems will be established of special relevance to social groupings within the repertoire. At the same time those who are outside the repertoire will to a lesser degree participate in the specific information and communication systems. In this way different social groups take part in processes of interpreting, inscribing and transcribing new media technology based on very different information access. We find the joint arenas for information and communication about the Internet first and foremost within the mass media and the social networks.

A great deal of science and technology communication takes place through a network of communication actors. 38% mention mass media as an important source, 29% mention special media such as specialised journals, magazines, periodicals, the Internet, providers of equipment and access, and the like, 26% mention their place of work and/or school, while 36% mention family, friends and acquaintances as an important source. Interest in the Internet and corresponding technologies is therefore closely linked to the degree to which these technologies constitute an important part of daily life. Those who are included in the ICT repertoire stress job and school as well as special media as their most important sources of knowledge about the Internet. On the other hand, large groups within the PT repertoire have the mass media as their most important source of knowledge about the Internet. The fact that job/school and special media are stressed as the most important sources of knowledge for groups within the ICT repertoire does not mean that the same groups have a passive relationship to the mass media. Rather it is the case that inclusion in a particular technological repertoire means greater interest in acquiring knowledge about a subject by means of several sources. The narrators behind the Internet articles therefore meet a heterogeneous public, but the most faithful readers are probably also those who have the most active relationship to the Internet. This makes it
interesting to look more closely at the interplay between narrators and the public. In order to be better able to analyse this interplay and its role in the communication of new media technology, it is necessary for us to take a look at the differences between the various communication routes.

Three Communication Routes
A traditional understanding of science and technology communication has been that the expert performs his/her research in the laboratory, or behind the scenes in Goffman’s terminology (Goffman 1969). When the discoveries are to be communicated, one steps forward onto the stage. In this understanding there is in other words a distinction between research and technology development that goes on behind the scenes and communication that takes place in public, whether the target group is colleagues or people in general. Bucchi quite rightly points out that the distinction between what takes place behind the scenes and what takes place front stage may be fuzzy. He therefore chose to focus his research project on the deviant cases, that is to say those cases in which the laboratory is moved out onto the stage. Bucchi suggests in this connection that some communication situations follow alternative routes (Bucchi 1998). These alternative routes he studies by means of three investigations: “cold fusion” mainly from 1989, “big bang” mainly from 1992 and Louis Pasteur’s experiment concerning anthrax vaccines in 1881. Common to the three examples is the fact that the researchers involve the public in different stages of the research process before the scientific results have been accepted by colleagues. Bucchi’s most important contribution to increased understanding of science and technology communication is that he gives a more nuanced picture of the researcher as a communicator. The classical separation between the laboratory on the one hand and the public on the other is diluted. Meyrowitz claims that to an increasing extent we are getting a middle region (Meyrowitz 1986). It is this form of science communication Bucchi attempts to describe with concepts from Goffman, but without bringing in Meyrowitz’s contribution to Goffman’s use of the theatre metaphor. Further, Bucchi does not problematise the role of the public to any great extent. The public remain a black box. To analyse the role of the public in science and technology communication, I shall here argue that science and technology communication takes place in accordance with three different communication routes: (1) the direct route, (2) the middleman-route and (3) the bazaar-route.

The Direct Route
The direct route is associated with a clear definition of who is the sender and who is the public. It is the expert who popularises the scientific findings for the general public. The group of actors that has received most attention in earlier research concerning science and technology communication is the experts – often in the form of researchers and scientists. Here I have chosen to keep a completely open mind about who are experts. The expert has a reasonable degree of control of the message. In the newspapers we recognise the direct route in the leading feature or the popular article. Otherwise lectures, textbooks or the popular book are viewed as the most central forms of communication within the direct route. The idea of popular enlightenment and the importance of knowledge transfer have had a strong position as grounds for the direct route. Only a small part of the studied material followed the direct route, 4% of the articles were contributions from
experts of various kinds. Among those, 44% had focus on the pro-innovation principle, 48% had focus on the domestication principle while 8% had focus on the anti-diffusion principle. The pro-innovation principle differs from the next two principles in that there are both a lot of contributions from experts that lend support to the principle and also a lot of contributions that problematise the principle. In numerous pro-innovation contributions it is emphasised that there is a need for more knowledge about the application possibilities, more user experience, new (communicative) competence, a new pedagogy and a new commitment to school and further education. In addition there is emphasis on the need for free and just competition on the Internet market. The implications that one sees from the new media technology are that one is reaching a new public, information is becoming easily available and cheap, the Internet is promoting democratic participation, one avoids the gatekeepers, the net can decentralise power, it can renew our written culture and not least electronic shopping will change the whole of world trade.

When the pro-innovation principle is problematised, there is a tendency to polarisation. On the one hand the Internet does not involve anything new in principle, it is easy to learn. In addition much use of the Internet is a waste of time and the costs are not in proportion to its usefulness. On the other hand the Internet makes possible a new situation in which “Big Brother is watching you”. It is a step towards increased alienation, technologising and information overload. The Internet further involves increased “linguistic and cultural imperialism”. A lot of information on the net is considered to be erroneous, and it takes solid knowledge and experience to interpret the information. The “gatekeepers” are therefore claimed to be important for the quality assurance of information.

In contrast to the pro-innovation principle, for the domestication principle there are only a few expert contributions in support, but more expert contributions that problematise the principle. The supporting contributions concentrate on the need for legislation and control measures against undesirable activities like pornography and racism, as well as on the need for safeguarding intellectual property rights. The voices of the experts raise, however, a number of questions about the domestication principle. Several arguments are voiced: (1) Unlawful material (especially pornography) is only a small part of the Internet and incidentally difficult to access and expensive. Those who criticise the Internet for being a “sewer” lack knowledge of what is happening on the Internet. (2) The net is an extension of public and private conversation. One cannot therefore censor utterances on the Internet that are otherwise legal. When it comes to private conversation, a lot of comparisons are made with the telephone as a medium, and one does not censor people’s telephone conversations. (3) The control activities have led to a one-sided focusing on intellectual property rights, which results in too high prices for intellectual material. (4) Many of the attacks on the Internet are in reality attacks on the content, not the medium as such. It is therefore wrong to attack the medium. (5) All new media are looked upon as dangerous in the initial phase. This is not something peculiar to the Internet.

When the Data Inspectorate becomes an advocate of the anti-diffusion principle as a solution to protect the privacy of people, it is claimed by those who criticise this principle that its adherents lack the necessary knowledge and competence. The principle is considered in such situations as unnecessary and as an expression of an exaggeratedly conservative attitude.

Among the contributions from different kinds of experts, 86% make their occupational platform known to the reader, often to support their argument. One finds engineers and
natural scientists (33%), social scientists (22%), cultural workers (25%), students (6%) and politicians of different kinds (14%). In many contributions the writer either opposes or enrols support from other experts. In the next route, the middleman route, it is the journalists who use experts in the same manner.

The Middleman Route

The middleman-route is associated with a notion that the expert does not understand the media’s possibilities and limitations, or does not have time, or does not see the news value of the research material. Professional communicators therefore become necessary. These people arise at the point of intersection between research and technology development on the one hand and the public on the other. The message thus falls increasingly into the hands of researchers with an interest in communication (experts who communicate both their own and others’ research), information officers, museum instructors, journalists, teachers and interested laymen. In connection with the middleman-route we often find an understanding of communication as a two-stage or multi-stage process, from various mass media through opinion-formers to the recipients (Lazerfeld et al 1968). The middleman-route also provides examples of the fact that middlemen both attempt to unmask (investigative journalism) and/or to conceal (a role that is often ascribed to information officers by both public and journalists).

Both implicitly and explicitly different actors appear in the mass media’s Internet narratives. I have chosen to concentrate on the explicit actors – those who speak in their own voices in the stories. In a number of narratives it is more or less anonymous actors who appear, as the “common” man, woman, young person, elderly person etc. However, I have made a close study of how the diversity, from Internet experts in the form of researchers and technologists to Internet opponents, appears in the narratives. In 32% of the narratives a named source appears, in 11% two named sources, and in 8% there are three or more named sources, while 49% of the articles do not quote their sources. In many articles the named sources are from the same firm, organisation or institution. More than one named source therefore does not necessarily mean multi-source cases in the sense that the sources correct one another. It is rather the case that the different actors complement and support one another.

Five different categories of expertise have been identified, (1) spokespersons, that is to say persons who speak on behalf of an organisation/firm/product (not seldom this will be PR staff or the general manager); (2) independent experts (as a rule employed in teaching and/or research); (3) users (that is to say persons who speak on the basis of their experiences as applicants); (4) party or interest-group politicians and (5) persons who speak on behalf of control or regulatory authorities (often police or legislative authorities) or other public authorities. Table 3 shows how actors are enrolled in the text depending on the position that is taken in the global media package. The closer we get to the pro-innovation principle, the more strongly different spokespersons and the users are enrolled, while the closer we get to the domestication principle and the anti-diffusion principle, the more strongly politicians and representatives of the control and regulatory authorities are enrolled.

In spite of the fact that spokespersons were those who most often appeared with their own voices in the texts, it was especially independent experts and users with whom the journalists were concerned in the course of the interviews. They saw it as a problem that some independent experts easily get “a season ticket from us and are allowed to speak
again and again and again”. Some names were mentioned by several of them, but on the whole it was stressed that they do not have a permanent source network when it comes to new media technology. If they do have permanent experts, the network of such experts is relatively loose. Most of the articles have their background in Norwegian conditions. 60% of the articles had in their entirety taken their examples from Norway, while 38% had taken their examples from other countries, many in combination with Norwegian examples. If the examples were taken from other countries, Norwegian experts were used to interpret them into a Norwegian context. One purpose of using local experts is therefore also to provide an explanation for and to give a face to events in completely different places. On the other hand the users are an important group of consequence experts. The users experience reality in their own way and it is therefore important “to communicate what the man in the street experiences”. Not all journalists use experts equally actively. They choose to write a lot on the basis of their own experiences with the Internet, instead of getting others to narrate. Their contributions are therefore more coloured by their own experiences and points of view. Journalists are also users of course, and according to several of them this provides a background for making statements about the user situation, so several therefore use themselves as reference persons, – “If I can do it, everybody can do it”. One of the journalists looks upon this lack of technical insight as an important qualification, – “I consider myself as the absolute touchstone of what it’s possible to achieve.”

Table 3. Actors in the Texts, as Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Pro- innovation</th>
<th>Domestication</th>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Anti-diffusion</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
<th>In all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control&amp;regulation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In all</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of actors</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles with actors</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>738</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in all</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very often there is a close connection between those who appear as experts in the texts and those who appear as sponsors. The global media package Net utopias is particularly sponsored by (1) researchers from the institute and university sector and spokespersons for different market research companies, (2) the users or central actors who want dialogue with “the people”, (3) the information providers and (4) all those who want to make money in the digital marketplace. The global media package Net wilds is particularly sponsored by (1) all those who want to make quick money by means of what they believe to be loopholes in the law or regulations, as well as those who make themselves into spokesmen for control of the same activities, (2) the experts from psychology and psychiatry, (3) representatives connected with “law and order” and (4) public control authorities and groups of activists. The global media package Net dystopias is particularly
sponsored by (1) control bodies and control expertise and (2) cultural workers and politicians. The power ratio between the actors is therefore important in the work of determining the agenda. The mass media both make their own choices when the material is angled and at the same time they often choose to trust the most influential actors in the political arena. When it comes to technology in general and media technology in particular, attempts have been made to look after changing interests through the world of politics. In the 1990s attention was particularly concentrated on regulation and deregulation policy. This strategy gave the technology producers and the service providers increased influence on and power over the agenda.

The middle-man route is usually the most important route in science and technology communication. However, the bazaar-route is of special importance in hot situations.

**The Bazaar-Route**

The bazaar-route is associated with an understanding that the relationship between sender and recipient is complex and polysemous at the same time as the entry threshold for participating in the communication process is lowered. What is relevant knowledge and how this is understood by various actors is the object of a dialogue in the bazaar. In media ethnography use has been made of inter alia social experimentation in which new media technology was introduced in field experiments. By means of participant observation and other data collection techniques, an attempt was subsequently made to understand the users’ ways of applying the media technology (Hetland and Meyer-Dallach 1998). Experience of social experiments of this kind has since been used to develop different techniques for technology evaluation. These are techniques that take advantage of the experience of laymen and users. Thus they are examples of a type of technology communication that follows the bazaar-route.

The Internet has given the public new possibilities of giving feedback directly to the journalists. Only a short time after the Internet had been launched as a public service, the Internet appeared among other things as the mass media’s feedback channel: the public was invited to interactivity. To an increasing extent the papers have also begun to publish e-mail addresses under the articles, which makes it easier to send feedback. Earlier the readers used to write solemn letters to the editor beginning “Sir, …” but now they send e-mail direct to the journalist in question. The journalists interviewed see this as an important change. In general terms it is difficult to put a figure on the extent of feedback of this kind since it is very dependent on theme. As a rule there is at least one e-mail per article, but if the article causes offence among major groups, there may be 20 to 30 e-mail messages. Generally there was agreement that the threshold for sending feedback had been lowered. The journalists also see feedback in the form of e-mail messages as less of a disturbance. This makes it easier for them to sort “the wheat from the chaff”. This feedback had also been important in the sense that in the next round it had provided better contact with the sources. The feedback messages had, according to the journalists, had a tendency to place themselves at two extreme points. They were either strong declarations of support or furious attacks. Many of the critical feedback contributions took up newspaper articles within the global media package Net wilds. The public had a need to answer back that the Internet consisted of much more than pornography and crime. With the wisdom of hindsight several of the journalists also say that it could easily become “absolutely marvellous or just too foul”. On the other hand several of the journalists comment on what they see as a group of “crusaders who do not like critical objec-
In the journalists’ opinion it is patently obvious that the Internet is like the rest of society with its “red-light districts, porn, drug addicts and criminals”. Even though the journalists may see this as obvious, it is clear that not all groups of the public share this view.

The bazaar-route may challenge the traditional understanding of the distinction between the research and development process on the one hand and the communication process on the other, in that the communication process becomes a part of the research and development process. The users are also part of the public in many ways. Several of the journalists comment on the reactions that came when the Internet suddenly became subject matter in the mass media. There were already established communities around and on the Internet. When journalists started writing about the net, the consequence was that the established communities felt they were being invaded. Their little private world was in the process of being destroyed, partly because the established mass media were beginning to take an interest in what was going on, and partly because most people were beginning to get onto the net. The journalists experienced large sections of the veteran community as dogmatic, with little understanding of the change that the Internet went through when it became common property. The old Internet generation ended up as “watchdogs for the medium in a way”. Several of the journalists were of the opinion that the feedback messages changed during the three-year period. In the beginning there was a lot of criticism to be had, not least anger and aggression. Later in the period the tone of the feedback changed for the better. This was not due to the fact that they wrote more pleasant articles, according to the journalists, but that gradually it was a cross-section of the population that sent in the feedback. According to several of the journalists this cross-section of the population probably had “more common courtesy than the pioneers or the net people”.

In 1995 Aftenposten published a story about misuse of a server at the University of Oslo. The paper reported that this server was functioning as an exchange centre for child pornography. Members of IRC groups were according to the paper exchanging pornographic pictures of children. This matter led to a comprehensive debate and a complaint to the Norwegian Press Complaints Commission (Pressens faglige utvalg). Furthermore this matter led to the fact that much of the debate was moved from the paper to the net. In this connection the journalist who wrote the original newspaper article, Jan Gunnar Furuly, became the target of the Furuly Watch Project by Naggum. The Furuly Watch Project was to map and follow up all articles written by Furuly. The project claimed that this journalist’s articles about the Internet were of a professionally unacceptable level and that he had angled the material in a tendentious and unacceptable way. “This journalist has demonstrated a degree of prejudice in respect of the Internet and its users that appears to make him incapable of writing one single article about the Internet that is not directly negative propaganda. … Users of the Internet believe they are being collectively persecuted by Jan Gunnar Furuly, and rightly so. We now wish to answer back by following his movements and getting answers to a number of important questions:

- Are his articles reliable or are they propaganda?
- Are his articles neutral or are they deliberately angled?
- Does he respect the views of both sides?
- Has he an agenda deliberately intended to smear the Internet?
- What distinguishes good articles, if any, from bad ones?
If you are interested in contributing to the project, or simply following developments, you should put your name on the mailing list. After this there followed a list of 16 articles. This example illustrates that not all feedback comes in the form of readers’ contributions in the same newspapers. Instances of problematizing in one medium may be carried further in other media. Direct reporting back to journalist or paper is therefore only one of several possibilities. Hot situations therefore lead to overflow between the media. Often this type of overflow is closely linked to different understandings or frames. Nobody has denied that the conferencing system IRC could be an “exchange” for paedophile pictures. The arguments against Furuly were mainly based on the fact that the pictures could not be transferred via the concrete server (one could at most enter into agreements on such exchanges), there was no proof that this had in fact happened, and otherwise sex was only a small part of the activity on the net. To the extent that sex was discussed, it was completely “… ordinary sex, much the same as in discussion programmes on the TV”. Further it was emphasised that closing the IRC server would not in any way prevent the spreading of pornography. In the wake of this matter, Furuly Watch was started, as has been mentioned. Furuly stresses that

… the first few days at any rate I felt that it was a bit unpleasant. He (Naggum) claimed that he had his own team, between 15 and 20 volunteers, who were to make sure that everything I wrote was put out on the web. And they put out all the articles in extensio on the web. You know, they were full of spelling mistakes. And there were indeed many strongly-worded allegations, pure and simple bullying and harassment with the use of words like ‘idiot’ and ‘feeble-minded’.

Aftenposten took the matter up with Naggum and pointed out that it was a breach of copyright to put out articles in the way he was doing. So the articles were removed, but still the name Furuly can be understood as a term of abuse in certain communities such as the discussion group no.general. Incidentally, Naggum has been interviewed in several newspapers and in a number of communities he has the status of a cult hero or net personality. Furuly for his part also has a collection of quotations that he often uses for introduction and illustration at courses he gives for other journalists on use of the Internet.

As time passes we begin to see a number of examples of overflow between frames and the media. One of these cases ended up in an attempt to draw a boundary between the Internet and personal conversation. The Development Director in Schibsted Nett AS is one of the many who took part in the electronic discussion groups on the Internet. The professional journal Computerworld used pieces of a contribution of his as part of an article commenting on child pornography on the net. In addition to complaining about the journal’s presentation of the matter, he also claimed “that the electronic discussion group must be considered as a “café table” and that any reproduction from it must be comparable to use of a “hidden microphone””. The Norwegian Press Complaints Commission concluded that Computerworld was fully entitled to quote from the Internet contribution since access to the discussion group was open to everybody. This conclusion therefore equated contributions on the Internet with contributions in other media.

Conclusion
The understanding of new media technology can gather different groups of actors in a common task of exploiting particular possibilities, but to extremely different ends. In phases of rapid technological development the mass media can be an important common
area for dialogue between actors in co-acting networks. The mass media can in this way function as an arena in which the public, different types of middlemen, and experts are all allowed to perform as experts, but in different expert roles. In situations where the public increasingly take the new technology into use, the direct route, the middleman route and the bazaar-route are all important in technology communication. However, the communication that takes place often takes place between the mass media and innovators & early users.

Bucchi calls the bazaar-route a deviant route. I wish however to claim that this route has always been an important and central route in science and technology communication, especially in what Callon calls hot situations. As communication routes, the three routes have existed parallel to one another for a long time. They do not replace one another, but one can argue that there is an increasing emphasis of the bazaar-route, especially in technology communication. This is connected with a number of factors: (1) To an increasing degree a critical light is being turned on technology development and research. This is due partly to the fact that the general level of knowledge among the public has increased and partly to the fact that many scientific and technological advances have turned out to be questionable. (2) The struggle for attention has increased. The media have therefore become an important arena for the marketing of what are to be important sides of the research and technology questions that are put on the agenda. The bazaar-route can therefore be increasingly experienced as an important route for ensuring institutional and personal interests on the science and technology market.

Notes

1. Part of this research was funded by a grant from the Norwegian Research Council under the programme "Societal and cultural presuppositions for information and communication technology". The study took its point of departure in the way in which three Norwegian daily newspaper portrayed the Internet in the period between 1995 and 1997. The data base consists of newspaper cuttings about the Internet from the following newspapers: Aftenposten (the morning edition of Aftenposten), Dagbladet and Dagsavisen. The important point was not to compare the three papers but to select three papers covering the breadth of the Norwegian press both politically and journalistically. I therefore chose three of the more national newspapers. One or more of the three newspapers included in the investigation was read by altogether 40.2% of the population over the age of 13 years in 1995/1996 and by altogether 42.2% over the age of 13 years in 1996/1997. According to the same source the figures for each individual newspaper showed that for 1996/1997 the morning edition of Aftenposten was read by 22.3%, Dagbladet by 26.3% and Dagsavisen by 4.8%. The established data base consists of 1 517 newspaper cuttings, 656 from Aftenposten, 491 from Dagsavisen and 370 from Dagbladet.

2. For a closer study of the journalists’ work, I chose to interview six of the most active journalists in the three-year periods in question. Of the six journalists were three from Aftenposten, two from Dagbladet, and one from Dagsavisen. With these six I carried out qualitative interviews concerning their coverage of the Internet. Furthermore I have studied their texts in detail.

3. In order to obtain a survey of the public and users I used special run-offs on the Gallup InterBuss for 1995, 1996 and 1997 (the November count for each year). The Gallup InterBuss is a quarterly investigation in which use of the Internet is the central theme. The investigation is conducted on the telephone each quarter in respect of a nationally representative sample of roughly 1000 individuals over the age of 13. The Gallup InterBuss was carried out for the first time in November 1995, and thus shows the development trends when it comes to central questions of use and assess. Seen from the angle of media science one of the weaknesses of the investigation is that relatively few questions are put to those who do not use the Internet. The strength of the investigation is the thorough coverage of questions of use and assess as well as the fact that over time the investigation describes a historical development. The investigation included Gallup’s standard investigation, as well as my own questions in 1997.

4. The concept of the “laboratory” usually makes one think of research in the natural sciences and technology. Here it is used more generally of those arenas in which research takes place.
5. The text had been written by Erik Naggum and was downloaded from the web on 8/2-1996.

References
The Power of Editing
The Editorial Role in a Historical Perspective

MARTIN EIDE

Editors play a key role in democratic societies. They are guarantors of freedom of expression and public opinion formation. Editors may be said to operate in a magnetic field between politics and government and the market. The Editor wields power, but is also under pressure.

How has this role evolved? How has it been cultivated and formed? What challenges and threats does it face today? What has the power of the Editor meant, and what does it mean today?

Based on a study of the evolution of the editorial role in Norway (Eide 2000), I will use the following pages to put forward ten propositions about the role of the Editor in a historical perspective. Although the propositions refer to a specifically Norwegian context, I believe they are more or less universally applicable. They say something about the professional-ideological force and historical legitimacy an editorship can maintain, and they say something about the tensions and cross-pressures that have surrounded, and continue to surround, the role.

As anyone who has read the least bit of press history is aware, histories of editors tend to be *hommages* to Great Men, moving from the embryo of greatness in the young man to the greatness of mind and grandness of thought of the adult. All recounted in the rosy glow of a firm belief in Progress, a conviction that the press and journalism itself are becoming ever better and ever more free. This kind of press history is a tale of a struggle of the Good against forces of Evil.

Contrary to mythologies of this kind we have equally mythological dystopias, based on an equally firm belief that journalism is a good way down the so-called ‘slippery slope’ into the abyss of commercialism. Journalism used to be better, journalists’ and editors’ ideals used to be higher, their motives nobler. That was before Commercialism perverted Free Expression and not-for-profit discussions of public affairs.

The only antidote to these two caricatures – the one of steady Progress, the other of successive Perversion – is balanced historical examination and analysis. Such a caveat may be called for when our aim is to understand the role of the Editor, in view of the number of testimonial banquets and editors who instinctively, as a reflex, meet even the slightest criticism with either lofty references to freedom of expression or self-congratulatory blustering. The history of the editorial role is all too important to be left to editors like these.

For, the role is truly vital, even when measured against such grand ideals as freedom of expression and democracy. The power of the Editor exists and needs to be examined. A better understanding of the role and its ramifications, both past and present, should be
enlightening, with respect to both press ideology and an understanding of how our societies function.

1.

My first proposition is that the evolution of the editorial role is inseparable from the evolution of the public sphere.

As public opinion emerges as a societal institution, the editor appears as an early caretaker and interpreter of the norms to govern public discourse. In Norwegian history we find seeds of such a role in the intellectual circles that coalesced around book printers in the latter half of the eighteenth century. But only with Norway’s independence from Danish rule and the adoption of our own Constitution in 1814 did political opposition become possible, which in turn inspired political debate – i.e., a legitimate public sphere that provided fertile soil for the growth of the editorial role. Newspapers and printing houses were hotbeds of civic culture, where the affairs of the day were eagerly discussed. These fora attracted many different kinds of intellects and busy-bodies. They were intellectual debating clubs and political workshops.

In time, the notion of editors as referees and guarantors of public discourse spread. It was their responsibility to see to it that important points of view reached the public eye – even if those who formulated the views on many occasions chose to remain anonymous. The right to anonymity was an important prerequisite to the growth of the editorial role as we know it (Øy 1992, 1994). Politically conscious editors defended the right – and their sources’ right – as a vital vent that allowed citizens to speak freely. As for themselves, editors gradually stepped forward, out of anonymity and into the floodlights of public discourse.

Editors assumed what they considered to be a key role in democratic society and wrote themselves into history books as brokers of public opinion. As one editor put it in 1824, they served “an authority greater than any mortal power,” namely, “public opinion”.

The new public sphere recognized the legitimacy, indeed, the necessity of critical views and a “Loyal Opposition”, and editors were cast in the role of guarantors of these necessities of political life. “King of the Opposition” was an epithet conferred on one leading editor in the 1840s. Another editor called his paper “The Citizen” (Statsborgeren). Ideally, the press should be an arena for, and an instrument in the service of, public opinion; it should provide citizens with the information they need to be able to carry out their civic duties.

With recognition of the editorial role as a kingpin of the public sphere came also criticism of editors, as when Ludvig Mariboe in 1836 lashed out at writers and editors, referring to them as “miserable wretches, charlatans, ignorant and devoid of taste, brats, barely out of school” (Husby 1943:20).

But the editorial role was to be performed with authority and pathos. Christian Friele, Editor of Morgonbladet between 1857 and 1893, was called the “President of Public Opinion”, and it was said of Friele’s predecessor, Adolf Bredo Stabell, that “as Editor of Morgonbladet he was a big power in his own right”. The people of Kristiania [later Oslo] took to the streets in March 1848 to demonstrate either their support for or opposition to “H.R.H. Stabell”, “King of the Opposition” (Seip 1974:172).

“I am the enactor of public opinion,” declares the title character in Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson’s play, “The Editor” (Redaktøren), published in 1874. Bjørnson’s model was none other than Christian Friele, a man who left no one indifferent. Loved and hated, he
was a well-known figure in the capital with his characteristic top hat, in the lining of which he often stuffed his manuscripts. He was peripatetic, always in the field. He was no 9-to-5 office man.

Friele was a man of many convictions (some of which he elevated to dogma) – sharply formulated by himself or others. It should be noted that he reigned in a period that was not conducive to moderate standpoints. It was a time of political polarization, when the struggle for parliamentary rule was at its peak. In the midst of the conflict the fundamentals of the editorial role manifested themselves, and the symbolic capital attached to it accrued.

Friele is also an eminently successful example of the kind of opinion leader who is more self-convinced than learned. He read few books in his lifetime. "The weakness of his academic background gave his arguments a tenacity that they under other circumstances would probably have lacked" (Stang 1939:71).

Combative, Conservative, Friele was able to write with certainty, partly thanks to the fact that doors closed to others were open to him. He hobnobbed with powerful men. Editor Friele was the personification of the Editor as conspirator.

In favourable accounts this facet of his career is described in statements like "His discretion was impeccable." The writer of one such testimonial (in a jubilee publication) goes so far as to say: "[D]iscretion was to a large degree the key to the power and influence Morgonbladet wielded" (Wendelbo 1909:7).

Friele was a man with contacts. He operated in intimate interaction with actors in a variety of roles and spheres. His paper’s contributing writers were more likely to be personages outside the paper’s staff than staff members – professors, figures in the ministries, politicians, merchants and industrialists “that either wrote, dictated, or inspired the articles Morgonbladet carried” (Stang 1939:69).

On the one hand, Friele appears both a conniver and collaborator with powerful political and economic interests; on the other, he appears a valiant, independent man, well aware of the role he played. Among the evidence supporting this latter interpretation is his rejection of a nomination to a Royal Order: “The Editor of ‘The Royal Norwegian Morgonbladet’, eh? No surer way to compromise the paper and its position!”

Friele was also an editor who drew a line between polemics and reporting. Even political adversaries’ statements and positions should be reported correctly, often in the form of extensive stenographic accounts that were allowed to displace other domestic and foreign news of the day.

Nor did he allow himself to give in to the temptation to publish the many personal scandals to which he was privy. His comment: “The sexual drive is fairly evenly distributed among the parties.”

Friele’s heyday was the 1860s and 1870s. In those years he both formed and staged public debate in Norway. It was not without reason they called him “the President of Public Opinion”.

2.

My second and parallel proposition is this: The evolution of the editorial role is central to the emergence and development of a journalistic field, to the institutionalization of the Norwegian press and Norwegian journalism and to the emergence of journalism as a force in society. I submit that the definition of the editorial role largely is a matter of accrualment of symbolic capital. This symbolic or cultural capital manifests itself successively in the form of rules, statutes, codes of conduct, literature, and judgments in court.
Professional organization is a central feature of this process. The editorial role played a central part in organizing members of the press, from the first associations in the late nineteenth century and, even more so, in the founding of the Norwegian Press Association in 1910.

Accumulation of cultural capital is a prerequisite to the establishment of journalism as an occupation of standing, and it is crucial to the effort to establish the independence of journalism from other social institutions and fields, such as the economy and politics. How editors go about accumulating such capital and how the symbolic capital of journalism relates to other kinds of real capital, both within journalism and in other fields, merits further study.

In early years, the nascent editorial role was linked with other fields and public roles such as authors, academics and politicians. The bonds between these fields and roles gradually relaxed, and they drifted apart in the overall process of modernity.

For many years, however, the editorial role was practised as a sideline to some other occupation. The history of the editorial role in Norway is one of enterprising individuals who found and developed a power base in diverse involvements in civic affairs. It is a history of restless, public-spirited men.

Hagbard Emanuel Berner, the first editor of *Dagbladet* (Kristiania/Oslo), was among the founders of a publishing house and a Norwegian feminist association; he was a Director of the Mortgage Bank of Norway and served as Mayor of the capital, Kristiania. Some will surely find symbolic significance in the fact that the Editor of *Dagbladet* also chaired the Norwegian Cremation Society.

The Editor’s bench was no easy-chair. Editors had many platforms from which to speak. And they had a lot to say, whether they fought for “Justice, Freedom and Enlightenment” as the founder of *Statsborgeren*, Peder Soelvold’s motto proclaimed in 1831, or more concrete concerns such as those the founding Editor of *Fredriksstad Blad* struggled for: “Freedom, Justice, Light, Room and Board”.

In the period of transition toward the end of the nineteenth century – that is to say, at the dawn of modernity – editors assumed a position of leadership in public life. They could do this, not because they were politicians or men of letters, but simply because they were editors.

A significant expression of this ‘coming of age’ of the editorial role in relation to other positions in society is the demise of the Editor-as-Man-of-Letters. One might say that “the Great I” was supplanted by “the Great We”. Editors with backgrounds in journalism replaced editors with backgrounds in the Arts. Each of the roles, the Man of Letters and the Editor, underwent a process of professionalization. But ‘poetocracy’, the eminence of Letters in public discourse, was to give way to the power of the professionalized Editor.

The editorial role successively established itself in the field of journalism by manifesting its independence, particularly vis-à-vis newspaper owners and government officials. Thus, for some time new and close relations prevailed between journalism and politics.

At significant junctures in Norwegian history, editors have been openly partisan and used every opportunity that came their way to promote one or another political party. Some editors drew fire for their political sympathies. Writer Helge Krog lambasted *Arbeiderbladet*’s Editor, Martin Tranmæl – or “Martin Pontius Pilate Tranmæl”, as Krog dubbed him – for turning the paper into “a laundry for hands dirtied in politics”. The allegation came after Tranmæl had attacked Krog for his part in “the dirty and disgusting traffic that salon radicals from the upper classes, masquerading as socialists, indulge in” (Longum 1998:30f).
But if we tend to think of the editors of party papers as humble, verging on servile, ‘megaphones’ of the party line, Martin Tranmæl hardly fits the picture. As Editor of *Arbeiderbladet* from 1921 to 1949, he steered the party as much as he ever was steered by it. De facto he led the party during the critical interwar period. Tranmæl’s office was a commando central – a political power centre – in which editorial power fused with the power of state.

3.

The era of the party press ends with a process of separation – a new declaration of independence on the part of journalism. The process gained momentum particularly in the 1970s. This development has provided a new base for editorial power. An interesting question is whether these successive processes of separation have increased or decreased the power of editors in relation to other fields and power bases. It may well be a rationalization, the so-called wisdom of hindsight, that regards the Editor as having been more powerful in days gone by, in the days when truly great and courageous Editors molded public opinion and left their mark on politics and the intellectual climate. Hence, my third proposition: *Editorial power may have changed in character, but it has hardly eroded*.

Even today, the Editor is one of the principals behind the media’s staging of public discourse. The Editor is the impresario and decides what repertoire will be played on the part of the media stage that he or she controls. The forms of representation and the logic of the media furthermore tend to have an impact on other social fields and to affect “power relationships within other fields”. This pressure affects what is done and produced there” (Bourdieu 1998:68). The editorial role exerts such influence not so much through the prerogative of editorial comment, but by virtue of the Editor’s role as protector of the logic of journalism. No modern institution or actor is untouched by the conventions and *modi operandi* of mass media, and those who control those conventions and modes wield considerable power. Editorial influence is expanding, and its logic can change power relationships and the premises for many other players in many different arenas.

When the powerful confer, not infrequently they discuss ways to relate to the media – how they can turn the logic of the media to their advantage. The relative ubiquity of media logic gives rise to a kind of medial power that we might call *logical power, contextual power, or backroom or collegial power*. It is a form of power more subtle, less direct than the power to set agendas or define problems.

Editorial power is manifold. It is both interesting and important, yet poorly understood.

4.

More often emphasized in this regard is the classic tension between Temple and Marketplace. In Norway the corresponding tension relating to the press has been formulated in the phrase, “Mind or Money”. The phrase goes back to a conflict between the Editor and the owners of the paper, *Verdens Gang*, in 1910. The conflict boiled down to the rhetorical question: “Shall mind or money decide what’s fit to print?”

This is the archetypal saga of the editorial role in Norwegian contexts. In the historical drama, the Editor, i.e., Mind, wins out. But the curtain has not fallen. The essential and crucial tension between economic power and Principle has not been resolved once and
for all, but still gives rise to dilemmas for modern-day custodians of the editorial role. The next ‘showdown’ between Mind and Money might have a different outcome than back in 1910.

The tensions between Temple and Marketplace, between Marketplace and Democracy, have hardly subsided in recent years. It prevails, despite the many banquet-speaker incantations about the Freedom and Independence of the media. “Anyone who has the slightest insight into the economic mechanisms that operate within the press and has the least bit of moral decency left is sickened by the fumes of all these puffed-up conceits about freedom and independence.” Such was the verdict of Helge Krog in 1939 in his Foreword to a revival of his play, “The Great We” (Det store Vi, 1919). Krog’s target was the growing spirit of collegial loyalty among the men and women of the press, the nascent ‘press corps’. This spirit – often automatic and over-zealous, at times even noxious – may also be seen as a buttress against pressures brought to bear on the editorial role. Collegiality can be problematic, the ‘down side’ of professionalization, but it is also understandable – and necessary. When any member of the press comes under fire, the corps closes ranks and forms a united front. But does it do any good?

The editorial role is under pressure – as always. The heaviest pressures have to do with Money, with owners’ preoccupation with the return on their investment. The pressure to return a profit represents the greatest challenge to the ideals attached to the editorial role today. Newspapers have always been market-oriented, but the consequences of that orientation have become much more acute. Newspapers nowadays are investments in the traditional capitalistic sense. That is to say, returns in the form of publicity and partisan sympathy no longer count; nowadays owners demand cold, hard, cash.

Thus, my fourth proposition is this: *Professionalization and the shift away from party affiliations represent a process of emancipation, but the process has been accompanied by a process of commercialization that may well thrust editorial power into a new set of chains.*

5.

My fifth proposition takes its point of departure in a recognition that we should avoid concentrating only on high ideals or only on the profit motive if we are to gain a proper understanding of the editorial role– whether past or present. My proposition is that we must consider the public and their everyday conditions and needs to be able to understand the history of the editorial role and the power Editors command.

Historically, we see how Editors have tried to establish a boundary vis-à-vis owners’ influence – “Mind vs. Money”, the authority of the Editor versus the power of capital. The ideal of independence is much celebrated. On the other hand, dependence on the market has been described, ideologized and interpreted as a matter of loyalty toward the readers. The press is in the service of its readers, listeners and viewers, we are told. The alliance with the public has proven a significant power base for Editors, vis-à-vis both owners and government. The ties to the public and Editors’ sensitivity to, and ability to play on, public sentiment have also given rise to fear of the power of the press.

This power is often interpreted as a perversion, as a dangerous sign of decay. We find an early Scandinavian example of this in philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, who characterized editors and journalists as custodians of the “tyranny of the vulgar” (cf. Bruhn Jensen 1996:127).
But popularly founded editorial power need not be ‘tyrannical’. There are numerous examples of Editors who have legitimately assembled a power base, based on their ability to articulate public sentiment. This sensibility has often been highly intuitive; only in modern times have Editors come to rely on opinion polls and readership statistics instead of intuition.

6.
The editorial role is played in the magnetic field between crafts and art, between rational organization and creativity, between planning and intuition.

It is necessary to distinguish between the Editor and the ‘media maker’. It is also necessary to distinguish between two different kinds of editors: the person who sees to it that the newspaper sees the light of day (Managing Editor in English parlance), and the person whose chief role is to lead and generate opinion (the Editor-in-Chief). The Managing Editor, who operates within the sphere of the newsroom more than in the public sphere, is more likely to be the real media maker. Editors who have played a major role in public arenas have generally left management of their papers to others. The abilities, to lead opinion and to manage a newspaper are two distinct talents; seldom are they united in one and the same person.

In Swedish press history, the dominant contrast has been that between the Editor and the ‘Master’, i.e., the academic. Academics have played a central role in several Swedish newspapers – *Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen* – over the years. In Norway, academics have tended to operate in the immediate surroundings of Norwegian newspapers rather than as journalists and editors. Numerous academics contributed reviews and essays to Norwegian papers on a casual basis during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Their role has declined, but not disappeared, as papers have sought to broaden their appeal. Meanwhile, newspaper management has become an increasingly independent and professional occupation.

A media maker has to be a bit of a cynic. Success is measured primarily in circulation figures, but also in the recognition of one’s colleagues. (The one often leads to the other.) Modern Managing Editors have no problems with making a profit, nor are they ashamed of leaning a bit more toward the Marketplace than toward the Temple, closer to the commercial than to the intellectual pole of the journalistic field. On the contrary, they tend to look upon those among their colleagues who do service in the Temple as elitist snobs, lacking in public appeal. For their part, managers are credited with a knack for sensing the pulse of the people – and an ability to turn what they sense into a commercial success.

Somewhat generally phrased, then, the sixth proposition is: *The manager of a news medium is not necessarily the Editor-in-Chief, and vice versa.*

7.
The next proposition relates to the fact that in Norway the legitimacy of the editorial role derives more from tradition and the code developed among practitioners within the field than from laws and statutes established outside it. The law mainly has to do with criminal liability. In a sense the code of ethics and the ideals surrounding editorial practice in Norway are a response to the absence of a legal framework. The seventh proposition, then: *To date, legality has rather little bearing on the legitimacy of the editorial role.*
The symbolic capital surrounding the Editor’s role was codified in 1953 with the adoption of the Editorial Code (Redaktørplakaten), where the norms and expectations attached to the editorship – which actually define the editorial role – are set out in print. Acceptance of the Code, first by newspaper publishers and then the Labour Court, conferred legitimacy on the editorial role. The claim to legitimacy has been strengthened by referring to the role of the press in democratic society and the “inviolable principle” of freedom of expression.

The Editorial Code expresses a fundamental obligation to society, to the public good. The “ideal objectives of the press” shall take precedence over all other motives.

When the Code calls for maintaining editorial independence from government and public authorities as well as independence from newspaper owners, it is in order to strengthen the Editor in his/her relation to a third party, namely, the public. The societal role of the press is conceived to be to promote a free and unprejudiced exchange of opinion and journalistic practices that maintain a distinction between facts and the paper’s views and values.

It is these principles and the Code in which they are expressed that, more than any legal instrument, convey legitimacy on the editorial role.

8.
In organizational terms, the editorial role is attached primarily to daily news media. The statutes of the Association of Norwegian Editors specify that members may be recruited from media that report news independent of and without deference to any other organization and that “[recognize] freedom of expression and freedom of the press as the fundamentals of a democratic society”. The media must, furthermore, address the public and have a periodicity in keeping with the function of a news-reporting medium. The same passage in an earlier version of the statutes was even more explicitly newspaper-oriented: “a frequency and regularity, a circulation, and a form that are comparable to the news reporting performed by daily newspapers”. Thus, the daily press is the standard. It is from day-to-day news reporting and the political work and ideological apparatus that have grown up around news reporting that the editorial role derives its legitimacy. It has its roots in the daily press.

In relation to the ideology of “social responsibility” and freedom of expression, however, a link to the daily press may be a less-than-optimal institutional base for the editorial role. A more open interpretation of the role may be called for. Editors of news media are not the only guarantors of public debate and freedom of expression.

Historically, of course, the editorial role has been intimately bound up with the emergence of journalism in Norway. Editors are also increasingly often recruited from the ranks of journalists. And, it is primarily among members of the press – subsequently complemented by other mass media – that the ideals and ideology of journalism have been formulated and put into practice via a self-imposed responsibility to society. Contemporary discussions of editorial responsibility and new media are strongly coloured by this prehistory.

The ordinary criminal code holds perpetrator(s) and their accomplices responsible for their acts – whether the crime occurs in reality or in cyberspace. Editorial responsibility, as set out in Norwegian law, is an extra liability, whereby the editor can be punished for acts – libel, for example – committed by others, even if he or she has become aware of the content only after publication. Editorial responsibility requires Editors to be aware
of what they send to press or transmit; failure to note a libellous statement constitutes a fault in the medium’s control routines, i.e., the Editor’s failure to perform his/her duty. The question is, should this particular responsibility be extended to web media?

The standpoint adopted by the Association of Norwegian Editors on this issue reflects the degree to which Norwegian editors see editorial responsibility as an outgrowth of their social responsibility. The Association favour extending editorial responsibility to cover electronic media, but rejects proposals to introduce a general liability covering all activities on the Internet or other kinds of web-based information. In the Association’s view, editorial responsibility should be confined to news reporting and other information relating to the happenings of the day. Simply put: Journalism gave birth to the editorial role, and ‘parental’ responsibilities belong to journalism.

Therefore, the Association of Norwegian Editors argue that editorial responsibility should be required only of media that provide services that are comparable to the services provided by print media and broadcasting, i.e., media that “serve the public news and information based on independent journalistic work”.

It is this kind of editorial responsibility on an ideal plane that the Association consider to be its duty to maintain and defend; it is what constitutes the “guarantee of freedom of expression and the independence, impartiality and quality of the editorial product”. A government commission set up to assess the implications of the convergence of the telecommunications, digital media (data processing and IT) and media sectors has proposed that personal editorial liability be extended to electronic publishing, but the commission acknowledges that the designated “responsible editor” would not always be able to control everything that appears on a web site.

It may become more difficult to argue for and maintain the editorial role in a universe characterized by the convergence and expansion of communications media that are not mass media in the conventional sense of the word. In many instances the broker role has become superfluous; we can all be our own editors. Yet it would be hasty to proclaim the death of the mediating messenger or the erosion of editorial power. Even the new information society will need a reliable editorial function – knowledge and opinion that is communicated in keeping with the ideals of the traditional editorial role.

To sum up the status of the editorial role in Norway today, an eighth proposition might be: In the tension between past and future, the rootedness of the editorial role in journalism becomes manifest.

9.

Painting in broad strokes, we may say that the editorial role is under pressure from owners’ demands of profitability, centripetal tendencies in the management of media conglomerates, from technological developments, and overly ambitious legislators with an inadequate grasp of freedom of expression in theory and in practice. Meanwhile, news sources, too, have become more sophisticated in their relations with the media; hence the growth of consultancies specializing in information and media strategy. In short, the editorial role is under pressure from commercialization, concentration, convergence, ‘control mania’, and the professionalization of news sources.

Editors themselves tend to exaggerate these external sources of pressure, pointing to the many threats from many quarters. As a consequence, they tend to disregard the threats to the editorial role that come from within and the ways in which their own behaviour can undermine that role.
I submit that *quality of editorial production may suffer as a result of an exaggerated celebration of the editorial role*. Many an Editor today is so busy demonstrating his or her independence and integrity that the quality and content that the Editor’s integrity should safeguard, becomes secondary. When independence becomes more a pose than an incitement to excellence, it is cause for thought. No proclamations of independence can disguise lacking competence or poor editorial quality in the long run.

Modern media are ‘addicted’ to their independence. The development of the editorial role has been a strong motor force behind this. The question today, however, is whether the euphoria attending this independence may have turned into an unreflecting cult.

For, it is much easier to surround oneself with an aura of independence than it is to practise critical and independent journalism. It is infinitely easier for the men and women of the press to develop a collective professional hubris than it is to take on the difficult task of acquiring solid knowledge. In the current phase of professionalization among journalists in Norway there is a tendency for self-satisfaction to grow faster than knowledge and insight.

That is why we often see a great deal of energy put into *demonstrating* independence, but relatively little energy devoted to acquiring a solid platform on which to build one’s an independent position. That is also why we see Editors’ duty to inform toned down in favour of their responsibility to stage ever more piquant, melodramatic tales of conflict. In this state of affairs it is necessary to insist that views and opinions are reported with at least a modicum of accuracy. The Editor must be held accountable, i.e., must ensure that what reaches the public is real, is true, and, ideally, he or she should share this sense of responsibility. Editors cannot reasonably have a greater responsibility for the temperature of public discourse than they have for its quality.

10.

“A newspaper is like a fortress, surrounded by people who bombard it with material. An Editor soon gets the impression that he is surrounded by people who have no greater aim in life than to see their words in print,” sighed Carl Jeppesen (1858-1930) in *Social-Demokraten*. In his view, “the quality an Editor needed most was that of a surly watchdog, the ability to keep adversaries at bay. And if he should itemize the most vital skills of an Editor, it would be literacy, larceny and apology – the ability to read everything, to decide what is of value to your readers, to appropriate it with a certain elegance, and the rest of the time to apologize to yourself and the rest of the world for the anger and irritation you have caused” (Bjørnsen 1984:213).

When the basic attitudes of editors and journalists are discussed today, the ability to stave off one’s adversaries is still a theme, but in a somewhat different respect than in Jeppesen’s era. The abilities to read, to think and to apologize are still needed, but hardly to the extent they were in Jeppesen’s day. Larceny is still a sine qua non, but to apologize “to oneself and to the world” for the anger you have caused – hardly!

Today, there is a need to convince others of one’s worth – even for Editors. A *raison d’être* that is comprehensible to the public is required. Tradition is no longer reason enough in modern society, even less so in the media society. One can no longer rest on one’s laurels. Conventional understandings of position and function can no longer be taken for granted. I submit that *Editors have a greater need to convince others of their value and to justify their role in times when the media’s social contract is under review.*
In the kind of examination of the status of the Editor’s role that we need today, it is necessary to involve the reading, viewing and listening public. Not just on a token basis, not just pro forma involvement in a sort of legitimating ritual, to show “how seriously we take our social responsibility” – as the litany goes. But real participation.

The challenge is to fill a call to readers to discuss press ethics and ideology – and, for that matter, the Editor’s role – with substance. If the editorial role falls into decline, so will public discourse.

Generally speaking, we should be on our watch concerning a shift in the balance of power between economic capital and symbolic and social capital. The situation in Norway is not such that we can simply say that “Money” has taken over from the parties. The symbolic capital of the press is still great, Editors still enjoy considerable support, and the defences of editorship as an institution are strong.

Consequently, Editors still wield power. They have yet to be relegated to the museum – a metaphor used by pressman and publisher Trygve Ramberg in a debate on the role of the editor over twenty-five years ago. The scenario Ramberg sketched was, he said, only a decade or so in the future. He described the visit of a school class to the “Museum of the Press”. There they came upon an odd sort of pulpet or bench-like artefact, cabowebs dangling from it. The text read: “Editor’s bench”. And the guide explained: ‘Here sat a man who “had amassed too much power and suffered from the delusion that he was the guarantor and chief executive of freedom of the press.’ The guide then lowered his voice and motioned the children to come closer. ‘In the end,’ the guide explained, ‘his sense of self-importance was so inflated that he actually stood in the way of true freedom of expression and the circulation of vital information in society. His bench stands here in the Museum as a warning, a reminder of the dark era of personality cult in Norwegian press history.”. And Ramberg concluded his tale: The children “listened wide-eyed to the guide’s every word as he described the evil-doings of the antidemocratic tyrant. ‘In his own eyes,’ the guide explained, ‘he was convinced he would survive since no one could ever find a better replacement. As it turned out he was sadly mistaken’” (Ramberg 1976:50).

When this fictive saga did not come true, nor is it likely to, it is because of the institutional framework surrounding the Editor’s role, and the complexity of media and editorial power. Perhaps it is also due to a will to redefine and renegotiate the social contract of the media and to reflect on the editorial role.

Notes
1. Ludvig Mariboe, founder of Patroullen, an opposition paper, in 1824.

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Journalistic and Commercial News Values

News Organizations as Patrons of an Institution and Market Actors

SIGURD ALLERN

Why do some events fill the columns and air time of news media, while others are ignored? Why do some stories make banner headlines whereas others merit no more than a few lines? What factors decide what news professionals consider newsworthy? Such questions are often answered – by journalists and media researchers alike – with references to journalistic news values or ‘news criteria’. Some answers are normatively founded; others are pragmatic and descriptive. In the present article, I submit that editorial priorities should not be analyzed in purely journalistic terms. Instead, they should be seen as efforts to combine journalistic norms and editorial ambitions, on the one hand, with commercial norms and market objectives, on the other.

Commercial Enterprise and Patron of an Institution

News media have a dual nature. On the one hand they represent a societal institution that is ascribed a vital role in relation to such core political values as freedom of expression and democracy. On the other hand, they are businesses that produce commodities – information and entertainment – for a market.

At the same time, because their products are descriptions of reality that influence our perceptions of the world around us, news media wield influence that extends far beyond the marketplace. Who controls the media is of significance to every member of society. As figures like Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi and the new Russian media barons remind us, control of the media is a key to political power. And while many venerable industries wither and die (or undergo profound metamorphoses) the consciousness industry – as writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1974) dubbed the media and other actors in the communication sector – is rapidly expanding.

Newspapers, radio programs and television transmissions differ with respect to how consumption of them affects our perception and understanding of reality. As Graham Murdoch observes:

By providing accounts of the contemporary world and images of the ‘good life’, they play a pivotal role in shaping social consciousness, and it is this ‘special relationship’ between economic and cultural power that has made the issue of
their control a continuing focus of academic and political concern (Murdoch 1982:118).

The chief news media are newspapers, news magazines, radio and television stations that carry newscasts, news bureaus and web-newspapers and newsletters. The boundaries vis-à-vis other media are sometimes fluid, however, and in practice very few media are pure news organizations. Besides news, reportage, comment and debate, newspapers also contain features, ‘human interest stories’ and pure entertainment; in Norwegian television, news fills less than 20 per cent of total transmission time on both state-owned public service television, NRK Fjernsynet, and commercially financed TV2. Common to all news media, however, is that news is a vital element in their overall content ‘mix’.

In market terms, news media are enterprises that produce and distribute media products over well-defined regions and fields. Take, for example, a company that publishes a printed newspaper. Today, the situation is often more complicated: a group company may own several news enterprises, which may operate within different media, such as the press, radio and television. Many printed newspapers also publish a net edition; in some cases these are organized as independent companies. In the present discussion the term, news enterprise designates companies having direct responsibility for journalistic publishing and known for their news and other output of topical material.

What distinguishes news media from other media, and news enterprises from other enterprises, is primarily their links to journalism and news as a societal institution. Timothy Cook (1998) distinguishes three central characteristics of institutions in general, and of media institutions in particular.  

First of all, institutions are social patterns of behaviour common to the organizations operating in a given sector of society. These include tacit procedures, routines and conditions that can both expand and constrain the room for maneuver. Such rules and procedures become internalized and are perceived as more or less natural ways to go about doing things.

If we then consider news media in this perspective, it becomes clear that regardless of the organization, there is a common understanding of certain basic genre rules that news reporting must observe and conventions regarding what is relevant and how it should be presented. This understanding is also reflected in both sources’ and the public’s expectations and requirements. News desks solve the problem by establishing certain routines for surveillance and news gathering in certain areas and through decisions concerning frameworks for the content ‘mix’, page or program editing, and design. Reporters are forced, as Gaye Tuchman (1973) so aptly put it, to “routinize the unexpected”. News stories are generally presented in familiar wrappings.

Another characteristic of institutions is that they extend over space and endure over time. “Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life,” as Anthony Giddens (1984:24) observes. News enterprises differ with respect to their size, geographical locality, orientation toward their audiences, technology and financing; they were established at different points in time and have different political histories. Newspapers and magazines were once alone among modern news media; then radio arrived on the scene, followed by television and now net media. Some news organizations fade away, and new ones see the light of day.

At the same time, an institutional ‘sisterhood’ among the media has evolved over the years. Among the common features are ethical norms and understandings of what constitutes “good journalistic practice” that apply to all media and media organizations.
Another common feature is the development of specialized training, which successively has elevated journalism to the status of a quasiprofession.

A third characteristic of institutions is that they are expected – by practitioners in the organizations within the institutions and others – to perform certain tasks and fill certain needs in society and politics.

Here we come to one of the most clearly institutional features of news media, namely, their roles as channel and arena for communication in the public sphere. Various commissions and committee reports on Swedish and Norwegian media speak of roles that are prerequisite to the proper functioning of democracy: public affairs information, scrutiny of wielders of power, and public debate. Political parties and elites have long viewed news media as important channels by which to reach the electorate and as competitive arenas for political opinion formation. Ideals relating to these roles are expressed, for example, in the code of ethics of the Norwegian Press Association that stresses the functions of information, debate and critical scrutiny. The notion of journalism as a mission, a task for the benefit of society has become a central part in the ideology of journalism.2 It is, as Odd Raaum (1999:65) points out, a myth that confers legitimacy on journalism as an occupation and enterprise.

By virtue of this myth or rationale, media companies are respected as patrons of the institution of news. Knut Helland describes the network of institutional linkages surrounding news media, as follows: “It is in the tension between performing idealized societal functions and serving up attractive products on the market that news reporting evolves as productional practices, as texts and as objects of interpretation” (Helland 1999:189). In an institutional perspective journalism cannot be considered a uniform or monolithic force or collective player. Institutions are complex and allow room for conflicting interpretations, priorities and solutions. How news companies and news desks perform their ‘custodial’ role in practice depends on numerous factors, e.g., the economic resources at their disposal and their relations to multiple markets: the stock market, advertising, the information market and users.

Tracking News Values

News is produced under different conditions, often in haste, and by people who may have different ideas as to what is important. Unexpected events – such as a journalist calling in sick – can influence editorial priorities: a story that surely would have been covered might be ignored due to a single reporter’s illness. A major fire or accident may cause any number of other stories to be shoved aside. On slow days, on the other hand, stories that might normally merit little attention may be played up as major events. One might say that the news threshold on such occasions is a notch or two lower.

Still, there is a system to these seemingly chance occurrences. One frequently hears the phrase that news values are “in the woodwork”, that is to say, that it is a question of a tacit newsroom culture that newcomers quickly absorb and internalize.

One of the causes – and journalists tend, for professional-ideological reasons, to stress this – is that certain values, occupational norms and work routines affect the news selection process. Statements about what constitutes “good journalism” often refer to codes of ethics and ideological notions of social responsibility, e.g., journalists’ ideas about their role as patrons of the news institution. The duty to provide information about important social issues and to train spotlights on wrongdoing and lapses is commonly subscribed to.
Textbooks on journalism (Mencher 1994; Østlyngen & Øvrebø 1998) link news values like these to words like significance (the relevance and importance of the event or phenomenon to readers), identification (geographical or cultural proximity), sensation (the element of surprise), timeliness (proximity in time), and conflict (controversy, confrontation). Last, but certainly not least, the salience (familiarity, prominence) and influence of the country, institution or person in the news story. In his book on television journalism, Olav Njaastad (1999:36) speaks of proximity as the one most central criterion, and he discusses several dimensions: proximity in time, proximity of effects or consequences, geographical proximity, cultural proximity and emotional proximity.

Such criteria arise out of both journalistic norms and practical experience of news reporting. At the same time, they are relatively general and abstract, which may give the impression that they are constants, independent of time and place. But news reporting and editing are always a question of evaluating specific things. Judgments of “newsworthiness” will always vary between news desks, and they will change over time.

Two models of news gathering are generally used when describing the news production process. In the one case, the news desk is said to make a selection among the flow of events, etc., that take place. ‘The news’ consists of the events that were selected. News editors have been likened to ‘gatekeepers’, a term coined by David Manning White (1950) in his landmark study of work routines within an American newspaper: “Mr. Gate“ decides what is news, and what is not. In the second model, the news desk is conceived of as searching for news stories. Might this or that idea make a good story? Which tips are worth following up? In this latter case the “news” does not come to the journalist; rather, the journalist “tracks down” the news and reveals what s/he has found.

Everyday practice contains elements that may be interpreted according to either model. That is to say, they are in fact complementary. Still, we have yet to explain why some news values, norms and objectives (and not others) guide the selections, priorities and reporting of news desks.

Two Pioneer Norwegian Contributions

News criteria have been a focus in the field of mass communication research for quite some time. In Norway, the Institute for Peace Research proposed hypotheses and undertook empirical studies of the news process as early as the 1960s. Their work was influential far beyond Norway’s borders. Its essence was encapsulated in a special issue of Journal of Peace Research (vol 2 no. 1) in 1965, in which Einar Østgaard has an article on factors influencing the flow of news and Johan Galtung and Marie Holmboe Ruge write on the structure of foreign news. The latter article has turned up now and then like a restless ghost in both Scandinavian and international discussions of so-called ‘news factors’.

Galtung and Homboe Ruge (1985:64-91) are primarily interested in the features of events that render them newsworthy. They liken the enormous number of events that occur any given day or week to the cacophony of broadcasting stations that fill the air waves. The question is, what of all this will catch our attention? Taking basic perception psychology as their starting point, they list a number of factors that will arouse the public’s interest. These factors are then transformed into eight main hypotheses and four supplementary hypotheses as to qualities in events, viewed in relation to characteristics of the news media, that will catch our attention.3
The fundamental hypothesis is that the more of these criteria a given event satisfies, the more likely it is to be reported as news. The factors are not independent of one another; they covary to some extent.

Galtung and Ruge then used some of these hypotheses in an analysis of the manner in which three items of foreign news were reported in four Norwegian newspapers. Over the years, however, the “factors” and hypotheses put forward in this article have been taken to be a comprehensive theory of the news, supported by empirical research. This was hardly Galtung and Ruge’s intention. I, myself, have experienced how Norwegian journalism students have taken the hypotheses as a kind of menu or checklist of news criteria and even as a sort of recipe for good news reporting.

Galtung and Ruge’s intentions were in fact quite the opposite. Their article ended in a scathing critique of the news practices of western media, and a call for a new kind of journalism that focuses not on discrete events, but on longer-term processes and that pays attention to other phenomena than the affairs of big powers and elite politicians.

Stig Hjarvard (1995) offers a thorough and critical account of how Galtung and Ruge’s article has been used and abused by mass communication researchers around the world, and I refer the interested reader to his work. Here I confine myself to pointing out the pitfalls of putting too much emphasis, and too one-sided emphasis, on the news value of the event itself. In reality, only very seldom do we encounter events that immediately, within the span of a day, have a force or amplitude that is so dramatic, so attention-getting and starkly delineated that they absolutely have to be reported as a national or international news events.

Keeping to the international arena, obviously brutal conflicts like those in Afghanistan and the Middle East gain extensive coverage. But, as we all know, the media seldom cover more than one or two conflicts or catastrophes at any given time. At the same time, they provide us with a steady stream of information about far less dramatic events and situations.

Einar Østgaard’s article in the same issue of *Journal of Peace Research* has received far less attention. That is a shame inasmuch as Østgaard brings up more basic relationships in the news process than Galtung and Ruge’s ‘perception model’. Østgaard starts with the observation that the “free flow of news” is influenced by conditions that apply within the news production process as well as by factors external to it, not least political and economic factors. Østgaard specifies their influence at various stages of the news process.

One such ‘external’ factor is the news source: Governments and powerful institutions make a conscious effort to influence how the news is reported. Sources can also influence articles about economic conditions, but, Østgaard points out, little was known about this in 1965, as the subject was still terra incognita within the media research community. Another external factor in the case of foreign news is the circumstance that news services produce news stories as ‘products’ on a market, i.e., they should be produced at the lowest possible cost and sold to as many clients in as many countries as possible. In addition, the news enterprise’s commercial rationale generally has considerable influence on editorial priorities. A third set of external factors are the priorities that arise out of the individual media company’s editorial policy and market orientation.

In addition to these there are any number of factors that are part and parcel of the news process, but are bound up with the above-mentioned external factors. A market orientation implies a need to simplify stories so that they are comprehensible to a broad segment of the population. The news story is always a version of reality that is less complex than
it might be. Secondly, stories intended for a broad segment of the public should contain some element that encourages identification, i.e., a well-known figures or familiar kind of events, something that is close to the reader/viewer in a cultural or geographical sense. The need to personify the news is closely related. Finally, we have sensationalism, which arises out of the tendency of news media to attach news value to situations characterized by conflict. In practice it is hard to understand journalistic news criteria without taking the news organizations’ market strategies into account. News is literally “for sale“.

Market Niches and Editorial Market Strategies

The media’s market orientation is reflected in several ways. Commercial considerations are most apparent in the case of the popular press, where front-page headlines serve as adverts for the paper. A similar Norwegian example is VG Nett, the internet site of Norway’s largest popular tabloid. In an interview (VG 9th June 2000) Torry Pedersen, then newly appointed editor-in-chief and general manager of VG Multimedia AS, characterized the three legs on which the news site stands: sports, celebrities and major news events:

He chooses sports for the young men, for they are the biggest users of Internet, and celebrities for the girls, because they are interested in things like that, and ...

“We need to be better at news. VG Nett should be the best place for the latest on Sierra Leone, Jens Stoltenberg, Ole Gunnar Solskjaer and Aqua-Lene.”

The formula is audience-oriented and commercial; the definition of an important news item is mainly that it is related to well-known people and celebrities and is popular in the niches and among the target audiences the site aims to reach. Plus room for “Sierra Leone,” which – most likely in connection with a civil war or major crisis – can take its place alongside the latest trivia regarding Manchester United’s Solskjaer and pop singer, Aqua-Lene.

‘Tabloid news values,’ whether in the press or on television, are a question of both the ‘mix’ and the angle and interpretive framework of the reporter. News beats that appeal to broad sectors of the public – scandals, crime, sports and pop culture – will be given very high priority relative to items about politics and public affairs (Sparks 2000). At the same time, the stories will be highly personified; they will impart sensations and emotions. Media dramaturgy has the aesthetic of melodrama, with a polarity between resrepresentatives of Good and Evil (Gripsrud 1992:88f).

Market-orientation in journalism is much more than commercial news media’s indulging popular tastes and interests. Three factors that are of decisive importance in news selection and news production should be mentioned here:

1) the geographical area of coverage and type of audience
2) the competition between media and news enterprises
3) the budget allotted news departments, which is an expression of the company’s commercial/financial objectives.

The area of coverage is the most obvious factor. The ‘catchment area’ of news media is, generally speaking, the most decisive factor regarding judgments of newsworthiness, of both events and personalities. It is not only a matter of proximity – that events nearby are more interesting than distant ones. Most newspapers are tailored to suit the reader-
ship in a given district. Newspapers that address readers all over the country naturally have a broader news horizon. Certain English-language elite papers, such as *Financial Times* and *Herald Tribune*, have market-based reasons to carry considerably more international politics, etc., than newspapers that address a national readership.

In Norway, regional and local newspapers are omnibus papers; the contents are all-round, and readers grasp most of the content. This is not the case in Great Britain, where the news market is segmented according to class, with “qualities” for the educated elites and tabloid “populars“ for the masses. But the allroundness of Norwegian papers, I should note, is limited to news and reportage that has some bearing on the district (ranging from small towns to the nation) where the readers and advertisers are located.

For a local newspaper or local radio station, events that take place in another county or another paper’s home market, even dramatic ones, may be considered non-events simply because they occur outside the area where the medium has its audience (and its advertisers). For example: A major traffic accident that occurs just east of the Lysaker River, i.e., a couple of hundred meters outside the Baerum city limits, will generally not interest the local newspaper in Baerum (*Asker og Baerums Budstikke*) unless one or more of the people involved resided in Asker or Baerum, the paper’s area of coverage. Or, as the editor of Tromsø, a paper that aspires to be the local paper of the city of Tromsø, puts it: “If there’s a murder in Finnsnes, what’s that to us?” In the local newspapers owned by the Orkla Group, it is the executive board, not the editor-in-chief who decides where the papers’ branch offices will be located. The relative concentration of readers and, thus, the commercial interest to advertisers count more than whether there are interesting news sources or objects of coverage in the area.

An example from *Aftenposten*, a paper in the Schibsted chain, illustrates the importance of this latter factor. In the late 1980s, Editor-in-Chief Egil Sundar tried to turn *Aftenposten*, a regional newspaper in Oslo and Eastern Norway, into Norway’s leading nationally distributed newspaper. Part of Sundar’s strategy was to make it possible for readers anywhere in Norway to subscribe to the Saturday edition. This required an earlier printing deadline and entailed considerable extra distribution costs, which were not covered by any increase in advertising revenue. The project was sabotaged by the commercial departments, which failed to balance the costly distribution with advertising sales on a national level, as Sundar’s ambitious scheme had envisaged. Shortly thereafter, Sundar was forced to leave his position, and *Aftenposten* returned to its original market concept. 5

*Nationally distributed newspapers*, with readers throughout Norway, de facto fill different news niches and serve different market segments. Norway’s two popular tabloids, *VG* and *Dagbladet*, appeal to ‘everyone’ with a combination of news and diversion/entertainment. A strong rivalry prevails between the two.

Right-wing, neoliberal business newspapers like *Dagens Næringsliv* and *Finansavisen* operate on a different market. They specialize in economic news of direct interest to top and middle management in both private enterprise and the public sector, whereas subjects like traffic accidents, violent crime and sports are excluded. Other niche papers have more the character of *opinion papers*. *Vårt Land* (a conservative Christian paper in religious matters, more social-liberal in politics), *Nationen* (with an emphasis on Norwegian news outside the metropoles and against Norwegian membership in the European Union), and *Klassekampen* (a socialist newspaper, likewise against Norwegian membership in the Union) are more allround than the business papers and address mainly politically and ideologically aware readers who feel a need for a complement to the local press.
Traits peculiar to different news media also play in. In the case of television newscasts, the desire to tell a good story with live footage often decides what is selected for treatment and becomes news. If a story cannot be visualized – be it with no more than a still or portrait photo – it will tend to be placed toward the end of the queue, if it is included at all (Sand & Helland 1998). This mechanism is also well-known among PR agents: an offer of 'live footage' can lower the news threshold.

Having an exclusive, i.e., being the only medium to cover a story, is an advantage in competitive situations. News organizations compete by developing stories on their own, and they will often ignore a story that many other media already have covered or are covering. Editors of newspapers, which appear only once a day, will furthermore try to judge how well-known a story may be by the time readers confront it in their product. If radio stations have carried a story a half day before the paper comes out, it may be regarded as ‘old hat’ or a ‘non-event’, even in nationally distributed papers. The same applies to other media, as well. If the news department of NRK (Dagsrevyen) or TV 2 feel they are alone in covering a story, they will be strongly motivated to make it the top of the evening news. The emergence of net media has heightened ‘old’ media’s motivation to cultivate their identities by carrying exclusive stories, background information and features that have not yet been published by others.

A third factor, then, is the budget news gathering and reporting is allotted. Every editor knows the possibilities and constraints the size of one’s budget implies, yet it is little discussed publicly. "Among the most remarkable aspects of the folklore of the press is the absence of reference to money," Herbert Altschull observes in Agents of Power (1984:253). Textbooks in journalism education seldom have very much to say about the relationship between how media are financed and their product characteristics. In Melvin Mencher’s News Reporting and Writing (1994), only two of 600 pages mention the influence finances can exert on content, news priorities and journalists’ choice of sources. Be that as it may, capitalization of the media has meant that journalists increasingly are required to be managers, and the managers focus more and more on budget control and reporters’ productivity rather than on winning professional recognition.

Every news chief knows that the news can be produced at different levels of expense. Cheapest are items based on rewrites of press releases, reports from press conferences and other situations where news sources serve information on a silver platter. Somewhat more demanding of time and effort – and therefore more costly – are follow-ups of stories that have already broken, e.g., contacting alternative sources for comment on some political initiative or statement to the press by a news source. If the news desk relies heavily on news of its own making – following up tips, developing its own reportage ideas and putting research into a solid background article – its costs will be high. Even more costly are investigative reporting and series. Reluctant sources and closed doors only add to the cost of such ventures.

Most news desks will also buy material from one or more news services. Since these services are subscribed, it is most economical to make use of the material the service provides as copy; it is much more costly to use it only as background and reference material for one’s reporters.

Studies of news media have found that, due to shortages of staff and budget constraints, news desks generally have to make sure they develop contacts with organized, bureaucratic sources – e.g., the police, the courts, traffic control centres, local administrators and political bodies – reliable sources of a steady stream of information that can easily be converted into news copy. Active, self-reliant news gathering costs. Offensive
offers of journalistically processed information from resource-rich sources are a daily
temptation. Precisely such ‘information subsidies’ play a central part in professional
agents’ media strategies (Gandy 1982; Allern 1997).

By the same token, some kinds of potential news stories are left aside, not because
they lack relevance, but because they require ‘digging’ and journalistic resources: time,
staff and money. Budget-consciousness means that certain kinds of news stories, those
that cost little to produce, tend to have an easier time making their way into news col-
umns and newscasts.

The traditional news criteria mentioned above may therefore be supplemented with
a set of “commercial news criteria“:

– The more resources – time, personnel and budget – it costs to cover, follow up or
  expose an event, etc., the less likely it will become a news story.

– The more journalistically a news source or sender has prepared a story for publica-
tion (the costs for such treatment being borne by the sender), the greater the likelihood
that it will become news.

– The more selectively a news story is distributed, e.g., in a manner that allows a jour-
nalist to present the story as his or her own work, under a personal byline, the more
likely it will become news.

– The more a news medium’s strategy is based on arousing sensations to catch public
  attention, the greater the likelihood of a ‘media twist’, where entertaining elements
  count more than criteria like relevance, truth and accuracy.

In the following, we shall consider two case studies, both taken from a content analysis
of a variety of Norwegian newspapers⁶, that illustrate market mechanisms like these in
news production.

Case study 1. The front-page news in three Norwegian newspapers

_Verdens Gang (VG)_ is a street-sale tabloid with Conservative leanings; it is the leading exponent of ‘tabloid culture’ in Norway. _VG_ also has the largest circulation among Norwegian newspapers (375,983 in 2000). _Dagens Næringsliv_ is a specialized newspaper that primarily addresses readers in the business community and public administration, i.e., readers with a particular interest in news and data on the economy and the finance market. The paper’s ideological orientation is neoliberal. It had a circulation of 71,364 in 2000. _Vårt Land_ is, as mentioned above, a Christian newspaper, middle-of-the-road in its politics. It had a circulation of 29,578 in 2000.

During the reconstructed sample week of the present study, the front pages of the three
papers carried 124 items (including ‘kickers’ that refer the reader to the inside pages).⁷
_Vårt Land_ had by far the most items, _VG_ the least. Despite the fact that all three papers
are published in Oslo and address a nationwide readership, none of the items was car-
rried in more than one paper. The differentiation was extreme.
All the items in VG were highly dramatic: acts of violence and other life-and-death situations, blackmail, and crises. ‘The drama of everyday life’ is part of the paper’s news concept. One of the front pages is about a young woman who, according to the paper, was forced by her driving instructor to pose naked on a motorcycle. To underline the ‘scandal’, the paper illustrates the story with a photo of the woman, naked, on the bike. Capitals in the headline reinforce the sensational aspect. Otherwise, a front page in VG typically features a prominently placed photo of one or another celebrity, who in most cases figures in a very minor story somewhere in the inside pages.

The front pages of Dagens Næringsliv live up to the paper’s name (Business Day) and report purchases, sales, interest rates, the stock market, options and various CEOs who have got the sack. Minor front-page headlines, too, are about economic aspects, but here the scope broadens to include branches like the media, cultural institutions and pop culture.

As might be expected, Vårt Land presents a quite different image of reality than the other two papers. Front-page stories in this Christian newspaper are about church life and religion, cultural life, health and human relations. The minor items, and particularly the ‘kickers’ provide a catalogue of the issue’s contents.

The selection of news presented on all three papers’ front pages clearly reflects the papers’ respective editorial standpoints and market orientations. Few news stories are, in themselves, significant or important enough to merit front-page coverage in all three papers. It takes a major accident, a protracted mass strike or a change of Government for an event to be given the same news priority. All three papers put a lot of effort into developing their own news stories, and stories worked up by the paper’s own staff are featured prominently. This is how the papers go about developing an identity in competition with other papers and media.

The front pages of these three papers represent three distinct news cultures. This is not to say that the journalists working for the respective papers have fundamentally different ideas about abstract news values like proximity and identification, significance and sensation. Over the years, the popular press in Oslo has in fact recruited many a reporter from Vårt Land. But the papers’ market positions and orientations toward their readership differ in the extreme. Consequently, the editorial strategies differ. This is what permeates “the woodwork“ in the newsroom and molds a paper’s news culture.

Case study 2. The Bodø press: the same news in both papers?

Bodø is a coastal town in northern Norway. For over sixty years, two local papers, Nordlands Framtid and Nordlandsposten, have been strong competitors in this area of Nordland County. In 2000, Nordlands Framtid, a daily with Social Democratic political roots, had a circulation of 19,337, and Nordlandsposten, a daily with Conservative political leanings, had a circulation of 15,448. In February 2002, the two papers were closed down after an agreement between their owners, the group companies A-pressen and the Harstad Tidende group/Schibsted. On the ruins of the two rivals a single new paper, Avisa Nordland, co-owned by the two groups, has arisen. The new paper will have a monopoly on the local market, which will make it easier to milk the advertising market. The owners appear to have wasted no time; according to the net edition of the professional paper, Journalisten (22nd February 2002), local advertisers in Bodø are protesting a rise in advertising rates. The agreement also provides for collaboration in advertising sales between the two group companies in other parts of the North.
Before *Nordlands Framtid* and *Nordlandsposten* became newspaper history, I performed an analysis of their news material (Allern 2001a). Due to the competition between them, both papers carried much more news copy than was common among newspapers of their size. It seemed reasonable to expect that the two competitors in this relatively small community would carry the same kinds of news. In one sense they did: the editorial pages in *Nordlands Framtid* and *Nordlandsposten* were organized more or less the same way, and the two papers allotted roughly the same space to local news, sports, culture and so forth. But did they also carry the same news stories?

Table 1 shows the frequency of overlap in various content categories. The basis of the comparison is articles in the inner pages, front-pages excluded. The number of news items (N) is the net of the total number of articles in the two papers, minus the number of items referring to the same news event. The category “Domestic and local news” includes articles on politics/public administration, the economy/business, health/education/the environment, traffic/accidents, crime/justice, and other local news that do not concern sports or the Arts. Sports, the Arts and foreign news are generally carried on separate pages in both papers, but articles on other pages are included in the respective categories where appropriate. The material does not include features (principally in the Saturday edition) and commentary (leaders, columns, letters-to-the-Editor).

### Table 1. The news copy (principal articles, secondary articles and news briefs) in a reconstructed news week in *Nordlands Framtid* and *Nordlandsposten*. Overlap in news coverage as a percentage of all news items and the categories, Domestic and local news, Sports, The Arts, and Foreign news

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overlap (%)</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and local news</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(589)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign news</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(872)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gross number of articles in the category domestic and local news was 633, with somewhat more in *Nordlands Framtid* than in *Nordlandsposten*. Forty-four of these articles were about events that both papers covered, which yields a net total of 589 news events. Of this remainder, 50 per cent were exclusive to *Nordlands Framtid*, and 42 percent exclusive to *Nordlandsposten*. Seven per cent appeared in both papers. In the case of sports, 8 per cent of the events were reported in both papers, whereas the shares for the Arts and foreign news were 11 and 13 per cent, respectively. On average, only 8 per cent of the news events appeared in both papers.

The few stories that both papers covered on the same day were out-of-the-ordinary events. Aside from a nationwide politically motivated strike, they mainly have to do with local crime and accidents. The papers put considerable resources into hunting out and developing their own news to a much greater extent than thinking up their own ‘angle’ on one and the same story. The same pattern was found in sports and the Arts, where both papers covered mainly major athletic events (recaps in the Monday edition), concerts and meetings.
The tendency to choose different news items was also apparent in the papers’ use of wire service material. The papers carried relatively little foreign news, particularly in Nordlandsposten, and what they carried was mainly news service copy from the Norwegian News Agency, NTB. Still, few items were carried in both papers. This may be due to the fact that the menu of items was long and space in the papers limited, which means that a few choices on the part of the respective desk editors could result in quite different priorities. Whatever the case, it is a reminder of how differently editors can judge the significance, relevance and interest of the stories that pass across their desks.

Even though the two papers were published in the same town and competed for the same readers, they chose to feature to a surprising extent quite different news events and figures. Obviously, they may have followed up each other’s news a day or two later, a possibility not investigated in the present study. But inasmuch as news desks tend to avoid ‘old news’, particularly if their competitors have carried it, such follow-ups were probably not frequent.

An overall characteristic of news, and a major factor behind such a pattern, is that surprising and dramatic “happenings” are far fewer, and therefore play a lesser role, than is generally assumed. News reporting deals for the most part with many other kinds of events: the presentation of plans and projects, reports from meetings and other gatherings (there are generally any number to choose from), and various actions and reactions in the realm of local politics. Opinion, e.g., complaints in the wake of an occurrence or a situation or reactions to others’ views, is yet another facet of news journalism.

Another interesting characteristic of the two papers in Bodø is that they, as a consequence of their intense rivalry, had more pages and richer contents than most local newspapers. Indeed, they were on a par with VG, Norway’s largest. Meanwhile, they were produced by only a fraction of the staff. Staff members’ productivity was extremely high.

Both papers held their own, economically speaking, but they did not turn much of a profit or make much in the way of group contributions. The new local monopoly paper will make it easier for the owners to reap a fatter profit. Whether this will mean more resources at the disposal of the new editorial staff (which, of course, is much smaller than in the former papers together), as some hope it will, remains to be seen. One thing is certain: news coverage in the district will be far less comprehensive than it was.

The Political News Beat

As noted earlier, the notion of news media as mainstays of political democracy has been central to the norms of news institutions and journalism as a (quasi)profession. In a study of the position of national political coverage in Norwegian media, I found that what happens in Parliament, the parliamentary parties and other central political processes is given relatively high priority in the media’s deployment of staff and internal organization (Allern 2001b). Just under 300 journalists and editors attached to 42 Norwegian news desks cover national politics. Many Norwegian newspapers, news bureaux and broadcasting organizations have political news departments and commentators. Smaller newspapers rely on two news services for most of their coverage of national politics.

Political journalism has been held in high esteem within the news business. Partly because political reporting requires knowledgeability and journalistic competence, but also because journalists who cover politics frequent the corridors of power and meet influential figures. If journalism is still a male-dominated occupation, political journalism is even more so.
The organization and management of news departments reflects the ideal of maintaining a distinction between political news journalism and political commentary. Consequently, political reporting and commentary sort under two different editors. Political editors are the ‘opinion generals’, whereas the head of the political news desk, who answers to the editor of the news department, commands the troops of political reporters.

One consequence of this division is that political journalism today is subject to the competition for the same space and air time as other news journalism. Most Norwegian newspapers no longer have pages reserved for political news (in contrast to, say, business news, culture and entertainment, and sports). The same is true of politics in television newscasts. What is assigned political ‘importance’ or ‘significance’ is judged in relation to an overall mix of contents that includes accidents, crime, business, sports, and entertainment. At some junctures (e.g., parliamentary impasses, reshuffling of the cabinet or internal strife in one or another party) the public may be served overdoses of certain types of political news that lend themselves to dramatization and personification. News items about political processes often lose out in the competition because things that immediately attract and interest readers and viewers are valued more highly. Similar considerations limit the amount of international news that media carry.

This is most probably one of the main reasons why political news, despite the relatively many journalists who work in this area, tends not to be accorded very much space in the nationally distributed Norwegian press. In my content analysis of ten Norwegian newspapers, nationally distributed VG, Dagens Næringsliv and Vårt Land (all published in Oslo) devoted least space to politics and public administration, whereas the smallest local newspapers gave such material rather high priority (Allern 2001a). This is because these latter papers generally cover what happens in local government (city and county councils). In contrast, parliamentary debates must reach the boiling point, cabinets fall to pieces, or party brothers and sisters be at each other’s throats before political news is given priority in major national papers. The dilemma is that political journalists, to win out in the competition, are forced to play up political gamesmanship and the drama of power-struggles, whereas decisions made in public administration and processes that go on behind the scenes in politics tend to be left aside.

What is more, news desks seldom have night editors with political savvy and experience. Therefore, they tend to follow a course that best corresponds to general, market-oriented news values. News editors are largely preoccupied with seeing to it that ‘we’ do not miss anything that our competitors manage to cover. Both politicians and political reporters whom I have interviewed say that on occasion even major interviews that have taken a lot of time and effort to arrange and carry out will be put aside because “the desk” could not fit them into the day’s ‘mix’ of news items. Journalists learn from experience what kinds of copy win editors’ favor. They learn quickly.

A good share of the journalism concerning national politics in Norway today focuses on power-struggles between the Government and the Opposition, the debate among parties in the Parliament and conflicts within the respective parties. In practice, this means that there is little room for the issues that have significance for people in their daily lives; what is more, it means that the images of reality political journalism imparts derive from the political elite and its immediate surroundings. Inasmuch as leading news organizations set their priorities in this manner, the political agenda of the press becomes relatively uniform.
This in turn gives rise to a strong herd mentality among journalists, a kind of conformity of attitudes and ideas as to who and what are the prize trophies in the political news hunt.

**Journalistic and Commercial News Criteria**

To sum up, then. Journalistic news values formulated in catchwords like timeliness, relevance, identification, etc. are so abstract that, taken alone, they tell us little about actual priorities and choices. They assume meaning only when placed in the context of the medium’s orientation to its readership or audience or, in other words, its market orientation and editorial market strategy. All kinds of media and news companies that operate on a capitalistic market need a strategy of this kind, even public service broadcasters and, for that matter, socialist newspapers and miscellaneous media that are run on an ideological or purely idealistic basis. At the same time, there are significant differences between news organizations that are primarily ‘idea-driven’ and those whose principal purpose is to turn a profit for their owners.

In the case of open stock companies, the prime aim must be to yield a maximum return on invested capital. In such companies, success vis-à-vis a given market segment or ‘target audience’ is only a means to serve the advertising market, to secure a profit, and to enhance the company’s standing on the stock exchange. Editorial costs are evaluated with the same considerations in mind. This can have a profound influence on the kind of news a medium carries and on the kinds of sources that are given priority. Editors employed in these companies know what is expected of them. Those who fail to ‘deliver’ soon discover that owners not only have the power to hire, but also to fire, at will. As in the rest of Fennoscandinavia, the role of Norwegian news media as power-brokers is no longer a matter of acting spokesman for or supporter of one or another political party. Today’s media concerns are generally on a good footing with the powers that be. They hire Editors-in-chief that stand for reliable, predictable consensus values and strive for political alliances that guarantee freedom of enterprise, political stability and a capital-friendly investment climate.

In some cases – when, for example, media appeal to elite audiences – commercial market objectives will allow room for quality journalism that requires considerable editorial resources. In Norway, the business newspaper *Dagens Næringsliv* sometimes shows itself capable of investigative journalism that not only wins it repute in professional circles but also attracts new readers. But far more typically, particularly when the advertising market is slow, the paper will let journalists go and reduce other editorial costs to make sure that it turns a profit. Local Norwegian newspapers in the Orkla and A-pressen chains that consistently return solid profits have been subject to similar cutbacks that have made it difficult, if not impossible, to undertake investigative reporting or more ambitious reportage projects. Instead, the papers have to rely on ‘assembly line journalism’, i.e., the kind of reporting that can be done from a desk, which necessarily implies a reliance on institutional, bureaucratic news sources.

There are, however, limits to how far commercialization and the profit motive can go. Even public stock media companies are dependent on a modicum of journalistic creativity, originality, and a willingness to work hard. Readers and audiences, too, have qualitative expectations of the news as an institution. This has given, and will continue to give rise to sharp conflicts between, on the one hand, priorities concerned with “maintaining the institution of news journalism” and, on the other hand, the demands of actors in the finance market.
Notes

1. In *Governing with the News*, Cook discusses the role of news media as political institutions and whether or not journalists can be conceived of as political actors. This discussion falls outside the bounds of the present article. I have, however, followed up the perspective in a recent book, *FlokkydypåLøvebakken: SøyelyspåStortingetspresselosjeogpolitikkensmedierammer* [Herd journalism? Spotlight on the Norwegian parliamentary press lobby and the media’s framing of politics] (Allern 2001b).

2. These tasks are frequently characterized as “functions of the media”. For example, in NOU 1983:3 *Massemedierogmediepolitikk* [Mass media and media policy]; NOU 1992:14 Mål og midler i pressepolitikken [The means and ends of press policy]; St. meld Nr. 32 1992/93 *Media i tida* [Contemporary media], Norwegian authorities and policy researchers have been inspired by the ideas expressed in the Swedish studies that preceded the introduction of a system of state subsidies to the press in the 1970s. Swedish media scholar Bengt Nerman (1991) rightly views the press’ and authorities’ embrace of the notion of a “mission” as corporative doctrine. For a critique of functional theories of news media, see Allern (1996:47-49).

3. 1) The media will give priority to stories that have a time-span that is consonant with the *tempo* of the medium, and the media prefer events to processes (“The building of a dam goes unnoticed, but not its inauguration.”). 2) An event must have a certain “amplitude”, i.e. an airplane crash resulting in 100 casualties will be given priority over a traffic accident in which no one was seriously injured (threshold). 3) The event should be clear-cut and easily grasped (no ambiguity). 4) The event should be perceived as relevant to the cultural circle to which the medium caters (meaningfulness). 5) News tends to be about certain familiar types of events (consonance). 6) Familiar phenomena that nonetheless occur unexpectedly will be carried (surprise). 7) Once an event has been given coverage, it will most likely continue to get coverage, for a while at least. As Galtung & Ruge put it, referring to the broadcasting metaphor: “If one signal has been tuned in to the more likely it will continue to be tuned in to as worth listening to.” (continuity) 8) Newsdesks are concerned about the balance of the content they carry (e.g., between foreign and national news); that is to say, newsworthiness is dependent on the overall assortment of items already carried (composition). Galtung & Ruge consider the above factors more or less universal; they do not vary between different political and cultural contexts. The following four factors, however, are culturally determined and are particularly relevant for western media’s treatment of foreign news. News tends to be about 9) elite nations and 10) elite individuals (“top dogs” as Galtung & Ruge put it); 11) stories are mainly about people, and 12) events of a negative character take priority.

4. Personal communication with the author. Finnsnes is roughly 60 km south of Tromsø.

5. Egil Sundar’s departure from *Aftenposten* was the consequence of several factors. A principal cause was his use of the paper to campaign for the formation of a Conservative-oriented coalition government. This was a marked departure from the ‘consensus’ or ‘middle-of-the-road’ profile the owners, not least for commercial reasons, sought to maintain.

6. The study, reported in Allern (2001a), analyzes ten Norwegian newspapers. Each newspaper is represented by one issue per day of the week (two issues in the case of papers appearing three days a week), dates chosen at random in the interval, October 1998—February 1999. For details of the sampling and analytical procedures, see the report.

7. The analysis includes issues six days of the week, Monday-Saturday. *VG*’s Sunday edition has been excluded.

8. The “same news event” may be an accident, a decision on the part of the city council, the grand opening of a bridge, the announcement of a proposal, coverage of a soccer match, and so forth.

9. Whereas *VG* had 342 editors and journalists, including desk typographers, in their employ in 1999 (the year of the study), *Nordlands Framtid* had 37 and *Nordlandsposten* 32.

References


The ERNO Television Exchange

*An Window on the Train of Trust in the Balkans*

Ullamaija Kivikuru

It is not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that constitute our being. This is a provocative formulation, but I am using it to restore to its rightful place a positive concept of prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by the French and the English Enlightenment. It can be shown that the concept of prejudice did not originally have the meaning we have attached to it. Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified or erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. (Gadamer, 1976:9.)

The Balkans are a region with mountains and graveyards, bombed buildings forming ghostly reminders of the bitter past in the midst of deserted countryside as well as in city centres overtly filled with “urban normality”, crowds busily running up and down – and satellite dishes, sometimes even two per house or balcony. Here sophisticated media professionals suddenly drop crudely formulated stereotypes of “all Serbs/Croats/Bosniaks” – as thinking or behaving in a certain way – although the reasoning underlying their presentations is otherwise fairly elaborate. In everyday situations, it seems essential to “place” people ethnically – to know where a colleague’s father comes from or where someone has his/her family roots.

In the Balkans today, the sound of an exploding bicycle tire makes relaxed customers in a streetside cafeteria jump in alarm. In the Balkans today societies as a whole as well as individual citizens are searching for a re-established openness based on prejudices, simultaneously historical, present, erroneous, justified and real. A decade-long succession of wars still resides in the minds of people who try to understand each other and themselves. These people seek, every day, a phenomenon that Gadamer calls “effective history”.

This is a story of one attempt to bring to the Balkans the type of media material which is meant to assist in coping with the complex contradictions and prejudices which are faced by the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia on a daily basis. In Slovenia the strongest ethnic tensions seem to be fading away already.

As such this story is simple, perhaps even mechanistic. It concerns a newsfilm exchange system which tries to increase “normality” among the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to discuss the editorial policy of a new exchange system, operating under extremely sensitive political conditions and, on
the other, to bring this discussion to the sphere of time/space/place. If the idea of a news and feature service is to spread understanding and regional consciousness, what kind of services should it offer – and what is possible, in the given political and journalistic conditions? Are the only options heavy politics or light human interest stories, especially when the exchange is run by a big international, routine-based system?

**ERNO – a Window for Spreading Understanding?**

ERNO is the youngest of the four “regional windows” which the EBU has established during the 1990s as a counter-attack to claims that the EBU main feed EVN pays too much attention to ministers and other dignitaries, climbing into and out of cars and, in general, favours the big and the powerful in Europe. The idea behind the regional windows is to soften the crash-news profile of EVN – but rather without extra costs. Thus it can be said that EBU established its regional windows to increase the proportion of “soft” news focusing on particular regions and countries.

The five rich Nordic countries pay the extra costs of their own Nordic window and get a daily service of 25 minutes, to a large extent economic news and noteworthy features. The eastern European window ERNE inherited the legacy of Intervision which went down with socialism in eastern Europe. All EBU members pay the costs of this regional window, sending material for 15 minutes daily to countries which used belong to the socialist block in eastern Europe. ERNE focuses quite much on the hard news with a regional aspect, allowing nation-level politicians from Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia not only to get their message across but also to get their pictures through as well. The Mediterranean window is older than ERNO, but this service still operates on a once-a-week basis and even then poorly. A regional identity has not yet propelled this television exchange into proper operation. The baby window is then **ERNO, a regional window for South East Europe**.

ERNO differs from the other regional windows because it has a mission. It is a news-film service meant to promote peace, democracy and reconciliation among 12 countries in its capacity as a member of the Stability Pact of the Balkans. Thus it can be claimed that ERNO’s objective is to assist or strengthen a citizen culture to be engendered in the Balkans. ERNO is running with Finnish and Danish assistance.

ERNO started a news and feature exchange in November of 2000. By the end of June 2001, it had transmitted altogether 398 items in its five-days-a-week, 15-minute service. On normal days, 3-4 items are transmitted via Geneva to all the participants plus a few extra receivers (Euronews, Austrian, Italian, and German television companies) at 16.25-16.40 CET. The material discussed in this paper was collected during a review mission in June-July 2001, when I visited the ERNO headquarters in Sarajevo plus five of the EBU desks.

Of the members of the network, the Banja Luka television (BATRS) was first established in 1992 and its objective was clear: to bring forward Serb interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the other companies operated before the 1990s as parts of a national Yugoslavian set-up. They had their own channels focusing on their own territories, but they also exchanged whole programmes vigorously, especially with neighbour stations. Instead, news and current affairs coverage of other parts of the former Yugoslavia was thinner than in, say, entertainment or sports. With some hesitation, one could claim that the war-mongering, spreading of hatred and xenophobia toward other nations in the former Yugoslavia was rather based on stereotypes formed in the course of history and
on the relative ignorance of each other’s present-day situation, than on overwhelming
information used for political purposes. No doubt television played a crucial role in the
process leading to the political instability in the 1990s. Depending on the
opinion of the interviewees, the television stations considered the worst in mongering
hatred and war varied in their choices. The ones mentioned most frequently are Serbian
and Croatian television.

The idea behind ERNO is to bring the power of television, so much misused previ-
ously, now to instigate peace and stability by showing how people live and solve their
problems in the other countries of the region. ERNO is meant to catch a glimpse of ever-
day life at the neighbour’s, into the living rooms next door.

One of the EBU rules is that when a news item gets hot, it is transferred from a re-
gional window to the main feed, such as EVN. When the months-long political tensions
burst out into open conflict in Macedonia in June 2001, the EBU sent a team with a mo-
bile satellite from Geneva to Skopje, and the Macedonian television started to cover the
conflict for the home audience only. Similarly, a flash news, say, from the Middle East
might interrupt the Nordic, ERNE, ERNO, or Mediterranean transmission.3

The ERNO objective: Media Pluralism
The ERNO Project relies on the Stability Pact agreed upon in Dayton, USA, and the
Charter for Media Freedom formulated by the states participating in the Pact. Also the
participants were selected according to the Stability Pact. This is quite a natural choice
for a “back-up” philosophy, because in the Charter, the participant states bind themselves
to strengthening of media pluralism and media institutions implementing pluralism;
media networks are explicitly mentioned in the Charter.

The tone in the Charter follows the official communication philosophy of western
democracies, though not too many of these are today able to give such a whole-hearted
support for media pluralism in their respective countries. Free enterprise frequently con-
tradicts genuine media freedom. Further, the role of the government remains quite ob-
scure in the declaration, despite the phrase in the introduction: “free flow of information
and ideas and open discussion, without the interference of public authorities”. The op-
erational role of the participating governments remains indefinite, assuming that all gov-
ernments consider freedom of expression as their ally. Thus the Charter gives fairly free
hands to governments to operate in the field of media, as long as they claim to do so
under the umbrella of media pluralism. This applies especially strongly to radio and tel-
evision institutions, if their public service status is not clear. Misuse of such liberties is
not a theoretical fear only. Perhaps the best examples of misuse can be found in the Bal-
kans themselves. The majority of the broadcasting companies there, aiming at a public
service function, have had serious difficulties in their endeavour to develop a public
company into a public service company with an arms-length distance from power-hold-
ers.

The ideology expressed in the Charter follows closely the Libertarian media philoso-
phy, which believes that the better people are informed of their “opponent’s” doings and
culture, the better are the chances to avoid conflicts or to release tensions, if there is a
conflict situation already. The division into “us” and “them” becomes less obvious and
thus allows more operational space for mutual understanding. However, another theo-
retical position is also available: that in a deeply infected social contradiction, informa-
tion does not help but perhaps even worsens the situation. According to such a philoso-
phy, exposure to even balanced reporting from “the other side” perhaps only strengthens outdated and biased stereotypes and leads to interpretations which increase tension and hostilities. In short, one's trust in the ability of the media to reconcile with a post-war peace is far less secure in such a philosophy.

Knowing how bitter the controversies in the Balkans are, this latter option could well have been possible there. But the international community has, as if unaware of such an option, rather exaggerated than downplayed the power of the media. ERNO has a slightly different background, although its financing comes from Nordic sources and its basic ideology does not differ much from the not-so-well-reputed international community in the Balkans. ERNO was developed, as a professional exercise, regarding how to increase relevant inside-region television programme exchange in long discussions between local journalists and their Nordic colleagues.

On the practical level, the project aims at improving the exchange of television material in the countries belonging to the former Yugoslavia, including other countries belonging to the Stability Pact. The aim is simply to give the television companies in these countries a chance to exchange programmes on a daily basis and thus to enable their audiences to observe how governments operate and what people in the region do in their everyday life.

The Exchange: The Strong Get Stronger

The daily programme “menu” is prepared by a two-person coordination crew in Sarajevo. So far, nothing is produced especially for ERNO. The exchange is composed of news and feature items originating from the newsrooms of the network members. The local EBU desks operate as mediators, preparing “dope sheets” in English, to accompany the items. Thus ERNO is a repackaging agency, but there are plans to introduce a special ERNO feature service and later to establish a 12-member production pool as part of the exchange. The ERNO office also prepares and distributes the only weekly event calendar in the Balkans.

After a somewhat quiet Christmas-New Year period 2000-2001, which was celebrated at different times by different religious communities, the supply of ERNO exchange has grown steadily as Table 1 indicates.

There are no statistics of the use of ERNO by members – nor of the EVN main feed, for that matter. The EBU collects membership fees, but it does not charge anything extra for the use of its transmissions. This has led to the fact that the members download everything, but the actual usage remains unknown. According to the estimates by the coordination office and the local EBU desks, the use of ERNO is 60-65%, considerably higher than the estimates of the EVN usage (estimated to be around 30%). The television companies in the Balkans are heavy users of all EBU materials, because the majority cannot afford the services of Reuters or APTN. Still, scarce resources alone cannot explain the popularity of the ERNO items. Obviously there is a genuine need to increase material covering the neighbours also. During the review mission, more than a dozen interviews with EBU desk editors were carried out in five companies. In these interviews, all placed the Balkan neighbours in the first sphere of news interest, followed by “EU Europe” or “occidental Europe”. It was clear that the Balkans were considered as being one entity, separate from Europe.
Table 1. Outputs of the ERNO Exchange, November 2000-June 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YURT$TS$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKRTV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZRTK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARTV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRTVS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRHRTV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGBNT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTVR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMTV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YURTV$C$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALRTV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER$**$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANCEL$***$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only 3 days. The activity started on Nov. 29th, 2000.

** ERNO office occasionally invites contributions from other companies, if they appear relevant to SEE countries (e.g. the Italian RAI on Mediterranean environment problems).

*** Cancellations refer to items which have been completed too late and thus missed the transmission. Still, they show a willingness to participate.

The Project provided all member companies with the basic equipment and basic telecommunications links necessary for full participation in the ERNO exchange. All the companies operate with extremely limited technical resources, but these have been especially scarce in Serbia where the NATO bombings destroyed the television station; the company is temporarily situated in an old film production building, and the whole company operates with three editing units, in Banja Luka, in Montenegro and in Tirana. The succession of wars has also broken such links between the companies which existed before the conflicts. Temporary terrestrial arrangements have been made to replace the broken links between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, and between Belgrade and Montenegro. In the arrangement of equipment and links, EBU and UNESCO have also been active. Of the participants, the relatively most well-off companies are found in Zagreb and Ljubljana. Montenegro was not able to upload any of its own items for a 6-month period due to technical problems, and Republika Srpska has similar problems when the winter snow arrives, because the temporary terrestrial link to Sarajevo does not tolerate heavy winter weather.

The Project has never even aimed at leveling any of the obvious resource imbalances; moreover in the politically delicate Balkans, such an attempt would hardly succeed without complications. For example, the establishment of the ERNO pool – 12 cameras, 12 editing units, 12 cameramen and 12 journalists – has been delayed due to the fact that acquiring the equipment could not be phased as the Nordic donors first suggested. Suspicions of favouritism emerged immediately.
The resource imbalances are reflected in the outputs, though in a rather mediated way. The “strong” companies have participated more eagerly, but the news scenery has driven some companies (e.g. Serbia) to participate even with extremely scarce resources (Table 2). Of the “outside” countries, Romania seems to be the most motivated for the ERNO exchange, while Hungary does not seem to bother too much with this regional window.

Table 2. Items Sent by Various Television Companies to the ERNO Exchange, November 2000-June 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YURTS (Serbia)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARTV (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRTVS (Slovenia)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBHBTV (Croatia)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTVR (Romania)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKRTV (Macedonia)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGBNT (Bulgaria)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZRTK (Kosovo)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YURTVC (Montenegro)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMTV (Hungary)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATRS (Republika Srpska)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALRTV (Albania)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the suppliers can be put into four different categories. The group of *activists* seems to develop in the course of the exercise. In this *top four* list belong the television companies of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia. All are, in principle, big companies and they also represent countries where the output of news is both even and large.

The following group comprises *regular providers*. They send items on a fairly regular basis, but less actively than the top four. In their supply, events taking place in their territory are also reflected. These companies include the Romanian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian television companies. Their technical and human (in Bulgaria and Macedonia perhaps also political) resources are perhaps a little more limited than those of the activist group. The limitations caused by scarce resources are reflected in the situation in Macedonia: as soon as the newest conflict started, the Macedonian television sent nothing after May 2001. Others discussed the Macedonian issue with concern, but Macedonia only transmitted material for its home audience.

The group of *occasional providers* sends material every now and then. In this group, there are in fact two types of companies. Two have or have had either technical problems to upload stories, or their human resources are limited (Republika Srpska, Montenegro, Kosovo) or the company simply is not very interested in the exchange (Hungary). The group comprises Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Hungary and Montenegro.

The fifth group could be called *passivists*, and it does not appear on the graph at all. The Albanian television has not sent a single story for the exchange so far. Albania is the only member, which remained totally passive throughout the seven-month period. An interesting issue, perhaps partly explaining the passivity of the Albanian company, refers
to the language question. With the exception of Albanians in Albania and in Kosovo, all other members of the network understand each other, though the Slovenian and Macedonian languages might cause some problems for the rest. The core of the exchange is composed of the companies representing the same language family – could a joint language be seen as a factor increasing cultural closeness, despite political and ethnic differences? And, on the other hand, could exactly the same issue be at least a side-factor for the fact that Albania has been so passive in the exercise?

Naturally, the main reason for a company to offer items to ERNO depends on the news scenery: when there are floods in the region or foreign dignitaries on a visit, stories are made to appeal to the home audience and offered to ERNO as well. However, the domination of the activists seems to have strengthened in the course of the exchange, disregarding the topical news arena. The more routinised the exchange has become, the more the same company names frequent the lists. For the small companies, the threshold is higher. For example, the EBU desk at the Republika Srpska television pointed out several times in June that they had offered more items than the exchange had accepted.

**Learning the Rules of the Game: Content Comparison**

For the review mission, I made a crude content analysis of the ERNO materials of November-December 2000 and March 2001, the idea being to assess whether or not any changes in news criteria have taken place during the so-called Pilot Phase of the Project. The analysis was based on so-called dope sheets prepared by the local EBU desks and accompanying the visual material.

The analysis is crude in the sense that each story is placed only in one category. That obviously creates a bias, which especially muffles down the proportion of politics, because in the majority of cases, there is a political sidetrack or other theme in the story. For example, an item describing negotiations between 2-3 countries in the Balkans carries a political undertone. Still, the story is placed under "Balkans"; as a matter of fact, practically all stories about the Balkans had a political character, but in the items on the Balkans, there was something of more practical politics also: region-wide meetings, negotiations on borders and assets, etc. So in November-December, the total proportion of political items was 34% and in March 31%. It can be said that at least one-third of the items seems to deal entirely with politics. In addition, especially in March more than half of the stories dealing with the international community also had a political character. Because its proportion in March was as large as 38%, the total of politically inclined stories approached one-half of the items.

Some of the dope sheets were so short that it would have been difficult to judge, if another category would have been more appropriate. In general as well, the idea was only to give a feeling for the content of the stories. In such a case, one coding category per item can be considered as being exact enough. The categories were established after a scrutiny of the items. Hence there is, e.g., no category for sports, because no sports were transmitted. But ERNO has no right to do that. Sports coverage belongs to the sports feed of the EVN.

The legacy of the 1990s becomes visible not only in the numerous reports of seminars and conferences organised by the international community but also in bilateral or multilateral meetings regarding borders, assets, airline arrangements and social security issues to be settled from a new perspective. An item that falls into the category of economic or domestic news might still indicate more general problems – and no doubt is interpreted
so by other participants using the item. In a way, such news clearly reflects a democratic element in an organised society. In the same way, ERNO has, throughout its operation time, emphasised parliamentary activities and elections. Again, this could be interpreted as a sign of normality.

In general, practically all items described events and processes happening either on the state level (majority, all categories) or dealing with individual citizens (minority, appearing in domestic, culture and feature). Extremely rarely such items were transmitted which could be considered as describing the public sphere or the civil society. This is quite an interesting notion, because during the Tito era, the former Yugoslavia was based on a kind of self-management of local organisations. This phenomenon is not found, at least not in the materials sent for the exchange. Another characteristic detail in all the material is that some 80-85% of the actors in the stories were men. Women had their say only in stories on culture, domestic issues (social policy, accidents), and features. This is obviously a reflection of the inbuilt male domination in the culture, because eight out of ten of the selectors at the EBU desks were women and hardly deliberately worked against women in this respect.

Table 3. ERNO Content Categories (%), November-December 2000 and March 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National politics</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first conclusion of Table 3 seems to be that the international community is given far more space in March than in November-December, and that national politics seem to have lost popularity as have the features as well. However, concerning politics, I tend to claim the opposite – that the proportion of politically oriented items is higher in March than at the opening phase of the exchange.

The exchange started with quite a strong enthusiasm, although the quiet Christmas season 2000-2001 was at the doorstep. The total number of items (62) was quite high for the introductory phase.

The largest group of items (26%) at the initial stage dealt with national politics: elections, government crises and ministers uttering statements, especially in Romania with the presidential election, Serbia with regional results of the recent elections and in Macedonia where political tensions were already brewing. The political news transmitted was quite formal, clear-cut procedures or changes without speculations.

November-December 2000 were strongly flavoured with Christmas celebrations – in towns, but also in villages with local customs and ingredients – and there were quite
many other light stories transmitted and offered: mushroom harvests, fierce dogs, wolves, bird-trapping, but also the mad cow disease, or rather, fear of its spreading into the Balkans, was reported. City and village pictures, suitable for background of a news flash later were transmitted quite frequently. Most of the companies lack archive pictures from other countries in the Balkans, and they wish to get this kind of material more often: street in the summer, streets in the winter, churches, villages. All in all, roughly one-fifth (18%) of the items fell into the category of features.

Two equally large item groups (13% both) dealt with the economy and with domestic issues. As in politics, economic items covered fairly formal issues (Serbian Chamber of Commerce activities, introduction of new bank notes in Serbia), but also economic contradictions such as trade union conflicts and strikes in Croatia. This is one of the few cases which described the public sphere activities in the region. An equally lively category was that on domestic issues: domestic violence in Macedonia, establishment of village schools in Kosovo, ordinary people’s fears in Kosovo villages, and the situation of mentally handicapped children in Belgrade. It could perhaps be said that these two categories came closest to how news is understood in the EBU main feed. There was more action than in the statement-oriented political items, and simultaneously the fear and anguish brought their “real-life” flavour to the contents.

Three categories reached equal size (7-8%): items dealing with issues shared by several countries in the Balkans, the international community, and crime. While reporting on the Balkans and the international community, the ERNO items covered negotiations on the properties of the former Yugoslavia, the free trade agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and discussions between airline companies (Air Srpska, Air Bosna and Air Yugoslav), border disputes, KFOR and SFOR peace forces, international meetings and seminars (the Council of Europe seminar in Macedonia, the USAID seminar on free media in Kosovo, etc.) – again clear-cut events on a fairly high level. The most common crime items dealt with the mafia and human trade. The international community was interpreted in the analysis quite broadly, as the countries (governments, ministers), governmental groups and organisations from countries that are not included in the Stability Pact. This category also showed that so many basic issues remain unsolved in the Balkans: borders, assets, pensions.

News on open conflicts was limited, and so were items on culture – without Christmas and the reopening of an archaeological museum in Split, Croatia, there would have been practically nothing on culture. Some Christmas items (a chorus performing in caves, Christmas plays) were placed in this category, because they described various cultural customs. An item on poisonous toys sold to parents in Hungary, for example, was placed in the category of economic material. Tones of conflict were found in many political pieces, but no dramatic “medium-size” conflict was found in the Balkans in November-December.

One could accept the notions given by some interviewees during the review mission in June 2001. At the initial phase, there seems to have been some haphazard selections on the one hand, and extreme cautions on the other hand, especially when dealing with politics. Furthermore, the proportions of various categories reflect the politically quiet Christmas and New-Year period, spread over quite a long interval, because different denominations spend the holidays at different times. Also the international community was rather quiet due to the holiday season. Hence, the content choice reflected, to a large extent, the fact that the news scenery was peaceful and quiet. Items stressing democracy and human rights entirely were perhaps not too many, but there was a clear aim to em-
phasis "normality": to show that the societies and social institutions under scrutiny operated according to accepted rules, or were designing such rules, and people also did "normal" things, such as preparing for Christmas festivities, on the one hand, and were fearful of social injustice – especially in Kosovo – on the other.

In the top six in the list of companies providing material were the Romanian ROTVR, the Slovenian SIRTVS, the Croatian HBHTV, the Kosovo ZZRTK, the Serbian YURTS and the Macedonian MKRTV. The list partly reflects the news scenery with more frequent events to report (Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia), and partly the fact that certain companies were considerably better prepared for such a new activity (Slovenia, Croatia). Romania represents an interesting case. The political arena with elections was lively there, but Romania – as the only one of the "outside" members of the exchange – also clearly indicated willingness to participate. This willingness has sustained itself and is continuing.

The total number of items in March 2001 was somewhat higher than during the first month (85), and also concerning the focus; there were clear-cut differences compared with the beginning, especially in the role of the international community which this time was by far the most frequently covered theme among ERNO items. In general as well, the selection of items seemed to resemble a "normal" supply of items by a regional window. It was strongly politically oriented, but offered also some light material. Naturally it can be said that the time for reporting was more filled with news items in March than in December, and that there were also such natural disasters as floods in the region. Still, the news selection of March gives a more established impression. Also variation within categories was smaller than in December. On the other hand, it can perhaps be said that the selection as a whole was less genuinely Balkan-oriented, offering endless numbers of seminars, visits and meetings, often though with a title which referred to reconciliation, democratisation and other problem areas typical to the Balkans. In short, ERNO seemed to have learned the rules of the EBU game.

Items covering the international community (38%) and its activities in the Balkans were by far the largest category. During the month of March, Belgrade seemed to be the most popular target for a variety of activities concerning new policies which the international community tried to establish. Of the three most popular capitals in the ERNO selection, Belgrade definitely had the most political profile, while Sarajevo seemed to be the centre for human-rights related activities – for example, Carla del Ponte paid a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina – and the share of Zagreb was the strongest in issues related to trade and commerce. However, Zagreb also had its share of media freedom seminars. The international community seemed to focus quite clearly on these three cities in its activities, though toward the end of the month, the international community also expressed more and more concern about the growing tensions in Macedonia. In addition, some of the items carried results achieved in the seminars and during the visits of dignitaries, but many others were routine statements by an individual dignitary or protocol reports on who met whom.

The second largest category (20%) covered items on the Balkans. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia achieved an agreement on human rights. Other Balkan countries expressed their concern about Macedonia, while not too many reports were filed by the Macedonian television itself. President Vojislav Kostunica visited Republika Srpska, a former Romanian Prime Minister died and others reacted to this, and the head of the Bank of Slovenia reacted to a statement of the Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic who suggested the return of the dinar as an all-Balkan currency. Individuals who had paid for
social security in the former Yugoslavia were granted the right to receive a pension in Slovenia.

Items dealing with national politics concerned predominantly Serbia and especially the former president, Slobodan Milosevic. The most popular politician in the ERNO exchange in March 2001 was still the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic, giving statements about a variety of issues. Svilanovic represented a new generation of Belgrade politicians, perhaps more easily accepted by the neighbours than either Kostunica or Djindjic, especially because the two were known as being rivals. Furthermore, Svilanovic also has television charisma; he appeared as a television personality. Seminars were organised on a national basis in several countries of the region. Several of these even planned action against illegal immigration. On the other hand, a corridor railway was planned to again link Salzburg and Sofia. The city of Bucharest reacted against stray dogs, and this brought Brigitte Bardot into the country – was this a domestic news issue or an international human interest feature remains to be discussed.

The category of features had reduced considerably since December (9%), but the scale of themes showed more social relevance than during the first month of the exchange. The Slovenian television reported about audience feelings before and after a football match between Slovenia and Yugoslavia, and there were still several items on individuals who had been hiding from the war for years and were just now coming back. In this category, there was also a banal rarity, definitely lacking any political flavour: an old man from Banja Luka was said to have married 161 times and his “achievement” was going to enter the Guinness Book of Records.

Floods dominated the category of domestic items (7%), because there were floods in almost all the countries concerned. There was a census organised in Bulgaria. Taxi drivers demonstrated in Bulgaria for the murder of a 3-year-old boy – a taxi driver’s son – and demanded the return of the death penalty in the country. A commemoration of the first international skiing competition (1895) was organised in Slovenia, and Hungary celebrated the 1848 revolution.

The economy and culture received equal attention (5%). The economy centred mostly upon the Chambers of Commerce and corruption policies, while the items on culture covered such rarities as the Martenitsas festival in Bulgaria, but also items with a clear human rights perspective, stressing the rights of minorities: ERNO reported on Bay ram festivities in Zagreb, Croatia, in Novi Pazar, Serbia, and in Sarajevo, Bosnia.

The categories of conflicts (3%) and crime (2%) received very few items, although a big heroine smuggling ring was revealed in Bulgaria. The conflict news dealt entirely with Macedonia. These categories are special in that, on the one hand, only crimes with assumed interest for the other countries in the Balkans are offered to the exchange and, on the other hand, a clear reluctance to report on conflicts was, quite understandably, evident in the March 2001 ERNO “menu”. Stories of conflicts are no longer news in the Balkans…

Among the television companies offering items, four formed a distinct top group: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgarian television companies, the two following ones were the Slovenian and Romanian television companies. Of these, Bulgaria perhaps could be said to represent a country which happened to have quite a vivid news scenery that month, ranging from floods and heroine smuggling to official visits. Its share of the supply for other months varied considerably. In contrast to this, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia seemed to dominate the supplier’s side month after month.

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What constructs a train of trust, stories about Milosevic or of the old man from Banja Luka? Not much can be said about the quality of the items based on dope sheets alone, but without hesitation one can state that especially the categories of features, culture and domestic issues show that the companies participating had understood the idea of ERNO and were no doubt committed to the course. The quality of visualisation varied considerably, but what strikes one most is how fast the isolated producers and gatekeepers, invalidated by scarce resources and stringent time pressures, easily learned the rules of the game. Since the 1970s, it has been documented that there is a strong trend to conformity in all television newsrooms in Europe. The EBU desk officers in the Balkans proposed and transmitted images which were somehow associated with the location – whether these were streets, houses, birds or politicians. These formed the identification poles for the locus, the decisive reason why just that particular story was told. But there was also reference to the time as well: images of popular and/or good-looking members of the present elites (close shots), while members of the elites who had lost power (e.g. Milosevic and his family) were not at all allowed these close-up shots. Soundbites were given either to the present political elite or to such exotic individuals like the man who married 161 times.

It would be worth the elaboration to analyse the delicate visual connotations of place and time given between the lines in such standard event-oriented news items of which all EBU feeds are composed. They are simple, systematic and highly routinised, creating both for the producers and the users a feeling of normality and professionalism. This is how a “proper” news item should be told, giving an eyewitness impression for the audience. That lesson was learned in the Balkans in less than half a year.

One could, of course, discuss further the style of reporting, both textually and visually. However, the dope sheets are short and lack depth. When we focus on the content of ERNO materials, the problem-setting could perhaps be vulgarised to a naïve or at least trivial-sounding question concerning news criteria:

For the course of reconciliation and the right to be understood, should ERNO focus on Slobodan Milosevic and the endless number of items which he and his wife, daughter, supporters and opponents produce, or should ERNO rather prefer such items as the story of an 83-year old man from Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, who has been married 161 times but now lives alone, disappointed with all women?

The choice is not an either/or option, but rather a question of priorities. What should be emphasised more, in order to allow the various ethnic groups the right to be understood by others – is it information or more culturally biased material that generates a quest for reconstructing social contacts? Further, would it not be good for the highly politicised communities in the Balkans to laugh and have fun also?

It is always somewhat dangerous to try to interpret the selection of news, because it does and it should reflect the situation in the society concerned. Still, a month is a time long enough to draw some conclusions carefully. The selection of ERNO items had definitely become more professional and consistent in the course of four months, and issues related to democracy and human rights – sometimes as a first theme, sometimes as a side-track – received considerably more space and attention in March 2001. Perhaps it is justified to claim that genuine Balkan issues seem to be fewer in March than in December 2001, while more general themes representing stability and order have gained more attention. Accordingly, one could argue that in the course of “normalising” the regional feed to meet the EBU standards, ERNO had missed something that could be termed ethnic genuineness. If this is the only choice available, the course of professional journali-
ism could be questioned. Further, for a Nordic analyst, the selection appears to have a strong bias for politics, but as the interviewees stated, the societies in the Balkans are now highly political. Hence the bias was perhaps justified. However, the claim of political hubris was based on statements by media professionals or professional politicians. Was their judgement valid? Did they know what the audience really wanted? Did they want to know – many seemed to have quite fixed perceptions about their audiences, assessed as the ignorant masses.

Probably they were not completely off in their assessment. The Balkans today are definitely an over-politicised region, and what makes the situation even more problematic is that there are various types of politics exercised in parallel. In the region as a whole, there are politics of ethnicity and politics of party interests exercised side by side, frequently even by the very same politicians. Thus the identification poles offered in the news items – often through visualisation – were not very clear for the viewers, either. They required quite a sharp sense of demarcation from the receiver side, which was lacking.

What the ERNO transmission tried to do during the time of this analysis was to emphasise the role of democratic institutions, and thus to weaken the significance of stereotypes based on ethnicity. Accordingly, a statement by a high-ranking European politician did not mean the same as a statement by a Bosnian or Serbian minister. The story of the European minister was a protocol news item, perhaps even an indication of the fact that outsiders again tried to master the scene in the Balkans, while the news about a statement from a local politician indicated that the democratic system was functioning. Further, a few contradictory statements also broke stereotypes by their sheer existence. They showed that Serbs/Croats/Bosniaks had differing opinions among themselves, they argued about social issues, not based on ethnic background or religion, but on a political ideology. Such politicians as Milosevic did not actually pose a greater problem, because he was already on his way out. It could even be claimed that continuous news transmission perhaps extended the topicality of Milosevic, thus preventing the public from seeing what was new in the Belgrade political arena. News transmission can be quite conservative and blind to nuances of this kind in such situations.

On the other hand, in societies with fixed stereotypes, also light and harmless items such as the one on the old man and his 161 wives perhaps only strengthened the stereotype of Serb hegemony among Croats and Bosniaks. In Slovenia with a more relaxed political atmosphere, exactly this problem seems to come to the fore. The television company there was not as interested in transmitting political statements. As features, it favoured narratives on missing relatives, soldiers who had been hiding for years and suddenly returned to their home village, and so on. While extremely careful in the formulations concerning political issues, the dope sheets of such items comprised surprisingly crude stereotyping of Serbs and Croats. Obviously the political crisis – in the Slovenian case, quite short and mild compared with all the others – already belongs to the past, to be occasionally remembered in Slovenia, but not in the rest of the Balkans. Such features might turn into a problem in the long run, if the political processes have disjunctures in various countries in the region and the degree of political tolerance differs from place to place.
Living with Prejudices

The kind of “hangover” processes which are ongoing in the Balkans are extremely complex in countries which have experienced ethnic conflicts during which “the other” has been labelled sub-human and posing a fundamental threat to “our” security. These processes are mixtures of history, rationality and irrationality – and use media as a huge, capricious megaphone system. *Multinational societies* have long traditions of territorially concentrated ethnic communities living side by side and in the course of history have incorporated into a larger state. In contrast, in *poly-ethnic states* the cultural diversity arises from the 19th and 20th century migration of both persons seeking a better life and refugees fleeing oppression. (Kymlicka, 1995.) Researchers of ethnic minorities tend to imply that the rights of the various ethnic groups in multinational societies are more easily arranged than those in poly-ethnic societies. Evidence from the Balkans seems to suggest the opposite.

The sharpness of social differentiation makes the situation in the Balkans different from the “civilized” and sophisticated prejudices which Ruben Konig talks about while analysing the picture of Germany and Germans in Dutch television (Konig, 2001:247-267). However, the theoretical framework remains the same as in Konig’s article. Prejudices are not considered “good” or “bad” as such, but as part of normal social processes in society. Berger and Luckmann (1991/1966:45) defined them long ago in the following way: “The reality of everyday life contains typificatory schemes in terms of which others are apprehended and ‘dealt with’”. Categorization and stereotypes are important human conceptual tools to handle the world we live in. In the Balkans, the world just happens to be crude, cruel, and filled with barely healed wounds.

Together with the ethnicity-based hangover come several other basic processes. In Bosnia-Herzegovina every second person is out of work, in the other states the unemployment figures are between 35 and 40 percent. Accordingly, it is impossible for the majority to buy a newspaper per day – that means 0.5 € to be invested in the media, accumulating to 15 € per month which means a sum equivalent to the electricity bill. People in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia can tolerate the 2.5€ annual television licence fee, but they cannot afford the daily newspapers which are, after all, known to be biased. Hence one should in fact buy at least two papers per day to get a more comprehensive picture of the situation. Still, people have acquired satellite dishes. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is clearly a tribute to CNN which reported so favourably about the Bosniaks during the war. In the other states, the acquiring of dishes relates more to the low credibility of the domestic media. While the majority is highly critical toward the international community operating in their own countries, they still tend to rely, when local issues are at stake, on CNN, the BBC, or on the various German channels relayed to the Balkans. Thus the dishes represent mistrust of the domestic media and their interpretation of the world.

Parallel to this, another trend contrary to the trust in foreign media is found in the Balkans. Some call it even “recolonisation” – we at the donor end have learned to give it far more respectable names such as “responsibility of the international community”. The West has moved into the Balkans and, while pouring money and projects into these societies, it also implies that people in the Balkans do not know how to live together; they would kill each other if the international community left. Especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the international community of at least 20,000 has dwelt for almost 10 years now, it has raised mixed feelings among the local population – proud of its history...
and uniqueness. The resident intellectuals have commented that the international community has tried to make them look like barbarians.

Cees Hamelink (1997:37-38) talks about the utmost importance of spotting and exposing crimes against humanity as early as possible. He suggests a Media Alert System (IMAS) to monitor incitement to war and other signs of an imminent conflict. He puts the responsibility, to a large extent, on the shoulders of the academic community, which is thus far not especially known for its civil courage. Hamelink’s point is valid, although his argumentation sounds “bigbrotherly”, allowing or even demanding that the international community keeps an eye on troublemakers, when human rights are in danger. Hamelink’s IMAS ideology would not be very popular in the Balkans today. There have been too many well-meaning and wealthy members of the international community around in the region, spreading money to any group that promises to distribute the rhetoric of democracy and freedom of expression. In practice, that means the establishment of new media. As a result, there is no space for consistent media policies, say, in Sarajevo which until recently had the questionable honour of abiding the presence of 200 radio and television companies for a population of 350,000. Several countries in the Balkans are now preparing (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia) or have just completed (Slovenia) new media laws, aimed at balanced journalism and public service broadcasting, but many professionals assess that the international community has ruined or at least disturbed these attempts by showing too much interest in these internal issues. Simultaneously the international community has totally mixed up the advertising markets by favouring certain – predominantly “independent” – media and ignoring others.

Further, the international community, in the name of promoting peace and democracy, removed all media heads, who had been working during the crisis, disregarding what they actually did. No doubt, television – the strongest news medium in a region where newspapers are both expensive, poorly distributed and one-sided – had been used as a tool for spreading hatred and xenophobic stereotypes, but the international community has in many respects also been quite blue-eyed and one-sided, generously giving money to anybody who has learned the rhetoric of free expression, ignoring a deeper analysis of the situation.

A framework for the objective of ERNO could be defined roughly in line with Charles Husband’s ideas (1998: 139), such that:

The Right to be Understood would place upon all a duty to seek comprehension of the other. The right to be understood qualifies the right to communicate by rejecting and condemning egocentric and ethnocentric routines of engaging with the communicative acts of others.

In a more recent text, Husband has developed the same idea into a suggestion for a multi-ethnic public sphere to be constituted in societies with several ethnic groups. He admits that for the time being, it remains a utopian project (Husband, 2000: 213). Its basic requirement is – which is also defined in the same way in the Balkans’ Stability Pact – a legal-political framework in which the distinctive histories and current experiences of differing ethnic groups can be formally recognized by the state. Thus a public sphere does not emerge without a pat on the head by the state, as contradictory as it might sound, according to Slavko Splichal has said while discussing the role of civil society in strongly market-oriented societies. The same applies to societies recovering from a conflict:

The relationship between civil society and the state is dialectically contradictory, as it represents dialectical interaction between the opposing tendencies of
integration (the state) and differentiation (civil society). In the information age this interaction is becoming “paradoxical”: the state itself, in some senses the “worst enemy” of civil society, has become, in the capitalist, parliamentarian countries, one of its safeguards. Although the state attempts to dominate civil society, it cannot avoid protecting some of the fundamental dimensions of civil society by providing the overall legal framework of social relations not directly regulated by the state. This paradox is the basis for any possible process of democratisation. (Spichal, 1994:73-74.)

But before any organised public sphere can be born, a quest for renewing social contracts must be found in society. Raymond Williams once wrote:

We want to speak as ourselves, and so elements of the past of the language, that we received from our parents, are always alive. At the same time, in an extending community, we want to speak with each other, reserving our actual differences but reducing those we find irrelevant. (Williams, 1965:252.)

As such, one should be careful with such “wonder concepts” as the public sphere or the civil society or the Third Sector, which seem to solve all social problems. For example, in Robert Putnam’s view, civic society is marked by the existence of social networks of reciprocity and trust (e.g. Putnam, 1993: 173-174). The combination might bring about a civilized community, but the same combination can also be made so that the end result is a closed network that oppresses at least some of its members. Unlike Putnam, A.B. Seligman tries to understand the concept of trust within its historical framework. Seligman distinguishes between trust in individuals and trust in institutions and abstract systems. He reserves the concept of trust for the former and applies the concept of confidence to the latter. (Seligman, 1997:18.) Of course, the two concepts are intertwined and basically refer to the same thing: the future and its predictability. Still, especially when we talk about the situation in the Balkans, such a distinction is useful. In order to bring about a sound, trustworthy civic society, both trust in individuals and confidence in social institutions are needed. Perhaps the problem could be simplified as the concept of the “train of trust” (Coleman, 1988), which in the sociological discourse often refers to indirect personal contacts. The final aim is to create a train of trust among the people living in the Balkans, but the train also uses social institutions such as the media as its vehicles.

The mediascape in the Balkans is quite controversial. On the one hand, the masses have been led by television. Television gives the interpretation of the outside world, but simultaneously, the book culture is important. In many situations the book appears as a more significant medium than the newspaper. And simultaneously, people with very limited language competence still acquire satellite dishes and follow the programming, assessing foreign stations as more credible. What this actually means is that they assess domestic media as lacking credibility. In short, one can hardly claim that the mediascape encourages to discussion and debate. It is an interesting, though partly contradictory, apparatus and it predominantly plays with images. News is appreciated, but it often reaches an individual via a two-step or multi-step flow. Books and music are important for the cultural identity, and the public dwelling with in the mediascape is deeply divided into two stereotypes: “modern”, urban individuals and a rural mass composed of old and middle-aged citizens. The only medium that these groups share is television.

Television is a popular medium, in fact, the medium of choice for the masses in the Balkans. On the other hand, it is a medium that deals with estimates, rough images rather
than exact information. The elaborations which Karin Becker, Jan Ekecrantz and Tom Olsson bring up while discussing the role of photographs in journalism (Becker et al., 2000: 8-9) is valid here as well. When television is used as a tool for reconciliation, the question relates to pictures of politics, the politics of pictures, as well as the politics of picturing politics from the producer’s perspective. At the pilot phase, the focus is mainly on the two latter ones, the politics of pictures and the politics of picturing politics. The first question – in the Swedish text the most elementary one – no doubt receives here the least attention. It is the selection of themes and items the project deals with, rather than a focus on the quality or accuracy of the pictures.

The indigenous and exogenous interpretations of the news values might differ significantly, even concerning the agenda of the news. (e.g. McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The agenda should be reflected against the whole social scenery. For the time being, the Balkans are highly politicised societies. Hence items with political value are worth transmission, because they are utilised. For example, there is a need to follow what is going to happen to Slobodan Milosevic. This does not necessarily mean that the receiver by any means agrees with Milosevic’s policies – but still everyone feels necessary to update his/her information about what happens to the icon of the problems of the 1990s.

Accordingly, it is important to point out that the ERNO exchange is meant to strengthen democratic thinking among the Balkans, not necessarily among Nordic researchers or the international community in the Balkans, who are filled with fixed ideas about democracy and human rights. The substance of these concepts has been brought from abroad. It is easy to talk about democracy in abstract, obscure terms, but what is needed here is the phenomenon which Peter Dahlgren terms as “civic culture” (1999).

ERNO was established to strengthen civic culture in the Balkans, not in the international community. Here I give the same meaning to civic culture as Dahlgren (1999, 140-144), who views it as being composed of four dimensions:

– relevant knowledge, competence and engagement. People must have access to credible and multiple information, describing and giving meaning to formations constructing the world around them; they must have access to analysis, interpretation, reflection and debate on social activity. Here the contradictory mediascape in the Balkans should be taken into account;

– loyalty to democratic values and processes. Without such virtues as tolerance and the will to follow the democratic rules of the game, democracy does not operate. This aspect refers to Seligman’s confidence. In the Balkans, this is one of the sore points of the society; people have very contradictory opinions about promotion of democracy, and the media have a role to play here.

– practice, routine, tradition. It is important that democracy does not remain as rhetoric only. It should embody itself in the everyday activities of the public sphere and in the lifeworlds of citizens. This dimension comprises activities with strong symbolic and historical components, such as election campaigns and daily routines such as meetings. Michael Billig calls such phenomena “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995). In the Balkans, the practical side of public life has often been stressed in attempts to promote democracy and the historical side muffled, because it is also the source for many uncontrolled prejudices.

– people’s identity as citizens. This includes people’s subjective perception of themselves as members in democratic communities. Perhaps Gellner’s idea of a “modular man” (1994) is relevant here. Gellner claims that a man creates multiple identities
without any of these “eating up” others. A citizen identity can be reflected as civic or political togetherness parallel on the international, national, or local level. A citizen identity does not follow formal political structures, though citizenship always includes juridical rights and responsibilities. Citizenship also has its cultural side (e.g. Mouffe 1993), and people can “be” citizens in a variety of modes and levels, the nation state representing just one among these. Here we deal predominantly with Seligman’s trust.

In an ideal case, the ERNO exchange could raise the information level of the publics in the Balkans, to bind them to democratic practices and concrete day-to-day routines with a democratic flavour, and encourage them in their search for a citizenship in the post-conflict situation, still extremely sensitive in political and ethnic terms. The demarcation of the political and the ethnic should perhaps be discussed more profoundly here, but that would lead us quite far from the problem-setting in this paper: if there is a system of distributing television news items in conflict-ridden societies, what kind of items should be exchanged in order to promote democracy?

Annabelle Sreberny concludes her considerations on various options available for television broadcasting of and for ethnic minorities in Great Britain in the following way:

All of this suggests that the representation of specifically minority ethnic themes, ideas and orientations is less and less likely to be encouraged, while a more diverse and diffuse multicultural orientation might be supported by the new organisational processes and commercial pressures. This can be seen optimistically as an opening of a window of opportunity, with a new wind of diversity to blow through it. But this needs monitoring to ensure that the same dynamics of exclusion and misrepresentation do not simply continue under new guises. (Sreberny, 1999:120.)

Sreberny’s warning of ethnic absolutism is even more appropriate in the Balkans with somewhat hostile ethnic groups of roughly the same size. Tolerance does not mean that all oddities of a particular culture are brought under the microscope in television coverage. Rather the opposite, perhaps also oddities are understood when a “train of trust” based on common denominators is first developed.

Thus the significance of the indigenous and exogenous interpretations should once again be emphasised here; the prejudices of the Balkans and the international community are simultaneously intriguingly similar and different. From a gender perspective most stories on Slobodan Milosevic represent a type of political personality news coverage that we seem to be well acquainted with. He has been close to his strong wife Mirjana Markovic and their daughter – and exactly this is one of the qualities which make him difficult to be accepted in the strongly male-chauvinist culture in the Balkans. In contrast, the old man from Banja Luka, showing his open disgust for the whole female gender, sounds far more easily acceptable, though most people are amused by the fact that he has had time, energy and motivation to marry so many times. A fairly traditional image of women frequents the Balkan media, although about one-half of the journalists in the former Yugoslavia are women. The strong woman representation in the profession is at least partly due to the fact that journalism is a poorly paid occupation and totally lacks the glory attached to it in many other parts of the world. In the Balkans, journalists are still considered to be the errand boys and girls of politicians. From this perspective, a news feature on Milosevic shakes cultural values more than the human interest feature about the disillusioned old man in Banja Luka…
There does exist a very real danger concerning news criteria, however, because there are already signs of it in the ERNO supply, when the “menus” of December 2000 and March 2001 were compared. This characteristic could be given a variety of names: for example, it could be called EBU pressure or a quest for quality journalism. In short, it concerns a desire to fit into mainstream journalism, there is a quest for conformity hidden in the hunger to formulate a solid policy line concerning the selection of items. The danger has not yet been great, because the majority of items relevant for the EVN have been fairly relevant for the Balkans as well, but the situation might change. Today, ERNO with its careful policy, and knowing that people are tired of conflicts, tends to muffle crisis news, but the EVN might consider the Balkans as a “trouble area” in years to come, thus stereotyping the region recovering from a crisis precisely with the image it wants to eliminate.

In the Balkans, the somewhat traumatic and contradictory relation to “occidental” Europe might become more complicated in the future. On the one hand, the societies in the Balkans consider themselves being outsiders in relation to Europe and being unnecessarily dominated and coached by Europeans in their own backyard; while on the other hand, Europe still provides a model for various social activities, in politics, and the economy, as well as in the mediascape.

**The Train of Trust and Ethnic Absolutism**

In the Balkans, the components of information, democratic institutions, and democratic routines are gradually strengthening themselves in the ideoscape, that is to say the ideological climate in the region. The media apparatus in any Balkan country that has come out of a deep crisis is gradually increasing the volume of relevant information about its own country and the neighbours; ERNO fits into this development very well. There is an unmistakable respect for democratic institutions and routines embedded in the ideoscape in the Balkans, although the form of these institutions and practices is somewhat diffuse in the minds of the people due to the socialist past. Many intellectuals – definitely not socialists by ideology – cherish the memory of the Tito era because the country was then unified and it fulfilled citizens’ basic needs concerning education, health and social security. During the Tito era, uniformity was based on the greatest common denominator, while in the 1990s, the region has been split up because the smallest common denominators have served as the point of departure. It seems as though people had latched on to the ethnic issues because their trust in democracy departed with the weakening social institutions – this is how the power struggle at the top echelons has been reflected on the level of “ordinary people”.

The degree of ethnic purity necessarily depends on its definition: what is considered genuine and pure is not always based on tradition and historical precedent, but on human will, on a deliberate decision-making process. Conformity in an ethnic group creates joint amnesia; a community “decides” to forget the issues its members disagree on. (Gellner, 1994.) Thus it can be claimed that the growth of ethnic absolutism in the Balkans is an unpremeditated impulse in answer to an increased insecurity in society on the part of the common people. These people stick to the few safety-nets which they are left with. Power-holders eagerly use absolute ethnicity and “authentic” traditions for their own purposes, and accordingly, a vicious circle is created. This has happened in Africa and India (e.g. Olaussen, 2001), and this seems to be the case in the Balkans also.
Thus the task of all democracy-generating projects is to usher in a redefinition of eth-
nicity and thereby promote a cultural hybridity that challenges stereotypes and establish-
ers precedence for co-existence with the existing prejudices in the sense which Gadamer
uses the concept. Hybridity allows for an increase in openness, within which space for
a proper public sphere could initially arise. Thus the aim is not to eliminate all prejudices,
quite the opposite in fact: the idea in projects of reconciliation and democracy genera-
tion is to partly exploit, and partly challenge, the capacity built into existing prejudices.
A human being without prejudices is, as Gadamer reminds us, “mentally naked” and con-
fused, whereby the idea of such efforts is to strengthen people’s feelings of safety.

The beginning of ERNO has been surprisingly smooth. Obviously there has been a
quest for such material and the material offered has been found relevant. Further, as long
as the exchange concerns only the repackaging of already existing material, ERNO has
perhaps been assessed as harmless. The situation might change, if the plans for a feature
magazine programme and an ERNO pool of journalists will be implemented. In the deli-
cate situation in the Balkans, especially the weaker partners (Montenegro, Kosovo,
Macedonia) might raise the question of the stronger partners attempting to dominate the
exchange. Signs of such a development can already be tracked down in Montenegro. A
balancing factor, increasing considerably the credibility of the exchange, is that the head
of the coordination is one of the most respected journalists in the region. He is Bosnian,
but well-known in the whole region for his professionally high profile and independence
during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, obviously not even as modest a cooperation project as ERNO – even with
the expertise of the coordinator available – could have been implemented without out-
side catalysts. This is one of the tragic features in the Balkans. People withdraw and criti-
cize the international community, but simultaneously they depend on it, not only finan-
cially but also as a buffer zone. Still, one cannot avoid some frustration about the fact
that in the Balkans, almost all imaginable faults and errors of development assistance in
media and communication have been repeated in the Balkans. The international commu-
nity has operated in a very arrogant manner, appearing as having learned nothing of their
experiences in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The fact that ERNO has been a professional project, run by media experts (also at the
Nordic end), has no doubt assisted in the acceptance of the project. Throughout the plan-
ning, pilot and project phases, the significance of public service broadcasting has been
emphasised, and this fact might have greater importance in the partner companies, all
aiming at a PSB function but still being quite far from it.

On the other hand, a service offering 3–4 items of which perhaps only a few seconds
is used, cannot be an important tool for strengthening the right to be understood. Further,
ERNO’s political line has been extremely careful: it has transmitted descriptions of
events and processes, no speculation or reflection, and the selection of persons allowed
soundbites has been safe. These politicians have been men with esteem. If the exchange
system develops its pool of journalists and cameramen, the situation might change, be-
cause such a pool easily selects controversial themes as well.

In summary, the beginning of ERNO seems to support an idea already well-known in
development communication; that is, it is far easier to create new media institutions, if
the basis already exists. Without the well-functioning bureaucracy and the massive sat-
ellites in Geneva, it would have been impossible to construct even the most modest ver-
sion of a news exchange for the Balkans. The project exist insofar as the Geneva satellites
are turned in a particular direction at a particular time to gather up a well-spring of
images and to redistribute it. Further, the majority of the partner companies already knew how the EBU operates; the succession of wars in the Balkans had not swept away previous professional experience. ERNO has got a far better start than dozens of other media projects in the region, but ERNO also has had far more favourable circumstances as a project: basic infrastructures, a long tradition of media operations, and a professionalism that fits in well with the mainstream. But that also implies a tendency to incorporate the content into the mainstream. Perhaps something unique has been lost? Perhaps this is part of the paradoxical interaction between the opposing tendencies of integration (the state) and differentiation (the civic society) which Splichal talks about?

An indication of the level of ethnic absolutism, as a reflection of differentiating tendencies in the Balkans today, is the fact that all over the region, the differences in the Slav languages spoken by the half-a-dozen nations in the region are emphasised instead of stating bluntly that it actually concerns dialects of one single language. Particularity is brought to an extreme in the case of language, and the same applies to music, customs, and to political routines. Is it probable to unlock the difficult situation by bringing into such a culture the elements which stress the greatest common denominators (that is, the integrative tendencies), not only in political institutions but also in the culture as a whole? The train of trust is a local train, but its windows should be opened. But how can the mediascape assist in opening the windows? The best method appears as being a non-routinised selection of material, surprises, confusing elements which offer a hammer to break down stereotypes and to reconstruct new ones. In short, a fairly courageous policy line, but implemented from inside the region. Only journalists from the Balkans know what kind of stereotypes to break apart and when the ideal time to do that would arrive. The role of outsiders – if any – should be just to provide the resources and to encourage a civic courage to follow through on it.

There is an extremely interesting paradox hidden in the modest selection of new items offered by the EBU regional feed for South East Europe: The idea behind all the regional windows is basically to soften the news selection, to use location as an interesting colourful speciality to give extra flavour to the main news feed. In the Balkans, the starting point is the “sense of borders” and its special values in the same way as in peripheral cultures which emphasise this particularity often to an extreme, in order to compensate for their isolation and feelings of inferiority. For the Balkans today, location – or more specifically, ethnicity within real boundaries – is often the starting point for activity. From this perspective, Sreberny’s comment on the avoidance of ‘pure’ ethnic themes in television sounds relevant. Perhaps ERNO has a role to play in decreasing the power of this localization. Such a process could reduce location perhaps to something similar to an imaginary space, which is perceived as a supportive, perhaps a somewhat melancholic element in both an individual and his or her community’s lifeworld (Moring, 2001). This applies especially to television because it plays with images and estimates.

From this perspective, it is perhaps less dangerous to update information on a Serb dictator, who has lost his power via democratic action, than to strengthen the male supremacy linked especially strongly with the Serbs (via elaborating on the juicy details of crazy human interest features such as the old man marrying and remarrying). This old man belongs to the realm of “banal nationalism” which Billig talks about, and the share of such banalities might be disproportionate in cultures which are not very tolerant. The old man from Banja Luka strengthens the stereotype of a Serb in the eyes of Bosniaks and Croats, perhaps even Serbs themselves. A good, relevant stop for the train of trust is the fact that ERNO emphasises the role of democratic institutions. They also form part
of banal nationalism. In fact, the sheer existence of ERNO works on cultivating such a direction, because ERNO enables the region to exist in the news bulletins on a regular basis.

But in the final analysis, what is democracy? Is it a set of sophisticated principles, practices and traditions also present in societies which have recently experienced a succession of cruel trial-and-error crises? Or is it simply a method to survive, to ensure oneself and one’s immediate surroundings a relatively safe future, perhaps partly with means that do not fit into the definitions of democracy and citizenship? The relevance of political action is always finally tested on the local level – perhaps the same applies to democracy and communication on the part of democracy? Perhaps democracy in the Balkans should be composed of slightly different ingredients than, say, in the Nordic countries? And what is the role of the media in such exercises, is the only option for the media to operate as a “window”, as the EBU vocabulary indicates, or could one think that the media could be march at least a step ahead of the public? In this sense, advocates of media freedom believe in the flagship function of the media.

I do not know. The review task was simply too complex for my capacity to comprehend and draw clear-cut conclusions. The only thing I do know is that I strongly hesitate to justify the theoretically defined ideas such as Hamelink’s IMAS system, at least when applied to the Balkans. As such, it is a detail in the set-up of the Balkans, but it could be viewed as a textbook example of over-simplification of a culturally (and politically) extremely delicate problem. It easily develops into an informer society, a we-know-better atmosphere which might lead to the tendencies of recolonisation. Could the international community, speaking in the name of democracy and human rights, be given the right to judge the internal affairs of a particular country, without working with, and through, the locals? Hamelink connects his discourse with monitoring the local media. The monitoring aspect is valid and essential, but rather than to operate as an international fire alarm, local-media monitoring could be used to sensitize local-media professionals to imbalances, biases and stereotypes and thus encourage debate and discussion inside the society. It is not an easy task, because media professionals in the Balkans lack resources, esteem and self-confidence. All this makes them into a fairly conservative group, resistant to change. But they are also extremely tired of ‘know-it-alls’ from “occidental” Europe, despite their thick wallets.

Notes

1. The members of the ERNO exchange are public or public service broadcasting companies in ALRTV in Tirana, Albania, BARTV in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, BATRS in Banja Luka Republika Srpska, BGBNT in Sofia, Bulgaria, HRHRTV in Zagreb, Croatia, HUMTV in Budapest, Hungary, MKRTV in Skopje, Macedonia, ROTVR in Bucharest, Romania, SIRTVS in Ljubljana, Slovenia, YURTS in Belgrade, Serbia, YURTVC in Podgorica, Montenegro and ZZRTK in Pristina, Kosovo. However, the Albanian television has never participated in uploadings, but it has downloaded some ERNO materials – how much is difficult to know. Of the Stability Pact countries, the broadcasting companies of Greece and Turkey are missing. At the time of the establishment of the exchange they did not show interest to join, but negotiations are going to restart soon. Of the members, all other than the Serbian and the Montenegro televisions are EBU members. The remnants of the former Yugoslavia (in practice, just Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro) were kicked out of the EBU during Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. Negotiations for rejoining were completed in summer of 2001. In the meantime, the Finnish broadcasting company YLE paid for the extra telecommunication costs to enable Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro to participate on equal terms.

2. Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Zagreb, Belgrade and Podgorica.
3. All regional windows have experienced this, but especially for ERNE and ERNO, such interruptions are bitter and, according to local interpretations, indicate that their services are not valued properly in Geneva. In the Balkans, several EBU desk officers told a story of the most recent interruption, when a flash from the Gaza strip interrupted the transmission of a feature on Brigitte Bardot’s visit to Bucharest to save local stray dogs, which the Mayor of Bucharest wanted to kill.

4. In general, the Finnish assistance covers all the operational costs (roughly two-thirds of the total) and the Danish assistance (Baltic Media Centre) all training and meetings (one-third). The Finnish implementing agency YLE gives all consultation free of charge, and the EBU assistance means that the EVN does not charge any extra costs, even for unilateral exchanges which ordinarily cost 400 Swiss franc per minute from Geneva to the Balkans. The monthly running costs (paid by Finns) of the coordination office are 15,000 FIM (2,500€). Until June 2001, all the expenses of the Project reached just 2 million FIM (336,000€). Thus ERNO is financially quite a modest exercise.

5. The categories were established after the first scrutiny of the material. They were the following:
   1. International community (covering all activities, predominantly political, of the “outside world”, operating both in the Balkans and outside)
   2. Balkan (processes and events, predominantly political, inside the Balkans, touching more than one country)
   3. National politics (domestic politics and the operation of political institutions)
   4. Conflict (open conflict, military action)
   5. Economy (private and public, state level, trade unions, individual entrepreneurs, etc.)
   6. Domestic affairs (events, accidents, but also social life)
   7. Crime
   8. Culture (culture, education, arts)
   9. Feature (human interest, less topical)

6. One of the most recent problems of this kind has been with Macedonia. During the review mission, several interviewees told about their futile attempts to get street pictures from Skopje and Tetovo to be used as background for news, but the Macedonian ERNO member totally dropped out when the crisis worsened.

7. See e.g. Varis & Jokelin (1976) who argue that the Eurovision exchange is biased in the sense that more than 40% of the material deal with politics. However, the most significant issue that the researchers point out is the similarity of the then two ideologically quite different television exchange systems, Eurovision and Intervision.

8. An other indication of the same phenomenon is that several EBU desk editors seemed to be very proud of the fact that a few times the EVN main feed plus Euronews had adopted some of their items. They had selected “right” items for the exchange, because they were accepted by bigger international media.

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In the Market for Symbolic Commodities

Swedish Lottery Game Show ‘Bingolotto’ and the Marketing of Social and Cultural Values

GÖRAN BOLIN

Historically, the broadcast media in Sweden and the Nordic countries have been organised around strong public service institutions. In a European perspective, Sweden, together with Denmark and Norway, has also been among the last to abandon the public service model and open the system to commercial competitors (Hultén 1996 p. 10). However, since the late 1980s the Nordic countries have seen deep and thorough changes in their radio and television systems. The deregulation of the public service monopolies in the wake of the introduction of transnational networks via cable and satellite, and the fragmentation that has followed from the enormous increase of new media technologies and content, have shaped the Nordic countries into multimediatised electronic landscapes. This has naturally changed the structures of media organisations (cf. Curran 2000), and has affected output structures both quantitatively and qualitatively (cf. Asp 2001 for a Swedish example). These changes have involved radically changed conditions for the production of broadcast content, perhaps especially for television. And it is probably not overstating the case to say that social and cultural effects will continue to follow in the wake of these processes, and that the consequences of these changes are yet to be discovered in full.

Quantitatively there has been an increased output in the broadcast media: more channels, more programmes, more possible viewing hours, etc. The demand for programmes to fill radio and television schedules has, firstly, speeded up the production process, to the benefit of productions that can be serialised, in the system of production that John Ellis (2000) describes as demand-led.

A second consequence of the new media geography, and the quantitative increase in output, is the rise of new genres and programme formats. One such new format that was launched when Sweden got its third terrestrial, national, and for the first time commercial, television channel (TV4), was Bingolotto. The introduction of TV4 in 1991 meant that viewers in all parts of the country could watch commercial television. Bingolotto allowed Swedish viewers to take part in a game and entertainment show with a level of prizes that had been impossible to air on the public service channels SVT1 and SVT2. The Bingolotto show, originally produced for a local television network in the Gothenburg area with the aim to help local sports associations financially, has since its start on
national television in October 1991 been aired live at prime time on Saturday evenings. It is usually broadcast between 19.00 and 21.00, but is occasionally extended for special occasions (monthly finals, the night before Christmas Eve, etc.). Thus the programme is just as old as TV4, and is one of the programmes that have made up the core of the channel’s programming (together with syndicated shows such as *Jeopardy*). The popularity of *Bingolotto* and other shows has led to TV4 being the largest single television channel in Sweden since 1994, if counted by audience share.

A third effect of the introduction of commercial broadcasting is that more organisations and collective agents have been involved in television production (cf. Robins & Cornford 1992). When the Nordic public service organisations had a monopoly position, the majority of domestic programmes were in-house productions, made by people employed by the media corporations, and often at their own production units. This is far from the case within commercial television, where production and distribution tends to be separated. Thus, the deregulation in Sweden and the Nordic countries paved the way for new media production enterprises. Subsequently, these enterprises have come to serve both the commercial television channels and the public service channels, thus changing the production practices not only in the commercial sector, but also in the remaining parts of the public service sector. The deregulation of the media market made entrepreneurial initiatives possible, and the expansion of the market for symbolic production also meant that people with little or no experience in media production could enter the field (cf. Paterson 2001). *Bingolotto* is the result of one such entrepreneurial initiative that has ultimately changed the structure of the field of television production and distribution in Sweden, where initiatives from regional sports societies with an interest in local television broadcasting have launched a programme to support their activities economically.

However, there have also been qualitative changes in the system – changes that concern the characteristics of the programmes produced. Naturally, some of these qualitative changes are connected to the quantitative changes. More programme hours lead to faster productions, which makes media production more industry-like, in an assembly line kind of way, where game shows are produced in series of a couple episodes per day (cf. Adorno & Horkheimer 1947/1979). This naturally affects the programme content, in that the programmes must fit into this mode of production (you cannot spend time on long rehearsals, etc.). Thus certain kinds of programme formats tend to be privileged. But this also affects the aesthetics of the programmes produced, in that sponsor demands enter into the process (e.g., product placement). As *Bingolotto* is a programme centred around a lottery game with sponsor-financed prizes, such features are, as I will show in greater detail below, evident.

Another thing that affects the production process qualitatively is the fact that the different interested parties that become involved in the production are of different kinds, and that their interests therefore differ. This is especially so in a complex production like *Bingolotto*. Besides the usual parties involved (advertisers, sponsors, television channel stock owners, media production enterprise owners, programme production staff, etc.), there are more unusual parties to be found. One such party are the Swedish ‘popular movements’ (folkrörelser), ideal, non-profit associations that distribute and sell the lottery tickets that viewers use when they play the lottery game bingolotto on Saturday evenings while watching the programme *Bingolotto*. Economically, *Bingolotto* helps in subsidising the activities of the popular movements since a third of the lottery ticket sales goes back to the selling association. Since the yearly lottery turnover for the last six to seven years has been around 3 billion SEK, this means that Swedish popular movements (mainly the sports movement) generate a bit over 1 billion each year. The proportions
could be illustrated by the fact that TV4, as the distributing channel, had an all-time high turnover in the year 2000 of 2.5 billion SEK.

Ideal associations are by nature non-profit, and are driven by other motives than are commercial organisations. One of the founding aims of commercial production, generally, is to create economic surplus value. However, the media commodity differs from several other commodities produced for commercial markets, since its form is non-material. A car has a material form, which gives it a certain characteristic in shape and in performance. These characteristics become charged with values in the social circulation of the product or commodity. Beside its material form it thus also has symbolic form, to which in social practice is conferred values to add and contribute to its exchange value, e.g. social, political and cultural values. An argument sustained in this article is that those symbolic values tend to be more important in non-material media production. And, furthermore, that the combination of these values in the case of Bingolotto is beneficial for capitalist commercial media production.

Although the everyday production practices of making a television entertainment show might not differ (you need a camera, editing facilities, a studio, etc.), the conditions under which commercial media television programmes are produced nonetheless dictate that the programme texts differ from those produced within public service systems. As the ultimate aim in a public service broadcasting system is not to create surplus value, but to create other kinds of values (social, cultural, political), the products produced take on different form, and must be analysed from different perspectives.

In the following I will, against the background of a Swedish broadcasting system in the process of change from a public service model to an increasingly commercialised business, discuss the products and commodities produced in and around the television programme Bingolotto, and the values with which they are bestowed. I will organise this discussion in three parts. Firstly I will give a historical background to the programme, with a special focus on the organisation of the national lottery ‘bingolotto’, and on the television programme Bingolotto. I will also give some background information on the development of the programme and describe changes in audience size and structure, connect this to changes made in the programme and in the lottery, and discuss how this affects the lottery turnover. Secondly, I will discuss the different interested parties in the lottery and the programme. This discussion will focus on the products, commodities and values produced. I will start with FSL, the body that organises the lottery and represents the Swedish popular movements, then follow the production chain to the production enterprise Interactive Gaming Systems (IGS), the distributing television channel TV4, the other interested parties such as the Swedish state, the advertisers and sponsors, and last but not least, the viewers. Thirdly, I will discuss the relations between the interested parties, and what effects these relations bear on the programme text. I will also discuss this at the level of internal relations within some of the interested parties, as they on an individual level sometimes carry conflicting interests and aims with the activity of producing the lottery and the show. I will end this part with a discussion on the interplay between the commodities and values produced in the process, and make some general conclusions on television production within a broadcasting landscape under transformation to an increasingly commercialised system.

I base my discussion on a wide range of material comprised of interviews with production staff (producers, programme hosts, technicians, etc.), managerial staff at the production enterprise IGS as well as at TV4 and FSL, and people involved in lottery distribution. The material also includes observations from programme production, and
interviews and participant observation among viewers. Furthermore, the discussion involves quantitative data on lottery distribution, reach and turnover by FSL, and audience statistics from FSL, TV4, ACNielsen and MMS. The project has also involved qualitative analysis of programmes, focusing on generic and narrative change and audience address. A more detailed presentation of the material and its related methodological considerations can be found in Bolin & Forsman (2002).

Bingolotto – The Historical Context

Bingolotto was launched as a local television programme, broadcast via cable over the Gothenburg area in the middle of autumn 1989. In October 1991 the first national version was aired on the then-newly launched third terrestrial national channel TV4, produced by the same enterprise and staff in Gothenburg who had been working with the programme locally. Having been of local concern for two years, the programme became a huge national success and the special Saturday event for millions of Swedes. It has since been aired in around 400 episodes nationally, and almost equally as many locally, since it was aired simultaneously on local television (on Tuesday evenings), with the same host and producers, until May 2000. The programme runs each Saturday for forty weeks per year. There is one short break during the Christmas holidays and another between the spring final in the beginning of June and the autumn opening in late August. This means that the show is among the most long-lived in the history of Swedish broadcasting, with a popularity and audience appeal that can only be compared to some of the most popular shows within SVT, e.g. Hylands hörna, a programme aired between 1962 and 1983, although not continuously. Bingolotto also shares other features with this predecessor, among other things in the immensely popular host Leif ‘Loket’ Olsson, who, just as his older colleague Lennart Hyland, had a way of talking to people about ordinary matters and making conversation about the weather and daily routines sound interesting. They also shared the feature of having started out as sports journalists in radio, and both had long experience of non-sport radio talk shows. However, there are also differences between them. Hyland had a more US-inspired way of hosting (and had also made trips as early as 1958 to the US to study game shows before he launched his own, cf. Sjögren 1997 p. 242). In contrast to Hyland, Olsson put a strong emphasis on features of Swedishness, often giving prominence to typically Swedish phenomena.

The basis for the television show is the lottery ‘bingolotto’. Just as the name indicates (in Swedish as well as in English), the game is a combination of bingo and lottery. The combination is due to the fact that Swedish law prevents live lotteries on television. Thus the bingo part of the lottery is a complicated, but to many viewers entertaining, way of checking if the number on the lottery ticket has won. The numbers have actually been drawn beforehand, but kept secret in order to preserve the illusion that they are drawn live, creating the suspension that the game builds upon. Each programme consists of three bingo/lottery games (five in the local programme). In addition to this, those who have managed to get five numbers in a row (bingo), can call into the studio to win more prizes, or to become special guests in the next week’s programme. Prizes consist of consumer goods such as food, snacks, coffee, petrol, clothing, furniture, electronics, vacation trips (often to destinations considered exotic by Swedes, such as Thailand), etc. But there are also more expensive prizes such as cars and cash up to several million SEK – the largest being 16.5 million SEK. Between the telephone calls and additional lottery draws artists perform.
Having been broadcast for more than ten years nationally, Bingolotto has gone through several changes. The most evolving change was probably in 1999, when the original programme host Leif ‘Loket’ Olsson was replaced by Lasse Kronér, a song and dance entertainer and, just like Olsson, a local personality in the Gothenburg area. Kronér shares with Olsson the same pronounced dialect, which places the programme in a distinct local, or regional, context. With the change to the somewhat younger Kronér also followed a new audience address, set design, a change in the colour scheme of the programme, and, not least important, a change in the artist profile. From the beginning, a standard feature of Bingolotto was its concentration on Swedish ‘dance orchestras’. These orchestras are known for their broad repertoire of popular songs, and usually play at weekend dance venues, mainly in small cities and in the countryside. The phenomenon is restricted to Sweden and Norway, and this type of music is largely despised by urban youth and among those with higher education (cf. Bjurström 1993).

Possibly as a consequence of this, Bingolotto seems to be of typical Swedish concern. Several attempts have been made to export the format, but almost all have failed. There have been successful attempts in Germany, but otherwise it has not met with success – even in the neighbouring Nordic countries.

The change in 1999, whose ultimate purpose was to reach younger and more urban audiences with greater purchasing power, was to a certain extent successful for the producers. Having had its largest audience among the age group 60+, the ‘new’ programme succeeded in attracting somewhat younger people, i.e. the 20-44 year age group. This group includes a third of Sweden’s population, and most important for TV4, the ‘families with young children, who are major consumers of convenience goods’, as Managing Director Thorbjörn Larsson of TV4 explains in the Annual Report of 1998 (p. 3). The symbolically important, but extremely hard to reach, audience group of teenagers and twenty-somethings have, however, never found the programme attractive.

The Organisation of the Lottery and the Programme
The national bingo lottery has had a total turnover of more than 30 billion SEK, which has given the Swedish popular movements around 10 billion SEK. Besides the revenue to the selling associations, a third of the turnover is returned to the lottery buyers in the form of prizes. The rest goes to the arrangements around the lottery organisation (distribution of tickets, PR, printing of tickets, etc.), and to the production of the programme.

The lottery game is organised by Folkrörelsernas Samarbetsorgan i Lotterifrågor (FSL), which is an alliance of around 60 ideal associations. In all, these associations have approximately 6.5 million members. Although there are people who are members in more than one association, this makes up quite a large proportion of Sweden’s 9 million inhabitants.

The largest of the associations within FSL is the Swedish Sports Confederation, an ‘umbrella organisation of the Swedish sports movement’ that among other things represents member organisations ‘in contacts with politicians, the government and other institutions/organisations’, as stated in its web pages (www.rf.se, 020215). The member associations of this confederation are responsible for around 90% of total lottery sales. Of the different sports represented in the Swedish Sports Confederation, handball, football and ice hockey clubs make up the core of the distribution and sales of lottery tickets. Of the ‘collective’ sports, handball stands out as the most engaged in the handling of lottery tickets, which might be explained by the relative lack of interest in this sport from sponsors, at least compared to sports with higher media attention such as football.
and ice hockey. In all, around 220,000 people are involved in the handling of lottery tickets each week. A lottery ticket costs 40 SEK (spring 2002), and of that amount somewhat more than 30% goes back to the association that sells it, often a local sports club.

FSL has, for the purpose of organising the television draw, launched its own production enterprise – Svensk TV-Bingo AB – which formally produces the programme. Svensk TV-Bingo has commissioned the actual production of the programme to Gert Eklund Television (GETV), a company owned by the holding company Eklundgruppen AB. Eklundgruppen eventually merged into Interactive Gaming Systems, a company registered in the Netherlands, but of which 80% is owned by Gert Eklund. Eklundgruppen then became responsible for IGS’ interests in Sweden (IGS was also engaged in Internet gambling and virtual casinos, which are activities that due to Swedish legislation cannot be operated from Sweden). The format was eventually sold to the Dutch company Novamedia in April 2001, whose main owner, Joop van der Ende, is known more for his association with the television production enterprise Endemol, which has a long row of internationally successful formats on its list of merits, e.g. Big Brother and All You Need is Love (cf. van Zoonen 2001).

Behind all these enterprises and companies is Gert Eklund, who ‘invented’ Bingolotto after having been inspired by a similar programme on Danish local television. Eklund has a firm background in the regional sports movement in Gothenburg. He is often described as a person with entrepreneurial abilities and a strong dislike of central as well as local authorities and state regulations. He was also deeply engaged in local television production early on. Gothenburg is one of the regions in Sweden where local television broadcasting via cable was first experimented with, and the history behind Bingolotto is heavily intertwined with local television development in the Gothenburg area (cf. Björkemarken 2000).

TV4 was granted a licence agreement (koncessionsrättighet) to terrestrial broadcasting as Sweden’s third national channel in October 1991, the same month as the premiere of Bingolotto. Terrestrial broadcasting began in March 1992, however. Until then, Bingolotto and all other programmes were broadcast via satellite. However, the symbolic value of having been granted this advantage over the commercial competitors should not be underestimated, and meant that the channel could make long-term investments and stake out plans and strategies for the future.

A prerequisite for being granted the licence agreement was that TV4 should provide a certain amount of locally produced material. When the discussions and bidding for the agreement was in full process, Gert Eklund was offering the programme concept to national broadcasters. The offer from Gert Eklund seemingly came in handy for TV4, as the company needed to develop local ‘windows’ in different parts of Sweden. Despite the character of the programme, which according to Eklund did not appeal to the staff from TV4, the offer on a regional window was evidently too good for TV4 to turn down. Eklund’s desire for the show to be aired on prime time Saturday evenings also met approval, likely because TV4 did not have any better alternative at the time.

TV4 does not pay for the production of Bingolotto, or for the right to air the show. Instead it grants IGS the disposal of the slot between 19.00 and 21.00 on Saturday evenings. In return, TV4 gets a programme that attracts millions of viewers, and can sell its viewing time to advertisers. As the licence agreement holds that programmes cannot be interrupted by commercials, Bingolotto is not one programme each Saturday, but three programmes, interrupted by short programmes of around three minutes, around which can be placed commercials. The three parts of the programme have a total broadcast time of
between 95-100 minutes, depending on how much advertising time has been sold by TV4. Each part of Bingolotto is around 31-35 minutes. After the first part there are a couple of advertising clips, then a three-minute programme (e.g., Om en bok [About a Book], where a celebrity tells about a favourite book of his or hers), then commercials again and then back to the next part of Bingolotto.

**Audience Statistics and Lottery Turnover**

Between autumn 1992 and spring 1997, Bingolotto had an audience rating of around 2 million viewers each week (with a drop in ratings during autumn 1993 and spring 1994) (Figure 1). The Christmas special programme of 1995 garnered 3,145,000 viewers, which is the highest rating in the history of the programme – and the all-time high for TV4 to date. Few television shows in Sweden can compete with such ratings.

**Figure 1. Average Audience Size per Programme and Season 1991 – 2001**

![Figure 1](image)

Having had such a large audience, Bingolotto has for periods been the most popular programme on Saturday evenings in Sweden. Through this, the programme has contributed to TV4 being today the largest single channel in Sweden audience-wise, not least in the target groups 15-45 years, the most attractive audience segment for sponsors and advertisers.

The correlation among audience size, lottery ticket sales and the turnover of the lottery is naturally strong. With many tickets sold, one can expect a large audience. This is also the case, as can be seen in Figure 2, in which the two curves are almost parallel to each other. Statistics produced by TV4’s audience analysis department on two occasions (1995 and 1998) also show that only one percent of viewers watch without having bought a ticket.
The relation among audience size, ticket sales and turnover is, however, not always straightforward. The size of turnover also has to be related to the price of the lottery tickets. Prices have been raised a couple of times over the years: in 1994 from 20 to 25 SEK, in 1996 from 25 to 30, and in 2001 up to 40 SEK. Ticket sales increased slightly on the first two of these occasions. However, due to the increase of the price of the ticket, turnover increased even more, as can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The Relation Between Number of Sold Tickets and Turnover (divided with 10 for increased comparability). Prices on Tickets Increased Before Autumn 1994 and Autumn 1996
The decrease in number of tickets sold while there is an increase in the turnover during autumn 2000 and spring 2001 is not connected to any increase in prices. This is due to the introduction of a new ‘double’ ticket. The double ticket costs twice as much as the ordinary ticket (and gives twice as much to the selling association). In this way, the turnover increases more than would be expected if seen against sales figures of lottery tickets.

The most successful ticket sales season was spring 1993. The 63.7 million tickets sold amounted to twice as much as were sold the previous season. A comparison made between the years 1992 and 1993 show that the increase was 275%. However, when compared with the turnover, it is possible to discern another pattern, in which the most successful year was 1997. From a turnover of 32 million SEK the first autumn the show was on air in 1991, turnover increased to 3.2 billion SEK in 1997 (which counted for a net revenue for associations of slightly more than 1.3 billion SEK, cf. Table 1). On an average each programme in 1997 had a ticket sale of nearly 2.8 million tickets, which meant a turnover of approximately 80 million SEK. In a study from 1996 it was estimated that 67% of the Swedish population had bought a lottery ticket on some occasion (Wicklin 1999). There is thus some truth in claiming the programme to be ‘popular’ (as in widespread) on the Swedish gaming market, and it is thus not surprising that the organiser FSL has re-branded itself ‘Folkspel’ (People’s Game).

**Table 1.** *Ticket Sales Turnover, and Net Revenue to the Selling and Distributing Organisations. Net Figures for 2001 are Preliminary*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ticket sales turnover (million SEK)</th>
<th>Net revenue to associations (million SEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2,361</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2,997</td>
<td>1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3,112</td>
<td>1,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>1,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: FSL.*

Tempting the audience with the chance of winning minor as well as larger prizes (cars, cash, etc.) has been a way of both promoting lottery ticket sales and attracting large audiences. Around 400 people had won cash prizes of one million SEK or more by the end of the autumn season 2001 (and more than 30 have won prize sums of more than 5 million SEK. Cars as prizes have also been significant for *Bingolotto*. Almost 3,000 cars of different models have been drawn in the lottery.

Until the mid-1990s *Bingolotto* conquered increasingly larger parts of the Swedish gaming market, and during 1995 and 1996 the lottery was the largest in Sweden if measured by turnover. For a while it seemed as *Bingolotto* and the popular movements behind
it constituted a threat to the state owned gaming companies Tipstjänst and Penninglotteriet, who traditionally controlled major parts of the gaming market in Sweden. Since 1997 these two institutions have merged into Svenska Spel, and together with other actors, such as state controlled ATG, recaptured their position on the market.

**Figure 4. Audience Size and Ticket Sales 1991 through 2001. Average per Season**

Since 1997 most statistics made around Bingo lottohave pointed downwards, both when it comes to audience size and amount of sold tickets (Figure 4). That is, until the autumn of 1999, when changes were introduced in the programme. This season saw a renewed increase in audience size and ticket sales, although not at all close to the sales figures of 1993, 1996 and 1997. Since 1999, audience sizes have stabilised over the seasons, at the same time as turnover has increased due to the introduction of the ‘double ticket’ (see Figure 2). Svensk TV-Bingo’s own estimations indicate an audience size of around 1.4 million viewers per show on average in 2000 and spring 2001. Although there has been a decrease in audience size (compared to the most successful years) as well as in ticket sales, there has been a continuation in the turnover, thanks to the introductions of new tickets, etc. On the other hand, the strategy adopted after the change has proven successful in attracting somewhat younger and more urban audiences (although the ages 45+ still made up 76% of the audience in the autumn of 1999). The introduction of the ‘double ticket’ during the autumn season 2000, which increased the chances of winning but also costs twice as much (and gives twice as much in return to the associations that sell them), has proven successful and has broken the negative trend in the turnover statistics.

Besides the lottery turnover, millions of SEK have changed hands in the handling of prizes and sponsor benefits. The sponsors’ parts in the handling of prizes in the programme have been the target of some muckraking in the press. Between 1990-1994, the local version of Bingo lotto was convicted on several occasions by the authorities (The Swedish Broadcasting Commission’s predecessor, Kabelnämnden) for violating the laws on advertising. The controversies around the production company IGS were repeated
when the programme went national on TV4. As a consequence TV4, in its capacity as broadcasting institution, was eventually blamed, which in turn led to open conflicts between the channel’s management and the producers of *Bingolotto*, primarily with Gert Eklund – a conflict that to a large extent took place in the evening tabloids.

To conclude, it is possible to characterise *Bingolotto* as ‘more than a television programme’, as is often held forth from within the production (and echoed in TV4’s slogan ‘more than a television channel’). It can also be concluded that a periodisation of the programme, to capture the historical trajectory, has to be made out of different premises: audience size, amount of lottery tickets sold, or size of turnover. The different parties involved in the programme’s production and distribution have their focus on one or more of these. Sometimes their interests are mutual, and sometimes they are conflicting. Irrespective of which, the consequence is that they are interconnected and interdependent. How, in more detail, this complicated web of relations is constructed is the subject of the next section.

### The Interest in Bingolotto

Following from the assertion that *Bingolotto* is ‘more than a television programme’ there are more interested parties involved compared with other game and entertainment television shows. All of these parties have opinions on the shape and character of the programme, its aesthetics and function, and on the handling of the lottery in relation to the television show. The kinds of agents involved in the production and distribution of a television programme vary, naturally, with the genre, the distributing channel’s organisational and financial forms, prevailing laws and regulations, etc. Which agents are identified is also dependent on the vantage point, i.e. if one adopts the perspective of the television channel, of the production enterprise, etc. If seen from the perspective of the distributing channel, hybrid channels such as TV4 are foremost ascribed three interested parties: the political authorities, the channel (stock) owners, and the advertisers (Syvertsen 1996 p. 63). However, if seen from the perspective of the actual production of *Bingolotto* it is easy to see from the descriptions in the previous section that there are more parties involved.

On the organisational level, the interested parties are FSL, IGS and TV4. At an individual level these organisations are represented by Managing Director Leif Flatow of Svensk TV-Bingo, IGS’ main owner Gert Eklund, Lars ‘Sverre’ Andersson (who was the main producer of the programme until the change), programme hosts Leif ‘Loket’ Olsson and Lasse Kronér, and TV4’s Programme Director at the time, Jan Scherman, just to mention a few of those involved in the production and distribution of the show. All these agents naturally have an interest in having their say about the form and aesthetics of *Bingolotto*, and thereby actively contribute to the final product.

Besides those involved in the actual production and distribution of the programme, there are others who want to express opinions on the making of the show. Among these can be found the Swedish Broadcasting Commission (Granskningsnämnden för Radio och TV), advertisers and sponsors, local sports clubs and their members, the television viewers, and many more. There are, for example, several business activities, such as the small printer’s office that prints the lottery tickets, that are connected to the programme indirectly and are thus dependent on its continuation.

These persons and organisations can be found at different levels within production and distribution, and their interests can be *economic, political, cultural or social* (or combi-
nations of these). In relation to each of these kinds of interests, a range of questions on the internal relations between these organisations and individual agents evoke. And just as their interests in the production and distribution differ, they differ in a number of other ways.

Firstly, the products and commodities that result from their actions are of different kinds. The television programme in itself is of course one of these products, and so is the lottery. The production of the programme is also, at another level, part in the production of a television market, where formats and programmes are bought and sold. And in this same way the lottery, together with other games and lotteries, produces a gaming market from which gamblers can choose their favourite entertainment game. The production of the television and gaming markets are naturally not the primary aim of FSL, IGS and TV4, but rather a consequence of their actions. And, equally, it is not TV4 or FSL who alone have shaped these markets, and thus they could be said to re-produce, rather than produce, them.

Secondly, the values produced are of different kinds. The values can be seen as resulting from the different types of interests that govern the production, and accordingly they can be divided into economic, political, cultural and social values.

The different products, commodities and values are partly the result of goal-oriented, strategic action, and partly by-products of the main production. The values generated in the actual production and distribution of the programme can especially be said to arise as by-products. I will therefore in the following discuss the most obvious of these products, commodities and values.

An interested party of a television programme can be defined as an individual or collective agent who aspires to have influence over content, form, scheduling, or the like. Defined in this way, there are at least nine major interested parties:

- **the Swedish popular movements**, which, through FSL and Svensk TV-Bingo AB, run the lottery and thereby also formally order the production of the programme;
- **IGS** (from 2002 and onwards, Novamedia), who are commissioned by FSL to execute the task of producing the programme;
- **television channel TV4**, who distributes the programme;
- **advertisers**, who make it economically possible for parties involved to produce the programme;
- **sponsors**, who, just like advertisers, have economic interests in the activities;
- **the Swedish state**, which has an interest in regulating the media flows in Sweden, to control the lottery market, and also benefits economically from the gaming market through state-controlled lotteries;
- **the competitors on the television market** (mainly SVT, but also other commercial channels as well), for whom the success or failure of Bingolotto affects their ability to reach as many citizens as possible (SVT) or attract as large shares of advertiser’s and sponsor’s means as possible (the commercial channels);
- **the competitors on the lottery and gaming market** (Svenska Spel, ATG), who compete for the money of the gaming market;
- **the viewers**, who firstly make up the aggregate of individuals who, by their appearance in the form of audience statistics, function as a regulating instance that decides...
the willingness to buy advertising or sponsor time, secondly function as an imaginary audience against which aesthetic considerations are made, and thirdly, express actual views on the appearance of the show and the running of the lottery via letters to the editors, programme hosts, etc.

A short overview over the relations within the production and distribution of the lottery and the programme show the following: in order to secure the interest around the lottery draw for the lottery ‘bingolotto’, the Swedish popular movements order the production of *Bingolotto*, through their national interest organisation FSL, or Folkspel, which it eventually chooses as a name for its ‘trademark’, in the words of the managing director. FSL has in turn invented a special enterprise for this special production – Svensk TV-Bingo AB. Svensk TV-Bingo, however, does not have the equipment to produce television shows, and can be described as a mediator between FSL and the actual production company Gert Eklund Television (GETV), which is subsumed under the production enterprise Interactive Gaming Systems (IGS) in January 1999. IGS upholds the relation with the sponsors on the one hand, and with the distributing channel TV4 on the other. As a third relation, IGS also communicates with the approximately 30 ‘service stations’ for the regional distribution of lottery tickets. These service stations distribute the tickets to the local sports clubs, or other associations whose members ultimately sell the tickets. TV4 has its contacts with the advertisers (through advertising intermediaries), who finance TV4 by buying advertising time between programmes. The precondition is that TV4 can offer the advertisers the target group that they want to reach. Thus there is an interest on the part of TV4 to create knowledge about the audience. There are also relations between TV4 and the Swedish state, through the Swedish Broadcasting Commission who look after the legislation on advertising (amount of time, placement of advertisements, etc.). There are also ties that bind the state and the organisations within the popular movements, as these parties in their capacity of being major gaming organisers are competitors on the gaming market, where the popular movements act through *Bingolotto* and other lotteries (which may or may not be connected with the media), and the Swedish state through ATG and Svenska Spel. The connection between the state and *Bingolotto* is also present via the National Gaming Board (Lotteriinspektionen), which regulates the lottery market.

The various positions taken by the interested parties result in different forms of power in the production process. There are those who have direct power over the form and content of the programme and the handling of the lottery, and those who have power of a more indirect kind. Among those with comparatively more power to influence the programme text are, for example, FSL and GETV/IGS. In a type of in-between position are TV4, advertisers, sponsors and the state. The most indirect power over the programme text and the form of the lottery is possessed by the audience. However, TV4 has – in contrast to the state (the Swedish Broadcasting Commission), advertisers and sponsors – the possibility to discuss the content of the programme with GETV, in policy questions via Programme Director Jan Scherman, and in more everyday matters via their executive producer. The different sponsors can naturally contribute to the aesthetics of *Bingolotto* by providing the producers of the programme with ‘presentation clips’ of their commodities. Presentation clips, as they are referred to among the production staff, are most often produced by GETV, although some sponsors such as Volvo present their commodities in clips with production values that obviously exceed what is normal for the show. To label the commodity-exposing clips ‘presentation clips’, instead of commercials, reflects the concerns taken towards the state and the regulations that state that TV4...
cannot broadcast advertisements within programmes. To contribute to the programme with video footage is of course to contribute to the content in a very obvious way. Other parties contribute to the forms and aesthetics in more subtle ways, such as avoiding matters that have to do with commodities that are competitive with sponsor products.

If sponsors sometimes directly contribute to the content of the show, this is less obvious for advertisers, not least since advertisers have their ties to TV4 rather than to the production enterprise GETV. Advertisers can thus be said to contribute to the creation of the context of the show, rather than to the show in itself. Furthermore, an interested party like the Swedish Broadcasting Commission can voice opinions on things that should not be included in the show (e.g., advertisements) – but only after the fact, thus setting the limits for what is legally acceptable. The power of the audience to influence the form and content of the show is even more indirect, and this interested party is taken into consideration mostly as a discursive category, as an ideal image to which the producers address their programme (cf. Gans 1957).

The Popular Movements and FSL

The main product that results from the activities of FSL (including its production enterprise Svensk TV-Bingo AB) is the lottery ‘bingolotto’. FSL represent the popular movements, or, more precisely, the sports movement, as local sports organisations make up 90% of ticket sales. When discussing the Swedish ‘popular movements’ in relation to Bingolotto it is important to bear this in mind, although other parts of these movements are also involved in the handling of lottery tickets. The concept of the popular movements indicates a ‘horizontal solidarity’, which introduced ‘new value systems and norms’ when they rose from self-organisation in the 19th century. An important feature was that they ‘gathered in protest for collective goals’ of political, religious or moral kind. They are thus identified by their ‘protest character’ (Lundkvist 1977 pp. 55 and 226). Historically, the religious movement was the first to organise during the first half of the 19th century. Then followed the temperance movement, and towards the end of the century the workers movement. The sports movement that rose shortly after has, however, lacked the protest component, and is not always counted on par with the other movements.

FSL produces a lottery with the purpose of financing the organisational work of its member organisations and their basically idealistic activities. They thus have an economic interest in selling as many tickets as possible. Historically, lotteries have been a frequent component in the popular movements’ economic activities, as well as one of the ways they have financed their activities besides state subsidies. Since its start in 1934, the gambling enterprise Tipstjänst (today, Svenska Spel) had exclusive rights to handling gambling tied to sports, and their revenues were to be of benefit to the state and the sports movement (Rönberg et al. 1999 p. 20). Besides this connection to the state, the lottery activities also involve a binding to the state as regulatory authority.

The production of Bingolotto brings with it some of the values that dominate the popular movements and FSL. Although there are differences in ideals among the different popular movements, they also have a shared feeling for certain social, communifying values of togetherness, participation and collectivism. And since the sports movement is so dominating, there is a strong influence of physical fitness and spiritual health values. The value of collectivism can be attributed to the fact that many of the sports clubs actively engaged in the distribution of lottery tickets represent collective team sports, e.g. handball or football. The values created as a result of the part played by the popular
movements are thus predominantly collectivist, and of social and cultural types rather than economic (since the economic activities do not aim at producing surplus value and profit for the organisations).

**Interactive Gaming Systems & GE Television**

Interactive Gaming Systems (IGS) and its production company GETV produces, on behalf of FSL and Svensk TV-Bingo, a television programme as part of the lottery. The programme is produced both as a way of drawing attention to the lottery, and as a means of giving an account of the draw. In this perspective, the programme should be seen as a part of the lottery rather than the lottery as a part of the programme. IGS, as a commercial corporation, has the ultimate aim of producing *surplus value* for the shareholders. The profit is generated by the differences between production costs and sponsor revenues. As a consequence of the specific production culture around the programme (with its far-reaching connections to the popular movements, which can be attributed to many of the pioneers’ background in sports activities), social and cultural values are produced. These values both result from, and can be analysed by, the specific audience address, the choices of artists and music, the aesthetics of the set design, etc. One might label these values or ideals as *popular movement values*, and they are in a wider sense involved in the production of ‘popularity’ (folklighet). As such, they play a part in the production of lifestyle ideals and values that also have a commercial potential (cf. Bakøy & Syvertsen 2001 pp. 21ff).

These basically idealistic values are, paradoxically enough, combined with an *ideology of consumption* that is also obvious in the programme text, with its strong emphasis on the prizes in the form of consumer merchandise (food, cars, travel trips, etc.) (cf. Holbrook 1993). This ethos of consumption is reinforced by the commercials before and after the programme. It manifests itself in slogans such as ‘Shop ’til you drop’, which appeared as the headline of the web page that announced the coming events on Bingolotto on 8 September 2001. The overarching theme for that show was ‘Shopping Saturday’, and the audience was tempted with ‘many amusing and wallet-friendly prices for the consumer-oriented (köplade)’. Also generated are *political values* around environmental issues in the programme production, for example around ‘Återvinsten’, whereby used lottery tickets are returned by players/viewers and used in a special lottery draw, the economic surplus of which goes to funds for environmental issues (e.g., the WWF). This special lottery was subsequently renamed (or ‘re-branded’, as the public relations jargon puts it) ‘Miljövinsten’ (the environmental draw), to strengthen the public relations value of taking responsibility for the environment. The importance of such values is highlighted when different competing interests clash, such as when attention was attracted to the fact that one of the prizes for Miljövinsten was a Volvo car. The re-labelling of this gaming segment can also be seen against the background of a harsh critique from well-known Swedish environmental debaters for giving profits of the game to unknown small organisations with dubious backgrounds, rather than to well established environmental organisations.

**TV4**

TV4 functions as the distributor of the programme Bingolotto, and in this capacity the programme becomes a means for the commodity that it produces and sells on the market. This commodity is the *audience*, which it sells to advertisers (cf. Smythe 1977, Ang
In order to produce this commodity, TV4 arranges a schedule of programmes that aim to attract and gather those audiences that the advertising agencies, and their customers in different consumer markets (travels, cars, furniture, etc.), want to buy. To be more precise, it is the viewers’ viewing time they buy (rather than the viewers themselves). TV4’s interest is in reaching its target audience with commercials between the three different parts of Bingolotto. The composition of this target audience has changed slightly over the years. From the start, it was defined as those in the age span of 12-59 years (Annual Report 1996 p. 13). Beginning in the latter part of the 1990’s, this was narrowed to the age span of 20-44 years, a group that according to then-managing director of the corporation, Thorbjörn Larsson, among other categories contains ‘families with young children’ (Annual Reports 1997 p. 5, and 1998 p. 3).

Through these arrangements, TV4 creates an audience with a specific gender, age, ethnicity, class and demographic composition, that can be priced and sold to those advertisers that have a demand for an audience with a matching composition. This is, however, not news to most of those who have studied media production from a political economy perspective, and such market logic has long prevailed in countries with a longer experience of commercial television than Sweden has. That ‘broadcasters are selling eyeballs to advertisers’ has also become widespread knowledge among people in the broadcasting industry itself (Andersen 1995 p. 5). This is also evident when speaking to audience analysts within TV4. Marketing strategies have been increasingly developed and made more effective, and it might be argued that they cut deeper into the production and affect the process in more fundamental ways than before. In this, Swedish broadcasters only follow trends laid out elsewhere in the world. They do so, however, under circumstances that are somewhat special to the Swedish (and Nordic) television market.

Thus, one specific feature stands out in the production of the audience in this specific national context. The legislation and restrictions for advertising and commercials in Sweden have made TV4 develop new methods to make the handling of the audience commodity even more effective. These new methods are labelled DIRR, which stands for ‘differentiated regional advertising’, and RBS, which is short for ‘run by station’.

Sweden is a country that stretches out for 1,574 kilometres from north to south. This means that there are many regional differences between the most southern and the most northern areas. Since 1997, TV4 has thus divided the nation into 16 regions, all of which can be separated and individually targeted with advertisements. Theoretically, this means that the overall programming consists of 16 different schedules. This strategy of programming is, however, for obvious reasons not employed to its full extent. It means, however, that TV4 can broadcast advertisements to regional markets. This refinement of the channel’s advertising strategies has a number of consequences. Firstly, it makes it possible for advertisers who would never have been able to afford to broadcast over national television (since their potential customers are found only locally or regionally) to take advantage of the commercial possibilities of television. Secondly, it makes it possible to regionally adjust advertisements with national potential in time to suit regional markets. Since Sweden’s outstretched geographical character means that winter arrives several months earlier in the north than it does far south, a commercial clip for, say, winter tires can be aired in October in the most northern parts, when there are still a couple of months before winter tires can – and according to Swedish legislation are allowed to – be used in the far south. Since a programme such as Bingolotto has such a long season, this advertising strategy fits like a glove for advertisers. From this follows that the audience commodity is not only structured by age, ethnicity, gender, educational
level or settlement (large city, town, village, countryside), but also in which city, town, village or part of the countryside the audience segment can be found.

Another market strategy, introduced in 1998, is RBS. This means that the advertiser buys a certain amount of ‘contacts’ in the target group, e.g. a specific amount of young, 20-year-old women living in large cities. TV4 then places the commercial close to, most often before, the television show (film, news broadcast, entertainment show) that attracts this very segment. And when the commercial has reached the audience size agreed upon with the advertiser, the deal is closed. In order to be cost-effective, TV4 obviously places the commercials as close as possible to those shows that attract the ‘right’ audience, in order to maximise audience reach with as few transmissions as possible of every commercial clip. This naturally sets new demands for sophisticated instruments that can measure the audience for every single commercial, and accordingly increasingly more effective ways of controlling the audience commodity this way have been developed. If the broadcaster is effective, it can reach the audience segments in few screenings, and thus take on more advertisements, for other commodities that advertisers want to promote, and in the end produce more surplus value for their shareholders. This strategy can be seen against the fact that the time for commercials that TV4 has at its disposal is restricted by its license agreement with the state. The agreement contains two important restrictions. Firstly, TV4 cannot interrupt programmes with commercials, but must screen them between programmes. This is, of course, why shorter programmes are preferred by the channel to lengthier ones, and a reason why it also produces programmes in different parts (such as the three parts of Bingolotto). Secondly, TV4 cannot exceed a certain time limit with commercials. One way to circumvent this restriction is to develop more effective ways to use the time at their disposal, hence RBS.

This can be compared to the ‘old’ ways of handling commercials, where an advertiser buys airtime in connection to the shows that the advertiser, based on audience measuring, thinks is reaching the right audience; this strategy is labelled ‘specific’. Obviously, such strategies are not specifically effective, if one takes Bingolotto as an example. Since the audience size for the show is quite large, and since the price of commercials depends on audience size, it is quite expensive to have a commercial in the break before the programme. This also means that there will be a certain amount of viewers in the audience that do not belong to the target group – those audiences that become ‘waste’, in the jargon dictated by commercial logic. Usually it is said that commercial television is concerned with reaching as large an audience as possible. This is often far from true, and sometimes large audiences can be negative, if seen from a commercial point of view, as they contain too much ‘waste’ that the audience buyer has to pay for, but has no use for. This is also the way in which many sponsors argue, according to the marketing manager at IGS. He thus sometimes finds it hard to convince sponsors that they might persuade people outside of the target groups to buy the products exposed in the programme, and he has several ‘happy stories’ that exemplify how previous sponsors have discovered new customers accidentally this way. This is, of course, a rhetoric that has developed to convince sponsors to ‘take part in the concept’.

That TV4 can reach their target audiences across the country, compared to their commercial competitors who broadcast via satellite and thus can only reach those with cable or satellite dishes, means that it can employ the DIRR and RBS strategies in a more effective way. This also reveals how the market logic dictates the way in which programming is made. As the driving force of the capitalistic market system is to produce surplus value, there is a continuous need to increase this value. ‘Staying put is the same thing...
as taking a step backward’, as then-Managing Director Thorbjörn Larsson claimed in TV4’s Annual Report for 1998.

The goal-oriented activities of TV4 result in (economic) surplus value, which is turned into profit for the shareholders of the broadcasting company, and this is what the managing director always emphasises in the annual reports. However, there are other values produced in the process that TV4 benefits from. In producing a certain type of audience for the programme Bingolotto, public service values are also produced, which are pointed to in statements by the managers of the company. Former Programme Director Jan Scherman often calls upon such values in relation to the show:

The programme exemplifies many of the values that I find important for TV4 to represent in its capacity of being a commercial television broadcaster. For me it is extremely important to mark a pronounced distance from TV3, TV5 and their form of unrestrained and cynical commercialism in their programming. On the other hand we don’t want to be associated with the programming profile of Sveriges Television either. It is somewhere in between these positions that we want to place ourselves, and thus Bingolotto fits just into that publicist profile of ours. [...] Previously, I used to speak about ‘commercially financed public service’ in relation to our profile, but we have lately begun to speak about a ‘quality commercial channel’, but one that has a genuinely popular anchorage, and that’s where Bingolotto fits in. I find that the definition of public service that you find in official reports from the state applies well with the programme. The programme is beneficial to society at many levels, both as broadcast programme and in the wider society. And it is a kind of entertainment that I find... sympathetic is a word I often use when describing Bingolotto. It doesn’t expose people in unpleasant ways, doesn’t devote itself to ‘mobbing journalism’, but is... well, sympathetic. (Interview with Jan Scherman 1 February 2000)

In his argument, Scherman emphasises the utility aspect of the programme and the public service ideology to which this refers. This argument is obviously not directed towards those with economic interests in the programme (e.g., the advertisers who finance the activities and are the basis for the possible profits for TV4), but rather points to the obligations that the broadcaster must attend to according to the license agreement. Former Programme Director Scherman can find support in his argument from statements by the former programme host Leif Olsson, who, with his motto ‘everybody can take part’ (‘alla kan vara med’), has aligned himself with those obligations that say that the broadcaster should address the whole population in Sweden (not just groups with great purchasing power). This is not least exemplified by the fact that Olsson, in his farewell programme before he resigned in June 1999, was officially thanked for his services by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Person. A programme such as Bingolotto thus supplies TV4 with legitimating arguments towards both the economic and the political power field, and it is hard to find a more obvious confirmation of the political legitimacy of TV4 and their programming policies than this (cf. Bolin 2002).

Other Interested Parties
A fourth interested party is advertisers. Advertisers promote commodities by exposing them to the viewers and lottery players. The commodities exposed are both material goods (cars, coffee, furniture, clothing, food, etc.), services (travels, weekend dinners, etc.), and symbolic merchandise (cash, share portfolios, etc.). Advertisers thus mediate
between producers of material and symbolic goods and services, and the broadcaster TV4, who delivers audiences to be exposed to the merchandise. Advertisers buy viewing time from TV4 and deliver this time to producers of goods and services, thus themselves producing a service that they sell to their customers.

Sponsors, on the other hand, can either work through advertising agencies that mediate between them and the production company IGS (and subsequently Novamedia), or make direct contact with the marketing division of the company. In the first case their relations are similar to those of advertisers, but in the second their more direct relations result in a different position when it comes to influencing the show’s aesthetics.

Advertisers and sponsors ultimately produce a consumer market (together with other sponsors and advertisers who promote other commodities). The power to influence the aesthetics of the programme differs among the various advertisers and sponsors. Some have quite direct influence by, e.g., contributing with their own commercials – as one of the main sponsors, Volvo, does in its clips, which clearly have much higher budgets than do those produced by IGS. Others have a more indirect influence, whereby the kind and quality of the commodity to be exposed is taken into consideration by the production staff in ‘presentation clips’, etc. This can, for example, result in the formation of certain themes within the show (around travel, for example). In both cases the overall focus on commodities contributes to the production of an ideology of consumption, as well as a promotion of certain lifestyles constructed in consumption (cf. Bjurström 1991, Campbell 1987, Jansson 2001). The outcome of the production in this case is naturally economic profit (surplus value) for the advertisers, sponsors and the production company, but cultural lifestyle values are also produced around the consumer merchandise. The production of lifestyle values is directly promoted by the lifestyle analyses of the audience carried out by audience analysts such as ACNielsen in the form of ‘Minerva lifestyle segmentation’. These segmentation analyses, and similar analyses such as Orvesto, focus on patterns of consumption among the viewers, whereby consumption of certain lifestyle commodities is correlated to consumption of other commodities and services. In this process, it could be argued that the lifestyles in themselves become commodities that are sold to advertisers and sponsors.

Another interested party, although not primarily economically, is the Swedish State administration. The state acts through the Swedish Broadcasting Commission and The National Gaming Board and does not produce commodities. However, its acting through its legal and other bodies produces political and cultural values as a consequence of the argumentation that precedes decisions.

The seventh and eighth interested parties are the competitors of Bingolotto as a television programme and as a lottery. Competition is naturally a crucial market component. An example of competitive activities on the television market is ‘counter-programming’, i.e. competitors compete for viewer attention by challenging their rivals and by scheduling a similar programme ‘head to head’ in a specific slot (cf. Ellis 2000 pp. 130ff). The viewers are the raw material that TV4 as a producer works up and refines to the audience commodity that it then offers to advertisers, by giving it an outer form shaped by a certain age, gender, education, etc., which in turn determines its economic value on the advertising market. As all commercial broadcasters compete in the same advertising market, they need to get the attention of the same segments of the audience that are in demand from advertisers and sponsors, which is why the market logic leads to programme politics that privilege similar programmes.
Seen from the perspective of the advertising market it would seem as if the main competitors of TV4 should be its rival commercial channels TV3 and Kanal 5. Interestingly in this context, however, is that TV4’s main competitor seems to be the public service broadcaster SVT and its two channels SVT1 and SVT2. For many years it seemed as if SVT did not wish to, or could not, compete with *Bingolotto*, a fact that comes as no surprise since SVT actually does not have to compete for viewer attention since it is not financed with commercial advertising (although it receives minor revenues from sponsors) (cf. Björkegren 2001 p. 146). However, with the introduction of *Expedition: Robinson* in 1998 SVT took on the challenge from TV4. That TV4 regards SVT as its main competitor is by no means surprising. The public service broadcaster has a long history in the minds of Swedish viewers, and has accustomed them to certain kinds of entertainment, especially on Saturdays, for example the earlier-mentioned *Hylands hörna* and other popular family shows. Comparisons with this milestone in Swedish television history are made by both Gert Eklund, the ‘creator’ of *Bingolotto*, and TV4’s Programme Director Jan Scherman in our interviews, and in Annual Reports (e.g., the Annual Report of 1999 p. 16). And by making such comparisons they reveal some of the hopes and ambitions that they have for *Bingolotto*. Eklund’s competitive ambitions aside, it is interesting to see the argumentation from Scherman as a representative of TV4. In our interview he comments on the programming strategies of SVT:

I read the other day that SVT’s new programme director Micke Olsson had stated that ‘*Bingolotto* is not public service, it could never be broadcast by Sveriges Television [SVT]’. Then I read an interview with my predecessor [as programme director] Lars Weiss, who in the journal *Vision* [branch journal for television professionals] has also paid attention to this statement, where he said that it is quite remarkable that *Expedition: Robinson* would be a public service programme but not *Bingolotto*. (Interview with Jan Scherman 1 February 2000)

One explanation for this competitive relationship can be found in the struggle for the value of ‘being public service’. As a hybrid channel (cf. Søndergaard 2000), TV4 has to adjust to certain obligations that follow from the licence agreement with the state. Some of these obligations are of public service character, e.g. having a certain amount of local production, reaching all parts of the country and all kinds of audiences, etc. And due to these obligations, TV4 has for many years struggled to legitimate its activities by holding on to these public service values, which has led to a continuous reproduction of the values. Thus a competitive situation was established, in which the stakes concern ‘who is the most public service’ (Syvertsen 1990) – a competition that generates both cultural and political values.

As a competitor in the lottery market, *Bingolotto* competes for the money of the gambling audience. As the other large games in Sweden are run by companies with close ties to the state system, the state as an interested party is involved also here, as are the ideal organisations within the popular movements. Generated here also are cultural values, mainly through the activities of the ideal organisations.

Last but certainly not least among the interested parties, we find the people who watch the programme (and play the lottery). In discussing viewer activities, one might be tempted to use the marketing term audience (cf. Mosco & Kaye 2001). However, it is imperative to distinguish between the audience as a commodity and the viewers as the social subjects that produce meaning, identities, and culture. The audience is a statistical construction based on aggregated characteristics among individuals (Ang 1991 pp.
53ff; cf. Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998), packed by the audience analysis industry represented by MMS and ACNielsen. The audience cannot act; it has no will of its own. The audience is incapable of producing anything, and as a statistical aggregate it is acted upon. However, as viewers and lottery ticket buyers these viewer subjects are actors who choose if they will buy tickets and how many to buy, as well as whether or not they are going to watch *Bingolotto*. The viewers naturally produce several things while watching: meanings, social relations, and sometimes – as is the case with the viewers of *Bingolotto* – fan material that they send to the programme production staff in the form of mascots and other small tokens of appreciation. The immensely popular Leif ‘Loket’ Olsson had a steady flow of such things coming to the studio in Gothenburg, and these items were exhibited in glass showcases at the entrance of the studio, for arriving guests of the program to see. These *guests* make up the third category in addition to the audience and the viewers. They are mostly regular viewers of the television show that come from various parts of the country, often in groups that have been organised by local sports clubs or other associations within the popular movements. However, once they enter the studio they take part in the production of the program, and in that capacity they are expected to act with cheers and applause, disappointed sighs and ‘bingo!’ shouts. Thus, they have an important function for the programme text, in which they act as an instance of identification for the television viewers and as representatives of those sitting in front of their television sets in households across Sweden. In this function the guests in the studio, together with the viewers at home, construct and produce social and cultural values in the act of *communification* in which they are involved (cf. Bolin 2000 p. 63).

However, this symbolic product in the form of social values built around identification and identities can hardly count as a commodity. A cultural identity cannot be sold on a market, and the experience of the show cannot be traded for another experience or for money. In an interesting discussion, Sut Jhally & Bill Livant (1986) argue that viewers work for the television networks when watching, as they take part in the production of viewers’ watching time together with the networks. Their work for the networks produces ‘surplus watching-time’ (p. 127). In exchange the viewers get ‘program content’, e.g. entertainment shows such as *Bingolotto*. Although it is certainly true that the networks need people who watch the programmes they broadcast, and that the viewing time is refined by statistical measures and sold to advertisers, the metaphor of working has a ‘blindspot’, to paraphrase Dallas Smythe (1977). If audiences are working, and if their salary is entertainment shows, how can they further convert this salary? You cannot buy food for the experience you have earned in watching *Bingolotto* or any other show. And few people besides media researchers can convert the knowledge gained from such shows into exchangeable commodities. It is then easier from the perspective of Jhally & Livant, and with the terminology of Marx (1867/1974) in his first chapter of volume one of *Capital*, to claim that the watching of entertainment is part of the recreation of the worker’s labour power. This recreation time is then refined, packed and sold on a market. In this perspective the watching is certainly part of the market system, although not as an activity that produces something but as raw material for refinement in the production process by others (cf. Meehan 2000 p. 77).

*Relations Between Interested Parties*

The interests of the different interested parties occasionally coincide, but there are also some interests that conflict. This is most notable when economic interests collide. IGS/Novamedia and TV4, for example, have quite different interests from FSL. This conflict
of interests stems from the ideal associations’ interest in the lottery turnover on the one hand, and the interests in audience ratings that the commercial actors share, which are dictated by their dependence on advertisers and sponsors, on the other hand. This conflict can be illustrated by IGS’ and TV4’s outspoken will to change the aesthetics and content of the programme towards the end of former host Leif Olsson’s career in the show, a change that aimed to attract younger and more urban audiences with greater purchasing power. As can be seen in Figure 1 above, audience ratings decreased substantially between spring 1997 and spring 1999. At the same time, the age structure of the audience became older. There was an increase among viewers that were older than 60 years, and a decrease among those between 15 and 44 years. The latter age segment is precisely those who are the primary target group for TV4, and it is against this background that it wished to change the audience address. The strategy was partly successful for IGS and TV4.

The conflict between the management of IGS and TV4 on the one hand, and the popular movements and FSL on the other, took on personal proportions in Leif Olsson’s last show. At the end of the programme the resigning Olsson was thanked for his services by Managing Director Gert Eklund (IGS) and Programme Director Jan Scherman (TV4). Olsson, who in several interviews had declared that he wanted to make a programme for the elderly and those with less urban identification, received thanks from Eklund and Scherman quite reluctantly. After having received flowers and thanks (and a telegram from the Prime Minister), he addressed the viewers, with his eyes straightforward into the camera, pleading for a continuation of the style of the programme:

Thank you very much! A great many viewers around Sweden have become best friends with me over the years. I know that many are grieved. But, all things have their end, and now eight years have passed… And now I will try to do something else. And I will not do anything in television, you need not worry about that. ‘Cause if I did, I would still be in Bingolotto. So, now Lasse Kronér will take over from the 28th. And shouldn’t he get the chance?! And I will just leave one message to Lasse and the rest: take care and preserve Bingolotto in the shape it has today! There are going to be some changes, that I am fully aware of. But be very careful, so that we can take care of those people that really need Bingolotto more than others.

The subsequent changes concerned, among other things, the performing artists. With Olsson as host, dance orchestras set their mark on the show, and contributed to the low status of the show among urban youth and people with higher education. However, the dance orchestras were an important feature to many viewers, according to studies conducted by TV4. When Lasse Kronér began hosting the show a more varied mix of artists was introduced, supposedly appealing to younger audiences. Among the international stars that have appeared on the show since then are Ricky Martin, David Bowie, Kim Wilde, and others who have a following of young adults (rather than teenagers).

The change of host also meant that a new style of hosting was introduced. Kronér, just like Olsson, has a prominent dialect that reveals his firm rootedness in Gothenburg. However, ‘Loket’ has a background as a handball referee and fifteen years’ experience of hosting morning radio shows. Kronér, being some twenty years younger, and with a background as an entertainer in the song and dance group Triple’n Touch, has a more international or US-inspired way of hosting. A telling difference is that Olsson always played the bingo games sitting on a living room sofa together with three guests that had
been drawn from among ticket buyers the previous week. Kronér stands at a podium or walks about on the stage during the bingo games, thus distancing himself from the players (and thus symbolically from the viewers). The symbolic social and cultural community that resulted from Olsson’s way of acting, as well as his unprecedented knowledge about Swedish geography, seemingly knowing every minor locality in Sweden, has changed substantially. In addition to this, the set design has changed in that the former air of 1950’s Swedish ’People’s home’ (folkhem) has disappeared.

As can be seen from Figure 4 above, these changes have not led to any increase in ticket sales, which ought to have caused concern for FSL. As a matter of fact, there has been a decrease in sales figures. This has been economically compensated for by an increase in turnover, made possible by the introduction of new ‘double’ tickets and special lotteries such as the Millennium Lottery on New Year’s Eve 1999 (which in itself had a turnover of 236 million SEK). The economic values have been preserved through these measures, while the social values that have bound individuals together in a lottery playing community have diminished. Thus, there has been no corresponding compensation for the loss of the social values that results from the fact that increasingly fewer people are involved in the lottery handling process, both as distributors of tickets and as players.

The various agents involved seem to have succeeded in their mutual efforts to reach a sufficient level of income from lottery sales (for FSL), and to capture the target audiences that IGS and TV4 need to reach in order to deliver audiences to sponsors (on the part of IGS) and advertisers (on the part of TV4). However, there are other conflicting interests, for example among TV4, IGS, advertisers and sponsors, that are revealed in interviews of the managerial staff. For example, it has not been popular among the sponsors that have made agreements with IGS when competing brands have bought advertising time around Bingolotto from TV4. Within the program, sponsors have branch exclusivity, but IGS cannot guarantee that competing brands will not buy advertising time from TV4.

To summarise, one could say that the different interested parties can be divided into four types. Firstly, there are those within the administrative-political system. These make up the minor part of the parties (The Swedish Broadcasting Commission, the National Gaming Board, and the competitors on the lottery market). Secondly, there are those that can be found within the market system, which comprise most of the parties (IGS/Nova-media, advertisers, sponsors, TV4, and the other competitors on the television market). Thirdly, there are those that can be found within the cultural public sphere (cf. Mortensen 1977). These are FSL and the associations that distribute and sell tickets. Then there are those within the private or intimate sphere – the viewers at home.

Conflicts that arise are predominantly between spheres, and most conflicts appear between the first three of these four. However, although the agents within the market system strive towards similar goals, competitive characteristics of the market also provide for some system-internal conflicts. Thus, there are also competing interests within the various collective bodies, as is shown by the example of branch exclusivity above.

**Internal Differences within Interested Parties**

The overarching aims with each activity – the production of the lottery for FSL, the production of the programme for IGS/Novamedia, the production of the audience for TV4 – are probably not controversial among individuals in these three organisations. However, there are obvious differences among the various individuals about secondary aims, i.e. goals that can be connected to the production of symbolic values. In this section I will
point to some such divergences, and how they affect the products and commodities produced.

When Bingolotto was first introduced on cable television in the Gothenburg area, many of those involved had little or no experience in professional television production. Many came from the sports movement. At the start of the deregulation of the Swedish television market, there were opportunities for non-media people lacking experience in media production to enter the production field, a fact that was also true in other Nordic countries at the time. In Norway the dating programme Reisesjekken started in the same way, supported by enthusiastic ‘amateurs’ with surprisingly low budgets and a good portion of entrepreneurial spirit (Bakøy & Syvertsen 2001 pp. 23ff). Another feature that this Norwegian production shares with its Swedish counterpart is its rebellious attitude towards the authorities, and towards the ‘old’ television system. The Norwegians also started with inexperienced production staff, as well as with little commercial competition on the television market, a fact that should not be neglected. Denmark had its syndicated version of Wheel of Fortune – Lykkehjulet – as a prominent feature in the deregulation process when Danish TV2 started in 1988 (cf. Skovmand 1992 p. 92). Put in the words of Kevin Robins & James Cornford (1992 p. 197), who noticed the same phenomenon in the UK some years earlier, these ‘Trojan horses’ enabled ‘non-television media groups to penetrate into the broadcasting sector’.

Many of those who were part of the production team of Bingolotto early on had a background in the sports movement and in ideal associations. There was a deeply rooted solidarity among the staff concerning the rhetoric behind the program, by which FSL promoted the programme as being ‘best friends with sports clubs’, as a 1999 slogan read. There was also a marked distance towards those who supposedly did not share this conviction, for example those who worked with media production in Stockholm, and the advertising business and economists in general.12 Clashes between individual representatives for economic and cultural ideals can be exemplified in the actions taken by the acting managing director for IGS in 1999 (then under the name Eklundgruppen). He was genuinely loathed by most in the production team, as well as others who worked close to the team, such as those responsible for the distribution of lottery tickets in the Gothenburg area whose office was next to the studio. Just as described by Jeremy Tunstall (1993 pp. 152ff) in relation to television producers, the staff considered the managing director one of those ‘wankers in suits’ that represent an economic and administrative rationality that are a poor fit with the cultural rationality represented by those with a background in the sports movement (cf. Björkgren 1996). After several incidents with the staff, he resigned during the summer, just during the process of change for the programme.

Internal discrepancies also concern divergent aesthetic opinions on what is ‘good television’. Here, the production process around Bingolotto provides us with examples on the professionalisation process, in which there is a continuous adaptation to television standards of other programmes. This is revealed in interviews with the editing staff, where the main editor was clearly ashamed when confronted in an interview with his first work on the programme. And it comes as no surprise that the programme looks quite different when one compares a broadcast from 1991, with few cameras, a studio room otherwise used as a lunch restaurant, and poor lighting, with broadcasts of later dates, where the colour scheme and lighting have become increasingly similar to Who wants to be a millionaire?, which was eventually broadcast by TV4 as well.

The internal discrepancies reveal how certain values tend to be dominating at times. Not surprisingly for a commercial production, economic values tend to dominate in the
When values struggle with dollars, put your cash on the cash every time (Tetzlaff 1992 p. 22). The struggles between values, however, do work at several levels. At the organisational level they work between the different systems and spheres described above. This should be of no surprise, but the interesting thing is how and on which occasion economic values tend to permeate and intrude into spheres dominated by other values, and in which situations, however few they may seem, that economic values are repressed. A revealing example can be related to the fact, mentioned earlier in this article, that historical periodisation of the programme must be made from different perspectives. Depending on which perspective one chooses, one finds different peak moments in the programme’s history. For example, the managing director for FSL, Leif Flatow, who is chief representative for the popular, ideal values, and responsible for securing the interests of the popular movements, describes in our interview Bingolotto’s golden age as being between 1994 and 1996. If one relates this to the development of ticket sales and turnover in Figure 3 above, it reveals that the ideal engagement and the large lottery sales exceed this period. Already in spring 1993, the amount of sold tickets was at its height. But the increase in turnover does not rise dramatically until 1994, and it is this turnover that seems to be of value for Flatow. It is quite clear that it is the economic, rather than the social value of having many people engaged in the distribution and handling of lottery tickets, that he espouses and has an interest in. In this, the economic rationale forces out those social values connected to the handling of lottery tickets (where the golden age would be assigned to another period).

**Interplay Between Values in the Post-Public Service Era**

*Bingolotto* is a programme that works in a new, post-public service Nordic media geography, marked by the logic of commercial television and its goal of maximum surplus value, as in other kinds of capitalist commodity production. However, the historical context of the production of the programme, in the wake of the deregulation of the broadcast media in the Nordic countries, makes the programme generate several other values besides the economic ones. To reduce *Bingolotto* to a commercial moneymaking machine is therefore to miss out entirely on some of the explanations that lie behind the contemporary workings of the culture industries. The somewhat overly complex production of *Bingolotto* might be extreme, but the kinds of relationships that the production of the programme highlights also make it a perfect prism for analyses of modern, commercial enterprises, and how ideological workings permeate our everyday electronic surroundings. The commodity form is obviously central to this mode of production. It is, however, certainly not pure economic logic that makes the system tick, and the importance of other values that add to, reinforce, and sometimes obscure, the economic intent that much media production has as its *raison d’être* should not be underestimated. This might illustrate the late modern form of commodity fetishism, to use Marx’s (1867/1974) terminology, wherein the economic value becomes embedded in other values.

In the production process, not all things produced take on commodity form, and a too one-sided concentration on the production of surplus value and profits can even be of hindrance in the long run. In order to be bestowed with use value, every commodity must mean something to someone, i.e. be equipped with cultural values. Through this process its exchange value is formed, and it can be circulated on a market. Cultural values are thus of utmost importance to the market system. Political and social values are not equally obvious in their ability to contribute to the exchange value of commodities. However, under certain circumstances and in specific combinations even these values can
be beneficial to the use value, as well as to the exchange value. The opposite is, however, not true. Social values alone cannot be sold on a market. If the social value of togetherness should be granted exchange value (and not just use value), it must be connected with something else.

Capitalist production in general is saturated with examples of paradoxes, and so is commercial media production. Not least paradoxical is the fact that Gert Eklund, after having been engaged in one of the largest Swedish media production projects for more than a decade, still seems to consider himself a challenger within the field of television production, and a representative of an alternative form of television. At the same time, Bingolotto espouses and reproduces some of the more fundamental values of public service television in the form of social, cultural and political values (if also mixed with the economic values of commercial production). This is possibly one of the explanations of the success of Bingolotto, and one of the reasons why TV4 has been so successful in attracting both those who reject traditional public service programming, as well as those who adhere to the habits of the public service output.

Morris Holbrook (1993 p. 115) ends his book on US television game shows by rhetorically asking why he finds himself ‘helplessly grinning’ and ‘rejoicing in my feelings of shared triumph’ while watching game shows, in spite of the fact that they ‘reflect a capitalist ethic of materialism based on greed’ that exemplifies ‘the culture of consumption gone berserk’, and as such should be opposed. The answer to this question is that these shows also reflect other values, which are less negative in most people’s eyes, and can sometimes overshadow the most apparent profit motifs behind commercial activities and make programmes enjoyable even to those who would otherwise object to the consumer ethic displayed.

Notes

1. In this article I will restrict my discussion to television production. The introduction of commercial enterprises have naturally also affected radio production, but as the examples are drawn from a project on television programming I will leave aside the discussion of radio.

2. Sweden is a country with a long tradition of organised social, or popular movements, for example the workers’ movement, the temperance movement, and the sports movement. These can be considered ‘the institutionalised lifeworld’, in Jean Cohen & Andrew Arato’s (1992) labelling (cf. Dahlgren 1995 pp. 127ff), and a part of the public domain or the public sphere in the theoretical following of Jürgen Habermas (1962/1989).

The Swedish popular movements, particularly the sports movement, but also parts of the temperance movement, pensioner associations, societies for disabled, etc., have a long-standing tradition of financing their (non-profit) activities through different kinds of lotteries. They also have an organisation that administrates the lotteries involved on a national level: FSL (Folkrörelsernas Samarbetsorgan i Lotterifrågor, which roughly translates as The Popular Movements’ Lottery Cooperation).

3. The concept was sold to the Dutch production enterprise Novamedia in April 2001. Novamedia took over in spring 2002, and changes after this takeover have thus not been considered here.


5. Audience ratings are taken from MMS between 1991 and 1994. From 1995 onwards, the ratings are based on statistics from Svensk TV-Bingo. These are estimated on the grounds of the highest value reached every Saturday. Thus, these figures depart somewhat from those from MMS, who counts all three parts of the program separately. As a consequence the ratings accounted for by Svensk TV-Bingo are slightly higher. If compared, the ratings from MMS show between 10-30,000 viewers less than do those from Svensk TV-Bingo. For the purpose of this article, and the overall tendencies accounted for, this is of minor significance.
6. As we have had no access to ratings for each program before 1995, we cannot make any comparisons before this date. However, nothing indicates that the pattern has differed dramatically before.

7. Leif ‘Loket’ Olsson and Jan Scherman have, on occasions, had public discussions in the press on the character of the program, in which Olsson has argued for the maintenance of the program style and audience address. Scherman has instead pointed to the need for change in order to reach broader audience segments. The executive producer did not have much to do with the actual production or distribution of the program, since the links between the studio in Gothenburg and the television channel headquarters in Stockholm were primarily a question of transmission technology, and were thus entrusted to the technical staff at TV4. In our interviews with her, it was obvious that she rarely watched the show for which she was executive producer.


10. TV4 naturally rather want to make it seem as if the viewers are the customers of the channel, as Programme Director Jan Scherman claims in the headline ‘The viewers – our customers’ in the Annual Report of 1997 (p. 9).

11. This has, however, changed recently, and since April 2002 it has been possible to interrupt programs longer than 45 minutes (‘TV4 får friare reklamregler’, in Dagens Nyheter 10 February 2002).

12. Independent production of television in Sweden is highly concentrated to Stockholm, and IGS/Nova-media are an exception to this rule.

References


The Culture of Post-Narcissism

Post-teenage, Pre-midlife Singles Culture in Seinfeld, Friends, and Ally – Seinfeld in Particular

Michael Skovmand

In a recent article, David P. Pierson makes a persuasive case for considering American television comedy, and sitcoms in particular, as ‘Modern Comedies of Manners’. These comedies afford a particular point of entry into contemporary mediated negotiations of ‘civility’, i.e. how individual desires and values interface with the conventions and standards of families, peer groups and society at large. The apparent triviality of subject matter and the hermetic appearance of the groups depicted may deceive the unsuspecting media researcher into believing that these comedies are indeed “shows about nothing”. The following is an attempt to point to a particular range of contemporary American television comedies as sites of ongoing negotiations of behavioural anxieties within post-teenage, pre-midlife singles culture – a culture which in many aspects seems to articulate central concerns of society as a whole. This range of comedies can also be seen, in a variety of ways, to point to new ways in which contemporary television comedy articulates audience relations and relations to contemporary culture as a whole.

American television series embody the time-honoured American continental dichotomy between the West Coast and the East Coast. The West Coast – LA – signifies the Barbie dolls of Baywatch, and the overgrown high school kids of Beverly Hills 90210. On the East Coast – more specifically New York and Boston, a sophisticated tradition of television comedy has developed since the early 1980s far removed from the beach boys and girls of California. It is grown-up – or almost grown-up television comedy, it is urban, and its roots are not the feel-good world of the Beach Boys, but the narcissistic conversational culture of Woody Allen.

The beginning – to the extent that one can talk about beginnings of genres that reach back into radio and beyond – was Cheers, the mother of recent sitcoms, which ruled the American networks between 1982 and -93, becoming the greatest succes series in American television history. The cosy Boston bar was home away from home to a handful of employees and regulars, plus whoever walked through the door, presided over by the ever-present Sam (Ted Danson), ex-baseball player with an ever vigilant eye on the main chance. Cheers gave us fast-paced adult talk, breaking new ground in conversational permissiveness and precision. But even this loosely constructed sitcom machine gradually depleted its narrative repertoire, and the defunct concept was milked by a number of spin-offs, notably Frazier. The real inheritor, however, was Jerry Seinfeld, the stand-up comedian of Saturday Night Live fame, who, along with Larry David created Seinfeld
(NBC 1989-98) in 1989, a sitcom that was to rival *Cheers* both in terms of humourous acuity and cult status. The series is based on two extraordinary gimmicks: Seinfeld plays himself, and the series pretends to be about nothing. Each episode (except for the last two seasons) is framed by stand-up monologue by Jerry himself, but the major attraction is the ensemble situation comedy of the four single friends Jerry, George (Jason Alexander), Kramer (Michael Richards), and Elaine (Julia Louis-Dreyfus), either in their favourite coffe-shop booth, or in Jerry’s small New York apartment, complete with the classic sitcom sofa facing the live audience, and a repertoire of running gags such as next-door neighbour Kramer’s sliding sideways entrances.

* Whereas *Seinfeld* is deliberately unglamorous, *Friends* (NBC 1994-) is far more yuppie-oriented – or perhaps post-yuppie-oriented. It is the story of six personable New York singles – three of each sex – neighbours in the same apartment building, and again the majority of the scenes are played out either in one of the apartments or on the sitcom sofa of the nearby coffee shop Central Perk. Metaphorically speaking, *Friends* can be seen as a sequel to *Family Ties*, the famous 1980’s sitcom, in which the nuclear family still existed, albeit in slightly parodic post-1968-ish version.

*Friends* is where Alex (Michael J. Fox) – again metaphorically speaking – can be seen to have moved to, after he moved away from his hippie parents in disgust. He has subsequently recognised the limitations of the 80’s Reaganite yuppie culture and has sought refuge in the quasi-commune of apartment-clustered single friends. In fact, Monica (Courtney Cox) of *Friends* is Alex’s sometime girlfriend from *Family Ties*.

Whereas *Seinfeld* determinedly undermines any tendency towards the emotional, *Friends* is a story about friendship among singles as a haven in an adult, demanding world full of demands, sexual, careerwise and otherwise – a haven in which the six singles are encapsuled in a bubble of security, from which would-be boyfriends and girl-friends are constantly assessed by the collective and found wanting. This Peter Pan world of *Friends* is strong on understated dialogue and ironic repartee, but veers back and forth between ironic detachment and sentimentality – a reflection of the dilemma of the series as a whole which is: how seriously to take the lifestyle problems of these post-adolescent characters.

*Ally* (FOX 1997-) has taken this dilemma further. The makeshift sitcom format has been scrapped in favour of what is simply termed ‘comedy’, which is to say no live audience, more ‘production value’, i.e. a more expensive and more edited production. With Calista Flockhart as the near-anorexic protagonist Ally (her weight problems and her potentially negative influence as a role model is seriously debated in American media), David Kelley, with a track record of unorthodoxy from series such as *Picket Fences* and *Chicago Hope*, has produced a post-feminist psychodrama, which takes the neuroses of post-adolescent singlehood to new heights of intensity. Set in a male-owned, but female-dominated firm of lawyers in Boston with unisex toilets – at times there is more action in the toilets than in the offices – the courtroom drama, more often than not, is upstaged by the sexual and emotional conflicts among the employees. Whereas *Seinfeld* is predominantly, if low-key Jewish, and *Friends* generally white urban, *Ally* reverts to the standard American serial ethnic mix, including both a Chinese and a black lawyer – both women – but apart from that the series is resolutely politically incorrect. To give an example: Ling, the Chinese woman lawyer at one point snarls angrily at a man in a wheelchair who gets in her way, adding, as an aside, “...as if you are not already getting all the good parking spots..."
In *Ally*, the invasion of the workplace by the personal sphere has been taken to extremes, frequently drowning out any sense that any real work is going on at all. On top of that, the series has inaugurated a surrealistic visual dimension, in which particularly Ally’s fantasies of sex, inferiority and motherhood are literalised in the form of digitised visual manipulations – reducing Ally to half size, extending her a tongue by a foot, or introducing hallucinations of the babies she has never had. Courtroom drama, when it does occur, has moved a long way from the concerned realism of such series as *LA. LAW* – at one point there is a case brought against God – veering between crazy screwball comedy and unbridled emotionality, often parodying the excesses of litigious American legal culture. One further entertaining dimension about *Ally* is its massive use of Oldies pop music, either performed by singer-pianist Vonda Shephard, or through cameo appearances of singers such as Barry White, whose performance of “My First, My Last, My Everything” on the show meant a relaunching of the career of the old crooner. Indeed, the use of Oldies pop music is consistently used to signify the nostalgic dimension of the emotional archive of the entire cast – nostalgia and neurosis being the overriding mindsets of the *Ally* environment. In this post-Freudian self-reflexive environment, the services of psychoanalysts are of little help. This post-yuppie generation knows only too well all the explanatory models of repression, early childhood trauma etc.

The characters of all three series are – with variations – caught in what Christopher Lasch as early as 1979, in the well-established vein of American cultural pessimism, identified as “The Culture of Narcissism”. They are beyond the civil rights movements, Vietnam, Watergate, and the yuppie optimism of the Reagan era, no longer with any confidence in the larger emancipatory creeds their parents and grandparents clung to. In their place there is a restless individualism, a post-ironic self-consciousness, and a peer group of post-adolescent friends. Larger concepts such as “society”, “politics”, or “justice” are not totally jettisoned, but are seen as problematic, compromised as they are by the rhetoric of the parent generation. Instead, there is a deliberate minimalism, where the emotional minutiae of the personal world are magnified into ironic proportions. All the characters are locked into what – since Gregory Bateson – has been referred to as a *double bind*: a powerful yearning towards and an equally strong fear against “commitment” – to permanent relationships, to parenthood, to a sense of purpose beyond themselves. And the biological clock – a recurrent fearful image in the series – keeps ticking away. As Jerry Seinfeld phrases it in one of the *Seinfeld* episodes: “What’s wrong with us? Why aren’t we married? Why don’t we have wives and children? Why are we not men like our fathers?”

*Seinfeld*: “No Hugging, No Learning”.

It is my contention in this essay that *Seinfeld* in particular has taken this minimalism to exceptionally interesting lengths. The following is an attempt to characterise this – now defunct – situation comedy as one of the defining televisual events of the 1990’s.

A Short History of *Seinfeld*

*Seinfeld* is a show which is firmly rooted in stand-up comedy. It is the exclusive creation of two people with extensive stand-up experience – Jerry Seinfeld and Larry David, and their background in shows such as the illustrious *Saturday Night Live* is felt in all aspects of the show, from the unorthodoxy of ideas to the irreverence of treatment of themes.
The pilot – *The Seinfeld Chronicles* – aired in 1989 – already contains the major ingredients of the show as we know it: Jerry Seinfeld’s introductory and concluding stand-up routines, the two major locations: the coffee shop and Jerry’s apartment, and the absurd focus on conversational minutiae. Kramer (named Kessler in this first episode) is already in character, preoccupied with the contents of Jerry’s fridge, and the story with its main focus on the etiquette of dating is recognizably Seinfeldian. The only element missing is the female character – Elaine – who is introduced in the next episode, (the show, according to Jerry Seinfeld, “lacked estrogen” (quoted in Gattuso, p.136)), making up the foursome that was to be the defining main cast for the next nine years.

The show was no immediate success – in fact the tribulations of the show can be paralleled to those of another quirky, groundbreaking show, of the early 1980’s, *Hill Street Blues*, as chronicled by Todd Gitlin in *Inside Prime Time* (1983).

It was not its overall ratings, but its segment appeal that saved it. As Seinfeld put it in an interview:

> What made us develop was, despite being very low rated in the beginning, we had a very high demographic profile. Though we were technically bombing, the people watching were what they call advertiser desirable. (Quoted in Gattuso, p.27)

A change in scheduling, however, was to make the real difference to the fortunes of the show. In February 1993, *Seinfeld* was shifted from Wednesdays 9:00 PM into the attractive Thursdays 9.30 PM slot, immediately after *Cheers*. The *Cheers* lead-in made all the difference to the show, improving its audience share by over 50%. Since then, Seinfeld was consistently among the top five in the ratings. When *Cheers* went off the air that same year, *Seinfeld* became NBC’s Thursday night anchor, subsequently providing a powerful lead-in for another single-in-the-city sitcom, *Friends* in 1994-95.

At the end of the 1995-96 season Larry David left the show. In the following season, the stand-up intro and exit routines were abandoned, making more time for increasingly intricate and wacky storylines. At the same time, the life of the show was threatened by a dispute between NBC and the three non-owning actors Alexander, Louis-Dreyfus and Richards who felt that they were not getting any benefits from the huge profits the show was raking in in syndication – in 1997, Jerry Seinfeld, as creator-producer and actor, was listed by Forbes magazine as having a gross income of $94 million, making him the sixth wealthiest entertainer, whereas the other three of the foursome were making a ‘measly’ $150.000 per episode. There was a settlement, quadrupling their pay, but they were only to enjoy the fruits of it for one more season. (Source: Gattuso, pp.41-43) At the end of 1997 Jerry Seinfeld decided that the 97-98 season would be the last one – he wanted to go out with a bang while the show was still at its peak, rather than keep on milking the success with a show creatively on the wane, as was perceived to have been the case with shows such as *Family Ties* (1982-89) and *Cheers* (1982-93). The final episode, massively publicized, was aired on May 14th 1998, to an audience of Super Bowl proportions, appropriately written by Larry David. The media frenzy went beyon anything hitherto associated with the ending of tv comedy series – including the much-hyped finales of *M.A.S.H.* and *Cheers*. The final show itself deserves a few comments.

In this episode the foursome are stranded in a small town and are passive witnesses to the mugging of a fat man. Instead of coming to his assistance, they crack jokes. George: ”He’s actually doing him a favor. There’s less money for him to buy food”. They
are then arrested by a local police officer and charged with breaking the local “good Samaritan law” which makes it punishable to refuse to come to the aid of a person in danger. There is a long trial scene in which “the New York Four” are confronted with minor characters and guest stars from the previous nine years of the show, appearing as character witnesses against them, making for an ironic summary of the history of the show. Judge Art Vandelay (the name George has been using over the years in his various schemes of deception) sentences the four to a year in jail, which is the last the television audience sees of Jerry, George, Elaine and Kramer. An appropriate ironic send-off to a show which resolutely refused any “learning” or moral preachifying, but which was always concerned, in its unheroic way, with the ethics of everyday existence. The final episode is given a lengthy ethical analysis in one of the numerous publications spawned by the success of the show, called *Seinfeld and Philosophy – A Book about Everything and Nothing* (2000).

**Seinfeld as Situation Comedy**

Situation comedy as a genre is not a specifically televsional form – its roots are in the long history of stage entertainment. What gives it its special place in the history of dramatic genres is its deliberately perfunctory dramatic form, its sketchiness and its staginess. Played out before a ‘live studio audience’ (although this feature is sometimes dispensed with), camera movement is restricted by the missing fourth wall – the audience position – and any variation of location and post-production editing is heavily limited. There is very little in terms of significant camera or editing action, of slow-motion, of inserts, of significant camera angles, the whole signifying repertoire of cinematography. The camera action is unobtrusive, representing rather than constructing characters in action. Although the gestural dimension is in evidence (witness Kramer), it is essentially dialogue-driven. The fictionality of situation comedy, unlike the major dramatic genres of comedy and tragedy, is perfunctory. The diegesis or story-world of sitcom is not a self-contained cocoon. Rather, it insists on its potential openness to “the real world” – that is the audience world – it is interruptable by the audience, its delivery is paced by the audience response. Its interest is not in the far away or the long ago – it is overwhelmingly contemporary.

*Seinfeld* makes innovative use of these features of sitcom. The presence of Jerry Seinfeld as “Jerry Seinfeld” is a feature deliberately puncturing the fictionality of representation. As Larry David has put it: “We try to keep Jerry and Jerry as close as we can. We don’t want him to do too much acting” (Gattuso p.101). Indeed, in “The Pilot”, the outrageously metafictional episode in which Jerry and George try to sell the idea of the show “Jerry – A Show About Nothing” (which is, of course, *Seinfeld*) to NBC, Jerry objects to playing the lead: “I can’t act. I stink!” The frequent presence of ‘real people’ – Keith Hernandez, the baseball player, George Steinbrenner, manager of the New York Yankees, and for a while George’s boss (actually an actor, always shot from behind) and a host of celebrity cameo appearances – is known from other sitcoms, but adds a continuous sense of permeability with the real contemporary world. Add to this the many ways in which the show generates celebrity in anything it touches. The character on which “The Soup Nazi” is based, the proprietor of Soup Kitchen International at 259-A West 55th Street in New York, a chef known for his outstanding soups and strict queueing discipline is now appearing in a food show on a home-shopping cable channel. The character on which Kramer is loosely based – his name is Kenny Kramer – now makes a living organising Kramer’s Reality Tour – a guided bus tour around sites in New York related to the
The man who insists on being the real-life George (his name is Mike Costanza) – has tried to capitalize on the success of the show by publishing his autobiography.

The relatively short production time of *Seinfeld* – a week – affords an opportunity of topicality and reference to current events impossible with more cumbersome fictional forms. In the episode “The Non-Fat Yogurt”, hours after Rudolph Giuliani had won the mayoral election in New York in 1993, a cameo of Giuliani, campaigning against fake low-fat yoghurt, was edited into a show aired the following night.

The narrative of *Seinfeld* is deceptively simple. The half-hour two-act format – with Jerry’s intro and exit stand-up routines, the predominance of two locations – Jerry’s living-room with the couch facing the audience, and the booth at Monk’s Diner, make for a minimalist setting in which dialogue is foregrounded. There is usually a storyline attached to each of the four characters, sometimes two characters share a storyline. It is however, as pointed out by scriptwriter Peter Mehlman, the situations that generate the comedy rather than witty dialogue in itself. As he puts it, “…there are no jokes in the show”. And it is the weaving of storylines into an intricate pattern of often fateful convergence which is the hallmark of the narrative structure of *Seinfeld*. A supreme example is the episode “the Pez Dispenser” (January 1992), in which the minute container of candy is the motif and engine of plot convergence.

Intertextuality and metafictionality are frequent features of narrative constructedness in *Seinfeld*. In “The Boyfriend” (February 1992), the reconstruction of a spitting episode during a baseball game is reconstructed in infinitesimal detail, mimicking the investigation into the 1963 assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas. In “The Betrayal” (November 1997), the backward temporal structure of Harold Pinter’s play *Betrayal* from 1978 is borrowed, including the title of Pinter’s play.

And, as referred to already, the self-reflexive/metafictional jeux d’esprit of selling the “reality-based” show “Jerry” to NBC is a thread through several episodes, concluding in an hour-long episode “The Pilot”, complete with casting interviews for look-alikes playing George, Elaine and Kramer – in fact, Kramer auditions for, and wins, the role as ‘himself’.

**Seinfeld – “The Show about Nothing”**

The point made above by James Monaco is well taken. We do tune in to sitcoms to spend time in the company of increasingly familiar characters. But Monaco’s comment is also wide of the mark. Sitcoms – including *Seinfeld* – are not about character, hence about nothing. Sitcoms – like all drama – in Aristotelian phrase – are about character in action, and the impetus of action – like all drama – is provided by situations producing dilemmas or conflicts. What is special about Seinfeld is the way in which it deliberately foregrounds the quotidian nature of its dilemmas – its everydayness. The show’s casting
itself as “a show about nothing” is a promotional strategy for profiling difference in the marketplace of sitcoms, as a sitcom of resolute minimalism. It does not want to present itself as edifying, and it does not want to present itself as empathetic. As Larry David puts it: “No hugging, no learning”. Or, as formulated by Peter Mehlman: “99% of the world is on the verge of tears, what’s the big deal to push them over?” The show may be said to be post-Modernist, not only because of its preoccupation with metafictionality, intertextuality and self-reflexivity – buzzwords of the post-Modern – but equally, and perhaps more importantly, because there is no agenda, no implicit allegiance to the grand emancipatory narratives of Modernism. Of course, comedy was never a problem-solving genre. Its business was always to point to incongruities, between preaching and practice, between the size of problems and our attention to them, between the grotesque consequences of minute actions. Comedic resolutions, as Northrop Frye has taught us, were always imposed, magical, arbitrary, in Shakespeare and elsewhere. One of the most controversial episodes of Seinfeld – “The Invitations” – the last episode Larry David wrote before he left the show at the end of the 1995-96 season – makes that point eloquently. In the episode, George is desperate to free himself from the commitment to marry Susan. The deus ex machina is provided by the toxic glue on the cheap envelopes of the marriage invitations, the licking of which produces the death of Susan, to the poorly concealed relief of George, who is quick to follow up on his secret infatuation with Marisa Tomei. As Gattuso puts it,

The episode divided fans, who were either floored by the intensity of David’s black comedy or outraged that the series’ sole likable character – one whose flaw was her taste in men – was killed off so unceremoniously.[...] Despite the flood of angry phone calls fielded by NBC switchboards, the Seinfeld team got a good chuckle and one of its highest ratings ever. (Gattuso,p.33)

Judging by the audience response, this episode did ‘push the envelope’ (sorry) of the genre of the sitcom, even as determined by the expectations of the otherwise magnanimous Seinfeld audience. Yet, the ambition of Seinfeld and David was always to delve into areas beyond, or beneath, the attention of mainstream network sitcoms. The examples are legion. A much discussed episode was “The Contest” (November 1992), in which the four characters make a wager about who will abstain the longest from masturbation – (the word was never used during the episode), implicitly establishing masturbation as a natural phenomenon among singles. Another episode is “The Outing” (February 1993), in which a a newspaper publishes rumours about Jerry and George being lovers. The ambiguity of their scandalised reaction combined with their liberal lip-service to the acceptability of homosexuality produced one of the catchphrases of the 90’s: “Not that there is anything wrong with that”. The episode won the show a media award from the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation.

What is the special appeal of a show such as Seinfeld? Audience figures and recurrent media debates are quantifiable ways of documenting the purchase it has had on public opinion. Its afterlife in syndication worldwide ensures its position as a popular cultural icon of the 1990’s. However, if one looks more closely at the specific ways it has impacted with its audience, it is without doubt the particular conversational idiom of the show which accounts for the major appeal of the show. Hundreds of personal websites testify to this. Its roots in stand-up comedy, with its knack of turning the minutiae of everyday life dilemmas into philosophical conundrums, gave the show an immediacy of appeal which went far beyond the set-up-pay-off-dominated structure of previous sitcoms. It is a paradox of the appeal of the show that however much it refused to cater to
identification and character empathy, the show was overwhelmingly perceived to reflect its audience’s idiom and concerns. The way in which a whole range of expressions and catchphrases have entered contemporary American testified to this: “Yada”, “Not that there is anything wrong with it”, “get out”, “shrinkage” – the list goes on and on. This is not simply a testimony to the extraordinary economical skills of the scriptwriters associated with the show, but just as much an effect of the exceptional authorial control Larry David and Jerry Seinfeld wielded on the show. Seinfeld, for all its laid-back conversational casualness, is – paradoxically – an unusually auteured sitcom. Over its nine years of production, for all its variety of themes and narrative structures, it has maintained a consistency of approach to the basic ingredients of its own project – a philosophical minimalist conversationalism, an acute sense of the dynamics of ordinary contemporary idiom, and a ruthless honesty in the exploration of the everyday anxieties of post-adolescent urban singledom.

Seinfeld, Friends, Ally, etc – Looking for a Paradigm

It is obvious that shows such as Seinfeld, Friends and Ally are riding the same wave of network orientation towards a particular audience segment: 18-49’s in general, more specifically urban singles. As Gattuso has it:

The success of Seinfeld has made a cottage industry out of the adult-oriented, single-in-the-city sitcoms. The exception to the “singles” rule was NBC’ Mad about You, with Paul Reiser as essentially a married Jerry Seinfeld. NBC created Friends, which got a “Seinfeldian” billing by the network as “A new comedy about...whatever”. Most recently, NBC launched Caroline in the City and The Single Guy on Thursday night to attract the Seinfeld/Friends crowd. ABC’s Ellen and Fox’s Living Single are spun from similar threads. (Gattuso, p.29)

There are solid demographic as well as narrative reasons for this. More than half of all adult Americans now live in ‘single households’. The purchasing power of this audience segment makes shows appealing to this group interesting vehicles for advertisers. Narratively speaking, young adult singles are the very stuff of which fiction is made. The history of the novel, from Jane Austen onwards, is testimony to the narrative dynamics of the ‘not yet married’. They are, as it were, a romance waiting to happen. Their transitional position between adolescence and their social enshrinement within the societal bastions of career, procreation and marriage is guaranteed to invoke themes of existential anxiety with a wide identificatory appeal. Furthermore, within the paradigm there is plenty of scope for variation. Along gender lines, Seinfeld, Friends and Ally provide a neat distribution of focus. Seinfeld is primarily male-oriented, with Elaine as ‘one of the boys’. As Kramer tells her in “The Pool Guy”: “You’re a man’s woman – you hate other women and they hate you”. Friends is precisely balanced in terms of male/female interest. Ally has an overwhelmingly female focus. This mirrors a parallel distribution along an axis of, at one end, ironic detachment and at the other end empathetic sentiment, with Seinfeld at the ironic end, with Ally at the other end, tending towards melodrama, and with Friends somewhere in the middle (given to unevenness of scriptwriting), toying with the ambiguities of the ironic and the empathetic.

Are these shows postmodern? The question raises a host of issues which reach far beyond the scope of this paper. From an aesthetic point of view, the application of the usual buzzwords ‘intertextuality’, ‘self-reflexivity’, ‘metafictionality’ will distribute the
three shows along an axis placing Ally as very PM, Seinfeld as fairly PM, and Friends as not very PM. If however, one opts for a broader socio-psychological approach to the shows, which situates the “world picture” of the shows within the vocabulary of socio-psychological criticism from Lasch to Giddens, applying such terms as “narcissism”, “individualisation”, “decline of metanarratives”, “unhookedness”, “risk society” etc., there seems to be a broader sense of uniformity across the range of the chosen television ‘texts’. It is, however, a sense of shared concerns which is deceptive, in the sense that an analysis should not lose sight of the extraordinary variety of textual strategies in the face of those shared concerns. Nor should any analysis of television content lose sight of the specificities and constraints of cultural production which obtain in each individual case. As Jim Collins puts it in his essay “Television and Postmodernism, in an argument with Fredric Jameson’s position of the postmodern as the superstructure of late capitalism:

The problem for television studies, as it tries to come to terms with postmodernism, is how to reconcile the semiotic and economic dimensions of television. Stressing the semiotic to the exclusion of the economic produces only a formalist game of ‘let’s count the intertexts’, but privileging the economic to the point that semiotic complexity is reduced to a limited set of moves allowed by a master system is just as simplistic. The attempt to turn television into a master system operating according to a single logic is a fundamentally nostalgic perspective; the culture of the 1990’s, though judged to be the sheer noise of late capitalism, is nevertheless expected to operate according to nineteenth-century models of culture as homogeneous totality. (p.766)

Bibliography


The Aesthetics of Sports Photography

SIGRID LIEN

When reading newspapers there are some pages I usually just quickly leaf through – the sport pages. This is in part because the photographs that accompany the reports do not yield an arresting experience. Although a handball enthusiast, not once have I ever been struck by photo-journalistic spreads of the sport. The aesthetic experience of the game and the joy and excitement of seeing the individual players’ agile movements, easily fuse into complete patterns that potentially culminate into magnificent goals – naturally not all this can be distilled into a single still photo. Nevertheless, it seems like a long dry spell between inspired cavortings and moments of surprise, at least as far as sports photography is concerned. Sports report photography is a pictorial genre with a very conventionalised profile, engendering the impression that if you’ve seen one photo you’ve seen them all.

This being the case, I was struck a few years back when I came upon some sensational, aesthetically and challenging photographic motifs of athletes. I “discovered” these in recently published works about the avant-garde art of the Russian Revolution, yet soon found that these photos had originally been part of a context of sports reporting. It was not just the aesthetic qualities of the pictures that woke my attention; I was also arrested by their great prevalence within Russian avant-garde aesthetics as a whole. In the context of sports, ‘avant-garde’ is in itself a surprising notion, especially seen in relation to contemporary avant-garde culture, where ‘sport’ and ‘avant-garde’ are generally thought to be incommensurable entities. In contrast to Russian sports photography, which was a product of the activity of what even then was well-known – experimental artists, the originators of contemporary sports photographs are relatively anonymous professionals.

In this paper I will examine the aesthetics of sports photograph by contrasting two different instances of this pictorial genre: the photographic idiom we find in today’s sports reporting in Norway and that of the Russian avant-garde. My intention is to show how these have their respective origins in different conceptions of sports in general, the role of sports in society, art, the significance of aesthetics, and finally how they are based on different understandings of photography as a medium for expression. My goal is to set a very noticeable yet little esteemed niche of the visual culture of our own time into a historical perspective, and in doing so (with a strategic move that is in fact similar to the Russian avant-garde aesthetic) hopefully make strange that which is all too well known.
Pictorial Examples

To begin, let’s look closer at these different forms for sports photography. I have chosen two examples I think are representative for the respective photo-aesthetical approaches: a black and white photo from 1938, taken by the Russian photographer Alexandr Rodchenko, found in a large catalogue of photographs1 (ill. 1), and a photo from an article in the sports pages of one of Norway’s largest daily newspapers, Bergens Tidende, from Friday 13.07.2001 (ill. 2).

In the catalogue where Rodchenko’s photo is presented, its title is given in English: *On the Parallel Bars*. We see a male gymnast, an anonymous athlete with his face hidden by the one arm, performing an exercise on the bars. The picture is clearly taken outdoors. In the upper right corner it is possible to glimpse vague contours of architecture. The man executing a supple handstand is neutrally clothed in black cloth shoes and wide trousers of the same colour; a loosely tied belt is fastened about his waist. His bare upper torso with its taught muscle play accentuates his athleticity.

The gymnast’s body fills the entire picture plane and the tension in his body creates a tight diagonal composition stretching from right to left. With only a tiny fragment of the parallel bars visible in the lower right corner – a marked contrast to the dominant diagonal structure – the photographer has chosen to see his motif from a very low angle and thus strengthen the impression of dynamic movement. The low perspective does not give us a horizon by which to anchor the figure in a space or a landscape. In other words, there are no pictorial elements between the floating body and the infinite sky. The strongly stylised composition, black and white colour, the conspicuous absence of “contextual clues” – for example a crowd of viewers, technological objects, clothing or tex-

tual elements such as advertisements —infuses the picture with an almost classical character.

By contrast, my second pictorial example is anchored in a richly detailed context. It is not a museal object or published in a catalogue far from its “original home”. We can view this photography in its first context of use: accompanying a text in a newspaper. The photo, taken by the press photographer Rune Sævig, shows an internationally well-known and specifically named athlete in action: the Norwegian handball goalkeeper Cecilie Leganger. She is, it seems, photographed in the moment she attempts to save a shot from the corner position. Out of focus and in the left foreground, we see the corner player who still has her body twisted sideways in the direction of the goal, her throwing arm raised. The ball is on its way towards Leganger who, in the moment of the camera flash, spreads her arms and legs in a “fall-out” to the left. The focus is tellingly placed on the star’s figure in the middle axis. Leganger’s face is turned toward the offensive player in the foreground and her expression signals full concentration.

In fact this picture has a reverse composition to what we found in Rodchenko’s photograph. The diagonal line goes from left to right: from the corner player via the ball’s placement and through Leganger’s laterally tilted body. The corner player cuts across the lower left and establishes a contrasting diagonal — just as the parallel bars did in the previous example. Sævig has also hunkered in a relatively low position in relation to his motif. Yet the pictorial structure is not as clear and stylised as Rodchenko’s for Sævig’s photograph is untidily full of details. This is not just because he uses colour film, which in this case lends a rather heterogeneous expression of strong contrasts between various colourful elements such as the uniforms and texts, etc. The amount of information is also

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significantly larger because there are a number of details which were absent in the Rodchenko photograph: other players are in the background, there is a grandstand with unevenly spread public, and to make vision even more chaotic, large advertisements lace the court rim and the players’ clothes. The advertisements are conspicuous and unfortunate, giving the players the appearance of veritable billboards. Every potential field is utilized. Even the corner player’s posterior is used as zone of aggressive advertisement for goods and services, in this case dairy products and graphic design.

Nevertheless, the reporter’s text gives an indication about what is editorially intended as the most important message. It anchors the photograph of Leganger to a concrete news event (ill. 3). This is presented boldly typed in the header line atop the picture: “Will train with Tertnes”. In the caption we are informed that this is an archival photo and given a truncated version of the article’s contents. The gist is that now there is a possibility for the local team, Tertnes, to get back their former star player, who has for the last few years competed for a rival Oslo club: “Wants to come home: Cecilie Leganger has not hidden the fact that she longs to return to Bergen. From what BT understands, she has sent her contract to the Handball Association to find out if Bækelaget [the Oslo team] has broken it. Here she is playing for Bækkelaget against Tertnes, next week she will train with Tertnes.”

After this presentation of the chosen pictorial material, we are prompted to ask what it is that, in spite of the formal compositional similarities, makes these pictures look so different. For example, why did Rodchenko choose his classically austere, aesthetically pure and informationally reductive fragment while the BT photographer presents a veritable chaos of meaningful elements? Moreover, why is Rodchenko’s subject presented as an anonymous athlete while the BT photo one-sidedly presents the individual Leganger, and thus her star-status?

These questions are critical issues in the following discussion, yet I would like to first direct our attention to what is perhaps the most important feature shared by these pictures: they are both photographs. How does this bear upon our understanding of their aesthetic character?
THE AESTHETICS OF SPORTS PHOTOGRAPHY

A Discourse on Photography: From the Context of use to Referential Magic

In posing the last question we land back in a discussion that has continued since the introduction of photography in the first half of the nineteenth-century, yet which still seems to be relevant. I choose to use the photo-historian Geoffrey Batchen’s contribution to this discussion, in particular his doctoral thesis Burning with Desire: The Conception of Photography (1997), as a theoretical springboard from which to analyse my pictorial material. In this text Geoffrey Batchen takes a critical incursion into the central works of photographic theory and its various phases. In fact there were two phases to its development, the first of which was the so-called modernist formalism, the dominant art-historical agenda of the 1960’s and 70’s. This was well established in the USA through the work of the art critic Clement Greenberg. Yet the most important exponent for modernist formalism in photography was the French film-critic André Bazin, who, in The Ontology of the Photographic Image (written in 1945 but published in English in 1967), essentially “translated” the theories of Greenberg to photography. He did this by proffering an assumption about the “objective character” of photography as the quality that differentiates it from other media, and which is the reason why it appears as “true realism”. The second main exponent of photo-formalism was the curator for photography at the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MOMA), John Szarkowski. In his writing and curatorial activities, Szarkowski sought to establish which feature of photography could be understood as specific for the medium. Furthermore, he wanted to establish what artists had successively accomplished with photography – and how their insights had contributed to extending knowledge of it as a medium? He therefore saw the history of photography as a continuous development towards increasingly deeper insight into the possibilities and limitations of the media – a perspective we also recognize from traditional art-history.

It is this understanding of photography and its history that is under attack by postmodern photographic theory, the likes of which finds the formalistic agenda both unfruitful and politically conservative. Batchen localizes the first critical voices in a number of texts published in the early 1970’s: John Berger’s Ways of Seeing (1972), Susan Sontag’s On Photography (1977) and Roland Barthe’s Image- Music- Text (French 1961, English 1977). From a theoretical foundation of Marxism and semiotics, these theoreticians contributed to developing a cultural anthropology for photography – an anthropology which comprises all possible pictorial expressions, not only photographically based art. This discourse was then incorporated into a more comprehensive criticism of modern cultural and social systems subsequently called Postmodernism. According to Batchen, although postmodern criticism has operated within a heterogeneous theoretical framework of partly competitive models (Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis and semiotics), it has generated a remarkably consistent view of photography.

Batchen documents how this view of photography permeates texts written by the foremost photo-theorists of the 1970’s and 80’s: John Tagg, Allan Sekula, Victor Burgin and Abigail Solomon-Godeau. Their view is that photography does not have any static identity or singular cultural status. To the contrary, photography is understood as an extensive and dynamic field, consisting of various forms for technology, social practices and pictures. As such, this photographic field is indivisible from the institutions and discourses that choose to make use of it. Thus the history of photography is also a collective and highly differentiated history about these institutions and their discourses. For this
reason it can also be concluded that photography does not have any continuous or united history as “itself” – beyond a selective documentation of various applied forms and effects. Furthermore, the meaning of a specific photograph will depend upon the context and time in which it is situated. A photograph can have one meaning in one context and another meaning in another context. The identity of a photograph is not pinned down to an intrinsically essential photographic quality, but, in the words of Batchen, in light of “what it actually does in the world”, in other words its function.

Although Batchen sees postmodern criticism as so thoroughly convincing that it must be taken as a given, he points out that there is still a question left to be answered: What is this thing we in our culture call photography? Furthermore, is photography to be identified with its own nature or with the culture that surrounds it? Batchen argues for the usefulness of transcending the traditional polarization between an essentialist and a contextually inclined theoretical approach to photography.

He does this based upon an exhaustive empirical study of the early development of the photograph in the early nineteenth-century, and conducts a new reading of the discourses tied to the invention of photography. With reference to Jacques Derrida’s concept of difference, he shows how the so-called proto-photographers presented their inventions within conceptual frameworks that defy both formalist and postmodernist attempts to identify photography from one single generative source: culture or nature, context or essence. These inventors understood the photograph as both a magical and a referential medium. I shall leave Batchen here since the most fruitful aspect of his theoretical discussion, as related to my project, is that he accentuates two things: firstly, the necessity of examining the discourses within which photography is situated, and secondly, the potential plurality of the conceptions of photography that are tied to various forms of photographic practice. I will now tentatively address these two points in relation to my chosen examples, by “reading them” with the photographic theory of the 1970’s and 80’s, in other words, by examining sports photography in relation to its context of use – the institutions and discoursed it is anchored in. This done, I will ask if it is fruitful to approach sports photography in light of later “neo-ontological” photographic theory, where it is stressed that the medium can be understood as both a magical and referential medium.

The Applied Context of Sports Photography I: 
Post Revolutionary reporting of 1938

In conducting a contextual reconstruction of Rodchenko’s photograph there is one question that immediately comes to mind: How was such a photograph used in the context of reporting?

Since Rodchenko’s photograph is now a museum piece, a freestanding artefact, it is difficult to give a concrete answer. Still we know that the originator was a central figure within the Russian avant-garde just prior to and after the Revolution, therefore this may be a valid context for the picture and help to further our inquiry. What then does the concept ‘avant-garde’ signify? What are the hallmarks of the Russian avant-garde praxis? What’s more, why was an avant-guardist like Rodchenko working with photo-reportage and sports motifs?

From early in the nineteenth-century the original military context for the term ‘avant-guard’ (a group of soldiers who form the front line in a military campaign) was already being used analogously for ‘the artist as a social visionary and heroic outsider’. Yet
according to Peter Bürger it was the burgeoning autonomy in the field of art and an accompanying preoccupation with its pictorial means that resulted in artists becoming increasingly isolated from contexts external to their field. Bürger characterizes this as the \textit{aesthetic avant-garde}. What he characterizes as the \textit{artistic-social} avant-garde came as a counter-reaction to the automation of art. The foremost purpose of the artistic-social avant-garde was to create art that was not purely referential to its own idiom, but that had a direct relationship to the experiences of empirical reality. One of the most marked artistic-social avant-garde movements in European history was precisely the Russian, reaching its apogee early in the 1920’s when the Bolsheviks consolidated their power. For the first time in the twentieth-century there was a social context conceived of as a promising arena for avant-garde artists, who could now create in a way that would fuse art and life together. In order to accentuate their close affiliation to the productive life and to de-mystify aesthetic production, these artists chose to call themselves \textit{Constructivists} or \textit{Productivists}. “The streets are our brushes – the squares our pallets” claimed Rodchenko’s close friend, the poet Maiakovskiy. Alexandr Rodchenko, who started his career as an abstract painter, was one of the most central figures in this milieu. In a photograph from 1921 we see how he let himself be portrayed standing in front of his metal constructions, clad in his self-designed outfit sewn by his wife, the designer Varvara Stepanova (ill. 4).

Rodchenko’s post-revolutionary activity can be roughly described as follows: In the years directly after the Revolution he was, in the same way as other prominent artists, intent upon developing strategies for making Constructivist painting and drawing the basis for a discourse concerning Revolutionary architecture and building design. Yet by the end of 1921 he declared that painting was “dead” and began to work with design. It was also at that time, early in the 1920’s, that he became interested in photography, and from 1924 on this became his primary means of expression. From the commencement of

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the five-year-plan in 1929, Soviet artists and designers were admonished to serve the state in a more direct way than had previously been the case. Thus Rodchenko, along with his colleagues, had to work within these new demands and limitations, which also opened up new possibilities for their patron, the Soviet state.9

What was the background for Rodchenko’s and the Russian avant-garde’s great interest in photography? We find one answer to this in the book on Soviet photography by the art historian Margareta Tupitsyn.10 Her study springs from the desire to correct existing writings of avant-garde history, writings which have been reticent to include photography. According to Tupitsyn, this is tied to the fact that avant-garde photography flourished at the same time as figuration gained prominence in the Soviet avant-garde milieu. In the same way as figurative painting, all photography from the middle of the 1920’s has tended to be viewed as a precursor of Social Realism. Tupitsyn challenges this view by showing that photography, such as it was used in photo-montage and in so-called “straight photography” at the end of the 1920’s and early 30’s, was part and parcel of a discourse concerning critical issues from earlier stages of avant-garde activity: questions concerning the status of Formalism, the artist’s relation to mass culture and the role of the Bolshevik regime in the development of the art world. Therefore, the function of photography in the years between 1924-27 can be viewed as the last great experiment in trying to establish an effective connection between artists, radical politics and the masses, Tupitsyn thinks.11

She describes Rodchenko’s use of photography as a balance between aesthetic and political considerations. This was already manifest in his first photomontages from the early 1920’s – these were works bearing witness of his reticence to mix formalistic compositions with political iconography. The artist himself was concerned with making a distinction between his photo-collages (for example illustrations for the film- and photo periodical Kino-fot and for Maikovskii’s poem Pro Eto, where he conducts formal experiments inspired by Western Cubist and Dada collages as well as collages in German magazines), and his more conventional, politically iconographical photo-montages (for example the historical montage of the Revolution History of VKP (b)).

Meanwhile, photography was conferred with ever greater importance for the transformation of the Russian society, not least in connection with implementing the first five-year-plan. Here avant-garde photographers were mandated to demonstrate the superiority of their pictorial medium through the propaganda for the plan’s agenda. From within this climate the critic Ossip Brik published an essay where he proffered the photography as “the true revolutionary art”. However, Tupitsyn believes that Rodchenko’s first pure photographs, for example the famous portrait of his mother (1924) (ill. 5) and a number of versions of his house in Miasnitskaia street in Moscow (1924) (ill. 6), were still marked by his resistance to give up modernistic methods in photography, methods that did not necessarily put documentary concerns first. Subsequently Brik criticized him, claiming that the photographs did not meet social concerns and that they were directed towards solving the problems of painting by means of photography.

It was surely in order to address this criticism that Rodchenko, starting from 1928, exhibited a pronounced interest for socialistic everyday life in his photographic works, such as we see in the photo-essay Newspaper, where he laboriously photographs the different work-processes up to the finished product – the daily newspaper. At this point in time Rodchenko was completely absorbed in photo-reportage and what he called “factographic” representations. The enthusiasm in this work is evident from the description his close friend and colleague Boris Ignatovich gave of the so-called Soviet photography:

"How Soviet photography is different from Western photography: no entertainment, no tricks, no commerce; with the people and for the people; life in all its typical manifestations, with typical people – that is the material Soviet photography uses. Photography is the most contemporary realist art".12

However, if there was wide agreement that photography was the most relevant and realistic art form, there was nevertheless no consensus on how one should present the everyday situations of Soviet life. The majority of photographers divided into two camps: those who were of the opinion that innovative modernistic idioms should be applied as forms of representation, and those who saw conventional pictorial modes as best fitted to reflect the events of daily life. The first group, where we can place Rodchenko, used fragmentation in such a way that external reality appeared as an disconnected and mysterious space. Tupitsyn’s example of this strategy is Rodchenko’s *Paving Streets* (1929) (ill. 7), where he photographed the work of paving a street with a series of fragmentary photos – all characterized by Tupitsyn as “interior monologues of the productive force”.13 The second group of artists, she claims, saw external reality as “a concrete, continuous entity”, 14 a reality that also was rendered with pictorial strategies communicating impressions of completeness and perspicuous comprehensivity. *Steamroller* by Arkadii Shaikhet (1931 (ill. 8), exemplifies this position, where the photographer illustrates the same work process as Rodchenko’s *Paving Streets*, yet does it in one single snapshot.

In Tupitsyn’s study, Rodchenko’s pictorial strategy – his extensive use of fragments (framing) and subsequent cutting – is seen as a result of the milieu surrounding the periodical *Lef* (The left-wing radical art-front). She especially focuses upon the critic Tretiakov, who defended the so-called experimental “factography” in 1928. His defence shows that this milieu considered photography as something more than pure documentation or a mirroring of reality; the photographer is seen as a didactic constructor, one who helps the pictorial editor see external reality with a radical eye: “It is necessary to experiment, as far as opportunity allows, in order to resolve concrete problems”… “photography is not just a stenographer, it also explains”. So for instance when a machine is photographed, its essential detail is singled out, while its other less important parts are obscured”, “…To assert the primacy of the raw, unworked, unorganized fact is to threaten the practical, professional skill of the photographer”.15

According to Tupitsyn, the de-individualized and compositionally conspicuous photographs of Rodchenko and his colleagues were able to transcend their historical specificity and as such, help the proletariat appear as united under the desire for utopia. From this she ties Rodchenko and his group of like-minded artists with Trotsky’s idea of a worldwide Revolution, hence distancing their photographic aesthetics from Stalinism and the conception that Communism could only come to fruition in the Soviet Union.

The most important aspects of Tupitsyn’s research are firstly, that she shows the artist’s aesthetics as being a consequence of his ties to the radically leftwing art-front. Secondly, she regards his photographs as standing aloof from Stalinism. These are also central points for another American art-historian, Abigail Solomon-Godeau’s reading of Rodchenko. Still, Solomon-Godeau delves deeper into the formalistic literary milieu. She shows how he, for example in the photograph *The Chauffeur* (1933) (ill. 9), in the same way as Roman Jacobson, seems to be focusing upon the means of photography itself. Rodchenko includes elements that reveal how the picture is constructed. It is pointed out that a great number of the artist’s innovative photographs from the 1920’s are marked by his rejection of the so-called natural, conventionalised mode of viewing. By using extreme vantage points (dramatically high or low perspectives), he insists that the photograph is the instrument for such seeing. Solomon-Godeau draws a parallel here to Victor Shlovsky’s concept of *ostranenie* ‘making the known unknown’, thus to effectively sharpen and radicalize our view of empirical reality.

Just as Tupitsyn, Solomon-Godeau is concerned with distancing Rodchenko from Stalinism. She describes how photographic Formalism from about 1930 increasingly was under pressure from the authorities, and how Rodchenko gave in to anti-formalistic pressure in 1936, and declared himself willing to reject Formalist photography to the advantage of an idiom more thoroughly able to serve Social Realism. The avant-garde is thus portrayed as falling victim to the Revolution’s success. Solomon-Godeau draws a picture of Rodchenko as a tragic hero who survived the Revolution; wing-clipped he returned to painting in 1940, where one of his preferred motifs were sorrowful clowns:

Four years later he returned to easel painting whose subjects came to include mournful clowns. In the space of about fifteen years, Russian Formalism had passed from an officially tolerated, if not sanctioned art practice, conceived as a tool in the forging of revolutionary consciousness, to an "elitist", "bourgeois", "decadent", and "counter-revolutionary" practice that condemned those who employed it to exile, silence, repudiation, or death.  

The British art historian Paul Wood (who is oriented towards cultural studies) sees this as a relatively common sort of heroic narrative – a narrative with seductive implications – but not necessarily historically correct. The implication here is that the avant-garde, who had found room in which to be creative during the chaos directly after the Revolution, is made into an object for suppression as soon as the revolutionary project is stabilized – the moment the authoritarian and artistically philistine Party shows its true colours. Wood acknowledges that while there is a kernel of truth here, this sort of heroic narrative, which in itself is ideological, has obfuscated the fact that there was continuity between the aesthetic activity just after the October Revolution and the activity of the consolidated state. 

In a study Victor Margolin has done on Rodchenko’s activities during the period of 1930-41, he shows that this foremost avant-gardist from the 1920’s in fact took on large government commissions after Stalin came to power. When examining the work Rodchenko did as one of the designers and photographers for the Russian propaganda magazine USSR in Construction, whose objective was to present a positive impression of the Soviet Union internationally, Margolin does not draw a picture of the artist’s activity in the service of the magazine as an obligatory capitulation under a repressive government. Still, his study does not support the view that Rodchenko held a demonstratively positive attitude towards the Stalinist regime either. He is baffled at how the experimental avant-garde must have experienced their own contribution towards furthering Stalin’s personality cult with the allotted material – small flowered folk art and conventional photography, such as in the photomontage Our country’s twentieth year (1938), or in The attack on the land took place with spades and explosives (1933), which present
canal building projects the artists must have known were built by slaving political prisoners – as heroic, Soviet deeds.

If we now return to our point of origin, Rodchenko’s sports photograph from 1938; we are able to establish an explanation of its aesthetic character through contextualizing it within the Russian avant-garde’s photographic practice. Furthermore, with the help of Tretiakov’s formulations, we are able to attest that the photograph is far from being an ensemble of raw, unorganised facts. Rather, it is a result of a well-reflected pictorial conception. We recognize the methods of pictorial representation as described by Tupitsyn and Solomon-Godeau, and which are hallmarks of Rodchenko’s photographic works: the discontinuous and mysterious depiction of space, the pictorial fragment with severely clipped objects (the parallel bars), the dramatic diagonal composition and the conspicuously low perspective. Yet the question still gone begging concerns the character of the motif: why has Rodchenko chosen a gymnast in action? Let us therefore look more closely at the conception of sports and sports exercises that reigned in the minds of the Revolutionaries.

On the report of the sports historian James Riordan, the initial impetus for Russian sports, just as for the capitalistic industrialization of Russia, came jointly from the state and from foreign interests. He describes how the most important impulses were spawned in the relatively large foreign milieus – Germans, Englishmen, Scots, Belgians and Frenchmen – who were living in Russia before the Revolution. Just the same, this pre-Revolutionary sporting activity was not directed towards the recreational needs of the urban poor. To take part in such, and thus to have the possibility of maintaining one’s physique was perceived as only for the privileged few. This being the case, the first worker’s sports clubs were established at the time of the Revolutionary riots of 1905. Riordan holds little doubt that the character of Russian pre-Revolutionary sports activities led to the later Bolshevik leaders’ establishing utilitarian and politicized sports after the Revolution (in addition to ordinary ball games, several of the worker’s sports clubs offered combat practice, weapon training, military drills and studies of Marxist literature). That sports would have this character was apparently also a necessity in a society where large segments of the population were illiterate, where the statistics for infant mortality were more ominous than in any other Western industrialized nation – where starvation and sickness raged and ignorance of hygiene was the general rule.

Still, the new Revolutionary leaders’ interest in sports was not limited to physical health. Sports were also conceived of as important for “social health”. Revolutionary sports should contribute to developing the whole person: a healthy soul in a sound body. As well, there were lively discussions about the role of athletic activities in the new society. In the first years after the Revolution the leaders favoured mass sports over the more competitive types, which were associated with Western Capitalism and hero-worship – far removed from socialistic ideals. At the other extreme, Riordan describes how such activities in the following Stalinist regime came to rest on completely different ideological premises. Sports became bread and circus – a medium for Soviet propaganda: “[...] the party (that is, Stalin) was beginning to see competitive sport (with its record breaking, individual heroes, and spectator – ”bread and circus” – potential) as a valuable adjunct to its impending industrialisation campaign.”

What does this indicate about our sports photograph? That Rodchenko and his circle must have been concerned with the idea of a ‘post Revolutionary harmonic body and soul’ is clear – not the least of which is seen in their design praxis from the mid 1920’s. Sports figures were not only prominent motifs in avant-garde textiles and clothing design,
ceramic décor, painting and photographs; Rodchenko also designed such things as chess boards and furniture for the activities of the workers clubs. Clearly ‘the sportsman’ was perceived as a symbol of ‘the new man’ and ‘the new society’. Likewise the photograph represented a picture of the sportsman in action: rationality, speed and precision – in a word, modernity.

The photograph of the gymnast from 1938 was made at a time when it was difficult to be an avant-garde artist in the Soviet society – and when the conception of the ideal function of sports was in transition. Nevertheless Rodchenko shows us an anonymous sportsman from what was more than anything else considered as the sport of the masses, gymnastics. Yet the gymnast’s perfect athletic physique and complete bodily control do not bear witness that this is an average citizen in a society hard hit by violent upheaval. Tupitsyn describes how Soviet photography at the end of the 1930’s moved from being so-called factography to mythography. Our pictorial example clearly has features in common with the latter. She intimates that the staged character of the mythographic photograph must be seen in light of the fact that Rodchenko was only allowed limited access to photographing official events:

[...] the series of photographs he made during the various parades in 1936-38 were hardly “spontaneous”. For the latter assignment he was given restricted access to record an official parade that included sport scenes, dances, a display of the achievements of the Republic’s military might, and portraits of prominent political heroes. The minimalist photo-stills of the October period, with their images of people caught off guard, are here replaced by photo-pictures of romanticized dancers and virtuoso athletes. These new Soviet heroes are not simply “found” jumping in the water, blowing into a trumpet, or exercising in the morning, but are recorded performing, after days of rehearsal, on the stage of Red Square. This new photo-reportage was based on maximum expressiveness, overt theatricality and careful staging, and resulted from strictly defined commissions with specific political aims. 23

Yet as we have seen, our pictorial example contains features that can be localized back in 1920’s formalistic photo-aesthetics. In her thesis on Rodchenko’s photography, the Norwegian art historian Vibeche Salthe has shown that his experimental photo-production seems more likely to have been rooted in the formalistic literary milieu of the magazine *Lef* from the 1920’s rather than in a later more functional attitude. 24

The photograph of the gymnast thus appears to be both paradoxical and mysterious. It can be read as a stylised, polished, Stalinist mythological representation of the ideal Soviet citizen, and yet also as an expression for artistic steadfastness – the will to hold on to an experimental pictorial paradigm. Throughout his career, even up until the late 1930’s, Rodchenko was criticized for being a method-fetishist and for placing form above content. 25 In that case it would have been brave of him to make photographs like this one. And perhaps this work is more than anything else to be understood as a compromising solution, an attempt to stabilize an unconventional form in a motif that could contribute to neutralizing what Rodchenko at the time the picture was taken, experienced as an insecure reality:

"These are strange times. Everyone is whispering. Everyone is afraid. It is nerve-wracking that everyone has friends who have been arrested. I do not know for what reason and where they are.” 26
The Applied Context of Sports Photography II: The Reporting Practice of the Norwegian Daily Newspaper, 2001

When we move our attention to our own time and the second pictorial example, the photograph of the Norwegian handball player Leganger, we suddenly find ourselves far removed from avant-garde ideas and political controversies. Still, it is relevant to ask why the picture looks as it does: what assumptions about photography and sports underpin this pictorial syntax? In the contextual reconstruction of this photograph I will use Barbara Rosenblum’s pioneering work *Photographers at work* as a starting point. In her study, Rosenblum analyzes press photo material with what we can call a ‘problem solving’ approach: in order to cast light on the aesthetics of this material it is necessary, she thinks, to examine the behaviour and intentions of the participants in this particular practice: “What do people actually do while making objects? What procedures are employed and for what purposes? How does the practitioner foresee the outcomes of various processes? What kinds of constraints affect behavior?” She establishes that the press photographer’s problem solving situation is generally contingent upon two kinds of constraints, which are structural and situationally determined. The structural constraints are defined as a product of newspaper editing, for example technological concerns and patterns of task distribution, while the situational are determined according to the contingent features of the practical and social situation the press photographer finds himself in, for instance in the sports hall. Structural constraints and the specific configuration of what is situationally determined will establish a parameter for qualitative evaluation. She refers here to evaluations of creativity made by the press photographer and photo editor make, and the assumptions underlying their judgements concerning what might be a good or bad photograph.

In order to understand what could have been the structural, situationally determined and qualitative evaluations in the production of the Leganger piece, I contacted the photographer who took the picture, Rune Sævig, assistant director of the Bergens Tidende photo department. The following sketch of the context of production for the Leganger photo is based upon this interview. Let us first examine the structural constraints.

The Bergens Tidende photo department is relatively large, with twelve full time photographers and about as many staff who service the pictorial archive and photo-desk. About ten years ago, in the aftermath of discussions concerning the increase of staged news-photography, the department’s leadership drew up a document containing the newspaper’s so-called pictorial conception. In this document it says, among other things, that “Bergens Tidende shall strive for truthful pictures of pertinent and documentary interest.” In other words, it is the documentary function of the photograph that is emphasized in the newspaper’s official photo-policy.

The task distribution amongst the photographers is based upon an informal structure where personal preferences seem to be the determining factor. Some photographers just seem to be better at sports photography and are therefore primarily given such assignments. Sævig divulges that sports photography has had rather low status in the department, which he thinks may have a connection with the uneven quality of results:

Actually sports photography doesn’t have high status in contrast with general news photography and photography for feature articles. There have been some really bad pictures, and so few really good photographers. Maybe that’s why. You have to work with it a long time to be good at it, to know the players, the way they play. The ones who are good at it only work with sports.
Sævig asserts that this form for experientially based, specialized expertise is necessary in order to take good sport photographs, and is something he claims photographers working for specialized international photo-bureaus achieve more than others. To a certain extent—especially in connection with international sports events where BT does not send its own photographers—the photo department buys pictures from such bureaus, for example Reuters and Scanpix.

The newspaper coverage of sports events is elitist: the large public attractions, the city’s top football (Brann) and handball (Tertnes) clubs are prioritised—although Sævig, for the record, informs me that the newspaper also reports on marginal sports activities, for example the small milieu of Sumo wrestling on the Southwest island of Stord. Sævig himself specializes in handball coverage and works relatively independently of the newspaper’s appointed journalists. At the same time, it should be mentioned that the paper tries to achieve a close correspondence between text and picture. For the match that was the context of our pictorial example, it had been decided beforehand that both the photographer and the journalist should direct their attention to the visiting team’s star goalkeeper:

At the game it was she [Leganger] who was the most interesting. And then it is much easier to get good pictures. Then we could concentrate on her… She’s a very good motif. Very photogenic. So expressive. Actually it’s a luxury to be able to focus on just one player; often you have to wait until way out into the game before you know who is outstanding.

And with this we are confronted with constraints that are situationally determined. According to Sævig there are three aspects which make photographing handball technically and aesthetically problematic: first, as a rule, there is not enough light in the sports venue. Secondly, the tempo of the game is fast and thirdly, the same players are almost always on offence. This makes it difficult to achieve a variation in motif, which again makes the pictures seem boring. The newspaper has just recently addressed the problem internally:

There was a discussion, Eir Steigane [B.T.’s handball journalist] sent an e-mail expressing irritation that the pictures were all so similar: They were all taken from the sidelines, always of offensive players who hopped in. But the problem in handball is that maybe there are two players that are very good at hopping in, and if you write about them, let’s say thirty times a year, and these are the ones photographed, then it gets really boring. So it was, like, an appeal for us to think again.

The many advertisements in the sports hall represent a third moment of the photographer’s repertoire of problems to solve. Advertisements on the uniforms and at courtside make it aesthetically difficult to achieve “clean” and arresting images (a problem often solved by using telephoto-lenses and by focusing closely on the object). The advertisements also seem to limit the physical availability of the motif:

In the good old days we had more freedom but that’s all changed. Now if you crouch in front of an advertisement board some guard comes and chases you away. The advertisers are getting more and more powerful. I think it’s gotten harder to take good pictures today than it was twenty years ago.

As well as the overriding objective of the photographs having a documentary character, the newspaper’s official photo policy states that, “The pictures must reflect the surround-
The aesthetics of sports photography

ing culture”. What then, do the newspaper’s photographs show us about the role of sports in the surrounding culture? Bergens Tidende does not show us the breadth of sporting activities, the daily exercises of amateurs and normal people, as 1920’s Russian idealists tried to do – although Norwegian handball also was tied to the so-called worker’s sports movement in the early days of sport. Nor does the paper give us pictures with overt political content. Rather, it conveys a picture of sports as specialized, star studded and commercially based entertainment, largely based on the sponsorial commitments of the business community.

To sum up, it can be alleged that my initial experience of the daily newspaper’s sports photography has been confirmed. We have seen a lack of variation and qualitative unevenness within the genre, readily admitted by photographers and sports journalists alike. Furthermore, the inquiry concerning the picture’s relationship to its own context of production has also provided a deeper understanding of why my chosen pictorial example looks as it does. We have become cognizant that the aesthetic character of sports photography is the result of a balanced compromise between editorial needs, technical/aesthetic considerations, the framework surrounding sports organizations and sponsorial interests.

Sports Photography as Mental Realism?

If we presuppose that the identity and meaning of a photograph is contingent upon its function (“what it actually does in the world”), then the chosen photographic examples can be understood by way of their respectively applied contexts, in a historical, post Revolutionary Russian context and in a contemporary Norwegian context of reporting. This opens for an understanding of how these pictures are woven into a tight network of discourses and institutions. This notwithstanding, what does the fact that they are photographs have to do with their meaning? In this concluding section I will briefly try to suggest a more complete reading of them, a reading based upon the view of photography as a so-called mental realism. I borrow this concept from the Danish photo-historian Mette Sandbye, who, in her newly published doctoral thesis, develops Geoffrey Batchen’s neo-ontological reading of photo-theory by way of analysing photo-based contemporary art.

Her analytical approach rests precisely upon the assumption that the photograph is encumbered with what she calls a tenacious epistemology, an epistemology which still influences our perception of the photographs in spite of the Post Structuralist criticism of representation. In order to understand the photograph’s affective meaning she directs her attention to its particular relation to time: The photograph as “that which once was”, as Roland Barthes formulated it in his book Camera Lucida. Barthes describes how the camera, at the same time as it freezes time, also gestalts a sort of presence: an emotional and direct contact with another time or temporality. Sandbye uses works of, among others, Sophie Calles, Larry Sultan and Christian Boltanski to exemplify how art, on the basis of such a view of photography, establishes an alternative realism: not one that is based upon a mimetic representation of reality, but on the indexical character of photography – the characteristic photos have of being traces of something that has already happened. It is this form for realism she characterizes as mental realism, a realism that is both magical and referential. Sandbye shows how the mentioned artists play upon a phenomenological aspect of photography and how they exploit indexicality as an artistic strategy.
What may have analogous value for the analysis of sports photography seems precisely to be the accentuation of the photograph as a medium of experience. It may also prove valuable to ask how the photographs can function in a dialectical, historically cognitive process. Can we, in trying to understand these two pictures, have cognisance of them as being momentary stoppages of time, as support pillars for personal memory and as experiences for cultivating identity? Which experiences of reality arise in our meeting with these photographs?

In order to identify the realistic effect of contemporary Norwegian sports photography, I will loan some reflections from Norbert Elias concerning the social function of sports in highly industrialized societies. According to Elias, the role of sports in modern life extends far beyond strengthening an individual’s physique through his or her own activity. He points to the significance of sports as a stress stabilizer and as socially therapeutic entertainment – on par with film, dance, pictorial art, opera or crime stories. The entertainment value lies precisely in the tension generated through these activities. Elias draws an analogy between the emotional experience of a soccer game and a classical tragedy:

A tragedy enacted in a theatre, as Aristotle discovered, may evoke in an audience feelings of fear and pity closely related to those experienced by human beings who witness from nearby a real condition of others tragically caught in the snares of their lives. But the imaginary setting of the theatrical tragedy is human-made. Here humans are the creators of their own world, masters of human destiny. The heaviness of the real life is lightened, the feeling itself is purified by the mimetic symbols of music and poetry, bodily movements or masks and by the mimetic tensions experienced by those who witness human suffering and pain in the imaginary setting of a human-made tragedy. The spectators of a football match may savour the mimetic excitement of the battle swaying to and fro on the playing field, knowing that no harm will come to the players or to themselves. As in real life they may be torn between hopes of success and fear of defeat; and in that case too strong feelings aroused in an imaginary setting and their open manifestation in the company of many others may be all the more enjoyable and perhaps liberating because in society at large people are more isolated and have few opportunities for collective manifestations of strong feelings.

Perhaps it is also possible to read sports reports in the daily newspaper as a sort of continuous narrative, a serial originating in sports just as Elias describes it – as an arena for the collective manifestation of strong feelings? The emotionally charged, cliché and melodramatic language in sports headlines is itself an indication of this: “The Fourth Gold Un-grasped”, “It was an Offer I Couldn’t Refuse”, “Stord in Hangover”, “Mette’s Difficult Choice”, “The Prodigle Savior”, “The World’s Best Big Sister” etc.

The report on Cecilie Leganger is just one part of a series of reports where Bergens Tidende handball enthusiasts have been able to follow the developments of the local Tertnes club almost daily: not only the more specific sports news such as team selection and game progress, there have also been articles concerning the choice of coaches, sponsor agreements and player purchase. Sports photography exists within a narrative framework where there are both heroes (“Once upon a time there was a talented player who left home to seek her fortune out in the wide world (Oslo)” and wicked villains (incompetent club managers, coaches, judges etc.). There are fairytale rewards for those who deserve it, namely the heroes (player’s salary and advertisement revenues), and where
there typically always will be a question over who gets who (Will Tertnes and Bergen get back their big player and the darling of the public?), and about who loves who (But will she really come home? Maybe she would rather stay in Oslo? Or will Tertnes get another, a new big talent [from Larvik]? – as was just publicized shortly after our chosen example). The photograph is loaded with references to reality, but also to memories and narratives tied to locally anchored sports. Therefore it is an identity-creating emotional drama for the reader. The *indexical fetishism*, which the contextualized photograph seems to represent, can be conceived of as a part of the *narrative desire* that is generated through the stories constituting this drama. Yet what about our historical example, the Rodchenko photograph, where these stories, if they ever did exist, are now lost? Which effect from reality would we be speaking of here? According to Sandbye photography offers, by way of its indexical character, “an alternative doorway into the past, into history, than the traditional narrative with its configurational, memory-based history telling; it is a dialectical picture story composed as a series of frozen points in time.” She adds that this also “demands that the viewer must unfold its meaning”. Therefore we are prompted to ask: how can we read the past in the present through Rodchenko’s photography?

**Conclusion: The Indexical Melancholy**

We have already seen how Rodchenko’s picture projects itself as a mysterious historical document. Yet it awakens other feelings in us as well: enthusiasm and melancholy. Enthusiasm is awakened because the sensational cultural products created in the Russian avant-garde’s monumental push to fuse art with life have for a long time been an unknown field in cultural history: a field now being elucidated. Paul Wood has described this as an archaeological endeavour for cultural history that also casts light upon our own time: The excavation of the full scope of the work of Rodchenko, Vertov, Klutsis, Vladimir Tatlin, Maiakovskii, and Lissitzky, not to mention the related theoretical perspectives of Osip Brik, Viktor Shklovskii, Valentin Voloshin, and others, has achieved that rare thing: the eruption of the historical work into the practical conjuncture of the present. It would not be going too far to say that a culture has been recovered – a culture, moreover, that is still revolutionary with respect to our own.

We are awoken as well to melancholy. Its dawning is tied to the contrast so clearly presented to us, the disheartening cleft between the public life of our own time – which the sports photograph is a part of – and the radical and aesthetically creative culture that burgeoned in the first fifteen years after the October Revolution. What we see are the traces of a culture where sports were intended as a means of providing health, happiness and entertainment, not just for the chosen few but for everyone; and where artists functioned as purveyors of ideals guised as visual publicity. They did this, just as we have seen with Rodchenko, on the basis of a critical, theoretical discourse, and through a kind of photography intended to challenge the viewer’s perceptual and aesthetic sensibilities – an approach that seems to be unprecedented in our own costly practice of press photography. More than anything else it is this contrast that is set in relief by the preceding comparison between Rodchenko and contemporary Norwegian sport photography.
Bibliography
Riordan, James, “Worker Sport Within a Worker State”, in: Krüger, Arnd and Riordan, James (red.), *The Story of Worker Sport*, Human Kinetics, Champaign, Ill 1996.

Notes
3. Ibid., p. 17.
6. Ibid., p. 91.
7. The term Constructivism was borrowed from the terminology of architecture and the building industry. It had in fact been used in the Russian art milieu before the Revolution, and when applied to both sculpture and painting, it referred to works of art as ‘constructions where the analytical treatment of means is stressed’. This was a tradition stemming from Cézanne. However, after the Revolution the concept of ‘Constructivism’ took on additional layers of meaning: it was associated with the idea of ‘the artist as one who constructs’, i.e., one who engages in culturally useful and edifying work. This idea was seen as a contrast to the conception of ‘the individualistically oriented and self-centred bourgeois artist’. See Briony Fer, “The Language of Construction”, in Briony Fer, David Batchelor, Paul Wood, *Realism, Rationalism, Surrealism. Art Between the Wars*, London 1993 pp. 87-167.
9. Margolin, op.cit. p.6. Literary research draws a rather complex picture of the Russian avant-garde’s relationship to the Revolution and to the Soviet state. Paul Wood claims that this relationship is still an un-adequately researched theme. He shows how the existing literature describes the relationship between the avant-garde and the Revolution according to three different, but more or less explicit, sets of assumptions. Firstly, there is the assumption that the avant-garde was distanced from, or not genuinely engaged in the politics of the Revolution. Secondly, some texts hold a thesis that accentuates the avant-garde’s Revolutionary commitments as a pre-condition for their many formal innovations. Lastly, there have been studies following in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union – inquiries


11. Ibid., p. 8.
12. Ignatievich quoted in Tupitsyn, ibid., p. 47.
13. Ibid., p. 67.
15. Tretiakov quoted in Tupitsyn, ibid., pp. 67-68.
16. Ibid., p. 98.
17. Abigail Solomon-Godeau, op.cit. note 11.
18. Ibid., p. 60.
22. Ibid., p. 56.
23. Tupitsyn op.cit. p. 156.
27. Barbara Rosenblum, Photographers at work. A Sociology of Photographic styles, N. Y., London 1978. With references to Marxist art-historical writings by Meyer Schapiro, Rosenblum’s goal is to elucidate the connection between social structures and stylistic expressions.
28. Ibid., p. 4.
29. The discussion took place 18.07.01
30. Øyvind Christensen, notes on the official photo policy of Bergens Tidende, May, 1991.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 9
36. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
On the night between 9 and 10 November 1938, the Nazi regime staged a gigantic pogrom throughout Germany, Austria and Bohemia. The events have been entered into the records of history as the “Reichskristallnacht” or the Night of Broken Glass, a scornful euphemism coined by the perpetrators in reference to all the shattered glass of Jewish shops and homes. What passed that night and in the days to follow can be seen as a final rehearsal before the Holocaust. The violence, the large-scale arrests and deportations to camps and the subsequent massive economic and judicial assault laid the ground for the destruction of a people, even physically.

It must be of matter of greatest moment to investigate the newspaper coverage of the Nazi outrages. They were in fact preparations for an act of genocide. How did the world press react to what happened? This paper deals with mediation of the news of the Swedish newspapers, the press of a neutral country invested with a good deal of traditional sympathies for German culture. In particular, it highlights the reporting of one newspaper, Stockholms-Tidningen, using it as a paradigmatic example. The first conclusions of the scrutiny are that Swedish readers were provided with a mass of information. This entails an inquiry into how they were informed. The argument here is that Swedish journalism adjusted awkwardly to a new radical agenda of Nazi anti-Semitism.

The article that follows is a first draft text. The full investigation will include three successive stages, of which the first is a close reading of the reporting that appeared in Stockholms-Tidningen. In order to make a judgement about the material in this particular newspaper, it is reasonable to do a comparative study of the reporting of the Night of Broken Glass in other Swedish newspapers and in the international press, notably the English and American press. The second stage will comprise such a comparison. To reach a deeper understanding of the role of the press at the time and the significance of its reporting of events concerning the German Jewry, the analysis begs questions of the Nazi ideology and the character of the radicalisation of anti-Semitism. The third stage will incorporate into the analysis perspectives from the political history of Nazi Germany, of the history of the Holocaust, and the history of ideas of German culture.

The article below covers the first stage and gives some leads into the implications of the two following stages.
The Background

Proclaimed pretext to the pogroms was the shooting of the Legation secretary in the German embassy in Paris, Ernst vom Rath, by the seventeen-year-old Polish Jew Herschel Grynszpan on 7 November. Grynszpan’s action was provoked by the series of events that began with the decision of the Polish government to render stateless thousands of Poles living abroad, including some fifty thousand Polish Jews living in Germany, in March earlier that year. In October the German authorities rounded up seventeen thousand of these people and with great violence hustled them into a no-man’s land between Germany and Poland, since the Polish government refused to admit them. Among the deportees were Grynszpan’s parents and two sisters. Illegally residing in Paris, he got the news of the family’s appalling situation through a letter from his sister and, fused with what he learnt from the press of the ever-deteriorating conditions of Jewish people in Germany, this produced a highly agitated state of mind.¹ As vom Rath lay on his deathbed the Nazi propaganda machine went to work, portraying the act as an international Jewish conspiracy and orchestrating a campaign of vengeance in the newspaper press.² In this atmosphere, several attacks on Jews and Jewish property were carried out in the following days. Vom Rath expired late in the afternoon 9 November and within hours pogroms were in progress throughout Germany, Austria and Bohemia.

The immediate results of the night of anti-Semitism turned loose were 267 destroyed synagogues and 7,500 vandalised businesses. Ninety-one Jews had been murdered and hundreds more had committed suicide or died later following mistreatment in the camps.³

In reality, what happened in November was the culmination of a sinister development that had been going on the whole year. From April to October the authorities had issued a number of decrees directed against the Jewish population.⁴ Synagogues in Munich and Nuremberg had been torn down during the summer for the alleged reasons that they posed traffic problems and were at odds with the town character.⁵

The significance of the Night of Broken Glass was that it demonstrated for the first time that the Nazis looked for a violent solution to the ‘Jewish Problem’.⁶

Stockholms-Tidningen

Stockholms-Tidningen is the natural choice for a number of reasons, when one wants a point of departure for an exploration of the Swedish press coverage of the Night of Broken Glass. At the time, this daily outdid all its competitors with a circulation of 400,000 copies a day. Despite the title, it was not only a Stockholm-spread newspaper but was also read throughout the country. Politically it defined itself as liberal, nevertheless in the course of the thirties it increasingly came out as a pro-German mouthpiece. Consequently, it catered to that big chunk of Swedish public opinion that nurtured a special kinship with Germany. That is not to say that the newspaper leaned towards a Nazi point of view, but rather why it makes a good case study as to how pro-German opinion reacted under Nazi pressure. Stockholms-Tidningen was also the paper that produced the most extensive coverage of the Night of Broken Glass among all the Swedish press. Quite a few competitors referred to its reports when stating the facts of the event. Furthermore, we happen to have some inside knowledge of Stockholms-Tidningen’s particular correspondent to Germany at the time. And this knowledge can inform our understanding of the meaning of the reports.
It is indeed a wealth of information that readers were offered in the course of the escalating assault on the German Jewry. People could know in detail what was going on, if they so chose. There were warnings beforehand of what was about to happen. And once the pogroms were put in motion their proportions and particulars were accounted for, as was the deep involvement of the regime.

The material appearing in Stockholms-Tidningen from 9 through 12 November 1938 will be presented in two steps. Step one will be a first impression account, providing an overview as well as an exposition of the most important bits of information relayed to the readers. Step two follows as some bewildering features loom into the foreground. It will be a second impression reading, focusing on a few critical aspects of the reports.

First Reading

Earlier research on the Swedish press and the Holocaust has concluded that there was a good amount of information available to the Swedish audience. This claim is confirmed when we take a closer look at the reporting of Stockholms-Tidningen. To start with, the paper gave warnings on 9 November that serious actions against the German Jewry were in the offing. The headlines that day signalled an ominous atmosphere in Germany: ‘Reprisals against all Jews in Germany for the Paris shooting announced’; ‘German plans to create ghettos in the cities. Intensified control of Jews. The press demands foreigners should also be targeted.’

The state of the wounded diplomat was keenly observed: ‘vom Rath in critical condition’. The press demanded that the wounded diplomat’s condition be observed closely. It was inconceivable that hundreds of thousands of Jews dominated whole shopping streets in German cities and towns. Leading party circles anticipated, it said, that the National Socialist regime would now move on without further ado with all measures deemed necessary to quicken a solution to the ‘Jewish question in the country’. In Kassel, Jews had been fetched from their homes and pushed into a meadow, then led down to the basement of a brewery. Demonstrators forced themselves into the local Synagogue and caused damage. There was also information of cases of battery. As to the exact forms of reprisal, this was not yet clear, however until the Jews had been brought together in specially designated streets they were to report daily at the nearest police station. Furthermore, it was assumed that the right of Jews as for any citizen to move around the country would be invalidated, and befriending Jews would be much more harshly dealt with than had been the case before.

The news of the pogroms had not yet reached the office 10 November; consequently the newspaper was still reporting from the build-up: ‘The German diplomat in Paris dies of gunshot injuries. Increased resentment against the Jews in Germany. Synagogue set on fire, burnt down to the ground.’; ‘The Dessau police had to protect Jews from demonstrators’. Stockholms-Tidningen told of several instances of anti-Semitic manifestations and particularly mentioned that the townspeople of Herafeld in Westphalia had stormed the synagogue and set it ablaze. What was described as ‘resentment’ had increased enormously, not only, the Berlin correspondent considered, among National Socialist youths and party organisations but also largely among ordinary Germans. And, remark-
ably enough, he even stated: ‘this night surely every Jewish premises would have been raided and every synagogue set on fire, had not the authorities, as they now actually do, kept their 80 million Germans in such tight rein.’

As we can see, readers of Stockholms-Tidningen should have been highly aware of what was going on in Germany in the wake of the Paris shooting. It was obvious that the Nazi regime would hold all German Jews responsible for the attack, and that it would respond with measures which violated their human rights. That German reactions had a distinct smell of physical violence, posing a threat to both Jewish property and life, can hardly have escaped anyone. Had there been any incitement whatsoever to raise a voice against an imminent calamity, here were every reason and argument. Given the known character of the regime as a dictatorship, readers should also have been put on guard by the aggressiveness of the German press, which the reports scrupulously relayed. Reasonably, there could have been no doubts about this being an orchestrated campaign, sanctioned from highest political level.

It was not before 11 November that Swedish readers were informed of what had passed during the night between the 9th and 10th in the Reich. The correspondent must have felt the urge to eat his own words, because the authorities were indeed far from keeping the Germans in tight rein, and precisely what he had predicted not to happen had in fact happened. The headlines spelled out the extent of the attacks and the havoc. ‘Violent persecution of Jews in all Germany. Synagogues to ashes, stores wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of Jews arrested. Berlin’s Jewish districts look as have been air-bombed. The mob looted demolished shops. Thursday blackest day of German Jewry.’; ‘All synagogues in Berlin laid in ashes. This went too far, even anti-Semites thought’; ‘Death-blow to Jewish business in Germany. Whole shopfronts ruined. Merchandise spread on the street.’; ‘The Jews expelled from Munich.’

The reports went into detail of the events. A brutal revenge, they said, was taken on the Jews, when angry crowds, lead by ‘storm troops’, forayed synagogues and set them ablaze, destroyed and pillaged shops, as police and fire brigade were incapable of intervening. Silverware, furs, furniture and various goods were strewn out into the business streets. In Berlin, one could witness how several Jews were badly beaten, and at Kurfürstendamm itself, the account pursued, a Jew was thrown out of a window from the second floor of a house and was thereafter pulled by the feet, heavily bleeding. A yelling crowd armed with sticks chased another Jew of about 60 years of age nearby the synagogue at Fasanenstrasse. He also suffered from profuse bleeding and was repeatedly lying down in the street unable to get up, under constant battering. A group of workers who tried to intervene against some plunderers were driven away by a squad of armed SA-men. The correspondent could also see for himself how the synagogues were left burning, with no attempts to put out the fires. ‘The firemen stood and looked on’.

It was clear from the reports that the actions implicated the authorities. The crowds attended to the orders of NSDAP-party men. The newspaper recorded how the vandalising of hundreds of high street shops took place without any sight of a policeman for the entire day. When a retired commanding officer tried to reach police command by telephone in order to put a halt to the rampage, the evidence was that they left his remonstrations unheeded. The conflagrations, which wasted Jewish sites of worship, were witnessed, Stockholms-Tidningen had to recount, by impassive firemen.

At last the German government, in the shape of propaganda minister Josef Goebbels, ventured to comment on what had taken place during the last few days. At a press conference in Berlin 11 November Goebbels expanded on the atrocities in front of the gathering of foreign correspondents. The headlines of Stockholms-Tidningen the following
day read: ‘No looting – not a Jew touched! Goebbels explains. New mass arrests, the feelings among Jews are not to be described’; ‘Dr. Goebbels promises new Jew laws. Had to leave without the usual clapping’. The propaganda minister allowed no questions from the journalists, and it seems as though his words made Stockholms-Tidningen’s man confused and sceptical but nevertheless all ears. Goebbels, he set forth, had undertaken to prove that the accounts of the foreign press, which were relatively concordant, had been incorrect on crucial points. The correspondent echoed Goebbels’s views that the raids had not been organised, the police had been too few but not passive, the plunders had not been masterminded from above and not a hair on a Jew’s head had been hurt. Dr. Goebbels denied all responsibility for what had occurred and described the events as a natural reaction of the people. And, one could not, the correspondent quoted him saying, ‘allow the police to shoot at the people’. The report went on to say that in the course of Friday large numbers of Jews had been taken into custody.\textsuperscript{19}

However, confronted with the manifest unconcern, Stockholms-Tidningen’s man on the spot gave the impression of having been taken in by the National Socialist dignitary, subsequently seeing his task as none other than relating the Nazi story.

The account of the press conference provided an extraordinary image of Goebbels’s appearance. Dr. Goebbels, it read, begged us, after we had represented yesterday’s events from our point of view, to then allow space for his opinion. ‘He stood’, it went on, ‘in the centre of the parquet floor in the Pompeian room, with two officials from the Ministry of Propaganda behind him, surrounded in a circle by the foreign correspondents. Naturally, all were utterly eager for what the little doctor should say, and one even admired him for his courage to, in this manner, make his appearance the very next day in the middle of the international press.’\textsuperscript{20}

Henceforth, the newspaper populated its columns with appalling statements. The subheads conveyed an insolent and frightening meaning. ‘“I should have done it properly”’; ‘Identical gauntlets consequently – no organisation’; ‘The Jewish problem shall be resolved legally’. The propaganda minister said that if he had been behind the manifestations, one would have seen not hundreds and thousands on the streets but hundreds of thousands and millions. He would have done it much more successfully and radically. Furthermore, he objected to the charges of pillage, but added jocularly, if an old woman had found something that she thought would make a nice Christmas gift for her daughter, one must understand that. Likewise, he dismissed accusations of Jews in Munich being collected in the middle of the night and transferred to concentration camps only in their nightgowns. Again, he adjoined in jest, then the government itself would have been forced to supply the clothing – one could not keep prisoners in concentration camps for years without anything but a nightshirt.

After this performance, the Swedish journalist witnessed to his own frustration that when the Nazi chieftain had had his say, he turned his back on the international press corps and left. There were quite a few questions one would have wished to put to him, the journalist ruminated. As it was, one could only silently give him the space for his viewpoint that he had asked for. ‘Never before has an explanation of Goebbels been so interesting. His appearance on the whole in such manner, likewise the content of his explanation both what he said and what he did not say and how he, with an appeal to the loyalty of the foreign press, expressed it, conferred a cogent insight into the atmosphere behind the scenes at Wilhelmstrasse the day after.’\textsuperscript{21, 22}

Today, long afterwards, one might be inclined to perceive a note of irony in the journalist’s writings. Nevertheless, this would be a mistake. He was, indeed, bewildered and unsatisfied, perhaps even perturbed, but his high opinion of the German minister of
propaganda was real enough. Of course, these are assertions that need to be supported by facts and I will return to them later. But first, there is another question that demands an answer: How is one to accommodate the previous graphic illustrations of the horrible abuses of the German Jewry with the apparent deference to the representative of Nazi supremacy? Let us now reread Stockholms-Tidningen from 9 November onwards and be particularly observant as to how the newspaper packaged the reports.

Second Reading
On the first page of Stockholms-Tidningen of 9 November there is another headline that claims our attention. ‘Bonnier kiosk causes protests. Tobacconists of the Nybro circus area oppose plans of an Alga kiosk: We have received the announcement with dismay.’ The item went on to say that the projected building of an annex, where air travellers would be catered to with newspapers, tobacco and sundry had stirred up quite a commotion among the shopkeepers in the vicinity of the Nybro circus. The newspaper’s wording was rather conspicuous: ‘At once, the Bonnier group pushed ahead and tried under the sign of the Swedish Press bureau to lay hands on the lucrative business.’

The Bonniers are one of Sweden’s most known Swedish-Jewish families. Traditionally, they have been linked to the book and newspaper publishing business, and their flagship was (and is) one of the major dailies and perhaps the first competitor of Stockholms-Tidningen, Dagens Nyheter. The influence of the Bonnier family in the publishing industry became a heated topic of discussion during the thirties. Nazis and pro-German circles continuously launched verbal attacks on their so-called unseasonable and foreign domination of the newspaper market. The owner of Stockholms-Tidningen even tried to buy out the Bonniers’ interest in Dagens Nyheter. Even among Dagens Nyheter’s own staff, not least its management, the owner family was seen as an uncomfortable fact during these years, and one would have preferred to put an end to the relationship. As a consequence, the family’s influence on the policy of its own paper diminished rapidly in the course of the pre-war events.

Accordingly, the item about the Bonnier kiosk was far from being a piece of neutral and routine news reporting. It had a plain anti-Semitic message, and the phrasing was fully deliberated: ‘the Bonnier group pushed ahead ... to lay hands on the lucrative business.’ The greedy Jew was, of course, a stock character of anti-Semitic propaganda.

Inside that same day’s newspaper one finds another item of similar tendency. The story was about a company manager who stood trial for purveying Austrian Jewesses with Swedish passports in order to give them a helping hand in leaving Austria. Now, this could have been a ‘Schindler’s List’ narrative, an unexpected but nonetheless brave saving angel effort. However, the framing Stockholms-Tidningen bestowed on it was quite the opposite. The headline read: ‘Sven Bylund planned to “save” Jew capital out of Austria. Export of Jewesses with their money. – Busted swindler at the bar.’ The body text followed up telling about Jewish women in Vienna, ‘who were hankering after Swedish citizenship’ and of ‘the profitable trade’ of helping Jewesses and conveying hard cash out of the country.

It is this context we must bear in mind as we proceed to reread the reports of the Night of Broken Glass.

As early as the news reports of the legation secretary’s critical state of health, there was a peculiar slant to the representation of the German situation. The attack, as the reporter put it, had made ‘a great impact’ in Germany, and all over Berlin people nurtured
the view that one would not ‘for all the gold in the world’ wish to be a Jew within the borders of the Third Reich. The description gives the impression of an understanding for the aggressive reactions. The phrase ‘for all the gold in the world’ was in its everyday parlance derogatory of the terror felt by the Jewish population before the inflammatory words of German newspaper headlines and political leaders. Moreover, the phrase, hardly by coincidence, carried the same old spiteful allusion to the greediness of Jews.

When reporting the actions against Jews prior to the events of the night between 9 and 10 November, the text referred to information of physical assaults and added ‘which would be quite understandable due to the influence of the Paris attack’. Despite the obvious fact that professional journalism called for a hearing of Jewish witnesses to the dramatic and frightening development, the correspondent never bothered to do so. Throughout the reports that followed the next few days, Jews never had their say. What is more, they do not even appear as individuals. When mentioned, they are nameless, faceless and, as stated, speechless, all blending into one indistinguishable mass.

If being someone is what first and foremost defines a human being, this strain of Stockholms-Tidningen’s coverage is particularly consequential and ominous. By contrast, the correspondent gives evidence early on to his self-assured capability to discern Jews from other people: ‘Today in Berlin there is not one single Jew to be seen out in the streets’. The alleged observation bespeaks a presumed racial awareness.

A more myopic reading of the headlines of the following day, when the nationwide pogroms were still not known, also reveals the sympathetic attitude towards the German reactions and the detached frame of mind concerning the Jewish population. ‘Increased resentment against the Jews in Germany.’ The Dessau police had to protect Jews from demonstrators’. The expression ‘resentment’ shows the newspaper preferred to see what happened from the point of view of the aggressors, whereas Jewish people consistently featured as abstract nouns. And now, in the clarified context, the remarkably unwitting prophetic utterance – ‘this night surely every Jewish premises would have been raided and every synagogue set on fire, had not the authorities, as they now actually do, kept their 80 million Germans in such tight rein’ – takes on new meaning. It betrays the correspondent’s trust in the regime, but also his readiness to normalise atrocities. At that, it puts on display his lack of preparedness and unwillingness to see what a Nazi sway in Germany held in store.

Thus, when we once again take a look at the reports of the pogroms, we will detect an undertext. ‘Jew persecution’; ‘the Jew action’; ‘Jew thrown out of window’; ‘the fleeing were apparently Jews [the italics are mine]’; ‘the Jews expelled’; ‘a large number of Jews’; ‘ Strikes a Jew or shoots a Jew’; ‘the Jewish problem’; ‘the Jewish shops’; ‘male Jews’; ‘Jew laws’; ‘the Jewish problem [verbatim ‘the Jew problem’]’; ‘the Jewish question [verbatim ‘the Jew question’]. The expressions ‘the Jewish problem’ and ‘the Jewish question’ are particularly worth noting in this series of dehumanising concepts and descriptions.

Those conceptions were pivotal to the Nazi anti-Semitism; its constant radicalisation turned around them. Once, there were a ‘problem’ and a ‘question’ that needed a solution and an answer. And the National Socialists were ever more aggressively eager to set that balance right again. The expressions were incorporated into Swedish, and indeed into European, political discourse even before Hitler’s assumption of power in Germany. As early as 1932 the expression ‘the Jew problem’ appeared, strangely enough, in the literary monthly of Bonnier’s publishing house, Bonniers Litterära Magasin. It did not
meet with any kind of riposte in the remainder of the issue. In *Stockholms-Tidningen*'s reporting the expressions occurred without quotation marks, having become commonplace when speaking of contemporary Europe, and integral parts of Swedish news language.

It is not surprising, then, that we find that *Stockholms-Tidningen*'s correspondent had absorbed other significant words and phrases from the Nazi vocabulary into his own accounts. Quite a few ‘Aryan shops’ had been rampaged by mistake in Munich, and Jewish shop owners were not allowed to sell off the premises and stocks to ‘Aryans’, he set forth. He related the arrests of tens of thousands of Jews as them having been taken into ‘protective custody’. Confronted with the gruesome look of the pogroms, he resorted to what he saw as a more dignified Germany and referred to ‘genuine German anti-Semites’. As if there were a kind of honest anti-Semitism, which, by all means, should be welcomed. And those, he offered, thought the pogroms went too far – a proposition that must have left the readers in suspense as to what would not have been too far.

Taking into account what is detailed above, it must not have been a big step in crossing the line to normalise the outrages. And the correspondent certainly did this. At the scene of the havoc, he informed the readers that he wanted to allow the National Socialists their say. Since he never gave anyone of the Jewish population their say, this was indeed a strange kind of justice. In any event, the question he put to a reported well-known party representative was the following: ‘Have not those Jews, whom you from the beginning and in reality want to get at, left long ago, and are not the innocent the ones staying behind to suffer?’ This was truly a plain subscription to far-reaching anti-Semitism. Despite his qualifications, the journalist obviously thought it reasonable to ‘get at’ Jewish people.

He provided impressions of events seemingly unfolding in an everyday manner, where the threats were posed to bystanders rather than to the actual victims. ‘Huge masses of people were out to look at the spectacle, among them an impressive number of women with their toddlers in prams – as always during quasi-revolution riots. Since they, for want of maids, had to bring the children along into an often highly dangerous throng in order to not miss out on the free show.’ The wording – e.g. ‘free show’ – is, when one considers what is dealt with, abhorring.

The cynicism, which often marked the whole course of events, was simply passed on by the correspondent, apparently without feeling a moment’s urge to reflect and react against it. ‘In a number of cases large department stores have been set on fire ... but that was out of the border of the planned action and in such cases the Jewish proprietors have been arrested on suspicion of arson.’ ‘A bunch of arrested Jews have been equipped with tools and sent off to the destroyed synagogues to clear up at the scenes of the fires.’

Even the chief officer of the fire brigade had, by the look of it, found it fit to mock the feelings of the afflicted in person. He paid a visit to the scene of the burning synagogue at Fasanenstrasse in Berlin with the intention ‘to – what the people outside made jokes about – investigate whether the fire also had been set with proper expert knowledge.’ Notwithstanding, we may suspect his repudiation here, the absence of any critical comment from the journalist to this perversion of authority, only added to the scorn towards the victims.

The second reading gives us a different conception of *Stockholms-Tidningen*’s accounts of the Night of Broken Glass. Still, from what is said thus far we must not jump to the conclusion that the journalist was simply a crypto-Nazi, trying whatever he could
to sell the brutal message of his principals. He was indeed shocked at what he saw, and
did voice criticism of the unbridled violence. If, today, we are to fully understand his
reports a more subtle interpretation is called for.

* * *

I shall end by just suggesting some of the forthcoming investigations.

In other Swedish newspapers the German perspective was not this manifest. Their
coverage was, however, more limited than that of Stockholms-Tidningen, and it seems as
though they actually played down the events. Dagens Nyheter, for example, did not top
with the news before 12 November, although it was well known by 11 November. The
framing of the news was often extraordinary, the victims were never in focus, and
Svenska Dagbladet, for example, worried in their headlines primarily about the devast-
tated insurance values. Their concern was the insurance companies, not the Jewish pro-
prieters. Most importantly, as in Stockholms-Tidningen, nowhere in the reporting is a
Jewish individual to be found. Likewise here, Jews formed a collective without features.
In leading articles the newspapers aired protests, but again, the issue was not the threat
to the German and European Jewry, but that to German culture. Besides, the conviction
was that the events were not representative of Germany. Nowhere is there a call for ac-
tion, and the absence of any governmental comments or protestations from the Swedish
elite is most striking to a reader today. The underlying notion seems to have been that,
overall, this was an internal German affair. The great exception was, not surprisingly to
anyone with some knowledge of Swedish press history, Göteborgs Handels- och
Sjöfartstidning. Its coverage was highly prioritised, the headlines were outspoken, and
the tragedies of individual Jews were told.

Both British and American coverage were pungent. In relation to the majority of the
Swedish press, it is noteworthy that the Manchester Guardian, for example, visited the
ousted Jewish families in the no-man’s-land between Germany and Poland before the
Night of Broken Glass and gave a vivid picture of their tragedy. Times and Guardian also
offered resistance to the new Nazi manner of understanding the world. Expressions like
‘Aryans’ and ‘protective custody’ were put in quotation marks. What is most conspicu-
ous in the Anglo-Saxon press is the weight it accorded to pronouncements of condem-
nation from politicians and other public persons.

The journalist Christer Jäderlund was of German parentage on his mother’s side. He
had an exceptional, favoured position among the foreign press corps in Berlin. Notwith-
standing, he was expelled twice from Germany as the regime did not always relish his
writings. In spring 1941 there appeared in Sweden a pamphlet calling for Germany’s
victory in the war, entitled The Struggling Germany. One of the contributors was
Jäderlund. Obviously, he had experienced what he had reported from the Night of Bro-
ken Glass. Afterwards he had been witness to, no doubt, many more and worse things.
Despite all this, he thought only a German victory would ensure a happy outcome of the
war. In other words, we are confronted with the enigma of his sympathies. If, only for a
moment, we could think of Jäderlund as his own reader, it is clear that it was quite pos-
sible to register all the horrors that hit the Jews and yet follow close behind Nazi Ger-
many. To understand why, we need to look far beyond the reporting’s face value.

A more penetrating analysis enquires about the contemporary meaning of Stockholms-
Tidningen’s account of the Night of Broken Glass. The motive for such an enquiry is
naturally a desire to place journalism into a larger historical context. How could
Stockholms-Tidningen have influenced the Swedish opinion at the time? Implicitly, here lies the wider-scope question: How could European press coverage of the Night of Broken Glass have influenced European opinion?

‘How was it possible?’ ‘Why did anyone not act?’ These questions relating to the Holocaust troubled the post-war world. The standard replies were: ‘We did not know.’ Now, the survey above makes it quite clear that there was plenty of information available at an early stage. The indications are that, henceforth as well, information was rich. If one wanted to know, one could have known. This leads me to propose quite a dramatic counter-hypothesis: That ‘we’ knew very well. And this is precisely why the Holocaust was possible.

Could such a hypothesis really have any credence? The question informs an enquiry for the meaning of the reporting. But before going about this, we must ponder the character of National Socialism. The premise here is that it was a revolutionary movement. Contemporaries spoke of Hitler’s taking power as the ‘German Revolution’. Recent research into the history of Nazi Germany has also called attention to the revolutionary aspect. I find my inspiration in this research, but also in works by two other scholars. Saul Friedländer introduced the term ‘redemptive anti-Semitism’ in his book Nazi Germany and the Jews. The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939. By this he meant a belief that Germanhood and the Aryan race were to perish if the struggle against the Jews was not joined. Thus, redemption would come as liberation from the Jews. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin has elaborated on ‘The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will’ in German culture (to be found in his book The Crooked Timber of Humanity. Chapters in the History of Ideas). This ‘will’ he characterised as a determination to live one’s own life, to form one’s own values, to sing one’s own songs, to be ruled by one’s own laws, not to be assimilated to forms of life that belong to all – a quest for self-realisation not to be impinged upon by alien obstacles. I assume, then, that Friedländer’s term ‘redemptive anti-Semitism’ makes anti-Semitism absolutely central to National Socialist ideology: a revolution should annihilate the Jews. The will, again, is consequently the fervour of that revolution.

From these assumptions I go on to propose that the Nazis stood before a huge undertaking to spark revolutionary enthusiasm within the German people, a people defeated in World War I and totally disillusioned by the recessions of the twenties. For this purpose they invented a strategic formula, which I call ‘inversion of values’. The Nazis turned black to white and white to black. What I finally set out to do is to show how this inversion of values is relayed and enacted in the reports of Stockholms-Tidningen.

Summary
The article highlights the reporting of the Night of Broken Glass in the Swedish daily Stockholms-Tidningen from 9 to 12 November 1938. The choice of Stockholms-Tidningen as a research object is a natural one: at the time, this newspaper had the largest circulation among the Swedish press. Since the Night of Broken Glass was crucial to the unfolding of the Holocaust, to study the press coverage of the event must be highly important. The inquiry is conducted in the form of two readings: a first impression reading providing an overview as well as an exposition of the most important bits of information, and another more analytical reading, focusing on a few critical aspects of the reports. The two readings represent the first of three planned levels of investigation.
The conclusions of the first reading are that the readers were provided with a wealth of information of the escalating assault on the German Jewry. It was possible to know in detail what was going on. The reporting gave beforehand warnings, the following pogroms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime’s guilt was made clear. The conclusions of the second reading are that, side by side with the reports, groms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime detailed what was going on. The reporting gave beforehand warnings, the following pogroms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime normalised the persecutions and atrocities. The reporting gave beforehand warnings, the following pogroms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime normalised the persecutions and atrocities. The reporting gave beforehand warnings, the following pogroms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime normalised the persecutions and atrocities. The reporting gave beforehand warnings, the following pogroms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime normalised the persecutions and atrocities. The reporting gave beforehand warnings, the following pogroms were duly represented as to proportions and particulars, and the regime normalised the persecutions and atrocities. The preliminary results give good reason for further investigations, the course of which the article provides only a few suggestions for. Comparative studies of other Swedish, British and American newspapers may on the one hand corroborate, with one or two exceptions, the Swedish paradigm set by Stockholms-Tidningen, and on the other hand show the critical perspectives, all things considered, available to the international press. To understand the role of the press in Sweden’s response to the Holocaust, one must look for the essence of the radicalisation of Nazi anti-Semitism. The journalism may be seen as both reflecting and interplaying with a constantly renewed anti-Jewish agenda.

Notes
41. BLM 1932.
The Finnish recession in the 1990’s was the deepest economic crisis in any developed, industrialised economy since the Second World War. It took place in the kind of welfare state which Gösta Esping-Andersen has labelled ‘Nordic’ or ‘social democrat’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999), the characteristics of which are, among others, high level of employment and labour market participation rate, high level of social security, low income differences and strong but moderate trade unions and left wing parties. 90’s crisis has been interpreted to be a turning point in the path of the welfare state development. Finnish welfare state has been loosing some of its discernible Nordic characteristics and Finnish welfare politics have taken a neo-conservative turn of a kind (Hänninen 1998, Julkunen 2001, Lehtonen & al. 2001).

In this paper we focus especially on the relationship between the alleged neo-conservative turn in Finnish politics and the newspaper stories about the unemployed. We describe four politically loaded and recurring news narratives about the unemployed – how the unemployed are represented in them and what kind of consequences these representations might have. These narratives include the story of the welfare abuser, of ‘the work shy’, of the exemplary job-seeker and of the ‘activation’ of the unemployed.

The consequences of narratives must be assessed against some frame of reference. Here we consider, what kind of impact such narratives might have for public life. Following Habermas we take the political public sphere, where public life takes place, to be the sphere “between” the state and the private sphere. According to Habermas, the public sphere could act as a “warning system” signalling the political system that some problems have become aggravated, and as an “amplifier” which is able to thematise and dramatise the detected problems in an influential way. (1996, 359). The social formations that constitute the ideal public life are not “crowds”, which are characteristically constituted by agitation, but “publics”. Publics are based on differing interests that must be adjusted to each other. Such a public must be able to think and discuss in a reasonable manner. (see V. Pietilä 1999, 7–8)

Moral Panic and Social Responsibilities
We take as our starting point the finding of Peter Golding and Sue Middleton, (Golding & Middleton 1982, see also Hall 1992, Clarke & Newman 1997, Julkunen 1993, Roche 1992) that neo-conservative politics of Margaret Thatcher were accompanied by a certain form of discourse used in order to produce ‘moral panic’ about welfare abuse, and
suggest that such a discourse can be taken as a paradigmatic example of a conservative discourse about the unemployed. The gist of such discourse is to represent the poor and their helpers as immoral or even criminal. Typically such discourse picks up court cases of poor accused of welfare abuse. These examples are used to make general claims for instance about the demoralising effects of welfare policies. Conservative speakers call for stricter control and less generosity, while more leftist voices are subdued by accusing them of speaking on behalf of criminals and crime. Indeed, it was found (see Renvall & Valtonen 1999) that the welfare abuse – narrative did become more and more prominent in the Finnish media during the 1990’s, especially in the last years studied, 1997 and 1998. It was promoted by some top conservative politicians, and some metaphors typical to the British case were invoked such as the claim that only ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of welfare abuse is visible. The narrative was, however, also challenged in the media by social workers, researchers and also journalists themselves. The narrative never achieved any unchallenged acceptance in the public debate.

Some characteristics of the neo-conservative image can be discerned in the following cartoon taken from a story in Aamulehti (21.7.1997. Figure 1). In the cartoon we see a character who, first of all, is young – young people obviously are one favourite group of scapegoats in our society and are often associated with subcultures, violence, drugs etc. He is also dressed in a way that refers to some youth subculture. He is surrounded with equipment both expensive and leisurely. He is, nevertheless, not looking satisfied but rather aggressive and ready to ask for more. Interestingly, the front page photograph of the same story, displaying various badges distinctive of certain youth subcultures, provoked a letter to the editor (AL 25.7.1997), in which a young writer ventured to deny that wearers of such badges are welfare abusers. Such a spontaneous attempt to dissociate the two images serves to show how such images work – abuse-narrative presses one to try to present oneself as ‘different but good’ in order to dissociate oneself and one’s subculture from the ‘bad’.

**Figure 1.**
Roche (1992) has pointed out, that, in thinking about welfare, the essence of neo-conservatism lies in emphasising social responsibilities of citizens instead of social rights. In the news, such as the example above, social responsibilities are emphasised at least in three ways: through individualisation, through moral indignation and through a critique of the income distribution policies of the state. Individualisation refers to the representing of the problems of the unemployed as their personal and individual problems, not as social or structural problems which should be taken care of by the state. In building moral indignation the well known “Us” vs. “Them” scheme is applied, where certain “others” are pointed out as “offenders” of various kinds. The welfare state is criticised for hindering economic growth and maintaining irresponsible behaviour. The more or less explicit aim underlying the use of such discourse is often to cut the welfare state.

It is obvious that the image above is about socially irresponsible behaviour. Moral narrative works here on two levels: first, it warns one, that since the deception is exposed and moral indignation is, presumably, aroused, the abuser will be punished – second, it includes a plea that in order not to hurt oneself as well as the whole community through acts which undermine social solidarity the abuser ought to change his or her ways. In the latter sense the narrative is emphasising the “internal good” (see MacIntyre 1987, 187–190) the abuser is loosing along with the whole community. Of course, such narratives can function ideologically in many ways. For instance, exaggerated attention to welfare abuse could reduce solidarity and security, the same internal goods the narrative claims to safeguard.

Other Narratives of Moral Responsibility
While the welfare abuse -narrative may be the best known social responsibility -narrative, it seems that there are other cases that fit with our model as well. When one looks at the writings1 or interviews2 of the unemployed themselves, the perhaps most often recurring complaint about the media and politicians is that they are implying that the unemployed are ‘work-shy’. According to the complaints this is often done by using the rhetoric of the ‘whip’. ‘Whip’ and ‘carrot’ are in Finland now commonly used as metaphors to describe two main ways of controlling the ‘the donkey’, i.e. the people. ‘Whip’, unlike ‘carrot’, refers to a kind of punishment – it implies some pain but not too much pain, pain to be used only as a means to a good end. ‘Whip’, unlike ‘carrot’, fits well in the social responsibility -narrative, because ‘whip’ can be used only to emphasise people what their responsibilities are. ‘Whip’ can be legitimately used only if people don’t otherwise do what they ought to do. ‘Carrot’, on the other hand, involves reward: it is about making a deal, and thus entails acknowledging that people have a right to expect something in return – thus it invokes the idea of social right rather than that of responsibility.

To take an example of the narrative of ‘whipping’: The Final Report of the Government Committee on Incentive Traps (Kannustinloukkuutöryhmä 1996) takes as its starting point the following programmatic statement of the government: “The social security system is to be developed so that working will always improve one’s economic situation”. (ibid. 5). If working is not profitable, one is caught in an incentive trap. However, removing incentive traps entails reducing benefits. The report recognises this: “The need to improve the incentives to working is basically contradictory with the need to maintain high level of social security and low income differences.” (ibid. 11). This recognition is
transformed into something like a language of miracle cure in the following statement: “Improving the social security and taxation systems so, that incentives increase, entails a relative decrease in the level of living for those living on social security at least on the short run. On the longer run these goals don’t have to be in contradiction with each other, because effective functioning of the labour market does help in improving the employment situation and those who will be employed in this way will also reach a higher income level than before.” (ibid. 11, italics ours). Here the ‘whip’ – worse benefits – is justified by a hopeful belief that more jobs will emerge and wages will be better than the previous higher benefits. Cutting benefits is represented as a cure to a complex of problems: unemployment, poverty, marginalisation, high social costs, functioning of the economy and the image of the welfare state in the eyes of the taxpayers. (ibid. 9 – 11). The core assumption of the cure is that it motivates people to search for and accept jobs, that people will find them, and that the pay will be good enough. Each assumption can be questioned.

How is the miracle cure -story, then, narrated in public? The following excerpt shows it wrapped in the language of economists. The speaker, whose suggestion is summarised in the leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (“Niinistö puuttuisi ansiosidonnaisseen”. 1.8.2000), is Minister of Finance Sauli Niinistö.

Niinistö proposed on Monday, that unemployment benefit should be scaled so, that its level would be higher in the beginning of the unemployment period and would decrease below the current level towards the end of the 500 days period … He believes that the proposed model would encourage people to become employed. The model would not, at least not at once, increase government costs … New measures are, in his view, needed, because there are still so many unemployed in the country despite the economic growth. On the other hand, some sectors face labour shortage, and supporting job-searching would block higher wages and thus inflation … Niinistö emphasised, that the country faces a risk of economic overheating, which is linked to insufficient supply of labour.

To further show why the story is close to the theme of social responsibility, we give another example. Here the speaker, conservative member of the European Parliament, Pia-Noora Kauppi, is expressing her support to the suggestion of the Minister of Finance (quoted in newspaper Aamulehti 9.8.2000, “Muut lehdet”).

The truth is, that jobs remain vacant because one cannot find workers out of these hundreds of thousands of unemployed. These jobs, that in vain wait for somebody to take them, are not only for well educated computer-nerds. There are also vacancies, that anyone who is healthy, adult and willing to work could fill. There are 30 000 unemployed job-seekers in the capital area only, but strawberries nevertheless rot in their bushes in Nurmijärvi because one cannot get anybody to gather them.

The party that took a prominent public role in promoting the miracle cure of incentives was not originally the conservative coalition party but the social democrats, and primarily the Second Minister of Finance Arja Alho, the chair of the Committee on Incentive Traps. She had also to defend the government’s policy in the parliament, which prompted the tabloid Ilta-Sanomat to print this headline on its front page (12.12.1996).

Minister Alho: The unemployed need also whipping
The quotes show three slightly different attitudes to the theme of social responsibility. While the first avoids moralising the unemployed openly, it nevertheless individualises them. Cutting benefits is legitimised by implying that the unemployed could indeed find work if they just tried hard enough. The second is already openly accusing the unemployed. In the third, minister Alho seems to employ the third aspect of social responsibility -narrative mentioned above, the tendency to criticise the welfare state by implying that cutting benefits is good for the unemployed. The benefits are now construed as harmful (though the effect of the rhetoric is, of course, somewhat undermined by irony in the headline).

Narratives we have studied so far seem to be inclined to represent the unemployed in negative terms – via showing instances where social responsibilities are neglected. One would suppose, that positive narratives about the unemployed might be also found. To be neo-conservative such narratives ought still to emphasise the idea of social responsibility. This could be achieved through telling about those unemployed who have performed in an exemplary way. This exemplary way should be something more than can be expected from one who lives according to the standards of the Nordic welfare state, which is to be construed as ‘bad life’. Thus, ‘good life’ would entail valuing ‘something else’ higher than the goods of the welfare state.

To take an example, when daily Aamulehti decided to publish a special section about (and for) the unemployed in 1993, the first “Unemployed’s Page” had, as its main story, an interview of an unemployed bank cashier who had bought a small shop (“’At last I get to meet people again’”, 21.2.1993). Workdays are long and the reader learns that the shopkeeper has managed to make 22 000 marks during her first year, but: “One must want it so much that small troubles just don’t bother at all.”. In 28.3.1993 another headline states: “I want to work even if that cost me money”. The story is about an unemployed stylist who takes a part time teaching job even though her unemployment benefits drop more than her salary brings her money. Besides being exemplary these characters problematise certain common views: e.g. that work is done mainly for money and that wage is a compensation for the pains of working. Instead, their stories imply, that work is good in itself and that not working is more painful than working. In the common view one weighs the pain of work against the wage and not working is simply leisure, while in the stories’ calculus one weighs the pain of not working against the wage, and joy of working becomes part of the wage: thus it becomes reasonable to pay for the chance to work.

The official labour policy has in Finland increasingly emphasised the job-seekers’ own initiative and responsibility in getting jobs (see Julkunen 2001, 177–184; Lehtonen & al. 2001 111–115). Ministry of Labour has ventured to use also media quite actively. A new territorial conquest has been a TV-show “Good Working” (Hyvää Työtä!), produced jointly by the public TV 2-channel and the Ministry of Labour. In the show three pre-chosen applicants are interviewed by a job-offering firm’s personnel manager in the TV-studio. The program has two hosts: an ice-hockey –coach and management consultant – known for his appearances as a TV-commentator – and a representative of the labour administration. The show is acted out in front of a live audience consisting of the firm’s other workers, the happy winner’s future team-mates. The prize, of course, is the job, which is given to only one of the three. The show builds a curious atmosphere by bringing something very private into public and construing something rather serious as entertainment.

The TV-show aside, there has appeared a host of less chimerical news stories where the unemployed act as participants in different labour policy measures. Instead of pre-
senting exemplary job-seekers, this kind of narrative appears to construe something as normal. Thus, the stories show what any unemployed are "normally" expected to do (be active, search for work) and how they are "normally" expected to present themselves in public (as job-seekers who hope to get help in searching for work). If one compares these representations of the "exemplary" with those of the "normal", one finds that both individualise the unemployed – either they are represented as ones who already have solved their problem or as ones being helped so that they could solve it. The moral indignation of earlier examples is transformed into praise or acceptance. What is avoided in such stories is making unemployment a political problem that requires political debate over possible solutions. Instead, the current policies are legitimised. Since these policies have come increasingly to emphasise individual responsibility, the stories legitimising them tend also to emphasise social responsibilities of the unemployed.

One characteristic difference between the "negative" stories and "positive" ones is, that the latter seem to require some kind of co-operation by the unemployed themselves. Typically some unemployed or applicants are brought to the public and interviewed. Politically these stories are, we suggest, ambiguous: people are not forced to say something they don’t want to say – neither can one say that they are simply speaking their mind. While speaking for themselves, they are also talking to some audience, and must adapt to the moral standards, real or imagined, of that audience. In short, they must present themselves in an acceptable way. Therefore, there is a possibility that when brought before the public eye they feel compelled to produce accounts that fit with the hegemonic discourse. This means that though the survival strategies that are offered may well be plausible, they are, nevertheless, strategies acceptable for the hegemonic view. In the context of neo-conservative shift this would mean more and more emphasis on individuals’ social responsibilities.

Narrative Paradox and Absurdity of the Public Sphere

We must set aside here the empirical question how far the different forms of individual responsibility –narratives have in fact acquired a hegemonic position in the welfare political news. Instead we try to assess their possible consequences. One thing that suggests the importance of such study is the critical assessment of the media, politics and policies, that is given by the unemployed themselves. The National Co-operation Organisation of the Unemployed (TVY) has criticised the attitude of the media towards both the unemployed and their organisation (see e.g. Oittinen 1997). The unemployed interviewed in Tampere in 1996 pointed out several problems already dealt with above. The perhaps most irritating feature in the media coverage was its moralising tone. Press wrote too little about unemployment, the coverage was superficial and the everyday experience of the unemployed was overlooked. The coverage tended to be unrealistic and presented a too nice picture of the issue. The unemployed were able to get their own views published only in the letters to the editor -section, which they themselves saw as a relatively marginal forum. (see also Ridell 2000). Similar critical assessments are found in the writings of the unemployed (see e.g. Laaksonen & Piela 1993, Kortteinen & Tuomikoski 1998). In these texts politicians and the media are often grouped together – either they are represented as co-operating or the media is represented as a neutral platform for the politicians. Both are often represented as inhuman and indifferent. In the special section “The Unemployeds’ Page” published by Aamulehti in co-operation with the local unemployeds’ association in Tampere in 1993 and 1994 the picture given of the authorities was
also primarily critical. The unemployed described the official policies as a “symbol-jungle” doing its best to hinder their attempts to improve their situation. (Vehkalahti 2000).

Research findings lend some support to the complaints against individualisation and moralising. Welfare abuse, for its part, has been generally deemed as not a very important problem, unlike the ‘tip of the iceberg’ rhetoric implies. One study estimates that abuse amounts to less than one per cent of the total sum of benefits even if the hidden part of abuse is taken into account (Heikkilä & al 1999, 76). Neither does it seem likely, that the Finnish unemployed were simply lazy job-seekers – even the most active job-seekers have difficulties in finding work. According to one study, even though active job searching is conducive to employment, no more than 22–28 per cent of those who claimed to be among the most active did in fact have a job 11 months after they were interviewed. Of the somewhat less active, 13–17 per cent had found themselves a job during the same period. (Virjo & Aho 2001). The results of the labour policy measures seem to have been somewhat disappointing (Aho & al. 1999, Aho & Kunttu 2001).

What is said so far suggests two comments. First, the individual’s possibilities to influence his or her position in the labour market should not be overestimated, but the narratives described above tend to emphasise individual responsibility and raise suspicions. Second, the function of the public sphere should be to challenge such narratives if need be, but the practises of the mass-mediated public sphere tend to marginalise the voices of marginalised groups like the unemployed. This is partly due to the journalists’ professional rules concerning who can be interviewed, what is publishable and newsworthy, what kind of action is acceptable etc. The proliferation of the narratives of social responsibility and the barring of the scapegoats from the public sphere could have, as their one possible practical consequence, a kind of absurd and closed public sphere. In the following we try to elaborate this claim a bit.

Moral narratives, first of all, tend to become paradoxical. This paradoxicality doesn’t refer to the phenomenon that different audiences decode the same texts in different ways. Rather, a paradoxical narrative, as we understand it here, tends to press some of its readers to do something that for them seems to be impossible, irrational or unfair. This pressure is related to the moral indignation or praise expressed by the narrative. Moral narrative represents some groups or individuals in moral terms, as villains, victims and heroes. However, in order to become paradoxical, such a narrative has also to be able to put pressure on its reader. This can be done by trying to appeal to the reader and by warning him or her. A negative story about some group may cause its members to feel that they should either dissociate themselves from the group or defend it. In addition, the group-members know that the story has stigmatised them in the eyes of the outsiders, which serves to amplify the pressure. In both ways, by appealing and by warning, a moral narrative drives people toward imitating its heroes or victims and avoiding to act like the villains. In this way the narrative seems to function like a command: it gives directions for action and hints about possible consequences if these are not followed.

The moral narrative seen as a command is at the core of our concept of paradoxical narrative. If a narrative can be a command, it can also be a paradoxical command, the so called double bind. According to Bateson (1987) (see also Wilden 1980, Bordo 1993; Hellsten & Renvall 1997) some communication may lead into a paradoxical situation, a double bind, and, furthermore, some paradoxical situations are pathological. The elements of a pathological double bind can be defined as follows (see Bateson 1987, 206-207; also Wilden 1980, 120):
1) In a double bind, there are two or several people, of whom one is “victim”. The relationship between these people is unequal.

2) The victim constantly feels s/he is in this double bind. It is not an experience or a memory of a traumatic experience, but a learnt way of experiencing a situation.

3) In a double bind situation, there are two conflicting negative commands and a threat of punishment. These commands can be expressed as follows: a) do not act so and so, or you will be punished; b) if you do not act so and so, you will be punished.

4) The second command is usually communicated in a metalevel, and is often given as a non-verbal clue.

5) There is also a third negative command which prevents a victim from breaking free from the double bind.

All these elements are not needed, when a victim has learnt to interpret his world through double binds.

It may be easier to grasp the idea of the double bind with the help of a simple example. The sentence “Don’t read this sentence” is a double bind, a command one cannot obey. If one tries to obey one at the same time disobeys. However, it is not a pathological double bind for no punishment follows if it is not obeyed.

In the following quote an unemployed writer describes his experience of what we take as a paradoxical command issued through TV-news. The writer refers to the Minister of Labour Ilkka Kanerva who apparently has used the narrative of the ‘whip’ described above. The quote is taken from Kortteinen & Tuomikoski (1998, 126) and belongs to the collection of stories by the unemployed referred to above. Two elements of the bind seem to be clearly discernible: the paradoxical command (to search for a job when there is none) and the feeling of helplessness (waiting in the train without the engine):

Kanerva pushed the knife ever deeper in this chest. Said that the unemployment benefits are to be scaled so that we’ll get to the general European level while at the same time activating the unemployed to find jobs. What jobs, damn it? Where are they? Sure we’ll soon be activated and take jobs by force from those who have them, if that’s the only advice the Minister of Labour has to give. ... When you try and you become activated, you will be given ... Let your dick bloat so that you cannot walk or piss anymore. In your dying pains then you’ll find out what it is to be on the side tracks of life, in a train that never moves anywhere. There one waits and no activating will pull the engineless train anywhere. It’s a shame for you bastard to beat one who is already down.

The double commands of Kanerva’s paradoxical narrative can be put roughly as follows: a) if you don’t try to get ‘active’ you are ‘not good’; b) if you try to get ‘active’ you nevertheless are ‘not good’. The logic of Kanerva’s argument, as it apparently was taken by the writer, goes as follows: if you are ‘active’ you’ll find work – thus, however much you try, if you don’t find work you never really were ‘active’. Any attempt to be ‘active’ is transformed into a further evidence that one never was – or wanted to be – ‘active’. This evidence justifies new incentives, new incentives cause further attempts to be ‘active’, these provide new evidence calling for new incentives and so on. The gist of this double bind is that, from the writer’s point of view, minister Kanerva refuses to admit that for the writer there is no such ‘activity’ that would bring him work and would thus count
as ‘real activity’. Precisely by trying to obey Kanerva’s command the writer would end up disobeying it.

Another concept of Bateson is also crucial here, that of metacommunication (see e.g. Wilden 1980, 120–121). Metacommunication is communication about the way one should be communicating and it provides a way to transcend the double bind. The victim of the bind may escape it by explaining those who keep up the bind the paradoxical nature of their communication, and the participants could then negotiate new ways of communicating. In a pathological double bind the third command blocks this possibility, and the victim remains in the loop. Our quote from the unemployed writer can be seen as an attempt to metacommunicate: to lay bare the paradoxical nature of the minister’s communication and perhaps even to try to change the patterns of communication between the minister and the unemployed. The violent style of the quote may describe the actual experience of the writer after watching the minister speak, but it might also be, that the writer has attempted to give as much force to his words as he is able to make himself heard somewhere.

We can deduce two questions concerning the nature of public life from the theory of the double bind. First, do the stories that the media circulates include paradoxical narratives like the one just described? Second, is the public sphere open to metacommunication, when someone feels s/he is caught in the double bind? As long as metacommunication is allowed, the public, in the sense of a reasonably discussing group, can emerge. We call the public sphere closed if it, for instance, refuses to represent subversive acts aiming at metacommunication or represents such acts only as simply condemnable, like as crimes, but avoids representing them as good or even possibly acceptable; or represents them as perhaps understandable but in that case always irrational; or, again, represents them in a way that leads nowhere, makes no difference. Closed public sphere tends, if we are right, to strengthen possible pathological double binds people are stuck with. It might also give rise to political attacks against all kinds of marginalised groups and subversive subcultures. If paradoxical narratives are circulated in the closed public sphere the result could be an absurd public sphere. In it impossible or irrational acts would be systematically represented as heroic, subversive acts as villainous and the victims made the focus of public suspicions.

If one accepts the claim that moral narratives have a tendency to become paradoxical, one might also suggest that the public sphere implied in such moral narratives resembles somewhat the absurd public sphere. Consider again the case of welfare abuse-narrative. As we already pointed out such a narrative tends to block dissenting voices out of the public sphere by accusing them of speaking for criminals and crime. There is also a double bind involved, for to avoid becoming a suspect of abuse one has to do better than not to abuse. One has to get work, which may be impossible.

In moral panic situations the features of the absurd public sphere are plainly visible: the proliferation of moral narratives causes fear and anger, provokes demands for immediate and strong actions and leads to the silencing of the dissident voices. However, moral panics may be only “local intensifications” (c.f. McRobbie 1994, 209) of an already existing, invisibly paradoxical public sphere. Moral panics are used in order to gain political support, but if the support already exists, the pattern of politics may turn out to be different. Stories and interviews of the unemployed contain descriptions of how the unemployed have to face, in everyday situations, the prejudices of the working, and how they themselves had held these prejudices before becoming unemployed. In such a situation nobody gains anything immediately if the paradoxes are brought to light. For the majority of the people such dissident voices would represent a threat to their beliefs.
Thus, for the politicians, to speak for the marginalised would mean endangering one’s public support. In the same way, for the journalists, giving voice to the marginalised might provoke an angry response from the majority of the readers. For the unemployed, on the other hand, speaking publicly would probably make little immediate difference politically, whereas the individual, personal risk could be immediate and considerable. In such a situation, everybody gains, at least on the short run, by keeping silent. On the long run, the unemployed, as a group, would probably suffer, because the paradoxes, as long as they have become constitutive elements of the majority view, tend to become constitutive elements of the public support for policies that shape the life of the unemployed.

Conclusion
We have, in this article, described four kind of narratives that emphasise social responsibilities of the unemployed by way of individualisation and moralising. Such narratives can also be used to criticise different social benefits and build support for cutting them. We pointed out, that if the marginalised groups such as the unemployed are unable to express their experiences in the public debate, such moral narratives run the risk of becoming paradoxical, which could lead to a closed and absurd public sphere. We have presented this argument as a primarily theoretical and hypothetical one. The empirical question as to how far the Finnish public sphere during the 90’s resembled such a distorted public sphere is left open. To conclude, we try to point out some features that may be relevant in answering this question.

It seems, first, that the accounts of the unemployed themselves would seem to give some plausibility to our description. These accounts fit with the picture we have of the overall development of the Finnish welfare state: the social rights are gradually being weakened while social responsibilities are emphasised (see Hänninen 1998, Julkunen 2001, Lehtonen & al. 2001). However, when the actual public debates were studied, it was found that the social responsibility -narratives were, to some extent at least, challenged by opposing narratives (e.g. Renvall & Valtonen 1999, Renvall 2001). In some cases the press has worked hard to give the unemployed a chance to gain access to the public sphere (Vehkalahti 2000). Nevertheless, there is a possibility that even if the press had functioned as a ”warning system” it may not have succeeded in functioning as an ”amplifier”, that is in thematising the problems in an influential way. In conclusion we point out two things that might support this interpretation.

Notes
1. The writings of the unemployed Finns were collected by the Finnish Literature Society (SKS) and the Educational Federation for Unions for Professional Employees (TJS) through a writing competition held in Spring 1993. 1200 texts were received, of which 33 were published in a book (Laaksonen & Piela 1993). We have used here these published texts as well as quotations of some unpublished texts in Kortteinen (1998). Here, as well as in the interviews, we looked for segments of texts where the media were mentioned, in order to find out how the unemployed spoke about the media and what features of it they criticised.
2. The interviews were made in Fall 1996 in a suburb Hervanta in Tampere. Of 55 interviewees 13 were then unemployed and 8 were interviewed especially about how the press represented the unemployed. We have used here these 8 interviews. (see Ridell 2000).
3. The victim of a double bind should not be confused with the victim of a moral narrative here.
Sources

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Women liberation is not only a struggle to gain economic and political power and equality, but a symbolic struggle over the cultural definition of femininity and masculinity. Such struggles are fought in the realm of mass communication entailing both those who like to challenge dominating definitions and those yearning to maintain the old and predictable dichotomies (van Zoonen 1994; 5). In this paper, I am directing the attention to new symbolic codes created by challenging groups that are expressed through public discourse. I aim to grasp the flexibility of news discourse in constructing possible alternative and maybe challenging definitions of gender in addition to mainstream representations of women, which in turn are responsible for engendering positions for its readers. The mass media are only one arena for public discourse, but they are the central one for social movements, because they are the only sites that provide a potentially shared public discourse (Gamson 1995; 85). The news media in particular play a crucial role for the wider dissemination and approval of new ideas and values and by framing events and issues significant for a woman movement.

The media has a role to play in the struggle for gender transformation and in saluting the achievements of women in society, in order to inspire others (Tanzania Gender Network Programme, 1997).

In contrast to most feminist research I have chosen to address women liberation as a cultural struggle within a development context focusing upon the cultural underpinnings of communication that might restrict or channel development and social change. The media is perceived as a major source of definitions and images of social reality, including representations of women and definitions of femininity. Thus, the media is also the place where the changing culture and the values of societies and groups are constructed and most visibly expressed. Tanzania makes an interesting case study in this respect. As in several other African countries, external and internal pressure and the struggle towards development have lead Tanzania to open up for democratic and economic reforms. From African socialism as guidelines in the sixties, Tanzania has changed its course to a multiparty system and marked economy in the mid-eighties. The political watershed facing Tanzania has created new opportunities for women to organize, articulate and express themselves. In addition, a new focus upon NGOs to hold an important role in development and civil society, from both donors and governments, makes it more legitimate for women/gender activists to fight for women’s rights and emancipation. In sum, these
changes have lead to a mushrooming of women/gender NGOs, which are crucial for a woman’s movement to emerge. The new political-economic framework has also made it possible for private media to operate which opens up for both new possibilities and risks for a woman’s movement. On one hand, it has lead to an explosion of mass mediated communication and a more open and independent media system, which gives the mass media the possibility to take a more active role in the struggle for gender transformation. On the other hand, liberalization and commercialization of the media serves as a recurring explanation for increased and widespread portrayal of women as objects of male pleasure and violence in Tanzania (Mtambalike 1996; 135). The political-economic transformation has also resulted in new social problems and tensions in the society, between traditional and modern values and ways of life with important bearing on gender notions and ideas. In this new landscape the media is becoming an important cultural agent and an arena for conflicts and contestation. As an agent for change the media can challenge dominant discourse by providing the society with alternative representations of women, new gender ideas and identities, values and ways of living that crosscut earlier traditions and beliefs. The media can also reinforce traditional gender definitions and cultural patterns and thereby legitimate, justify and preserve dominant ideology of gender.

Women liberation is seen to have wider implications for development, which is supported by recent approaches to development that gives more attention to human development, human rights and grassroots participation (Melkote 1991). Along with this movement follows an assumption that development cannot occur without integrating women as active participants in development processes. This calls for gender transformation in society that replace traditional attitudes against women as subordinate and incapable creatures with gender notions promoting equality and positive attitudes towards women as capable of making a living, taking decisions, and participating in all areas of life and society. A key question is whether women are portrayed as subjects taking an active role in their society and able to influence their own life situation or become objects of other people’s actions, which inscribes a ‘reader position’ of women to be coordinated and objectified.

A common notion in feminist media and development studies has been that constant under-representation of women and women’s issues in the media or portraying them in a negative and stereotype manner work as a barrier to women’s participation, empowerment and development. I take another point of departure in which I focus on alternative representations of women that can open up new thoughts, perceptions, and actions. At the same time, I am trying to keep a critical outlook in order to identify oppressive gender structures in the news discourse. This standpoint has several implications for this paper. First, it has guided me to study the news coverage of a key event in a woman’s movement in Tanzania conducted by a prominent woman non-governmental organization. Second, it has lead to a post-structuralist orientation, which provides a focus upon the media as a site of conflict and contestation in which the definition of gender is subjected to continuous discursive struggle and negotiation. Finally, the nature of this study turned my attention to interpretative forms of inquires that can account for the contradictions in the construction of gender in news and the ambiguous process of meaning production. On the following pages, I discuss the theoretical orientation and implications for this paper, and provide an outline of the analytical model used to analyze media texts. Then, I will return to explore issues of gender representations through a concrete case study consisting of news coverage of a debate on gender violence and sexual abuse organized by a prominent woman NGO.
Gender as Constructed in Media Discourse

I argue that a post-structuralist orientation in feminist media research can help to improve conceptualizing how gender might be articulated in media discourses. Feminist post-structuralism introduced a perspective on gender as part of an ongoing process, never finished, stable or true often constituted in paradoxical ways (van Zoonen 1994; 33). This view opens up to see gender as a cultural construction or as constructed in discursive practices. Gender then is seen to be an intrinsic part of culture – loosely defined as the production of meaning – and is subjected to continuous discursive struggle and negotiation (van Zoonen 1994; 33). Within this perspective media are seen as sites of conflict and contestation, accommodating, modifying, reconstructing and producing as well as disciplining contradictory cultural definitions of femininity. This view opens up for multiple ideological positions, which position the individual subject in heterogeneous, overlaying and competing ways (Ang/Hermes 1996; 334). The emphasis of post-structuralism on the multiplicity of discourse allows for oppositional discourses to develop. A central point therefore is that the disciplinary power of discourse prescribing and restricting gender identities and experiences can be resisted and subverted. I therefore find a post-structuralist orientation to carry a liberal element, which is crucial in a cultural struggle of women liberation and explaining social change in general. Within this perspective woman/gender NGOs can be viewed as “communities of discourse” engaged in the enunciation of new cultural codes that often contest dominant cultural codes and representations by articulating new ideas, values, and frames of interpretations (Lichterman 1992 in Taylor/Whittier 1995).

Still, central to post-structuralism is to analyze gender as embedded in existing power formations in society, which influences the representations and perception of women. The access and power to engage in the processes of reality defining is not equally distributed, but intricately linked to variables such as gender, class, ethnic, political-economic and international relations. This means that post-structuralism not only stress the multiplicity of discourse reflecting the contradictory and ambiguous process of meaning production, but also prompts a critical perspective on discursive practices highlighting gender ideology and power relations. Discourse is also itself a form of power, since both the process of discourse (the symbolic interaction) and the product of discourse (i.e. gender definitions) limit the possibilities of interpretation and privilege certain meanings above others (van Zoonen 1994; 39). As van Zoonen points out, the power of discourse lies not only in its capacity to define what is a social problem, but also in its prescriptions of how an issue should be understood, the legitimate views on it, the legitimacy and deviance of the actors involved, the appropriateness of certain acts etc. (van Zoonen 1994; 40).

Post-structural feminist theory has adopted a profound sense of gender skepticism, and thereby eradicating any pre-given guarantee for female unity, which has made feminist activist uneasy by the political implications of post-structuralism. This position erodes the rationale of articulating universal and absolute demands for ‘political correctness’, truths and solutions, but not necessarily involve relativist political retreat. Rather it is an acknowledgment that in order to confront ‘sexism in all its endless variety and monotonous similarity’ a more flexible and pragmatic form of criticism might be more effective than one based upon pre-defined truths (Fraser & Nicholson 1990 in Ang/Hermes 1996; 342). As such feminist post-structuralism can be seen a critical reaction to the normative and moralist absolutism in earlier feminist traditions and approaches. Acknowledging the media’s role as constructing female representations rather than reflect and locate the true image of women doesn’t mean that we have to accept those constructions
In order to formulate a comprehensive cultural critique it is an important task to analyze how gender representations are constructed, reconstructed and contested in media discourses, for instance in news and genre conventions. The media have a responsibility to report upon a multitude of representations, issues and concerns contributing to a better understanding of women’s lives and that empower women to take an active role in the social transformation of their societies.

Analytical Model

Discourse analysis of media entails different levels and dimensions in texts that might form a consistent pattern of discursive features that signal various and even contradictory underlying meanings, opinions and ideological positions (van Dijk 1991). I have chosen narrative analysis as starting point for an ideological analysis rather than a strict linguistic or semiotic approach. Narrative analysis is not limited to dramatic narrative programs, but also applicable to other genres such as news. Narrative analysis is based upon the notion that every story is told by ‘someone’ and in particular ways to whom and for whose benefit the story is told (Allen 1992; 113). It can help to explain how the transmission of news and news conventions are crucial for the ways media handles social tensions and contradictions, and how the structural and functional logic of text development naturalize a sequence of events (White 1991; 173).

A common distinction in narrative analysis is between story and discourse (Kozloff 1991; 67, Chatman 1978; 19). The story is occupied with the question what in the narrative (what happens to whom) consisting of two major elements; events (actions or happenings) and existents (news actors and setting). The discourse is how the story is told, which includes the means by which the content is communicated. The discourse is said to ‘state’ the story. As illustrated in figure 1, these statements are of two kinds – process and stasis. Process statements are in the mode of DO or HAPPEN – as abstract expressional categories – either in form of recounting or enacting an event. Stasis statement is the mode of IS, either in form of exposing or presenting. We can see from the model below that events build upon process statements according to whether someone did something or something happen that either way bring a change of state. I have added to the model that an action can be carried out by a male or a female agent, driven by self-interest or for the social good (family, community or society at large) with fortunate or fatal consequences for those involved2.

Figure 1. Elements of a Narrative Grid and Gender Dichotomy

Stasis statement points to whether something simply exist in the story, which includes news actors and setting. The importance of a news actor can be seen to the extent he/she takes or is affected by significant actions or happenings. I have integrated into the model a classification of ‘spheres of action’, divided into the private/domestic sphere and the public/social coordinating sphere. If the agent or narrative subject recurrently appears in form of a male and the existent or narrative object takes shape of a female it is a clear indication that a man is thought to be active and enacting upon events, while a woman is seen as passive and subjected to other peoples actions and decisions. One implication is that men are associated with the sphere of wider social coordination while women occupy the sub-units being coordinated with possible disempowering effects for women.

Discursive devices in the transmission of news, which might support or undercut the thematic, might concern order and selection. Different news genres have different conventions of the presence/absence of the journalist. Most news reports are at the negative pole of journalist-presence trying to appear as objective as possible. We hear a voice speaking of events or news actors, but its owner reminds hidden in the discursive shadows. Such expression implies interpretative devices or mediator, which include backgrounding and foregrounding of elements of various degrees of importance, and presuppositions (Chatman, 1978; 197). In news an interpreting person of events, issues or agents can appear in form of an informant or authority. Altogether, I attempt to get a better understanding of powerful spoken and unspoken cultural messages subsumed by ‘alternative’ news by addressing both the thematic and structure of news.

Case Study: Gender Violence & Sexual Abuse
Gender-based violence and sexual abuse used to be a taboo in Tanzania and the victims would suffer in silence while the offenders would go free. However, the last decade featured by liberalization and commercialization of the media and increasing pressure from feminist groups stories about rape and sexual abuse against women and children have become a daily event in the Tanzanian press. On one hand, it is of crucial importance for a woman’s movement that these stories are exposed to the public. On the other hand, there is also a danger that women are reduced to victims of men’s actions sitting on the sideline in discussions influencing their lives. On this background, I have chosen an event-oriented case study consisting of news coverage of a prominent woman non-governmental organization concentrating their efforts against gender-based violence and sexual offenses.

Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) is in the forefront of women’s struggle for liberation in Tanzania. TAMWA stands out by their continuous efforts to put violence against women and children on the political agenda as well as using the media as a tool for sensitization purposes. As such TAMWA is an important vehicle producing and carrying the message of an emerging woman movement in Tanzania. However, the chosen event is just one moment in the formation of a woman movement. The following case study consists of newspaper coverage of a debate on gender violence and sexual harassment organized by TAMWA, which they held for the Members of Parliament (MPs) in Dodoma, Tanzania, July 26th 1997. TAMWA wanted to sensitize the MPs on the magnitude of gender-based violence and child abuse in Tanzania, and to win support of the legislators to repeal or amend laws that discriminate or deny women and children of their basic human rights. The Symposium resulted in a dialog among the policy makers in society, which subsequently contributed to the new “Sexual Offences Special Provision Bill 1998”.
The TAMWA Symposium attracted many journalists and received extensive media coverage. 12 newspapers were involved in covering the event with a total of 35 articles. For analytical purposes the articles have been divided into groups according to well-used journalistic categories. The first group of articles focuses primarily on what is happening; what the debate is about, the problems, issues etc. The second category is occupied with how TAMWA carried out or planned to carry out the event. The third group of articles focuses on how to deal with the increasing incidents of rape, defilement and sodomy, measures to be taken etc. Finally, I have included a section focusing upon why is it happening and whom to blame.

I Struggle for Women’s Rights is Legitimate

Ten articles focus mainly on what the TAMWA Symposium is about and the issues involved. In terms of story and discourse the analysis shows a general pattern based upon process statements in which TAMWA is portrayed as the agent leading up to the debate on gender violence, rape and sexual harassment against women and children. TAMWA is foregrounded in the stories in headings and lead paragraphs. The positioning of TAMWA can be illustrated in the example below:

Mtanzania July 27 1997 Editorial

TAMWA has lighted up the torch, our duty is to race it

Yesterday for the first time in the history of our nation there were processions and later debate in Dodoma town about the practices of raping, sodomising and sexual harassment against women, male and female children which are now common in the country. The Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) organized this event, which is peculiar, and it involved citizen, public institutions, international and private institutions. The problem of raping is big; therefore there is no reason for writing a lot about it. It is an issue that requires deep investigation and undoubtedly no one can object that it is necessary to fight against it by any means. It is not only that raping is an act, which is inhuman, but also it harasses and humiliates, that is why in most cases the victims end up in problems. …

TAMWA’s actions are seen to be driven by a motivation for the social good for the society at large, and with intended fortunate effects for women and children. This is evenmore evident anothe editorial: “The director of the Dodoma debate, Mrs. Maria Shaba should use her status and act as a hero of millions of women who are being harassed and undervalued. Maybe after the Dodoma debate, women and children harassment and raping events will decrease”. Among these articles there were surprisingly many editorials and commentaries – genres that aim to be pervasive or argumentative – which can be taken as an indication that the newspapers take an active role in framing the event. This is reflected on several levels in the texts. In the last paragraph the support of TAMWA is repeated directly or indirectly by inviting the Members of Parliaments (MPs) to take the issue seriously and to amend laws to accommodate stern measurement against the offenders. The authors are present in the texts using the pronoun ‘we’, making interpretations, judgments and generalizations that might mold beliefs in favor of women. “The habit of leaders to address in words without any implementations should
be abandoned, otherwise it will be difficult for our nation to develop. Lastly, we insist that campaigning to eliminate the acts of raping and harassing women should continue” (Commentary: SHABA, 28/7/97). Also language and choices of vocabulary support the positive position the newspapers have taken regarding the Symposium. Rape and sexual harassment are described in negative laden terms, such as inhuman, horrible, evil acts, terrible problem, and dangerous game. There is also a tendency to place gender violence and sexual abuse within the context of women’s rights as well as in relation to women’s low status in society (economically, politically, and culturally). This is especially evident in two interviews with TAMWA members, which puts the Symposium into a broader context for potential readers. The TAMWA members draws upon a liberal feminist framework of human rights, basic and legal rights, and laws discriminating women in inheritance, land tenure, education, and cultural heritage. The context brings out that sexual offenses are one of many interrelated important issues for women liberation.

In contrast to editorials, commentaries, and even reader’s letters, the authors in news reports are minimally present. Three news reports are covering the Symposium’s objectives and issues, which record nothing beyond the speech of news actors. However, indirectly the articles support TAMWA by order and selection of sources and statements. One of the news reports stresses the magnitude of rape, sodomy, and wife battering by using TAMWA sources and source texts: 2400 WOMEN HAVE BEEN RAPED: TAMWA REVEALS IN DODOMA (HEKO, July 27 1997). Hence, the article gives precedence to TAMWA and their conceptualizations and thereby indirectly support TAMWA’s efforts. Statistics and research is a form of form of generalization that also gives legitimacy to the issues.

The different levels and dimensions of the analysis form a rather coherent pattern of discursive features supporting TAMWA’s objectives and fight against gender violence and abuse in both an open and direct and a more covert manner. Thus, the coverage gives legitimacy to the issue of gender violence and sexual abuse. At another level an implication of the coverage is that it contest the dominant gender dichotomy. Women are making headlines in vigor of their social status, acting as social coordinators in the public sphere who are willing to take action to influence political-legal processes to improve the lives of women and children. These representations of women crosscut traditional beliefs of women as subordinate, weak, passive and dependent, and thereby contribute to more modern and positive perception of women as able to participate in society and development of the country. Hence, these newspaper articles can be characterized as empowering.

II Bringing Private Destines to Parliament, Not Acceptable

11 articles are concerned with how TAMWA planned to carry out or conducted the event. As the discourse turns from emphasizing what to how, TAMWA has to share the role as the agent or textual subject with the MPs. Along with this shift the majority of the articles facilitate a negative image of TAMWA by foregrounding accusations and criticism against TAMWA’s methods. To a large extent the criticism is allowed to pass uncontested. Two major issues are recurring.

The first issue concerns TAMWA’s plan to bring rape victims to ‘testify’ before the MPs. The articles have slightly different focus, but they are all based on the same chain of events: TAMWA wants to bring rape victims to Parliament (X); MPs react with refusal to attend if TAMWA goes through with their plans (Y). As a final consequence TAMWA decides not to bring life testimonies before the MPs (Z). According to the newspapers
MPs refused live testimonies, because it would further harass those women, which the following statement illustrates: "What jolted my mind was the proposals to parade victims of rape and defilement to testify before the MPs. Thank God this did not happen. One up for the office of the parliament, which I am told, shot down the idea. Having said that, I must acknowledge that the Symposium stirred the right reaction from MPs" (Editorial: Daily News 28/7/97). TAMWA's action then may be interpreted as an act of self-interest with possible fatal consequences for those female victims involved, while MPs contra action is seen as for the social good and with fortunate effects. An implication to draw from this is that it is not acceptable to bring private destinies to the Parliament; they belong to be handled in court. This one-sided view cuts off the possibility to give rape victims a face, which in turn could contribute to reduce the social stigma attached to rape victims and their families.

The second issue concerns a question of payment of MPs and journalist, which appeared after the event. These articles represent a split view of TAMWA. Three of the articles focus on TAMWA's good intentions by paying the MPs in order to convince them to attend in the struggle against sexual harassment and rape. It is also foregrounded that TAMWA is willing to sleep in tents to economize, which implies that TAMWA members sacrifice own comfort to the campaign. However, the issue of payment also raises harsh critique in other articles in which TAMWA is condemned for discriminating against debate members (see example below). Partly, TAMWA is criticized for paying the MPs allowances while the journalists had to sleep in tents, and partly for paying some journalists while others didn't get paid. The complaints come from both MPs speaking on behalf of the journalists and journalists themselves:

HEKO 29/7/97, by correspondent in Dodoma

MPs CONDEMN TAMWA FOR DESPISING THE JOURNALISTS

Several members of the parliament have complained against the Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) for paying them big allowances in the women debate and forgot the journalists, even the ones they came with from Dar es Salaam. ... Honorable Juma Akukweti said that keeping people [journalists] in tents while they had preserved money for paying the MPs was not wise and does not confirm to Tanzanian customs and traditions. He said, Tanzanians are used to cooperating in everything when they are in trouble or harmony.

The articles are written from the journalists' point of view who are part of the conflict, and might be said to signalize the journalists (authors) opinions. This is reflected in foregrounding accusation that are based upon the journalists' own observations or supported by MPs statements as in the example above. Choices of negative laden vocabulary confirm the negative image of TAMWA, such as condemn and despising. Alternatively, it could have stressed that the journalists attending the meeting traveled and ate on TAMWA's expense and had the opportunity to sleep in tents for free rather than complaining of what they didn't get. With all respect, it is the journalists'/media's job to cover important events and issues in society.
Overall, the tone is changing and TAMWA put in a negative light by portraying their organizing methods on two different issues directly or indirectly as emotional, unfair, improper, immoral, dishonest, and disrespectful that needs to be condemned. A possible ideological implication is re-enforcing a prevailing attitude that women are too emotional and not fit as organizers or social coordinators of issues of public concern. In a wider meaning such a definition of women or femininity could restrict women’s participation in politics, decision-making, and recourse allocation and thereby in development of the country as a whole.

**III Castration, Hanging, Injection or Shot to Death**

How to deal with the increasing incidents of rape, sodomy, and defilement against women and children is the main theme in ten articles. Most of the articles are in form of news reports; repeating suggestions, views and opinions. The news discourse has shifted to portray MPs as the agents who want to take action against these “evils”, while TAMWA figures more in the background. However, some newspapers choose to blow up certain views or stress an angle that are eye catching out of commercial motives rather than informative or educational purposes.

About half of the articles foreground serious propositions that were presented in the debate on behalf of TAMWA, and thereby indirectly support TAMWA’s ideas. These measures include amending existing laws, a proposal on special courts for sex offenders, the establishment of a human right committee, and to change the police form (PF3) claimed to be inadequate to prove rape, sodomy, and defilement. The other half of the articles stresses lighthearted suggestions from the MPs that signalize that they don’t take the debate seriously. This is reflected in headings and leads, which can be illustrated by the following title: **RAPING: WHICH PUNISHMENT IS SUITABLE – CASTRATION, INJECTION OR DEATH BY A GUN? Members of Parliament are still mediating on this issue** (Mtanzania, July 30 1997). Suggestions include hanging or shooting the “culprit” in public, injection to weaken sexual power, separate apartments in jail so the rapists can “rape themselves”. While these kinds of statements make big headlines in the newspapers they are not very useful for the debate. There are at least two possible implications involved. First, it makes a critical issue that should be treated with care and respect into a laughing matter, which might also indicate that the MPs are not taking the organizers of the debate in a serious manner (read women). Second, more important arguments and solutions to the problem of sexual harassment and rape get less attention by the newspapers and possibly by their readers.

Male sources are now outnumbering female sources, and there is a tendency to forefront a male source before a female source. Both tendencies can partly be explained by that the majority of the MPs and Ministers are men, and partly by valuing a man’s opinion before a woman’s opinion. Still, female MPs are represented in almost every article and in some articles they ‘compete’ with their male peers. A positive implication to draw from this is that women to a certain degree are portrayed as subjects and to hold important posts as MPs, who are enacting upon events to change the conditions of women and children.

**IV Women in Miniskirt and Mentally Ill Men**

While law and court procedures is an attempt to combat rape, sodomy, and defilement in society moral decay is a recurrent theme introduced to explain causes to the increase
of these offenses. It corresponds to the journalistic category why is it happening, which is usually backgrounded in news reports if taken into consideration at all. However, in most of the articles discussed in the previous section it is made one or more attempts to explain causes to the increase of rape, sodomy, and defilement. In addition, moral decay is also the main topic in four articles. Recurrent issues are women’s dressing, influence of television and western culture, and mental illness. Blames are directed against “sexually starved men” for raping women and as “a strange mental illness that drives a man to assault a toddler the size of his sexual organ”. TV is repeatedly blamed to teach the youths a western culture and lifestyle, for instance by showing “half-naked women dancing in seductive ways “ that can cause to raise men’s emotions and lead to rape. However, attacks against women in mini-skirts and “certain behavior” are made into a major issue that outdo the other explanations framed within the broader framework of moral decay.

In total, ten articles touch upon the question of women’s dressing. When treated as a sub theme the articles mostly report upon MPs divergent opinions. Some claiming that the way some women dress arises men’s emotions and lead to rape. Others deny that this is a reason or should be used as an excuse for rape, defend women’s right to dress as they wish, and that men have to cultivate self-discipline in order to get respected. The issue of dressing is a good example on how the movement from socialist to capitalist principles creates conflicts between traditional and modern values, and how the media becomes an arena for contestation where prevailing definitions of gender are being contested.

The articles taking up moral decay as the main topic forefront a one-sided critique against women in mini dresses as illustrated in the example below. TAMWA is the main news actor in two of these articles in which the organization is criticized for defending women’s freedom to dress as they wish. The editor (male) in the example below supports TAMWA’s efforts and fight against rape and sexual harassment as can be seen in the lead paragraph. However, a feminist discourse is undercut by focusing on women (victims) as the main source to the problem of rape and sexual harassment. The author makes explicitly his views, which might mold values, norms, and beliefs in the interest of a traditional perception of women and femininity. TAMWA is seen to go against Tanzanian moral and culture, and thereby contribute to moral decay in the society (fatal effects).

HEKO 11/8/97 By the editor

TAMWA SHOULD NOT SWERVE FROM TANZANIAN MORALS

The Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) has come up on the front line in the struggle for women’s rights. … The struggle for children’s rights, the female child’s right to education, sexual harassment within the Tanzanian society are the efforts that have given TAMWA very high respect…. According to the moralities of our country, we did not expect women who are required to awake the society and to stand firm, like TAMWA, defending dresses that are not respectful in our society. …The event that was reported upon in the media yesterday about mocking of a woman in such dressing is enough testimony that the society does not accept it.
The last statement in the example above refers to a news report from the day before: **A WOMAN MOCKED IN DAR FOR PUTTING ON A SHORT DRESS** (paper unknown 10/8/97). The event is based upon a chain of actions. A woman had put on a very short dress (x), and after being groaned and mocked at with insults and accusations by a group of people in the city (y), she ran around to by “kitenge” to cover up and disappeared in a taxi (z). In other words, the woman is both subject and victim of other people’s actions, which she has brought upon herself due to her own selfishness, and the consequences of her actions are fatal. However, the story doesn’t stop here: “When people were rounding her (the woman mocked), some were heard singing a song, some of the words were TAMWA, TAMWA, the words were not clear …”. Unlike the editor, the journalist makes no explicit judgments, but link the singing to the TAMWA Symposium and leaves a gap to be filled in by the readers. Following the structural logic of the text it explains and naturalizes a sequence of events, which implies that dressing up in mini-skirts is morally wrong and the society will not accept such behavior. Embedded in the discourse is also that TAMWA is wrong in supporting such immoral acts. This is backed up by a statement in the last paragraph in which the journalist points to two lawyers who claim, “that within the law there is a notion of being in a dignity situation and that all shameful practices should be groaned at”.

There are several ideological implications involved. First, the overall message in all four articles focusing on moral decay is that if you break with the dominant cultural codes you will face the consequences both as individuals and organizations. Second, both the direct and indirect transmission of the news favors a view that moral decay is a major cause to the increase of rape, sodomy and defilement, and thereby fail to grasp underlying gender-based power relations, cultural attitudes, and social structure. Third, by focusing on women only the problem is localized to women (the victims), who are seen to have brought such acts upon themselves. This biased focus not only frees men from the responsibility, but also avoids pinpointing underlying gender-based power relations. Both the authors and the sources in the four articles discussed here are males and could therefore be said to signal a male attitude that might favor a specific ideological perspective geared towards men’s interests, which reproduces and legitimates men’s power. In turn, such an ideological perspective might govern news gathering routines, interpretation of sources and other texts, and description of news events.

**Conclusion**

The discourse analysis reveals that fighting for gender transformation is a slippery road with lots of turns and potholes involving both opportunities and risks for a woman’s movement and its NGO’s spearheading the struggle. The articles focusing upon what the debate is about represent the most positive position for TAMWA and opens up for a feminist discourse (I). It is stressed that TAMWA is in the frontline of woman’s struggle for liberation, and the articles express directly or indirectly support for TAMWA’s efforts. The newspapers draws upon TAMWA as an important source and discourse, which is significant not only for the approval of TAMWA’s objectives and ideas, but also represents a vital moment in a woman’s movement in challenging dominant discourse of gender. An important dimension in the news discourse is that women are portrayed to be the agent carrying out the event, driven by a motivation for the social good intending to improve the conditions of women and children. The discourse contests the gender dichotomy prevailing in society by portraying women as actors in the public sphere, as social coordinators defined in terms of role categories aligned with culture. Implicit the
news discourse embodies ideas and values that challenge traditional beliefs about women as subordinate, emotional and unable to participate in public debate and decision-making. In turn, this can have a positive effect on the inclusion of women in decision-making, coordination and resource allocation, and thereby channel development in the interests of women and children. At the same time, grassroots women have a strictly limited voice and positioned as victims of gender violence, rape, and sexual harassment. In a covert manner it might be said that there is a distinction between woman activists (and female MPs) on one side, and ordinary women on the other. This positioning is probably partly a result of news conventions attaching news value to elite groups before ordinary people. Nevertheless, the underlying distinction could affect the ways in which individuals take up positions inscribed in the news discourse, and thereby limit the effect of alternative gender representations.

In spite of the news discourse being rather coherent in supporting TAMWA’s objectives with the Symposium the organization ‘looses’ control as the event evolves. TAMWA’s ability to organize is disputed on several issues in articles concerned with how the event was conducted (II). As news actor and agent TAMWA is now competing with MPs, and the majority of sources are males as are the journalists. Members of Parliament takes over as the main news actor/agent in the articles concerned with how to deal with the increasing incidents of rape, sodomy, and defilement (III). Male sources are outnumbering female sources. Compared to the articles in the first category a feminist discourse is now backgrounded in favor of a commercial discourse turning the issue into a show of punishment methods. In the last category why is it happening and whom to blame TAMWA seems to have lost all influence over the debate, which turns into a question of moral decay in particular blaming women themselves. The strong focus upon mini-skirts and to a certain degree TV and western influence takes the attention away from deeper social and cultural explanations. In sum, the analysis show that the interaction between TAMWA, MPs and journalists representing different institutional and personal interests plays an important role in the development of a woman’s movement. In particular, the media’s interpretations have wider implications for the formation of a woman movement’s identity. It also shows that the struggle of meaning takes place within existing frames of power relations in society in which the access and power to engage in the process of reality defining is reflected along power lines in society. The main impression is that these articles facilitate a negative image that could cause TAMWA’s basic objectives and ideas to suffer.

The power of discourse is visible in defining what is a social problem. Among the various themes that were presented at the Symposium one specific issue is foregrounded in the news discourse; rape, sodomy, and defilement. Other important themes and issues that were introduced during the Symposium get little attention, such as wife battering, land and inheritance rights, social and cultural norms discriminating against women and girls. This choice might be interpreted as being geared towards commercial interests in which women have become objects of sensational news reporting (sex and violence). Moreover, the news discourse prescribes that rape is an issue that should be understood as a human right issue within a liberal feminist framework, which undercuts the importance of an alternative framework of interpretation scrutinizing underlying gender-based power relations and the meaning of gender. The power of discourse also lies in writing off TAMWA’s plan to bring private testimonies as improper without taking into consideration of what could be gained. Last, but not at least the discourse legitimate the view that moral decay and deviant acts, such as mini-dresses, TV-influence, and mental illness
are major explanations for the increase of rape, sodomy, and defilement. Such explanations isolate the case of raping, sodomy, and defilement from the rest of the society; like cancerous tumor that must be removed. The medicine prescribed is abandoning Western culture and television, and going back to the original African culture. Hence, the possibility that sexual harassment and abuse is a question of gender and power relations is eliminated and thereby the topic can be discussed without being a threat to men and their position. Blaming women in short dresses, television and western influence, and mentally ill men become superficial explanations for the increase and combat of rape, defilement and sodomy. In the debate there has not been presented any evidence that women in short dresses are more likely to be raped than women who dress according to Tanzania customs. Also, there is no indication that rape is more widespread in areas where the exposure of television is rather high than in areas where it rarely exists. All in all, the investigations for explanations have to go deeper into problems in society, and social and cultural practices and attitudes that naturalizes a male dominated culture and prestige structure.

The overall implication for gender might be of both empowering and disempowering character. Gender is constructed and reconstructed through various and sometimes contradicting ideas, values and definitions of femininity, which support a feminist post-structuralist view of the construction of gender as a discursive construct. Women are portrayed as both fit and unfit as social coordinators, as both active subjects enacting upon events and victims of other people’s actions, as both freedom fighters and immoral temptations. The news discourse carries multiple ideological positions or gender positioning, which in turn place the individual reader in heterogeneous, overlapping, and competing ways.

Notes
1. This paper is based upon parts of my work on my doctoral thesis: Gender, Media and Development: The role of the Media in the Cultural Struggle of gender transformation in Tanzania.
2. The gender dichotomy is based upon a well-known anthropological dichotomy as suggested by Ortner and Whitehead (1981), who operates with the following oppositions claimed to recur cross culturally: Nature vs. culture, domestic vs. public, self interest vs. social good.
3. This statement is based on a survey conducted by the author of 14 newspapers in Dar es Salaam during two weeks of September 1997.

References


Delinquency and Icelandic Adolescents’ Viewing of Television Violence

Gudbjörg Hildur Kolbeins

During the 1990s, discussion about the causes of juvenile delinquency and aggression among children and adolescents became more prevalent in Iceland. Not surprisingly, people blamed the amount of violence in entertainment media for the apparent increase in the juvenile delinquency rate.

For the past four decades or so, a plethora of studies has been conducted on the relationship between aggression and filmed violence. The vast majority of the research has found a positive relationship between viewing of violence and aggressive behavior, no matter whether the studies were done in a laboratory setting (for ex. Bandura et al., 1963) or as longitudinal research (for ex. Huesmann, 1986; Eron & Huesmann, 1986).

After doing a meta-analysis on 217 studies, dating between 1957 and 1990, Paik and Comstock reported that the overall correlation between viewing violence and antisocial behavior is .31. Paik and Comstock argue that “this 10% increase in success rate, or 10 viewers out of 100 being affected by television violence, cannot be dismissed as an insignificant effect” (Paik & Comstock, 1994: 535). However, it should be noted that when the survey design has been used to investigate the relationship between criminal violence and violence viewing, the correlation is only .06 and thus accounting for only 0.4% of the variance (Paik & Comstock, 1994).

Although the tendency has been to assume that television violence is the antecedent to aggressive behavior, i.e. the cause of the behavior, a number of studies has found that although we have a correlation between violence viewing and aggressive/antisocial behavior, aggressive people may actually be seeking out violent material (Bryant, 1989; Gunter, 1983; Black & Bevan, 1992).

When the research, which is reported in this paper, was conducted, the relationship between television viewing and aggressive behavior among Icelandic adolescents was an unknown territory, i.e. no study had attempted to replicate in Iceland the findings from studies elsewhere in the world.

More specifically, the present study attempted to answer the following two questions: Does viewing of violent television shows increase the aggressiveness of Icelandic adolescents? Does viewing violent television shows increase juvenile delinquency, other than aggression, among Icelandic adolescents?

It was expected that:
1. There will be a positive relationship between the adolescents’ viewing of television violence and their level of aggressiveness.

2. There will be a positive relationship between the adolescents’ viewing of television violence and their delinquent behavior.

At the time of the present study, Icelanders had lived with television for just over three decades, and in a multi-channel environment for 12 years. Hence, the oldest adolescents, who participated in this study, were still pre-schoolers when broadcasting was deregulated, and many of the youngest subjects had no recollection of a single-channel home.

Considering the dramatic changes in the availability of channels and increased air time in Iceland, one might say that these adolescents belong to the first generation of viewers who were raised in a similar television environment to their counterparts in the United States and in other European countries. Thus, keeping in mind the number of studies which have found a relationship between viewing of violence and aggressive behavior, one might expect the results of the present study to be consistent with these other studies and to find a significant association between viewing of television violence and aggression and delinquency among Icelandic adolescents.

Sample and Procedure

The sample for the present study was recruited from ten public schools in the Reykjavík-metropolitan area in Iceland. With the exception of two of the schools, four classes were randomly selected from each school, i.e. one in 7th grade, one in 8th grade, one in 9th grade and finally one in 10th grade.

The sample (674 individuals) ranged in age from 11 to 16. Girls were 54.2% of the sample (365) and boys 45.8% (309).

All of the questionnaires were administered by the students’ teachers who had received written instructions from the researcher. According to Thóroddur Bjarnason (1995), this method of administering the questionnaires does not affect the validity or the reliability of the study. It has even turned out to be better sometimes to have a familiar figure (the teacher) administer the questionnaires instead of an outsider (the researcher or his research assistants). The students had 40 minutes, one class hour, to answer all of the questions.

Parental Education and Income

To get some crude measure of parental education and SES status, macro data on the percentage of college educated people in the adolescents’ school districts and the average monthly family income in the school districts were obtained from the Social Sciences Research Institute at the University of Iceland.

But what does the percentage of college educated people in the adolescent’s school district really tell us? In some cases it tells us something about the adolescent’s parents, but it also tells us something about the adolescent’s neighborhood and his/her friends as friendships are usually formed with those who have similar backgrounds as we do. Since children in Iceland usually attend school in their own neighborhoods and within a five- or a ten-minute walking distance from their homes, their out-of-class friends are usually their classmates. Like the proverb goes: “Birds of feather flock together”. Thus, the macro data cannot simply be taken at face value. It’s indirectly telling us a lot more than
just what the average family income is or what the percentage of college graduates in the school district is.

Total Viewing of Television
Two questions tapped the frequency of television viewing. More specifically the first question asked: “From Monday to Friday, how many hours a day do you usually watch television?” The other question asked: “How many hours a day do you usually watch television on Saturdays and Sundays?”

The options were the same for both questions, i.e. one hour or less (1), one to two hours (2), two to three hours (3), three to four hours (4), four to five hours (5), five to six hours (6), six to eight hours (7) and eight hours or more (8).

Those two questions were then weighted proportionally (the score for Monday through Friday was multiplied by five and added to the score for Saturdays and Sundays which was multiplied by two) and combined to create one variable that could be a reliable measurement of total television viewing.

Viewing of Genres
Since so many homes in Iceland have now access to satellite television and foreign channels, it wasn’t thought to be realistic to present the sample with lists of programs that are only broadcast on the four Icelandic channels. Instead, it was felt that it would work better to have the subjects rate their frequency of viewing of specific genres on a Likert-type nine-point scale. The problem with doing that, of course, is that one is leaving it up to each individual to decide what our measures or scales actually mean. Does “6”, for example, mean once a week or does it mean three times a week? On the other hand, one could argue that the individual’s definition is more important and is more meaningful than the researcher’s because in terms of effects, it’s the individual’s definition and experience of the event that really matters but not necessarily how often it happened.

The question on viewing of genre asked: “How often do you watch the following material on television?” The students were then asked, for example, to circle 9 if they watched frequently or to circle 1 if they never watched that specific genre.

The question included the following genres: a) situation comedies, b) cartoons, c) children and family programs, d) drama, e) crime shows, f) action shows, g) science fiction, h) horror shows, i) erotica (called “light blue” in Iceland), j) documentaries, k) music videos, l) sport programs, m) news, and n) boxing.

Factor analysis (varimax rotation) revealed five factors when it came to the adolescents’ viewing of television genres. The following genres loaded most heavily on the first factor, i.e. action programs, horror programs and boxing. This factor also included erotic programs, and was thus labeled the violence and erotica factor. It accounted for 20.7% of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 2.90.

Family Cohesion and Parental Supervision
The 13 items that were used to measure family cohesiveness, i.e. the relationship between the adolescent and his/her parents, were borrowed and adapted from various scales, including a scale used by Rannsóknarstofnun uppeldis- og menntamála (RUM) in 1997 (The Institute for Educational Research in Iceland) and Cernkovich and Giordano (1987).
It was expected that high scores on this Likert-scale would indicate a good family atmosphere and closeness between the subject and his/her parents, while low scores were indicators of emotional neglect.

The family cohesiveness question asked: “Answer the following statements to the best of your ability. Circle the answer that applies to you.” In addition, the question specifically stated that the word “parents” also meant adoptive parents or stepparents. The scale ranged from 1 to 5, 1 being never and 5 being frequently.

The following statements were included:

a) My parents ask my how I’m doing in school.

b) My parents are proud of me.

c) My parents trust me.

d) I have a good relationship with my parents.

e) My parents listen to my opinions and respect them.

f) I can talk to my parents about matters that bother me.

g) I can talk to my parents about everything.

h) I spend my free time with my parents.

i) I have the same interests as my parents.

j) My parents show me warmth and affection.

k) My parents help me with my homework.

l) It’s easy for me to borrow money from my parents.

m) I show my parents that I care about them.

The seven items that made up the parental supervision Likert-scale are all commonly used to measure supervision and were presented in the same form as the statements which measured family cohesion. They have, for example, been used in one form or another by RUM, Haapasalo and Tremblay (1994) and Cernkovich and Giordano (1987).

It is crucial to get good measures of parental supervision since it has been found to be one of the strongest predictors of delinquent behavior (Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986). In addition, it is expected that parental supervision is negatively associated with viewing of television. Thus, lack of monitoring by parents may concurrently contribute to delinquent behavior among adolescents and their viewing of violent material. This would give some support to the theory of media delinquency that argues that watching violence is one of many manifestations of delinquency (Roe, 1995).

The following statements were included:

a) I obey rules about how long I can stay out.

b) My parents know whom I’m with when I’m not home.

c) My parents know whom I’m with when I go out in the evening.

d) My parents know my friends.

e) My parents know where my friends live.

f) My parents know how I’m doing in school.

g) I leave messages if my parents aren’t home when I go out.

Originally it was expected that family cohesion, i.e. the adolescents’ relationship with their parents, and parental supervision were two separate dimensions. However, although factor analysis revealed that they load separately on two factors, the reliability alpha for
a combined scale of these items is .9256 and removing any one of them would lower the alpha. Hence, the measurement instrument appears to be quite reliable when all of the items are included in one scale, and it also appears that the family cohesion items and the supervision items are in fact to a large degree measuring the same concept. Also, the correlation between the cohesion items and the parental supervision items is .6426 (p< .001). This simply means that the better the relationship between the adolescents and their parents, the more likely the parents are to monitor their adolescents’ behavior and their comings and goings. Or one could argue that this is actually the other way around, i.e. because parents supervise their adolescents, it may improve the relationship between the parents and their adolescents.

Relationships with Siblings and Family Tension/Violence
Patterson’s coercive cycle of violence assumes that siblings provide a training ground for aggressive behavior (Patterson, 1986). Consequently, it is essential to measure the subject’s relationship with his/her siblings. Frequent sibling fighting might also be manifested in increased tension and conflict in the home.

Thus, the sample was asked: “How often do you argue with your siblings (without physical fighting)?”, “How often do you fight [physically] with your siblings?” And finally: “How often do you tease your siblings?”

The options were the following: doesn’t apply because I’m the only child (coded as 1 – missing), never (2), infrequently (3), seldom (4), sometimes (5), often (6) and frequently (7).

To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no other study in Iceland had investigated the prevalence of child abuse, as reported by the children. The previously mentioned study by RUM asked the subjects how often in the past 12 months an adult they knew well had punched them, hit them, kicked them or headbutted them – without asking specifically about what relations that adult had with the child.

Two questions examined how often the subject had observed verbally and physically violent acts in his/her home, while another two questions asked specifically how often the students had been subjected to various violent behaviors by their parents – verbal and physical.

More specifically, “How often do you see someone at home scream or fight with someone else?” and “How often do you see someone at home use physical violence against someone else (kick, slap, punch, put in a headlock, headbut, burn [scorch], pull hair or push)?” “How often do your parents or your custodians scream at you or fight with you?” And finally: “How often do your parents or custodians use physical violence against you (kick, slap, punch, put in a headlock, headbut, burn [scorch], pull hair or push)?”

The adolescent could respond never (1), infrequently (2), seldom (3), sometimes (4), often (5) and frequently (6).

Since abuse doesn’t necessarily happen on regular basis like once a day or once a week, leaving the interpretation of the options up to the adolescents was thought to be a better choice than using more specific options. The rationale for that was the same as for using the genre-viewing scale, i.e. if the adolescent feels that he is being abused frequently, even though it may be twice a year but not every day – that is what really counts. It’s the adolescent’s interpretation of the event and the impact of the event that matters, but not how often it occurs in terms of days or weeks. Another adolescent might consider twice a year to be seldom because that’s what it feels like to him/her.
It was originally expected that the items which measured family tension/violence might load on three separate factors (fights with siblings, observing violence and being the victim of violence), and they did, but the reliability alpha for the combined items on a single scale was .7385 and removing any item would have lowered it – made the scale less reliable as a measurement instrument.

**Aggression, Delinquency and Illicit Drug Use**

Most of the questions that measured aggression were used in the spring of 1997 by The Institute for Educational Research in Iceland (RUM).

The question on aggression asked: “In the past 12 months, how often have you done the following to another human being?” a) punched, b) pushed, c) kicked, d) slapped, e) put in a headlock, f) headbutted, g) burnt [scorched], h) pulled hair, i) threatened violence, and j) threatened with a weapon.

The options were: never (coded as 1), once (2), 2-5 times (3), 6-9 times (4), 10-13 times (5), 14-17 times (6) and 18 or more times (7).

These 10 aggression items were combined into a single scale with a reliability alpha of .8813.

A number of the items that made up the delinquency scale were borrowed from a 54-item scale that Moffitt and Silva used in New Zealand (Moffitt & Silva, 1988). In addition, quite a few items were new and were constructed after the researcher’s conversation with Karl Steinar Valsson, a criminologist and an assistant police chief with the Reykjavík Police Department. Moffitt has argued that delinquency is normative during adolescence and that most people do something illegal during that period of their lives (Moffitt, 1993). By using a normative scale of delinquency, it is believed that one can get a greater range in behaviors.

Most of the 28 items that were included in this questionnaire are behaviors that are believed to be fairly common in Iceland. A few items on the New Zealand scale were either culturally specific to New Zealand, like stealing money from milk bottles or placing things on railway tracks, or they were simply so common in Iceland that they are not considered deviant at all (like going to R-rated movies or swearing loudly).

The questions on delinquency asked: “In the past 12 months, how often have you done the following?” The answer choices and the coding was the same as for the aggression scale.

Some of the items (three of them), which measured drug use, are to be found on the original 29-item illegal scale used in New Zealand, while other items were added.

Again, the answer options were the same, and the coding was the same, as for the aggression scale.

The question on drug use asked: “In the last 12 months, how often have you..?” a) sniffed glue or other poisonous chemicals, b) used cannabis like hashish and/or marijuana, c) drunk alcohol to get intoxicated, d) used heroin, e) used pills to get high, f) used ecstasy (e-pills), g) used cocaine, h) used LSD, and i) used amphetamine.

Combining all of the juvenile delinquency items into a single scale, as RUM has done in the past, for example, was considered to be seriously problematic for various reasons. The first of them being that the items vary tremendously in their seriousness, from simply causing their victims annoyance, like the crank phone calls, to being serious felonies that carry several months in penitentiaries – breaking into homes to steal or stealing cars, for example. Instead of trying to come up with some arbitrary way of weighing each item in a combined scale of all of these items, varimax rotation was used to factor analyze them.
During the first factor analysis attempt, six factors emerged. However, one of them didn’t seem to have any theoretical explanation at all – so the factors were forced down to five, resulting in much cleaner factors.

The first factor accounted for 39.9% of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 14.78. It included the 11 most serious offenses on the delinquency list, i.e. a) stolen a car, b) broken into cars to steal stereos or CDs, c) broken windows of school buildings, stores or other buildings, d) damaged a car by keying it or broken the mirrors, e) broken parking meters to steal money, f) broken into homes or companies to steal, g) fought in the streets, h) carried a weapon, knives or bats, for example, i) hurt someone seriously in a fight, j) used weapons in a fight, k) stolen something that was worth more than 5,000 Icelandic krónur. This factor was labeled serious crimes factor. In addition to the items mentioned above, blowing up home-made bombs had a secondary loading of .47 on it.

The second factor included six substance abuse items, i.e. a) used cocaine, b) used ecstasy, c) used heroin, d) used LSD, e) used pills, and f) used amphetamine. This factor had an eigenvalue of 3.85 and accounted for 10.4% of the variance. Since all of the hard drugs items loaded on this factor, it is labeled hard drugs factor. Interestingly, breaking into homes and companies was the only serious crimes item that also had a secondary loading on this factor (.49). One might have expected a stronger relationship between these two factors, considering that criminal behavior is in many cases the result of substance abuse as the drug addicts resort to crimes to finance their drug use. Nevertheless, the fact that breaking into homes loaded on this factor seems to indicate that those adolescents who use hard drugs are financing their substance abuse by breaking and entering.

The third factor had an eigenvalue of 2.59 and accounted for 7% of the variance. Almost all of the items which loaded on this factor were alcohol-related, i.e. a) bought alcohol, b) stolen alcohol from parents, c) taken money from parents or custodians without their permission, d) been truant, e) stolen something worth less than 5,000 Icelandic krónur., f) drank alcohol to get intoxicated, and g) used cannabis. Consequently, this factor was labeled as alcohol-related behavior.

It could be argued that most of these items are minor transgressions and for the most part normative during the years of adolescence. It’s interesting to note that using cannabis loaded on this factor but not the drug factor. It’s possible that these adolescents are, what has been termed, recreational users, i.e. they are once-in-a-while users of narcotics (Gunnlaugsson & Thórisdóttir, 1999). Furthermore, it’s quite likely that the those, who will later abuse drugs to a larger extent, haven’t moved on to the harder drugs. Thus, at this stage in their lives, they are going through a transitional period, moving from just alcohol consumption to drugs, and using cannabis is the first step in that transition.

Stealing something worth more than 5,000 Icelandic krónur and stealing clothes from clothing stores had secondary loadings on this factor, i.e. they had loadings of .44 and .46 respectively.

The fourth factor accounted for 4.3% of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 1.60. The common theme of many of the items that loaded on this factor was vandalism. The following items loaded on it: a) blown up home-made bombs, b) vandalized bus shelters, c) stolen something from convenience stores d) lit fires where it was forbidden, e) damaged school property, f) made crank phone calls, and g) written on walls or fences.

These acts appear to be very juvenile, i.e. something that the younger kids would do, like making crank phone calls and damaging school property. Again, quite a few of them can probably be considered normative, something that a large number of adolescents do.
Five other items had secondary loadings on this vandalism factor, i.e. carried a weapon, fought in the streets, broke windows, and taken money from parents without their permission and stolen something worth less than 5000 kr.

The fifth and final factor included mostly behaviors that have to do with stealing something, i.e. a) stolen books from bookstores, b) stolen clothing (coats and other things) from school mates, c) stolen clothing from clothing stores, d) cheated on a test, and e) run away from home, and e) uses glue to get high. In addition, breaking parking meters and vandalizing bus shelters had secondary loadings on this factor. The eigenvalue for this stealing factor was 1.53 and it accounted for 4.1% of the variance.

As there was a problem with skewness in the distribution of the five delinquency factors, the factors were transformed into scales, which were later dichotomized and recoded. An average score of 1 on a scale was recoded as 0 (having never done any of the delinquent acts on the scale) and an average score of 1.01 or higher was coded as 1 (having transgressed). The five scales, or five types of behaviors, were then combined to produce a single delinquency score for each subject. Thus, the scores ranged from 0 for those who had never transgressed to 5 for those who were the most delinquent.

Looking at the frequency of the various behaviors, it is clear that it is quite common for adolescents to vandalize things, and considering how many adolescents engage in vandalism, it appears to be a normative behavior during adolescence; 82.7% or 550 adolescents had engaged in vandalism. Seven out of every 10 adolescents had engaged in alcohol-related behavior, close to 40% had committed at least one of the more serious crimes but only 2.7% (18 individuals) had used hard drugs.

It appears that adolescents move from one type of delinquent behavior to another type, or stage, of behavior. For example, vandalism seems to precede the alcohol-related behavior as only 48 subjects had engaged in alcohol-related behavior without having vandalized, while 120 subjects had vandalized without engaging in alcohol-related behavior, and 427 of 477 subjects who had engaged in alcohol-related behavior had also committed vandalism.

Alcohol-related behavior in turn seems to precede stealing as only 30 students had scores on the stealing scale without having used alcohol. On the other hand, 208 subjects had used alcohol without stealing and 265 of 297 who steal also use alcohol.

It is quite clear that most adolescents who steal have also vandalized as only 29 of those who had scores on the stealing scale had never vandalized while 279 subjects had vandalized without stealing and 267 subjects had scores on both scales.

Stealing, however, does not seem to be a necessary condition for committing the more serious crimes. Four out of 10 adolescents who had committed at least one of the more serious crimes didn’t have any scores on the stealing scale. These results appear to give some support to the idea of different pathways to delinquency, as stealing is a non-aggressive behavior while many of the items, which made up the serious crimes scale, measured aggressive behavior.

It is clear from the data that adolescents vandalize and engage in alcohol-related behavior before moving on to committing the more serious crimes. Only 11 subjects had committed serious crimes without vandalizing and only 28 subjects had committed serious crimes without engaging in alcohol-related behavior.

Sixteen out of the 18 individuals who had used hard drugs had also committed the more serious crimes, and they had all vandalized something and engaged in alcohol-related behavior, and all but one had a score on the stealing scale.
Thus, the data appear to provide evidence for the claim that adolescents do indeed gradually add to their repertoire of delinquent behaviors, and that the most delinquent ones have sampled all five types of behaviors and consequently score on the highest on the delinquency scale.

It should be noted, of course, that there were 57 adolescents who had a perfectly clean slate, while 112 had engaged in just one type of delinquent behavior, 153 had engaged in two types of behaviors (mostly vandalism and alcohol-related behavior), 192 had engaged in three types of behaviors (either vandalism, alcohol-related behavior and stealing, or vandalism, alcohol-related behavior and serious crimes), 125 had engaged in the four previously mentioned behaviors, and 16 of the 18 hard-drug users had engaged in all five types of behaviors.

Results

The Relationship Between Violence Viewing and Inter-Personal Aggression

Taking into account the large number of studies that show a significant relationship between viewing of violence and aggressive behavior, it was hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between the adolescents’ score on the aggression scale and their viewing of violence.

Hypothesis 1 was supported. However, viewing of violence only explained 2% of the variance for the whole sample while gender seemed to explain 11%, and more importantly, the family environment, both family tension/violence and family cohesion explained 17% of the variance (table 1). Thus, it can be concluded that yes, there is a relationship between watching violence on television and aggressive behavior. Nonetheless, other factors have much stronger influence on adolescents’ aggression.

Table 1. The Relationship Between Adolescents’ Viewing of TV Violence and Their Aggression

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<td>.23****</td>
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<td>.17****</td>
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*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001

Once gender has been factored out, family cohesion and family tension/violence still explain 20% of the variance for both boys and girls (table 2). Since the zero-order correlations between family tension/violence and family cohesion and aggression are both significant, it seems that family cohesion and family tension/violence both contribute significantly to adolescents’ aggressiveness.
Table 2. The Relationship Between Girls’ and Boys’ Viewing of Violent Television Shows and Their Aggressiveness

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<td>.26</td>
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<td>.20****</td>
<td>.02*</td>
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</table>

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001

Nonetheless, viewing of television violence explains 4% of girls’ aggressiveness and 2% of boys’ aggressiveness. This apparently greater influence of television violence on girls is consistent with previous findings by Eron et al. (1986). It may be, as Eron et al. have proposed, that because girls have traditionally been less aggressive than boys, there is more room for television to affect them. Their conclusion was as follows:

Even though boys in general obtain higher aggression scores than girls and watch significantly more violent TV, the correlation between the two variables is now actually higher for girls than for boys, indicating they are now even more affected by TV violence than are boys (Eron & Huesmann, 1986).

The Relationship Between Violence Viewing and Juvenile Delinquency

Hypothesis 2 stated that there would be a positive relationship between viewing of violence and delinquent behavior. This hypothesis was supported as viewing of television violence accounted for 6% of the variance for the sample as a whole (table 3).

Table 3. The Relationship Between Adolescents’ Viewing of TV Violence and Their Delinquent Behavior

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*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001
Looking separately at boys and girls, it is clear that the relationship between violence viewing and delinquent behavior is significant for both genders. The relationship between viewing of television violence and delinquent behavior is slightly stronger for girls than boys. Television violence accounts for 7% of the variance for girls while it explains 4% of the variance for boys (table 4).

### Table 4. The Relationship Between Girls’ and Boys’ Viewing of Violent Television Shows and Their Delinquent Behavior

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*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001

Interestingly, once viewing of television television was entered into the equation, the beta for gender became insignificant, making one want to make the claim that boys are more delinquent than girls simply because they watch more violence on television.

Total viewing of television was entered into the regression model after the viewing of violence but it did not explain a significant percentage of the variance. Thus, it can be concluded that it is selective viewing of television violence, not total viewing of television, that is contributing to the adolescents’ delinquency.

Age explained a significant proportion of the variance, both for girls and boys. It accounted for 6% of the variance for boys and 7% of the variance for girls as older adolescents are more delinquent than the younger ones (table 4). It may be proposed that it isn’t age per se that is responsible for this, but rather everything that is associated with going through adolescence, i.e. increased time away from home and out of sight of parents, possibly increased influence of peers and along with that peer pressure.

Neither the percentage of college-educated people in the neighborhood, nor the average family income of the neighborhood did explain any of the variance for the sample as a whole or for boys. Before family tension/violence and family cohesion were entered into the equation, the beta for the average family income in the neighborhood turned out to be significant for girls.

Not surprisingly, and as might have been expected, family tension/violence and family cohesion together explained 15% of the variance for the total sample, 11% of the variance for boys, but 21% of the variance for girls.

When it was first entered into the equation, the beta for family tension/violence was significant at the p< .10 level for the total sample but it was otherwise insignificant. Because of the strong correlation between family tension/violence and family cohesion,
one has to be careful in making the assumption that it is lack of family cohesion alone that contributes to juvenile delinquency but not family cohesion in conjunction with family tension/violence. The zero-order correlation between delinquency and family tension/violence is .23 while the zero-order correlation between family cohesion and delinquency is slightly stronger at -.47.

Even though the family plays an important role in the delinquency of adolescents (the worse the family environment, the more delinquent the adolescents become), there is a clear indication that there is in fact a positive relationship between viewing of television violence and juvenile delinquency. The more delinquent adolescents watched the most violence. These findings are consistent with most other studies which have investigated the relationship between viewing of television violence and aggressive or antisocial behavior.

Discussion
If one looks first at interpersonal aggression, it is clear that one of the strongest predictors of aggressive behavior is gender.

After reviewing the literature on gender and aggression, Maccoby and Jacklin concluded that:

1. Males are more aggressive than females in all human societies for which evidence is available.

2. The sex differences are found early in life, at a time when there is no evidence that differential socialization pressures have been brought to bear by adults to “shape” aggression differently in the two sexes (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1978: 242).

Thus, the findings from the present study are completely consistent with previous studies.

Secondly, family tension/violence and family cohesion are the strongest predictors of aggressive behavior among adolescents, accounting for one fifth of the variance. As numerous studies have shown, violence breeds violence and this is certainly the case. Lack of cohesion and high levels of family tension/violence make adolescents aggressive.

As hypothesized, the relationship between interpersonal aggression and the adolescents’ viewing of television violence was significant, and family cohesion and tension are important as well.

Age alone accounted for a significant proportion of the variance when it came to juvenile delinquency. Age per se is hardly responsible for the behavior, but rather the changes that occur during adolescence – namely the increased importance of peers and the decreased time spent with the family. A study on American teenagers found that talking to their friends occupied more of their time than any other activity (Steinberg, 1993).

The importance of the peer group was clearly demonstrated in the study by RUM in 1997 when time spent with friends, peers’ use of illegal drugs and their attitudes towards that use accounted for 59% of the adolescents’ use of illegal drugs and their smoking (Thórlindsson et al., 1998).

Unfortunately the present study did not include any peer measures, and thus the argument that age as a variable was at least partially measuring the influence of peers must be purely speculative.

More importantly, as was the case with interpersonal aggression, there is a significant relationship between viewing of violence and delinquency among Icelandic adolescents. But what does it mean?
There are three possible answers to this question, i.e. aggressive people prefer to watch violence, violence causes aggressive behavior, and finally, some third unknown variable is the cause of both. It is quite possible that all three of these choices have some merit and may even be correct.

A Canadian study by Black and Bevan found that aggressive people seek out aggressive material (Black & Bevan, 1992). These findings could be explained in terms of Scarr and McCartney’s genotype—>environment effect (Scarr & McCartney, 1983). We tend to seek out environment that is consistent with our genotype. Thus, it’s logical to draw the conclusion that aggressive individuals prefer aggressive material. As a child’s genotype is related to his/her parents genotype, the parents of an aggressive child will provide him/her with an environment that is conducive to aggression. When it comes to television viewing, for example, it is quite possible that parents of aggressive children are equally likely to watch violence and even draw their children into their own viewing of violence. And thereby fostering an environment of aggression.

As Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber have pointed out, causally related variables are often correlated with each other. Family factors, including genetic factors, that are believed to cause antisocial behaviors tend to be correlated with each other (Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986). Hence, the parent’s genotype operates in conjunction with other parental and familial factors to increase the risk of antisocial behavior.

Along those lines, one can claim that a “bad” genotype only adds to the cumulative effects of bad parenting practices. It appears that “multiple-handicaps” are associated with higher probability of antisocial behavior among children (Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986).

On the other hand, television viewing may be the cause of aggressive behavior in relatively normal children, i.e. children without any major neuropsychological or behavioral problems. As the Bobo-doll studies by Bandura clearly demonstrated, children learn and imitate what they see when provided with the opportunity and if the behavior is not condemned (Bandura et al., 1963).

Thirdly, aggressive behavior/juvenile delinquency and viewing of violence may be a part of a certain lifestyle. In that case, viewing violence would not be the cause of the delinquency nor would the delinquent behavior be the cause of the violence viewing. Violence viewing could be but one part of a delinquent behavioral pattern. That argument is consistent with Roe’s theory of media delinquency. Roe argued that adolescents’ use of, what he preferred to call, socially disvalued media (watching violence and listening to hard rock/heavy metal music) is only one manifestation of delinquent behavior.

Even though this study was not designed to establish the directionality of the relationship between viewing of violence and aggression, the data do allow us to make some arguments about it.

The present study established that the family contributes significantly to adolescents’ aggressiveness, accounting for one fifth of the variance. By controlling for the family environment when looking at the relationship between viewing of television violence and delinquency, one is indirectly, and at least partially, eliminating the possibility of aggression driving the viewing of violence.

To summarize, there is a significant relationship between viewing of television violence among Icelandic adolescents and their aggressive and delinquent behavior. Furthermore, it appears that the violence on television is the cause of the aggressiveness, rather than the aggressiveness causing the viewing.
Bibliography


Competitive Advantage in the Magazine Publishing Business

A Resource-Based Perspective

HELENE HAFSTRAND

When studying the magazine publishing business in the Nordic countries, two trends are particularly apparent. The first trend is the decline of the general interest magazines and, on the other hand, the expansion of the special interest and the lifestyle magazines. The second trend is that the international markets are becoming increasingly important. Magazine publishing, at least when talking about the bigger publishing companies, is increasingly an international business. For the Nordic publishers this trend means a possibility of expansion in new markets, but it also means the threat of new competitors in the home market. The magazine publishing industry also has to deal with the rapid development of the Internet, which can be considered both a threat and a possibility. In order to survive and prosper in a changing industry structure and competitive situation, a magazine publishing company clearly more than ever requires a viable competitive strategy.

In this article, possible sources of sustainable competitive advantage for magazine publishing companies are discussed from a resource-based perspective. After a short summary of the basic theoretical concepts of the resource-based view of the firm, follows a discussion of the shortcomings of the value chain framework for decomposing the value creation logic of a magazine publishing company and an alternative model, the value network, is suggested. Based on the latter model some examples of possible sources of competitive advantage in the magazine business are given.

The Resource-Based View

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the strategy literature emphasized the external environment of the firm. The focus was on the analysis of the industry attractiveness and the competition. The work of Harvard economist Michael Porter was very influential. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus increasingly shifted towards the internal aspects of the firm. According to the so-called resource-based view of the firm, competitive advantage is seen as being dependent less upon a firm’s chosen position within an industry and more upon the exploitation of unique internal resources and capabilities.

As the resource-based view of the firm to some extent evolved as a reaction to the dominance of the external perspective on strategy, some authors proclaim that it is a new and alternative theory of strategy. Others argue that there are important advantages to be
gained by linking and integrating the two views. The view that strategy is about linking the opportunities and threats in the external environment with the internal strengths and weaknesses of the company goes back to the seminal work of Andrews in the 1970s.

The resource-based view of the firm has its roots in the writings of the well-known economists David Ricardo, Joseph Schumpeter and Edith Penrose (Grant, 1991). However, the growing interest and the mass of publications over the past years have caused considerable terminological confusion. Competence, core competence, visible and invisible assets, strategic assets, strategic stocks, resources, skills etc. are used to refer to strategic components of one type or another (Bogaert et al., 1994).

Barney (1991) has a broad definition of firm resources—they include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge etc., controlled by a firm and enabling it to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. A firm’s resources thus include, according to Barney, both tangible and intangible resources and he makes no clear distinction between what a firm does and what it has. Wernerfelt (1984) has a similar, broad definition. A firm’s resources are those tangible and intangible assets that are tied semipermanently to the firm. Examples given by Wernerfelt are brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery, efficient procedures and capital.

Strategic assets are those that underpin the competitive advantage of the firm. Strategic assets have four attributes: they are valuable, they are rare among the firm’s current and potential competitors, they are imperfectly imitable and no strategically equivalent substitutes exist (see, e.g., Dierickx and Cool 1989, Barney 1991, 1994, Bogaert et al., 1994, Habann, 2000).

Dierickx and Cool (1989) distinguish between asset stocks and flows. Firms deploy both tradable and nontradable assets. When an asset is nontradable on the factor market, the firm has to deploy it in product markets in order to tap its rent earning potential. Conversely, a firm that does not own a nontradable asset, which it needs to implement its product market strategy, has to build this asset. For example, a reputation for quality may be built by following a consistent set of policies regarding production, quality control etc. Strategic asset stocks are accumulated by choosing appropriate time paths of flows over a period of time.

Dierickx and Cool use the ”bath-tub metaphor” to illustrate the difference between stocks and flows: ”At any moment in time, the stock of water is indicated by the level of water in the tub; it is the cumulative result of flows of water into the tub (through the tap) and out of it (through a leak). In the example of R&D, the amount of water in the tub represents the stock of know-how at a particular moment in time, whereas current R&D spending is represented by the water flowing in through the tap; the fact that knowledge depreciates over time is represented by the flow of water leaking through a hole in the tub. A crucial point illustrated by the bathtub metaphor is that while flows can be adjusted instantaneously, stocks cannot. It takes a consistent pattern of resource flows to accumulate a desired change in strategic asset stocks” (p.1506). Critical or strategic asset stocks are those assets that are nontradable, nonimitable and nonsubstitutable.

A frequent distinction made in the literature is between having, i.e. what the firm owns that is superior to the competitors, and doing, i.e. what the firm or parts of it does better than competitors (see, e.g., Aaker, 1989, Hall 1994). Assets or resources are notions used to refer to what a firm owns, and skills, competencies or capabilities refer to what a firm does. Assets can be both tangible and intangible. Examples of intangible assets are intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks, copyright and registered design or brand reputation (Bogaert et al., 1994).
Other authors, such as Grant (1991), make distinctions between resources and capabilities. Resources, according to Grant, are inputs into the production process. These could be financial resources, physical resources, human resources, technological resources, reputation and organizational resources. But resources are not productive in themselves. A capability, according to Grant, is the capacity for a team of resources to perform some task or activity. Thus, resources are the source of a firm's capabilities and these in turn the main source of its competitive advantage.

Amit and Schoemaker (1993) make a similar distinction when they define resources as "stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the firm. Resources are converted into final products or services by using a wide range of other firm assets and bonding mechanisms such as technology, management information systems, incentive systems, trust between labor, and more" (p. 35). Capability, according to Amit and Schoemaker, refers to the capacity of a firm to deploy resources using organizational processes to effect a desired end. Capabilities are "information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and are developed over time through complex interactions among the firm's resources" (p. 35). Thus, competitive advantage can evolve from distinctive competencies, which are the capabilities the organization possesses that set it apart from its competitors. The firm should identify its key business processes, manage them centrally and invest in them (Bogaert et al., 1994).

A concept closely related to the resource-based view is that of core competencies, introduced by Hamel and Prahalad. Core competencies arise through the collective learning of the firm, especially through coordinating diverse production skills and integrating multiple streams of technologies (Rumelt, 1994). Core competencies are enhanced through use and they span across several businesses and products within a corporation. Hamel and Prahalad (1990) suggest that management should develop a corporate-wide strategic architecture, "a road map of the future that identifies which core competencies to build and their constituent technologies" (p. 89).

Asset Accumulation
Strategic assets are accumulated over time. If the processes by which the assets are accumulated represent barriers to replication for competing firms, a business that can increase the speed and reduce the cost of asset accumulation will be in a position to generate competitive advantage (Verdin and Williamson, 1984).

Dierickx and Cool (1989) offer an often cited analysis of when it can be time consuming, costly or both for competitors to replicate a non-tradable asset stock possessed by a firm. Imitability depends on the characteristics of the process by which the asset stock is accumulated.

Time compression diseconomies. The "law of diminishing returns" when one input, viz. time, is held constant. "Crash" R&D programs are typically less effective than programs where annual R&D outlays are lower but spread out over a proportionally longer period of time.

Asset mass efficiencies. Some types of assets are less costly to accumulate when the firm already possesses high levels of that asset stock. Historical success translates into favorable initial asset stock positions, which in turn facilitate further asset accumulation. Catching up from low initial levels may be difficult, especially when critical mass is required. This might be the case, for example, when the value of a product or service depends on the number of "members" in the network, as for instance in the credit card business.
Interconnectedness of asset stocks. The accumulation process of an asset stock can also be dependent on the level of other asset stocks. For example, it may be harder for a firm that lacks a service network to improve its product quality since it does not have access to in-house information from the field.

Asset erosion. Just as for physical plants and equipment, all asset stocks need to be maintained, or they will erode. If a firm, for example, does not continuously invest in its brand, brand loyalty will eventually erode as new consumers enter the market, as consumers forget etc. Advertising expenditure is a flow variable while brand awareness is a stock variable. According to Dierickx and Cool, flow variables are not in general credible vehicles for entry deterrence, whereas brand loyalty is.

Causal ambiguity. The accumulation of asset stocks is not always a deterministic and continuous process. In many industries it is better described as stochastic and discontinuous. Dierickx and Cool describe what they call a “jackpot model”: “Firms sink R&D flows in projects with highly uncertain outcomes, and only few firms actually “hit the jackpot” by bringing out highly successful products. The stocks vs. flows framework ... can easily be accommodated to deal with such industries. In fact, the levels of the firm’s stocks will determine each firm’s probability of success, i.e. different firms try their fortunes on different slot machines, the odds of each machine being set by the levels of that firm’s relevant asset stocks” (pp. 1508-1509). When uncertainty is high as to the role different factors play in the accumulation process, it is almost impossible for other firms to imitate that asset stock.

Value Chain vs. Value Network
The value chain framework (Porter, 1985) is a method for decomposing the firm’s value creation logic into discrete activities in order to understand their impact on the relative cost position and their ability to create a basis for differentiation. The value creation of a firm is depicted as a chain of sequentially interlinked primary activities that gradually transform raw materials into finished products. The five primary activity categories are inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and service. Five categories of support activities are linked to the primary activities. These support activities are procurement, technology development, human resource management and firm infrastructure.

The activities associated with the very production of the physical magazine can readily be described and decomposed in accordance with the value chain framework. Very briefly, inbound logistics is the editorial content, i.e. texts, articles, pictures etc. organized according to a specific lay-out, operations is the printing process and outbound logistics the distribution to the sales outlets. Marketing and sales are directed to consumers, advertisers, distribution channels as well as intermediaries. But for different reasons, the value chain framework is incapable of capturing the core value creation logic of a magazine publisher.

A strong trend within the magazine business during the past decades is decreasing vertical integration. Many magazine publishers have divested their printing facilities and instead purchased printing capacity on the open market. An exception is publishers with printing facilities dimensioned for very high volumes, i.e. some of the German magazine publishers. Due to the capacity they can also compete for other high volume jobs on an open market. Another notable exception is the Swedish branch of the Aller company. The distribution function on the Swedish market is carried out by organizationally independ-
ent companies, Tidsam and to some extent Interpress. Tidsam is owned and controlled by the larger magazine publishers, which can be a major entry barrier as well as a strategic asset. On the other hand, the Swedish Competition Authority has urged the owners of Tidsam to open up the system for titles from competing publishers. Also the subscription routines are handled by independent companies. Thus, the value chain briefly described above captures the activities and the different companies associated with the physical production and distribution of a magazine, but it could be argued that it does not capture the core value creation logic of a single magazine publisher.

Magazine publishing is largely a creative business with several similarities to the service industry. The value chain framework is often criticized for not being able to capture the value creation logic of these kinds of companies. For a magazine publisher, the core value creating activities have taken place before or simultaneously with the physical production of the magazine and cannot be described as a sequential process. Thus a different framework seems to be needed to facilitate our understanding of the activities, resources deployed, capabilities and thus the potential for sustainable competitive advantage for a magazine publisher.

Building on Thompson's (1967) typology of long-linked, intensive and mediating technologies, Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) suggest three different value configuration models. The long-linked technology delivers value by transforming inputs into products. The value creating logic of the long-linked technology is thus captured by the value chain framework. The intensive technology, or the value shop as Stabell and Fjeldstad call it, delivers value by resolving unique customer problems. Hospitals, professional service firms and educational institutions are common examples of firms that rely on an intensive technology.

The mediating technology, or the value network, delivers value by facilitating a network relationship between their customers. The firm itself is not the network; it provides a networking service. Examples given of companies that create value by facilitating exchange among their customers are telephone companies, transportation companies, insurance companies and banks. Although the value network metaphor is not completely applicable to a magazine publishing company, it offers a different angle of approach to how the value creating activities can be described and analyzed.

A common view is that the core value creating activities of a magazine publishing company are tied to the production of content. Knowledge about the needs and preferences of the potential readers and a distinctive competence in producing the kind of content that satisfies these needs and preferences are seen as the key to success, often expressed in circulation numbers. High circulation, or merely high reach in well-defined target groups, is regarded as the main competitive factor on the advertising market. If the core competence and main strategic assets of a magazine publisher are the production and ownership through copyright of content, a viable competitive strategy would be to deploy these assets and competencies in other technologies, such as on the Internet or in television programs.

If instead a magazine publishing company is pictured as a value network, the publishing company becomes a conductor in a network that interconnects readers, advertisers and the different actors on what can be called a “content market”. The paper-based issue of the magazine is the mediating technology, but value is created not primarily in the production of the physical magazine but in the organization and facilitation of exchange between readers, advertisers and the different actors on the content market (Figure 1).
It is obvious that there is an exchange between readers and advertisers. Advertisers use the magazine to communicate with the readers. Very often, though not always, the readers also wish to be connected with the advertisers. This is especially true for special interest magazines, where the advertisements can play a more informative role than is the case in general interest magazines. But also in the case of, for instance, a fashion magazine, the advertisements can be of value to the readers.

It is also possible to regard the magazine as a mediating technology for linking readers and the actors on a content market. This market consists of people, i.e. artists, celebrities, royalties etc., companies, organizations and other groupings who need or desire media attention for different reasons, be it to spread a message or an idea or simply to gain legitimacy. Journalists, then, can be considered as intermediaries between the content market and the readers. Needless to say, this does not imply that the journalists simply pass on messages from the content market. They create content based on what they perceive is happening on the content market, a place for exchange of influences, ideas, information etc.

Even if a magazine publishing company is pictured as a value network, the content, and how it is presented in the physical magazine, is still the most important outcome. But it could be argued that the content as such is not the potential basis for competitive advantage. Content can be traded and imitated. This is obvious if you compare the topics chosen and the articles in different magazines. It is even more obvious if you compare some Swedish magazines with their international role models. Instead, it is merely the core competencies or the capabilities to organize and manage the network that can generate a sustainable competitive advantage. As a consequence, diversification should be based on these capabilities and to a less degree on content. Instead of considering an Internet site as a new channel or technology for distributing content, the networking capabilities could be used to enable an interactive communication between the readers/surfers, the actors on the content market and the advertisers, i.e. to organize a Virtual
Community. In an analysis of the web sites of Scandinavian, German, British and American magazine publishers (Brodin and Ekdahl, 2000), the authors concluded that IPC, Hearst Corporation and Rodale Press act as organizers of Virtual Communities and that several other publishers are developing their web sites in the same direction.

*The Value Network as a Club*

According to Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998), managing a mediating firm in a value network can be compared to managing a club. The mediating firm admits members that complement each other and in some cases excludes those that do not. An important task for a publishing company thus is to decide who will be a part of the network and who will not. This is done both on the level of the single title, in possible joint functions such as advertising sales, and on the business unit and corporate level through strategic management. The suitable "members" of the network are a result of the interdependence between the editorial content of the single title, its readership profile and the advertising market. There has to be a fit between the actors from the content market that are let in, e.g. the editorial profile, the demographic and lifestyle profile of the readers, and the kind of advertisers.

The advertisers are also a part of the editorial environment; they contribute to the "soul" of the magazine. This means that not only the amount of advertisers is of importance for the survival of a magazine, but also selection of the "right" advertisers. For instance, one contributing factor to the lack of success for magazines targeted at the commercially interesting 50+-segment on the Swedish market is said to be the problem of attracting the "right" advertisers, i.e. travel organizers, insurance companies, producers of capital goods etc. Instead the magazines were dominated by advertisements about health care products and prescription-free drugs for elderly people, which ruined the editorial environment.

*Strategic Resources and Capabilities in the Magazine Business*

As stated in the literature review, strategic assets or resources are those that are non-tradable, nonimitable and nonsubstitutable. Some authors, i.e. Grant (1991), make a clear distinction between what a firm has – resources and assets – and does – capabilities, skills, competencies – and argue that it is what a firm does, i.e. its capabilities to manage the resources, that is the main source of competitive advantage. In a value network perspective, these capabilities are to be found in how the different magazine publishing companies manage the network. In the following, possible sources of competitive advantage are discussed within three different areas – human resource management, market knowledge and product development.

*Human Resource Management*

The heart of a magazine is the editorial staff, especially the editor. Typically, an editor is given considerable freedom to put his or her personal "touch" on a magazine. Creating a magazine is sometimes considered an art and the editor is the artist, who needs his or her creative freedom. In the magazine business, as in many other media companies, there is a considerable element of the "guru-factor".

But having talented editors employed cannot be a sustainable competitive advantage according to the resource-based view, since editors are "tradable", i.e. they can easily
move on to another magazine. Instead, the potential for a sustainable competitive advantage is the capabilities within human resource management, for instance to find, employ, educate, stimulate and tap the full potential of gifted editors. Here the larger publishers have a clear advantage. They have the financial capacity to pay the salary needed. They can educate journalists and offer them a career path by letting them work on different magazines and also in different business units. For instance in the Bonnier group, the largest media group in Sweden, several editors have also worked on the evening tabloids. Talented editors can also be used as a “fire brigade”. For instance, the almost legendary Gunny Widell has many times, during her long career within the Bonnier group, successfully turned around a magazine in crisis.

Company reputation is also a valuable resource with regard to attracting employees. In spring 2001, four journalists left the male lifestyle magazine Slitz for the competitor Café. The timing might seem odd - after several years of keen competition, Slitz is the market leader within the segment while the future for Café is very unsure. But the move can be explained by the fact that Café has a better reputation and that it is owned by the multinational publisher Hachette, while Slitz is the single title published by an entrepreneur who does not have the best reputation in the business.

**Market Knowledge**

A magazine publisher competes on three markets – the advertising, the circulation and the content market. Again according to the resource-based view, it is not specific knowledge at a certain time that can generate a sustainable competitive advantage. Specific knowledge can be bought on the open market through market research. It is the information systems, the accumulated knowledge in the organization and the capability to react to signals from the market that are nontradable and hard to imitate. Market research is what Dierickx and Cool call a flow variable, the water flowing into the bathtub through the tap, while market knowledge is a stock variable, the water accumulated in the bathtub during a long time, which cannot be adjusted instantaneously.

A good example of this is the German publisher Gruner + Jahr and their entry on the British market in the late 1980’s. The two titles Prima and Best were originally developed by the French subsidiary Prisma Presse. A two-year-long research and development program was followed by a test launch in the south of France. After that, launches were made in France, Spain and Germany. When Gruner + Jahr entered the British market the extensive research program carried out in France had become a stock variable that could also be used on the British market, and therefore the launching decisions for Prima and Best could be made rather quickly.

An important source for market information is the sales force. A publisher that chooses to outsource the advertising sales function to an independent company, which is often the case with smaller publishers, does not have access to the information picked up by the sales force. The interrupted launch in autumn 1999 of the Bonnier male lifestyle magazine Adam illustrates the importance of information from the advertising market. The magazine was scheduled to hit the shelves in September. During the spring and summer, a dummy was presented to the potential advertisers. Shortly afterwards, Bonniers decided not to launch the magazine. It is reasonable to believe that it was the contact with and reactions from the advertisers that made them change their minds.
Product Development

In a sense, a magazine publishing company delivers a new product every week or every month. Product development is a continuing process. Reiner and Gosh (1988) from Boston Consulting Group claim that other companies have a great deal to learn from the way magazine publishers handle product development. Companies need to invest actively in the activities that support rapid product development. According to Reiner and Gosh, directing this investment is a key function of senior management. An important source of competitive advantage for a magazine publishing company is thus the capabilities and competencies to coordinate human, technical and organizational resources in a way that enhances continuing product development.

There is a close and mutual relationship between market knowledge and product development. But there is also considerable causal ambiguity involved. A thorough market research and development job is no guarantee that the launch of a new title will succeed. The news magazine title Reportage, launched by Bonniers 1980, is a good example of this. The results from market research and testing indicated a major success, but the title turned out to be a complete failure and was withdrawn only a few month after the launch. On the other hand, when Bonniers thirty years ago launched the first food magazine on the Swedish market, Allt om Mat, several people in the business were skeptical to the concept. But Allt om Mat turned out to be a success and is still the leading food magazine despite several competing titles. The "jackpot model" by Dierickx and Cool seems to be very relevant in the magazine publishing business – launching new titles is like playing on a slot machine, but the odds of each machine is set by the level of the company’s relevant asset stocks.

A special case of new product development is when a publisher uses a concept as leverage for international expansion, as for instance is the case of the fashion magazine Elle, owned by the French publisher Hachette. Each national edition is largely adapted to the specific market and is often launched in cooperation with a leading national publisher. The concept as such could probably both easily and legally be imitated by the national publisher. It is reasonable to believe that the competitive advantage of Hachette is the knowledge about how to handle and develop the concept in combination with access to the content market.

Conclusions

A magazine publishing company may, as any company, be viewed as a bundle of resources. According to the resource-based view of the firm, resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and for which no strategically equivalent substitute exists can be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Examples of important areas where sustainable competitive advantage can be generated for a magazine publishing company are human resource management, market knowledge and product development. It seems reasonable to believe that it is not resources or assets as such that generate competitive advantage, but the organizational capabilities and routines to handle them. Capabilities, knowledge and routines within human resource management, market research and product development are accumulated over a long time and embedded in the organization and therefore cannot be easily replicated. Also, it can be argued that a characteristic trait of the magazine business is that there is a great deal of causal ambiguity involved, which makes it even harder to imitate the assets or capabilities of a competitor.
A dominating framework for capturing the value creating logic of a company is the value chain. But decomposing the value creation of a magazine publishing company into discrete and sequential activities raises some problems. An alternative is to view the magazine publishing company as a conductor in a value network, creating value by facilitating exchange between readers, advertisers and the actors on the content market. As a consequence it can be argued that magazine publishing companies are not in the content business but in the relationship business. The possible sources of sustainable competitive advantage are to be found in how the publishing companies manage these relationships.

References
Long-Time-A-Dying

Transformation of the Cinema Exhibition Market in Iceland 1980–2000

Ragnar Karlsson

– Going to see a film is still an event…

Introduction: Premature Death of the Cinema

The film and the cinema have frequently been declared in an irreversible decline. The evidence is there, manifested in dramatic fall in admissions since in the mid-of-the-last century throughout the western world, at least; less variety of films screened; decay of national film industries; and more generally the sense that the film has lost its centrality to other media and cultural forms (see, e.g. Nowell-Smith, 1996; Sorlin, 1991). The villains and the foes responsible for this decay are readily at hand, as asserted: television, cable and satellite TV, video, and now lastly, emerging forms of multi-media, which are supposed to have made the cinema somehow inferior to other forms of audio-visual mediation, if not obsolete.

Behind the regular doom assertions is the mistaken conviction that cinema and television are compatible and recognised as competing with each other for people’s attention and commercial and critical acclaim. True enough, there are some obvious similarities between television and cinema: both combine sound and visual images; both provide narrative fiction; the images of both are closely related to leisure, entertainment and pleasure, rather than work, duty and compulsion. Moreover, there is an overlap between the products and production processes of the two: films are shown on TV; visual angles, narrative forms and sequences originally developed within the film industry have been exploited by television; the various genres of content have easily crossed from one medium to the other (e.g. Ellis, 1982; Turner, 1993).

Apart from the more obvious similarities, the cinema and television and other audio-visual media do not occupy the same space and do not serve the same social activities. Unlike other media, which are mostly consumed within the home, the cinema is consumed outside the private sphere. As film-going is most often a group-activity, the cinema serves an important function as a meeting place, which offers its audiences a distinctive set of shared pleasures, experiences and social practices. In the multiple television channel environment and transferral of leisure activities into the home with advent and spread of multi-media and information technology, the importance of the cinema as a meeting place is more apparent than before (Lindholm et al., 1999: 421; Turner, 1993;
Hence, the survival of the theatrical film is due to its nature as a medium, and its social usefulness to its audiences. None of the competing media are able to replicate these, notwithstanding development of high-definition and wide-screen pictures and other technical perfections and elegance. While television, video and other forms of film visualising in the home ‘may supply narrative to its audiences’, as Graeme Turner (1993: 97–8) argues, they do ‘not offer them the event of cinema-going’, nor do they ‘replicate the experience of the darkened cinema with its larger-than-life images and Dolby stereo sound.’

The cultural hegemony of the feature film and the cinema as the predominant form of entertainment is surely over, but reports of their death are greatly exaggerated. ‘The notion of the ‘decline of the cinema’ that has somehow infiltrated everywhere as an established fact is’, as John Ellis (1982: 175–76) maintains, ‘far more complex than a simple decline from a position of pure eminence to a subordinate position, or even towards distinction.’ Television in its various forms of distribution has not destroyed the cinema, not anymore than cinema was not capable of wiping out the theatre and vaudeville and fairground entertainments, or radio destroying the music business, for that matter. Despite the decline in the cinema audience we should not forget, as Raymond Williams (1976: 24) noted quite some time ago ‘still leaves a very large public.’

Whilst declining public demand for the cinema in most western countries coincided with development and penetration of television, it did not, however, have any automatic effect for the cinema, contrary to an often-held belief. ‘In some cases’, Pierre Sorlin (1991: 91) maintains, ‘television strongly influenced frequency of attendance but in others it was harmless.’ This is not to deny that television and later cable and private satellite television and video were not implicated in the fall of public demand for the cinema. Rather that they were just among many things that ‘implicated in this complex of conditions that produced this trend’ (Turner, 1993: 18), such as demographic changes in the post-war era and increased choice in leisure activities. Internal factors within the cinema sector are to blame as well. Negligence in the exhibition business contributed to a vicious circle for the cinema, which reduced audiences further. Migration to the suburbs meant often there was a shortage of screens for many customers, while at same the cinemas that remained in the centre of cities were often left to decay, ‘as ‘flea pits’, turning film-going into a activity watched in slum conditions’ (Dale, 1997: 172–73).

This article deals with the main trends of development in the cinema audience, exhibition and distribution market in Iceland from 1980 onwards. Outnumbering most nations in terms of cinema admissions per capita, Icelanders go to the cinema between five and a half time a year on average, or nearly three times more frequently than people in the other Nordic countries, or Europe as a whole do (EAO, 2001). Only the well-lubricated exhibition market in the US and Singapore in the Far East are of equivalence in that respect (Screen Digest, Sept. 2000, p. 282). In some ways, this would indicate that the cinema in Iceland is in a good shape. However, as in most countries, the exhibition market in Iceland has had serious setbacks since in 1980s, which have affected all levels of the industry.

In this article, the aim is to identify and discuss the key features of the cinema market that has evolved out of the drastic decline in cinema-going in Iceland since in 1980. First, the development of the audience side of the market is reviewed briefly and the likely reasons for the exceptionally high number of admissions per population in Iceland are discussed. Following it is analysed how shrinking admissions have paved the way for fundamental changes in the supply side of the market and how the exhibition and distri-
bution sector has responded and the repercussions it has had for the film fare on the wide screen, which, as argued, is responsible for more recent revival in cinema-going.

**Long and Winding Road: Restructuring of the Audience Market**

Iceland has for long consistently maintained average rate of cinema attendance per head of population far above the European average. Until more recently cinema admissions in most western countries have declined almost uninterruptedly since about in the 1950s when cinema attendance reached its peak. The massive reduction in admissions occurred in most countries when television turned into a mass medium in the 1950s and 1960s. The pace of the decline levelled out in the 1980s and admissions started to increase again in many countries in the 1990s (Deiss, 2001; EAO, 2001; Eurostat, 2001; MEDIA Salles, 2000a, 2000b).

The decline in admissions in Iceland has developed slower and more unevenly than in most western countries. Albeit admissions plummeted over 30 per cent around and in the aftermath of introduction of television in 1966 the decline was only temporary. Unlike in most countries, admissions started soon to crop up again and reached the all-time-height in the late-1970s with about 2.6 million tickets sold a year. The resurgence was short-lived, however, and admissions started to fall again in the early-1980s, as indicated in Table 1. In the year 2000 admissions were nearly one million lower than in 1980, signifying a fall of 39 per cent, or more than double of that in the EU over the period (EUROSTAT, 2001: 39). Coupled by fast population growth the decline has even been more severe in per capita terms as more than halved. Icelanders went on average 11.2 times to the cinema in 1980 against 5.5 times in recent years.

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**Note:** Admissions to full-length feature releases only.

**Source:** Karlsson (ed.), 1999, 2002.

The decline, which was particularly fast in the 1980s, coincided with fast increasing amount of households with colour TV and video, and multiplied hours on television after introduction of private television in 1986. Although the impact of video and increased time on television was assumedly quite strong initially, the decline levelled out in the mid-1990s, and the market has witnessed an upsurge in cinema-going in recent years, by about five per cent average growth per annum.

At same time, cinema-going in Iceland has become predominantly an urban leisure activity with an ever increasing division between the theatrical market in the capital region (Reykjavík, including suburbs) and in other parts of the country, as exemplified in
Table 1. Whilst admissions in the capital region have fallen nearly 39 per cent since 1980, attendance in other parts of the country has declined enormously, or by 75 per cent. The exhibition sector in the capital region increased its share of the total market from some 70 per cent in 1980 to nearly 90 per cent at the present, far exceeding the region’s share of the total population. Translated into visits per population, admissions in the capital region nearly halved over twenty years period, from 14.7 visits a year in 1980 down to 7.9 visits in 2000. Following a drop to an all-time-low of 1.1 million in 1988, admissions have started to crop up again to 1.3–1.4 million in recent years, or comparable to that in the mid–1980s. Elsewhere in the country, the decline has been much sever and it has lasted longer. Admissions declined almost without interruption, or from 7.2 visits per capita in 1980 to 1.8 visits on average in 2000. The bottom line was not reached until in 1998 when admissions started to pick-up again rather unexpectedly by no less than 45 per cent in 1999, followed by a more ‘moderate’ growth of nearly 20 per cent in 2000.

Composition of the Cinema-Going Public
In place of the family market that once sustained the film industry, is a predominantly youthful market essentially made up of people aged between teens and the late-twenties, in higher degree males than females, which is in line to that elsewhere in the western world (Andersen, 1995; Corrigan, 1983; Dale, 1997; London Economics, 1992: 37–39ff). A narrow segment of the population as a whole, the group 12–29 years of age is over-represented in the cinema-going population, accounting in 1996 for four out of every ten audiences. Another three of every ten among cinema attendants were between 30 and 39 years of age. More than half of the population 50 years of age and older never goes to the movies, compared to 20 per cent of people 30–49 years of age, and five per cent of people 12–29 years of age (recounted from Bjarnason et al., 1997, table p. 64). The core of the film audience is ‘avids’ who attend at least twice a month, or amounting to some 12–14 per cent of the population in recent years, whereas most are between 12–29 years of age. Crudely estimated, this group buys some 40 per cent of all tickets and further up some 20–25 per cent are sold to those who go monthly to every other month to the movies. Recent revival in admissions has brought back some of the groups previously lost to the cinema. According to a national survey in 1998, roughly 17 per cent of adolescents and adults never went to the movies, compared to some 39 per cent a decade earlier.

High frequency of cinema-going in Iceland is probably to some degree related to composition of the population in terms of age, as young people are the most enthusiastic cinemagoers. Compared to the fast ageing nations of Western Europe the Icelandic population is relatively young, whereas 40 per cent are 24 years of age and younger. Icelandic adolescents have presumably more disposable money in their pockets to spend on movies than their contemporaries in Europe where past-time work with school and during vacations is not as common.

The ‘Metropolis Effect’
Exceptionally high average cinema attendance in Iceland compared to in most other countries is yet something of a riddle. It is worth noting that Icelanders are not only remarkably keen movie-goers, but they are as well in the top league among the world’s nations as renting of videos per household is concerned (IVF, 2000).
High frequency of cinema-going in Iceland can probably to some extent been explained with clustering of the population in the capital region, or what we might coin as the *metropolis effect*. It is a well established fact that cinema-going is an urban leisure activity. Cinema visits per number of the population are significantly higher in the urban centres than elsewhere. The largest cities, and in particular metropolitan areas, provide the audiences with plenty of capacity, greater choice of films and first-run cinemas, than can be expected in less populated cities and regions (see, e.g. Dale, 1997; London Economics, 1992). With a surface area of roughly 100,000 sq km, or significantly larger than Ireland and more than twofold of Denmark, Iceland has the lowest population densities in the Europe, with only 2.8 inhabitants per sq km. As far as concentration of the population is concerned, however, Iceland resembles a city-state, whereas roughly 60 per cent of the inhabitants are clustered in the capital region, a much higher proportion than of any other European metropolitan area, leaving the European micro-states of Monaco and San Marino, aside.

Admissions per capita for the total population and population of the highest attending cities or urban regions in the west European countries in 1999, is presented in Figure 1. The highest cinema attending cities are in all cases the metropolis in each of the respective countries as well. In all the countries indicated, frequency of attendance is significantly higher in the metropolis than for in the whole countries, with Luxembourg City and Paris in the lead.

*Figure 1. Cinema Admissions per Capita in West European Countries in 1999. Total and in the Largest City*

*Note:* Data for Cyprus and Greece refer to the year 1998. Largest city refers to the Greater London area in UK and the capital region in Iceland.

In Figure 2, the share of population in the cities with highest frequency of attendance is compared with admissions per capita in each country. The data clearly indicate that there is a positive correlation between the share of the total population of the city with highest attendance and average cinema visits per number of population for the country as a whole, with the Pearson’s $r$ as .66 and the coefficient of determination ($R^2$) as .45, leaving 55 per cent of the variance unaccounted for or unexplained.

**Figure 2. Population Concentration and Cinema Admissions per Capita in some European Countries 1999**

![Figure 2](image)

**Note:** Abbreviation for name of countries according to ISO. Data for Cyprus and Greece refer to the year 1998. Largest city refers to the Greater London area in UK and the capital region in Iceland.

**Source:** MEDIA Salles, 1999, 2000b.

Certainly this does not prove that there is a causal relationship between the level of concentration of the population in the metropolis area and cinema visits per population (cf. Wimmer et al., 1983: 181–83). Numerous other factors, both external and internal, are most likely here at play as well, such as relative affluence of the population, the state of the distribution-exhibition industry, *etc.* Assuming cinema-going is dependent as well upon income by the population, and hence leaving the least affluent countries in terms of GDP per capita out of the picture (*i.e.* Cyprus, Greece and Portugal), we have strong positive relationship ($r = .87$), whereas the coefficient of determination ($R^2$) is .75, leaving 25 per cent of the variance unaccounted for or unexplained. This leaves us with the conclusion that exceptionally high number of annual visits to the cinema per person on average in Iceland owes probably much to high concentration ratio of the population in the capital region. Because of exceptionally high share of the population living in the capital region, and other things equal, the average attendance is significantly higher for Iceland than in countries with as high or higher admissions per capita in the highest attending city, but with lower population concentration.
Adjustment and Revival of the Exhibition Market

Although the former number of visitors to the cinema cannot be hoped for, there is still a hope from the quality point of view. Current indicators show that fall in box office throughout the western world has been stemmed, even reversed slightly since in the 1980s, which is generally linked to upgrading of premises and opening of multiplexes, usually located in new-suburban areas, offering the supermarket convenience of choice and parking facilities (cf. Deiss, 2001; EAO, 2001; Screen Digest, Sept. 2000). This in turn strongly suggests, as Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (1996: 761) maintains, that 'the decline in cinema-going has been partly due, not to a lack of interest in films but to the fact that theatres were badly situated and offered inadequate facilities'. In a like way, the exhibition sector in Iceland has adjusted to falling demand in numerous ways by closing of unprofitable sites in appreciable numbers, extensive refurbishment, such as improvements in sound and vision, multi-screen developments, and intensive marketing, which is linked to rise in admissions in recent years.

Excess Capacity and Over-Screening

Inevitable result of the reduction in admissions in the 1980s was a closure of sizeable number of cinemas. Yet, Iceland surpasses the EU and the Nordic countries with 0.18 screens for every thousand persons, compared to 0.07 and 0.09 respectively (EUROSTAT, 2001: 42). Cinemas reduced in numbers from 47 down to 25 between 1980 and 2000. Most of the closed venues were second-run cinemas, mostly located outside the capital region, in small towns and villages. The number of local communities with cinemas halved during the time-span under review, or dropped from 36 down to 18.

The actual number of cinema screens, however, only decreased slightly over the same period, from 50 to 47 due to multi-screen developments, mostly confined to the capital region. In total, the seating capacity of these 47 cinemas is of nearly 10,000 seats, or averaging 207 seats per a screen. About seven of every ten seats belong to cinemas in the capital region.

None of the cinemas measure up to the criteria of being multiplexes, defined as cinemas with eight screens or more (cf. MEDIA Salles, 2000a: 37–8; 101–5). All the cinemas in the capital region are multi screen cinemas, with two to six screens, or 26 screens in total. Together these took 87 per cent of the total gross box office in 2000. All are first-run cinemas, operated seven days a week, with four to five daily screenings per a screen.

Of the 18 cinemas operated outside the capital region, 15 are mono screen cinemas, and three are twin screen cinemas. The sheer number of sites outside the capital region does not tell the whole story. Most of the cinemas are operated part-time for a limited number of days a year. Municipalities or other non-commercial bodies operate many of the rural and small community cinemas for social reasons. Most are not purpose-built for film exhibition, and the sound and projection equipment of many needs badly upgrading, as operators are unwilling or unable to find the required funds for modernisation.

With the decrease in admissions since the 1980s screen utilisation has decreased significantly, as readily measured through admissions per screen. Screen utilisation fell by 35 per cent from 1980 to 2000, or from 51,000 to 33,000 admissions per site. Increase in admissions in recent years has not managed to reverse this trend in any substantial degree, due to increment in number of sites. Despite large margin as number of cinema screens per capita is concerned, but due to relatively high frequency in cinema-going, the screen utilisation in Iceland is comparable to that in the EU as a whole with 34,000 ad-
missions per site, but significantly higher than in the Nordic countries with only 23,000 admissions per screen in 1999 (EUROSTAT, 2001: 42).

Screen utilisation in the capital region has reduced by nearly 55 per cent, or from 119,000 admissions per a screen in 1980 down to 53,000 spectators in 2000. Closure of unprofitable sites outside the capital region in appreciable numbers has not been sufficient to absorb the sharp fall in public demand. Screen utilisation outside the capital region fell over the period from 22,000 down to 9,000. The massive reduction in screen utilisation over the period indicates clearly that the market has for some time been largely over-screened.

Inflating Cinema Prices
One of the least expensive markets in Europe in the early-1980s, Iceland has the dubious distinction of being one the most expensive markets as cinema ticket prices are concerned (EUROSTAT, 2001: 45). In simple economic terms, when demand for a product falls, and supply remains unchanged or escalates, we expect to see the price of the product falling as firms compete for more limited sources of revenues, not the opposite. In fact, there has been a considerable rise in the real price of cinema admissions in Iceland since in the early-1980s, despite a long-term falling of demand for the cinema until more recently.

In Figure 3 indices for average ticket price (gross box office receipts divided by number of admissions), gross box office receipts and admissions are shown for the years 1985–2000, available for the capital region only, where indices begin at 100 in 1980. As the figure clearly demonstrates, the real price of the average ticket rose substantially above the general level of price inflation in the 1980s, but ticket prices have since mostly stabilized in real terms. The real price of cinema tickets has doubled since 1980, compared to a rise by 40 and 14 per cent from 1985 and 1990 and onwards. Gross box office receipts have increased at slower rate compared to general price inflation, or by 138 per cent since 1980 and by 38 and 29 per cent since in 1985 and 1990, respectively. At same time, admissions fell by 23 per cent over the period under review. It should be kept in mind, however, that the rise in the real price of cinema admissions indicated are gross values including taxes and duties, and that exhibitors have to make payments for film rights, between 50–70 per cent out of the box office receipts shown.

There is a notable discrepancy between the rise in gross box office receipts and the average ticket price. This is due to effects of lower priced tickets to special children screenings until more recently, and the taking up of promotionally priced tickets (e.g. two tickets for the price of one) leading to a slower growth rate of the gross box office than that of the average ticket prices.

Although data only from 1996 to 2000 is available for prices to the cinema outside the capital region, the real prices have risen considerably above the general inflation level of consumption prices, or nearly 50 per cent, compared to roughly 10 per cent increase in the capital region. Greatly inflated prices outside the capital region can be largely explained by an exceptional growth in admissions in the last two years, and the fact that many of the more inexpensive cinemas have been closed down in recent years, whereas high priced cinemas have largely increased their share in admissions as indicated by a steep rise in average ticket prices.
It is worth noting that at same time as real price of cinema tickets has risen substantially, average price for video rental films has fallen some 40 per cent in real terms since in 1985. Average cinema ticket price in 2000 was ISK 632 in fixed prices, or amounting to US$ 8, while the average charge for rental video film was half of that, or ISK 280–290 (about US$ 4). Considered that the rental video is allegedly one of the main competitors to the cinema, the real price increase in tickets from the box office is even more interesting, suggesting strongly that demand for the cinema is inelastic to changes in the video price.

Leaving here unanswered the possibility that exhibitors may have increased their net returns, inflation in real price cinema admissions far above changes in general prices is probably caused by a number of factors. While some have increased costs on the supply side, others are related to change in size and nature of the demand for the cinema. Investments in new screens, refurbishment, higher sound quality, upgrading of projection equipment, better seating, etc., have been reflected by rising ticket prices. In addition to increment of expenses due to improved facilities in response to the audience drain, this might as well be related to rising costs from the supplier side and more expensive film supply (i.e. emphasis on recent releases, big films and smash hits), and increasing marketing costs.4 As far as information is available, higher distributor spending, notably on film advertising and promotion have pushed up average rentals in Iceland, likewise as observed in most countries (Screen Digest, Sept. 2001, p. 283). Average rental payments to distributors for first-run release increased some eight per cent between the years 1996–1997, as accounted (Screen Digest, June 1999, p. 136).

Substantial increase in the price for the cinema and recent increase in cinema admissions indicates strongly changed nature of the medium. Discussing reasons for staggering price inflation in the cinema in the EU since in the 1950s, the media consultancy London Economics (1991) argues that partly through competition with television and

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**Source:** Karlsson (ed.), 1999, 2002; Statistics Iceland.
other leisure activities the nature of the product has changed. By offering a more expensive product, the cinema has moved away from the low-cost position it occupied in the entertainment market. Instead of competing directly with television and video as relatively inexpensive leisure media, the cinema appeals for the young and the relatively affluent adults as a way for people to spend their night out. ‘Cutting the price of admissions from the current level probably would not be profitable for cinemas, because they would not attract sufficient consumers away from television, and other cheaper forms of entertainment, to compensate for the loss in revenue from their existing consumers’ (London Economics, 1991: 30).

Consolidation of the Market

The fall in demand for the cinema and restructuring of the exhibition business over the last two decades has largely affected the exhibitor-distributor side of the market. The structure of the Icelandic exhibition sector is now largely characterised by a high concentration of ownership of screens and by integration with the distribution side of the industry. Presently four companies own all the cinemas in the capital region, besides some operate as well cinemas in the largest towns outside the region. These large exhibitors are active in film distribution as well, controlling over 90 per cent of new releases. In addition, all are active in video distribution, with approximately 85–90 per cent share of the rental and retail market.

Unlike in many European countries where American films do have direct presence through distribution and exhibition, the Icelandic exhibitors deal directly with Hollywood studios and other film suppliers. Until more recently the film distribution was done in an aligned way, with specific distributors showing the films of specific studios and production companies, but now blockbusters are commonly released through competing exhibitors’ cinemas.

In an effort to increase the revenue stream from exhibitions, the market has begun to consolidate itself as recently witnessed by acquisitions by larger exhibitors of smaller competitors and alliances as recently exemplified in an allied partnership in film distribution of two of the large distributors. The large exhibitors-distributors are also increasingly turning their attention to the largest locations outside the capital region, underserved mainly by part-time venues, resulting in substantial increase in admissions for the past two years. Although the bigger operators can hope to capture extra revenues from this source, the overall impact on the market will be limited, as hampered by small size of the populations in the towns involved.

The grip of the large exhibitors-distributors of the market has been preserved further by extensive advertising and promotion. ‘Advertising expenditure’, as Nicholas Garnham (1990: 201) points out, ‘has always played an important role in the oligopolistic control of markets.’ In the movie industry, it ‘increasingly serves to defend the market against new entrants by raising the price of entry’ and ‘at same time reinforcing tendencies to concentration of control.’ It is perhaps of some relevance here that no newcomer has entered into the exhibition market in the capital region for past two decades or so, and recent attempts to break into the distribution side of the market have been futile so far.
Shrinking World on the Wide Screen

Disquieting phenomenon from a European and indeed world perspective is the growing dominance of US films of the total film fare in exhibition venues. Today US films have become more rooted and naturalized parts of the film culture in most countries than national productions, and this situation is repeated in television drama and on video. In most countries in Europe, US films have now captured some 70–80 per cent of the market, with the rest being taken up by domestic films and only a negligible share of films from other European countries and countries outside the continent (EAO, 2001: 92–7; Screen Digest, June 2000, p. 189). In Iceland, likewise, the film fare has changed to a substantial degree over the last two decades, or so, for the advance of US productions. The cinema market is by at large overshadowed by presence of US interests, indifferent of speaking of supply of films, or in terms of admissions and box office receipts. This puts Iceland in the unenviable position of being among those countries where US films retain highest share on the market, as far as European comparison is concerned (EURO-STAT, 2001: 36). The British film producer, David Puttnam (who once enjoyed a brief stint as head of one of Hollywood’s majors, the Columbia Pictures Corporation) describes this as ‘a fundamental dislocation between the world of the imagination, created by the moving image, and the everyday lives of people around the globe’ (quoted in Boyd-Barrett, 1998: 160).

Combination of the American market as enjoying a large population and high GDP per capita, sharing a common language and receptiveness towards commercial products made for mass consumption are important factors for Hollywood’s strength on the international film market (Hoskins et al., 1988, 1997; Wildman, 1994). Symbolic goods, like films and other audio-visual products are, however, not culturally neutral. A media product sold abroad will achieve a lower popularity outside its home market, which is related to what has been termed ‘cultural discount’. An important component of this depreciation in value that information undergoes when exported is language. As English has achieved something near to a status of lingua franca in our times (Crystal, 1997), ensures that ‘US programmes, and especially films attract a relatively small cultural discount in most foreign markets … claiming something close to a worldwide audience’ (Hoskins et al., 1997: 44).

Seen Through the Lens of Hollywood

Strong position of American films on the Icelandic market is of course not a recent trend. Already during and in aftermath of the Second World War, which had left the film industry in Europe in ruins, the United States was the principal film supplier on the Icelandic market. Since in the 1980s onwards, however, US films have increased their share on the Icelandic cinema exhibition market substantially.

In Table 2, the share of full-length releases to cinemas in Iceland by origin is shown between 1980 and 2000. First, the total number of released features per annum has oscillated heavily, however, the general tendency points to a roughly 20 per cent decrease in releases since in the period before 1990. As clearly affirmed, US production have increased their share of total releases to a substantial degree over the period, or from roughly 60 per cent in 1980 to over 80 per cent. This ascent of US releases has primarily occurred at the expense of films from Britain and the category Other Europe, now reduced to seven and less than four per cent of total releases, a significant fall since in the 1980 of 15 and 14 per cent, respectively.
The share of releases of Nordic films have been relatively stable over the period, or around three per cent, corresponding to some three to four premieres per annum an average. Notwithstanding occasional commercial releases, films originated outside Europe and the United States are generally not to be seen on the wide screen, except then on film festivals. The rest is taken up by domestic releases, an average of three films annually, or representing a share of some two per cent of the total.

### Table 2. Origin of Full-Length Feature Releases in Iceland 1980–2000

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<td>3.7</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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*Note:* No account is taken of co-productions, origin of films refer to principal producing country. Figures are rounded to the nearest decimal and do not necessarily have to add up to the total.


The share of American films in admissions and gross box office is even higher than their share of releases, or between 85 and 90 percent in the capital region in recent years. Outside the capital region, the market share of US films is even higher, as films originated from elsewhere generally do not travel widely.

Growing share of US films of total releases can be seen as a response of exhibitors to falling or stagnation in admissions. Similarly as noted for elsewhere (Hoskins et al., 1997; Nowell-Smith, 1996), Icelandic exhibitors-distributors are relying more heavily on films with large commercial potential and wide releases, a trend, which is often accentuated further with advent of multi screen cinemas, in contrast to what might be expected. Even though multi screen exhibitors may be tempted to experiment with unknown films because of reduced overheads, this depends upon the extent to which there is a sufficient stream of supply of US films, which can be passed down to smaller screens as their audiences diminishes. If expected returns of an unknown film are lower than the revenue of the least popular US film then exhibitors will not be lured to take chance with unknown films (London Economics, 1991: 47).^5^ 

In Figure 4 ‘demand curves’ are shown for domestic, US and other films screened in 2000, as measured in box office receipts (VAT excluded). The year indicated was exceptional, indeed, in the sense that nationally produced films ranked exceptionally high in terms of box office with 18 per cent share, compared to three to four per cent share in previous years. Three domestic productions were the most lucrative films of the year, outweighing US blockbusters such as *Toy Story 2*, *American Beauty* and *My, Myself and Irene*. Nonetheless, the figure exemplifies clearly enough elasticity of demand in the market for US films. Whilst 17 US films and three nationally made films achieved more than ISK 10 million in box office returns, the highest film originated from elsewhere (the French-German-Italian *Astérix et Obélix contre César*) generated only ISK 6.4 million. The majority of other films than US and domestic films had virtually zero box office. Of
32 foreign films originated outside the United States, three of every four films achieved box office revenue of ISK two million or less, compared to less than half of the US releases.

*Figure 4. Demand Curve for Full-Length Feature Films in Iceland in 2000*

![Demand Curve for Full-Length Feature Films in Iceland in 2000](image)

*Source: Statistics Iceland.*

While it can be asserted that English-language films have lesser cultural discount than films from other language areas in the Icelandic market, the dominance of the US productions, especially the blockbusters, is sustained further through heavy advertising, especially on television and promotion with allowances from the studios. Films from elsewhere, on the other hand, are mostly poorly marketed. Usually these are released one screen at a time (Torfason, 1994), except they have already a history of success behind them, or they are with a strong pan-Atlantic angle.

Seen in this respect it is perhaps no wonder that the top ranking films in recent years are mostly US products. In Table 3 the Top 20 feature films are shown for the six last years, 1995–2000, according to number of admissions. Of the 120 films indicated, 103 are US productions, or some 86 per cent of the total, while 11 are from other countries, or nine per cent, most of them British. Only one foreign film originated outside the United States and Europe achieved to rank among the Top 20 twenty films in the year 1995, the Australian-French *Muriel’s Wedding*. Six nationally produced films take up the rest, with a five per cent share of the total.

The success of the US films is further affirmed when considered that they ordered higher among the 20 highest attended films during these years. US films were the most attended films except in two years when domestic releases *Djöflaeyjan* (The Devils’ Island) and *Englar alheimsins* (Angels of the Universe) crowned the top of the charts, with 70,000 and 83,000 in 1996 and 2000, respectively. Unsurprisingly, however, the far most attended film in recent years is the James Cameron’s *Titanic*, seen by 124,000 spec-
tators in 1997, or about one of every three of the country’s population, – a record that
is unlikely to be matched or surpassed in near future.

Table 3. Origin of Top 20 Feature Films in Iceland 1995–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Other European</th>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>17</td>
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</table>

No. of films, total

% share of total no.

of Top 20 films 5.0 0.8 6.7 0.8 85.8 0.8

Note: According to number of admissions in the whole country. Figures are rounded to the nearest decimal and do not necessarily add up to the total. Origin of films refers to principal producing country.

Conclusion

Towards the end of the twentieth century, the Icelandic cinema market underwent a dras-
tic change. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the cinema exhibition market ex-
erience a significant drop in admissions. This trend has been stemmed, and even re-
versed slightly as manifested by rising number in admissions since in more recent years.
This renaissance for the cinema-going has though not been without painful adjustment
and restructuring of the cinema exhibition and distribution sector, in favour of the large
exhibitors-distributors in the capital region and at the expense of small operators else-
where. This has been done with closure of unprofitable sites in appreciable numbers, by
extensive refurbishing of premises, multi screen developments, and by relying on expen-
sive blockbusters, whose releases have been accompanied by extensive advertising and
promotion. This has resulted in a largely changed supply of films further for the advan-
tage of US films, which in recent years have retained between 80 and 90 per cent mar-
ket share, independent whether measured in share of total releases, admissions or Gross
box office receipts.

Notwithstanding staggering loss of audiences to the cinema since in 1980s, going to
the pictures is still a popular pastime activity in Iceland, as manifested in exceptionally
high frequency of attendance per population. This is probably attributable to the more
specific population characteristics of the country, such as in terms of composition of age,
whereas the Icelandic nation is relatively young in comparison to other industrialised
nations, and unequally high concentration of the population in capital region, which of-
fers its audiences greater choice in films and convenience.

Long famed as Europe’s most prolific film-going country, it seems as though most of
the potential of the Icelandic market may now be exhausted, notwithstanding a modest
growth in admissions in recent years. Despite the relatively high annual admissions per
a head, the market is over-screened, with some of the cinemas operating only at 12-13 per cent of capacity, as reported (Grummitt et al., 1999: 35). All things considered, it seems that the cinema market in Iceland has reached a plateau. ‘While a smash hit local film could disrupt the prediction of flat admissions, in the absence of such a surprise event the likelihood is, indeed, of some consolidation as the only route to squeezing higher profits out of a static market’ (Grummitt et al., 1999: 37).

Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 15th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research, Workshop Structure and Economy of Media, Reykjavik 11–13 August 2001. The author owes acknowledgements to professor Thorbjörn Broddason, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Iceland, and researcher Tuomo Sauri, Statistics Finland for valued comments on earlier version of this paper. More extensive version of this study is available online on European Audiovisual Observatory’s website (http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/eurocine/film_is.html) titled ‘Cinema’s Nine Lives: Fall and Revival of the Theatrical Film Market in Iceland 1965–2000’. – Unless otherwise indicated, numerical data used in the main text below is referred to in Karlsson ed., 1999 and 2002. All amounts in ISK and US$ are expressed in fixed average 2000 prices.
2. The first multi screen cinema opened in 1978 in Reykjavik.
3. Included is VAT, which has slightly increased over the period from 23.5 to 24.5 per cent, 15 per cent entertainment tax until abolished in mid-year 1998 (domestic films exempted from both levies), and music rights as one per cent of GBO applying to all films.
4. In recent years, cinema releases have been the most heavily advertised products and services in the media, as measured by gross advertising expenditure, with a share of 6.6 per cent in the year 2000 (advertising in radio and online media excluded) (see Karlsson ed., 2002, rate card data from IM Gallup).
5. This is fairly well exemplified by a marked difference in the film fare between different exhibitor-distributors. For instance, the large distributor-exhibitor Samfilm, which distributes films from many of Hollywood’s majors, rarely releases European films to its many screens, while its smaller competitors have to rely on more diverse film supply for their screens.

References


Statistics Iceland, unpublished information from the Media, Telecommunication and Culture Database.


The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views of Statistics Iceland.
WebArt

Methods for Investigating Design and User Experience Through a Reflexivity Lab

Lisa Gjedde & Bruno Ingemann

Works of interactive art on the internet or WebArt are similar to film and theatre because of their temporal unfoldment. What distinguishes works of WebArt from film and theatre are the possibilities for interaction.

The experience which is created during the interaction is temporal. Through a process of video recording of the work of art as well as the users interaction with the work of art it can be made object of a process of analysis. In this article we will present a method to capture and retain the users’ experience. The main focus is on the user and the users’ interaction with the work of art and the inherent potentials for meaning and interaction that are unfolded.

By means of this method, a number of conditions for the experience of the user are investigated. The design for this investigation is based on the experimental experience method (Gjedde & Ingemann 1999, 2001) and includes a focus on rules, control, strategies of reading, cognitive resonance and the users’ physical interaction with the work of art.

Three pieces of WebArt has been chosen for this investigation which involves three participants. The aim is to develop this reflexivity lab as a method to be used with different types of web design in order to reach a deeper understanding of the construction of meaning in interactive media.

The WebArt Project

Art is understood as an area that allows for the creation as well as the exploration and challenge of meanings within a frame of possibilities. Art is interpretative and does not carry predefined meanings to the same extent as non-fiction works, and this highlights the process of construction of meaning.

These processes of meaning construction are closely linked with and involve the users’ experiential process. The concept of experiential learning is fundamental to learning theory (Kolb 1984), but experience in an educational sense is often linked with everyday practices that are thought to be of use within a certain framework.

The concept of art is defined in terms of different experiential qualities, that go beyond the use in mundane terms and have a different ontological status, with a value that is thought to be independent of its supposed usefulness, but rather based on its experiential qualities.
We will make a tentative definition of works of WebArt as encompassing two areas: One is the frame of possibilities of the work of WebArt: this includes all the elements present in the interface and the interactive choices the users make. The other is the frame of possibilities of the user: the personal relevance, the experience and the values which the user brings to the encounter with the work of WebArt. It also includes their willingness to get involved with the work of WebArt and enter into a dialogue with it.

We assume that a work of WebArt is made manifest temporally, through the users’ interactivity and use of several channels of processing the work. (Ingemann 1999). In order to retain the work as it is created temporally we have designed a project that uses a state-of-the-art usability lab to register the construction of the work of WebArt on video. The activity on the screen is captured on video by using a scan-converter, while a second camera is recording the informants’ face and body expression. The two sources are mixed simultaneously so that a video is recorded which has the image of the screen as its main image and a video of the informants’ expression inserted in a corner.

The three participating informants are separately presented with the 3 different works of WebArt on a web-page which we have designed specifically for this purpose. This web-page has links to the different works of WebArt that we are using.

A facilitator is sitting next to the informant and enters into a dialogue with the informant about what she/he is seeing and associating with the work of WebArt. The other facilitator is sitting a different place and watching the activity and selecting central areas in the activity which can be interesting to go further into in the subsequent reflexivity interview. The encounter between the frame of possibilities of the work of WebArt and the frame of possibilities of the user has four different material expressions: the video, the facilitated dialogue, the interview on the work of art and the reflexivity interview which involves the informants reviewing the video made during her/his explorations of the work and art and reflections on it.

Illustration 1: Reflexivity Lab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The frame of possibilities of the work of WebArt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• a video recording which shows the interaction with the work of WebArt and also showing the kineasthetic expression of the user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• a process dialog between the user and the facilitator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• an interview on the work of art which the facilitator conducts immediately after each work of WebArt has been experienced by the user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• a reflection interview conducted after the whole interaction process has been finished, in which the video of this is presented in short sequences and the other facilitator the interviews the user.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The frame of possibilities of the user |

It is this encounter between the frame of possibilities of the work of art and the frame of possibilities of the user, which provides the setting for the analysis of the interplay between the work of WebArt and the users experience.

We are using the term reflexivity lab for this methodological approach, because it is derived from the previously conceptualised experimental experience method. (Gjedde & Ingemann 2001). In the experiential reflexivity lab this approach is implemented and
explored in relation to interactive digital media and the multifaceted reflection is partly happening during the interaction, partly in the subsequent dialogue.

WebArt can be characterised as an area of interactive expression in which limits and possibilities are tried out and explored through works of art. A work of WebArt can be seen as needing an act of interactivity from the user in order to be changed and brought into existence at a different level. This is brought about through a bodily action: the mouse is moved around or clicked in order to explore and bring about changes in the work of WebArt. Thereby the notion of time is introduced: the work of art is changed and created through a temporal development which resembles film and theatre, since it is a temporal expression that cannot be frozen and captured but needs a temporal dimension in order to perceived.

The Frame of Possibilities – Encounters Between the Users and the Work of WebArt

Each work of WebArt has a beginning and is in a starting position before the user enters into an interaction with the work of art. One of the three works of art is Tetrasonia, which starts from a minimalist position. At first we see only a rectangular surface which is divided into four squares of colour: a quadrangular orange surface, a rectangular dark blue surface, a quadrangular light blue surface and a rectangular green surface.

Illustration. 2: Anna looks at Tetrasonia.

This starting point is very open – what can one do next? In the following we will present the meeting between this work of art and the three informants, and the frame of possibilities that are emerging through their interactivity.

Anna is the first informant who is interacting with the works of art. She has a background teaching educational drama, and she approaches the works of WebArt with an exploring and open attitude.

She discovers that by moving the mouse over the coloured surfaces she can call forth some small rectangular images. By clicking on them she can make them stick to the surface and also make a sound. These sounds are sampled from natural sounds, like the song of the humpback whale, the frogs of the Amazons or a volcanic explosion, … “Is this then music, or is it an underscoring of the symbol?”

This rhetorical question will frame Anna’s exploration of this work of art which she in the interview reflects on: “… But to me it was also an interrogation of the media”.
From an analysis of the complex data, we have extracted different types of strategies through which our informants are approaching the works of WebArt.

**Cognitive Resonance**

An overarching parameter, which is decisive for the degree to which the user gets involved with the work of WebArt and enters into a process with it, is the degree of cognitive resonance. Cognitive resonance is in this context understood as an openness and receptivity from the user towards the frame of possibilities of the work of WebArt. This incorporates context as well as content and makes it possible to enter into a process of meaning construction which involves the user at a deeper level.

Anna is having an encounter with the work of WebArt with a cognitive resonance, which makes her engage with the work of art with the intention of fully exploring it, and wanting to bring forth all its inherent possibilities for interaction and meaning. She is empathetic to the work of art and its possibilities, one of which is to enter into a role that she constructs for herself as a composer, and using the sounds of nature as a tool to compose with.

Carl is professionally involved with interaction design and learning. While Anne could engage herself with Tetrasonia for more than half an hour, Carl is only spending ten minutes exploring it, and only stays with it because he is prompted by the facilitator.

Carl does not see the work of WebArt as art. To him it is: “…maybe a bit more like a hypertext. The navigational structure.” He also makes connections to other information sites: “… it is actually like many other hypertexts, encyclopaedias, Encarta.”

He stays in a phase of initial exploration and does not perceive it as a work of art, neither does the work of WebArt afford him a way to develop such a resonance.

The third user, Bettina, is an arts teacher and very interested in contemporary art. She spends approximately half an hour on Tetrasonia. She has an explorative strategy. The moment she discovers the fundamental concept of the work of art as consisting of four elements, she stops her exploration.

While Carl quickly is categorising the work of art as a hypertext based on its navigational structure, Bettina is finding this blend of info and art to be challenging “… such a blend of culture, information knowledge acquisition and then experience……I think
this is a very interesting genre of blending where you are expanding the concept of a work of art.”

One of the works of art, Dustharp, differs from the other works of art by allowing for the experience of a flow, which initially is not dependent on the activity of the user. This is the experience Carl encounters.

Initially he sees a red surface, upon which a big crimson oval figure is resting. Within this oval figure a number of pink bullets are moving forth and back in a quiet tempo. Carl is trying to hold on to one of the bullets or maybe transform it into something else. Then a sound is produced. A sound of a harp. Through the movement of the mouse he may play the harp. His physical expression is nonetheless a quick mouse clicking activity. Dustharp is the only work of art which he will characterise as such, and also the only he can relate to emotionally. “This reminds me of an artery or something like that, maybe inside the body. Something very quiet, maybe a birth…”

Conditions for Resonance

The encounter with Dustharp has a cognitive resonance for Carl. He approaches the work of art with an open attitude that is supported by its interface and design elements, allowing for a playful use of the sound element. The music genre resembles new age music, inviting the user to relax and peacefully explore.
The aesthetic elements are easily accessible and lead the user into a clearly defined environment, which offers the user an overview as well as possibilities for interaction. They also offer a pattern of causality in the navigational structure, which is challenging and aesthetically pleasing for the user.

The architectural structure maintains a balance between an openness and a closedness, which is appealing to the user and draws the user into an interaction with the work of art.

The resonance draws on qualities inherent in the work of art and in the attitude with which the user encounters the work of art. Dustharp draws on well-known schemas and an open design that may support a resonance, while the resonance with Tetrasonia depends on the user encountering it with preconceived notions of it as a work of art.

Narrativity and Existence
In order to investigate the process of meaning construction from a narrative approach, we have evoked the users’ narratives about what they saw and experienced during the usage. We explicitly wanted to find out if they experienced the use of the works of WebArt as a narrative they created. In the analysis we have looked at the possibilities inherent in the works of WebArt for evoking the users’ narratives at different levels. We have also looked at the extent to which the users through the use of narratives demonstrate that they have been able to construct meaning at a global level.

Bettina narrates how she through the interaction with Dustharp experiences a sense of acting as a conductor for the activity – she perceives herself acting as a conductor of an orchestra “….for each click I make, I am building up the sound of the orchestra…..it is quite minimalist…starting at the coloured surfaces and from there evolving the entire universe.”

Anna’s strategy is through a process of orchestration to try and evolve a complete work of art, in which she works out the conflict between good and evil through her creation of the work of WebArt. This strategy must be seen in relation to her own repertoire of narratives and myths.

Bettina, on the other hand, has a strategy involving a distancing and more exploratory approach, exploring alternative narratives that may evolve from the work of WebArt. Her strategy of exploration/distancing can be viewed as a detective investigating a mystery, trying to find a solution. The quality of a mystery is important, and it has to be hard to solve. This contains the challenge and the intellectual satisfaction of reaching a solution through a strategy of problem solving.

Playing and Explorative Strategies
The third work of art that we have used in this investigation first appears as a little white quadrangle on a full-screen black background. This is the Work of Art. This is White & Black.

We can see that she through her exploration of the work of WebArt is focusing on the temporal aspects. “..if I want something from these works of art which are temporal, I will need to give them time… here is a stripe with some movements and that is it… but when you give it a bit of time, like I do now, then some boundaries are emerging. My eyes are perceiving different boundaries now, than they did before…. I am starting to see the black and white fields in a different way… I am becoming more and more engrossed in this universe…”
It is the constraints of this work of WebArt, as Bettina perceives it, that challenges her and makes her perceive it in a meditative way within her frame of possibilities. Bettina says she does not perceive a narrative in this experience, but finds it meaningful by relating it to her concept of art.

Bettina does not perceive a narrative in White&Black, but could it be inherent in its frame of possibilities? We capture three still images of different stages of the movements. A narrative must contain elements denoting differences. The three still images are very different. A small white quadrangle; a large white pillar with lines of black studded with black and white tiny quadrangles; a smaller pillar with lots of black broken lines. But do these elements contain more of that which we ordinarily would term a narrative (Gjedde 1999).

Is there a setting? Yes, there is a white quadrangle on a black background. And then there is the cursor, representing the movements of the hand and the mouse. This is the minimalist setting in which a narrative may unfold, even if transferred to the universe of the user, since the user though her interactions participates as a player. Does it have a conflict? Yes, a conflict is building up between one player, the white quadrangle and the other player – the user. A conflict involves control and interaction. Is there a point or solution? Yes, to the extent to which the user explores the potentials of the environment and solves the conflict between the quadrangle and the user by establishing and clarifying the principles of causality in the environment.

The reason why Bettina does not experience it as a narrative may be that she does not to the same extent find familiar and concrete elements in it as she does, for instance, in Tetrasonia. These familiar elements may facilitate associations to the story of the creation of the world, or she may relate directly to the four elements. White&Black does not provide the same stereotypes to embed the story in. This does, however, not indicate that there is no story within its frame of possibilities, only that it is being unfolded at a more subtle level, but still to be found at the level of the users’ activity.

In this work of WebArt we find that the central function of the interactivity is a play activity. It is a serious and focused play, which has a value in itself. Some informants have concrete associations to images of moving traffic and blurred cityscapes, but they are not central aims for the activity. It is through the play as exploration that the work of art gains existence and meaning. The interaction does not lead to anything, but it carries its own reward.

**Play and Control**

The way all three informants approach the experience of interaction with the works of WebArt involve three phases, which are similar to a traditional visit to a museum. These
are: a phase of orientation (which lasts approximately 1/7 of the total spent time); a phase of focusing (5/7) and a fading out phase (1/7) (Falk & Dierking, 1992:58)

We have found that during the individual exploration of each work of WebArt, the phase of orientation is focused on discovering rules for the interaction with the work of art, and the possibilities the user has for affecting and controlling the work of art.

We have further found that use of the works of WebArt stops when the user through the play has uncovered the rules that are embedded in the work of art, and when the user through his or her interaction with the work of art has found the boundaries for the control that is offered.

The uncovering of the control and the rules are happening all through the interaction – but fundamentally it is being mapped out already during the phase of orientation. In the phase of focusing, the rules are further tested out and the users’ frame of possibilities is defining the limits for the interaction beyond those in the work itself.

Focus and Strategies

The interactivity is both a concrete physical activity and also the vehicle through which the user shows the strategy and the focus she/he brings to the encounter. It is though this activity that she/he makes a connection with the work of art.

When Carl encounters Tetrasonia and White&Black, it is with a top-down strategy and a predominantly logical-rational perspective.

Anna is obviously immersed in the works of art and we find that she is using a bottom-up strategy.

She creates narrative structures and enters into a process of creating associations reflecting aspects of her cultural as well everyday life. She is also exploring the works of WebArt for existential themes.

We find that Bettina’s strategies for interaction are positioned between the strategies of Carl and Anna, drawing on elements of them both. She is using a top-down strategy as well as an open and immersive attitude. The frame of possibilities she unfolds is closely linked with her professional interpretative approach and less with her everyday life.

Through the process of interaction the frame of possibilities is facilitated for the user as well as for the work of WebArt. At the core of the interactivity is the choice of the user, which we suggest is something that goes beyond the click or the movement with the mouse. This core of interactivity holds meaning in itself. The importance of this core of interactivity depends on whether it is connected to the process of clarifying the rules through an attitude of play. New possibilities for interaction design may be developed based on this approach, which not only should focus on simplicity and easy navigation, but also on providing the user with fruitful movements and challenges.

Interaction and Immersion

The attunement is a prerequisite for the connection between the user’s frame of possibilities and the interactivity. The Danish writer Ole Thyssen states that: “To attune is to work with the observer’s blind receptivity to the suggestive force of the aesthetic arrangement”. (Thyssen 1998:229).

One might say that the attunement is both something which the user is bringing to the encounter with the works of WebArt, but also something which is emerging through the
WebArt

encounter with the works of art. The work of art may have a suggestive force or lack it. The spectator may have an openness or lack it.

The quality of the attunement depends, among other things, on the spectator’s openness and experience. This is not necessarily made explicit, but may be expressed through the temporal construction of the work of WebArt. It can be seen in an attitude of either an immersion into or a distancing from it. The attuning is a precondition for the perception and construction of meaning, but the perception and construction of meaning is equally a precondition for the attunement. The perception and construction of meaning is part of the experience. In the experience is embedded the qualities of knowledge, emotions, values and action. (Gjedde & Ingemann 1999, 2001)

The informant’s body language communicates beyond the consciousness of the informant. Gestures and facial expressions were observed during the informants creation of the work of WebArt. This body language is dynamic and temporal. This also makes it difficult to capture. We have edited the several hours of video, and thereby condensed the sequence of the construction of the works of art, interactivity and kinetics in order to extract the meaningful sequences and prototypical expressions.

The first phase has condensed the video recordings to last only 18 minutes. After this we made a further condensation and chose prototypical examples of body language, which we then captured as still images from the video. This condensation can be seen as a parallel to the condensation being made in analyses of qualitative interviews, in which long sequences are condensed into a focal sentence (Kvale 1998). In this case, where we have used video, we have condensed the long sequences into the most important elements which, as a narrative, cover the informant’s process of meaning construction and interactivity. These were finally condensed into still images which underscore significant bodily expressions of the informant. (Argyle 1975:215)

As an example, we will look at Anna.

Illustration 7: Anna in the phase of orientation.
Illustration 8: Anna in the phase of focusing.
Illustration 9: Anna in the phase of fading out.

In the orientation phase it is characteristic of Anna that she leans forward a little and smiles. We interpret this as an expression of openness and anticipation. In the focusing phase, Anna is silent. She leans back and holds her hand up in front of her mouth with a finger up against her chin. We see this as a certain insecurity and thoughtfulness. The hand is partly covering the mouth and covering up emotional expressions. In the fading out phase Anna leans back. She is tentative and listening and has a sceptical expression.

The visual impact of her body actions enhanced certain areas of the verbal expression recorded during the facilitated dialogue - the interview on the work of art and the reflexivity interview.
This happened during an early stage of the analysis – and the stills of these prototypical bodily expressions captured during the condensation phase impacted on our overall experience of the interaction between the informant and the work of WebArt.

**The Fourth Informant**

The three informants are obviously present in the project. They are our informants – but there is also a more hidden fourth informant – the two researchers. We are also participating in the construction of meaning as those who have initiated the *Reflexivity lab* and the conditions it is operating under.

We are not the fourth informant as one who in interacting with the works of WebArt – but we are the fourth informant who is bringing a hermeneutical perspective to the situation and the different forms of dialogue and interviews.

This text can then be understood as an expression of the understanding and construction of meaning of the fourth informant. The reflective focus mirrors the construction of meaning and the frames within which the process is happening.

Many usability studies focus on uncovering problems in interface and other HCI issues, and on investigating how design can support predefined goals, or uncovering the needs of the users (Dumas & Redish 1993, Nielsen 1993). This project has had a totally different focus, looking at how qualities like attunement and immersion may enhance processes of experience and learning.

The design of the project implies levels of attention put on the user, which may affect the user's attunement. We are much interested in knowing what the informant is experiencing, thinking and able to express.

We are aware of our framing the experience of the informants, as well as affecting the experience itself through our involvement. This methodological approach to the interaction between informant and researcher involves a reflection and consciousness of the researcher as a fourth informant. This we see as an expansion of the methodological framework related to a phenomenological approach (Moustakas 1994).

**Discussion**

On the concrete level, this project has focused on the experience of three informants interacting with three chosen works of WebArt. One may suggest that art fundamentally has an intrinsic value and not necessarily a need to communicate anything definite or bear reference to anything definite. In materials that are meant for teaching or information, one may say that references to an outer reality are obvious and that these types of materials are meant to communicate something definite. On the other hand some possibilities for experiences may be closed if the approach is solely logical-rational. In this case, possibilities for the user may be inaccessible if the approach is too limited.

A more open approach may involve attunement and interactivity as carriers of an intrinsic value. This may be related to the frame of possibilities of the user as well as the work of WebArt, the uncovering of its rules and the construction of meaning through narratives.

Even though three informants cannot represent all possible strategies of experience and interaction with the chosen works of WebArt, they do represent a spectre of possible approaches in the encounter between the user’s frame of possibilities and the frame of
possibilities of the work of WebArt. Further research will be needed to further develop this spectre.

This study has focused on the development of a methodological approach to the analysis of a work of interactive WebArt with emphasis on immersion and exploration, which may be relevant for analysis of other genres beyond WebArt.

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http://akira.ruc.dk/~bruno/webart1.html
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CINEMA • FILMS • MARKET • MEDIA STRUCTURE
NEWSPAPERS • MEDIA INDUSTRIES • ECONOMICS • COMPETITION
Group 3 Multimedia and Internet

Chairman: Knut Lundby
Vice Chairman: Elfa Ýr Gylfadóttir


INTERNET • VIOLENCE • PORNOGRAPHY • ACCESS TO INFORMATION


INTERNET • TEXT • LINGUISTICS • COMMUNICATION THEORY


INTERNET • DIGITAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS • TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE • KNOWLEDGE


TELEVISION • DIGITALIZATION • INTERNET • MEDIA STRUCTURE

Hetland, Per: Communicating the web: three routes in science and technology communication. Lillehammer, Østlandsforskning; 2001, 15 p.

WORLD WIDE WEB • SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION • TECHNOLOGY • COMMUNICATION


INTERNET • BOOKS • MEDIA INDUSTRY • TECHNOLOGY


NEWSPAPERS • INTERNET • YOUTH • READING

Isotalus, Pekka; Palosaaari, Anni; Muukkonen, Hanni: Reading news from PDA and comparing it to other media. Helsinki, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, Center for Knowledge and Innovation Research; 2001, 18 p.

NEWS • COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY • COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT • MEDIA USE


COMPUTER GAMES • AESTHETICS • INTERACTIVITY • TECHNOLOGY


INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY • COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY • DISTANCE LEARNING • UNIVERSITIES


INTERNET • WORLD WIDE WEB • INTERACTIVITY • PARTICIPATION


INTERNET • CHILDREN • MEDIA USE • GLOBALIZATION


INTERNET • WORLD WIDE WEB • CHAT GROUPS • ETHNOGRAPHY


HEALTH INFORMATION • INTERNET • INFORMATION SOURCES • SOCIAL INTERACTION
Group 5 Media History
Chairman: Karin Nordberg
Vice Chairman: Raimo Salakangas
MEDIA • INFORMATION SOCIETY • HYPERTEXT • INTERNET
NEWSPAPERS • JOURNALISM • PUBLIC SPHERE • HISTORY
JOURNALISM • COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT • OCCUPATIONAL LIFE • HISTORY
NEWSPAPERS • JOURNALISM • POLITICS • VALUES
JOURNALISM • TEXT • PRODUCTION • RECEPTION
ADVERTISING • HISTORY • FILMS • ANIMATED CARTOONS
RADIO • HISTORY • TEXT • DISCOURSE

Group 6 Television: Institution, Production and Text
Chairman: Espen Ytreberg
Vice Chairman: Johan Lindén
Linden, Johan; Syvertsen, Trine: The use of the concept of "publicservice broadcasting". Oslo, Universitetet i Oslo, Institutt for medier og kommunikasjon; 2001, 30 p.
BROADCASTING • PUBLIC SERVICE • MEDIA POLICY • CONCEPT ANALYSIS
TELEVISION • MEDIA CONVERGENCE • COMMERCIAL TELEVISION • PUBLIC SERVICE • HISTORY

Group 7 Radio Research
Chairman: Carin Åberg
Jökulsson, Stefán: The importance of encounter. Reykjavik, University of Iceland, Department of social sciences; 2001, 10 p.
RADIO • PUBLIC SERVICE • BROADCASTING • PRODUCTION
RADIO • NEWS • DIGITALIZATION • TIME
RADIO • SOUND • KNOWLEDGE • MUSIC

Group 8 Political Communication
Chairman: Lars Nord
Vice Chairman: Göran Djupsund
Djupsund, Göran; Carlson, Tom: Catching the "Wired voter" : theoretical considerations and an empirical analysis. Vasa: Åbo Akademi University, Department of Social Sciences; 2001, 21 p.
POLITICS • POLITICAL PARTIES • ELECTION CAMPAIGNS • INTERNET
PRESS • ETHICS • DISCOURSE
Kjær, Peter; Langer Roy: *Business as usual?: political communication in pink or business journalism as political communication*. København, Handelshøjskolen i København, Institut for Organisation og Arbejdssociologi; Handelshøjskolen i København, Institut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse; 2001, 27 p.

**POLITICAL COMMUNICATION • MANAGEMENT • MEDIA • SOCIOLOGY**


**POLITICAL COMMUNICATION • DISCOURSE • SPEECH • CITIZENS**


**NEWSPAPERS • EDITORS • DEVELOPMENT • HISTORY**

Sulmane, Ilze: *Ethnic and political stereotypes in Latvian and Russian language press in Latvia*. University of Latvia, Faculty of social sciences, Department of communication studies; 2001, 14 p.

**POLITICS • ETHNOGRAPHY • STEREOTYPES • LANGUAGE**

Tainio, Susanna: *How are trends in political communication reflected in conversations?* Jyväskylä, University of Jyväskylä; 2001, 12 p.

**POLITICS • POLITICAL COMMUNICATION • MEDIA RESEARCH**

**Group 9 Research in Journalism**

Chairman: Birgitta Ney
Vice Chairman: Risto Kunelius


**JOURNALISM • JOURNALISTIC GENRES • ETHNIC MINORITIES • JOURNALISTS**


**JOURNALISM • MASS COMMUNICATION • PRESS • INFORMATION SOCIETY**

Kivikuru, Ullamaija: *Milocevic and/or the man who married 161 times: ERNO television exchange - a window to the train of trust in the Balkans*. Helsinki, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Social Science; 2001, 23 p.

**JOURNALISM • POLITICAL COMMUNICATION • TELEVISION**

Kunelius, Risto: *Good journalism?: on the evaluation criteria of some interested and experienced actors*. Tampere, University of Tampere, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication; 2001, 16 p.

**JOURNALISM • NEWS CRITERIA • CRITICISM**


**JOURNALISM • WAR • ETHICS • PROPAGANDA**

**Group 10 The Sociology and Aesthetics of News Reporting**

Chairman: Jan Ekecrantz
Vice Chairman: Knut Helland


**MEDIA • NEWS • POLITICS • IDENTITY**


**TELEVISION • NEWS • WOMEN • GENDER**


**MEDIA • TIME • POSTMODERNISM • HISTORY**


**JOURNALISM • JOURNALISTS • RESEARCH • PRESS**


**JOURNALISM • HISTORY • NEWS • TECHNOLOGY**

**JOURNALISM • DISCOURSE • NARRATOLOGY**


**MEDIA • SOCIETY • TELEVISION PROGRAMMES • CULTURE**


**TELEVISION NEWS • TELEVISION PROGRAMMES • INTERNATIONAL NEWS • NEWS COVERAGE**


**TELEVISION • COVERAGE • TRAFFIC • DISCOURSE**

Group 11 Reception and Audience Studies

Chairman: Juha Kytömäki


**RECEPTION • THEORY • AUDIENCES • CULTURAL STUDIES**


**YOUTH CULTURE • ETHNOGRAPHY • MEDIA USE • LEISURE TIME ACTIVITIES**

Group 12 Children, Adolescents and the Media

Chairman: Jette Rygaard

Vice Chairman: Guðbjörg Hildur Kolbeins

Ivanian, Rouzanna: *Journalism and social work with children in current Russia*. St Petersburg, Saint-Petersburg state institute for service and economy, Social technologies faculty; 2001, 14 p.

**JOURNALISM • CHILDREN • SOCIAL LIFE • INTERVIEWS**


**TELEVISION • VIOLENCE • YOUTH**

Oksman, Virpi; Rautaiainen, Pirjo: *“Perhaps it is a body part”: how the mobile phone became an organic part of the everyday lives of children and adolescents: a case study of Finland*. Tampere, University of Tampere, Information Society Research Centre; 2001, 14 p.

**COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT • MOBILE TELEPHONES • YOUTH • TELECOMMUNICATION**


**TELEVISION • AUDIENCE • YOUTH • SURVEYS**


**YOUTH CULTURE • MEDIA USE**

Group 13 Media Education

Chairman: Sirkku Kotilainen

Jökulsson, Stefán: *Media literacy for what purpose?*. Reykjavik, University of Iceland, Department of social sciences; 2001, 10 p.

**MEDIA • EDUCATION • KNOWLEDGE • PEDAGOGY**


**TEACHER • TEACHER TRAINING • MEDIA EDUCATION**

Sintonen, Sara: *Theoretical foundations on media education research from musical point of view*. Helsinki, Sibelius Academy, Department of Music Education; 2001, 3 p.

**MEDIA EDUCATION • EDUCATION • MUSIC**

Group 14 Popular Culture

Chairman: Hanne Bruun

Vice Chairman: Ása Thelander

Rouslan, Bekourov: *MTV as a lifestyle*. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg state university, Faculty of journalism; 2001, 10 p.


Group 15 Fiction in Films and on Television

Chairman: *Gunhild Agger*
Vice Chairman: *Ingrid Lindell*


Group 16 Visual Culture

Chairman: *Arild Fetveit*


Group 17 The Language and the Rhetoric of the Media

Chairman: *Helen Andersson*

Renvall, Mika; Vehkalahti, Pertti: *The unemployed as "others" in welfare journalism: logic of otherness - a double bound theory*. Tampere, University of Tampere, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication; 2001, 23 p.

Group 18 Images of Gender in the Media

Chairman: *Leonor Camauër*


Group 19 Public Relations/Planned Communication
Chairman: Carol Henriksen

Babochieva, Madina: *Role of public relations in transformation of social processes in Russia*. St Petersburg, St Petersburg state university, Faculty of journalism; 2001, 11 p.


Group 20 Mediated Risk and Crisis Communication
Chairman: Stig Arne Nohrstedt

Friday, August 10th, 2001

17.00-21.00 Arrival and registration in Oddi (room 201) at the University of Iceland. Light snack (sandwiches and drinks).

Saturday, August 11th, 2001

8.00-9.30 Registration in the University Theater (Háskólabíó) and coffee.
9.30-10.15 Opening ceremony at the University Theater (auditorium 2):
   Welcome address: Þorbjörn Broddason.
   Opening: The president of Iceland, Mr. Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson.
10.15-10.30 Coffee break.
10.30-12.00 Plenary session I (New media, New opportunities, New societies?):
   Keynote speaker: Kirsten Drotner, Odense, Denmark.
12.00-13.30 Lunch at the Radisson SAS in Súlnasalur.
13.30-16.30 Working groups meet in Oddi, Árnagarður and Lögberg.
17.00-22.00 Trip to the Blue Lagoon. Dinner will be served, and the Blue Lagoon cocktail.

Sunday, August 12th, 2001

10.00-12.00 Plenary session II (New generations, New media) at the University Theater (auditorium 2):
   Speaker: Ellen Wartella, University of Texas – Austin.
12.00-13.30 Lunch at the Radisson SAS in Súlnasalur.
13.30-17.00 Working groups meet in Oddi, Árnagarður and Lögberg.
17.00-22.00 Optional activities.

Monday, August 13th, 2001

9.00-12.00 Plenary session III (Media history) at the University Theater (auditorium 2):
   Speaker: Ib Bondebjerg, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
   Panel: Hans Fredrik Dahl, University of Oslo, Klaus Bruhn Jensen, University of Copenhagen, Raimo Salokangas, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, and Monika Djerf-Pierre, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
12.00-13.30 Lunch at the Radisson SAS in Súlnasalur.
13.30-16.30 Working groups meet in Oddi, Árnagarður and Lögberg.
16.30-17.30 Time for meetings.
18.30-19.30 Reception at the Reykjavik City Hall.
20.00-24.00 Gala dinner at the Hôtel Saga-Radisson SAS.
New Literature
Denmark
Documentalist: Peder Grøngaard

The Aesthetics of Television

The aim of the anthology is to describe and analyse television as an aesthetic phenomenon. The question is approached from different angles: general aesthetic problems concerning the audio-visual media, the particular aesthetic means of expression belonging to the television medium, the quality of the individual programme, the distinctive features and aesthetic codes of individual television genres, enunciation and forms of address in television, etc. Among the television genres and programme formats dealt with are: talk shows, documentaries, police series, sport, fiction, advertising, everyday talk on television, comedy series, TV journalism, and interactive programme formats.


Note: For further information, see: http://www.forlag.auc.dk/

Instead of the Ideal Debate: Doing Politics and Doing Gender in Nordic Political Campaign Discourse

This book is about Nordic political campaign discourse. More specifically, it analyzes how political actors present themselves and their message in televised election campaign debates in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. A wide spectrum of phenomena related to women’s and men’s campaign discourse is covered, including discursive styles, rhetorical strategies, and conversational tactics.


Note: For further information, see: http://www.unipress.dk/
Advertising Research in the Nordic Countries


This book is published on the basis of the seminar “Advertising Research in the Nordic Countries” held in Copenhagen, June 7th-8th 2000. The seminar was organised and hosted by the Forum for Advertising Research, Department of Marketing, Copenhagen Business School. Researchers from Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark were present at the two-day seminar. All the presentations gave an interesting insight into advertising research in the different countries, and furthermore the seminar gave a valuable network of Nordic researchers.


Note: For further information, see: http://www.samfundslitteratur.dk/
Comics & Culture: Analytical and Theoretical Approaches to Comics

The book offers an introduction to the field of comics research written by scholars from Europe and USA. The articles span a great variety of approaches including general discussions of the aesthetics and definition of comics, comparisons of comics with other media, analyses of specific comics and genres, and discussions of the cultural status of comics in society.


Note: For further information, see: http://www.mtp.dk/

Special Issue: Comparing American and European Filmmaking and Practices in Other Media

The articles in the present issue of p.o.v. are devoted to comparisons of American and European filmmaking and practices in other media. The reader will find in these pages a broad spectrum of opinions as to how European and American storytelling and media practices might best be compared, as well as whether or not such comparisons can be made at all.


Note: This, as well as all previous issues of p.o.v. can be found on the Internet at: http://imv.au.dk/publikationer/pov/POV.html

Other new literature


The question of national cinema is currently very much on film scholars’ critical agenda, where it figures alongside such terms as “nationalism”, “postnationalism”, “transnationalism” and “supranationalism”, which are held to identify related or competing phenomena, depending on the specificity of the theoretical account in question. This book is designed to contribute to the project of conceptual clarification that orients discussions of national cinema during the late 1980s and 1990s. Contains among other things the following articles: Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie: Introduction, Mette Hjort: Themes of nation, Ulf Hedetoft: Contemporary cinema: between cultural globalisation and national interpretation.


Poster, Mark: Print and digital authorship. Århus, The Centre for Internet Research, 2001, 21 p., ISBN 87-91163-00-5, (Papers from The Centre for Internet Research; 1), ISSN 1601-5371. (Århus Universitet, Institut for Informations- og Medievidenskab, Center for Internetforskning/CFI).


Contains the following articles: Richard Raskin: An interview with Petri Kotwica on “Las Nueve

FILMS • SHORT FILMS • FILM DIRECTORS • FILM PRODUCTION


MEDIA • CHILDREN • MEDIA USE • SOCIAL INTERACTION


TELEVISION SERIALS • EDUCATION • SOCIAL CHANGE • RECEPTION


MEDIA • YOUTH • ETHNIC MINORITIES • MEDIA USE


MEDIA • LIBRARIES • ETHNIC MINORITIES • LOCAL MEDIA


TELEVISION SERIALS • ETHNOGRAPHY • EVERYDAY LIFE • TELEVISION GENRES
Finland
Documentalist: Eija Poteri

The Politics of Public Issues

What was the public profile of the economic crisis in Finland like, and how did people interpret and mediate it? How does the media mediate information about scientific achievements? How is gender constructed in television? All the processes and phenomena analysed in the articles have been central issues in Finland in the 1990s. Some texts are linked together as parts of projects; some are “interim reports” of individual doctoral students. Articles are: Kivikuru, Ullamaia: Media coverage versus citizen response. Kantola, Anu: Power talk: institutionalising political authority in the Finnish economic crisis. Aslama, Minna; Valtonen, Sanna: Under bad weather: or how to approach “citizens’ talk” about the economic recession and the media. Kivikuru, Ullamaia: Paradise lost or regained?: citizen culture and media in pre, core and post recession Finland. Salovaara-Moring, Inka: Symbolic geography of media: identity formation and meaning marketing in Finnish regional press. Parikka, Tuija: Media, memories and the economic crisis: subjectification of the unemployed in the 90’s Finland. Väliverronen, Esa: From mediation to mediatization the new politics of communicating science and biotechnology. Hellsten, Iina: Opening the book of life: politics of metaphors and the human genome. Ojajärvi, Sanna: A private issue of public interest discourses of gender and sexuality on television.


Other new literature


The objective of the study is to deepen the understanding of how productional practices give one ink-printed work a certain kind of aesthetic identity and another a completely different character. According to a pragamatic approach, the aesthetic identity of an artwork is not something determined and invariable. The study consists of two parts: the textual part (this book) and the artistic part (the photobook Metropol).

PHOTOGRAPHS • PHOTOGRAPHY • AESTHETICS • IMAGE


This is an anthology which deals with the Internet as a space of local communication. The articles are: Heinonen, Ari: Introduction: the global net,
locality and publicness; Mäkinen, Maarit: The Internet as a community media; Ridell, Seija: Manse Forum; a local experiment with web-mediated civic publicness; Martikainen, Ari: Towards dialogical online journalism; Halttu, Mika: Local content production: hardware and software development; Heinonen, Ari; Ridell, Seija; Sirkkunen, Esa: Lessons learned from the project. Publisher’s home page and possibility for ordering: http://granum.uta.fi/

INTERNET • CITIZENS • LOCAL COMMUNICATION • WORLD WIDE WEB


FILMS • FEMINISM • PORNOGRAPHY • GENDER ADVERTISING • TELEVISION . SEXUALITY


The aim of this study is to look at the impact of culture on international branding, that is, what kinds of cultural factors and the extent to which the marketer should take them into account, with particular reference to the case of a Finnish mobile phone marketer in Finland. The key finding of this study is that the Chinese did not respond positively to the branding of the Finnish marketer analysed in this case due to different cultural values and practises.

Book orders: E-mail: kirjamyyni@kampusdata.fi

MARKETING • COMMUNICATION • CULTURAL INTERACTION


This study analyses the production of public journalistic text. The focus is on editorial-censorship transformations in texts made in journalistic institutions of Soviet Estonia at the beginning of 1980s. The study includes a theoretical-conceptual framework of the problem, analysis of historical context, and empirical material. A socio-semiotic method has been constructed by which to analyse the latter. The data consists of 79 edited-censored radio texts, as well as interviews with journalists and editors.

JOURNALISM • IDEOLOGIES • CENSORSHIP • SOCIETY


This book deals with the production, the public criticism and the authorship of TV 2 serial drama. TV 2’s family series are known for their investment in “realism”, strong female figures, and their utility value in portraying social life. Iiris Ruoho explores the particular discourse of the utility drama, which has had different articulations in the family genre. These have served the special interpretations of the informational program policy and the ideology of public service. Publisher’s home page and possibility for ordering: http://granum.uta.fi/

TELEVISION DRAMAS • TELEVISION SERIALS • TELEVISION PROGRAMMES • TELEVISION


The focus of the study is the design of modern, computerized media- and communication technologies which systematically influence subjective experiences and knowledge of the perceivers. Publisher’s
home page and possibility for ordering: http://granum.uta.fi/

COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY • MEDIA • PERCEPTION • SEMANTICS


As media organizations embrace the Internet as a viable media, new models of publishing are being investigated. This is due both to the need to find a new economics of customer-driven publishing services and to the emergence of a more demanding and technologically empowered customer. Customized forms of information selection and presentation increase the perceived relevance of media content, and provide new and potentially more efficient tools for learning and creation of new knowledge.

ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING • CONSUMERS • INTERNET • NEWS


This study investigates the Latin American negotiators’ perceptions of Finnish and Colombian negotiators and the cultural differences that the Latin American negotiators perceive when communicating with Finnish negotiators. The Latin American and Spanish negotiators’ perceptions of Finnish negotiators is compared. Book orders: E-mail: kirjamyynti@kampusdata.fi

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION • INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION • GLOBALIZATION • CULTURE

Articles

Isotalus, Pekka: Presidential campaigning in Finland and americanization. World communication 30 (2001)2, ISSN 0882-4088, pp. 5-23.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION • ELECTION CAMPAIGNS • POLITICIANS


PUBLIC SPHERE • ECONOMIC TRENDS • POLITICS • POLITICAL COMMUNICATION


JOURNALISM • DEMOCRACY


PUBLIC SPHERE • MEDIA RESEARCH • CITIZENS


GLOBALIZATION • MEDIA INDUSTRY • INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION


MEDIA • DEMOCRACY • INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION • COMMUNICATION POLICY


ETHICS • VALUES • JOURNALISM • FREEDOM OF SPEECH


COMMUNICATION EDUCATION • SURVEYS • JOURNALIST TRAINING • SCHOOLS OF JOURNALISM


PUBLIC OPINION • COMMUNITIES • POLITICAL THEORY • PUBLICITY

CHILDREN • YOUTH • MEDIA • MEDIA RESEARCH


MEDIA • WAR • CONFLICTS • INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
NORWAY
Documentalist: Borghild Gramstad


INTERNET • TELEVISION • AUDIENCES
• LEISURE TIME ACTIVITIES


COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY • THEORY
• TELECOMMUNICATION • SOCIOLOGY


TELEVISION • CONVERGENCE • MEDIA POLICY
• REGULATIONS

Articles

Bakke, Marit: Cultural policy in Norway. The journal of arts, management, law and society 31 (2001)1, ISSN 1063-2921, pp. 10-34.

CULTURE • POLITICS • CULTURAL POLICY
• ECONOMICS


AUDIENCES • ETHNIC MINORITIES • PRESS
• MEDIA USE


FILMS • HEALTH INFORMATION • CONTENT
• TEXT ANALYSIS


ANIMATED CARTOONS • DOCUMENTARY FILMS
• DOCUMENTARISM • HISTORY

Articles


ECONOMICS • ARTS • SUBSIDIES • POLITICS
**Journalism and the New World Order. Studying War and the Media. Vol. 2.**


This is the second volume of the project called ‘Journalism in the New World Order’. The present volume deals with theoretical, historical and methodological problems of war reporting and war propaganda. The first part of the book deals with the media’s role in conflicts and provides conceptual and theoretical tool for the analysis of conflict coverage and war reporting. Under the title ‘How Did We Get There?’, the second part of the volume provides the historical background needed to understand the present situation of journalism in war. The third part presents different methodological approaches to the study of war and the media, applying both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysing media discourse. The fourth part is dedicated to studies of the Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia and demonstrates application of the previously described theoretical models and methodological approaches. Finally, ‘Beyond Wishful Thinking’, the closing part of the volume, summarizes the implications of this kind of research in terms of practical journalism.


The publication gives a broad outline of children and media in the world, focusing on media literacy in the manifold sense of the word. The concept of ‘media literacy’ has been given a great many definitions worldwide, something that is touched upon in the booklet. What we have in view here is knowledge of children and media, and efforts made to realise children’s rights in this respect, not least their right to influence and participate in the media. The yearbook contains a review of recent and current international trends in media literacy including research on children and media – this is, summarising examples of/references to research and practices, important conferences and declarations related to the area, and a selection of relevant organisations and web sites.
The volume presents media information for five countries in the form of detailed data and country analysis. The publication contributes knowledge about a wide range of media sectors – newspapers, magazines, books, radio, television, video, film and cinema, phonograms, PC and Internet. Data treat the events of the past ten years, from 1990 through 1999/2000, and analyses describe each country’s media landscape with focus on structure, economy and consumption.

Based upon perspectives and concepts from a social and historical research on technical systems, this dissertation describes and analyses events and processes relating to the dramatic changes in television in Western Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, it focuses on how Swedish television, conceived as a large socio-technical system, has shifted from a traditional public television broadcasting, it has now come to encompass several commercial channels distributed through an expanding combination of technical and market alternatives, including satellite television.

The study traces the multiple ways in which socio-historical processes and contingencies have shaped the television system in Sweden. The most detailed historical description and analyses focus on the entrepreneurial activities of the Swedish firm, Industriförlätnings AB Kinnevik, documenting the introduction of the satellite channel TV3 in Sweden and the related expansion of the system. The entrepreneurial actions of Kinnevik in establishing the new satellite channel TV3 are analysed against the background of 1) the characteristics of the traditional Swedish radio and TV Broadcasting system, 2) the development of cable television in Sweden, and 3) the broad history of satellite television. Emphasis is placed on how and why it was possible for a new actor to successfully challenge, gain access to, and help transform a well-established system that had remained relatively stable for a long time. This raises attendant questions of timing. How do we account for and explain the relative stability of this system for such a long period? Why did radical change occur at a particular time and not before or after? Whereas the empirical material concerning the activities of Kinnevik in relation to its entrance on the television market covers the period between 1984 and 1991, the study in general addresses developments throughout the twentieth century and, occasionally, even further back in history. The focus is thus on the system as a whole, rather than on only one of its components.


This thesis investigate the public debate on gene technology, between 1973 and 1996, in one of the agenda-setting media in Sweden, Dagens Nyheter.

Gene technology is one of the latest technologies which characterise our present Western society. The main concern of the study is the dynamic of this mediated debate on gene technology, which represents variation in the intensity and content of the debate over time. Potential controversies in this debate have also been a major focus.

The study is mainly based on a quantitative content analysis of all articles published by Dagens Nyheter with gene technology as the main theme, but also on a qualitative text analysis of a smaller amount of articles covering controversies within the same population of articles.

Patterns of Recollection: The Documentary Meets Digital Media


Radical breakthroughs in the technologies for registration and dissemination of moving images have created a need for common vocabularies that can be shared by media practitioners, researchers from different fields of inquiry, and end-users of documentary accounts.

The dissertation proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of historical programming in digital media. The elements of the proposed framework are derived from the fields of architecture, genre theory, and computer software design. It adheres to the pattern language approach proposed by Christopher Alexander, a methodology for cooperative design that has been applied in the design of computer software. The study suggests that this method for identifying design elements resonate well with recent contributors to genre theory made by film-scholar Rick Altman and by computer-scientist Thomas Erickson.

The application of pattern-informed genre framework is demonstrated in a series of explorations that exemplifies documentaries from different periods of production informed by different techniques for research, production, distribution, and exhibition. The examples range from the films of Humphrey Jennings, produced in the 1940’s to current examples of digital documentaries produced and exhibited on the World Wide Web. A collection of forty-three candidate design patterns is identified that characterise the different modes of production and technologies employed. For each example, a small set of characteristic patterns of composition is discussed and some pertinent shifts in practical application of new techniques for recording, editing and navigating are briefly reviewed. The last example demonstrates the application of design patterns as a tool for design dialogues with end-users in an ongoing project at the Centre for User-oriented IT Design (CID, Royal Institute of Technology), a project in which the author has taken an active part.
The hypothesis that pattern languages for documentary analysis and design can offer new practical insights into digital media of moving images is assessed in the concluding part of the study. Finally, the pattern language method, and an early technique for motion capture that mimics it, are discussed against the backdrop of current socio-political analysis made by sociologist Manuel Castells. Here the pattern approach and chronographic techniques through which it can be applied, are proposed as means for documentary producers to meet critical audience demand for authenticity in history programming.

Other new literature


This thesis consists of five articles. Their common denominator is advertising and promotion on the Internet. The articles cover Web advertising and promotion effectiveness with respect to a number of important factors, such as involvement, product type, brand familiarity, ad wearout, and Internet user experience. The behaviours of visitors to a retail site are also studied, with important implications for Web site and promotion design.


This dissertation probes two somewhat different but interrelated practices: vision made difficult, and making visible what is otherwise not seen with the naked eye. The construction of cinematic invisibility furnishes a paramount example of a counter-visual tendency manifested within the frame of a medium not only based on the visual but on the idea of being an indexical imprint of reality. Invisibility therefore challenges the replicating abilities of the cinematographic medium, but simultaneously displays the medium’s prowess to depict phenomena impinging on reality in different fashions.

The many guises of this theme were gradually transferred from a performance context within a theatrical setting to a quasi-realistic narrative of sorts. These simple stories were often set in urban surroundings, where the phenomenon of invisibility was explained by means of technologies, inventions or other aspects brought about by modern society. Trick work played a central role when it came to the development of cinematic techniques and changes in narrative strategies. The complexity of the trick-film genre and its hybrids exceeds the purely spectacular and the apparent simplicity of the tricks themselves.

This study displays and analyzes the wide range of applications of the trick mode. The same underlying conception to make visible the otherwise invisible can be found not only in trick films proper, but also in féeries, early animated films, biblical films, and scientific films, and in a less obvious sense even in comic films, detective and crime films. By this process of colonization or absorption, the cinematic depiction of invisible realms became conspicuous facets of film making during the years 1896-1916, especially in three of the main production companies in France, namely Star-Film, Pathé Frères and Gaumont.


Johnsson-Smaragdi, Ulla: *Young people & new media in Sweden*. Växjö universitet, Institutionen
This work is a corpus-based diachronic study of the language of English up-market ("quality") newspaper editorials, covering the period 1900-1993. CENE, the Corpus of English Newspapers Editorials, was compiled for the purposes of this study and comprises editorials from the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, and the Times chosen to represent periods at ten-year intervals.

The language of the editorial was investigated with regard to features that previous research had proved to be markers of such types of discourse as might be of interest to an investigation of the development of the language of newspaper editorials. The linguistic features included in the present study were such as Douglas Biber had proved to be markers of the communicative functions the author was interested in: personal involvement, information density, narrative discourse, argumentative discourse, abstract discourse, and explicit reference, comprising 42 features, all in all. To these the author added four features: imperatives, as a marker of personal involvement, sentence length and subordination, as markers of information density, and relative that, as marker of explicit reference.

Articles

Kaasik, Sigrid: Four discourses on the northern dimension in Helsingin Sanomat. Nordicom Information 23(2001)1, ISSN 0349-5949, pp. 75-85.

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