Nordicom Review offers reviews of Nordic publications, and publishes notes on a wide range of literature, thus enabling scholars all over the world to keep abreast of Nordic contributions in the field.

Special thematic issues of interest are also published from time to time. Nordicom Review welcomes contributions from senior researchers as well as younger scholars.

Nordicom Review is a scholarly journal published by the Nordic Information Centre for Media and Communication Research (Nordicom) and is distributed to member universities in the Nordic region – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Nordicom Review (ISSN 1403-1108) provides a major forum for media and communication researchers in the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The semi-annual journal is addressed to the international scholarly community. It publishes the best of media and communication research in the region, as well as theoretical works in all its diversity; it seeks to reflect the great variety of intellectual traditions in the field and to facilitate a dialogue between them. As an interdisciplinary journal, Nordicom Review welcomes contributions from the best of the Nordic scholarship in relevant areas, and encourages contributions from senior researchers as well as younger scholars.

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NORDIC INFORMATION CENTRE FOR MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

www.nordicom.gu.se

NORDICOM’s overriding goal and purpose is to make the media and communication research undertaken in the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – known, both throughout and far beyond our part of the world. Toward this end we use a variety of channels to reach researchers, students, decision-makers, media practitioners, journalists, information officers, teachers, and interested members of the general public.

Nordicom works to establish and strengthen links between the Nordic research community and colleagues in all parts of the world, both through information and by linking individual researchers, research groups and institutions.

Nordicom documents media trends in the Nordic countries. Our joint Nordic information service addresses users throughout our region, in Europe and further afield. The production of comparative media statistics forms the core of this service.

Nordicom has been commissioned by UNESCO and the Swedish Government to operate The International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media, whose aim it is to keep users around the world abreast of current research findings and insights in this area.

An institution of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordicom operates at both national and regional levels.

Journals, Books, Overviews
One of the prime purposes of Nordicom is to publicize Nordic research on journalism, media and communication. This is done on a continual basis through a variety of publications: journals, anthologies, overviews.

Nordicom-Information, a research journal in the Nordic languages, is published quarterly. (Subscriptions: SEK 200/year).

Nordicom Review, a research journal in English, is published twice annually.

Communication Contents. Current Contents of Mass Communication Journals lists the contents of some 60 international journals in the field of media and communication research. It is available via Internet.

The national Nordicom centres publish national newsletters and reports. Nordicom-Sweden publishes a series of book-length publications on themes such as popular culture, journalism, media rhetoric, women and the media, the meeting of different research traditions and perspectives and media effects.

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NCOM is a bibliographic data base containing some 36,000 references (June 2004) from 1975 forward. Entries are books, chapters in books, journal articles, conference papers, academic research reports, etc.

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NINS is a database that lists research and educational institutions in the field of media and communication research in the Nordic countries.

Media Trends and Statistics
Recent years have seen far-reaching changes in Nordic media systems. Media scholars are continually consulted and asked to cast light on new and different phenomena.

Nordicom offers a Nordic information service covering media developments. A prime goal is the production of reliable comparative statistics.

Nordicom gathers and collates data on a variety of media in all the Nordic countries. These data are processed, analyzed and reported in a series entitled Nordic Media Trends.

Children, Youth and Media
In 1997, Nordicom began establishment of The International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media financed by the Swedish government and UNESCO. The overall point of departure for the Clearinghouse’s efforts with respect to children, youth and media is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The aim of the Clearinghouse is to increase awareness and knowledge about children, youth and media, thereby providing a basis for relevant policy-making, contributing to a constructive public debate, and enhancing children’s and young people’s media literacy and media competence. Moreover, it is hoped that the Clearinghouse’s work will stimulate further research on children, youth and media.

The Clearinghouse informs various groups of users – researchers, policy-makers, media professionals, voluntary organisations, teachers, students and interested individuals – about
• research on children, young people and media, with special attention to media violence
• research and practices regarding media education and children’s/young people’s participation in the media
• measures, activities and research concerning children’s and young people’s media environment.

Fundamental to the work of the Clearinghouse is the creation of a global network. The Clearinghouse publishes a yearbook and a newsletter.

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Foreword

The 16th Nordic Conference for Media and Communication Research was held on the 15th - 17th August in Kristiansand, Norway. Hosts of the meeting were the Norwegian media and communication researchers. More than 320 scholars from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden gathered to discuss current research and research findings. Colleagues from the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Russia also attended.

As usual, the conference programme comprised working groups, plenary sessions and a number of social and cultural events. Working groups have been the core of every Nordic conference to date, and the sixteenth conference was no exception. Nearly 200 papers were presented and discussed in 25 different working groups:

1. Media and Global Culture
2. The Structure and Economics of Mass Media
3. Local and Regional Media
4. Mass Media History
5. Film History
6. Television Research
7. Radio Research
8. Political Communication
9. Journalism Research
10. The Sociology and Aesthetics of News Reporting
11. Reception and Audience Studies
12. Children, Youth and the Media
13. Media Education
14. Popular Culture
15. Film and Television Fiction
16. Visual Culture
17. The Language and Rhetoric of the Media
18. Media Constructions of Gender
19. Public Relations and Purposive Communication
20. Mediated Risk and Crisis Communication
21. Digital Texts (Hypertext)
22. Digital Culture
23. Sport and Media
24. Media and Ethnic Minorities
25. Media and Communication Theory

A number of conference papers have been revised by their authors for publication in this special issue of Nordicom Review. The articles, which were selected in collaboration with the working group chairmen, serve as indicators of the breadth and depth of inquiry in the field of media and mass communication research in the Nordic countries today. All addresses to the plenum are included here, as well.

May I take this opportunity to thank the authors for the time and effort they have put into making this anthology possible.

The Nordic conferences for media and communication research play an important role in the development of the research field in the Nordic countries. We hope that the contents of this anthology will also interest our colleagues abroad.

Göteborg in June 2004

Ulla Carlsson
Editor
To arrange a media studies conference is to get a chance to think about the status of the field. It provides a chance to think about what has been accomplished and what is in need of further development. When the conference started 20 years ago it was predominantly a communication research conference attended by social scientists. The present form of media studies, which comprises both social science and humanities oriented approaches, was initiated some five years later, but only partly implemented across the Nordic countries. Herein lies not only a key challenge for the conference, but also for media studies more generally. Can the conference and can media studies as a field overcome its initial institutionalization as a social scientific endeavor and become a truly interdisciplinary field comprising approaches from the humanities as much as from the social sciences?

Bare facts suggest that many humanities scholars working on film, photography, television and digital media across the Nordic countries consistently do not attend the conference. The question then becomes whether we should just proceed with business as usual, or try to do something about this. We decided to do something. We tried to make a conference which could provide a common space for reflection and thought for all media scholars. As a further goal, we conceived of a conference which could be developed into a viable forum for interdisciplinary reflection, a forum where anthropologist, literary scholars, computer scientists, art historians, criminologists and democracy theorists (to name a few) would visit and meet up with media scholars when their work involve media issues, which it increasingly seem to do.

In the 1999 conference, Klaus Bruhn Jensen suggested that “media and communication research should become neither a field, nor a discipline, nor a department, but a faculty with a number of departments and other constituents,” covering “the phenomena of culture and communication across disciplines from literary theory and linguistics to sociology, anthropology, and geography” (2000: 28). “Among the benefits of a Faculty of Media, Communication, and Culture”, he noted, “could be a more thoroughly modernized approach to the study of human cultures, a more differentiated training of a central, expanding profession, and a reconsideration of what forms of culture and communication should be preserved for the future in museums and archives” (29). If this reconfiguration of the academy seems bold and hard to accomplish, the spirit of Bruhn Jensen’s vision could at least be realized in a more deliberate attempt to develop the conference into an interdisciplinary forum for media studies across a variety of disciplines. However, we felt that the task of developing such an interdisciplinary forum must come second to the
more primary task of making the conference a venue for all media scholars. This first task was implicitly called for in a plenary address to the 1997 conference.

In his reflections after ten years in the field Jostein Gripsrud noted that “social scientific approaches in a broader sense...dominate the field”, to the detriment of other lines of inquiry (1998: 21). “The areas I am most concerned about,” he said, “are what we might call History, Philosophy and Aesthetics – that is to say, the key constitutive subjects of the humanities, which for that matter are also fundamental to any theory of society worthy of the name” (22). His vision of how we need to address this was one in which we should make room – much more than we have to date – for theories of aesthetics and in-depth analysis of texts and their features. This also implies including the “meaning-less” (the non-meaning-laden) aspects of texts – from “dance numbers” in musicals to the fascination of rhythms in verbal, audiovisual and musical texts. To paraphrase Susan Sontag: Not only do we need a media-hermeneutics, we need a “media-erotics”, as well. (24-5)

A key idea behind the development of the 2003 conference program was to move one step towards rectifying some of these im-bales. We wanted to make a program which could signal to humanities scholars that the conference was for them too, while at the same time making it relevant for social scientists. The attempt to develop our field came together with a couple of other major challenges. One was to address some of the changes linked to what has broadly been associated with the term digitalization. Another challenge came from the culture and time in which we found ourselves in 2002. This was a time when the aggressive rhetoric of George W. Bush’s “war on terrorism,” and the naturalization of deceptive talk from politicians through the euphemism “spin,” called on us to bring our insights to bear upon a political situation which seemed increasingly volatile and dangerous. In hindsight, our fears about the aggressive rhetoric and what it could entail have sadly proven to be warranted. It now seems apparent that the “war on terrorism” has been more effective in fostering than in eradicating the threat it allegedly was devised to address. In short, Bush has given Bin Laden what he wanted, as several commentators have noted. This is truly an ironic twist to a 30 year collaborative business relationship between the Bush and the Bin Laden families, a relationship detailed in Michael Moore’s film Farenheit 9/11 (2003), newly awarded the The Palme d’Or in the 2004 Cannes festival.

These remarks suggest some of the thinking which went into the conception of the plenary sessions in the 2003 conference. This thinking led us to have a film scholar address the issue of movie rhetoric and international politics, and to have that talk commented on from a journalism perspective more aligned with social science traditions. It led us to focus on digital aesthetics in an attempt to show the relevance of aesthetical perspectives in the analysis of “digitalization”, which has tended to be construed as a matter of convergence from a social science perspective. It also prompted us to put globalization on the agenda, comprising both aesthetical and political perspectives, and to explore more closely the relationship between a key discipline which exists both as a part of and separated from media studies – a discipline through which it can even be claimed that media studies began more than 2000 years ago – namely rhetoric.

We can only hope that the reader will be inspired and provoked by some of the thoughts offered, and that they will foster further reflections and contribute to the development of the field. Hopefully, the opening exchange might foster continued exchange and a broadened view of the connections between film and current political developments. Maybe a susceptible reader will detect some of the “media-erotics” Gripsrud called for in the sensual analysis and pondering reflections on quick time movies and
digital photography? Perhaps further links between the realms of aesthetics, politics and journalism also will be opened through the exchange on globalization? And perhaps even the broader ambition to include humanities scholars, and also to develop a forum for productive exchange between scholars of media and related disciplines can be found in the session on rhetoric?

If there is a broader message here to be passed on it might be the following. Bruhn Jensen cited the following lyrics from Leonard Cohen (1988) in his ambitious 1999 address:

They sentenced me to twenty years of boredom
for trying to change the system from within.
I’m coming now
I’m coming to reward them.
First we take Manhattan,
then we take Berlin.

After citing this, Bruhn Jensen went on to say that “First we took a Department, then we take a Faculty. Ladies and gentlemen…. Let’s ‘take Berlin’” (2000: 29). Now, the conference might in fact prove an even better vehicle than the Faculty, in the attempt to take Berlin. However that may be, with Gripsrud, it must be noted that as long as we have a “social science hegemony” (1998: 22) in media studies as well as in the conference – which is all to evident in the “working groups” – we have not really taken the “Department”. Thus, let’s take Berlin, but, first we take Manhattan!

* Chair of the Organizing Committee of the 16th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research
In a classical essay from 1946, French film critic André Bazin wrote that one of the most important functions of art is to cheat death by creating immortality. Thus, he formulated the so-called “myth of total cinema” – which is also the title of the essay – a theory of aesthetic predestination according to which the movies might accomplish what no other medium had ever been able to do, namely to reproduce reality completely. In retrospect, it turns out that Bazin can be seen as both right and wrong in his prophecy; the medium of total cinema does indeed exist, but it is not film. Rather, it is life itself, which in turn seems to reproduce the movies, so that the boundary between cinema and reality is blurred once and for all. This is true not least of the political scene.

In his book *Life: The Movie. How Entertainment Conquered Reality*, Neal Gabler takes up the Bazinian heritage in offering an analysis of the real accomplishments of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, which according to him are rather to be situated within the domain of movie rhetoric.

“In the first place, he [Reagan] made the movies the model for public policy. It was because Reagan had paved the way with science fiction movie plans like his ‘Star Wars’ antimissile system, and with B movie pronouncements like ‘They can run, but they can’t hide’, when Arab terrorists hijacked the *Achille Lauro* luxury liner and killed an American passenger, that House Speaker Newt Gingrich could talk seriously of solving the welfare problem by invoking the old MGM movie *Boys Town* or that George Bush, in accepting the Republican nomination for the presidency, could use Clint Eastwood’s line ‘Read my lips’ to swear that he would endorse no new taxes.” (Gabler 1998: 113)

It quickly became commonplace in media and cultural studies to interpret the Gulf War as formulated like a World War II picture from Reagan’s Hollywood heyday. Gabler characterizes it as “meant to be short and sharp”, with a clear narrative outline, with heroic heroes and a “mustachioed villain, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, an evil mastermind right out of the hoariest anti-Nazi propaganda”. He also notes that the war, as broadcast by the conventional media, “even ended like a World War II movie, with the troops parading triumphantly down Broadway or Main Street, showered by confetti and basking in the gratitude of their fellow Americans while the credits rolled”. And the analogy could be drawn even further as the Gulf War, even after it was over, “like every blockbuster, had its ancillary markets: trading cards, T-shirts, videocassettes of the action.” (Gabler 1998: 113)
Many, media scholars and critical journalists alike, have also noted that the reports from the Gulf war and afterwards have increasingly become constructed like a television series, with different logo’s and musical signatures. There is also a narrative construction communicated, for example, by different title cards, and the on-site reporters like CNN’s Peter Arnett and NBC’s Arthur Kent, or more recently Åsne Seierstad as Nordic reporter from the war in Iraq, have instantly been transformed into stars. Thus, war is turned into entertainment.

However, one important difference might be pointed out between these so-called war movies and the classical movies from World War II: that is that they were designed to mobilize support for a real war. But if the war itself is turned into a movie, what exactly is this war movie mobilizing support for? Neal Gabler suggests that Reagan, once again, provided the answer: it mobilizes support for itself. He argues that the real point of the Gulf War may not have been to liberate occupied Kuwait, insure the flow of oil or eliminate Saddam Hussein, each of which had been mentioned as possible objectives. Even though President Bush may not have realized it himself, and though it might discount the legitimate risks of the war to say so, the real point may simply have been to provide a narrative both for the nation and the international scene, provided with a happy ending. This, again, is traditionally the function of entertainment rather than of warfare:

Turning the presidency into a movie and policy into escapism are no small accomplishments, but Reagan’s most enduring legacy may be that in doing so, he also wound up establishing a new measure of presidential success: the president’s skill before the media. (Gabler 1998: 114)

And it has turned out that George Bush may be even more skilled than Ronald Reagan as a real-life actor. The Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also share the common features of using a kind of movie-like rhetoric, such as frequent dead-line settings. And Bush has also specialized in certain movie-like lines, making up the phraseology of the war, like his famous “Go out there and get them.” But the movie rhetoric does appear not least in the very codenames of the operations – like Desert Storm, which rather seems to be the title of a Hollywood movie. And the fact that the first codename for the US operation against terrorists was Infinite Justice does indeed seem ironic. This name, taken seriously, is profoundly ambiguous. Either it means that the Americans must have the right to ruthlessly destroy not only all terrorists, but also all that gave them support: material, moral, ideological etc., and that, by definition, this process will be endless. Or it means that the justice exerted must be truly infinite. Later, a complaint from American Islamic clerics arguing that only God can exert infinite justice actually led to a change of the code name. But the strategy continues, as one of President Bush’s later rhetorical accomplishments indicates – the utterly ambiguous “Bring them on” from a talk on July 2nd. This was immediately criticized by Democrat Dick Gephardt as “dangerous macho rhetoric”, but it is only one example of Bush’s long series of rhetorical statements that would definitely fit better in a B-movie than on the world stage.

However, perhaps the most decisive event in this evolution of political “lifies” was not staged by Hollywood, but imposed from the outside. September 11th marked a turning point, at least symbolically, which has invited not only responses in the form of Infinite Justice operations, but also in the form of infinite comments, interpretations and appropriations, summarized in the catchword: “Nothing will ever be the same after September 11th”. The link between Hollywood and the international political scene was also confirmed in a unique way during the ‘war against terrorism’ that resulted from these events,
namely when the Pentagon decided to solicit the help of Hollywood in early October 2001. Then, a group of Hollywood scenarists and directors, specialists in disaster movies, was established at the instigation of the Pentagon, with the aim of imagining possible scenarios for terrorist attacks and how to fight them. And one month later, it appeared that these meetings continued. Now the aim was that of – as Zizek put it – “coordinating the war effect and establishing how Hollywood could help in the ‘war against terrorism’ by getting the right ideological message across not only to Americans, but also to the Hollywood public around the globe”. For good reasons, this has been interpreted by cultural theorists as “the ultimate empirical proof that Hollywood does in fact function as an ‘ideological state apparatus’”. (Zizek 2002: 16) Thus, it is only logical that, on the 4th of July this year, Arnold Schwarzenegger went to Iraq to show Terminator 3 to the soldiers, as part of his “Schwarzenegger for governor” campaign, which turned out so successfully.

I would like to take some of these comments as a point of departure for reflection, as they also take part in formulating a rhetoric on the significance of the political situation, the “before and after”. They may contribute to developing what Michael J Shapiro has aptly called a “cinematic political thought”. On the anniversary of the event, among many other things, a movie was made with the title 11'09”01, September 11: A Film. Among the several directors are Iranian Samira Makmalbaf, Youssef Chahine from Egypt, Idrissa Ouedraogo from Burkina Faso, Ken Loach from the UK, Mira Nair, India, Sean Penn from the US, and Shohei Imamura, Japan; in other words, an impressive list of canonical art cinema directors. In the credits, the film is presented like this: “11 directors from different countries and cultures. 11 visions of the tragic events that occurred in New York City on September 11 2001. 11 points of view commenting their subjective conscience. Complete freedom of expression.”

The film is particularly interesting as a way of responding to this highly visual event within visual culture itself. Three books were also published by Verso on the same occasion, two of which had already appeared in French. It was Jean Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism (L’esprit du terrorisme), which was later followed up by his Power Inferno, Slavoj Zizek’s Welcome to the Desert of the Real, and Paul Virilio’s Ground Zero, published in French as Ce qui arrive. Each one of them in its own way also offers a highly visual or cinematic way of thinking.

Of the three authors, Paul Virilio is the one who has the largest grip on the event. One could start with a cinematic reference, to Fritz Lang, who in his films on Dr Mabuse describes the anonymity of the criminal, a new phenomenon in early modernity. The crime syndicate is well organized, but it finds its best support in the anonymity of the masses. Lang creates secret connections between the anonymous, organized criminals and politics, between science and terrorism. September 11 might be considered the final victory for this kind of anonymity, privatized criminality that the iconoclastic high priests of development theory had dreamt of for centuries.

Virilio describes the ravages of iconoclasm during the reformation in Europe. As its basis in a Calvin or a Cromwell, the conviction of mankind’s negative predestination may be found, her involuntary submission to a world under the power of evil, where life may best be summarized as suffering, or, in E M Cioran’s words, as “the inconvenience of being born”.

This iconoclastic wave would sweep along whole cultures and nations. The Manichean ideas of the iconoclasts may also be found among the scientists who, during the twentieth century, argued for different evolutionary theories, theories of genetics, of
racial hygiene, of phrenology; in other words convictions that formed the ideological apparatus that founded the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. Only progress may liberate humanity – this remains a favourite idea of the iconoclasts, summarized in François Raspail’s sentence, cited as a motto in Ground Zero: “Science, the only religion of the future”.

The dark history of the twentieth century remains for Virilio a kind of black hole in the idea of development, where the “philopholia” – the love for madness – of science and technology is born. In its extension, this seems to organize the self-destruction of a species that has become too slow, because it no longer succeeds in adapting to the general development.

Silvio Berlusconi’s role in international politics is significant: it points to a change from the classical left-right division to a new division between the political and the medial. The politically correct has been replaced by the optically correct. The parliamentary democracy, which in reality was secured by general elections, has in practice been replaced by the direct democracy of opinion polls, where the right to utter one’s opinion, to speak one’s mind in public – in other words, to enter into medial reality – also seems to guarantee citizenship. E-democracy on-line is the catchword of tomorrow.

And televisual reality, as represented by reality-TV (like in Big Brother or all its equivalents), has made its entrance into the world for real. According to Virilio, a straight line might be drawn from Big Brother by way of the Kosovo conflict to September 11 – they are all products of the same multi-medial image strategy. In Big Brother, there is the ambition to show real life and to democratize the star system. However, the real actors are not the locked up volunteers on screen, but rather all the millions of spectators taking part in the vote. All of a sudden, all possible means of communication are allowed: Hertz-TV, Internet, telephone, SMS – which in a way all aim at eliminating human relations.

In the Kosovo conflict, the ambition was to create a war with no losses, a war for specialists. Here, there was no longer dying in the camps any more, but rather the question of manipulating death machinery at a safe distance. The grand battles of history have been replaced by the world live, with its “mort en direct”. Here, Virilio meets Zizek, who states that:

…it is not only that Hollywood stages a semblance of real life deprived of the weight and inertia of materiality – in late-capitalist consumerist society, ‘real social life’ itself somehow acquires the features of a staged fake, with our neighbours behaving in ‘real’ life like stage actors and extras... Again, the ultimate truth of the capitalist utilitarian de-spiritualized universe is the dematerialization of ‘real life’ itself, its reversal into a spectral show. (Zizek 2002: 13-14)

Consequently, September 11 also presented a number of anonymous actors in what to many spectators at first seemed like a global super-production, where reality once and for all was lost in electronic nothingness; most TV spectators seem to have apprehended the images as fiction. French director Claude Lelouch takes this as a point of departure in his episode in the 110901 film. He tells the story of a deaf photographer visiting New York, whose boyfriend leaves in the morning on September 11 for his job as a guide in the World Trade Center. With the TV constantly on, she sits in front of the computer, writing a letter to him about the crisis in their relationship, telling him that she feels “lost in a talking picture”. Had she thrown a glance at the TV screen, it is obvious that she wouldn’t have reacted to the images, as the comments weren’t available to her.
That the events of September 11 reached most of us through the TV screen made it inevitable that, in retrospect, so many parallels were drawn to the long series of catastrophe movies in the history of Hollywood. In Zizek’s words: “The unthinkable which happened was the object of fantasy, so that, in a way, America got what it fantasized about, and that was the biggest surprise.” (Zizek 2002: 16) And these parallels to disaster movies occurred regardless of whether they were used to explain the event, as offering possible models of actions for the terrorists, or, as in Karl-Heinz Stockhausen’s controversial statement, they just served to ‘celebrate’ the planes hitting the Twin Towers as the ultimate work of art. In Stockhausen’s view, it is as if we had watched the most spectacular special effect ever made; the terrorist act itself was made to achieve this spectacular effect. And it was as if only after having seen this spectacle, the spectators became really able to experience the falsity of reality TV, where people play themselves and there is thus a certain enactment, despite the aspiration towards reality. But at the same time, the infinite repetition of the shots of the Twin Towers collapsing contributed to fictionalizing the event. When we see it over and over again, the experience of a real event is gradually weakened. At the same time, this fictionalization is part of a process of abstraction, which may serve to maintain a boundary separating us – as spectators – from them – those who were there in reality. Real life thus acquires a fictional dimension.

In his comment on September 11 in the episodical film, the one that deals in the most direct way with the actual events, Mexican director Alejandro González Iñárritu refuses to take part in this process. The first part of his 11 minute long contribution starts with a completely black screen. On the complex soundtrack, several voices are combined which may be hard to discern: a monotonous recitation; the voices of reporters from all over the world talking in different languages about their first impressions of the event; cuts from talks on mobile phones from people in the Twin Towers. This is followed by a crescendo of the sound of the aircraft and then a complete silence, after which several images of the towers collapsing are cut in. But the soundtrack remains the most important part of the film. Towards the end, the shifting sounds are replaced by music, and then the image fades into white, with the final rhetorical question: “Does God’s light guide us or blind us?” González Iñárritu might be accused of mystifying the Other with the voices on the first part of the soundtrack, incomprehensible to most Western spectators. However, I find this film most interesting precisely because it almost entirely withdraws from the visual side of September 11. By its refusal to visualize the event as a whole, it also points to the very collapse of the visual order in the face of the unimaginable. This is probably as far away as one can get from traditional Hollywood movie rhetoric. But it is also a way of appropriating a political event through the art cinema institution, thus paradoxically creating a kind of alternative movie rhetoric.

As Jean Baudrillard has noted in his Power Inferno from October 2002, Slavoj Zizek – who in his turn refers to Alain Badiou and his book Le siècle – has identified the eschatological passion for the Real as the key feature of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. It is a nostalgic passion for the Real as a kind of lost object, or at least a vanishing object. But this passion for the Real turns out to be deeply paradoxical, because it culminates in what seems to be its absolute opposite, namely a theatrical spectacle. The spectacular terrorist acts might, according to Zizek, be interpreted as a kind of climactic conclusion of this passion for the Real in twentieth century art:

If, then, the passion for the Real ends up in the pure semblance of the spectacular effect of the Real, then, in an exact inversion, the ‘postmodern’ passion for the semblance ends up in a violent return to the passion for the Real. (Zizek 2002:9-10)
What happens, then, to the real event, if the image – the fictional or the virtual – penetrates everywhere into reality? In the present case, there is a certain risk in considering the event as “real violence” intruding into a potentially virtual universe. In many comments, the end of postmodern virtuality was actually proclaimed. But does one here really see reality, or history, as surpassing fiction? One might instead say that a sort of duel is initiated between reality and the image, a duel concerning which event might be the most unimaginable. In the case of the Twin Towers’ collapse, the real adds to the image as the first and foremost among terrors. It is not only terrifying, but in addition, it is real. The image is here in the first place, and the real enters the scene in the second place. Something is added as yet another fiction, surpassing fiction itself. The real is here invented as the ultimate, and thus the most awesome fiction.

What happened on September 11 was that this fantasmatic screen apparition entered reality. It is not that reality entered the image, as many argued; on the contrary, the image entered reality, thus shattering it. That many blockbusters postponed scenes resembling the collapse of the Twin Towers must be read not only as a sign of respect for the victims, but first and foremost as a repression of the cultural fantasies that provided such a forceful background for the disaster. It is neither what Roland Barthes in his famous essay from the 1960s called l’effet du réel, but rather its inversion, l’effet de l’irréel, where – in Zizek’s words – “the Real itself, in order to be sustained, has to be perceived as a nightmarish unreal spectre”. Nor is it the often-posed imperative of not mistaking fiction for reality. Rather, it is again the opposite: the question of not mistaking reality for fiction, “but to be able to discern, in what we cannot but experience as fiction, the hard kernel of the Real which we are able to sustain only if we fictionalize it”. (Zizek 2002: 19)

The event in itself resists representation, firstly because it seems to absorb in itself imagination as such, and secondly because it doesn’t make any sense; these are precisely the two points that Gonzáles Inárrita’s film underlines. The collapse of the towers did not bring about any collapse of the world order, neither politically, nor economically. But in a certain sense, it meant a certain bankruptcy of the image. Baudrillard has argued that the system cannot function if it cannot exchange itself against its own image, reflect itself as the towers in their perfect symmetry, or find its equivalent in an ideal reference. This is what makes the system invulnerable – and it is precisely this equivalence that was destroyed.

This terrorist violence, thus, is not a return of the flame of reality, neither of that of history. The violence is not “real”. In a certain sense, it is worse: it is symbolic. Only symbolic violence may generate singularity. And in this singular mixture, in this Manhattan catastrophic film, a meeting is staged between “the two major mass elements of fascination of the 20th century. That is: the white magic – or the white light – of cinema, of the cinematic image, and the black magic – or the black light – of terrorism”, which is also staged symbolically in Gonzáles Inárrita’s film. (Baudrillard 2002: 1: 40).

The search for an explanation, for any interpretation, of the terrorist act is in vain. Any massacre could be pardoned if it could be interpreted as having a historical sense. The very radicality of the spectacle lies precisely in this absence of possible interpretation or understanding. The spectacle of terrorism imposes the terrorism of the spectacle. In consequence, it might be argued that the idea that “terrorism would be nothing without the media” is illusory – because there is no possible good use of the media in reporting on the event, as the media cannot avoid becoming part of the event themselves. (Baudrillard 2002: 1: 41)
In the contribution to 11.09.01 made by Israeli director Amos Gitaï, he comments precisely on this unavoidable intertwining of the spectacle of terrorism and the media. Everything starts as in an action film. First, the sound of a bomb covers the soundtrack on an image track still black. Then, a person dressed in military outfit cries out: “Clear the sector! There may be more explosives!” A couple of minutes later, a reporter enters the stage, and the genre seems to change to documentary. She wants to report live on the terrorist act in Tel Aviv, on Jerusalem Avenue; however, she soon realizes that she is cut off from her position “on the air”, and this because of some event in distant New York: “Who gives the shit about New York?” When the somewhat hysterical reporter is forced to realize that an actual catastrophe is taking place there, she interrupts her list of events of what has happened historically on September 11 by stating that “two terrorist acts today stand against another”. Tel Aviv versus New York: her statement shouldn’t be as absurd as it might appear, as it contrasts a continual scene of terrorism to one single spectacular event.

The victory of terrorism is double: first of all that it allows for an outburst of repression, which is uncontrollable, which not least the actual situation in Israel/Palestine shows. Thus, in turn, it legitimates new terrorist acts ad infinitum. But this also brings about the effect that all other acts of violence may be appropriated by and to the terrorists. It has been called the “automatic writing of terrorism”, nourished and sustained by the “unintentional terrorism of information”, supported by movie rhetoric, with all the consequences of different kinds of panic. And war as response offers only a déjà-vu situation with phantom information and deceitful discourses – this is true of the Gulf war as well as the war in Afghanistan or the war in Iraq. (Baudrillard 2002: 1: 45) It is symptomatic that, when al-Quaida and the remaining Taliban forces unexpectedly fought back in March 2002, the event was treated in several media comments as yet another proof of their being terrorists: when fired on, they shoot back… That is, a basic principle had been violated: Zizek argues that far from pointing towards twentieth-century warfare, the Twin Towers’ collapse was its most spectacular cry. What we are now getting is “war deprived of its substance – a virtual war fought behind computer screens, a war experienced by its participants as a video game, a war with no casualties” (Zizek 2002: 37).

In the new global order, there are no longer wars, at least not in the classical sense of regulated conflicts between sovereign states. There are “ethnic-religious conflicts” or attacks on the US – and when the US responds to these attacks, it has adopted the role of a sovereign mediating agent of peace and global order crushing particular rebellions. The opposition between war and humanitarian aid has been deconstructed – the two are now closely connected, because, as many did observe not least during the war in Afghanistan, the same aircrafts might drop either bombs or food packages. But the distinction between war and peace has also been blurred, as when President Bush, after September 11th, stated that “America is in a state of war”. And the peace in Iraq, declared by Bush in May this year, has only been followed by more losses, both real and symbolic, on the US side during “peacetime” than during the actual war.

The wars in Afghanistan or in Iraq could also be defined as primarily directed towards “normalization”, beyond any political and economical goal that may have been set up. The general idea behind this normalizing effort is globalization: to line up all territories, to bring them into alignment, to reduce any resistance to zone, to colonize any savage space, be it geographical or mental. Any resistance is thus by definition terrorist resistance. Modernity will not allow itself to be renounced in its aspiration towards globality. (Baudrillard 2002: 2: 76, 78)
In Spring 2002, the war in Afghanistan (and also to a certain extent the events of September 11th) was all of a sudden relegated to the background, and the focus of general attention shifted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Spring 2003, again, the war in Iraq took over as the main focus of interest, and what happened (and continued to happen) in Israel/Palestine faded away in the background. But at a certain point during the war, the opposite took place again. The conflict in Iraq became blurred, as Saddam Hussein appeared to have vanished into thin air and no chemical weapons were found, so that the narrative line all of a sudden was no longer as clear as a war movie in real life demands. Thus, a happy ending was provided, with the American liberators and happy Iraqi people in the streets, with some disturbing astonished comments about the Iraqi people not being grateful enough towards their liberators. Then, the focus shifted back to the suicide bombers in Palestine – as well as their Tjetjenian counterparts in Russia. And what has been happening in Iraq from May 2003 and onwards has obviously become a source of constant disturbance to the clear-cut conflict of the original “life” designed by President Bush & Co.

This media rhetoric and its changes of focus are obviously not innocent. Rather, it constructs over and over again the idea of a clash of civilizations, which by Samuel P Huntington has been designed as the main political struggle of the 21st century – an idea, by the way, to which Michael J Shapiro has provided both energetic and sharp counterarguments.

The ‘reality’ that Huntington assembles in his West versus the rest mapping of the globe constitutes a moral geography, a security-oriented ethico-political initiative aimed at protecting an enclave whose civilizational integrity is more a function of the way he tells the story of modernity than it is of discernable cultural or civilizational difference. (Shapiro 1999: 119)

This notion of the ‘clash of civilizations’ is indeed more mystifying than clarifying. The central clashes today seem to take place within each civilization, rather than between them. As a consequence of Shapiro’s critique, one might argue that these so-called clashes of civilizations today may be identified as clashes inherent in Western global capitalism. What we are witnessing is precisely a number of real-life clashes related to globalization. There is always an economic background to be revealed behind the conflicts: they turn out to be clashes of economic or geopolitical interests within Western capitalism itself.

What Jean Baudrillard attempts to do in his books is also precisely to consider the terrorist act as not only beyond the spectacular violence that it enacts, but even beyond Islam and beyond the US and any possible clash of civilizations. He sees it as an emergence of a radical antagonism at the very heart of the globalization process, of an irreducible force in the midst of this integral technical and mental achievement, which disturbs the seemingly inevitable evolution towards a perfect and complete world order. (Baudrillard 2002: 2: 36) It as if the world itself resisted globalization.

Globalization first of all touches the market, but it also affects signs and values in culture; thus, there is no longer any clear difference between the global and the universal. The so-called universal values have been globalized and circulate on the market like any product whatsoever. There is a deliberate confusion here between the two concepts of “global” and “universal”. Today, universality might, or should – as Zizek has argued – be defined as the impossible or at least infinite task of translation, which may create a shared space of understanding between cultures. But it is precisely this “universalit”
that tends to be replaced by “globality”. The resistance to globalization should thus be seen not only as a rejection of the global techno-structure, but also above all as a refusal of the mental image structure imposed, which absorbs all cultures with the false pretension of regarding them as equivalent. To end where we started, and to paraphrase Bazin, it is no longer a question of the myth of total cinema, but rather of the myth of global cinema. This global cinema is being projected endlessly on our cultural screens, offering us again and again the same old story of global values, being threatened by some ominous agent from out there – different incarnations of the very figure of Absolute Evil that is so familiar to us movie-fans.

References
Michael Moore used the stage at the Academy Awards this year for a political manifestation against President Bush. When receiving the award for his film “Bowling for Columbine” his opening remark was: “We are living in a fictitious society”. Moore’s point was that it is increasingly difficult to identify the borderline between fiction and reality. His claim in the book “Stupid White Men” was that even the more recent presidential election was fiction, because the actual winner, Al Gore, is not in the White House (Moore 2001). As Astrid Söderbergh Widding showed us in her interesting paper, an obvious consequence of the increased influence of the entertainment and film industry was the election of a B-actor like Ronald Reagan to the office of President of the United States. In that respect, Reagan created a trend of which Arnold Schwarzenegger is the most recent example. Schwarzenegger made the conversion from the screen to public office by announcing his candidacy for the office of Governor of California – the very place Ronald Reagan started his political carrier. Or is it correct to call it a conversion? Can we see a trend in which actors are successful in politics because acting and media performance are more important than politics itself? The list of actors turned politicians is growing: Jerry Springer, the famous talk show host, became Mayor of Cincinnati in 1977; Clint Eastwood became Mayor of Carmel California in 1986; Sony Bono became Mayor of Palm Springs and senator from California; not to mention TV-wrestler Jesse Ventura, Governor of Minnesota since 1998 (Aftenposten 8.8. 2003).

Returning to Ronald Reagan, it is a fact that he was the first president to systematically use PR agencies to ensure that he got his message through to the public (Schiller et al. 1992). As we all know, the purpose of PR agencies is to drive home the opinion on whatever message their clients want to sell – whether the message contains truth or lies is of less importance. This point was highlighted recently during the hearing in Great Britain after the tragic suicide of David Kelly and the testimonies indicating that the Blair government partly used fiction to make the threat from Saddam Hussein look more “sexy” – whatever that might actually mean.

I have never understood why a threat and the potential existence of weapons of mass destruction should be considered “sexy”. To fully understand this, I think we should look to the field of gender research. In one of her studies, Berit von der Lippe identified the linkage between male dominance and the heavy use of sex-related metaphor within the field of
security police and defence studies (von der Lippe: 1999:163). As we have seen the past few weeks, the core of the campaign to persuade the world to go to war against Iraq seems to have been partly based on fiction. Because there is thus far no evidence of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein, it seems apparent that world opinion was led to believe that these non-existent weapons constituted an immediate threat to the world. I have been asked to follow up Astrid Söderberg Widding’s paper using my background from research on war coverage in news media to highlight the borderline between fiction and reality in war propaganda. I find this an interesting challenge, and after thinking about it during the summer, I am convinced that there is a need for more collaboration and multidisciplinary research between scholars working with film and those like myself working mostly with the news media.

New York Times revealed, in January 2002, that the US Minister of Defence, Donald Rumsfeldt, had created the “Office of strategic Influence” – authorized to manipulate media with lies if necessary to rally the media behind the war against terrorism. It was apparently closed down after this exposure, but the operation continued under the name “Operation for Special plans” and was under the direct control of Central Command at the headquarters in Qatar during the war against Iraq (Arkin 2003). At the press centre in Qatar, the stage was designed by Hollywood consultants to make the “performance” of the military spokesmen more convincing. Philip Knightley, in a quite frightening essay entitled “Turning the tanks on the reporter”, claimed that the Pentagon’s actual policy during the Iraq war was to target those journalists and media reporting “from the side of the enemy”, whether it was Al Jazeera or critical reporters from Europe. Knightley pointed out that “The Pentagon made it clear from the beginning of the Iraq war that there would be no censorship. What it failed to say was that war correspondents might find themselves in a situation similar to that in Korea in 1950. This was described by one American correspondent as the military saying: ‘You can write what you like – but if we don’t like it we’ll shoot you.’ Up to now (mid-August), seventeen media people are dead. The war in Iraq was the most dangerous war for journalists ever, if you consider how short the campaign was. Knightley also pointed out the connection between this danger and the performance on the Hollywood-created scene in Qatar. When New York magazine writer Michael Wolff broke ranks at the coalition’s daily press conference at Qatar and asked General Brooks: ‘Why are we here? Why should we stay? What’s the value of what we’re learning at this million-dollar press centre?’ Fox TV attacked him for lack of patriotism, and right-wing commentator Rush Limbaugh gave out Wolff’s email address. In one day, Wolff received 3,000 hate emails. One day a mysterious civilian in army uniform took him aside and told him: ‘This is a fucking war, asshole. No more questions for you.’ As Knightley put it: “Wolff realised that the press conferences were not for the benefit of correspondents. The correspondents were extras in a piece of theatre” (quoted from Knightley 2003). I will use the opportunity here to credit Sigrun Slapgard, correspondent from the Norwegian Broadcasting Company (NRK) at the press centre in Qatar during the Iraqi war. Several times during her stay, she made a point of how little information they received at the press centre.

This is, of course, not the first time Hollywood consultants were used to polish up the Pentagon’s information strategy. After the terrible attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, the Pentagon consulted Hollywood in order to understand the new situation for US society (VG 9.10. 2001). Among those called in to assist were screenwriter Steven E. DeSouza (responsible for the movie Die Hard), director Joseph Zito (creator of “Delta Force One Missing in Action”) and the TV writer David Engelbach (responsible...
for the MacGyver series). The irony of this is that makers of fiction were consulted to help the US administration face reality (Grossberg 2001).

It is no news that the Pentagon has professionalized its information strategy since the Vietnam War when the military lost its grip on public opinion (Ottosen 1994). The Pentagon-Hollywood relationship is one part of the new strategy. The magazine “Brills content” revealed in 1999 that the Pentagon has its own officers whose job it is to be consultants on media scripts and to decide whether or not the Pentagon will take part in a production. Once the decision on cooperation is made, their job is to be helpful in providing military personnel and technical assistance in the form of equipment, planes and naval ships. An example: The script of the movie “Asteroid” included a story about an American space-shuttle sent into space to use nuclear weapons to shoot down and an asteroid approaching the earth. The problem at the time was that the Pentagon felt obliged to respect the treaty banning deployment of nuclear weapons in space. The Pentagon consultants then suggested an alternative. If the manuscript were changed, the Pentagon would put at the movie crew’s disposal the newest model of the F-16 airplane, air base and flying time free of charge. This was an opportunity to show off their latest equipment and heroic pilots. So the deal was done.

The Pentagon gets about 100 movie manuscript in their hands every year and decides to cooperate in about one third of the cases. Many times negotiations and compromises are necessary in order to satisfy the Pentagon. There is also competition between the different branches of the military in this field. A liaison officer from the Air Force is working full-time to “sell” the Air Force to Hollywood. Before the major movie “Air Force One”, the US Air Force lent six F-15 planes free of charge (Gunn 1999).

For me, the most interesting cases are, of course, movies based on real wars. The most recent example is “Black Hawk Down”, based on the failed “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia in 1992, in which 18 American soldiers died. I myself have written an essay about this entitled “Rambo in Somalia” (Ottosen 1997). In this case, the Pentagon liked the script because the heroic images of the soldiers dying in battle helped to rewrite the image of a failure operation. And the film got their support, but at what price? “If you want to use the military’s toys you’ve got to play by their rules”, said military technical adviser John Lovett (AP 2001). The military historian Lawrence Suid explained in detail how this system works in the book Guts & Glory. Suid called it a “system for mutual exploitations” (Ibid.).

If the Pentagon dislikes the manuscript, they turn down any suggestion of cooperation. They provided no help for the movie “Apocalypse Now” about an officer during the Vietnam War who was dispatched to kill another officers. This was not good advertising to boost the image of the just and heroic soldier. For the Gulf War film “Courage under fire”, negotiations for support failed because there was no clear “good guy” in Meg Ryan’s crew (Ibid.).

Commercial television is of course the link between the entertainment and the news industry. The television series “The Agency” produced by CBS was sponsored by the CIA. This series, in which heroic CIA agents save the world from Arabic terrorists and villains, is produced in close cooperation with the CIA. The CIA had consultants working on the manuscript and the agency put their locations and manpower at the disposal of the series. According to The New York Times, the CIA explained this by claiming that it was a part of the agency’s strategy to get through to the public with “the truth about the CIA” and persuaded the sceptics to increase the funding for a budget of 30 billion dollars. Interestingly enough, the Norwegian commercial channel TV2 bought the rights
to the series in Norway, according to the newspaper *Dagens Næringsliv*, without knowledge of the CIA’s role in the making of the series (Kibar 2002). Johan Roppen has given other examples of series like Pensacola – Wings of God, created to boost the image of the Pentagon, the CIA and other government agencies (Roppen 2001).

This is, of course, also an issue of globalization. These series, like Jack Bauer and 24 hours, are now running all over the world (including Norway). It is part of the competition in a global market. As Edward Herman and Robert McChesney showed in their excellent book “The Global Media. The new missionaries of global capitalism,” motion pictures and radio technology were among the first industries to compete on a global market. As early as in 1914, 85 per cent of the world’s film audience was watching American movies (Herman & McChesney: 13-14). One of the early players in this market in broadcasting was CBS – just mentioned in connection with the series “The Agency”. They started their global career in radio and helped create Voice of America as a propaganda tool for the US government during the Second World War. The experience with film, broadcasting and propaganda in general elevated the importance of communication in the minds of policy-makers during the interwar years and has continued to do so to this very day. As a result, US-based film companies still have commercial and political global hegemony. The global film industry was controlled by a few US companies like Columbia, Twentieth Century-Fox, United Artists, MCA (Universal), Warner Brothers, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and Paramount (Herman & McChesney:19).

Historically, under US broadcasting regulations (subsequently partly eliminated and under constant pressure), the US networks NBC, CBS and ABC have been restricted in what they are allowed to produce for domestic broadcast. Thus, the major US program producers, and therefore the major global TV production studios, were actually the film studios of Hollywood (Herman & McChesney:21).

The present global market is dominated by the studios owned by Disney, Time Warner, Viacom, Universal, Sony Polygram and News Corporation.

The introduction of global satellite television – with 24 hours news and CNN as the first big player on the news market, with the Gulf War in 1991 as its commercial breakthrough – changed the news industry forever. In an international comparative study, my Swedish colleague Stig Arne Nohrstedt and I have documented how television coverage of the Gulf War constituted the distribution of US perspectives to a global audience (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 1991). The existence of Al Jazeera and other Arab channels, however, has made it more difficult to spread simplified US propaganda to a global television audience through the news.

The merging of the entertainment and film industry and the news industry was evident when Time Warner bought CNN and when Disney bought the television network ABC. Robert Murdoch had his breakthrough in the British media market (primarily newspapers) in the 1960s. When he became big in the US market in the 1980s, his company News Corporation purchased Twentieth Century Fox, which led to creation of the Fox Television Network.

Fox Television is an interesting phenomenon in this borderline between entertainment and news. Its news program created history during the first phase of the war against terror when a so-called reporter sat on top of a US tank during the war in Afghanistan, shooting his own pistol into the air to prove his patriotic position. During the new atmosphere of patriotic reporting after September 11, Murdoch himself broke new barriers in the discussion on the line between enterprise control and editorial autonomy when he ordered his editors, on a global basis, to support the US-led war in Iraq.
I will end my comment with some perspectives on the "soap opera" known as the Jessica Lynch Story. The positive aspect of this is that it was the BBC, with their critical journalism, that revealed the disinformation campaign surrounding the story. There is still hope for journalism. The following is based on BBC reporter John Kampfner’s version, as it was told through the BBC documentary “War Spin”. According to Kampfner, Private Jessica Lynch became a propaganda icon of the war. The story of her capture by the Iraqis and her rescue by US Special Forces became one of the great patriotic moments of the conflict. But this story, according to Kampfner, “is one of the most stunning pieces of news management ever conceived”. Jessica Lynch, a 19-year-old army clerk from Palestine, West Virginia, was captured when her company took a wrong turn just outside Nasiriya. The car was ambushed and nine of her comrades were killed. Jessica Lynch was taken to the local hospital, which at the time was full of Iraqi soldiers. Eight days later, US Special Forces stormed the hospital, capturing the “dramatic” events on a night vision camera.

The propaganda version was that they had to come under fire from the hospital, but still they made it to Lynch and rescued her in a dramatic helicopter escape. We were told that she had stab and bullet wounds, and that she had been physically harmed during interrogations.

But Iraqi doctors in Nasiriya said they provided the best treatment they could for her in the midst of war. She was assigned the only specialist bed in the hospital, and one of only two nurses on the floor took care of her. “I examined her, I saw she had a broken arm, a broken thigh and a dislocated ankle,” said Dr Harith a-Houssona, who looked after her and was interviewed by BBC. The doctor said he saw no sign of shooting, no bullet inside her body, no stab wound – only signs of the traffic accident. Witnesses told BBC that the Special Forces knew that the Iraqi military had fled a day before they swooped down on the hospital. “We were surprised. Why do this? There was no military, there were no soldiers in the hospital,” said Dr Anmar Uday, who worked there at the time. The next remark by Dr. Uday in the BBC interview is interesting:

“It was like a Hollywood film. They cried ‘go, go, go’, with guns and blanks without bullets, blanks and the sound of explosions. They made a show for the American attack on the hospital action movies like Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan.” said Dr. Uday.

Two days before the snatch squad arrived, Dr. Harith had arranged to deliver Jessica to the Americans in an ambulance. So there seems to have been no justification for this operation at all.

When footage of the rescue was released, General Vincent Brooks, US spokesman in Doha, said: “Some brave souls put their lives on the line to make this happen, loyal to a creed that they know that they’ll never leave a fallen comrade” (quoted from Kampfner).

The American strategy was to ensure the right television footage by using embedded reporters and images from their own cameras, editing the film themselves.

According to Kampfner, the Pentagon had been influenced by Hollywood producers of reality TV and action movies, notably the man behind Black Hawk Down, Jerry Bruckheimer.

Bruckheimer advised the Pentagon on the primetime television series “Profiles from the Front Line that followed US forces in Afghanistan in 2001. That approach was adopted and developed on the field of battle in Iraq and manifested itself in the story of Jessica Lynch. But doctors now say she has no recollection of the whole episode and probably never will (quoted Kampfner 2003).
Now the hunt is on for Jessica’s version, and it is worth millions. The networks, film companies and publishing houses are lining up with their million dollar contracts.

According to the Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen, CBS offered the Lynch family a multimedia package. CBS is owned by Viacom and also controls Paramount, the video rental chain Blockbuster, MTV and other entertainment companies. Officially, there is no editorial linkage between the companies just mentioned, but in the letter from CBS, the family was promised a great deal of money for exposure in different media. It should all begin with a journalistic interview on CBS, which they, according to their code of ethics, could not pay for. But the family was offered money for recirculation of the story by other Viacom companies, including a two-hour documentary, a special MTV program, and a televised welcome home concert in her hometown. Included in the package were talks with the Viacom publishing company Simon & Schuster on a book based on her story (Kulås 2003). A few days ago, I read in the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang that the family has turned down all the offers for an interview and decided to publish her story in a book they can control themselves (price tag for the rights unknown). NBC, which tried to offer an even better deal than CBS, has not been stopped by a “no” from the Lynch family. They will now make an unauthorized movie on the story of Jessica Lynch with Laure Regan in the role as Jessica (VG NETT 11.8. 2003).

There is an interesting footnote to the Jessica Lynch story. Earlier this year, the journalist Jason Blair was fired from the New York Times after it was revealed that he had made up many of the stories he had written for the newspaper. The story that finally revealed his fraudulent behaviour was an alleged portrait of Jessica’s family. It was stolen from a Texas newspaper, which recognized the essential part in the article, reproduced by Blair in his New York apartment.

There is some irony to this. The American public is getting high on a patriotic story based partly on fiction. A journalist rightfully lost his job, and the most prestigious newspaper in the US to engage in humiliating self-criticism before its readers because of a comparably small fraud – small compared to the big fraud of the story on Jessica Lynch, which lives on and on and is constantly being reproduced as propaganda. Unlike with Jason Blair, nobody seems to hold anybody in the US media industry or in the Pentagon’s propaganda machinery accountable for this fiction presented as facts. Thank you for the attention.

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Nostalgia for a Digital Object

*Regrets on the Quickening of QuickTime*

VIVIAN SOBCHACK

Whenever I watch QuickTime “movies”, I find myself drawn into someone else’s – and my computer’s – memory. Faced with their strange collections, moving collages, and juxtapositions of image-objects whose half-life I can barely re-member, I tend to drift into a reverie not quite my own. Indeed, the form usually evokes from me the kind of temporal nostalgia and spatial intensity I feel not at the movies but before American artist Joseph Cornell’s mysterious boxed relics. Both QT movies and Cornell boxes preserve “under glass” fragments of a “read-only” memory that is, paradoxically, “random access”: that is, dynamic, contingent, associative. Both also refuse mundane space-time, drawing us into enclosed and nested poetic worlds far more miniature, layered, and vertically deep than we usually find in cinema. Both also salvage the flotsam and jetsam of daily life and redeem it as used material whose re-collected and re-member presence echoes with traces of an individual yet collective past. And both also construct “reliquaries” – cherishing “the ephemeral object as if it were the rarest heirloom”.

Both QuickTime movies and Cornell boxes contain “intense, distilled images that create a remarkable confrontation between past and present” – a confrontation furthered by QT’s stuttering attempts to achieve “real-time” movement, or to embrace the spatio-temporal lacunae that visibly mark its expressions. While cut-out statues and matted silhouettes float gracefully like collaged dreams across photorealist backgrounds that effortlessly warp and melt, “live-action” balks and stiffens in contrast. Strangely static and consequently moving, full of gaps, gasps, starts and repetitions, QT movies intensify our corporeal sense of the molecular labor of human becoming – evoking not the seamlessly-lived animations of real-time and live-action movies, but, rather, the half-life of certain time-worn kinetic objects: wooden puppets with chipped paint, forsaken dolls with missing limbs, Muybridge-like figures in old flip books hovering with bravado and uncertainty between photography and cinema, images of 19th century strong men hand-cranked into imperfect action by old Mutoscopes relegated to the dark corners of amusement arcades.

Given the pleasure I find in their fragmented temporality and intensely condensed space, I have no desire to see QuickTime movies get any quicker – or bigger. I don’t want them to achieve the “streaming” momentum of real-time and live-action – measured against the standard and semblance of cinema. Indeed, precisely because QT’s miniature spatial forms and temporal lacunae struggle against (as they struggle to become) cinema, they poetically
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dramatize and philosophically interrogate the nature of memory and temporality, the value of scale, and the meaning of animation. In sum, I don’t want them to become “real movies” at all. Nonetheless, they will—and have. It was just a matter of time, compression, memory, and bandwidth. Thus, it is a shame that QT movies were called “movies”: so named, their extinction as a specifically computergraphic form of aesthetic expression was virtually preordained. Although QT is a “multimedia architecture”, most developers and users quickly reduced it: “In QuickTime, a set of time-based data is referred to as a movie”.3

Long ago, André Bazin argued in “The Myth of Total Cinema” that before the technology that made it possible, cinema was preconceived “as a total and complete representation of reality...the reconstruction of a perfect illusion of the outside world”.4 Unfortunately this realist desire remains in force despite the emergence of a new medium—one that digitizes, integrates, and transforms all others. Belief in the myth of total cinema has led not only to the realization of sound, color, and relief, but also to the primacy of cinema, even as it is transformed into something else by a new medium. Thus, the aesthetic values of QT “movies” are measured against those of “cinema”—and the true computergraphic novelty of QT works becomes historically inverted as a false cinematic “primitivism”. Hence the desire to make QT movies quicker and bigger rather than stopping to privilege the stalled and uncanny momentum of their animation and the poetic intensity condensed by their miniaturization and framing.

Indeed, I would have much preferred calling QuickTime works “memory boxes” rather than “movies”—for “memory box” evokes not only Joseph Cornell’s work, but also the essential fundament of QT’s existence: the computer. As well, referring to diverse containers from reliquaries to shoe boxes filled with photographs or souvenirs, “memory box” draws our attention to memory’s historical transformations and the material conditions of its preservation. After all, in our technological moment, what is the computer but a fathomless “memory box”—one that collects, preserves, and allows for the conscious retrieval and visible re-collection of memories, all “cached” in an enormous, unseen network of past images, sounds, and texts.

Memory Boxes and Databases

In The Poetics of Space, Gaston Bachelard writes of a character in a novel who basks in the solidity and order of his oak filing cabinet: “Everything had been designed and calculated by a meticulous mind for purposes of utility. And what a marvelous tool! It replaced everything, memory as well as intelligence. In this well-fitted cube there was not an iota of haziness or shiftiness”.5 I often get the same feeling from my computer “desktop”. It reassures me with hierarchy, clarity and order, with principled and logical menus, commands, and systems through which I can access vast amounts of information (if not intelligence or knowledge). While unseen, this information does not seem hidden to me; rather, it is “filed” away in “folders” and, more deeply, in “records” and “fields”. It is rationally organized and always hypothetically available for retrieval and display. Indeed, my computer gives me access to what seems an infinite store of information—and I take comfort in the hierarchical logic of its “unhazy” and “unshifty” memory (of an order quite different than my own). Here is the logical—and official—organization of the office, catalog, library, museum, and stock room. Here, everything has been “designed and calculated by a meticulous mind for purposes of utility”. Here, I’ve no sense of the secretive or unconscious: at worst, information gets bureaucratically “classified”, misplaced, or erased (not repressed). Thus, the virtual “solidity” of my “desktop” and “files” refuses ambiguity or
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Poetry – and any discomfort I feel in the face of mistakes, losses, or frustrations arises not from my “well-fitted cube” but from my own very human and irregular logic.

Human memory doesn’t compute neatly. The orderly and hierarchical logic of the file cabinet and its database is not that of Cornell or QT memory boxes. Thus, as Bachelard writes: “A well-calculated geometric description is not the only way to write a ‘box.’”

Some other rationale informs these memory boxes: associative rather than hierarchical, dynamic rather than static, contingent rather than determined (even when “given” to us in “read only” form). Its search engines driven to the past by a present moment of desire (not utility), this is the eccentric, extensible, yet localized logic of the hyperlink that radically transforms the phenomenology of the file cabinet and its database. The file cabinet becomes charged with experience, temporality, and desire and its hierarchical order becomes jumbled by logically incompatible – if psychologically comprehensible – functions. Like Cornell’s description of a preparatory file for one of his boxes, the file cabinet becomes “a diary journal, repository, laboratory, picture gallery, museum, sanctuary, observatory, key ... the core of a labyrinth, a clearing house for dreams and visions”. And the database? Its hierarchical order becomes labyrinthine – comprehensive but incomprehensible, a vast and boundless maze of images and sounds, dreams, and visions in which one follows, backtracks, veers off, gets lost in multiple trajectories, all the time weaving tenuous threads of association into the endless teleology and texture of desire. Here, there is no fixed data or information requiring mere re-collection; here, from the first, are only unstable bits of experience, disordered as they are re-membered.

The poetic power of both Cornell’s and QT’s memory boxes emerge explicitly from their relation to a larger totality of material and memorial possibilities: they and their found objects exist not only as fragments of personal experience, but also as “emblem[s] of a presence too elusive or too vast to be enclosed in a box. These missing presences crowd the imagination”. Thus, in differentiating QT’s memory boxes from movies, it bears pointing out that watching a film, I usually don’t have a profound sense of all the images left on the cutting room floor; watching a QT memory box, however, I always feel the presence of an elusive and vast absence, a sea of memories shifting below the surface and in the interstices of what I actually see. In other words, I am always aware of the database as effluvial.

Privileging both the fragment and the slightness and ambiguity of their associational links, both Cornell’s and QT’s memory boxes thus point to their own presence as the poignant and precious visible landmarks of an unseen, lost, and incomprehensible field of experience. What Carter Ratcliff says of Cornell’s memory boxes is equally true of QT’s: “[T]he mode is enchanted by fragmentariness itself, which serves as an emblem of a wholeness to be found in other times and places”; thus it produces “an aura of loss which is as perfect in its own way as reunion would be”. Indeed, “the panic of loss gives way to nostalgia”.

Frames within Frames

Although “a mode enchanted by fragmentariness”, Cornell and QT’s memory boxes are themselves bounded containers. At the same time, their miniature size, collector’s sensibility, and the discretion of their enclosures gain particular power from – and exist always against – their own containment by a larger and marked visual field. Both externally and internally, then, Cornell and QT works provoke a structural and poetic tension between two different logics: one represented by the hierarchical and rational organiza-
tion of the “file cabinet” and computer “desktop” where everything has its place in some comprehensive master plan; the other by the associational organization that is the psycho-logic of the memory box and the “hyperlink” in which everything has a relative and mutable order that cannot be mastered as a totality. This tension is simultaneously framing and framed.

As a framing device, this tension exists in – and as – an exterior space (and logic) containing but juxtaposed to the associational logic of the Cornell and QT box. With Cornell’s works, there is the museo-logic of the vitrine in which the box sits; with the QT memory box and its hyperlink logic, there is the hierarchical logic of the computer “desktop” upon which it is opened. That is, the larger frame of the vitrine or desktop allows the smaller frame of the memory box an intensified condensation and concentration of its visible contents into an aesthetic totality: a poetically meaningful and contained microcosm nested within the dispersed and different order and meaning of the macrocosm that surrounds them. In this aspect, both Cornell and QT memory boxes take on the magnitude and function (if not the geometric size) of 16th and 17th century Wunderkammern, chambers of curiosities and art curated less on logic than on the personal sensibilities and desires of their wealthy collectors.

Writing of these condensed collections, Anthony Grafton wonders what contemporary visitors sought in them and concludes it was the experience of totality and plenitude: “They hoped…to encounter the universe in all its richness and variety, artfully compressed into the microscopic form of a single room that showed all the elements, all the humors, all the musical intervals, all the planets, and all the varieties of plant and animal creation”. Obviously, these viewers of the Wunderkammer were not worried by the implications of its contingent arrangement or overwhelmed by its (to our eyes) chaotic clutter. Indeed, historicized, the Wunderkammer’s totalizing impulse can be read as a celebration of mastery, order, and structural homology: that is, comprehension of the “universe in all its richness and variety” is represented mimetically in a single chamber complacently “nested” within the larger frameworks of both the master’s residence and God’s “master plan”. We can find similar compressions and homologies articulated in the smaller Wunderkammern of Cornell and QT boxes as they emerge structurally and figurally nested – framing and framed within a larger field. But this compression of a homologous universe is apparent also in the content of these more contemporary memory boxes. Their multi-layered and rich imagery is marked repeatedly by maps, planetary and astrological charts; hourglasses and clocks and other measuring devices; diagrams and schematics of optical devices from the microscope to telescope; evolutionary and devolutionary biological images of microbes, spores, skulls and skeletons. Consistently asserting homologies of shape and structure across scale from the microscopic to the macrocosmic, much like the Wunderkammern these memory boxes position themselves as both framing and framed by larger cosmologies and cosmogonies.

Nonetheless, times and cosmologies change – transformed in and by historical sensibility. Thus, in Cornell’s boxes, homologies between the micro- and macrocosmic are not emblematic of man’s security and mastery – and, in QT boxes, they are used to foreground a relativism quite other than the comforting and nested unity of God’s master plan. Cornell’s boxes are nostalgic – indeed, elegiac – in relation to harmony and order. Homologies between mundane and cosmic objects thus provoke a sense of the great loss and mystery of “totality” and perfect “comprehension” – the boxes, as Ratcliff noted, generating “an aura of loss ... as perfect in its own way as reunion would be”. In QT memory boxes, homologies between the micro- and macrocosmic are also not about mastery, security, or
“nested-ness”. Here, self-similarity across scale and structure constitutes the disconcerting relativism of “chaos”, often evoking the vertiginous and non-hierarchical “totality” of “infinite regress” and “cosmic zooms”, thus undoing a hierarchical history that frames and privileges the mastery and rationality of both God and Man. Indeed, in QT, it is not God’s rational master plan framing or framed by the memory box opened on my computer desktop or browser; rather, these images of maps, measures, microbes, and constellations mimetically contain, figure, and point to the containment and mastering structure of a more contemporary – and secular – “main frame”: the computer.

As suggested earlier, along with the poetic tension generated by the juxtaposed relation between the interior and exterior spaces of these contemporary memory boxes, poetic tension also emerges framed within the intimate space of the boxes themselves. Bachelard writes: “For many people, the fact that there should exist a homology between the geometry of the small box and the psychology of secrecy does not call for protracted comment”. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that within both Cornell and QT memory boxes, we see such a homology dramatized again and again: the “secret” vagaries and “hyperlinked” debris of contingency, dream, and desire overlaid in palimpsestic relation to the geometry and hierarchy that governs the “orderly” order of the rational “file cabinet”. Cornell’s work evidences such internal tension in memory boxes that exist in taxonomic series titled “Jewel Cases”, “Museums”, “Pharmacies”, “Aviaries”, and “Habitats” which often, as Ratcliff notes, “tuck images into drawers and vials and grids”. Compartments, drawers, slots, grids, and boxes within boxes: these displays of hierarchy and order point not only to potentially larger (and smaller) organizational frameworks so that scale, in Cornell’s art, becomes “multiple”; such nesting also points to potentially uncontrollable fragments of temporality and experience that are infinitely extensible in their generation of secrecy, memory, and meaning.

The same is true of QT memory boxes. Frequently overlaying the image fragments and detritus of their re-membered experience are orderly grids and schematic diagrams, geometry in the form of mattes that segment and compartmentalize. And, specific to the particular medium, such compartmentalization and grid work points not only to the larger order and framework of the surrounding “desktop”, but also to the smaller, hidden, and thus more “secretive” orders of the computer: microchips, bits, and bytes. Re-membered experience in QT is often explicitly “bit-mapped” and “pixel-ated”. Boxed fragments of photorealist images are compartmentalized further into smaller boxes yet – dissolving the personal meaning and contours of human memory and re-solving them into the visible and controlled geometry that in-forms the underlying memory and structure of the computer itself.

There is, then, both without and within QT and Cornell memory boxes, a tension between two kinds of logic and order and between a desire to re-collect and to re-member. Memory is thus generated and enacted by both box and viewer as a multi-stable phenomenon – one echoed in a palimpsestic structure and imagery that together provoke a richly poetic ambivalence and ambiguity. On the one hand, the geometry of compartments, mattes, and pixels re-collect and contain the amorphous and ever-extensible material of experience. On the other, the composited and collaged accumulations and associations of this experiential material challenge the neatness of the re-collection by re-membering it – and we are reminded there is a radical difference between a “pharmacy” and a “treasure box”, between a computer’s memory and our own. In sum, Cornell and QT memory boxes gain their poetic power from the juxtaposition and layering of “two kinds of space”; as Bachelard suggests, “intimate space and exterior space...keep encouraging each other, as it were, in their growth”.

33
“Little Movies”: Miniaturization and Compression

Digital theorist Lev Manovich has used QT to make a series of what, with historical irony, he calls “little movies”. All six use classic cinematic imagery as the raw material of an exploration that interrogates the differences between the cinematic and the digital. All also foreground and privilege the limitations of computer memory under which they are constructed and by which they are constrained – and, in various ways, all thus explore their miniature size and compressed nature. “A Single Pixel Movie” is particularly striking. To a quite literally “loopy” tune reminiscent of Laurel and Hardy’s theme music and against a black background, we watch the small square of a primitive “movie” in which a strong man holding a pole does rote exercises, intermittently interrupted by the sound of a “blip” and a digitized circle of “light”. With each blip, the image becomes smaller and smaller (and less and less audible) until both blip and “movie” are reduced to a single pixel on the screen. The effect is more compelling and poignant than the comical repetition of mechanical motion and see-sawing music would seem to warrant. We watch more and more intently as the already miniaturized image becomes smaller and smaller – and we become more and more aware of the increasing fragility and impending disappearance not only of the early cinema strong man but also of the QT “movie” presently being extinguished from our human sight.

It is no small thing that these “little movies” are “small” both spatially and temporally. Bachelard tells us in *The Poetics of Space*: “It must be understood that values become condensed and enriched in miniature”. Thus, as Susan Stewart notes: “A reduction in dimensions does not produce a corresponding reduction in significance”. Quite the opposite. Suggesting that “we should lose all sense of real values if we interpreted miniatures from the standpoint of the simple relativism of large and small,” Bachelard points out: “A bit of moss may well be a pine, but a pine will never be a bit of moss. The imagination does not function with the same conviction in both directions”.

The “little movies” in QuickTime – or, as I prefer, QT “memory boxes” – not only emerge from and allegorize the objective necessities and constraints of data storage involving digital memory and compression, but they also accrue phenomenological and aesthetic value as an effect of these limitations. Objectively, the miniature is a compression of data in space, but phenomenologically and poetically, compression and condensation intensify the experience and value of the data, making it something rare and precious, something spatially intensified and temporally condensed that is “vast in its way”. As Stewart suggests, “a constant daydream the miniature presents” is that “the world of things can open itself to reveal a secret life… a set of actions and hence a narrativity and history outside the given field of perception”. The miniature, then, is always to some degree secretive, pointing to hidden dimensions and unseen narratives. Its “nested-ness” within a larger whole draws us not only beyond its frame, but also into and beneath it. Thus, the miniature nature of QT’s “little movies” or memory boxes exaggerates interiority – not only that of the individual perceiving subject, but also of the computer. Thus, whether in my sight or not, the strong man of Manovich’s “little movie” will exercise forever in the depths of my – and the computer’s – memory. Unlike with cinema, I never quite have the sense that QT “movies” are ever really “over”. (Rather, their “terminal” status is “under”.)

In sum, the spatial condensations of Cornell and QT constitute an interiority that transcends quotidian spatial and temporal relations – and “as an object consumed”, their miniaturization “finds its ‘use value’ transformed into the infinite time of reverie”. Excluded by their physical size from the miniaturized interior of the memory box, both artist and
viewer imaginatively prospect and inhabit its suggestive spaces, filling them with their own missing presence in fragments of autobiography, dream, memory, confession. (Speaking both to us and for its maker, one QT miniature superimposes over a vague, empty, and receding hallway the following textual reverie: “Here is the solitude from which you are absent”.23) Like Cornell’s work with its slots, drawers, and compartments meant to contain and control the materials of overwhelming experience, QT memory boxes draw us inward into an ever-extensible reverie: its compartments, according to no “rational or logical sequence”, further housing and condensing “private and nearly unfathomable associations, almost like a metaphor for the cells of the unconscious mind”.24 Here, in the reverie the miniature provokes, it can indeed be said that “the poet inhabits the cellular image”.25

Mnemonics and Reliquaries
The miniature memory boxes of Cornell and QuickTime, in framing and effect, are “reliquaries” – preserving, as it were, precious remnants and souvenirs that gain additional poetic force in that they are “under glass”. As Bachelard notes, “valorization of the contents” can also emerge through a “valorization of the container”.26 Hence the fragment and the miniature “encourage” each other – evoking the “singular”, the “rare”, the “fragile”, the “ephemeral”, and the “compressed” as materially and poetically valuable. Manovich makes “little movies” that his text suggests will disappear, “the artifacts of the early days of digital media. “Bachelard privileges treasure chests and caskets. And Cornell creates “jewel cases” and places some of his compositions “under bell jars” as if “holding captive a moment in a transient, enclosed world”.27

The preciousness articulated here is thus connected to the particular kind of contingency that informs the artfully arranged but “found” objects of the memory box. That is, we encounter these re-membered objects as objectively assembled according to subjectively ephemeral associations, the very slightness of the links among them making their present appearance seem singular, fragile, fleeting – and thus precious. Stewart, writing of the material fragments of the past gathered in photograph albums or collections of antiquarian relics or souvenirs, points out: “There is no continuous identity between these objects and their referents. Only the act of memory constitutes their resemblance. And it is in this gap between resemblance and identity that nostalgic desire arises”.28 Hence the corollary desire to preserve these tenuous associations, to keep them “in mind”.

Cornell and QT memory boxes, then, tend toward what I would call a “mnemonic aesthetic” – privileging and practicing various devices that serve to preserve the fleeting memory, to “pin it down” and “put it under glass” like the gloriously colored butterflies one sees fixed in the vitrines of natural history museums. Such mnemonic practices are all based on repetition and rhythm and take a variety of forms and modes: “rote quotation” and mnemonic “clichés”; “looping”, duplication, cyclical recurrence, repeated uses of images, objects, and sounds; rhythmic and repetitious patterning that is ritualistic, mechanical, or “mantric”. All are mobilized in a concentrated effort to keep hold of memories that keeps threatening to slip away and vanish.

What Ratcliff observes in Cornell’s work can be also observed in QuickTime memory boxes. The artist, we are told, “is drawn to ‘material facts’ – objects and images – whose preciousness is ratified by memory and he often calls on popular memory to reinforce his own. His image-chains often run along lines of well-worn cliché – butterfly, swan, ballerina”.29 Through repetition, Cornell make common objects mysterious: a row of wine glasses, a field of thimbles, a series of cork balls or pharmacy vials. However, this is “not
the intellectualized notion of serialization, but more like the ritualized repetition of the alchemist”. Indeed, as Ratcliff says: “To duplicate an image endlessly is often to make its spell all the more binding”. Both Cornell and QT memory boxes are also highly citational: that is, they not only attempt to fix personal memories through repetition, but also quote and repeat previous artifacts of cultural memory – particularly privileging those that speak mnemonically to technologies of reproduction and preservation. Hence, both QT and Cornell memory boxes are “deeply involved with the photograph, the postcard, the photocopy, and the printed reproduction of works of art”. The boxes also use and repeat art historical images that reference the past: well-known paintings, old lithographs, classical statuary. Sound is also used mnemonically to an extraordinary degree in QuickTime. It marks time in repetitive patterns and, in musical form, is generally less melodic than it is insistently rhythmic. While often voiced (literally) in fragments, it also is often looped, repeating a partial thought, setting up a percussive rhythm of mechanical repetition, “scratching” or “stuck” in a temporal sonic groove as if in an old phonograph record, possibly creating a “mantra.” Indeed, middle Eastern and Indian music are used to a striking degree – particularly given often unrelated cultural imagery.

In their attempts to grasp and preserve the ephemeral fragments and fragile relics of memory, the boxes construct mnemonic rituals and, as Ratcliff notes, “ritual is mechanical, so any ritualizing aesthetic must have the power to mechanize the artist’s meanings”. This mechanization is particularly compelling in QT memory boxes – for, rather than the “ritualized repetition of the alchemist” that marks Cornell’s work, QT boxes do often convey “an intellectualized notion of serialization”. That is, ritualized duplication and repetition often seem much more “mechanical” than “alchemical”. Indeed, QT works derive much of their poetic power from mimetic allegory: the boxes duplicate and repeat their “memory fragments” as figural repetitions of the functional capacities of the computer itself to “duplicate”, “copy”, and “paste”. Here, the mnemonic aesthetic emerges not only from a desire to preserve scarce and rare memory, but also from the ritualized and “mechanical” capacity of the computer to do the same.

In “Two Marks Jump”, for example, serial images are stutteringly animated, duplicated, and endlessly looped. Two of the same young man leap into and out of a scene accompanied by a similarly looped and endless yell; here the titular description of “two” Marks is self-consciously belied by the rote duplication of an infinite series of one. “Hommage à Magritte” [sic], not only duplicates and transform the artist’s emblematic bowler hats, but it also “mechanically” animates his famous painting “Golconde”, in which dozens of indistinguishable little bourgeois men rain down upon a sterile townscape. In QT memory boxes, then, mechanical serialization and mnemonic repetition often combine, each “encouraging” the other to keep in mind – to re-collect and re-present – the ephemera of memory that would otherwise disappear from view.

**Time, Movement, and the “Illusion of Life”**

The miniature encourages the experience of intensity, interiority, and material preciousness through its compression and condensation of data in space. But the miniature also effects our sense of time. As Stewart points out, there is “a phenomenological correlation between the experience of scale and the experience of duration”. That is, time is transformed in the miniature: it thickens in significance and implodes. Compressed to “nest” in small spaces, time is reflexive: it falls back upon itself and “encrusts”, building up the weight of a generalized past – or it collapses from its own density, diffusing into an ahistorical and
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infinitely deep state of reverie. Thus, as Stewart says: “The miniature does not attach itself to lived historical time. Unlike the metonymic world of realism...the metaphoric world of the miniature makes everyday life absolutely anterior and exterior to itself”. Furthermore, when we engage the miniature, our sense of temporality never “streams” toward the future. Temporal compression and condensation conflict with forward movement and “life-like” animation. Thus “the miniature always tends toward tableau rather than toward narrative, toward silence and spatial boundaries rather than towards expository closure”.38

Fragments and traces of past experience exist in our sight and reverie as not only poetically evocative but also emblematic of irrecoverable “originary” moments of wholeness. Broken and poignant, the fragment’s stuttering or static and tableau-like presence points to both the passage of everyday life from particularity into allegory and to the great temporal mysteries of matter’s slow and inexorable emergence and extinction. (Here, we might remember the memory box’s tendency to figure and make thematic cosmological imagery that suggests not human temporality, but the imperceptible dynamics and perspective of “longue durée”: a form of history written not in human events but in the cosmic temporality of geologic or climatic transformation.)

There is, finally, an extraordinary obfuscation (and questionable desire) in the nomination “QuickTime”. QT is anything but quick: its animations are forestalled, its “illusion of life” incomplete. Compressing and condensing its imagery in a “miniature” number of bits of digital memory and display space, the material conditions that inform QT’s miniature memory boxes are literally dramatized in the “half-life” of its objects. Not only are these objects constituted as fragments in space, they are also fragmented in temporality and motion. Thus, even when human in form, the animated “subjects” of QT are experienced as partially discontinuous and without agency. Phenomenologically, their movement seems imposed from “without” rather than emerging intentionally from “within”. At best, like the puppet Pinocchio, they struggle against their existence as mere kinetic objects in frustrated fits and starts, stuttering out the desire to become a “real boy” – that is, fully alive in the temporal continuity and spatial coherence of intentional and realized action.

Central here is intermittent motion: time and action broken into fragments, gaps foregrounded, the laborious struggle to achieve human momentum and agency. In the misnamed QT “movie”. Pinocchio’s bildungsroman of self-realization is countered with the oxymoronic miniaturization and intermittencies that undo cinema within cinema (something that also occurs in the uncanny films of Jan Svankmajer and the Brothers Quay). Indeed, Cornell’s own filmmaking efforts were meant to undo cinematic “live-action” and “real-time”: he insisted that Rose Hobart – shot at sound speed (24 fps) and using fragments of a 1931 sound melodrama (East of Borneo) – be projected at silent speed (16-18fps) to the accompaniment of scratchy phonograph recordings.39

The intermittent motion in Cornell and QT memory boxes, then, is always more than merely mechanical: it articulates the existential conundrum of discontinuity. That is, “momentum” is condensed and compressed into a series of reified and frozen “moments”. Thus, the “illusion of life” becomes temporally solidified in what we might call a kinetic “souvenir”: a memory of motion that is now merely its token.

In closing, we know that Pinocchio eventually became a “real boy” – and that QuickTime will eventually and seamlessly “stream” into real-time and live-action “cinema”. But something quite poetic will be lost. Call me retrograde: as QuickTime enlarges and quickens to the myth of total cinema, I feel nostalgia for the impending loss of a unique historical experience and a rare and precious digital object.
Notes
10. Ratcliff, 43.
12. Bachelard, 82.
13. Ratcliff, 60.
14. Ratcliff, 43.
15. Bachelard, 201.
17. Bachelard, 150.
18. Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 44.
22. Stewart, 65.
23. “Flight from Intention” by Victoria Duckett, Laboratory for New Media, UCLA Department of Film and Television: http://pixels.filmtv.ucla.edu/
25. Bachelard, 228.
26. Bachelard, 86.
27. McShine, 10-11.
28. Stewart, 145.
29. Ratcliff, 54.
30. Dore Ashton, quoted in Ratcliff, 57.
31. Ratcliff, 64.
32. McShine, 13.
33. Ratcliff, 58.
34. 1993, no credits available.
36. Stewart, 66.
37. Stewart, 65.
38. Stewart 66.

What’s the Point of an Index?  
or, Faking Photographs

Tom Gunning

If Freud had subjected one of the West’s central ideologies – historical progress – to psychoanalysis, he might have discovered the primary psychic operation of displacement, operating behind our constant impetus towards ever-greater perfection. What passes for progress (especially theoretical progress), I am claiming, often simply displaces unresolved problems onto new material. As a historian of early cinema (and of the even earlier visual and sound technology that preceded the cinema – such as the magic lantern, the phantasmagoria, the panorama, the phonograph and the devices of instantaneous and chronophotography) I am excited, but also a bit dismayed by the current discussion of newly emerging media, especially when this discussion provides an account of the older media of cinema and photography. There is no question in my mind that the recent interest in early cinema and its technological antecedents springs partly from the excitement the appearance of such new media generates (and my friend and colleague Erkki Huhtamo has demonstrated this interrelation of old and new most wonderfully1). But, as Norman Mailer once said, ideals of progress often depend on the anaesthetization of the past. While I believe that the possibilities and realities of new media invites us to (in fact, demands that we) rethink the history of visual media, I also fear it can produce the opposite: a sort of reification of our view of the older media, an ignoring of the true complexities that photography, cinema and other visual media capturing light and motion presented, simply displacing their promises and disappointments unto a yet-to-be-achieved digital media utopia. Especially bothering to me is a tendency to cast the older media as bad objects, imbued with a series of (displaced) sins that the good objects of new media will absolve.

Let’s tackle one of the largest problem first, the truth claim of traditional photography (and to some extent cinematography) which has become identified with Charles Peirce’s term “indexicality.” Both aspects need investigation: the nature of the truth claim, and the adequacy of indexicality to account for it. This whole issues becomes even more obscure when critics or theorists claim (I hope less frequently as time goes by) that the digital and the indexical are opposed terms.

I will approach this last issue first, both because I think it is rather simple and because others have made the argument as well or better than I can (most recently Phil Rosen in his fine work Change Mummified).2 I have some difficulty figuring out how this confu-
sion arose, but I imagine it went something like this: the indexicality of the photograph depends on a physical relation between the object photographed and the image finally created. The image on the photographic negative derives from the transformation of light sensitive emulsion caused by light reflecting off the object photographed filtered through the lens and diaphragm. In a digital image, however, instead of light sensitive emulsion affected by the luminous object, the image is formed through data about light that is encoded in a matrix of numbers.

But what problem does this change present and how does it challenge indexicality? Clearly a digital camera records through its numerical data the same intensities of light that a non-digital camera records: hence the similarity of their images. The difference between the digital and the film-based camera has to do with the way the information is captured – which does have strong implications for the way the images can be stored, transferred and indeed manipulated. But storage in terms of numerical data does not eliminate indexicality (which is why digital images can serve as passport photographs and the other sorts of legal evidence or documents, which ordinary photographs supply). Further, it would be foolish to closely identify the indexical with the photographic; most indexical information is not recorded by photography. Long before digital media were introduced, medical instruments and other instrument of measurement, indexical instruments *par excellence* – such as devices for reading pulse rate, temperature, heart rate, etc, or speedometers, wind gauges, and barometers – all converted their information into numbers.

Although a photograph combines both types of signs, the indexical quality of a photograph must not be confused with its iconicity. The fact that rows of numbers do not resemble a photograph, or what the photograph is supposed to represent, does not undermine any indexical claim. An index need not (and frequently does not) resemble the thing it represents. The indexicality of a traditional photograph inheres in the effect of light on chemicals, not in the picture it produces. The rows of numerical data produced by a digital camera and the image of traditional chemical photography are both indexically determined by objects outside the camera. Both photographic chemicals and the digital data must be subjected to elaborate procedures before a picture will result. Here we might grasp how the claim for digital uniqueness displaces a problematic issue within our conception of traditional photography, an especially pernicious one. The claim that the digital media alone transforms its data into an intermediary form fosters the myth that photography involves a transparent process, a direct transfer from the object to the photograph. The mediation of lens, film stock, exposure rate, type of shutter, processes of developing and of printing become magically whisked away if one considers the photograph as a direct imprint of reality.

Thus the very strong claim that digital images can be manipulated in ways photographic images could not, must also be qualified. Indeed the much-heralded malleability of the digital image does not contrast absolutely with photography. I would not deny that the ease, speed and quality of digital manipulation represent an important new stage in the technology of imagery. But we must carefully consider the situations in which such malleability becomes a value and the considerable debt such transformations owe to (although often displacing our attention from) the history of photography. Here especially, the intertwining of indexicality and iconicity must be observed.

Let us grant for the moment, the ability of digital photography to absolutely transform the appearance of the object originally photographed. If we grant that the original digital photograph of Uncle Harry was indexical (and therefore bears an important relation
to the actual Uncle Harry), what happens when we then intervene on the data in a Photoshop program and transform his nose into a pronounced beak, his baldhead into a shaggy wilderness, turn his brown eyes blue? Surely the indexical is being attenuated! Two answers are relevant here, both of which depend on a qualified yes. Yes, but ... film-based photography can also transform Uncle Harry’s appearance, whether through retouching, use of filters or lenses, selection of angle of photography, exposure time, use of specially prepared chemicals in the developing stage, or adding elements through multiple printing. Traditional photography, therefore, also possesses processes that can attenuate, ignore, or even undo the indexical. No question digital processes can perform these alterations more quickly and more seamlessly, but the difference between digital and film-based photography cannot be described as absolute.

But a more complex and, I think, more interesting answer would point out that the power of the digital (or even the traditional photographic) to “transform” an image depends on maintaining something of the original image’s visual accuracy and recognizability. I use this phrase (“visual accuracy and recognizability”) to indicate the manner in which indexicality intertwines with iconicity in our common assessment of photographs. Our evaluation of a photograph as accurate (i.e. visually reflecting its subject) depends not simply on its indexical basis (the chemical process), but on our recognition of it as looking like its subject. A host of psychological and perceptual processes intervene here which cannot be reduced to the indexical process. The recognition of a photograph by a viewer as an image of its subject would not simply result from indexically. Indeed, one could produce an indexical image of something or someone that remained unrecognizable. The image must also be legible in order to be likened to its subject.

Let me get at this via another route. If one of the great consequences of the digital revolution lies in the freedom it gives people to transform a photographic image, we could say that the digital aspires to the condition of painting, in which color, shape, texture, all the components of an image are completely up to the painter, rather than determined by the original subject through an indexical process. But do users of Photoshop want an absolute freedom? Do they really want to create an image or, rather, to transform one which can still be recognized as a photograph (and maybe even as a photograph of Uncle Harry?)

The interest in transforming Uncle Harry’s photograph is not quite the same as that of drawing a caricature of him. Admittedly one could point out that few of us have the depictive talent to produce a caricature, and that digital manipulation programs give us that power (interestingly this recalls the argument Fox Talbot gave for his invention of photography). But it seems to me that the power of most digital manipulation of photographs depends on our recognizing them as manipulated photographs, being aware of the strata of the indexical (or perhaps better, the visually recognizable) beneath the manipulation.

The wonderful playfulness celebrated in the digital revolution remains parasitic on the initial claim of accuracy contained in some uses of photography. Just as I tried to untangle the idea of visual accuracy from simple indexicality, I would now like to consider the “truth claim” of photography that relies on both indexicality and visual accuracy but includes more (and perhaps less) than either of them. A great deal of the discussion of the digital revolution has involved its effect of the truth claim of photography, either from a paranoid position (photographs will be manipulated to serve as evidence of things which do not exist thereby manipulating the population to believe in things that do not exist), or from what we might call a schizophrenic position (celebrating the release of
photographic images from claims of truth, issuing in a world presumably of universal
doubt and play, allowing us to cavort endlessly in the veils of Maya).

I use the word “truth claim” because I want to emphasize that this is not simply a
property inherent in a photograph, but a claim made for it (dependent, of course, on our
understanding of its inherent properties). Perhaps its Ur-form can be found in Dion
Boucicault’s 1859 melodrama The Octoroon, in which Scudder, the play’s Yankee “photo-
graphic operator”, discovers that an act of murder has been recorded by a camera. He
offers the photograph as evidence to a lynch mob about to string up an Indian falsely
accused of the murder, declaring, “‘Tis true! the apparatus can’t lie!”3

We might add immediately that the apparatus, in itself, can neither lie, nor tell the truth.
Bereft of language, a photograph relies on people to say things about it or for it. It is no
accident that Boucicault’s melodrama involves a mock trial in which the photograph ex-
onerates the falsely accused Indian chief Wahnotee and determines the true culprit. Given
the early date of this play characters question whether a court of law would actually accept
such evidence. Both historically and institutionally, in order to tell the truth, the photograph
must be subjected to a series of discourses, become, in effect, the supporting evidence for
a statement. Anyone who knows either the complex history by which photographs were
granted evidentiary status in legal trial, or indeed the scrutiny and discussion to which they
must be subjected before they are granted such status in contemporary trials must realize
that in order to speak the truth the photograph must be integrated into a statement, subjected
to complex rules of discourse – legal, rhetorical and even scientific (discussing all the as-
pect of the photograph, its exposure, developing and printing).

But I think we would also have to contradict Scudder and say a photograph can only
tell the truth if it is also capable of telling a lie. In other words, the truth claim is always
a claim and lurking behind it is a suspicion of fakery, even if the default mode is belief.
In other words, the value placed on the visual accuracy of a photograph, founded on its
combination of indexicality and iconicity, forms the basis of a truth claim that can be
made in a variety of discourses whether legal (“Here we see the accused caught by a sur-
veillance camera…”) or less formal and interpersonal (“Yes, his penis really is that
big…”). But in so far as this value of visual accuracy exists, there will always be a drive
to counterfeit it. The truth implies the possibility of lying, and vice versa.

Faking photographs has a long history and was always possible given the processes that
intervene or shape the indexical process as it becomes a picture. Spirit photography, the
attempt by Spiritualist to prove the survival of a soul after death by capturing its image,
a practice dear to my heart, provides only one early example.4 The variety of doctored
photographs for political purposes is another.5 But my point here is not simply to claim
either that the manipulatability of photographs predates the digital (undeniable) or that
this practice was frequently employed in circumstances where truth claims were at-
ttempted (undoubted). Rather my point is that the practice of faking or counterfeiting can
only exist when true coin of the realm exists as well. Rather than denying photography’s
truth claim, the practice of faking photographs depends upon and demonstrates it.

Thus the concern over, or the celebration of, the possibility of the digital undermin-
ing the association of photography with a truth claim involves an inherent contradiction.
If the digital undermines the truth claim of photography, we will have to ask in what
contexts this occurs. Within interpersonal relations someone could digitally alter the size
of his penis in a photograph and most likely a general incredulity about extraordinary
photographs has already set in within the personal exchange of images. But in cases of
legal or scientific evidence protocols are set in place for determining the process by
which the photograph would be made and the likelihood of its accuracy. Clearly journalism (and governmental use of the media) pose arenas in which the greatest concern abounds. But equally clearly, institutions of journalism and government watchdog organizations will endeavor to preserve the possibility (the inevitability is not an issue) of photographs supporting truth claims in certain situations. I by no means claim that conspiracies of deception cannot exist, but simply that they will not differ essentially from other attempts at political deception. George Bush did not provide photographs of Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction” to justify his invasion (although Colin Powell did attempt some rather vague photographic evidence in his address to the United Nations).

Thus a recent journalism text book dedicated to this issue proposes that organizations dedicated to reporting news take a pledge of “Truth and Accuracy in Media Photography” and that organizations so pledging could display “a badge or symbol certifying their commitment” to the visual integrity of their images (i.e. that they have not been altered digitally). My point is not to predict if such a practice will be widely adopted, but rather to demonstrate that truth claims about photographs possess an institutional value in specific circumstances (the text book I quoted at one point queries it journalism student readers: “Will we Photoshop ourselves out of a job?”). Therefore means will be taken to preserve this value, even in an era where it is easy and cheap to alter photographs and produce a believable image. The truth claim must always be supported by rules of discourse, whether rigorously defined (as in scientific or legal evidence) or inherent in general practice (as in the belief that news reporting generally tells the truth; it seems to me that doubts about journalists’ commitments to the truth more likely undermine belief in the truth claim of a photograph than the simple fact of technical manipulability).

Likewise the use of photographs as evidence, whether legal or scientific, has always entailed a considerable disciplining of the photographic image. Consistency and uniformity of photographic processes (such as the very specific manuals written for police photographers or the strictly determined routine of distance, camera angle, lighting, and type of lens and apparatus used in the creation of Bertillon’s photographs of criminal for use in identification) rule institution photographic practices. A photograph’s use as evidence or scientific data often has to contend with the excesses of its intertwined indexical and iconic aspects. For scientists photographs frequently recorded too much information, and, as Peter Galison has shown, scientists debated whether to remove this excessive information or to forthrightly acknowledge it.

Etienne Jules Marey (whose chronophotography provides the most direct ancestor of the commercial cinema) provides a fascinating example as Joel Snyder and Marta Braun have shown. Marey’s first investigations of the human and animal body in motion used instruments that provided only numerical readings or graphic inscriptions. However, after encountering Eadweard Muybridge’s serial photographs of the horse in motion, Marey realized the increased sensitivity of new photographic processes and emulsions provided a new temporal control, capturing instants of motion that the human eye could not see. The possibility of analyzing human and animal motion through multiple instantaneous images in rapid succession excited Marey. However, for certain purposes the excess of visual information interfered with analysis and Marey arranged the subject in front of the camera in order to create a more abstract image.

We might describe Marey as a digital manipulator of photographs avant le lettre. Subjects wearing dark costumes in which white stripes and metal studs marked joints and limbs converted Marey’s photographs into graph-like images, which with a slightly increased abstraction became literal graphs. Yet one thing Marey did not eliminate from
the image was its indexical relation to the subject, another indication of the way in which the indexical and digital need not be opposed and that the indexical may have little relation to photography’s iconic properties. Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth century scientists introduced protocols of both the way photographs were made and the way they could be read which tamed the photographic image and made it useable as scientific evidence.

Let us consider the other side of the equation: the celebration of the new digital utopia (as Rosen calls it) in which digital manipulation liberates photography from its stable and predictable identity and its seemingly mechanical reiteration of the facts. As an art form photography has never been limited to any such restriction to the factual or accurate. In contrast to the protocols that enabled the truth claim of the legal or scientific photograph, art photography may create its own protocols and practices, free to explore its forms. The processes of superimposing multiple negatives, gum printing, or solarization – not to mention aesthetic selection of lighting, exposure and composition – have always delivered photography from a simple adherence to accuracy and truth claims, when it desired to explore its visual possibilities as an art form. The techniques of 19th century photographers on all levels (including the costuming and posing of models as in the work of Julia Cameron or Lewis Carroll) were hardly examples of “faking” photographs, but were the means of creating photographs as a mode of representation, play and imagination. The aesthetic triumph of styles of direct photography during much of the twentieth century (scorning many of these techniques in favor of hard-edged focus and printing techniques) primarily involves processes of artistic choice and stylistic differentiation, no matter how much claims of essential truthfulness of photography might be invoked by practitioners and critics.

Thus digital manipulation can hardly be seen as transforming the nature of photography as an art form, although it offers both new exciting techniques and new processes of discovery in the exploration of those techniques. We must keep in mind that only a limited practice of photography ever made accuracy or truth claims an essential part of its practice and that many uses of photography intentionally flout such claims. Beyond the modernist practices of art photography, popular form of what we could call “rhetorical” uses of photography, such as in advertising or political persuasion, do not depend exclusively, or often even primarily, on such truth claims.

Finally, we could observe that if indeed a digital revolution ever did trigger a complete overthrow of the truth claim of photography – if the association of photography in people’s minds with truth claims and accuracy were entirely abolished through repeated encounters with photography images that could not be trusted – then the possibility of deception, would also be abolished, and little motive for counterfeiting would remain. If the truth claim were utterly destroyed as a possibility, what would be the motivation for making photographs rather than drawings or paintings, other than Fox Talbot’s embarrassing claim that photography could place visual representation in the hands of the artistically challenged?

Here I think we encounter a basic aporia in our understanding of photography, one that I believe can only be approached phenomenologically, rather than semiotically. It is only by a phenomenological investigation of our investment in the photographic image (digital or otherwise obtained) that I think we can truly grasp the drive behind digitalization and why photography seems unlikely to disappear and why, even without a formulated truth claim, it offers us something that other forms of visual representation cannot.
Let us consider modes of photography that seem designed to flout the truth or even the accuracy claim associated with photography. While I would not deny that forms of photography can exist in which this flouting triumphs to such a degree that any referential role seems to vanish, I think that in most instances such photographs actually strive to present a contradiction, an oxymoron, an impossible presence, invoking photographic accuracy or truth even while contradicting it. Thus surrealist superimpositions in the work of Man Ray, photomontages by John Heartfield, or defamiliarizing camera angles by Rodchenko, to cite a few masters of modernist photography, all work with (and against) the recognizability and accuracy of the photograph.

Our delight in a clever digital manipulation of a photographic image in an advertisement or magazine cover does not come from being fooled by the image, but rather by its playful push-pull between its associations with accuracy (that is how a woman’s face actually looks) and its obvious distortion (but no face looks like that). But just as a counterfeit image relies on us still believing in the reliability of images, a playful image that deconstructs itself before our eyes relies on our common investment in the photograph’s ability to show objects accurately. Nor is this play the product of simple novelty and unfamiliarity. In other words, I do not believe that seeing a large number of photomontages, surrealist superimpositions or bizarre digital manipulations will abolish this game for us (although making original and fresh images from these process remains a challenge to artistic skill and originality). I think the delight in seeing a photographic image of a familiar world distorted in an unfamiliar manner will always provide pleasure.

Thus I would maintain the particular artistic and entertaining delight of digitally manipulated photographs depends on a continued investment in the photograph as potentially an accurate representation. This sense of the photograph as accurate remains inherent even while contradicted in a manipulated photograph. Yes, the back of a woman does not have incisions like the soundboard of a violin. But while Man Ray’s pun “The violin of Ingres” could have been conveyed by a drawing or even a rebus, it is the photographic nature of this woman’s back rubbed against the absurdity of seeing her as a fleshly violin and the wit of Man Ray’s joke that produces its effect. This photograph makes no truth claim (there never was a woman like this), yet it does still depend on a perceptual accuracy (we recognize the contours and texture of the woman’s flesh and back).

I am positing a phenomenological fascination with photography that involves a continuing sense of the relation between the photograph and a pre-existing reality. While this is precisely what “indexicality” supposedly involves, I am less and less sure this semiotic term provides the proper term for the experience. It is often claimed that our belief in photographic images depends on our knowledge of how they are made, on being aware of the fact that light bounced from the object has a causal role in the creation of the image. Without denying this, since I believe that cultural knowledge shapes our perception of things, I wonder whether this putative knowledge really provides the source of our investment in the photographic image. If a friend shows me a pen and tells me it was the one Herman Melville used to write Moby Dick my fascination with the pen is dependent on this fact. If I find out my friend is joking and bought the pen at a dime store, my fascination vanishes. But when I am told a photograph has been digitalized I may cease to believe its truth claim, but I think I am still intrigued by it. The same irrational appeal applies to the uncanny fascination that spirit photographs have for me.

I am not sure that the indexical explanation fully accounts for our fascination with the photographic image, its sense of perceptual richness and nearly infinite detail that strikes us as somehow more direct than other forms of representation. Confronted with a pho-
tograph, I do not so much make a judgment based on my knowledge of its means of produc-
duction as I immediately inhabit its image and recognize it, even if the recognition in-
volves the playful discovery that this world is impossible.

I think we should pause in our attempts to explain the effect of the photographic image and instead describe it more fully. There is no question of mistaking a photograph for the world; its stillness, borders, sense of texture, etc. forbid that. Photography therefore does not effect me like a hallucination. But outside of some form of analysis, I am not sure we ordinarily approach photographs semiotically, that is, taking them as signs. Certainly a photograph can function as a sign for something, usually its subject, a souvenir of a place or a person, a way of identifying or referring to something. But I think this is a secondary process to its ability as a picture to present us with an image of the world. Pictures generally are more than signs, and frequently we would be hard pressed to claim they referred to anything other than themselves. But photographs do seem to point beyond themselves in a curious manner, and this is part of the reason the index does seem to explain part of its power. But whereas signs reduce their reference to a signification, I would claim the photograph opens up a passageway to its subject, not as a signification but as a world, multiple and complex.

Thus photographs are more than just pictures. Or rather, they are pictures of a special sort, ones whose visual accuracy invites us to a different sort of observation. The photograph does make us imagine something else, something behind it, before it, somewhere in relation to it. Barthes indicates this, I believe, by his claim that the photograph and its referent “adhere”. And yet even Barthes, the semiotician, differentiates this adherence of the photograph to its referent from the way other signs refer. Photography, Barthes, first told us in an early essay, was an image without a code, thus outside of ordinary semiotics. He later told us, reaffirming his earlier position, that photography was not a copy of reality but rather its emanation. In his self-described “realist” position, Barthes shares Bazin’s belief that a photograph puts us in the presence of something, that it possesses an ontology rather than a semiotics.

The fairly recent preoccupation with the index as a means of understanding photography derives not only from the rediscovery of Peirce that accompanied the shift to a semiotics of culture, but more directly from Peter Wollen’s brilliant application of Peirce’s category to Bazin’s discussion of the ontology of the photographic image. But Wollen’s translation of Bazin’s ontology of photography into a semiotics involved a canny appropriation and transformation of Bazin (who never used the term “index,” although his terms of comparison with photography – death masks, fingerprints, moulds – certainly correspond to Peirce’s examples of indices). If Wollen’s semiotic gloss on Bazin rendered his argument more rational and understandable, it may have also cut us off from a different understanding of the power of the photograph implied in some of Bazin’s less understandable passages.

For Bazin, the photograph is not a sign of something, but a presence of something, or perhaps we could say a means for putting us into the presence of something, since clearly Bazin realizes that a photograph differs from its subject. But is the indexical relation to a referent enough to truly explain what Bazin describes as photography’s “irrational power to bear away our faith”? An indexical relation falls entirely into the rational realm. Likewise Barthes describes the power of photography as, “A magic, not an art.” When Barthes describes a photograph as an emanation of a past reality rather than a copy of something, he underscores the way a photograph relates to a single individual object and a unique moment in the existence of that object. Within the realm of signs, only a
index possess this sort of specificity, but one might question if semiotics provides an account for those aspects of the photograph that seem most compelling to Bazin and Barthes. Rather than finding equivalents to photography within the science of signs, we might explore the way photography transforms – or even possibly avoids – the sign’s essential function of substitution. Barthes and Bazin are agreed that the photograph offers neither a copy (a simple iconic sign) nor a substitute (the function of all signs, including indices). “Photography actually contributes something to the natural order of creation instead of providing a substitute for it,” claims Bazin.19

Besides photography’s ability to put us in the presence of its reference, the quality Barthes describes as an emanation, we might want to describe aspects of its visually which the index alone does not imply. It is not enough, I think, to simply class photography as an icon without describing its unique depictive qualities. These unique qualities are often described in terms of photography’s mode of production, especially the mechanical nature of its process, so that images do not derive from a skilled human hand, but rather rely on principles of optics mechanically controlled and chemically captured. While the importance of, as Bazin puts it, the absence of man20 remains an issue in need of continued exploration, I would rather emphasize the sense of a nearly inexhaustible visual richness to the photograph, combined with a sense of the photograph’s lack of selection. The photograph appears to share the complexity of its subject, to capture all its details, even those we might not ordinarily notice. The first commentators on photography marveled over this sense of an unprecedented visual array, possessing overwhelming detail. Marey’s processes or Bertillon procedures sought to remove precisely this excessive aspect of photography, so that photographs could function better as unambiguous signs and clear sources of indexical data. It is photography’s resistance to significance, its excessive “noise” which characterizes its realism, as well as its sense of uniqueness and contingency, values especially prized in Barthes’ account of photography and essential, I would claim, to our fascination with photographs as a different sort of picture.

These qualities do not necessarily relate to indexicality, but they certainly make up a considerable part of the desire for total illusion that Bazin described in the “Myth of Total Cinema”, the companion piece to his essay on “The Ontology of the Photographical Image”, and an essay in which indexicality places a subsidiary role to the capturing of the visual detail and complexity of the world.21 In this essay Bazin places cinema not so much in the tradition of photography as an index, but of other 19thcentury devices designed to overwhelm the senses with their excessive detail, such as the panorama, the diorama, the stereoscope and ultimately the phonograph. For Bazin the painted colors and entirely non-indexical animated drawings of Reynaud’s Pantomimes Lumineuse are more essential to the history of cinema than the abstracted motion studies of Marey.

Here our discussion comes full circle, because if the digitally produced new media may differentiate itself from cinema and photography, it would seem to relate strongly to the artificial realities of the panorama, diorama and Reynaud’s animations. If these devices lack the indexical claim of photography, they absolutely claim the ability to fashion a counter-reality through perceptual stimulation. But rather than maintaining the absolute barrier of the indexical, we might want to place photography into this tradition, accenting its visual acuity and excessive quality to often bypassed by recent commentaries (although Jonathan Crary’s treatment of the stereoscope opens a similar line of investigation).22

Thus I think we are able to pose the questions about the relation between the new digital media and photography in ways which avoids the sacred cows associated with each side of this supposed divide. To refer to the digital as the “post-photographic” seems
not only polemic rather than descriptive, but most likely mystifying. The translation of photographic information into a number-based system certainly represents a revolutionary moment in photography, but one not unlike the replacement of the wet collodion process by the dry plate, or the conquering of exposure time with instantaneous photography, or the introduction of the hand camera. Like these earlier transformations in photographic history, the digital revolution will change how photographs are made, who makes them, and how they are used — but they will still be photographs.

The new ease of manipulation of the image that digital processes offer can at points seem to attenuate the indexically based truth claim of the photograph, but this threat of deceit has always been an aspect of photographic practice: the risk that often defines the game, dependent on the social value of photography’s truth claim. Since this claim is the product of social discourses as well as the indexical quality of the camera, it seems likely means will be found to preserve it, at least in certain circumstances. The risk will remain a risk, not become a rout. Likewise, since the fascination of a transformed photograph lies partly in its verisimilitude, it would seem likely that even on a popular or artistic level, the sense of photography as an accurate record of the way things look will also survive, or the fun found in distortion becomes thin.

But finally I would claim that we still have only the beginnings of an account of the fascination photography exerts and although the use of the term “index” may have helped explain some aspects of this fascination, I am not at all sure it is either an adequate or accurate term. The semiotic category of the index assimilates photography to the realm of the sign, and although a photograph like most anything (everything?) can be used as a sign, I think this approach prematurely cuts off the claims made by theorists like Barthes, Bazin (and I think Deleuze) that the photograph exceeds the functions of a sign and that this indeed is part of the fascination it offers.

The description of a photograph as putting us into the presence of something (and for Barthes especially the presenting of a past time) needs to be explored outside the concept of the index. To explore this further the actual visual experience occasioned by the photograph needs more probing. Here our delight in visual illusion may play as important a role as indexicality. And if we are to deal with illusions it seems to me that the play with photographic imagery that the digital revolution allows may provide the perfect playground/laboratory for a greater understanding of a fascination that I maintain is likely to have a future.

Notes
What’s the Point of an Index? Or, Faking Photographs

7. Ibid., p. 111.
The ‘War on Terror’ declared by President George W. Bush after the terrible events of September 11, 2001, has already had profound consequences on world political developments and global opinion. Media are – either actively or passively – actors in the resultant propaganda war and can as such influence public opinion.

Globalization processes imply transnational mediated flows of meaning at the same time as the perceived meanings vary between cultures and countries. That media divide globally in the coverage of the War on Terror is not only obvious when comparing American and Arab media, but also between the U.S. and Western European media. This has partly to do with the difficult demands on journalists and media as to how to manage the flood of propaganda and the threats to professional integrity and standards.

How images of the U.S. and the Others are portrayed by media in various countries after September 11 and the attack on Afghanistan is at the focus of this volume. The book contains a collection of essays by media researchers and journalists with backgrounds from a number of countries.
Comments on Vivian Sobchack’s and Tom Gunning’s presentations

ARILD FETVEIT

The theme of digital aesthetics echos one of the key themes in media studies – questions of how changing media technologies have bearings on the aesthetic and cultural figuration of media expressions. Many have noted the way digital media mimic and remediate forms and figurations of older media. Internet publications model themselves on and rework existing formats and genres from newspapers, magazines and television. The internet also aspires to become a site for the display of movies.

The point at which Vivian Sobchack’s intervenes is interesting in several ways. It is an ephemeral moment in the history of a medium’s development: before the digital technology is able, with stelth smoothness, to mimic the cherished object of the celluloid film perfectly, and render film obsolete chemically speaking. Vivian Sobchack’s fascination carries a level of irony, in that the stuttering and not quite successful attempts by the digital technology of The Quick Time Movies to mimic cinema becomes an object for aesthetic analysis. Thus, her aesthetic appreciation comes with an ironic foregrounding of the shortcomings of the digital medium in question, especially as compared with cinema. We could maybe question the relevance of an aesthetic analysis of a digital stuttering which reflects as much economic and technological limitations as it does deliberate aesthetic priorities. Yet The Quick Time Movies are there to be experienced, and it proves interesting to follow Vivian Sobchack’s phenomenological description of this moment in a new mediums development.

I am especially intrigued by the stuttering articulation of a position in-between photography and film – which again echos the wonder of still images portraying live movements – which is the wonder of cinema. The Quick Time Movies – in their stuttering disruption of the flow of film, seem to back-track and recall this fascinating moment – before the series of still images had developed fully into a movie and the gaps between the still images were closed, hidden in a flow of motion. A curious tension is articulated in this stuttering moment, as if the The Quick Time Movie struggles to decide whether it belongs to the still image culture of the photograph and the painting – an image culture almost as old as mankind – or to the modern culture of the moving image which crowned the industrial development of the 19th century. Vivian Sobchack’s observations convinces me that it does not fully belong to neither, but articulates its own intriguing position.
As for Tom Gunning’s paper, it was fascinating to follow someone working through issues I have been grappling with myself, and finding myself not only in agreement with the points made, but also overwhelmed by the richness and precision with which they are made. Your points about deception being grounded in a truth value which is still valid, and your emphasis on the institutional warrant which upholds trust in photographic evidence for example, are important.

When it comes to the indexical, however, I have always thought of that as a helpful concept, whereas you seem on the verge of dismissing it. Thus, I will throw out a few ideas in the hope that they might make you see the concept in a more positive light. To start with, I share your interest for photographic images to carry away our faith – an interest which is articulated in related ways by Benjamin, Bazin and Barthes, and which I also believe needs to be explored through rich phenomenological descriptions. So far we agree. But if the concept of indexicality does not in itself suffice to capture our sense of fascination with these images, why don’t we just supplement it rather than dismiss it? Second, anthropologists sometimes make the distinction between experience-near and experience-distant concepts. Could the inadequacy of “index” simply be a matter of the term’s experience-distant technicality? Third, Barthes left semiology in his Camera Lucida (1982) in order to talk about photography from a more phenomenological perspective. But his was a Saussurean semiology based on a conventional relationship between signifier and signified. It did not have the richer options of Peircian semiotics to distinguish, as is most often done, between icon, index and symbol. Thus, Barthes move away from semiology did not imply an explicit rejection of the index, and many of his key observations (as well as Bazin’s and Benjamin’s) seem to be easily reconcilable with the concept of the index.

You emphasise the richness in detail as a source of fascination – evoking Bazin’s myth of total cinema (which prefigure later ideas of total immersion). I conceive of this richness – full of sparks from incidents, as Benjamin talked about – as grounded in a sign which is both indexical and iconic – as well as symbolic. Søren Kjørup talks in this context of a congruity between the iconical and the indexical. This is surprisingly close to the words of Fox Talbot – one of the inventors of photography – who said that the images are forced to resemble what they depict. If the word forced invokes the indexical, resemble invokes the iconical. Maybe the concept of the index becomes more useful in its application to photography when we do not use it isolated? Could it be possible to see the fascination with photography as in important ways grounded in an iconic-indexical congruity, yet, and at the same time, in need of a thicker and more sensous description?

It has been said that the digital will change it all. Clearly this is not quite true. Thus we need to foster measured reflections on the changes it entails. I want to thank Vivian Sobchack and Tom Gunning for contributing to this reflection by giving us a richer sense of what quick time movies are, as well as a more measured view of the digital revolution in photography. Exploring such issues can set us on a road to interrogate more closely into what characterizes different media – and on this road media studies can aspire to really become media studies, and not merely mass communication studies.
COMMENTS ON VIVIAN SOBCHACK’S AND TOM GUNNING’S PRESENTATIONS

KARIN BECKER

A medium in our culture can never operate in isolation, because it must enter into relationships of respect and rivalry with other media.¹ My assignment here is to comment on two articles which at face value appear marginal to what is generally included in media studies in the Nordic countries. The media which Gunning and Sobchak each address in their work, the construction of the realist aesthetic in film and photography in Gunning’s case, and the provocative parallels Sobchak locates between small “Quick time” digital movies and the memory boxes made by the American artist Joseph Cornell, can hardly be described as central to the theory and research of media in the our part of the globe. Including Gunning’s and Sobchak’s contributions here, following their presentation at a plenary session on “Digital Aesthetics” provokes the following question: What can these objects – an artist’s memory boxes, the already nearly obsolete Quick time movie – and the old question of the photograph’s indexicality, tell us about contemporary media? Why should we pay attention to them? I wish to frame my answer to this question first by addressing briefly the importance a serious study of visuality carries for our field. I then consider several propositions that arise out of the nexus that ties these two otherwise quite diverse papers together: namely a joining of history, nostalgia and memory. I consider this particular nexus as supporting a perspective that while certainly not new in itself, can provoke questions and offer insights highly relevant to the development of media studies. I close with a few critical comments on the ideal of the “totality” as a trope to be critically examined for the consequences it bears both for the development of media and how we study them.

The concept of visual culture has been used so widely and to cover such a diverse range of practices and phenomena that it is on the verge of losing whatever critical insights it may have once offered. In its most common construction, the study of visual culture is construed as introducing a continually expanding range of new objects to the field of media inquiry. In direct contradiction to this perspective, many scholars now argue that the study of visual objects and artefacts is based in a problematic essentialization of the visual as involving a distinct set of practices and phenomena (Bal 2003). Instead of examining objects and artefacts as essentially or primarily “visual”, we need to be considering what makes them interesting. This involves examining how vision is
historically and culturally constructed, in close and dynamic relationship with other sen-
sory-based information. The focus of inquiry shifts from visual objects to questions of
how people see, the forms of knowledge that arise in the practices of looking, and how
these are interwoven in discourses of power and knowledge (Sturken & Cartwright 2001).

Gunning’s interrogation of the photograph offers an ideal example of this shift. We can
understand the “truth claims” made for the photograph only if we examine the historically
and institutionally based series of discourses that support the photograph as a statement that
can be true — or false. Underlying the claim of visual accuracy — based on photography’s
combination of indexicality and iconicity- Gunning finds apparatuses that claim the oppo-
site, in legal as well as more informal and interpersonal discourses. In order to be seen as
true, the photograph must contain the possibility of the lie. Gunning then pursues this in
an attempt to understand what he describes as the “phenomenological fascination with
photography” which he claims cannot be fully accounted for by the semiotic postulate of
the photograph’s indexicality. We do not lose interest in an image that has been proven
false. A photograph that has lost its truth claim, through digitization for example, can and
does still fascinate. The knowledge that deceptive practices have been involved in produc-
ing the photograph can in fact make it even more intriguing to look at.

Gunning does not examine any particular photograph or selection of photographs, but
the idea of the photographic image as an ontological construction. This interrogation of
the relationship between knowledge, visuality and desire does not preclude, however, an
examination of objects that one finds visually fascinating. On the contrary, as Sobchak
argues, visual culture study depends upon close scrutiny of the “specificity of forms”. In
her article we find in fact a method whereby the attraction she finds in one particular
media form can be understood at least in part, when the medium is subjected to a close
analysis and comparison with other visual forms, drawn from what would appear to be
quite disparate fields.

Media constantly refer to other media, not only in their content, but more relevant in
the present context, in the ways people encounter and use media. Sobchak’s model of
media analysis, if I may call it that, is not idiosyncratic. The connotations raised by the
Quick time movies, reminding her of an experience from other media and other spheres
of visual experience, can serve as an example of how people interpret media form and
content. Such intermedial encounters between different technologies and texts are inte-
gral to contemporary media experience, an intrinsic aspect of everyday life (Lehtonen
2000, Fornäs 2001). The concept of intermediality refers in the first instance to relations-
ships between different media or to two or more instances of the same medium. In the
complex cross referencing between media genres and forms, intertextuality emerges as
a deeper interpenetration between media texts. Sobchak’s example illustrates the more
general difficulty of maintaining meaningful distinctions between content and form in her
interpretations of these visual texts. She describes an experience of the text where the
content and form of two different media interpenetrate each other, first in her encounter
with the two media forms and then in her intertextual analysis of the dynamic relation-
ship between them.

In this so-called digital age, intermediality and intertextuality also have a diachronic
aspect, as new media continually reproduce and replace other media. This process of
remediation, to use Bolter and Grusin’s term, further complicates any attempts to draw
lines between “new” and “old” media. As new media circuits are created, they continu-
ally incorporate and appropriate “the techniques, forms and social significance of other
media” (Bolter & Grusin 1999: 65). But in what sense is this a new phenomenon?
Haven’t media always referred to their predecessors, drawing on the forms, themes and genres of the past? And people, in turn, always make use of the past as they interpret and find new applications for contemporary media. My purpose in pointing to this continual recycling of the past, is not to discredit the concept of remediation, but rather to suggest it as a useful concept for reexamining the history of media and their uses.

The *ur-forms* of media continue to fascinate us. Both the technology and the content and programs of early media are recycled in often ritualized forms. In these new settings (seeing early Disney films on Christmas Eve, watching *I Love Lucy* on a transatlantic plane, looking through old photo albums) the old media do not appear underdeveloped or lacking in meaning. On the contrary, they have become a rich source of history and memory, in many cases bearing a greater authenticity than contemporary media. The meanings experienced in these encounters with “old” media are a significant aspect of cultural history. As Gunning and Sobchak both show in their articles, a return to the phenomenological aspects of prior media can give us new ways of reflecting upon and understanding the significance of media change.

Prior media forms are often experienced as fragments, as incomplete glimpses into the past. There is something missing. The flickering quality of an old film, the static from an old radio broadcast create disruptions and discontinuities that the audience must fill with its own experience. Both Gunning and Sobchak refer to this fragmentary, piecemeal quality of prior media forms as part of the fascination they arouse. The ur-forms of media appeal to memory and nostalgia, as Walter Benjamin noted in his discussions of the optical subconscious (Benjamin 1969, 1979). They contribute to a re-experience of the past that is quite different from the broad scope of historical events. Whereas media are often regarded as a valuable means of recapturing the historical past, they are seldom considered for their value in this alternative respect, that is, for their capacity to elicit the subjective, phenomenological experience of the past.

It is beyond the scope of these brief comments to attempt to characterize more fully the quality and experience of prior media forms, and their intermedial and intertextual relationships to the contemporary media landscape. Even at this stage, however, it is clear that central to that fuller analysis are the ways media consumption engages aesthetic experience. Gunning and Sobchak both point to aesthetics as critical to understanding how people use media.

Finally, I wish to point out an apparent paradox between on the one hand the strong aesthetic appeal of the fragmentary images and sounds of the past and on the other, the persistent ideal of the total media experience. Today we find the ideal of a total experience, for example, in the marketing of the home cinema complete with “surround sound”, and in the goal of verisimilitude for virtual reality and computer games. Totality as a measure of completeness permeates the ideals of journalism (“total coverage”) and is linked to standards of control (as in “total vision” and “total recall”). Embedded in the development of digital media is the continued striving after a seamless, total representation of the visual, audio and sensory experience. In a narrow sense this can be seen as a technologically driven dream. Yet the trope of totality so deeply imbedded in qualitative assessments of media and their content that it must be seen as transcending the demands of technology. In the total media experience the line between reality and representation is eliminated. Sobchak cites André Bazin’s argument from “The Myth of the Total Cinema” to support her claim that the ideal of a seamless illusion of the outside world preceded the technological possibilty of its creation (Bazin 1964). Yet, as the technologies of reproduction improved, cinema itself became the ideal against which other
media of visual movement and sound were measured. Sobchak points to the conflict between two aesthetic values, in the struggle of the condensed fragmentary form of Quick time, which she considers more evocative and far superior to the cinematic ideal of a complete representation. One may disagree with her evaluation of the qualities of the medium she examines in her article. Yet the tension she identifies between these two ideals – that of completeness or totality and the fragment or glimpse – suggests two very different appeals which media exert. Examining these appeals, the contexts in which they arise and when they each have relevance for media producers and their audiences may have profound implications, offering new critical understandings of the ideals of media representation and use.

Notes
2. Here I am making a broad generalization about the field of media studies, quite aware that there are notable exceptions in the studies of specific media, including photography and film.

References
In this essay I wish to address a problem that has received little attention in mass media research to date. It has to do with the relationship between journalism and art, literature and film, or, in a broader sense, the relation of journalism and aesthetics. I should like to start with two examples.

“Why all these full-page spreads from Sydney?” The question was raised by veteran newspaper correspondent Sven Öste in a column in *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm) in the early 1990s. Öste was one of the generation of foreign correspondents who in the 1950s and 1960s brought the world beyond Europe within sight for Swedish readers. The object of his question was the tremendous energy and resources West-European media spent covering brushfires in New South Wales. The fires had claimed four lives and destroyed 191 homes. During the same period, the rest of the world was not exactly serene, Öste noted: “A gas explosion in China killed 70 workers. It got ten lines. Floods rendered 150,000 people in Sri Lanka homeless. Eight lines.” When an earthquake in Maharashtra killed roughly 10,000 Indians, the media lost interest after a day or two.1

Why are brushfires that kill four Australians in suburban Sydney accorded greater news value than an earthquake in India that kills thousands? It is fairly clear that Western news reporting values a white Australian who sees his home go up in flames much higher than a poor Indian who dies in an earthquake. The difference in news value reflects a difference in the value ascribed to the two persons as human beings. And this difference is so obvious and self-evident that we don’t even reflect on it, Öste wrote.

There would be no cause for concern if our news institutions had no greater pretensions than to promote our sense of community and to confirm our own culturally bound worldview. It is hardly surprising if people in Stockholm find it easier to identify with people whose lives and lifestyle resemble their own than to relate to peasants in rural India. To bemoan that would be as silly as to criticize a local newspaper for carrying local news.

But, in an age in which media are becoming ever more globalized, Öste’s question becomes urgent. With global concentration of the media, the global media conglomerates of the West make a claim, whether explicitly or implicitly, to universal validity. We are presented with a situation in which a given cultural community, with its parochial concept of newsworthiness, is convinced that its values apply universally to Humankind. As a culturally bounded definition of newsworthiness – along with the relative valuation

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1. Öste, Sven. "Why all these full-page spreads from Sydney?" *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm, 1990s.
of human beings in different parts of the world that the definition reflects – is adopted as a world standard, other culturally bounded ideas about what is important and who is important will be marginalized. The result is the kind of bias that Sven Öste criticized: the globalized media system codes a resident of suburban Sydney and a resident of the Maharashtra hinterland in such a way that readers and viewers will identify with the fate of the former, whereas the latter remains out of view. The result is paradoxical, for are we not often told that globalization is broadening our horizons?

Now, to my second example. Some years ago I saw an exhibit of the work of the Chilean artist, Alfredo Jaar. Instead of the customary brochure or catalogue, visitors to the exhibit were furnished with a passport and what appeared to be a map. Unfolding the map, I found instead a collection of large poster-size photographs of people in Nigeria, Brazil and a refugee camp outside Hong Kong. I seemed to hear a whisper: “Look closely! This is what we look like, the people on the other side of the border!”

Then their Faces Vanished.

Inscribed on Jaar’s map was a single sentence: “Geography above all serves the purpose of war”.

For Alfredo Jaar, every frontier – geographical, political, economic, or cultural — represents a crime against humanity. In 1986, he rented the advertising space at the Spring Street subway station on Manhattan. Spring Street is the stop where Wall Street’s stock brokers end and start their daily commute. Gold up $1.80! Jaar’s ads declared. Alongside this encouraging piece of news Jaar displayed photos of the gold-diggers, or garimpeiros, of Serra Pelada, the largest open-pit mine in Brazil. At the time Jaar took his photos, more than 40,000 migrant laborers were working the mine, each digging his own shaft toward the center of the Earth. In the photos, the mine looks like a giant’s footprint in an anthill. Tiny creatures covered with mud are scrambling over each other. With their one hand on the ladder and the other on their sack of up to one hundred pounds of gold-bearing mud, they climb toward daylight.

In Jaar’s images, the wretched workers of Serra Pelada haunt us like figures in a geopolitical nightmare. Jaar shows us the faces and bodies of people whose existence is denied in price quotations, the media, or economic development programs.

Jaar’s art is political, even didactic. It gives faces to the faceless ones. But the real point of his work is a different one. With minimalistic precision, he frames his photos in such a way that the depicted persons always appear to be fading away or falling outside the visual plane. Sometimes, he veils his subjects’ faces or dilutes and distorts them by letting them appear as reflections in water or ingeniously placed mirrors. Or he hangs his pictures face-to-wall, so that the spectator can only guess the motif on the basis of the caption.

Furthest in, in a sort of sanctum sanctorum in the exhibition hall, Jaar confronted the visitor with a broad image, illuminated from behind, showing seven men in Lagos, Nigeria. They are standing next to or leaning against a stack of rusty barrels of toxic waste, imports from Europe. This picture was followed by four similarly illuminated close-up portraits of garimpeiros encrusted in mud; the figures were tightly cropped, with their point of gravity just outside the frame.

The passport had no spaces for entry and exit stamps. Instead, each page showed a picture of a frontier marked by barbed wire and illuminated by glaring searchlights. And across each page a phrase, in flaming red letters, was repeated in several languages: “Abriendo nuevas puertas”, “Es öffnen sich neue Tore”, “Opening new doors”.

Such is the ultimate interpretation of Jaar’s work: it opens doors to the worlds that have been marginalized in Western media. But his work also has another effect. It makes
the spectator aware of the political barriers and mental inhibitions that prevent us from seeing the world’s lower classes. The Damned of the Earth always await us just beyond the pale of our perception. Jaar lets the viewer see that he or she does not see the Other.

On the basis of these two examples I should like to formulate an hypothesis. The first example speaks of the increasing conformism of global mass media. An ever greater share of the media worldwide are governed by a norm that dictates what is worth knowing and looking at, what to enjoy and what to mourn, what counts as happiness, justice, goodness and love. The norm is confining in that it suppresses other, alternative ideas about these values.

The second example speaks of the increasing politicization of art. By politicization I mean the process that brings what we might call “the political” – as opposed to “politics” – to light. The political signifies the fundamentals and underlying principles of politics, namely, people’s ability to represent themselves and their interests in the public sphere – a public sphere, moreover, that has become global. Alfredo Jaar calls attention to the political in the sense that his art evokes the mechanisms that exclude some of humanity from the public sphere, thereby denying them political representation.

My hypothesis concerns the links between these two processes. I propose that the conformism of media journalism and the politicization of art are communicating vessels, that is, the processes interact. Indeed, I would venture even further and posit that the conformism of journalism and the politicization of art are two facets of the same historical process, which we might term the globalization of culture.

To put it a bit drastically: On the one hand we have a trend toward uniformity; the world-view represented in journalism increasingly coincides with a perspective that is characteristic of a specific subject position: white, male, Western and of the owning classes. This subject position constitutes the implicit narrator as well as the implicit listener of the mass media that today address a global audience. In most media narratives, this subject functions a general model of the human. Those who take interest in these narratives are urged to emulate this model, which for the majority of the world’s population means that they must renounce those culturally specific identities that does not conform with the model. The result of this process is a divide that is by now well known in contemporary cultural analysis. A conflict arises between a Western dominant that claims to represent the general interest – which may be coded in cultural terms (enlightenment, secularization, traditional humanist education), in political terms (democracy, parliamentarism, etc.) and/or economic terms (market economy, free trade, capitalism) – and a series of subordinate tendencies that are assumed to represent various minority interests and are often coded in ethnic, religious, cultural or national terms.

On the other hand we see a number of politicizing currents in contemporary literature, film, art and music. They call attention to experiences, histories, bodies, and identities that have long been homeless in the Western public sector, and they do so with an energy and innovative creativity that has put them at the center of the aesthetic discussion in the West. The work of Alfredo Jaar is an example of this tendency which, broadly speaking, might be labelled “postcolonial”. The “Documenta 11” exhibition in Kassel in 2002 presented a comprehensive inventory of this movement within the visual arts. Contemporary literature presents a good number of other examples, and here it suffices to list some of the recent Nobel laureates, such as Derek Walcott, V S Naipaul, Nadine Gordimer, Wole Soyinka, Toni Morrison and Gabriel Garcia Marquez. They differ greatly, to be sure. Yet, what they have in common is a desire to express stories and existential experience from the dark and repressed side of Western civilization.
It would appear, then, that the course of developments in journalism and aesthetic genres are tending in opposite directions. One might even say that the Arts are compensating for the “blind spots” of journalism.

How might we characterize the relationship between these two trends? The question is theoretical: what interpretive models help us understand the relation of journalism to aesthetics? The question is also practical and methodological: by comparing these simultaneous but contrary processes in the arts and journalism, respectively, we may further our understanding of both.

The interplay between different levels in the cultural superstructure is a central theme in classical Marxist theory. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Karl Kautsky and Franz Mehring both showed how literature and the arts in certain historical periods are politicized, in the sense that it becomes one of their main functions to channel information, ideas and experiences that are otherwise excluded from public cultural and political debate. For instance, there are societies in which direct or indirect censorship has prevented the media from carrying an open discussion and publishing opinions that are critical of the existing power. Such was the case in the Soviet Union (as in Russia under the czars), in France under absolutist rule, in Germany under the rule of despotic princes, but also under absolutist rule in Sweden around 1800. In these societies, prohibited opinions and knowledge were rechanneled to literature and the arts. The aesthetic form allowed the communication and discussion of banned themes and ideas in encrypted form. As a consequence, social-political discourse moved to the theater stage, to novels, and to the visual arts, in short, to aesthetic genres that could speak at once multivocally and equivocally, thereby evading – for the most part – the censors.

One should be cautious about drawing parallels between today’s conformism in journalism and the kind of thought control exercised in societies under totalitarian and absolutist rule. Yet, in much of contemporary journalism the forms of presentation, the modes of public address, and the verbal and narrative registers have become so constrained that they effectively prevent the expression of certain kinds of knowledge and experience. Most extreme in this regard is television journalism, where strict formats and limited air time often rule out background analysis and the exposition of causal explanation altogether. Such elements flee to public media that are at once more narrow and more generous: book-length reportage, journal essays, installation art, the novel, and documentary film — genres that traditionally have presupposed a will to aesthetic form and a mode of address or perspective that is subjective and personal.

The above-mentioned “Documenta 11” offered a veritable catalogue of such expressions. Chantal Akerman’s film and video installation, “From the Other Side”, treated the plight of migrants crossing the border between Mexico and the U.S. Fareed Armaly invited visitors to draw their own mental maps of Palestine. For the purposes of the exhibition Maria Eichhorn founded a public company, the sole purpose of which was to preserve the company’s equity without accumulating profit or interest; her “venture” demonstrated the nature of capitalism and the art market more poignantly than most business journalists are able to do. With his suite of documentary photos of commercial shipping Allan Sekula showed the infrastructure of the global market, the flows of goods from one part of the world to another. The Italian artists’ collective Multiplicity presented the results of investigative journalism in its best sense through a dramatization of an event that both media and authorities had suppressed. The day after Christmas 1996 a fishing boat sank between Malta and Sicily. All on board – 283 Pakistanis, Indians and Lankese – drowned, without anyone being held responsible, and even without any investigation of the disaster.
The themes these artists elaborate are roughly the same as the ones we encounter daily in our news media. They all have something to do with the globalization process and the conflicts and confusion that arise in its wake, particularly the mass migrations of people from poorer to wealthier regions of the world. What distinguishes artistic approaches to these themes from journalistic approaches is not mainly their subjective commitment, nor their eagerness to experiment with visual, cinematographic and verbal forms; above all, it is their sensitivity to suppressed aspects of ongoing political and cultural processes. The arts often render events, problems, and structures that cast Western society in a critical light, or even hold Western society responsible for preserving the privileges it enjoys, at the cost of the rest of the world.

Artist Felix Gonzales-Torres once derided heavy-handed politicizing tendencies of art. Slightly travestied, he phrased his question as follows: Do we really need an art gallery to find out what we can read in the paper or watch on CNN? The point of the art that I am discussing here, however, is that it gives us a sense of aspects of the political that we cannot read about in the newspaper or watch on the CNN.

It is not a given, that art should tackle such subjects, much less that it should constitute itself as a political or ethical tribunal. On the contrary, this is the role that traditionally has been assumed by journalism. That the arts increasingly tend to assume this role with both a sense of urgency and commitment and, what is more, with the kind of creativity that is strikingly absent in contemporary journalism testifies to the kind of role-switching that I am talking about. It is a shift within the ideological superstructure much like those Mehring and Kautsky analyzed in their time. In a situation where the forms and content of journalism have become standardized to the point of censorship, it has fallen upon the arts to inspire discussions of the future of society. This is why it is increasingly the task of the arts to give expression to “the political”, that is to say, the implicit preconditions and consequences of the political and economic policies that dominate in the world, whereas mainstream journalism increasingly serves “politics”; it is content to mirror the rituals of institutionalized power and to convey the various opinions that bear the “stamp of approval” of the dominating authorities. When journalism is reduced to little more than a mirror for princes, the arts assume the role of journalism in its original sense: a running chronicle that elucidates social events.

I suggested earlier that these shifts represent two sides of the globalization of culture. In the age of globalization we can identify three distinct tendencies in the cultural sector. First, American mass culture continues its triumphal tour across the globe – under the banners of Nike, McDonald’s, Walt Disney and Coca-Cola. Second, the “high culture” of the West is becoming part of elite lifestyles not only in Paris and Washington, but in Beijing and Buenos Aires, as well. From each and every metropole in the world there now emanates a sponsored noise of Pavarotti, Bach and Eric Satie, and in just about whatever city you visit you will find a major exhibit of Hieronymus Bosch, Russian icons, van Gogh or Andy Warhol. A growing number of artists and writers consciously cater to the tastes of the world’s upper classes. There is a journalistic equivalent of this kind of globalized culture in the press, most clearly articulated in papers like USA Today and International Herald Tribune – the former for the middle classes, the latter for the upper classes, but both tailored to suit all in their target group and not to furrow any brows.

Dominating these two tendencies are a handful of gigantic media groups: Disney, Time Warner, Viacom, Sony, Seagram, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, AT&T, General Electric and Bertelsmann. The tendencies lead us to the motor behind the globalization of culture: the establishment of universal equivalents, or “value-forms,” which make it
possible to judge and rank the “value” of different news stories, cultural products, works of art, knowledge, events, ethical behavior, and political systems, regardless of their cultural origin and contexts.

Let me explain this in more detail. Political values, ethical values, existential values, news values, aesthetic values, and human values were long culture-specific, bound to cultural origins and local traditions. They could not be measured on the yardsticks supplied by other cultures. Traditionally, the only value that could be exchanged without difficulty across cultural boundaries internationally was monetary value. Today, however, everything is subject to measure and judgment according to yardsticks that are alleged to have universal validity. This is not to say that the phenomena measured are reduced to monetary value, only that they are subjected to the same kind of logic that applies to the exchange of monetary values: immaterial fruits of human endeavor – education, news reporting, goodness, poetry, patriotic feeling, or anything else – are now increasingly valued in relation to a universal equivalent. The standardizations of all kinds of value effected by such universal equivalents is, in my view, the most appropriate analytical definition of cultural globalization.

Consider, for example, motion pictures, where the so-called Hollywood narrative has superseded alternative modes of cinematographic story-telling. A film is hardly recognized as a film (but is automatically smacked with an “art film” label) unless it follows the conventions of Hollywood. Or, consider news reporting, where over the past decade CNN has become a mirror and measure for news values worldwide. An event cannot become a “story” unless it conforms to the CNN mold. In the world of digital communication the Windows operating systems represent another strong factor of global equivalence. Nothing has emotive, aesthetic, cognitive, political or communicative value, nothing is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, good or evil, real or unreal until it has been processed by television or Microsoft systems. Theirs are the value forms that delimit our world-view, that present selected portions of the world to us, in ready-made frames. Yet another of these universal equating mechanisms is the English language, which has spread to the point that we now have a global lingua franca that artists, entertainers, politicians and scientists must have a command of if they and their work are to be taken seriously by the dominant institutions in their respective fields.

Out of the reactions to this standardization of elite and popular culture, a third tendency has emerged. It consists of all the local, ethnic or national movements having the aim to resist the globalization of culture. Every now and then, someone out in the periphery vandalizes a McDonald’s. French culturati express their outrage when the USA tries to force European governments to cease supporting European film production on the grounds that it gives European film-makers an unfair competitive advantage on the world market. In the USA, Latino and Asian students demand that curricula include their peoples’ history and traditions alongside those of Anglos, Blacks and Native Americans. The president of Malaysia accuses the USA of propagating an individualistic ideology with respect to human rights as a means of securing international dominance. I have yet to mention terrorism, the most desperate response of the periphery to the processes of centralization and globalization.

Face to face with the new, global norms, people – be they Persian or Québécois – are “discovering” that they have a cultural identity and that it is under threat and needs to be defended. They are returning to their cultural roots, ethnic origins, confessional values or blood kin, maintaining that their values cannot be uprooted from their cultural context and equivalized according to some universal standard.
All artistic, intellectual and journalistic work today is carried out in a field of tension between these three tendencies – standardized elite culture, commercialized mass culture, and local traditions of stubborn resistance. But most important is that all three are interwoven and simultaneously present in every country, every locality, every work of art, indeed, in every life. Yesterday, culture could be located on the map and defined as “domestic” or “foreign”, according to national frontiers. That is no longer possible. Anyone who tries to identify and define, say, Swedish or American culture has either to invoke some supposed national character – thereby verging on cultural racism – or else admit that every culture is subject to the forces of globalization, tugging at once in several different directions.

Therefore, I should like to postulate a fourth tendency, one that specifically deals with the conflicts and power relationships between the three poles in contemporary cultural life: global mass culture, the elite’s “culture of cultural events”, and miscellaneous, more or less nationalistic cultural projects. The most striking manifestation of this fourth tendency to date was, precisely, the “Documenta” exhibit in Kassel, which gathered a good number of intellectuals, writers, artists and institutions, all of whom operate in the interface between “domestic” and “foreign” and strive to express and give form to “the political”, that is to say, the very preconditions for and limits to participation in contemporary public spheres of politics and culture.

Many attempts have been made to define this zone, where cultural influences mix, giving rise to new cultural identities. Cultural theorist Homi Bhabha calls it “the third space”; Mexican anthropologist García Canclini speaks of “hybrid culture,” and artist Guillermo Gómez Peña of “border culture.” Other terms in currency are geoculture, transculture, postcolonial culture, interculture, multiculture and world culture. This zone is already present in most places. One might call it “the public sphere of in-betweenness,” a place where the contradictions and potentialities of globalization, the never-ending struggle over who should be included and who left out of “the international community,” are debated.

It should be noted that the culture of in-betweenness is no new phenomenon; it has always been there, although it has been described in many different terms. In 1907, for example, Otto Bauer, Marxist theorist and chairman of the Socialist Party in Austria, described what happens when an individual straddles different national cultures: “For the individual who is affected by the culture of two or more nations, whose character becomes equally strongly influenced by different cultures, does not simply unite the character traits of two nations but possesses a wholly new character. [The] mixture of cultural elements creates a new character.” That is why the child of many cultures is often greeted with mistrust, in times of strife even as a traitor, Bauer adds. Bauer himself lived through the last years of the Habsburg Empire, which encompassed numerous minority cultures without any dominating majority, and in which it was necessary to invent a model of humanness and citizenship that rose above the nationalist conflicts – “a wholly new character.”

The point of the notion of a “public sphere of in-betweenness” is that it rejects the distinction between center and periphery and all the polarities – culture and barbarism, “us” and “them”, civilization and savagery – that can be derived from it. What might be called a monotopic interpretation of the world is here replaced by a pluritopic interpretation, or what Edward Said referred to as a “contrapuntal interpretation,” that is sensitive to actions and texts that have broken away from, or been devastated by the dominant tradition. The pluritopic interpretation is rooted in thinking that does not refer to a
certain ground or a given tradition, but rather moves between different cultural horizons. Thus, it resists every attempt to assign any given tradition, event or place to any single truth, identity, origin, spirit or character. A pluritopic interpretation instead posits that every history and geographic place is a kaleidoscopic collection of interacting identities. It has no place for majorities or minorities, for Norwegian, Swedish, Nordic or foreign. All such categories are undone once we realize that every cultural identity is shot through by strands from numberless other places on the planet.

The fourth tendency arising out of the globalization of culture is apparent in the realm of aesthetics and in contemporary cultural theory. But not in journalism. Mainstream journalism and news reporting remain dependent on a worldview of the kind Sven Öste criticized. Events and people are measured and valued in relation to a presumed center, national or global, an allegedly objective vantage point, from which an allegedly impartial observer surveys and catalogues the course of humanity and the changes of the world.

Perhaps the demonstrated weakness of journalism when it comes to documenting the political processes of globalization is due to the fact that it is still bound to such an objectivist and positivist epistemology. Perhaps the key to the greater achievements of the arts in this regard is that their vantage point lies precisely in the intersection of the contradictory processes of globalization. Let me offer another example and make a new distinction that clarifies the difference.

The example is the so-called war on terrorism, more precisely its initial phase, the attack on the Talibans in Afghanistan. Most opinion leaders in Europe and North America started with the assumption that the war was a both justified and appropriate response. Mainstream Western journalism cast the war in a narrative reminiscent of a battle of Light versus Darkness. Intellectuals having roots in the Muslim world – like Naguib Mahfouz, Tahar Ben Jelloun, Abdelrahman Munif, Tariq Ali, Edward Said, Sherif Hetata and Khalid Duran – were, by contrast, convinced that the war would only worsen existing problems and create new ones.

How are we to explain the diametrical difference between the respective views of Western intellectuals and their Arab-Muslim colleagues? Before the war, both groups belonged to the same international league of secularized intellectuals who adhered to the same ideals of democracy, human rights and enlightenment values. After the war, both profess the same values. And yet they have been divided along precisely the cultural lines that both groups claim to have risen above.

It may be that the two groups read and interpreted the war in two distinctly different contexts. For the war on terrorism can be understood and explained against the background of several different narratives. One explanatory narrative is about the efforts of democracy and open societies to defend themselves against enemies that are not above murdering innocent people en masse. Another is about the most recent phase in the USA’s buttressing of the country’s imperial hegemony. A third concerns the ultimate consequences of globalization, and a fourth the dialectic between religious faith and secularization in the Muslim world. This multiplicity of perspectives is cause for thought. Which of the narratives that influences one’s interpretation of the war obviously has to do with one’s position in the field of tension of world politics. Whether one is Arab or European, for example.

Still, dominant opinion leaders and mainstream media in the West believe, and would have us believe, that their particular interpretation is the only one possible. When they ignore all the other possible contexts in which the war may be understood, they are turning a blind eye to the world around them. Literature historian Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht
sees this blindness as a case of “complexity reduction”. He considers the Western reaction – and, by extension, Western media coverage – typical of a modernity that has embraced what he calls a “subject culture”, \textit{Subjekts-Kultur}, that is, an attitude to the world in which the observer of world events is taken to be placeless, disembodied, omniscient, and impartial. “The world” is something the observer approaches with conceptual tools, not a place he or she lives in and is formed by. A precondition for this attitude or position is that the individual in question has attained a measure of wealth and security that shelters him or her from the material pressures of history; he or she is no longer immediately involved in history, but can view it \textit{von oben}. This attitude is so deeply imbued in the culture of modernity that even Western concepts of knowledge and morals are predicated on it; the world is here seen as an image, separate from the observer, or as a “world picture,” as Heidegger puts it.\textsuperscript{15} Western journalists, reporters and opinion leaders tend to assume this position of withdrawn superiority; indeed, the position is a prerequisite to being able to say anything about the world or the war on terrorism.

The elevation of this position to an absolute, Gumbrecht argues, is the reason why Western journalists and intellectuals are badly equipped to understand that less privileged places are still characterized not only by the “subject culture” of modernity, but also by what he calls a “culture of presence” (\textit{Präsenz-Kultur}), a state in which the individual conceives of himself as being bound to a specific body and a specific place – a presence. To such an individual, history is more than a twine of meanings or a flow of information. It is a physical force that intrudes upon the body and transforms one’s space of existence. To take an example: Gumbrecht notes that Muslims take offense to the stationing of American fighter planes near Mecca; their presence provokes frustration and rage. Meanwhile, leaders and spokespersons in the West seem altogether to lack the sensorium needed to comprehend how such geopolitical measures can be perceived as a humiliating act of encroachment.

Media coverage of world politics suffers from the same handicap. History is observed from the comfort of loge seats. The arts, however, inevitably relate to concrete human experience. Even Hegel noted that art is inalienable from sensory experience, to the representation of how life and society look, sound, feel, taste – even how they smell. Here we have yet another reason why art today is able to give us some idea of the political repercussions of globalization, far closer to reality than the general overviews provided by journalists and statisticians.

The contrast I am describing here could be summed up as the difference between experience and overview, where the arts remain true to their mission of representing concrete human experience – here, the experience of living in the “battle zones” of globalization – whereas journalism and the media provide “structure” and overview. The contrast between the two would appear to have been driven to an extreme these days. Cultural theorist Fredric Jameson has given the classical formulation of this problem, or double-bind: We have today, he writes, “a situation in which we can say that if individual experience is authentic, then it cannot be true; and that if a scientific or cognitive model of the same content is true, then it escapes individual experience”.\textsuperscript{16} By extension, Jameson’s reasoning would imply that artistic attempts to express authentic experiences of contemporary political events can never claim to be true, whereas journalistic attempts to tell the truth about reality seldom or never say anything about the authentic experiences which, ultimately, steer the course of history.

The dichotomy is drastic. As we all know, a good share of contemporary art and literature claim to reveal truths about hidden political and historical structures; at the same
time, the best journalism leans toward concrete human experience. Thus, the best work of both strive to achieve what Jameson calls a “cognitive mapping” of the world as totality: to make global processes accessible to our senses and our experience.17

Both make the effort, but it seems that the aesthetic genres are always one step ahead of the renditions of reality presented in mass media. Why is this? One might put it this way: Art, literature and film invent the forms of representation that are subsequently institutionalized and applied in journalism and the media. There are numerous interesting examples of how journalistic genres have borrowed from literature, art and film: nineteenth-century realism and naturalism in literature presage documentary reportage in the daily press; avant garde film developed editing techniques that subsequently became the norm in television; dialogic patterns developed in drama and philosophical novels have enriched the journalistic interview; photo journalism has borrowed from the iconography of painting; investigative reporting in both print and broadcast media applies the fluid narrative perspective developed in modernist novels.

The historiography of documentary film offers another illustrative example. American film historian Bill Nichols has recently published what many might call a “revisionist” history of the genre.18 His analysis is of general applicability to the question of the relationship between journalism and aesthetics. Film historians have long maintained that documentarism represents the essence of cinematography. Ever since 1895, when the Lumière brothers arranged the first public screening of moving pictures and an astounded audience could see moving pictures of workers leaving their factory and a train pulling into a station, film has been assumed to be directly related to authentic reality. All film is – by birth and definition – documentary, a kind of journalism. When in the 1920s “documentary film” was introduced as a concept, it was – as accepted historiography would have it – nothing new, but only a new name for what moving pictures always had been: documentations of reality. Thus, historians have invented a mythical ancestry for the documentary, Nichols comments. The documentary film is portrayed as a necessary consequence of the realism of film as a medium: it offers us a window on reality and the naked truth. In short, the documentary would appear to demonstrate the very essence of the reality-revealing function of journalism.

Nichols rejects this reasoning out of hand. The first films, he argues, were not at all received as documented reality, but as magical spectacles. And, if all film is essentially documentary, why did the genre not appear until 1928? If the accepted history holds, the genre should have appeared much earlier, Nichols reasons. Furthermore, documentary film is much more than a matter of recording reality. In addition to cinematographic techniques there are three additional elements: a particular narrative style, developed in early films of the genre; a social mission, a desire to inform and arouse the public that appeared first in the of the interwar period; and, finally, the montage techniques by which avant garde films of the 1920s achieved both defamiliarization and revelation of reality. Nichols is particularly interested in this third aspect and demonstrates how the documentary and, for that matter, all journalistic use of moving pictures are indebted to the film experiments of Walter Ruttman, Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, Man Ray and Luis Buñuel, that is to say the modernist avant garde.

So reasons Nichols, and I think the point is clear: A documentary genre that strives to fulfill all the journalistic criteria of truth and factuality has its origins in avant garde film-makers’ free experimentation with images and narratives. Why is this legacy so seldom acknowledged? Nichols’ answer is that documentary film would risk losing its credibility, were its true parentage to be known. One would then have to admit that the
way to true depictions of reality leads through aesthetic fiction, that documentary and journalistic truth is in large part a construction.

All journalism – like any representative genre or medium that makes claim to verifiable truth – tends to succumb to an ideological sclerosis. It turns into an instrument, the purpose of which is to confirm a given “world picture. Journalism can only avoid such a fate by learning from the arts, with their demonstrated ability to penetrate beyond stereotypes, hackneyed jargon and worn-out codes. In this way artistic experimentation with images and narrative structures inspires and refreshes journalistic representation of reality. Aesthetics would seem to be a vaccine that protects journalism from conformity and keeps it from degenerating into shallow, if perhaps entertaining, reproduction of the gestures of power.

We are currently in the midst of this vaccination program. Art, literature and film are increasingly politicized; they direct our attention to new zones of conflict and techniques of representation that no doubt will characterize the journalism of tomorrow. The process is necessary, not for the sake of the Arts or of journalism, but for the sake of society: democracy presumes the existence of media that represent reality impartially and in a credible fashion.

And, inasmuch as we are in the midst of the process, we should not be surprised if a good share of contemporary art seems to coincide with reportage and the documentary, while a good share of contemporary journalism seems to coincide with soaps, crime drama, action film or, as Timothy Garton Ash put it recently, “sheer fiction”.19

Notes


3. The distinction is based on a discussion among French political theorists of the relationship between “le politique” (politics) and “la politique” (the political). See Alain Badiou, Peut-on penser la politique (Paris: Seuil, 1985); Claude Lefort, “La question de la démocratie” in Le Retrait du politique: Travaux du Centre de Recherches Philosophiques sur le Politique (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1983), pages 71-88.


6. The project is described briefly in the exhibition catalogue, Documenta 11 — Platform 5: Exhibition (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002).


13. This, of course, is a generalization. As media researcher Elisabeth Eide, who has extensive knowledge of Afghanistan, has pointed out, a number of Western media, particularly in Norway and the rest of Scandinavia, have made great efforts to publish views on the war from the Muslim world. But these, I would say, are only the exceptions that prove the rule. That some media consider it important to include commentary and analysis from Afghans and others in the Muslim world is a welcome deviation from the norm, a norm that presumes that Western media can, on their own, give their readers and viewers an adequate and impartial interpretation of the world. But that these more progressive media have to make such efforts to include others’ voices demonstrates just how strong the norm is.

Translation: Charly Hultén
Comments on Stefan Jonsson’s presentation

HILDE ARNTSEN

Here, Stefan Jonsson delivers, as he usually does, knowledgeable, well-written essays and analyses, which provide the reader with new insights and material for further reflection. In this text, Jonsson deliberates on questions of key significance within cultural studies and media studies, and gratefully his frames of reference move beyond the strictly methodological and those of theoretical juggling for its own sake. In other words, it is as a broadminded essayist Stefan Jonsson writes his paper, not only as a practicing editor of the cultural affairs pages in one of Sweden’s most significant broadsheets. Jonsson, thus, has both an insider’s view on journalism and the benefit of an external view on the logics of the media in a time of globalisation. I have read his contribution with great interest, but also with increasing frustration on behalf of media studies. Although I share some of Jonsson’s views on the state of affairs, I am not quite sure whether I also share his pessimism. Further, I do not share his elitism. In order to comment on his intense paper, I have had to do exactly what Jonsson criticizes Western media for: I have found it necessary to make a selection based on my interests and from my particular point of view.

I would like to start my commentary on Jonsson’s paper by providing an example for the world outside Scandinavia and from the media in the age of globalisation. When Black secondary school youths in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, before the country’s plunge towards chaos, started in earnest and wanted to signal among themselves and to the world around them that they were progressive and modern, they were careful to speak in English with one another. Not only during school time, as English is after all the language of instruction in the country, but some of them spoke English even outside school. Provided they had access to a television set in working order, they chose to watch television series from the US or from Australia (which were imported cheaply by the state broadcaster); they tuned into the English language state radio broadcaster, which played mostly foreign music; and they certainly did not listen to the state radio focussing on the cultures and music of the majority population in general and the politics of the ruling party in particular.

These youngsters, popularly referred to as the “nose brigade” for their use of English and their apparent embracing of Western culture in general and Western popular cultures in particular, both illustrate the globalized media world and the status of languages
therein, as Stig Hjarvard discussed with examples from Denmark, and the problems inherent in global media and cultures, as Stefan Jonsson elaborates on in his paper. These youngsters gather the stuff of their dreams, as do many of us, from the media, among other places. The products of global popular culture are central as points of orientation. Journalism, however, is chiefly at the mercy of the government’s political regulations. The saying that ‘news equals propaganda’ is unfortunately a sad reality in Zimbabwe as it is in many other parts of the world. The global, on the other hand, might become a resource for those who have access to it, albeit in an uneven power relationship between the Zimbabwean youth and the global media products and their owners.

The youth from Harare fundamentally break with the image of Africans we in Scandinavia may easily get from the media reports of war and catastrophes in the so-called Third World, and through the silence around events and people not embraced by the Western media logic’s definition of newsworthiness. This is the starting point for Stefan Jonsson when he quotes the question “Why all these full-page spreads from Sydney?” When four casualties in a brushfire in Australia get more media coverage in Swedish news media than do ten thousand people who lost their lives in an earthquake in India, this is an illustration of news values and culturally sensitive priorities in practice. Unfortunately, the fact that a person from the West is worth more than one from the Third Word when represented in Western media output is manifested time and again. Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge showed this in their article on the structure of foreign news as early as 1965. Jonsson comments that globalization entails that the news reporting of Western media corporations appears as universal values. This is an established truth that fortunately must be partly modified. The Western media logic has admittedly become the norm in a great proportion of the world’s news media, but the manner in which the news is framed and in turn interpreted in various cultures around the world nonetheless leaves room for local variations. Thanks to the interpretive powers of the readers or audience which provide for considerable interpretive leeway, and certain attempts at providing news according to different criteria, the picture might be pessimistic, but not only so. The slantedness of the global news system to which Jonsson draws our attention, may on closer inspection be less globalizing and less standardized than the impressions we get from our position. To people in totalitarian regimes, national government restrictions on their lives and their media seem to hold more apparent threats. On the other hand, this should not make us close our eyes to the state of matters and comment in resignation that we are too small agents on the global actors’ great stage.

Jonsson discusses various developments within the field of cultural globalization. The first tendency he points to is the worldwide triumph of US mass cultures. The Harare youths may at first glance seem to confirm this tendency. They have seemingly adopted Western culture or more specifically certain parts thereof. Although they seem to be as familiar with parts of Western popular culture as are many Scandinavians, there is a fundamental difference. The youths in Harare adopt certain elements of Western popular culture and appropriate it. They do so knowing well that their social, political and cultural possibilities for changing their life accordingly are meagre. The dreams with which they engage in popular culture will remain dreams for the majority of them.

Jonsson’s second example is taken from the world of art and cartography, namely the art exhibition of Alfredo Jaar in Oslo, where the visitor is given a passport and a map case containing pictures of the culture’s and the world’s marginalized others. Jonsson argues that Alfredo Jaar opens the doors to the worlds of the marginalized others chiefly
by arguing that the visitor becomes aware that he or she does not see the others. This might well be correct, but we are still talking about the rest becoming available to people in the West. What about turning the perspective around? The image of the West in the Third World is not constructed only through media images of wars, catastrophes and conflict, but rather through the products of popular culture, the sweatshops of global capitalism, and the temptation of buying the West’s capital products sold in the Third World. The products are mixed with images of freedom, democracy and political double standards, and such dreams sell well. When the Danish arts festival “Images of Africa” in 1996 published the book *Images of the West*, they turned the gaze around: Instead of merely providing the Danes with alternative images of Africa, the festival published a collection of texts and images that attempt to show how the West is viewed from Africa. The book *Images of the West* is a reminder that the West is a composite concept and an invitation for the West to question its self-assumed position and reputation in the world. The question remains, however, whether art exhibitions such as that of Jaar, or the *Images of Africa* collection, contribute to a widening of vision within journalism. Jonsson argues that these two worlds are able to fruitfully expand one another, and that art compensates the “blinds spots” of journalism. In my opinion, such cross-fertilization must come from within journalistic practice itself, or from the media in general, such as through products of popular culture.

Jonsson presents the hypothesis that the “standardisation of mass media journalism and the politicisation of art is interdependent”. Many might agree that the global media logics are based on a White, male, Western and property-owning subject position. This subject position is suitable both to the implicit narrator and the implicit listener in the mass media geared to a global audience. But, is this not a bit too simple? Research has suggested that the so-called global appeal is overly emphasized, as different people in different cultures read different things into the same media text. We did perhaps not get wall-to-wall Dallas, but we did almost get wall-to-wall Big Brother and other programme formats that are bought and sold as commodities on the global market before being adapted to the main cultures in the markets in which they will be broadcast. Furthermore, there are formats developed in less mainstream cultures and subsequently exported. Let me merely mention telenovelas or Indian film production in so-called Bollywood. It may be a problem that Jonsson, to such a considerable extent, moves the potential to comment on the state of affairs from the mainstream media and over to the special-interest media for so-called narrowly defined interests. This is some of what I find problematic in Jonsson’s otherwise inspiring paper, and this constitutes one of the points on which I do not share his pessimism. Is popular culture a failure in such a way of thinking? There are, on the other hand, several examples of popular culture with liberating potential that Jonsson also could have noticed. He does not. Why? May I suggest that the aesthetics argument loses its potential when moved out of the realm of the special-interest media? Will the aesthetics aspect maintain its critical potential when not only purporting to fertilize journalism, but rather to influence popular culture?

Local, ethnic or national movements that offer resistance to the globalization processes of culture are also, in my opinion, central counter-forces. But it is important to caution that not all that is local is resistance, and that not all resistance is local.

The fourth tendency within globalization can, according to Jonsson, be found within the aesthetic field and within contemporary cultural theory. He argues, however, that this has not yet made its way into journalism, as people and events are there assessed according to the imagined centre. Aesthetics seem to be Jonsson’s answer to saving
journalism from unidirectionality, standardizing, and from repeating the gestures of those in power. This will, according to Jonsson, point to new conflict areas and content forms that will influence journalism to come. Today’s journalism, in Jonsson’s words, is equal to soap opera, crime drama, war films or pure fiction. Although I read Jonsson’s text with great interest, I sometimes wonder where he, with his considerable grasp of postcolonial theories, is keeping his knowledge of media in other parts of the world. Certain kinds of journalism, for instance in Zimbabwe’s government-controlled mass media, may be pure fiction, but that is, I will argue, a fiction that does not exist isolated in its own universe. Nor is it a fiction that moves from journalism to the art gallery. This is a kind of fiction that concurs with tear gas, lack of food, lack of money and appropriate money notes, and ill treatment because one bought the wrong newspaper.

Jonsson argues that it is politicized art that will constitute the counter-force to the global capital’s unidirection of journalism. This is an interesting point. The question remains whether these two processes are active within separate fields of action. Youth in Harare who watch American fictional television series seem not to care whether art comments on the shortcomings of the media to which they have access. Hence, Jonsson argues about the media in a very narrow sense of the word, and his arguments on journalism’s rendering of reality are limited in the global media flow. It is therefore rather problematic when he discusses the media as if they equal journalism, and the media as if they only exist as they do in the West. Journalism in the pocket of global capital is only one side of the coin.

The myth of global media’s so-called view from nowhere must be called a bluff once and for all. But it is also a myth, in my opinion, that journalism will be improved thanks to the influence of aesthetics and politicized art. It is not necessarily a bad thing that journalism seems to equal soap opera, crime drama or war films. What is key is having structures on which to hinge this kind of journalism. Pure fiction radically breaks with the ideal of journalism, but the idea that journalism is mirroring reality is a myth only journalists believe.

Last, but not least, I find it problematic that Jonsson refers to the globalization of the culture as if globalization is a homogeneous singular entity, despite its theoretical complexity and wide empirical focus.

**Summing up**

Jonsson sees aesthetics and art as counter-weights to tendencies of uni-directionality within the globalization processes. The problem, as I see it, is that these tendencies seem to operate under other kinds of premises, paradoxically primarily available first and foremost for those who may not necessarily need them: people who already are tuned into the multicultural diversity where various media and art styles interact and fruitfully influence one another. The people outside these inner circles are then left out once again.

Art, literature and film develop modes of presentation that are subsequently brought into journalism and the mass media, Jonsson argues. Popular cultures as independent agents are also a vital power source, and Jonsson seems to overlook the field of popular culture outside the capitalist popular culture between high culture (i.e. art, literature and film) and journalism. At the same time, the individual’s interpretive activities in dealing with popular cultures, art, literature or journalism are part of the ongoing global processes of change. They continue to have, on the other hand, creative and counter-weighing potentials.
Notes

2. Stig Hjarvard’s plenary paper at the Kristiansand conference.
The Globalization of Language

How the Media Contribute to the Spread of English and the Emergence of Medialects

STIG HJARVARD

When words have ceased to bear witness to what takes place in the Realm of the Living, we shun them – with the possible exception of the philologists, for they have always had a weakness for words as cadavers. Jeppe Aakjær (1916:118)

In the following analysis of the role of media in the metamorphosis of modern Danish I am particularly interested in the spread of English and the evolution of media-bound varieties of language. My first hypothesis is that the media both are vehicles of Anglo-Saxon culture and contribute to the anglicization of global culture (Hjarvard 2003a). The media are more than a neutral channel through which Anglo-American culture spreads; by virtue of their institutional structure and a strong dominance of English-speaking actors in the software industry in a broader sense (i.e., computers, television, music, etc.) they actively contribute to cementing the paramountcy of English over other languages.

The linguistic effects of the media are not limited to spreading English; the media themselves also give rise to new uses of the language. The media represent a material and social infrastructure for communication among people, and as a consequence, their characteristics quite naturally have an imprint on language. My second hypothesis is, therefore, that as human communication becomes mediatized (Hjarvard 2003b), media-bound varieties of language will arise. Whereas linguists have focused on linguistic traits relating to the user’s geographical origin (dialect) and sociological traits relating to class or degree of formal education (sociolects), any analysis of an increasingly mediated society’s use of language must also take into account the linguistic variants that arise out of specific media. These are what I have chosen to call medialects. Furthermore, there is an interplay between English and the medialects in that the media-specific varieties of language are strongly influenced by English.

Third, I posit that the linguistic effects of the media play a part in processes of social and cultural distinction in Danish society and that it is therefore not adequate to view these influences in national terms, as a question of Danish vs other languages. The question of English influences on Danish is often treated as though it were a choice between a pure danophone culture and a given foreign culture. Moreover, it is often
treated as a matter of taste and/or cultivation: English influences are often considered as a symptom of carelessness, as a bad habit that heightened linguistic sensitivity and discipline might cure. Although influences on the national linguistic culture do play a role, I should like to focus instead on the social and cultural aspects of the influences here. In extension of Bourdieu’s (1984, 1992) theory of different kinds of capital in different fields of society, I conceive of language as a field in which cultural and social conflicts are articulated. Linguistic prowess (e.g., fluency in one or more foreign languages or the ability to switch between a local dialect and the standard language as the situation demands) constitutes capital that the individual may use to attain social status, an identity and/or power in relation to others. In Bourdieu’s terminology, linguistic ability constitutes symbolic capital that may be converted to cultural capital (repute, social status, etc.) or economic capital (better-paid work, etc.) Thus, greater use of English in the media not only represents a foreign influence, but acts to reinforce or change social and cultural distinctions and power relationships within Danish society, as well.

English, the Language of Globalization

Over the past two or three decades, English has come to occupy a singular position among languages. Previously only one among several dominant European languages, on a par with French or Spanish, it is today a world language, the language people use whenever they wish to communicate with others outside their own linguistic community. English has become the lingua franca of the global network: where the TCP/IP protocol secures technical communication between computers via the internet, English is the "protocol" for oral and written communication across national frontiers.

As English has moved toward paramountcy, the status of the other principal languages has changed. Even though they are spoken by more people today than ever before, they have been demoted, degraded in relation to English. Today, French, Spanish, Arabic, German, Russian, etc., more or less have the status of regional languages, national languages that can be used beyond their national frontiers. But, they are losing their currency as the language of international communication, formal and informal: both in political and commercial contexts and in intercultural exchanges, as bridges between people who cross cultural frontiers or who like to enrich their lives with media products from abroad.

The different languages have also been affected by the challenge English poses, tending to a greater or lesser degree to absorb English words, pronunciation, word order, and so forth. At the same time, a growing number of languages and dialects are in danger of extinction. Linguists count approximately 6,800 different languages in the world today. The languages differ widely in terms of the number of people who use them. The eleven most widely used languages encompass nearly half the population of the planet. While not the most widely spoken language, English was spoken by about 341 million people as their first language in 1999. Roughly 500 million spoke English as their first or second language.

Some 417 languages are considered virtually extinct today; they are spoken by very few, elderly people. But many more languages have experienced decline in various respects (www.ethnologue.com). The trend is no new phenomenon, nor can it be attributed exclusively to the spread of English. In fact, the trend can be traced back centuries, during which time European imperialism over most of the planet contributed to the dominance of a handful of languages at the expense of a number of local languages and dia-

Linguistic homogenization is not only a consequence of global imperial domination; the process of *nation-building* has also contributed. Frequently, the creation of nation-states has involved the adoption of a single national language, whereupon education and cultural expressions in other dialects and languages within the national frontiers have ceased. Not infrequently, use of subordinate languages and dialects has been forbidden or subject to political sanctions. In a similar fashion, different dialects of the designated national language occupy different positions in a rank order, where one dialect is the prescribed norm (Milroy & Milroy 1999). Thus, globalization and the predominance of English at the expense of other languages is nothing new. It is rather a question of a radicalization and acceleration of a centuries-long trend, in which local varieties of language die out, and more universal varieties survive.

Some linguists and cultural historians speak of “linguistic genocide” and point accusing fingers at globalization. Rather than speaking of “extinction”, which connotes a natural and perhaps inevitable process, they use a term signifying “mass murder” to point out the societal and premeditated nature of the phenomenon. When languages die out, it is the consequence of the workings of specific institutions: “Among the principal perpetrators of this linguistic (and cultural) genocide are formal education and mass media, and behind them are economic and political actors on a macro-level” (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 2001:33).

Globalization has not, however, acted solely to homogenize language and promote use of English. We also find examples of heightened political activity to gain recognition of, and to generally promote regional languages like Scots Gaelic, Welsh, Catalan and Kurdish. Most of these movements have not identified their adversary as globalization per se (or, for that matter, English when used as an international lingua franca), but rather the dominant language of the dominant national culture, like, for example, Turkish in Turkey. In some instances – in Norway, for example – the defense of dialects has been incorporated in national linguistic policy. There, mainstream media, too, are engaged in the effort to preserve both parochial dialects and the synthetic, dialect-based national language, New Norwegian (Vestad 2003). The political struggle for recognition of local and regional languages is part of a greater striving for cultural identity and recognition, and against the hegemony of the majority culture(s) of the nation-state. Viewed in this perspective, national linguistic cultures may be said to be under attack from without and within, which is very much in keeping with globalization theorists’ characterization of the process as being at once globalizing and localizing.

**Danes Speak English – and Standard Danish**

English has influenced the Danish language, as it has many other languages, throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. The influence is noticeable in pronunciation, declensions and conjugations, as well as word order, but the most obvious influence is the number of new words having their roots in Anglo-American culture. In connection with a comprehensive inventory of new words in the Danish vocabulary in the period 1955-1998, Jarvad (1999:110) reports the following distribution in terms of the origin of the words:
Loans from languages other than English (e.g., tortilla) 5%
Names, words, phrases taken directly from English (e.g., death metal) 13%
Hybrids, with an English element (e.g., hårspray; hår = hair) 14%
Pseudo-English words (e.g., bigshopper) 2%
Conceptual loans from English (e.g., turbulens) 9%
Danish innovations (e.g., salgsbrev) 57%

As Jarvad points out, the categories may be combined and tallied in numerous ways, some of which support more or less alarming conclusions as to the influence of English. If we choose to stress how foreign words and phrases are “danified”, we find that only 13% of the new additions to the language are borrowed directly and intact from English, plus 5% from other languages. This means that 82% of all the new words in the Danish language are more or less Danish. If, however, we stress English influences of various kinds, we find that 38% of all the new words have an English connection. Irrespective of what we choose to emphasize, the influence of languages other than English is relatively weak.

The influence of English on the Danish language is only one facet of Anglo-Saxon influence. Today, increasingly, there are settings in Denmark in which English has supplanted Danish. Some large corporations having extensive operations and contacts abroad have introduced English as the company language; some fields of science, where Danish and/or several foreign languages were once used, have converted to English. Information technology, music and music publishing, and advertising are other branches where English is rapidly gaining ground, in some instances to the exclusion of Danish. Linguists characterize the situation as a “loss of domain”, and it is precisely losses of domain that worry some Danish researchers most. Danish as such will surely survive, but losses of domain may reduce Danish in terms of both extent and status. If Danish is on the ebb in key areas of life in Denmark – not least in fields having to do with new technologies and so-called growth sectors – its vitality and versatility may be at risk (Davidsen-Nielsen & Herslund 1999, Jarvad 1999).

If Danish is becoming more and more receptive to influences from English, it is at the same time becoming less receptive to local varieties of Danish. Danish dialects have receded steadily throughout the period of Denmark’s modernization, starting in the nineteenth century, and today we find hardly any true dialects left. Only among extremely aged Danes do we find usage that is specific to a given locality. In their place we find a handful of more or less diluted regional dialects like those spoken on the islands of Funen and Bornholm and in Southern Jutland. These, too, are in decline, however. Generally speaking, regional dialects are spoken mostly by elderly people and people with less formal education, whereas young people and more highly educated individuals tend to speak standard Danish (Lund 2001). Meanwhile, new linguistic varieties that are specific to uses of new media – chatrooms, text messages, e-mail etc. – have emerged. These are characterized by a mixture of formal and informal styles and new combinations of spoken and written forms (Crystal 2001).

Mass media are often singled out as the most important factors behind the increasing influence of English on Danish. Davidsen-Nielsen & Herslund (1999:11) speak of the influence of “the whole American Star Wars arsenal of audiovisual media,” and Preisler (1999a, 1999b) focuses on the influence of English in subcultures, where use of mediated cultural expressions like rock music and computer games mold fans’ and players’ identity. In a similar vein, Phillipson (1992:59) cites film, video and television as vehicles of
English linguistic imperialism. But few have specified the role the media play to any greater extent.

Generally, the frequency of English in media content is simply taken as a sort of index of the degree of influence without any further discussion of the role of the media in the process. Preisler (1999a, 1999b) has probed deepest into the relationship between English and Danish in conjunction with his study of mediated subcultures. He tends toward the view that the media themselves are not responsible for the influence. According to Preisler, the prime factors are to be found in overall changes in Danish culture. Danish society is undergoing a general Anglo-Americanization, and it is here we find the causes of linguistic influences. In Preisler’s view, the media mirror culture rather than create it.

But the issue of media influences on Danish hardly originated with the advent of globalization. Media have played a role in linguistic rivalries and power struggles for centuries, and when we consider linguistic influences in a historical perspective, it becomes clear that they are social and cultural phenomena and not simply a question of establishing a common national language with standardized diction. Standard Danish, the norm now challenged by English and miscellaneous medialects, is no natural or even impartial version of the Danish language; it is the dialect that emerged victorious out of a cultural and social power struggle. A historical perspective also reveals the roles foreign influences on Danish have played in the articulation of social and cultural hierarchies in the country. There have been periods when losses of domain to one or another foreign language were much more far-reaching than either the situation today or what is likely to obtain in the foreseeable future.

Thus, “standard Danish,” the language virtually all Danes speak today, is the product of a very long social and cultural process, the aim of which has been the establishment of a unified national culture. Standard Danish is the linguistic result of a nation-building project, whereby nation-state and society were to be forged into one, where state, people, culture and language were linked together through the construction of a common Danish identity. In the course of the process, elites had to relinquish their ties with other linguistic cultures, while commoners were made to sacrifice their local idiom. Standard Danish became the common denominator, the basis for the homogenization of Danish society within the framework of the welfare state. It is the language in which all Danes could feel at home in a modern, industrialized and urbanized Denmark.

Given globalization, the bond between nation-state and people is no longer fully so unequivocal. In an increasing number of contexts, “Danishness” is neither self-evident nor adequate as a framework for social interaction and identity-formation. Whether in the business world, in politics, or the Arts, Danishness is under stress. Danishness can no longer serve as the common denominator of state and society when both state and society have been globalized.

**Language by Class, Class by Language**

The Danish language has not always been the universal language in Denmark. For long periods, different classes and occupations spoke other languages. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the kingdom was ruled by Divine Right, class distinctions were not primarily marked by differences in the Danish one spoke. Foreign languages were used widely, particularly in the capital. German, the language of skilled craftsmen, was very important. Many craftsmen were immigrants from German-speaking territory, and German was more generally the language of the Crafts. Many Danish crafts-
men had learned German through travel and apprenticeships abroad. German was also the language of the military and remained the official language of command until 1773. Parts of the state administration and Court both wrote and spoke German, both Low and High varieties. Some Danish kings never wrote a word of Danish, expressing themselves in German instead. Starting in the mid-seventeenth century, French began to gain currency. Knowledge of French conferred prestige at Court and in the Arts. French was also the language of diplomacy throughout Western Europe. Correspondence between Danish emissaries abroad and the Ministry in Copenhagen was in French, as was correspondence addressed to foreign powers and their legations in the Danish capital. Latin was the language of the Church and Academia. Academic lectures were commonly held in Latin up to 1835 (Petersen, forthcoming).

The simultaneous currency of several languages in the capital mirrored both its diverse composition – not least the presence of a good number of immigrants from German-speaking areas – and the social and cultural orientations of the upper classes of the city, irrespective of their origins. French, German and Latin were languages of high status in different fields; Danish was a sign of low status, the language of the peasantry and the uneducated. In most cases members of the social and cultural elite were at least bilingual, so that members of the upper classes were able to use different languages, depending on factors in the social setting and situation, e.g., the purpose of their communication, what etiquette required, and the ability of the receiver to understand. That is to say, most members of the elite could speak at least a modicum of Danish, but for many it was an actively acquired second or third language. As Skautrup (1947) points out in his history of the Danish language, non-knowledge of Danish could confer status. He cites the report of the British emissary Molesworth who, in 1692, commented that he “had heard many a Dane in high positions boast of not knowing how to speak Danish!” (Skautrup 1947:305f).

The media of that day, principally print media, addressed elite audiences. Consequently, a good number of them were published in German, French or Latin. That many printers and newspaper publishers in Copenhagen were of German origin naturally contributed. In the late 1600s and the first half of the 1700s, the wealthy classes of Copenhagen read newspapers imported from Germany, Holland and France. In the 1670s, book printer Daniel Paulli, hailed as “the leading personality of Danish journalism of the seventeenth century” (Stolpe 1879:II,97), started newspaper publishing in Danish on a regular basis. Paulli was followed in the next century by, among others, Joachim Wielandt and Ernst Heinrich Berling. In all three cases, newspapers in Danish represented only a part of the titles they published. For the most part, they offered papers in three languages: German, French and Danish. Papers in the respective languages differed somewhat in content and character, inasmuch as they addressed different readerships. Jørgen Paulli published, for example, a German weekly and a Danish monthly. Press historian P M Stolpe offers a concise characterization of the relationships between language, content and readership:

The superficial difference, that the weekly paper is in German and the monthly is in Danish, grows out of this underlying difference; for it is in the order of things that the organ for affairs of state, war and commerce should be written in German in a country where German is the language of the Court and the Military, whereas the Danish language is the obvious choice in a paper whose principal purpose it is to convey domestic news and which, with an assortment of amusing miscellany and rudimentary excerpts from current politics, would satisfy the news interests of that part of the population that was not equipped to read German (Stolpe 1879:II,167).
Ernst Heinrich Berling, who began publishing *Københavnske Danske Post-Tidender* (*Berlingske Tidende* today) in 1749, also published *Kopenhagener Deutsche Post-Zeitungen* and *Gazette de Copenhague*. As noted earlier, French was a prestige-conferring language, spoken among the nobility; Berling’s *Gazette* addressed a well-to-do readership who wished to polish their language skills and keep abreast of French cultural life.

The publishing of newspapers in different languages in Denmark was motivated by a wish to crowd imported newspapers, read by the upper classes, off the domestic market. This goal was largely achieved over the span of the latter half of the 1700s in Copenhagen; in Jutland and Funen, however, foreign papers continued to dominate the markets the century out. Use of foreign languages among the upper classes was widespread, but not total, nor was the custom universally accepted. The comedies of Danish playwright Ludvig Holberg, which playfully ridiculed the snobbery of using Latin and French, bear witness to a danophone self-awareness among the Copenhagen bourgeoisie in the latter 1700s.

The use of foreign languages among the upper classes gradually declined over the course of the nineteenth century, in part due to a wave of nationalism and National Romanticism that swept over European politics and cultural life. Even if the National Romantic currents had wellled up outside Denmark’s borders, in Denmark they gave rise to a renewed orientation toward the Danish language and a sense of a special relationship between the Danish people and the nation. The media played a central role in this re-orientation toward the nation and things Danish. With the advance of the ideas of the Enlightenment and liberal ideals in the wake of the bourgeois revolutions of 1789 newspapers acquired a more important role than had been envisaged in the era of absolute monarchy. The press became an agent of publicity, first for the opposition to absolute rule and later the movement for democracy. As the press evolved into a pro-democratic medium, the various social classes and groups found it necessary to legitimate their policies and arouse “public opinion”, and this could only be done via the publicity the media offered. The democratization of political discourse, possible in great measure thanks to print media, in itself contributed to the danification of the discourse and a greater orientation toward, and use of the Danish language.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, we find that varieties of spoken Danish began to assume importance as indicators of social position. Above all, there arose a distinction between what the elite considered “cultivated parlance” – i.e., a virtually dialect-free and placeless national language spoken by the rather small upper class of Copenhagen and the natives of a few villages on the island of Sealand, near the capital – and other parochial dialects, which were considered rustic and vulgar (Skautrup 1953:213ff). As Danish gained status and currency even among the upper classes, foreign languages lost ground. French and German continued to exert considerable influence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, albeit no longer in daily use, but in the form of loan words.

**The Media as Instruments of Standardization**

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Danish language underwent a process of gradual homogenization through the steady advance of “standard Danish” at the expense of local and regional varieties. Today, standard Danish sets the norm, but standard Danish, too, continues to evolve. One of the strongest influences comes from the Copenhagen working-class vernacular, “low Copenhagenish”. As a con-
sequence, more elderly members of the population feel that Danish is being vulgarized: a once higher norm is sinking toward the vernacular.

One of the factors behind the demise of local dialects is greater mobility. For every new rail line, airport or highway built, a bouquet of local varieties withers and dies. Urbanization is another homogenizing factor. But material factors like these are not the only hoes at work in the garden. Social institutions like the schools and mass media, too, have done their part to weed out local varieties and to promote the national standard. Here, I should like briefly to outline the media’s roles in this regard.

Jeppe Aakjær was an unfailing champion of local dialects and an early critic of the verbal “uniforming of the Danish people” practiced by the schools, and by the press, which he decried as “a giant grindstone bearing down across the land”.

It hones and scours us all, not just in the man of the capital, whom it polishes so he gleams, but even the most remote peasant, sitting there between board and bench, spitting between his clogs as he reads his daily paper (Aakjær 1907:109)

[…] Alas, the country has been roughly treated, and now the turn seems to have come to the language, judging from the outcries in the press these days when we, pastoral writers – as they call us – come along, toting our books (Aakjær 1907:111).

Newspapers, both their form and their content, helped standardize the Danish language. Literature written in dialect was not well received by the critics, and the papers themselves clove to an urban patois, and, not least, the language of the capital. As a consequence, the people of the provinces gradually discarded their dialects. Or, as Aakjær so colorfully puts it: “And if the peasant himself has become a bit dry and calculating, so has his language, which now and again has the flavour of printer’s ink, fresh off the pages of Folketidenden” (Aakjær 1916: 122).

Homogenization means not only that dialects are suppressed, but also that the written language takes a step or two toward the vernacular and away from the academic. Viggo Hørup, who as Editor-in-chief of Politiken and political speaker was known to be a fierce and fearless critic of social wrongs, saw a danger in all too liberal use of foreign words and academic phraseology in newspaper copy. The purpose of the paper was to speak to the people, therefore, it should use the language people use. Thus, Viggo Hørup warned his writers: “Just as it is bad form to whisper when in company, it is bad form to exclude people from a discussion through the use of foreign, unfamiliar words. Anyone who wishes to be read by the public should take care not to leave his readers by the wayside through sheer snobbery or carelessness” (17th January 1883, as quoted in Skautrup 1968:180f).

As newspaper readership extended further among the ranks of the general public, the press became more and more of a “grindstone”, on the one hand culling dialects, on the other, bringing written Danish closer to the vernacular. Over the course of the 1900s, journalistic Danish grew more and more accessible to the common man. The commercial and amusement-oriented press of the capital around the turn of the century, followed by general interest news dailies, which in turn were followed by the sensational tabloids, each contributed to bring the written language more in line with the spoken, which also meant a bringing together of the Danish spoken by the elites and that spoken by the people.

Non-commercial public radio and television have also been significant homogenizing agents. Whereas the influence of print media could only be indirect, radio and television
could exert a direct influence on spoken Danish. As a consequence of the educational mandate of public broadcasting, particularly in its first decades, correct Danish, i.e., usage in keeping with the norm of standard Danish, was a prime feature of programming. The privilege of addressing the Danish public was entrusted to speakers who had been chosen for, among other things, their diction, that is, their ability to speak standard Danish. The role of radio in homogenizing Danish usage can hardly be exaggerated. With the advent of radio, Danes all over the country were able to listen to spoken messages from all over the country, but in practice, most of radio content was uttered by professionally trained speakers in Copenhagen. Usage in the broadcast media precipitated many a debate as to the correctness of diction and grammar on the air waves; time and again the media found themselves under attack.

The following general comment on the role of the language used in radio newscasts gives an indication of public expectations in this regard:

The radio news clearly has a great – not to say enormous! – potential to come to the aid of our native tongue, and that would be no little service, were it to do so... A single radio news editor-journalist puts the entire transmission together, that is, reads it aloud, and thus he is in a much better position to correct grammatical errors, and it is of utmost importance to the language and to public edification that he do that. The news reader has in his hand the mighty power to influence hundreds of thousands of Danes – and with it a not insignificant responsibility (Kolding Avis, 11 April 1930, quoted in Christiansen et al. 1950:408f).

Both the telephone and the cinema have contributed to the homogenization of the Danish language, as well. Telephones, like radio, put Danes on speaking terms, no matter the distance between them. To carry on a conversation from one end of the country to the other meant that the parties had to strive to find a mutually functional idiom. In the case of films, standard Danish predominated (Brink 2003). This was not so much the result of a selection on the basis of the individual’s usage, as in the case of radio announcers, but more a consequence of the fact that the actors were professionals who had learned standard Danish in drama school and only now and then let a hint of their native dialects be heard. In films from the ‘forties, ‘fifties and ‘sixties even children, farmers and servants speak astonishingly correct Danish; dialects are spoken only by the elderly, by bumpkins and buffoons, or by gangsters in the Copenhagen underworld.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, we note a change in attitude regarding the language spoken in mass media. Dialects have not necessarily assumed greater prominence, but there is generally a much greater tolerance of the vernacular, of everyday language, not least of expressions once branded as vulgar. The most recent broadcasting legislation and guidelines make explicit reference to the duties of radio and television with regard to the Danish language. Today, there is a greater general emphasis on cultural diversity, which radio and television should mirror. This includes linguistic variants, so that dialects and the various accents of recent immigrants to Denmark should be represented. Such ambitions are also clearly stated in Danmarks Radio’s policy on language.

Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that there are not awfully many dialects left. It is truly ironic that the very media which, during most of the past century, actively worked to standardize the Danish language, to the exclusion of local variants, are now charged to resurrect them. More realistically it is a question not of re-creating the diversity of Danish once spoken, but rather of securing the dialects a place in our collective
memory of “days of auld lang syne”. For, Moving Day is here: our dialects are leaving the realm of living language, life that may be boisterous, harsh, intimate or loving, for the rest-home serenity of institutional sound archives.

Even if the overall trend is as it is, now and again one or another dialect finds itself in the limelight. Not because we are paying our last respects, nor is it the critical attention dialects used to get for their various idiosyncrasies. No, today, dialects attract interest because they are kitsch. They have such low status and are considered in such “bad taste” that they have become “hip” and good-natured fun. Consider, for example, an advertising campaign for multinational Sonofon in 2001: The characters in a series of TV spots, “Polle from Snave”, are from the island of Funen. Polle and his friends gained “cult” status because they are vulgar, dumb, lazy – and proud of it. In short, they are low status, and one of the principal signals of their low status is their broad Funish dialect. The banter that issued from their mouths leaves no doubt of their yokeldom. In the campaign, Sonofon’s customers were given the opportunity to make the language their own by downloading greetings, some of them fairly outrageous, recorded by Polle & Co., to their cell phones. It is an odd twist that a transnational company like Sonofon should choose the yokel Polle and his friends, who sound more like their grandparents’ generation, to attract young consumers to a new, global lifestyle phenomenon, viz., mobile telephony. It is a case of using low-status “old-timer” bait – dialect-as-kitsch – to market a new medium and a new language that afford new possibilities to signal high status.

Another instance of dialect-as-kitsch on television is a Christmas feuilleton (originally aired in 1992 on nationally distributed TV2, but repeated in 2001) that starred De Nattergales, a comedy trio from Jutland. The serial, under the Anglo-Danish title, The Julekalender, revolves around the comical communication problems that arise in the meeting of a rural couple, potato-growers, from Jutland, a fellow called Benny from Copenhagen, and Christmas elves, who speak a kind of English, highly seasoned with Danish words and phrases. The Julekalender poke fun at some Danes’ Malaprop penchant for dropping English words, but what made it really funny were the characters’ raving renditions of a Jutland dialect and the Copenhagen vernacular. The series put the Jutlandic dialect in vogue nationwide, but only as kitsch, as a sort of “exception that proves the rule” – “the rule”, of course, being standard Danish. Dialects cannot be taken seriously; they are used with a wink or, as one might say, even in Danish: “tongue in cheek”.

Continuity in Linguistic Hierarchies
When asked about dialects, Danes express favourable opinions of them. Most find them quaint and pleasant-to-the-ear; it would be a pity if they died out (Maegaard 2002). But if we instead consider Danes’ perceptions of people who speak dialects, the picture changes. We find that there is a definite rank-order among the varieties of spoken Danish: after standard Danish come the dialects of Funen and Jutland, whereas the dialects of rural Sjælland and the Copenhagen vernacular come in last place. The reasons given for this ranking are generally put in terms of aesthetics: Funish sounds better, it is more melodious, whereas the Copenhagen vernacular sounds mean and hard, even vulgar.

But these aesthetic characterizations actually reflect respondents’ perceptions of a social hierarchy. Estimations of a given dialect involve an estimation of those who speak it. Ladegaard (2002) has examined how different pronunciations of Danish are linked with assumptions about the speaker’s personality traits, character and social competence. Those who have a Funish accent are commonly assumed to be friendly and humoristic,
but not particularly intelligent or well-educated. Similarly, people who have a Jutlandic accent are considered reliable, but not particularly shrewd.

Lowest on the social ranking is the Copenhagen vernacular; it is not associated with either favourable human traits or social competence. The only dimension it scores high on is “self-confidence” – which shows that the traditional stereotype of the shrewd, but culturally benighted Copenhagen “city slicker” is still going strong. The upper-class Copenhagen accent, common to the northern suburbs of the capital is associated with considerable professional competence, but not much in the way of “friendliness”. In other words, people with that accent may be capable and clever, but they are not awfully pleasant. Interestingly, standard Danish appears to stand over and above this fundamental contradiction between social competence and friendliness; speakers of standard Danish are perceived to be well-educated, and they inspire confidence. In other words, standard Danish is a thoroughly agreeable norm; it casts no shadow on those who speak it. Ladegaard (2002) conducted his study in the early ‘nineties, but a recent study by Maegaard (2002) among young people in southern Jutland confirms the pattern and also shows how standard Danish signals a modern outlook. “The more [of the dialect] you speak, the more you sound like a hayseed,” said a student at Tønder Gymnasium in Maegaard’s survey. And, it should be noted, she was a native of the region, not an outsider; she is rejecting the language of her place and people. Speaking standard Danish is better in two ways: it sounds better, and it boosts one’s identity.

In his study of attitudes among the Danes toward English as a language Preisler (1999a) finds overwhelmingly positive valuations of the language in both its British and North American variants. By and large, Danes consider English important as a world language, as a vehicle for their contacts with the rest of the world, and an agent that broadens their cultural horizons. There is little support for the notion that the presence of English in everyday life in Denmark might pose a threat to Danish. Nearly three Danes in four (73%) disagree, either somewhat or strongly, with the proposition that English is a threat to the Danish language, and fully 80 per cent disagree, somewhat or strongly, with the proposition that English threatens Danish culture. Only 8 per cent of Preisler’s respondents expressed wholehearted agreement with the proposition that English poses a threat to Danish (Preisler 1999a:68).

Danish views on the English language exhibit some variation, however, particularly according to respondents’ age and level of formal education. Generally speaking, younger, better educated Danes are more accepting of use of English in everyday life, whereas the elder generation with less formal education and less contact with working life tend to be more skeptical. The respondents’ language abilities play in here; the better one’s command of English, the more positive one’s attitude. Preisler (1999a) points out that “functional illiteracy” in English is beginning to be perceived as a handicap in some quarters as English becomes increasingly prevalent. That is to say, Danes who do not know English more frequently encounter practical difficulties in daily life, including their use of mass media, and consequently find their non-knowledge a disability. Preisler (1999a) calculates that up to 20 per cent of the population may experience such frustration.

Interestingly, the groups who are most accepting of English and who have fewer problems with the presence of English in their daily lives are also those who speak dialects least. By the same token, it is among those who speak dialects most, viz., the elderly and less educated (Lund 2001), that we find least acceptance of English and more frustration due to the intrusion of English into their daily lives. This suggests that there is a sort of continuum, a progression from dialect to standard Danish, and on to English.
Older, less educated Danes are less willing to abandon their dialects for standard Danish, and they are correspondingly less positively disposed toward the English language. Younger and well educated Danes are more willing to switch over to both standard Danish and English. Their orientation toward English may in a sense be seen as an extension of the choice of standard Danish over the local dialect.

Thus, in a sense English may be seen to extend the social hierarchy articulated in the relationship between standard Danish and the dialects. With the demise of the dialects an older, Early Modern linguistic hierarchy dissolved in the standardized national language, and in its place arises a new system of stratification based on the lingua franca of High Modernity, English. The contest between dialects and standard Danish, which included the conflicts between town and country, between agrarian production and its lifestyle and industrial production and urban living, articulated the social hierarchies of the industrial revolution. The contest between standard Danish and English influence articulates new axes of conflict belonging to the “network society,” the economic and cultural premium attached to mobility and interaction across national frontiers (Bauman 1998, Castells 1996) among them.

**English in the Media**

In the following we shall consider the use of English in the media and examine more closely the extent and character of English influences as well as when they began to make an impact in a serious fashion. Before going any further, it should be made clear that Danish predominates in most Danish media; it is used much more than any other language. Danish is totally dominant in newspapers, radio and magazines, it also predominates in cinema film and television, particularly in prime time on the major public service channels. Much of television output and a majority of cinema titles are of Anglo-American origin, however, and even if the content is “danified” via subtitles and dubbing (for very young audiences), these translations often bear traces of English (Gottlieb 2002, 2003). Some media were anglicized quite early on; in popular music and the recording industry, for example, we may speak of a “loss of domain” for the Danish language. Today, English is the norm for lyrics and song titles, and it is frequently used in the technical and commercial areas of the recording industry, as well. English has become the rule in the music industry, indeed, to the extent that it has become something of a “statement” to choose to produce a CD with the lyrics in Danish.

The World Wide Web, “www”, is another realm in which English predominates. A tally of the languages used on the web in 2000 found that 68.4 per cent of all websites were in English. English, the most frequent language, was followed by Japanese, German and Chinese (http://global-reach.biz/globstats). This, of course, affords no more than a rough estimate and should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt. But, seen in relation to the fact that only 8.3 per cent of the people on the globe speak English as their native or second language, the overrepresentation of English – and, by the same token, the relative lack of linguistic diversity – on the web is quite striking. The skew may be attributed in part to the fact that the “www” is still much more prevalent in the English-speaking parts of the world, and we can expect that the number of websites in languages other than English on the web will grow as the web becomes more accessible in other linguistic cultures. In 1997, a similar inventory found that 82.3 per cent of all websites were in English, which lends some support to the assumption. In the space of only a few years other languages than English have taken their places on the web. Still, however, there is little doubt that English will continue
to be the global lingua franca on the World Wide Web. Other languages will be used “locally”, among people within the linguistic culture, whereas English will be used by most of us whenever we cross linguistic frontiers. Thus, we find that the vast majority of bilingual websites are in the “local” language, plus “global” English.

Returning to Danish media, we find the influence of English in many places, even in media where Danish still predominates. In these contexts English has gained currency largely as a signal of a more attractive lifestyle and identity. The English language articulates a high ranking on various social hierarchies and is therefore effective in marketing and advertising. By way of illustration, let us take a closer look at some situations where English is used for marketing purposes. We find, for example, English in the titles of many films and computer games and in advertising for popular magazines. Inasmuch as the title of a film or computer game is believed to be an important factor in consumers’ decision to buy, growing use of English must be assumed to reflect higher status ascribed to the language per se.

The use of English in film titles shows an unequivocal trend: Whereas most foreign films were once given Danish titles, today only about half are re-named (Figure 1). In the ‘eighties and into the early ‘nineties, the share of translated titles was about 80 per cent, but in the mid-nineties policy changed. We should also note that use of other languages than English in film titles remains rare – which has to do with the fact that the great majority of foreign films that play Danish cinemas are American.

In the case of computer games, it is not meaningful to look for changes over time inasmuch as computer games have only become common in Danish households in the past decade. As for the titles, foreign languages are very common. As indicated in Figure 2, no less than 84 per cent of the computer games on the Danish market have English titles. Of the computer games having Danish titles, the lion’s share are games intended for young children. In these cases, the games themselves are in Danish, as well, since the children have not learned English, nor can they read. In most of the games intended for older consumers, not only the titles, but the games themselves are in English. That is, they presume that the player can read and understand English, and often on a high level of proficiency. Thus, alongside popular music, computer games are an anglophone domain.

Now, to consider the use of English in magazine advertising. In order to gain something of an overview, we selected four titles having contrasting readership profiles in terms of gender, age, education, and income. Familie Journalen is read primarily by middle-aged and older women in low-income groups. (Earlier on, the magazine had a somewhat higher-status appeal.) Alt for Damerne is a women’s magazine that appeals to younger, better-educated women than Familie Journalen; Vi Unge addresses young people; Euroman is read by younger men in above-average income brackets.

When we look at the use of English in advertising in Familie Journalen (Figure 3), we find little change over the years. At no point over the past thirty years has English been used to any greater extent. If anything, English is used less today than it was some years ago. There is hardly any advertisement in which English dominates in Familie Journalen.

We find a different trend in Alt for Damerne (Figure 4). Here, the frequency of English in advertisements in 1970 was about the same as that in Familie Journalen. That has changed. Use of English has increased markedly since the ‘nineties, and in 2001 more than half the advertisements contain English expressions. Starting in the ‘nineties, we also find a steady growth in the number of chiefly English-language advertisements. Other foreign languages, it should be noted, are extremely scarce.
**Figure 1.** *Use of Foreign Languages in the Titles of Imported Films (per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Danish title</th>
<th>English title</th>
<th>Other languages</th>
<th>Unidentified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Base: Total samples of imported feature films in cinema distribution in Denmark*

**Figure 2.** *Language of Computer Games on the Danish Market in 2001 (per cent)*

- English
- Danish
- Unidentified

*Base: The 261 computer games released onto the Danish market in 2001 according to data supplied by distributors (CMN Group, Vision Park, Nordic Softsales, K. E. Mathiassen (K.E. Media), UbiSoft, Infogrames Nordic and Boston Distribution. Language of games as specified by the distributors.***

**Figure 3.** *Language in Advertisements: Familie Journalen (per cent)*

- Includes some foreign word or expression
- Primarily or entirely in a foreign language
- In Danish only

*Note: The material analyzed comprises all advertisements, one-quarter page or larger, in 12 randomly selected issues of each year.*
The young people’s magazine *Vi Unge* shows a trend similar to that of *Alt for Damerne*. The chief difference is that even as early as 1970, *Vi Unge* showed a slightly more frequent use of English in advertisements, and observations in 1995 and 2001 indicate that the frequency has continued to rise (Figure 5). Thus, generally speaking, *Vi Unge* appears to be even more accepting of the English language than *Alt for Damerne*.

*Euroman*, a lifestyle magazine, is new; there is no longitudinal trend to speak of. As the title suggests, *Euroman* addresses readers (male) who see themselves as “Europeans”. This international orientation is clearly reflected in the advertising the magazine carries. Here we find much more frequent use of English expressions. In 2001, only 16.5 per cent of the advertisements in Euroman had a strictly Danish text. 31.5 per cent contained some element of another language, in by far the most cases English; 52 per cent of the advertisements were primarily or wholly in English (Figure 6).
When we compare the four titles, we find distinct differences between them as to the degree of English influence in the advertising they carry (Figure 7). Familie Journalen and Euroman constitute the poles of a continuum in this regard. Alt for Damerne and ViUnge are intermediate in the frequency of English – more moderate than Euroman, but closer to Euroman than to Familie Journalen. If we take these differences as an index of the status English has among the titles’ respective readerships, we find a pattern: English enjoys high status among the young, well-educated and well-paid labor force, whereas Danish suffices in all respects in communication with older and less highly educated Danes. Modern lifestyles, of which English has become an integral part and “insignia”, remain largely outside the pale of Familie Journalen’s readers’ daily lives. Not only are these women out of touch with modern lifestyles, but as a consequence of

**Figure 6. Language in Advertisements: Euroman (per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Type</th>
<th>Familie Journalen</th>
<th>Alt for Damerne</th>
<th>Vi Unge</th>
<th>Euroman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Danish only</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes some foreign word or expression</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily or entirely in a foreign language</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The material analyzed comprises all advertisements, one-quarter page or larger, in 12 randomly selected issues of each year.

**Figure 7. Languages in Magazine Advertisements: 4 titles in 2001 (per cent)**

When we compare the four titles, we find distinct differences between them as to the degree of English influence in the advertising they carry (Figure 7). Familie Journalen and Euroman constitute the poles of a continuum in this regard. Alt for Damerne and Vi Unge are intermediate in the frequency of English – more moderate than Euroman, but closer to Euroman than to Familie Journalen. If we take these differences as an index of the status English has among the titles’ respective readerships, we find a pattern: English enjoys high status among the young, well-educated and well-paid labor force, whereas Danish suffices in all respects in communication with older and less highly educated Danes. Modern lifestyles, of which English has become an integral part and “insignia”, remain largely outside the pale of Familie Journalen’s readers’ daily lives. Not only are these women out of touch with modern lifestyles, but as a consequence of
deliberate choices on the part of the advertising industry to “sell” lifestyle to specific target groups, they are also barred from them.

**Media in the Language**

Preisler (1999a, 1999b) argues that the influence of the English language should be seen as a result of a broader Anglo-Americanization of the Danish culture and society. If we understand Preisler to mean that linguistic influence should always be considered in a broader social and cultural context in order to understand popular acceptance and use of the language, his argument is convincing. But Preisler goes further:

> Therefore, the language may be seen as a symptom of the cultural trend. /.../ If anyone is worried about the Danish language, it is not the language itself – the symptom – they should try to do something about, but rather the cultural developments that are the cause of the change in the language – that is to say in essence, the overall Anglo-Americanization of Danish society (Preisler 1999b:62; original emphasis).

Viewed in this light, the increasing frequency of English in Danish media content is but a symptom of a societal and cultural reality; it is not in itself a cause. Or, as Preisler puts it: “When the media of the dominant culture use young people’s language to reach them, this is primarily a case of youth influencing the media, not the other way around” (Preisler 1999a:233; original emphasis).

This way of looking at things seems to me to be unnecessarily mechanistic, and it makes it difficult to explain, to identify the factors behind the change in attitudes toward Anglo-American culture. It is as though overall cultural change is put before influences on the individual level, the result before the cause. To my way of thinking, the broader Anglo-Americanization of Danish culture has to be seen as the product of the influences any number of concrete social actors – mass media among them – have exerted. Thus, the media actively contribute to changes in the structure, spread and status of languages; hardly alone, of course, but among many other actors. Out of the sum of all these influences a broader linguistic influence emerges, along with other influences bearing such labels as “anglicization”, “Americanization” and so forth.

Preisler (1999a, 1999b), too, offers a model for how language is influenced in that he describes the influence of English on Danish as coming both from above and from below. Influence “from above” is exerted by virtue of the status English is accorded in official and institutionalized quarters, i.e., education, business, international politics and diplomacy, etc. Influence “from below” arises out of the status English has in various popular subcultures such as heavy metal music and hip hop. English is both the language of sta-
tus and a source of identity and meaning for individual adherents to the subculture. Subcultures serve as Trojan horses for the English language; influences from subcultures filter slowly but surely upwards and into mainstream usage. As English exerts influence from both above and below, mainstream culture is subtly, yet inexorably changed.

It seems reasonable enough to recognize the importance of, on the one hand, the official culture that is cultivated in the schools, etc., – that is to say, the sphere Habermas (1987) assigns to “the system” – and, on the other hand, the lesser subcultures, which Habermas (1987) considers a (small) part of the “lifeworld”. To my way of thinking, however, the importance of subcultures seems somewhat exaggerated, and – more crucially – there is no specification of either the interaction between Danish and Anglo-American culture or any understanding of the internal dynamics of dominant cultures. Preisler envisages the dominant Danish culture as a passive victim of influences from above and below, not as an active field having a developmental dynamics of its own.

Specific subcultures can most assuredly over extended spans of time play a role that far exceeds the size or substantive significance of the subculture in question, but pointing to influences exerted by subcultures hardly strikes me as an adequate explanation of changes in the Danish culture’s relationship with English. If we consider the influence of English in broad popular culture, e.g., cinema film, television and advertising, to which the vast majority of Danes are exposed, it seems more likely that these media are directly influenced by the central role Anglo-American culture plays in the media industry – in terms of economics, production format and stylistics, genre, concept development and so forth. The international success of Danish serial fiction in television, such as Nicolaj and Julie and Unit One, has been attributed to the writers’ and producers’ assimilation of the dramaturgy and production methods that predominate in American television fiction (Skovmark & Christiansen 2003).

In other words, broad, mainstream Danish culture has been directly influenced by Anglo-American mainstream culture. When Danish mainstream media make ever greater use of English material when they address young audiences, it is not necessarily an adaptation to the linguistic codes young people develop within subcultures like heavy metal, but equally much an adaptation to the cultural experience and preferences they have developed through their use of mainstream Danish media, through watching series like Beverly Hills and pop music on MTV. Thus, it is a question of interaction, of mutual influences: the media speak young people’s language, yes, but increasingly, young people speak the language of the media. To extend Preisler’s metaphor, I propose that in addition to influences from above and from below, there occurs a significant lateral – or frontal, if you will – influence. English exerts a massive influence on Danish because it is used in the schools and in business, in specific subcultures, and in mainstream popular culture.

**Medialects**

Media influence the Danish language in several ways. In addition to overall anglicization, there are usages that are specific to activities and situations where different media are involved. These media-specific usages, *medialects*, are a consequence of the circumstance that a steadily growing share of human communication takes place via media. New media are constantly appearing on the scene, and they influence all kinds of communication, from the strictly private to the totally public: cell-phones, text messages, e-mail, chatrooms, and
so forth. Media are increasingly present in the language as an infrastructure, through which we communicate with one another. This observation raises at least two points that have bearing on the influence English exerts. First, English is the linguistic vehicle for meta-communication about mediated communication. Second, the increasing mediatization of communication affords considerable leeway for linguistic innovation and creativity. While the media contribute to a narrowing of the spectrum of foreign languages to English, they also provide the preconditions for linguistic differentiation and innovation.

Hutchby (2001) provides a theoretical vantage point for an understanding of how media serve as structuring forces with regard to language. His approach to the ways media technology affects the structure and content of conversations is inspired by the ecological perception psychology of J J Gibson and his concept of “affordances”. By affordances Gibson means the options that a given material object offers or affords different actors. The leaves of a plant may afford one animal shade and shelter; to another they make a good meal. But the shape and character of the leaves also limit the options available to each. In a similar fashion a given communicative appliance will invite multiple uses within the range of what its material features permit. These options may be more or less dependent on the concrete situation and the specific actors and their intentions; that is to say, the technology is open to the user’s interpretation and intent. In short, the technology represents a material reality, the features of which do not allow all kinds of communicative interaction with the user, but both define a set of more or less prescribed uses and give structure to the communication they make possible. The communicative affordances of any given technology at once facilitate, limit and structure the interaction. Hutchby (2001) goes on to demonstrate and analyze how a range of media, from the telephone to chatrooms on the net, intrude on and structure the user’s use of language: the taking of turns, linguistic markers of time, space and actors, sentence structure, and so forth.

As new forms of mediated communication continue to arise, a meta-language attached to each medium develops that users of the medium use to steer the conduct of the communication. It may consist of technical terms that describe specific choices of operating systems, web addresses, browser types, etc.; verbs and nouns that denote actions and situations that are part of the communication; use of abbreviations that arise because of the verbal limitations of the medium, and, finally, popular expressions/slang for the activity itself, e.g., to text, to chat, to mail, etc. Inasmuch as nearly all new media in the twentieth century were developed and first launched in Anglo-American settings, and since the software industry, too, is dominated by Anglo-American companies, these meta-languages generally have English roots. In time, domestic equivalents may develop. In many countries, however, only some of the words will be translated; in Denmark translations are few and far between. Thus, every new medium has been and will likely continue to be accompanied by a wave or ripple of English influence. English has become the meta-language that enables the conduct of communication.

At the same time, new media constitute a material resource for new forms of communication, and thanks to them we can note a good deal of linguistic innovation and creativity in connection with their emergence. Crystal (2001) discusses the influence of the internet on usage. Congruent with Hutchby (2001), he shows how new usage is generated in different media of communication. Thus, we cannot speak of a single new use of language on the internet, but rather different usages, depending on whether we are talking about, for example, e-mail, online chatting or offline chatting. This is in agreement with analyses performed by Rasmussen (2002, 2003) and Audon and Poulsen (2001),
which show how specific material features of SMS and chat technology, respectively, and the cultural contexts in which the media use takes place exert decisive influences on the language used. Even though there are differences, there are also some characteristics that are common to all uses of the internet. The most salient of these is the tendency to mix the conventions of written and oral forms of expression. According to Crystal (2001) it is not only a question of a new mixture of the conventions of writing and speech, but, in linguistic terms, “a genuine ‘third medium’” that is best described by the formula: “speech + writing + electronically mediated properties” (Crystal 2001:48).

Another principal linguistic characteristic that is common to media old and new is the change in the relationship between formal and informal forms of expression. This is not to say that the media simply allow less and less formality; rather, new styles of informal expression are born, which contribute to a successive differentiation of styles of expression, both formal and informal:

> There is no indication, in any of the areas I have examined, of Netspeak replacing or threatening already existing varieties. On the contrary, the arrival of new, informal, even bizarre forms of language extends the range of our sensitivity to linguistic contrasts. Formal language, and informal language, are seen in a new light, by virtue of the existence of Netspeak (Crystal 2001: 241f).

With a view to tracing the evolution and identifying linguistic characteristics of these media-specific varieties, Crystal (2001:60) proposes research into internet dialects and related sociolects. It is doubtful, however, that the existing concepts of “dialect” and “sociolect” are up to the task. To date, research in linguistics has focused either on the immanent structures of linguistic systems or on the actual usage of individuals. In the latter case, the variables applied include geographical origin (the study of dialects) or sociological characteristics such as class and level of formal education (the study of sociolects). Little interest has been accorded to the medium by which the communication takes place – even though linguistic analyses in many cases are highly dependent on media-borne records: written language in books, periodicals and letters, or spoken language as “captured” by microphones and tape-recorders. It is, for example, something of a paradox that although the material used in conversation analysis frequently derives from telephone conversations – a convenient, unobtrusive means to observe spontaneous speech production (Hutchby 2001:55) – the analysts appear not to have given much thought to how their material may have been affected by the medium.

There is a need, as I see it, for a concept that includes the medium, its characteristics and constraints. I propose the term, “medialect.” Unlike dialects, medialects have no geographical province; in contrast to the case of sociolects, the users’ social position, etc., is indifferent. Instead, the focus rests on the channel of communication. Individuals may use many different medialects, depending on the number of media they use. This, too, poses a contrast to dialects and sociolects, which are considered relatively immutable in relation to the individual. Indeed, they are often used to identify a person’s origins, whether or not the individual in question wishes them to be revealed. People use medialects – consciously or unconsciously – in specific situations, according to what they consider appropriate. Thus, any given individual may be expected to command several medialects. The static nature of dialects and sociolects is, however, undergoing change as a consequence of urbanization and globalization. As noted earlier, the past century has witnessed major changes in both. Furthermore, it appears that dialects and sociolects are the object of increasing reflexivity as a consequence of globalization (Hjar-
The globalization of language

As, for example, Maegaard (2002) shows, young Danish speakers of dialect are keenly aware of the social status attached to their dialect and are able to shift between different “degrees” of dialect and standard Danish, depending on the situation; dialects may also be used as a form of verbal “kitsch”.

Like dialects and sociolects, medialects are assigned ranking in social and cultural status hierarchies, and they are inclusive and exclusive, defining social groupings, large and small. Mastery of a given medialect confers status in the act of communication, just as those who lack a command of the medialect either feel excluded or are repulsed by the particular mode of communication. Medialects influence each other; just as the Copenhagen vernacular has influenced standard Danish, there are indications that linguistic traits from one medialect spread to other medialects as well as to traditional written and spoken communication. The use of abbreviations or smiley faces, for example, has spread to many forms of mediated communication, and they are occasionally used in speech.

The New Localities of Globalization

We may conclude that the media, under the influence of globalization, contribute in some ways to standardization of the Danish language, and to linguistic variety and creativity in others. On the one hand, the media spread English, often at the expense of other languages. In this sense the media are a homogenizing factor. On the other hand, the media have considerable potential for a new kind of linguistic diversity that transcends the various national languages in that innovation is attached to use of the media, not the individual user. In this sense, the media are a differentiating factor.

Globalization may be seen as a new epoch in linguistic history. The “golden age” of dialects was associated with an essentially rural society, where agricultural production was the norm and industrial production was still in its cradle, a society where the local community was central and permanence the rule, where mobility across geographical and other boundaries was the exception. With the advent of industrial production, urbanization and national consciousness, dialects were forced to retreat before the onslaught of a standardized national language. In Denmark, the battles between the dialects and standard Danish reflected conflicts between town and country, between province and capital, between the farm and the factory. The global network society, finally, impacts on the social hierarchies of national industrial society. Not least its valuation of mobility means that a command of English and modern communications technologies confers status.

As Castells (1996) points out, the network society gives rise to a “culture of real virtuality”. The global society is a mediated society, where communication via electronic networks constitutes a new reality. The ability to take part in these networks has more than symbolic importance; increasingly it has implications for individuals’ economic standing, job opportunities and success on the marketplace, cultural identity and sense of belonging in society. The media are the places where people now meet, trade, provide services, converse and present themselves to one another. English and the medialects may thus be seen as the dialects of globalization. Geographical place is losing its importance, being supplanted by electronic, virtual localities – and, as this occurs, local varieties of language are supplanted by global varieties of language like English and the medialects.
Note
1. National Romanticism was a movement in Northern European countries, especially in architecture, to return to the nation’s cultural fundamentals or “roots”. Other currents in the general “wave” are Pan-Slavism (in its early years) and the Arts and Crafts movement in England.

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Translation: Charly Hultén

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Thanks to Professor Frans Gregersen, Associate Professor Henrik Gottlieb and Professor Bent Preisler for their constructive comments on the draft of this article. Thanks, too, to Lecturer Anne Jespersen and research assistants Anne Keiding and Louise Juul-Hansen for their assistance in the coding of cinema film, advertisements, and computer games, respectively.
It is a pleasure to make comments on a presentation that has enabled us to get a better insight into what such a concept as globalization means on the everyday level. I do agree with most of the issues Stig Hjarvard took up. That is why I will not go into details, but rather try to develop further some of the themes he discussed.

As such, there were not that many totally new elements in Hjarvard’s presentation, but it definitely gives us all a challenge. It is in fact surprising that we as communication scholars so rarely deal with the language. Nowadays, every other piece of research in Nordic media and communication studies has something to do with discourse analysis, but the language as such has only rarely caught our attention as a theme for research, although if anyone should know how crucial language is to communication it is we.

It would not be difficult for me to present as dramatic details as Hjarvard has about the influence of the English language on my mother tongue, Finnish – perhaps even more alarming, because the Finnish language is old-fashioned and grammar bound. The English language is able to break up deeper structures in Finnish than perhaps in Danish. In Finland we have gradually started to talk more and more through substantives and adjectives, although one in fact should put most emphasis on verbs in the Finnish language. Our verbs have become pale and our way of expressing ourselves more and more clumsy.

Also in Finland dialects have changed into kitsch – and into kitsch that sells well. During the past 5-10 years, the Bible as well as Donald Duck has been translated into several Finnish dialects. One could, of course, interpret this to mean that people have become interested in local dialects, but unfortunately this is not the case. Dialects have turned exotic and distant, and that is why those texts sell so well. Reading them is like visiting the tropical animals at Korkeasaari Zoo in Helsinki. For the news media, dialects definitely mean something vulgar and stupid. If a source uses a dialect, it is excluded from the reporter’s text in the name of credibility – and it is left there if the reporter wants to destroy the legitimacy of the source. The worst case is if the source speaks one of the eastern dialects! During the EU membership campaign in the early 1990s, the media quite frequently used a technique whereby they selected Savolax-speaking sources when they were covering matters related to the No-to-EU campaign, thus indicating that the whole “No” movement was old-fashioned and out-of-touch with reality.
But the situation is not exactly the same in the Danish and Finnish mediascapes. In Finland, we have a dozen Swedish-language newspapers, and we have Swedish-language radio and television channels. We do have, every now and then, stupid debates about the role and status of the Swedish minority language in the country and in the media, but simultaneously these debates sensitise us all to the significance of languages in general. There is a slight built-in tension concerning language questions in Finland, but the very same tension keeps alive our discussions on languages and their significance in society.

Stig Hjarvard seems to think that there is only one English-language culture, or perhaps two, a British and an American. However, the English that sneaks into the Danish language does not represent any genuine English-language culture. There is quite a large range of cultures operating in the English language, and they differ from each other considerably, depending for example on the role English has had in different parts of the world in colonialism and industrialism. The English that Hjarvard talks about is in fact the communication means of globalization, with only weak contacts with the British, American or any other culture operating in English. The language of globalization has no links with either space or time. Many English-language researchers and authors are as concerned about what is happening to the English language as Hjarvard is about what is happening to the Danish. These critics feel that their language is increasingly becoming an industrial product that anybody has the right to mistreat. The creative component belonging to genuine languages has disappeared.

As I stated earlier, I agree with almost everything Hjarvard said. However, I consider him somewhat ahistorical. I expected to hear more about power, language and the media. Changes in languages and language use have always reflected changes in power structures. Languages have reflected the views and values set by the strong, operating either in politics, the economy, religion or the culture. I am not even convinced that the pressures being exerted by the globalized English on the Nordic languages are at their strongest now. History has driven nations against each other, and languages have functioned as a means for conflict as well as for reconciliation. The scary side of globalization is the speed of changes in languages. The other languages have no time to adapt to the new situation and the new language regime.

The fact that languages are important for identity construction is a distinctly European phenomenon. For example in Africa, it is quite natural that an ordinary person uses, without difficulty, 2-3 languages on a daily basis. People change language according to the person they talk with, because the main thing is to understand and to be understood. Identity is constructed on another basis, mainly via music, dance and inherited traditions. Changing language is not a big issue. Contacts with history and the tribe are so strong that the means of communication is secondary. However, the relation of language to power is known and sensitised. Kiswahili was not raised to an East African lingua franca because it was the language of the slave trade. And in South Africa and Namibia, English was chosen as the official language after a change in the political sphere, because, unlike in many other parts of Africa, English was not the language of colonialism in the southern region.

The theme for today also allows us to talk about a linguistic domination far closer to us. Year after year, Finnish-speaking Finns attending Nordic conferences have talked about the difficulties they encounter, especially with the Danish language. We do want to participate in the Nordic conferences, but we simply do not understand the other Nordic languages, and for many, expressing oneself in Swedish also causes problems.
Personally, I feel that is a pity that there are so few Finnish-speaking Finns participating in this conference as well. We „old-timers“ do come, because we know that these conferences are thrilling, but younger researchers tend to select other venues. One of my doctoral students said a few months ago, when I asked why she had not registered for this conference: „Only very few have such good self-esteem that they are willing to pay to be labelled stupid or at least withdrawn and quiet, because they cannot express themselves adequately“. Do we need to be orthodox with the Nordic languages, if the main function of the language is then partly or totally lost? Nordic togetherness and a community of understanding cannot be created if people do not understand each other. Languages exist to enable communication.

This is one side of the issue, but there is another side as well. It is exactly the one Stig Hjarvard talked about. We as communication researchers have a special responsibility to promote and cherish our own languages. In today’s Nordic countries, some courage is needed in this respect. At least in Finland, universities indicate that they want to promote internationalization. In practice, this means that all research reported in English is automatically assessed higher than research reported in the domestic languages. We should have the courage to state that it is the quality of the research, not the language that matters. Perhaps language does not matter as much in the natural sciences, but in the humanities and social sciences it does. It is not only the choice of language we are talking about here. If we talk to a foreign audience in a foreign language, we also pose the questions in another way than when we focus on a domestic audience. Who will study our local media circumstances from a local perspective, if not we? Moreover, we also bear the responsibility for keeping our mother tongue alive, rich and creative. This is possible only if the language is used in full scale: at home, at school, in literature and at our universities.
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Rhetoric takes a view of media and of public communication generally that we may call functionalist. Rhetoricians tend to think that we use public discourse to do certain things for us with words. Rhetoric is a practical subject, which also implies that it is normative: it will teach us, not only to do certain things with words, but also to do these things well with words. Because rhetoric is about doing things well with words, it is also central to it that we should always be very aware of what we are trying to do, for we can do many different things with words, and they need to be done with different words; in general rhetoric teaches us that the function a message is meant to serve very largely determines all the properties that the message should have, which again implies that messages meant to serve different functions will have very different properties.

Rhetoric is not just a subject about how each individual can do his or her own thing with words, sometimes at the expense of others. It also holds that we have language and communication to perform certain vital functions in society. Rhetoric has always been seen by some of its practitioners as the ongoing public discourse that has helped establish human societies and hold them together; society would not have existed without the constant workings of rhetoric. In fact, the way rhetoricians figure that is that they believe that if everyone is enabled and allowed to do their own things with words, then that is the way in which the interest of society is best served.

Today, the media are the forum where public discourse is conducted. It follows that we should criticise the media when they fail to perform this function, and we should try to suggest how they could do it better.

By taking this stance toward the media, rhetoric distances itself from a couple of other positions that are strongly represented in today’s academic world. In Critical Discourse Analysis and similar orientations there is, as in Rhetoric, an emphasis on the utterance and its specific properties, and on how discourse is always an attempt to further the encoder’s interests; but there is also, inspired by Foucault, a constant assumption that public discourse serves to maintain a hegemony, that is, to preserve and extend power structures.

The strong suit of Critical Discourse Analysis, as practiced by Fairclough and others, is its meticulous observations of verbal messages revealing how even the smallest lin-
guistic features of public messages may work to impress a view on us – a view which fits the agenda of the ruling powers. Critical Discourse Analysis, as Fairclough and others define it, is an astute attempt to incorporate linguistic analysis into social science so as to understand the transformations of modern capitalism. So basically, Critical Discourse Analysis is a purely descriptive pursuit. There is no theory of how public communication ought to be in order for it to fulfil a constructive role in society. There seems to be no theory of public communication as a necessary factor in a modern coherent society, no notion of a constructive function for public discourse at all.

Rhetoric, in contrast, is based on the premise that public discourse is beneficial and indeed necessary in human societies – but not any kind of discourse. Rhetoric shares with Critical Discourse Analysis the wish to look very closely at utterances in the public sphere and to analyse what they do and how they do it, but Rhetoric believes that there is good discourse and bad discourse, i.e., some properties of public discourse will hinder and some will serve the functions for which public discourse is needed. Hence Rhetoric is informed by the wish to identify these properties and to suggest or demand specific changes in current social discourse practices.

There are other voices in the study of public communication which also represent a purely descriptive stance, but with an orientation that is a far cry from the systematic suspicion of the critical discourse analysts. Polemically, one might refer to these other scholars as uncritical analysts in that they seem to have taken it upon themselves to defend the media en bloc against any criticism. The outstanding British-American scholar Pippa Norris, it might be argued, is a representative of this trend. In her recent book, *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies* (2000), she broadly dismisses what she refers to as “media malaise” and demonstrates with a wide battery of empirical data that there is a consistently positive correlation between attention to the news media and political knowledge, trust and participation. Hence, runs the argument, we should not “blame the messenger” but should look elsewhere to understand and confront the more deep-rooted flaws in current representative democracy.

But it is hardly surprising that there is a positive correlation between media use and political engagement; how could it be otherwise? Still this obvious fact does not acquit the media from any criticism of how, and how well, they perform their social functions. As a rhetorician one must find it disappointing that a media scholar like Norris never descends from the bird’s-eye-view to look at specific types or even instances of political journalism. Also it is striking that Norris and other leading media scholars refrain from entering into any normative judgments; she has nothing to say as to which types of political journalism might be better than others in some way, nor as to types of political debate or engagement. Such media studies can of very little help both to society and to the media themselves.

In contrast to these two broad orientations, which we may polemically call the paranoic and the obsequious, a rhetorician looks at public communication and the media with a functionalist eye. It recognizes that we need public communication for society to exist at all, and it asks not only: “How well does public communication perform the social functions it is meant to perform?” but also: “How could it perform them better?”

A trend in media studies that rhetoric has much in common with is uses-and-gratifications theory. Rhetoric shares with it the notion that utterances are used for different, specific purposes. However, uses-and-gratifications theory assumes, optimistically and individualistically, that each user selects and uses media content for his or her individual purposes. Rhetoric takes the social angle: how can we have communication that will per-
form these social functions for us? As a result, rhetoricians look closely at specific properties of media content, often with a view to how it could be different, whereas uses-and-gratifications theory, in a much broader approach, describes what each medium, considered as such, is used for.

Rhetoric acknowledges that the function of verbal communication is mainly to impress our views and our will on others. However, its view of interpersonal communication has more to it than this. If citizens have the means and the opportunity to make a case for their views in open debate, then that is the best way to build a human society that will endure.

What we are talking about here is often called the deliberative function of public communication. Deliberation actually means to weigh something, as on a pair of scales, and what we weigh when we deliberate is decisions. Where decisions are concerned you cannot prove anything, i.e., make a logically “valid” case one way or the other; instead, you have to see if you can increase your audience’s adherence to your proposal. It follows that the best we can do in public debate is to make sure that the best reasons on both sides of a case are heard, understood and given attention.

The criteria for public debate just given have several implications. Public communication on politics should give much attention to the reasons that may be offered for or against a proposed policy. Hence, rhetoricians would, for example, look critically at the ways in which the media present reasons for a decision to go to war. Do the media, in particular, manage to make the available arguments on both sides of the issue accessible and understandable to the public? Also, rhetoric would look carefully at how spokespersons on each side of an issue make their case, and what treatment they in turn are given by the media. For example, it would expect would-be deliberative debaters to acknowledge legitimate arguments on the opposite side. Good reasons should be stated, heard and attended to, also by those who disagree. One important complaint against the way politicians and other decision makers argue is precisely that they tend to suppress, ignore or distort the reasons that the opposite side has to offer – especially the good ones.

The media should try to make politicians attend to good reasons offered by the other side, and media critics should watch that the media do so. This is because the necessary function of deliberative debate is to identify, in Aristotle’s phrase, “the available means of persuasion” (cf. Rhetoric 1355b) on both sides, thereby helping audiences form their own reasoned standpoints.

As an example of how scholars with a rhetorical approach would look at the media and their performance, we might consider the studies that Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph Cappella presented, in their book Spiral of Cynicism (1997), of how the media reported the political activities around a possible health care reform in the US during the early years of the Clinton presidency. What Jamieson and Cappella found was essentially that the media, instead of focusing on “issues,” i.e., the problems facing the American health care system, their possible solutions and what cases could be made for them, they focused overwhelmingly on “strategy,” i.e., the moves and manoeuvres of the warring parties and political figures in the legislative process. The view of politics underlying this kind of coverage is that, as a general assumption, politicians are driven by a wish to preserve and extend their personal power, not by ideas about what policies are best for society. Further, Jamieson and Cappella argued that this strategic focus was instrumental in bringing the legislative process to a deadlock so that no reform came about. The book presents a series of studies suggesting that strategic coverage of specific issues tends to infect media users with a general cynicism regarding the entire political proc-
ess; also, that media users do not want or demand strategic coverage of politics to nearly the extent that media people think they do, and that as cynicism grows, so does also public distrust of the media themselves – hence the term “spiral of cynicism.”

Regina Lawrence (2000) did a further study of the dysfunctional workings of political coverage in the media, showing how media, in the phase where a piece of legislation was still in the making, would concentrate on the strategic aspects of the political process; only after it was made effective, but only then, would they begin to describe what how it would affect citizens.

There are several other empirical data which suggest that the media and their users do not see eye to eye as to what aspects of politics political journalism ought to focus on. In a 1999 study of the presidential election in 1996, two University of Connecticut researchers found that the way the media covered that election was grossly out of touch with how voters wanted it covered, (Dautrich and Hartley 1999). Consistently throughout the campaign, voters found that the media focused too much on candidates’ personalities, on “horse race” and on strategy and tactics, but too little on their standpoints on issues, on the effect if either of them were elected, and on the views of third parties.

For two years I directed a project financed by the Danish Newspapers Association to investigate current and alternative ways of doing political journalism in print media. The project is reported in the book Forstå verden: Politisk journalistik for fremtiden (Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur, 2002). In one study, I did a content analysis of all articles in the Danish daily newspapers about the budget negotiations for the year 2000. The articles, it turned out, were mainly about strategic manoeuvring by the various parties involved in, or excluded from, negotiations about the upcoming budget. In addition, there was a good deal of articles about minor, controversial items or proposals many of which never materialised. But there was virtually no coverage of the overall structure of the budget, for example the fact that out of the 400 billion kroner in the Danish state budget, the vast majority is bound by other laws and hence untouchable, whereas less than 10 billion may in fact be shifted about in budget negotiations. But what, then, are the purposes for which we set aside nearly all of our national household money? How big are these programs in relation to each and in relation to corresponding accounts in other countries? Which have grown most, and why? Why does a rich nation not have enough for health, education, and care for the elderly? How much do we spend on these accounts, by the way? In short, what are we spending our household money on? These are the questions that traditional budget negotiation coverage in newspapers leaves unanswered. Imagine a family living in similar ignorance of their available income is spent on.

Moreover, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that newspaper readers or even TV audiences actually want the coverage of national budget affairs to be the way it traditionally is. Media researchers ought to intervene here and point out that this is the way the media treat a subject like this; they might try to work out what users actually feel about it, and what the objective effects of it is; and they might suggest alternatives and do research to find out what users might think of them.

A group of journalism students who had heard of the critical stance our project was taking towards traditional political journalism did a study to see whether a sample of ordinary readers were in agreement with the media’s own criteria as to which types of news stories they found most interesting (reported in the book). They constructed a list of 10 made-up news headlines, five reflecting “traditional” criteria of newsworthiness, and five which reflected a focus in broader structural issues. They asked political editors at five national newspapers and 76 ordinary readers to select the five stories that they
would be most eager to print, respectively, to read. This brought out a strong discrepancy between editors’ and readers’ preferences. The most attractive story to the editors was one that stated that the Minister for culture would withdraw from politics in connection with the upcoming birth of her third child. This story was the one that readers were least likely to read. Instead, they gave top priority to a story whose headline asked the question: “Euthanasia – murder or charity. We have the right to live. Should we also be given the right to die?” …

An interesting wider implication of this study is that some of the stories ranked highest by readers were in fact not about news. Their number 3 favourite was one whose headline said, “A multicultural democracy – Europe is the cradle of democracy, but are we willing to give immigrant citizens full democratic rights?” To this one editor objected that such a headline was “dreadfully abstract,” and editors ranked this story eighth.

The interesting general issue here is that the media apparently do not necessarily give the audience what they want. There have been many claims that the media nowadays are run by money people, not by news people, and that this is the reason behind much of the current media malaise. But what we see in the case of political journalism is that what the media offer us is to large extent not what the market forces would dictate. The forces that give us cynical, horse-race-oriented, unenlightening political journalism are not the market forces of public demand, but perhaps rather the forces of journalistic myth and orthodoxy.

One article of orthodox journalistic faith is precisely the cynical view of politics – the view of politicians as self-serving individuals whose every action or statement is dictated by a will to preserve or extend their power. This attitude, on the one hand, supplies an explanatory framework that is characteristic of the journalistic profession; it makes the journalist who adopts this attitude look like a seasoned expert, someone with savvy and no illusions who is not easily taken in; however, with this framework to explain anything that goes on in politics, the journalist is not obliged to have any substantive knowledge of any actual policy areas. For example, in commenting on politicians’ moves on health care legislation, the journalist needs no medical expertise or knowledge of health care economics, but may fall back on the same type of catch-all theory as for any other area of political debate: the power struggle framework. Adopting this framework is thus not only gratifying for the journalist, because it gives him a distinctive journalistic angle on politics; it is also cheap: with this one simplistic framework applied to everything any cub reporter can be a professional, because he needs no real knowledge of anything. For this stance I would like to suggest the term “Instant professionalism.”

The cynical view that gives political journalists Instant professionalism is only one of several myths that haunt the media. It is a myth in the sense that contrary to what many journalists believe, it is not good for society, and since readers do not particularly want it, it is not good for business either. Another myth that specifically plagues newspaper journalism has to do not with the ideological but with the formal or structural dimension of messages. It is the myth of the “inverted news pyramid.” This term refers to the traditional structure of news copy where everything is arranged in a linear sequence, beginning with whatever has most news value and then presenting additional chunks of information in order of descending importance. This often means: irrespective of chronology, logic and clarity.

The inverted pyramid is similar to the set menu at some restaurants, where the chef alone decides what we are having and in what order. Except that when we read it is easier to rebel
and either drop out, which is what most readers do most of the time, or skip around, in which case one often has to skip pretty much at random, because it is usually not possible to see in advance what the individual parts of the article contain.

As stated before, it is a key point in a rhetorician’s approach to the media that a given medium has several widely differing functions. Consequently, it makes little sense to speak of the function of that medium as such, or to assume that the medium as such imposes specific conditions on whatever content it is used to mediate. The function of a medium is to mediate the functions of the content that it carries. And each medium may carry many types of content, each with its own distinctive function.

It is clear that each medium will be better suited for certain functions than for others. Still, it is a mistake to believe that a given medium, e.g., television, imposes certain specific requirements on all of its content regardless of function. For example, there has been a strong desire in TV programming to inject narrative qualities into material that is not by nature narrative. This often involves an entire dramaturgy with heroes, villains, build-up, point of no return, etc. However, it is not necessarily the case that such a dramaturgy is functional in dealing with political issues, and while many viewers who watch a TV documentary based on these principles may feel that they are offered a strong narrative experience, they may also feel that somehow not given a fair and useful understanding of the issue involved.

Media scholars might perhaps expect a rhetorician to say to them, “Go ahead, learn all the tricks of the rhetorical trade, and use them. Use metaphors, symbols, tropes and figures, narrative suspense, identification and all the other tools that rhetoricians have identified.” But no, what this rhetorician would say above all is, “Learn all these tricks of the trade but also learn to use them for what they are good at, for the functions that they will serve well and not for other functions where they tend to have a confounding effect.”

An example of how rhetorical devices tend to confound some functions while pretending to serve others is a study by Michael Milburn and Anne McGrail on “The Dramatic Presentation of News and its Effects on Cognitive Complexity” (1992). What they did was to show authentic, dramatic news stories to two groups, for example an item about election unrest in Chile, where one group saw the original while the other saw a version with the most dramatic scenes cut out. What they found was that “exposure to the dramatic news stories significantly decreased subjects’ recall of the information in the stories and reduced the complexity with which individuals thought about the events reported.”

More generally, as a rhetorician one would welcome more studies of the use of visuals in news programs on TV, such as what types of visuals are used for particular types of content, what effects they have, for example in terms of recall, learning, etc., and what other types might be used, if indeed visuals are necessary regardless of the type of story that is being presented.

A similar type of studies might be conducted on the use of visuals in newspapers. One aspect of this that deserves closer study is the use or non-use of graphics such as diagrams, maps, tables, etc. What are such devices good for, what are they not good for, where may graphs do a better job than pictures or verbal copy, what types are better than other types, what is current practice, and what suggestions for reform and experimentation might we make?

The use of graphics is one of the important but neglected issues for any medium that wishes to present quantitative information about national or international issues, and even more if one wants to help readers understand correlation, causation etc. Any important
political issue involves quantitative dimensions and question of what causes what, for example global warming, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and budget balancing. This is one question that cannot be left to the media themselves. For one thing, the use of graphs requires specialized knowledge of statistics and mapping techniques that are generally not part of journalism programs and certainly not of traditional journalistic skills. Also, the proper use of any such communicative device requires empirical studies, qualitative as well as quantitative, for which news organizations have neither the skills nor the means. As part of our political journalism project we did a study of the actual use of graphs in a leading newspaper, and the results clearly suggest that practical journalists grapple in the dark as to what types of graphic presentation of data exist, and what they can do.

Graphics are just one example of a type of rhetorical-communicative devices that is available to the media but is not used at all to serve the functions that it might. There seems to be a prejudice in the profession to the effect that graphics are trite and superficial, and another to the effect that they are nerdy and hence boring. So what some media have done, e.g., the American daily *USA Today*, is to use banal graphics that are pepped up with much colour and cartoon-like artwork. What few people in the profession have realized is that graphics of the type used by *USA Today* are perhaps boring because they are banal; no amount of four-colour hysterical artwork will conceal the fact they generally communicate nothing.

Graphics, then, represent one aspect of media rhetoric that media studies might give more attention to. By nature, they are two-dimensional and they may be packed with information and even insight at a ratio that is hard to match with other means. All this suggests that they are particularly suited for print media. And that brings us to the general question: Which rhetorical devices are particularly suited for which media?

In addition to this, we already another equally general question: which rhetorical functions are particularly suited for which media? That is the kind of question that our project asked itself in relation the daily newspaper, especially regarding its coverage of politics. Our answer was one that involved not only the physical makeup of the newspaper, including what we call its enormous, easily navigable user interface, but also the fact that it appears once a day and once only, as well as the fact that most newspapers have a long-established credibility or ethos to draw upon. Moreover, the newspaper is under increasing pressure as to the time readers will have or want to spend on it, given competition from other media and activities. All these particular conditions and constraints go together to suggest that what the newspaper of tomorrow should increasingly focus on as far as political coverage is concerned is well-researched material that tries to illuminate structures and issues that are currently debated or which will be in the time to come; and they should do this with an increased emphasis on two-dimensional devices, i.e., an array of elements, verbal or visual, that illuminate separate aspects of an issue, and which are easily identifiable as to what they offer. For example, it should be possible to “read” a graphic separately, or an item specifying historical background, or a narrative item representing the human side of the issue, or a analytic piece predicting likely outcomes, or setting out reasons on both sides of the issue. All this means less emphasis on breaking news, less use of the so-called inverted pyramid in reportage, which, as a linear and purely verbal structure, makes little advantage of the newspaper’s two-dimensionality and fails to take account of readers’ time constraints and reading behaviours. Also it means less opinionated preaching of party lines and correct opinions and more respect for readers who want help to form a considered view for themselves.
An obvious objection to all these claims would be that political journalism which follows these guidelines would not be read because it would be boring.

There are two answers to this. The first is that of course it is a good thing not to be boring, and the media should try to make sure that material about society and its problems is interesting. It might be argued that a piece which actually managed to explain something like the makeup of the national budget would be scary rather than anything else, and what’s scary is at least not boring.

The second answer is that interest in this kind of material should come from its capacity to illuminate, i.e., that is to bring insight, not necessarily from its entertainment quality. We all want entertainment, but many of us also want enlightenment, and the two functions, as any rhetorician remembers, are different. Some genres are good at one of these functions; others are good at another.

These have been a few examples of how media experts might look rhetorically at the media. The main emphasis has been on that old-fashioned medium that media studies perhaps tend to neglect: the newspaper. But as we know there are several other media to look at, and several other functions that we would like these media to perform in society, so there are countless opportunities to ask questions of the type, “What functions should this particular medium be used to serve, which ones is it particularly good at, for which does it have constraints that call for special solutions, which rhetorical devices could this medium use to perform this function? What is current practice, and how could it be changed or reformed? What will users think of such a change, and what will its effect on them be?” These are what I, as a rhetorician speaking to media scholars, would call true rhetorical questions.

References
A Counter-Statement to Depoliticizations

Mediation and Simulational Politics

BARRY BRUMMETT

Carl Boggs, in The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere, laments the decline of civic participation, “the profound deterioration of political discourse” (vii), in sum the end of politics especially in western cultures and most especially in the United States. Today, he claims, “we live in a thoroughly depoliticized society” (17). Boggs is not alone in his concerns; similarly, Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community observes a lack of public civic engagement in traditional forms of community and politics. These and other writers, sharing Boggs’s conception of politics as “the ever broadening capacity of whole populations to be engaged in the vital affairs of public life” (97), complain of reduced voter turnout, lack of interest in public political events, and general inability to debate social and political issues with substance.

Dire predictions of the decline of politics seem similar to histories that assert the waxing and waning of rhetoric during different periods (e.g., Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, 1-15). But Boggs agrees with Antonio Gramsci’s observation that “man is essentially ‘political’” (243; Gramsci, 360), just as many have observed that rhetoric is an essential part of being human (Brummett, Reading 1). If both politics and rhetoric are fundamental dimensions of humanity, then perhaps these dimensions neither decline nor strengthen but rather, change in terms of form, manifestation, and sites of expression. The task of the scholar then is to be alert for new forms of politics as well as communication, to avoid assuming that change or difference must necessarily be for the worse, and to balance despair and naivete as one seeks to understand the world in the process of recreation. My purpose in this essay is to sketch out some ways in which we might do that at the intersection between politics and rhetoric. I will suggest some places to look for new political discursive forms in the world that Boggs describes, a world of corporate hegemony and infatuation with mediated entertainment that may nevertheless contain new sites for the venerable practice of political rhetoric. Taking Boggs as representative of a wider group of scholars concerned with the state of politics, I will suggest a different way to understand the world that Boggs sees. In its place I will point to new forms of political discourse that are simulational, erotic, and local.
Bracketing and Representation in Traditional Political Forms

Boggs is especially concerned with the alleged decline of political discourse because he perceives a world of “social crisis and political decay,” as he calls his second chapter (41-66). Society everywhere is threatened by “a rapidly decaying social infrastructure” (6) and “a host of other social problems – crime, drugs, and education for example” (52). A lengthy discussion warns of impending ecological disaster unless there is political intervention (89-95). It is specifically the contrast between a perception of dire needs and a perception of the decline of traditional political reactions to such needs that fuels Boggs’s concern. If everything in the world were perfectly alright, the decline of politics might even make sense.

Of course, a situation in which the world is “perfectly alright,” or an optimum state of civic affairs, is a matter of perception. I want to suggest that an important reason for the decline of political forms as Boggs understands them is precisely the widespread perception that civic affairs are alright, if not perfectly so then at least enough alright to no longer require the vigorous wielding of traditional political discourse that was designed to address material crises.

I am suggesting that most people in the western democracies of which Boggs despairs are happy enough with the distribution of goods and resources that they have no felt need for political action to change that distribution. We live in an age of optimum entitlements in which enough people feel satisfied enough with what government is doing for them to feel no need for political struggle. The schools are good enough, the economy sound enough even in times of recession, the streets well enough maintained, foreign enemies kept at enough of a distance – and this state of affairs has been going along in this manner for quite some time. There are surely people in western democracies for whom the schools are terrible, the economy inadequate, the streets unlivable, and so forth – but there are relatively speaking not enough of these people, and they are not unhappy enough, to mobilize political action.

Let me say that it will not do to claim that the public ought to be more concerned about the ecology, imperialism, war, and so forth. Although I might well agree with such a stance personally, it is the business of politics to be the terrain on which the mass of ordinary people work out their needs, hopes, and desires – it is not the business of politics to answer to the clarion call of academic elites who want people to bestir themselves even if they are happy enough. I suggest that we are living in a political state of affairs in which many, perhaps most, major issues are bracketed off from public discussion and intervention because those issues have crossed a threshold of being “good enough.”

The phenomenon of bracketing off major issues from political struggle is found in every era and in every political arrangement. There has been little or no public, political discussion recently in western democracies as to whether slavery should be legal because that issue was put to rest some time ago: it was bracketed off from discussion. Less extreme issues that have been bracketed off include questions of universal suffrage related to gender or race, questions of the income tax, or of the legality of labor unions.

Let me suggest that a lack of public debate over ecological issues, for instance, reflects a widespread (not universal) agreement that economic development is preferable to environmental purity, and that the possibility of future disaster is worth the risk of building and burning at top speed today. If there is indifference to ecological issues it is because an understanding of what to risk and what to tolerate was achieved some time ago and has been bracketed off.
When Boggs complains of a lack of opposition to “the largely taken-for-grANTED character of deeply entrenched forms of domination” (71), that entrenchment can be understood as an already achieved bracketing of certain major issues; it is not clear at all that calling those issues back onto center stage would change the decision to bracket them. In Boggs there is realization of a recent political trend in the United States which I believe clearly supports this notion of bracketing, and that is “the degree to which differences between Democrats and Republicans have mostly collapsed” (26). I would argue that the Clinton presidency, sacrificing principles for power and expediency, coalesced several trends into today’s settled bracketing of so many major public issues. Boggs acknowledges this in part by referring to Clinton’s welfare reform as a “Reaganesque bill” (53). In fact, it was a Reaganesque presidency, and instrumental in both creating and reflecting our general acceptance of settled, bracketed decisions on major issues. Boggs’s exhortations for people to come out of their political caves and fight fails because not enough people fundamentally disagree about the issues upon which he invites struggle.

A model in which political discourse is about specific, identifiable, “real world” issues is a representational model of discourse (John Stewart, Bill Nichols). Representation is a mode of discourse that is dualist, presuming a set of signs “over here” that refer to objects, events, and actions “over there.” Representational discourse operates on an ethical terrain of truth and falsehood, for its signs may always be judged in terms of whether they accurately represent some state of affairs.

That Boggs’s view of politics is representational, or that most people think of political discourse, indeed any discourse, as representational may seem unsurprising. When he complains that “there is so little public discourse on the main problems of social conflict” (52) Boggs implies a discourse that is about, that represents, the material reality of that conflict. Boggs sees the main function of television news as “reporting” events in the world so that such reports may be taken up into political discourse (82), clearly a representational view. That political discourse should be about, should represent, a world exterior to and apart from it may seem to be patently obvious; for the moment, let me just observe that such an assumption underlies Boggs’s view of politics and discourse.

Of course, representation is also a theory of politics (Boggs, 247): the ability of men and women to represent those who elected them is the key feature of this theory. Power is vested in the people, and is only represented in the actions of legislators, judges, and executives. These people are the public’s “representatives.”

Representation is also a theory of mediation, so basic a theory as to be encoded almost unconsciously, automatically, in many views of how mediation works. The foundational Shannon-Weaver model of communication implies a mediation that represents original thoughts or realities. Mediation, in this view, stands between and connects people. The telephone mediates between two people and what one hears on the instrument is a representation of what the real person says far away. One goes to see films that are representations of something: perhaps of technical processes, perhaps of actors and sets, perhaps of stories once told in novels, and so forth. This representational view of media sees the medium as bringing to the viewer or auditor some signs of something that has happened or that exists elsewhere. Boggs clearly shares a representational view of media. He understands the “technological infrastructure” as constituting a “huge multimedia system” that can lead to “the democratization of knowledge” (267). Media, in this view, present users with signs (pixels on a screen, digitized sounds, and so forth) that convey knowledge about the world, about truths lying beyond the computer, the television screen, or the headphones. Media work when “citizen-empowerment messages get
transmitted in cyberspace” (271), messages that empower because they represent realities, the knowledge of which is to the advantage of citizens who use them.

Politics in today’s large democracies are of necessity mediated. But I want to argue that today’s political discourse is called upon less and less to represent real states of affairs because public concerns over those states of affairs are bracketed off into general acceptance. Hence, mediation is less representational than it used to be, less representational than in Boggs’s formulations. If people engage in political communication today, there is less interest in the role of that communication to represent real affairs if people are relatively satisfied with how those affairs are. But politics as a dimension of humanity must continue in some form, and in large western democracies, must continue in a mediated form. This alternative form of mediation is simulation rather than representation. Thus I will argue that today’s politics is largely played out on a terrain of simulational mediation. I will next argue that an understanding of the simulational nature of today’s mediation of political discourse leads to an understanding of politics as erotic – that is to say, as grounded in desire. This simulational grounding in desire is precisely the reason behind the corporate hegemony that Boggs decry in politics. And finally, I will suggest that when politics today is not grounded in simulational mediation, it is largely personal and local.

Politics is Simulational

A simulation is an experience of a set of signs that have no direct reference outside of themselves. If I tell you about a castle I visited, I am using signs to represent a real castle somewhere. But in a video game, the castle I enter is nothing more nor less than a set of signs on a screen which do not refer directly to any real events in any real castle but only to themselves. Two key characteristics define simulations. First, because their constitutive signs are not primarily representational, a simulation is a closed loop into which one enters without direct and immediate reference to a reality (there are definitely indirect, residual, and long term connections to reality; more about this below). Second, because simulations are constructed from signs which are easily renewed, the manipulation of which has few real consequences or costs, simulations are repetitive, repeatable, and recursive: one need only push the reset button on the computer game to have the world reborn afresh (Brummett, World).

Much of the public today, bracketing off most political decisions as satisfactory enough, express their political proclivities by entering into the playful terrain of politics as simulation. Boggs is aware of this, although he sees it as precisely the problem, as when he decries the “seductions” of television and computers (271), and the “more artificial forms of public engagement (talk radio, consumer malls, cyberspace, and so forth)” (36). “Artificiality” is of the essence of simulations. Similarly, Boggs discusses the high priest of simulation, Jean Baudrillard, at despairing length (214-15), and Baudrillard’s claims that western cultures are increasingly simulational are the basis for Boggs’s complaints.

Political discourse today is largely a simulational experience. Boggs would seem to agree in identifying public discourse as “less relevant to what is actually happening in the world or to any conceivable policy outcomes,” although he would be unlikely to call the simulational terrain one of “politics” (2). Nevertheless, one can find acknowledgment here and there in Boggs that issues formerly debated on public platforms in the park are now being enacted in simulations. He complains of the 1991 Gulf War becoming a “television
sight” (83) – but he does not consider the extent to which Americans may well have been doing politics as they tuned into the video game world that television created out of that conflict. Likewise, he acknowledges that issues of power and freedom might be expressed in dance clubs, but he does not see how such expressions might be political (220).

Instead, Boggs reads the sealed off terrain of simulation as being “enmeshed in private preoccupations (whether excessive television viewing, Web surfing, or ‘shopping ‘til you drop’)” (47). Boggs understands that “American politics” has become “another manifestation of the theatrical spectacle – irrelevant but amusing” (4). He refers to “the shallowness of the political spectacle – of politics as part media culture, part marketing venture, part entertainment” (66). I suggest that the simulational nature of the theater is indeed characteristic of politics today. People watch political talk shows, presidential debates, and political news coverage not with a view to how the signs that comprise those events represent real events elsewhere, but so as to enter a simulational terrain on which the shows, debates, and news are consumed on their own terms and for their own sakes.

I have suggested that representation is a theory of mediation as well as of politics. Similarly, simulation can also be a theory of mediation. I return here to Marshall McLuhan’s early formulation of a medium as “any extension of the self.” Note how much that definition is unconcerned with representation. It invites us to think of a medium as an extension of the terrain of the self, whether physical or psychological. The player of a video game may be understood as extending the self into the game on the screen through the medium of the game and its apparatus. A medium becomes a ground into which one extends the self, often with the expectation of meeting others who have similarly extended their selves. This theory of media accommodates a view of media as a place or apparatus set apart, which is a simulational view.

But we need to complicate our view of simulation as sealed off, for the signs which make up a simulation carry some sort of reference with them, for how else would one recognize the setting for this particular video game as a castle? The reference is indirect, to castles as a type, in general. But an indirect reference or effect can nevertheless be important. A simulation can coach in its participants dispositions and attitudes that have powerful if indirect effects on the conduct of real life. Airplane pilots are trained in simulators precisely so that the skills and habits they acquire in the simulation will carry over into real life; but the carryover must be indirect, since the signs of flight that surround them refer to no immediate reality.

I suggest that simulational politics likewise instills in its participants dispositions and attitudes with powerful but indirect effects on real life. A distinction that will help us to understand this is a distinction between rhetoric and politics with structural versus functional effects. If a television commercial selling deodorant has a functional effect, it will move an audience to make an immediate, focused decision to purchase that deodorant. But if the advertisement has a structural effect, it will contribute to a long term, sedimented audience predisposition to value a neutral body odor as a sign of good hygiene, and to believe that hygiene in general may be achieved through commodities. Those fundamental predispositions provide a structure within which the specific function of selling a particular brand of deodorant may proceed. Likewise, a political advertisement that urges one to vote for Jones the Republican may proceed. Likewise, a political advertisement that urges one to vote for Jones the Republican seeks the functional effect of ushering Jones into office, but it may have the structural effect of reinforcing in an audience the conviction that voting matters, that the election process is legitimate, and that the Republican party is a legitimate choice for voting – all those provide a structural framework within which many electoral choices are situated as functions of the structure.
I suggest that simulational politics is not meant for particular functional decisions precisely because so much of politics is bracketed away as generally acceptable. There is little point in passionate argument over the condition of the schools because, in most perceptions, that condition is acceptable enough. Instead, an audience that gets its politics from watching made-for-television movies of the civil rights struggle, or of the difficulties encountered by a lesbian couple, or of a poor family facing layoff, is engaging in a simulational politics that is affecting attitudes and predispositions about race, sexuality, and economics at a structural level. In this way simulational politics is indirectly important. Working in a world of bracketed acceptance of most pressing political decisions, simulational politics takes the long view.

Boggs is attuned to a politics that works at a functional level, I believe. He attacks “identity politics” as unable to “give rise to transformations in the class and power relations of society as a whole” (233). But I believe that identity politics, especially worked out in mediated simulations of film and television shows that explore what it means to have identities keyed to race, gender, and so forth, do indeed have an effect precisely at the structural level of class and power relations, if not at the functional level of today’s particular decisions. And while Boggs’s remedies for “reversing the downward spiral” are largely designed to enable a functional politics (255-67), I suggest that we need to be attuned to the possibility of a vigorous structural politics being played out on a mediated simulational terrain.

Politics is Erotic

The subtitle of Boggs’s book, and an ongoing theme in his argument, is corporate power and hegemony. He claims that “traditional civic-mindedness has been subverted by an array of overpowering forces, first and foremost by corporate power” (ix). Boggs argues throughout the book that power is being exercised by corporations rather than by legitimately elected governments. These “giant entities actually begin to constitute a new public sphere of their own” (69). The “corporate agenda…does have all the coherence the party system lacks” in our times (28). That corporate agenda is clearly linked to “the mass media itself [which] has become little more than an extension of corporate agendas” (111). Yet I do not believe that Boggs reveals any clear mechanism by which such corporate power is created and maintained, nor how such a mechanism connects to today’s simulational, mediated politics.

I believe that the engine driving corporate success is an order of desire, or as Gilles DeLeuze and Felix Guattari, or Herbert Marcuse, would describe it, an erotic. Pre-industrial economies were motivated by survival, in most cases: a society’s productive capacity pretty much kept up with what people had to have in order to survive; surpluses were always in peril. Today’s industrial capacity is exponentially beyond need, and must therefore be fueled by desire. Corporate hegemony maintains itself by keeping the public in a constant state of desire. The dominant motive in the public is therefore gratification of pleasure. Boggs is aware of the centrality of that motive as “the pleasure principle,” but he complains of it (129). Let me suggest that it will not do for academics to feel superior to such an order of desire, for if a public chooses to be moved by desire for pleasure rather than by religious fervor or nationalistic jingoism, who are we to judge?

A major site of gratification of pleasure today is entertainment (Gabler, Postman). The ascendance of erotics, of the order of desire, can be seen clearly in public engrossment with film, television, video games, and so forth. Boggs correctly notes corporate domi-
nation in public and private life today, but it will help our understanding to realize that this domination is fueled in large part through a public desire for entertainment. This erotic is then expressed through many if not all dimensions of life. Even purchases of ordinary commodities such as food and clothing become linked to the erotic of entertainment, as shoes are acquired for their resonance with famous athletes, and food may be chosen for its connection with exotic places. Corporations are dominant because they scratch the public itch for entertainment.

The most powerful and most desired entertainments, I suggest, are precisely those conveyed to the public through simulational media. Simulation is strongly influenced by aesthetic values which undergird the satisfaction of desire for pleasure. Especially when considering the mediated nature of simulation, the ability to create an aesthetic environment that seems technically similar to reality is highly valued. Hence, while simulation has always been available to people through novels, plays, and so forth, it is the rapidly rising technical quality of today’s simulations that make it such an appealing terrain for all sorts of experiences – including politics. Simulational engrossment is where pleasure is sold to the public today. Even in homes, the two speaker hi fi system of yesterday has given way to total entertainment, surround-sound systems and big screen televisions designed to create simulational experiences.

People will struggle politically over what they want, and they will struggle on the terrains where they feel closest to what they want. Once most fundamental political decisions having to do with material life are bracketed away into acceptability, people enter a simulational terrain. That is what they care about and hence, that is where we should expect political struggles. The fates of nations, characters, and struggles on the entertainment screens, within those simulational worlds, are what engross people now. Whether Bill gets impeached, whether the contestants get off the island, whether racism is overcome on the soap opera is where political struggles now occur. And these issues are worth struggling over not only because that is where people invest their desires now, but because those struggles create effects at a structural level outside, in the material world. Boggs decries a lack of public debate over gun violence even as he observes increasing preoccupation with gun violence on television and in film (147). But I think he misses the fact that it is precisely on the latter, simulated, mediated terrain that political struggle over that and so many other issues is taking place.

Politics is also expressed in what one buys. Very often that is the purchase of entertainment, specifically, the purchase of mediated simulations. Sometimes it is expressed in the purchase of commodities that gratify pleasure. If it becomes "cool to be Black," and the purchase of signs of African and African-American culture achieve high rank in an erotic, who is to say that the purchase of hip-hop CD’s and Fubu clothing is not political expression and struggle?

It is no wonder that both simulational mediation and politics are now governed almost entirely by the same measure, the same denominator, namely the opinion poll. Elections have become but the Poll of Most Importance. The poll is losing its representational importance just as media is becoming less representational, and both are moving toward simulation: the poll results are now what people struggle over politically, they are not a reflection of political struggles happening elsewhere. The extraordinary attunement of politicians, or at least American politicians, to approval ratings (which are publicized regularly) is identical to the Nielsen ratings of the most watched television shows. Political struggle still works, when a president or governor’s show is cancelled after only one four year season.
Politics is Local

People do not, of course, live their whole lives on terrains of simulational media. When engaged in direct political action, I think that people are indeed working less and less in traditional political modes and discourses. I am inclined to agree with Boggs’s assessment of the decline of the public sphere as traditionally understood. Politics has rushed off of the public platform, in the direction of simulated mediation on one side, but in the direction of the immediate, personal, and local on the other side.

The local and personal manifestation of politics today may well be less than it has been in the past, as reflected in Putnam’s analysis of the decline of civic organizations, social clubs, and so forth. But Putnam may also be looking for political, civic engagement in traditional forms and hence miss other local expressions of the political dimension of humanity. I suggest that struggle continues in the micro-local contexts of backyard politics, of neighborly and family relationships, of negotiations over wandering dogs, unkempt lawns, or PTA elections.

What is the rise of gang membership, at least in the United States, over the last few decades but a rise in local political involvement? Unable to affect events at city hall, much less in Washington, the urban, disenfranchised poor may well be expressing their political inclinations in simulational video games on the one hand, and in involvement in local polities of Bloods and Latin Knights on the other hand. If Boggs is looking for politics on a larger scale, he may dismiss these local political terrains as “individual or privatized outlooks” (19), as “privatized retreat” (163), or at best as “micro politics” (209). Boggs is well aware of “an intricate and quasi-underground gang structure” (199), but he sees it only as a sign of “deep alienation” and not as a site of political activity.

In sum, I have suggested here that the reported death of politics may be instead a shift of the natural and indestructible human propensity for politics into the micro-politics of local activity on the one hand, and into the terrain of simulational mediation on the other hand. Let me suggest that this move, much as it may horrify academics, the People of the Book and the Speech, is perfectly consistent with most people’s perceptions and desires. Critics may complain of this all they like, may contend that people should be engaging more in traditional political discourses on traditional political terrains. But if these critics want anybody to hear them, ought they not likewise be entertaining people in simulations? Would Boggs and his brethren not reach a wider audience with production of the video game, Depoliticization: Enter the Public Sphere of Doom?

Notes

1. Other scholars, of course, have likewise suggested ways to understand new political practices in an increasingly mediated culture. See Chris Hables Gray and Diana Saco.

References


A COUNTER-STATEMENT TO DEPOLITICIZATIONS

Promote or Protect? Perspectives on Media Literacy and Media Regulations. Cecilia von Feilitzen & Ulla Carlsson (Eds) Price Paperback: SEK 250 € 25, $ 25 (+ p & p)


The International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media
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Articles

based on papers presented at the 16th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research
Intermedial Passages
in Time and Space

Contexts, Currents and Circuits of Media Consumption

JOHAN FORNÄS

Media are tools for communicating across space and time. They are technologies of culture, socially organised machineries for constructing meanings, identities and forms of power. Media use is always spatially and temporally located, while simultaneously both representing and effectively shaping space and time. Each specific media use is also anchored in multiple networks of mediation, where single media are intrinsically interconnected and interdependent. A critical cultural studies perspective on mediated communication acknowledges its powerful social and spatial contexts, its shifting temporal processes and its open and heterogeneous internal structures.

Experiences from the large Swedish media ethnographic Passages project highlight some consequences of such a perspective for media and communication studies at large.\(^1\) I will focus on three aspects that became central to this interdisciplinary project and that invite reworking key perspectives within current media studies in general, relating to some basic spatial, temporal and relational aspects of mediated communication. The project worked as a collective research team, combining multifarious methods and perspectives in a study of media use in everyday practices. The starting-point was a large shopping centre, where a wide range of media genres and media users were present. The rich results can be summarised along three main dimensions. (1) Starting in a specific place made it possible to develop an awareness of the spatial aspects of media use. (2) Following the temporal processes of media use from beginning to end acknowledged the processual character of encounters between media and people. (3) Looking for intermedial relations between media types and genres was a way to avoid isolating and reifying any of them. I will in turn discuss some preliminary conclusions for media studies at large that can be drawn in each of these directions, based on a selection of findings.

1. Spatial Contexts of Media Places
Cultural phenomena are defined by the communicative interplay between people and media in specific settings, as identities, meanings and power are produced in multiple and dynamic triplets of subjects, texts and contexts.\(^2\) Much research in traditional media studies starts with one particular medium, media genre or even an individual text, investigating how it is structured, produced, distributed or used by different people in various cir-

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cumstances. Thus, there are studies of genres, industries or uses of television, or of the press, of news, of docuseries or even of some particular TV series. Research on reception has instead often chosen to focus on specific categories, groups or even individuals as media users, in order to see how they interact with some kinds of media in different places. There are thus studies of the media worlds of children, of immigrants and of families. The Passages project chose to instead let a specific physical place and social space define its research field. This made it possible to see other things and to acknowledge how a wide range of media and of people cross each other’s passages and flows, instead of isolating them from each other.

Deciding to start in a specific spatial setting, rather than with one particular medium or genre, or one single category or group of media users, was not a totally unique decision. Growing efforts are made in social anthropology, interactionist sociology and cultural geography to use ethnographic methods to understand localised media practices in everyday life, and these efforts often tend to enter specific places and map out the media uses taking place there. Still, there are surprisingly few examples of competent media studies of complex communication processes in specific locations. This can partly be explained by a traditional division of work according to a habitual fixation to inherited media categories, so that scholars tend to reproduce the divisions between cultural industries (and their corresponding trade unions). But it may also be an effect of a general blindness to spatial contexts, and a tendency to treat media processes as if they took place in a placeless vacuum.

There are necessarily limitations to all approaches. Starting with a specific place where people meet media may well tend to reify that space and hide other kinds of surrounding or distant places through which these media and people also move. However, as a corrective to the research mainstream, a place-sensitive approach is definitely welcome. Also, certain places are extraordinarily open to and densely crossed by plural flows of media and people, thus inviting a problematisation of the very concepts of place and space as such. The Passages project chose one such kind of space – a shopping centre. First, shopping centres are made to attract wide sets of potential consumers, and thus are not monopolised by very specific social groups, in terms of age, gender, profession, class, ethnicity or cultural taste. Second, they also aim to trade a wide range of media commodities, while also being the setting for use (by visitors, customers, employees and management) of even further kinds of media within the walls of the centre. Third, shopping centres have inherited from the classical 19th century arcades the ambivalent characteristics of being “house no less than street”. Some visitors make themselves at home and experience centres as bounded spaces with a strong local identity, while others just pass through them, hardly noticing their walls and borders. And while some media are sold or used in ways that help constructing the centre as a delimited space, others do not respect its borders at all. For instance, ads in magazines and on posters will mediate the identifying slogans of the centre, and the photo shop may be filled with images of local celebrities that constantly remind customers of where they are in geography. On the other hand, media chain stores for records, pictures or computer games may not particularly mark out the peculiarities of a certain locality, and a mobile phone user may walk through a centre entrance without paying any notice of that threshold. Centres are thus at once places and non-places: local unities as well as crossroads for open-ended currents of commodities and people.

Shopping centres certainly differ in their degree of social, medial and spatial openness. Some are rather narrow in scope, geared towards specialised population strata or
with a very limited range of media shops, or in architecture and design circumscribing that potential transient openness which big market places have historically always offered. Solna Centre near Stockholm was carefully selected for containing the widest possible range of media stores and visitor categories. It also turned out to be designed and used in highly open ways.

The interplay between people and media – including so-called new media – are always spatially contextualised, in spite of the inherent transgressivity of communication. Places frame and delimit media uses, which at the same time form spatialities as meaningful geographic places and social worlds.

First, all media use is spatially located, framed and determined. On one hand, there are material and technical limitations related to access of electricity, network coverage etc. Books and papers tend to dissolve under water and cannot be read in the dark. Before transistors, light-weight batteries, micro electronics and the establishment of far-reaching radiation nets, radio, television, records, telephones and computers were all strictly bound to fixed and mostly indoor stations for use, and there still are geographic or climate conditions where they normally do not work. On the other hand, there are functional and social limitations as well. It is hard to watch movies on the dance floor or the football arena – at least for the dancers and players in question. It is impolite to let your phone ring while holding a lecture or making love. Likewise, when media can (and are) used, the place of use interferes with that use, affecting the interpretations made. The place of reading, listening or viewing is not neutral to the meaning or pleasure that media texts offer. Having read a text at home, at school, in the subway or on vacation makes a difference to how you experience it. For my own part, I can actually in my memory directly connect many books I have read to the exact places where I read them: on some train or beach which continues to be for me forever mentally bound to that particular text. And even when such links are not consciously remembered, they make a difference to interpretation that is too rarely acknowledged and explored in media studies.

Second, media represent places and spaces, and afford them meaning. In our project, we found many examples of mediated “place identities” – media texts representing a location and associating it with historical, cultural and social meanings. In fact, no place or space can ever be thought or experienced in a pure way, without such symbolic meanings attached. We may try to experience a building or a street in a raw, physical and “meaning-less” manner, but being human beings, we are doomed to culture, bound to always make interpretations, so that our experiences will always immediately be coloured by signifying associations. Not all is already language, but all tends continuously to be drawn into meaning-making. The centre itself was in one respect a nontextual structure of cement and glass, framing material movements of things and organisms, but it was always also more or less consciously understood and experienced as a kind of text – read by management and visitors alike to mean different things. And this faculty of making meaning was actively played with in all architecture and design. In the other direction, all media texts repeatedly refer to spatial forms and symbolically reconstruct them as virtual spaces. The spaces narrated, depicted or implicitly referred to in computer games, posters or film music interact with the spaces in which this media are used. This interaction is sometimes rather arbitrary, but at other times deliberately planned and utilised in order to modify spatial identification. The shopping centre used web pages, ads, signposts, placards and mural paintings to remind of historical events that located the centre as a unique place and invested it with intentionally positive meanings, in order to attract visitors and make them eager to consume there. Solna Centre identified itself by
referring to Solna’s popular football team (AIK) and to its honourable history as the cradle of Swedish film production. Such references in and around the centre marked out its identity and its difference from competing centres. Some visitors were attracted to that local identity, identifying with the place and its history, while others might be repelled, for instance if they had another favourite team. There were also internal tensions in how the centre depicted itself in its marketing, for instance between the stress on “feeling at home” and the wish to create a sense of excitement with the alternate slogan that the centre was supposed to be a “centre of events”.6

Third, media uses created social spaces within the centre. A study of mobile phones showed how they formed talk spaces that intersected geographical space: bound physically distant places together while drawing circles around the talking individual, separating her or him from the surrounding others who could not hear the distant voice and were not expected to interfere in the dialogue. Persons reading papers on a bench likewise were surrounded by a kind of invisible and silent halo that socially prevented others from disturbing their reading. Social communicative rules for media use sometimes changed abruptly when crossing entrances to the centre and to various stores and other spaces. The library was for example full of little signs forbidding mobile phone talk, and the books and papers found there could be read and borrowed but not sold, in contrast to the bookshop offering. Places of and for media use (street, library, magazine shop etc.) were dialectically intertwined with places in media use – those virtual arenas constructed in media use and those distant places to which media connected. Talking in a phone or reading a paper you could connect to people and events far away, for instance in your old home town if you were immigrant from a foreign part of Sweden or another continent. Certain places in the centre were like doors that opened up for such transitional and often transnational connections, and echoes from those distant places sort of vibrated also in the various media shops, through sounds, images and memories reminding of somewhere else.

All these intersecting ways in which media use related to spatial localisation were also fields of struggle for power over space. There were continuous struggles between individual shops and chains, centre staff and management, producers and distributors, and visitors and customers of different kinds. The commercial interests of market agents intersected conflictually with public interests administered by state and municipality institutions and with private and public interests in civil society, defended by individuals, groups, associations and media. Not only did senior citizens and shop owners quarrel about the number of benches for resting; there were also contradictory views on the balance between public art and commercial ads in the cityscape of a centre that was simultaneously a town centre and a shopping centre. Another line of debate related to the amount of freedom of expression for political and other associations on the squares and streets that had been made indoor spaces with the adding of a glass roof in 1989. Issues of communication thus related to issues of public and communal versus private and commercial space.

The decision to start in a specific place, and specifically in a large and complex place like a shopping centre, had crucial methodological implications for the project. First, starting in a place made participant observation a main source of knowledge, mapping out the flows and structures at large, rather than beginning with individual ideas or media texts. Interviews and textual interpretation were also used intensely, but the observational aspects of ethnography had a certain priority. Second, the size and complexity of the place made group work necessary. Collectivity was developed into a conscious tool for knowledge production, demanding a high degree of careful planning and engineering of
the research team. The lessons from this large work have been reflected upon in the project’s last Swedish volume, edited by social anthropologist Lena Gemzöe and dealing with media ethnography in relation to issues of reflexive anthropology. Some such issues are the concept of field in globalised late modern network society; the implication of a cultural studies perspective for media ethnography; hermeneutic ethnography versus methodological fetishism; agency and structure in fieldwork; role conflicts in fieldwork at home; uses of photography to visualise the field; historical sources in contemporary fieldwork; and administrative, social and scientific aspects of organising interdisciplinary project collectivity.

Starting in a specific space as open and ambiguous as a shopping centre not only dissolved some artificial boundaries between media types and between groups of media users, but also problematised basic concepts like space and place, border and movement, field and locality. This connected well to recent theory development in media anthropology and cultural geography, where the attention to mediatisation, migration, globalisation and transnational flows has questioned routine ways of conceiving fieldwork as a focused visit to one foreign and well defined location. The intensified flows of people, commodities and media across space make such assumptions obsolete, demanding new ways of defining the object as well as the methods of research. What is a field, if not a bounded area? How to ethnographically study cultural flows that seem to respect no geographical boundaries, while still remaining conscious of the continuing importance of spatial locations? The collective media ethnography of the Passages project came to grip with key issues in recent anthropology, but it also took part in the development of media studies, where there is also an ongoing discussion on the values and problems of ethnographic methods. The project highlighted neglected spatial aspects of media and communication processes, showing multifarious ways in which spaces and places frame and are formed by media use.

2. Temporal Currents of Media Consumption

Secondly, the decision to look at media use in the shopping centre environment drew attention to the specific use forms related to consumption of commodities. This hinted at a problematic of currents of media consumption, i.e., the temporal processes involved when people interact with media. Deciding not to freeze media use into still moments of reception, made it possible to investigate the shifting passages through which media and people encounter each other. This meant restoring the full arc of consumption acts that have been sadly bifurcated by the division between consumption research and media studies: from (selection and) purchase to use (and disposal). These two areas of research have developed with remarkably little mutual contact, and they start with completely different concepts of consumption. In most of research on shopping and consumption – whether marketing and economic or anthropological and cultural studies – consumption is understood mainly as the selection and acquisition of commodities or services, involving a transfer of money. However, in research on media use – whether in political economy or cultural studies kinds of reception studies – consumption is instead understood as the use of these goods. This means for instance buying or renting a video in the first case, watching it in the second. Daniel Miller’s anthology Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies (1995) is an interesting example, where all chapters treat consumption as acts of purchase, except the final one by David Morley on “Consumption theories in media studies”, which only treats consumption as use. This total contrast
in the definition of consumption does not even seem to be noted by the editor or any of the authors involved.

This is again a polydimensional interface where media use is both framed by time limits and take actively part in representing time and in making time. Several kinds of temporal frames to media use were found, which simultaneously also created and recreated temporalities.

First, media use is always located in time, bound to time. It is organised in daily, weekly, annual, generational and life-span cycles, slightly different for each kind of medium – and for each individual. I read the paper for breakfast, start working at the computer in the morning, listen to radio news at lunch, make some afternoon phone calls, listen to a cd and watch evening television and then read a book at bedtime. Media correlate to my daily life rhythms, and even help organise them so that I am in phase with the surrounding world. Also, each act of media consumption takes its definite time. Watching a poster or postcard image may take just an instant, while reading a book, watching a movie or following a soap opera occupies a very different time span.

Media consumption acts are processual practices, and cannot be reduced to those focal acts of reception alone. They are prolonged and dispersed chains of encounters between people and media, comprising at least four consecutive phases of shifting length, character and location, and which might be broken off at any stage. First, there is the phase of selection, where you hear about a certain software or hardware product and start thinking about buying it. Then comes the actual act of purchase, exchanging money for the commodity in question. This is followed by the use, and the process ends with some kind of disposal, through destruction, sale or gift. Paying attention to these processes and phases of media consumption made it possible to discern important differences and relations between media uses.

Consumption processes are densely intertwined, as open sets of media and people cross each other’s paths through various times and spaces. Through a shopping centre like that in Solna, a great number of media commodities and human beings pass in and out at all moments. These passages give rise to an immense number of different kinds of meetings, where people meet people (interaction, identification), media meet media (intermediality, intertextuality) and people meet media (consumption, interpretation, representation). It is worth analysing for different sets of media and people in what pace and place each phase of consumption occurs. Some phases are fast, others slow, some are located in public places, others at home. Also, the forms of consumption differs. Media (texts as well as machines) can be bought, hired, borrowed, stolen, self-made or received as a gift. Some media are sold as commodities, others offered as common public goods (for instance as loans in a library), yet others transferred as interpersonal gifts. Those media commodities that are sold and used in discrete units may be called “simple”: books, journals and printed pictures. Other media are “double” in that their use require a combination of software (texts) and hardware (decoding machines): radio, television, records, videos, telephones, computers. Sales may be organised by the piece (books) or through some kind of subscription (journals, television). Among double media, the software units may be packaged as things (materially separable units, like tapes or records) or as flows (as with broadcast media). Some such differentiations between single/dou-

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between countries and instances. Intricate social conventions regulate how media are supposed to circulate as various kinds of commodities, common goods, loans, private gifts and self-produced use values. All these variants can be further explored and systematised only with a careful attention to the temporal processes of intersecting consumption acts. Their significance is lost or misrepresented when consumption research is reduced to studies of shopping and media reception research focuses exclusively on the interpretations and uses of media texts.

The processes of media consumption that form multifarious temporal chains of acquisition and use also affect time at all levels, from present moments to historical memories that shape identities. Inspired by Walter Benjamin’s *Arcades Project*, the Passages project developed a historical perspective on how the past, present and future are combined when media structure modern daily life. This was not only a matter of registering statistical trends in media consumption, but also of acknowledging and interpreting the ways in which historical traces are present and reconstructed within today’s media world. Media *represent* and *recreate* different times: depict night and day, summer and winter, past and present, as *virtual times*. Nostalgia is only one obvious example of this mechanism whereby mediated and mediating texts colour and reconstruct memories, history and individual as well as collective identities.

There is no sharp limit between reproduction and production. Media not only represent “real” time and affords it specific meanings by reinforcing certain cultural associations. They clearly also *construct* and invent time, in particular through the collaboration between media time (the temporal processes of media use) and mediated time (temporalities represented in media texts). Let me just mention one such example: the way Solna Centre constructed the annual seasons. This indoor place was not strongly tied to the external seasons and weather conditions, but could at least well stretch the temporalities of the surrounding world within its own walls, with the aid of ventilation, light, decoration, ads and events. For instance, public communication from the centre constructed the seasons in such a way that winter hardly existed at all, while instead Christmas was treated as one long season of its own, from mid October to early February.

There are also important *methodological consequences* of these temporal aspects. In consumption research – whether social-economic or cultural-ethnographic – only the act of acquisition through purchase (shopping) is usually noticed. In media studies, on the other hand – again, whether of the political economy or the cultural studies variety – it is instead only the acts of use that are paid attention to, and then only those uses that have to do with interpretation of texts through reading, viewing or listening (reception). That gap is really obvious and annoying. Key works in consumption studies, like Miller (1998) and Miller et al. (1998), completely avoid to integrate issues of media use in their concepts of consumption, whereas media reception studies notoriously neglect the acts of shopping that are the prerequisite for interpretative reception. By mending the problematic gap between media and consumption research, one can fruitfully restore the full chains of consumption and acknowledge the many shapes and forms they each (and in every phase) may take. For consumption research, the challenge is to fully integrate media commodities but also to extend the scope of study to the uses made of what people shop. For media studies, the challenge is instead to include the acquisition of media commodities – and the key forms and effects of the commodity form itself in relation to communication practices – but also to include historical aspects and the production of temporality through media uses. In this way, reception studies may be enriched and developed into a wider understanding of how people and media interact in many different
ways, of which the work of interpretation taking place in reading, viewing and listening is only one particular use form among others (such as presents for others, self-mirroring or status-rising collecting, etc.) – even though it may be a core and even defining use value of cultural artefacts and media products. The combination of contemporary ethnographic fieldwork and an historical perspective inspired by Walter Benjamin was another interdisciplinary effort in this context.

3. Relational Circuits of Media Types

Third, instead of at the outset fixating a definite and limited set of media, the project included all possible kinds of media and media use found within the centre. This posed questions about what constitutes a communication medium. Those questions were studied both analytically (through a conceptual reworking of basic categories in relation to key theories) and in the field (people’s everyday understandings of the concept of media).

The very concept of “a medium” is surprisingly vague and commonly used in highly divergent senses. Some of the project’s informants shared the rather limited idea of much media research, focusing on press, radio and television. But most had quite different definitions, not only including telephones, homepages, computers and computer games, cameras, movies, videos, ads, CDs and books, but also copper threads or “everything one sees or hears”. In fact, the manager of the centre even talked about the whole centre as one big medium, its 9 million annual visitors who pass its windows, signs and posters in some way being comparable to the readers of a daily newspaper.15

A close reading of classical and contemporary texts in media studies actually offers little clarification when it comes to offering a useful and consistent definition of media.16 So much research is still tied to the journalistic practices of producing information and news, while systematically neglecting mass-produced genres like entertainment, fiction and games as well as interpersonal communication through phone, post or computer networks, or interactive/productive media uses like in photography or web pages. There is generally no theoretical justification for this, only a conventional habit to mirror the conventions and interests of certain media industries. This sad fact makes more general studies of mediated communication to a large extent absent in media and communication studies, relegated to other disciplines and fields like sociology, ethnology, anthropology, literary “media history” or separate departments for digital media.17 There are of course individual media scholars who find such basic theoretical work inspiring, but among dominant voices in the Nordic disciplinary mainstream, this is depressingly rare. Instead, conservative arguments are repeated for keeping media and communication studies confined to political science approaches to news genres in press and broadcasting, and for marginalising broader perspectives inspired by cultural studies, cultural sociology, social anthropology, gender studies and Internet studies. This aggressive fencing-off may be seen as a defence against acknowledging a paradigmatic crisis in that disciplinary mainstream itself, but it has sad material results in effectively shutting dissidents out from any strong position in the field. Actually, a wider sense of media would offer a better chance to see how specific media – including those favoured by conventional media studies – function in a wider context in a late modern world where all media forms are in practice closely interrelated.

Media industries and research have conventional ways to define and differentiate media types. These boundaries – both the external ones around what may function as media and the internal ones between different media – are challenged by technical, social and cultural transformations, in particular by the intermedial flows and hybrids that
have been intensified by the development of digital and telecom technology. The *Passages* studies made visible a series of such cooperative practices, border cases and fusions that highlighted limitations of traditional categories. There was a close connection between the need for theoretical reflection on basic media concepts, the demand for studying a much wider set of media and the importance of acknowledging various kinds of intermedial crossings.

The Danish book market expert Hans Hertel, among others, has found tendencies towards a *media symbiosis*, suggesting that cultural circuits are increasingly closely connected by a “media lift”, which transports specific works, characters, narratives and genres up or down across various borders and hierarchies that previously seemed relatively stable. Late modern tendencies toward media *convergence* are not limited to digital media, though these form a push factor in that process. Coding in digital form enables technical, institutional and textual fusions, creating new multimedia but also new intermedial connections. Some interplays between media are *intertextual*, others *extratextual*, depending on whether two textual units or two material apparatuses are related to each other or not. A novel can tell about fateful phone calls or mention a specific film narrative, but it may also just happen to be placed beside a postcard in the bookshop window. Textual connections can in their turn relate to aspects of either *form* or *content*, in that either stylistic design or semantic levels are activated. A further distinction is between those intermedialities founded on (substantial or formal) *similarity* and those based on (spatial or functional) *proximity* between the two media. In practice however, real media relations are impure mixtures of these main types. For instance, similarity often makes proximity possible – and vice versa.

The interplay between media can occur with a varying degree of intensity and activity, from simple connection, over some kind of exchange, to a more thorough transformation of the media involved. Another distinction may be made according to how symmetric the relation is between the two. The multiplication of these two dimensions results in six main types of intermediality.

When two media or media texts are only passively compared to each other without being affected or transformed themselves, there is a relatively simple relation of *grouping*. Media and/or texts may be treated as similar or related in some way, based on their perceived similarity or proximity, or some mixture of them both. One example is when texts are combined into genres according to some principle of affinity, for instance on the shelves of a CD store, a library, or in the consumer’s home.

When both media are activated in a combined action or joint use practice, which still respects their distinct identities, there is, some form of multimedral *co-operation*. One example is when texts accompany and fuse with other texts, such as prefaces, commentaries and covers to videos or records, or when films, books, papers, radio and television programmes work as a joint ensemble to push each others in promoting a certain phenomenon, with Harry Potter and Disney film characters as well-known examples.

An even more radical (but still symmetric) combination of two previously separate media forms and practices fuses them into a single multimedral hybrid unit. Obvious examples of such fusion are of course offered by digital technologies (computers, web phones) in which several previously distinct forms may be seamlessly combined.

If fusion is an intense but symmetric combination of two media, *substitution* may be regarded as an equally radical but asymmetric one. CDs may not fully have replaced vinyls, but computers have almost superseded typewriters and who uses old kinds of duplicating machines when there is the photocopier?
Co-operation may be regarded as an active kind of grouping, where different media (texts) still remain relatively separate and unchanged as such. It may however also include some form of transfer where one medium or text more actively engages with, integrates and transforms forms and/or contents from another one. (a) This kind of intermediality may take the form of intertextual references – direct quotations, pastiche works or hidden allusions – to texts deriving from some other medium. (b) A second sub-type consists of translations of whole works, of specific narratives or of more general themes and genres between media: Dracula or the detective genre moving from novels to films to computer games, or images moving from photos to posters. (c) A third category is the remediation processes whereby new media forms imitate older ones, borrowing intratextual (formal) or extratextual (material) characteristics (rather than semantics or narratives) from an older medium.20

Finally, thematization is a kind of asymmetric, hierarchic or reflexive transfer where the active medium explicitly thematizes another medium, based on a symbolic representation of that medium, rather than an imitation of its aspects. There is a range of genres here, from essays of cultural critique and book reviews in magazines to representations of phones and television in ads or literary fiction or as material artefacts (candy, key-chains).

The six types are interrelated in that they combine two axes: symmetry and activity. Symmetrical combinations can be radical as in fusion, active but respecting distinctions as in co-operation, or rather passive as in grouping. Asymmetrical relations can likewise be radical substitutions, active transfers where both media remain distinct, or thematizations where what is transferred does not basically affect the other medium in which is incorporated. Fusion, co-operation and grouping are symmetrical combinations of media side by side. Substitution, transfer and thematization are asymmetrical relations, where one medium acts on another rather than the reverse.

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<th>Symmetric combinations (A + B)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Fusion</td>
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<td>Exchange</td>
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<td>Connection</td>
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These six intermedial forms – fusion, substitution, co-operation, transfer, grouping and thematization – are in practice often combined. A border case is when a medium is used to store or spread texts for another medium. When televised films are recorded on video, or when Internet or post services distribute all kinds of media texts – either as physical units (like books or records) or in digital form for use in various machines (mp3-files or e-books) – this is both an active co-operation and a transfer of one media content through another mediating channel. Remediating transfers may further include moments of explicit thematization. And when media texts are accompanied by follow-up stories, advertisements, and related commodities like toys or t-shirts, this supplementary circulation extends and intervenes in the reception process, thus affecting the meanings constructed around the primary text and implying a dialectical play of articulation where transfer and co-operation mingle. The boundaries between media are continuously crossed in everyday practices; but then, they are also continuously reinforced by more or less subtle demarcations of old or new differences between media circuits.
Media convergence and media lifts imply an intensified transfer and co-operation between media. When such co-operation is more or less permanently institutionalised, new “multimedia” arise out of a symbiosis of previously separate media. Since borders between media circuits are flexible and diffuse, all talk of intermediality is necessarily provisional and spatiotemporally situated. New media often are first perceived and used as hybrid combinations of their predecessors, until the new forms have gained independent status. And all such relations can either be general and typical for whole media groups or genres, or be particular characteristics of individually staged media encounters. The connection between television and video is for instance a much more general rule than a specific quotation of a poem in a particular computer game.

Media circuits thus notoriously leak into one another. Each medium is in itself intrinsically mixed, incorporating elements of others. Media also work closely together in all production and consumption phases, including shopping and use, as well as in their textual formats (CD covers including lyrics and photos etc.). And they are distributed, sold and used together in book shops, libraries etc. An expanded media concept let us scrutinize how media circuits are kept apart and but also interconnected in communicative practices of various kinds. By not taking received media types for granted, it is possible to see those mechanisms through which media circuits are produced as separate and then again intermedially combined at all stages and levels, from production to use and from single texts to whole industrial branches.

Methodologically, such insights demand increasing traffic between media research, aesthetic theory and research on digital media. There is a need for intensified conceptual work, but also for empirical research on neglected but socially important media forms like photography, books and phonograms, and on various kinds of intermedial relations.

Passages
In conclusion, our experiences from the Passages project call for a multidimensional renewal of media and communication studies. There is a need for empirical expansion into neglected but key phenomena, including non-journalistic media and hybrid forms as well as spatial and temporal dimensions of media use. It is time to acknowledge the spatial and temporal localisation of media uses, but also the ways in which media represent and produce spatialities and temporalities. It is time to stop marginalising media forms outside press and broadcasting, and to focus on cooperation, flows and mixtures between different media. There is also a need for methodological innovation, where collective and reflexive media ethnography is one option among many. A more brave and intense theoretical updating is also needed, exploring some heterodox directions that are sadly absent in today’s media and communication disciplines. Intensified interdisciplinary dialogues would be profitable with fields like cultural studies, postcolonial studies, gender and queer theory, science and literature studies, actor-network theory and consumption studies, as well as with disciplines like computer science, anthropology, geography, history, literature and other arts disciplines. Fencing oneself off from ongoing developments in these fields is damagingly counterproductive, in particular in a period when mediatisation are making them all increasingly aware of and interesting in understanding media-related phenomena. Instead of hiding away in a narrowly defined and petrified understanding of its own knowledge field, media and communication studies could have a key role to play in this emerging world of mediation.
Notes

1. After an initiating conference in 1996 and a full-scale project start in 1998, with funding from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (Riksbankens Jubileumsfond), the interdisciplinary research team has for five years empirically investigated interacting processes of communication and consumption in a specific shopping centre. The handful of senior researchers in the core group had a basis in media and communication studies but also each a foot in other disciplines like gender studies, sociology, musicology, literature and the arts. A shifting set of co-researchers – in all a dozen scholars from anthropology, ethnology, economic history, communication and media studies – joined the group for certain periods in order to add specific studies to the primitively evolving project body. Results are reported in four Swedish books (Bjurström et al. 2000, Becker et al. 2001 and 2002, Gemzöe 2004) and one English volume (Becker et al. forthcoming) plus an interactive/hypertextual cd-rom disk, distributed with the last two volumes.

2. The spatial terms like “space”, “place”, “room” and “locality” are notoriously vague and polysemic, partly due to the dense superposition of metaphorical uses of them (Fornäs 1995: 49ff; also Becker et al. 2002: 38ff). I will here roughly stick to the widespread practice to let “space” denote a more abstract extension while “place” indicates a more specific and precisely located geographical position.

3. For examples and overviews, see Askew & Wilk (2002) and Ginsburg et al. (2002).

4. Benjamin (1982/1999: 10; see also 406: “Arcades are houses or passages having no outside – like the dream”).

5. Langer (1953) offers a fascinating theory of virtuality as the basis for cultural imagination (virtual space, time, powers, life, memory, history, etc.), long before the cybercultural inflation of the word; see Fornäs et al. (2002: 29ff).

6. These issues were thoroughly discussed by Hillevi Ganetz, Karin Becker, Erling Bjurström and myself in Becker et al. (2001, 2002 and forthcoming). See also Goss (1993).


10. On the crucial distinction between media use and consumption, see Bjurström et al. (2000: 143ff and 158ff), Becker et al. (2002: 304ff), but also Williams (1976/1988: 78f).

11. This is developed in much greater detail in Bjurström et al. (2000: 42ff and 143ff) and Becker et al. (2001: 311ff, 2002: 302ff and forthcoming).


13. This was analysed by Hillevi Ganetz in Becker et al. (2001: 229ff).

14. Rare exceptions may be found in some studies of advertising, such as Nava et al. (1997), or in studies of cultural aspects of for instance book markets, such as Hertel (1996/1997), Radway (1997), Furuland & Svedjedal (1997) or Svedjedal (2000).

15. Interviews with centre visitors were made and analysed by Martina Ladendorf in Becker et al. (2001: 354ff). The manager’s ideas were interpreted in my own contributions (Becker et al. 2001: 159 och 326).


References


Becker, Karin; Bjurström, Erling; Fornäs, Johan & Ganetz, Hillevi (forthcoming) *Consuming Media*.


What follows is an intervention into what may be termed an increasing globalization of audience studies. Prompted by technological, economic and legal changes in media and ICT production, more media scholars frame even local audience studies within a global framework of understanding, a framing that serves to refract familiar theoretical issues within new empirical sets of realities.

My empirical focus is on the ways in which young and adult audiences articulate and try to understand the complex universe of the Walt Disney Company, one of the oldest media giants and still one of the largest. More specifically, the article addresses some of the most obvious aspects of globalization in the Disney universe as seen from the perspective of audiences in Denmark. Here, along with the rest of Northern Europe, since the early 1990s animated film and tv have taken priority over print media, here a theme park in 1992 first came within geographical and financial reach of many people (Euro Disney, renamed Disneyland Paris in 1994 and Disneyland Resort Paris in 2002), and here promotion and merchandising strategies have been drastically intensified as is the case with other affluent global markets within the potential reach of the Disney corporation. This transformation is centrally due to the drastic reorganization of the Walt Disney Company, a reorganization that took place from the mid-1980s on when the so-called “team Disney”, led by CEO Michael Eisner, initiated an explicitly global synergy in production, distribution and promotion (Wasko 2001).

One can rarely ask audiences directly about media globalization, especially when audiences are very young. Analytical issues have to be transformed into empirical questions. Among those to be answered in the following are: How do children and adults, respectively, articulate the narrative aspects of the Disney universe in terms of their possible global traits? How do they lay claim to the Disney universe as a range of imported, material objects? Does language play a part in these negotiations as a discursive identity marker given that Disney’s animated film are among the only media and ICT products in Denmark which are dubbed rather than subtitled? What about audiences’ take on Disneyland Paris as a very tangible example of Disney’s more global extension into lucrative markets?

The data set, on which my analysis is based, encompasses interviews with 24 children, aged 6-7, who belong to Disney’s key audience, along with 24 children, aged 11-12, who are “growing out” of Disney, and with their respective parents. So, comparisons between
young and adults invite obvious discussions in terms of age, but they equally invite discussions in terms of audience perspectives on the Walt Disney Company’s change of marketing and distribution strategies in view of intensified media globalization.

**Perspectives on Media Globalization**

While the concept of globalization has for long been a nearly global catch-phrase in economic and political sciences, it is only within the last decade or so that media and ICT scholars have impacted on those wider debates arguing successfully for the constitutive role played by media and ICTs in the formation of globalization processes. Satellite television and the internet, transborder mergers and acquisitions in media and ICT corporations, deregulation and increased commodification of media production, cross-selling and cross-promotion; these are just some of the most obvious catalysts of the renewed academic interest in media globalization.

Not unnaturally, it is researchers withing political economy of communication who have marked the discussion from early on posing familiar and thorny questions in media and ICT studies such as the distribution of information flows, the regulation of media ownership, and the impact of media on collective identities. Yet they have also provided more contradictory answers than those offered in the media imperialism discussions of the 1960s and 1970s, and, quite often, they have been more self-consciously guarded in their claims to universal explanations. More recently, the top-down approach of political economy has been offset by more bottom-up, culturalist approaches to media globalization, many of which heed the calls made for more empirically-based studies of globalizing processes (e.g. Tomlinson 1991, Ferguson 1992).

Most of these empirical investigations may be seen as a continuation of audience studies that developed in the 1980s and carrying with them some familiar problematics from that tradition such as a focus on audiences defined by distinct lifestyles, and texts that invite discussions of interpretive power struggles (Cunningham & Jacka 1994, Allen 1995, Baym 1999). A number of the more recent audience studies go beyond the local nature of most earlier audience studies in taking a comparative approach, which media globalization both invites and enforces. These studies serve as important levers of more reflexive audience analyses of media globalization in general not least in a methodological sense (Jensen 1998, Richardson & Meinhof 1999, Livingstone & Bovill 2001). Thus, my initial claim to a globalization of audience studies does not merely concern an observable, empirical trend; it equally signals an increased methodological, and even theoretical, awareness that it is necessary to relate particular positions and results to wider socio-cultural frames also in audience studies that focus on a single group, locality or medium (Schrøder et al. 2003).

The top-down approach of political economy as well as the bottom-up approach of audience studies are framed by the complexity of the globalization concept itself. Like many other grand concepts, it operates in a contradictory discursive field as is evidenced in the difficulties scholars have in providing inclusive definitions. For example, David Held and Anthony McGrew speak of two theoretical camps, which they term the globalists and the skeptics: the globalists acknowledge the empirical existence of global trends in economy, technology and, more modestly, culture, while the skeptics identify the term as a largely ideological construct and a lever of neo-liberal politics (Held & McGrew 2000). Jonathan Friedman makes a distinction between a political-economy approach and a cultural approach to globalization (Friedman 1994), a distinction which the globalization trend in
media studies seems to confirm. And Screberny-Mohammadi et al. (1997), focusing more directly on media globalization, refrain from providing any definition, calling for an interdisciplinary dialogue (Screberny-Mohammadi et al. 1997: ix).

**Situating Disney Audiences in the Academy**

The present study follows the call for a dialogic approach in the sense that disbands with an initial definition of media globalization in favour of a more bottom-up, inductive analysis of informants’ articulations and understandings of the term as a conceptual lever. As such it follows a standard approach in audience studies whereby concept-building emanates from informants while conceptual analysis and theoretical understanding is the researcher’s task (Schröder et al. 2003). Still, the study also differs from most empirical audience studies of media and ICT globalization in a number of important ways. I approach Disney as a complex universe encompassing figures, narratives (animation), merchandise and theme parks, not singling out a particular programme, format or genre beforehand; I study children, not adults; and I focus on ordinary users, not dedicated fans or distinct diasporic cultures.

These choices result from my object of study: the unifying feature of the Walt Disney Company is its complexity, and as such it is an epitome of a global media conglomerate. To study such a phenomenon, one has to incorporate its complexity into the analytical framework. Moreover, the primary target group for the corporation is children (or, indeed, the child in all of us, as Disney’s promotion logic has it). And so it seems natural to focus on young users. This became all the more relevant as I realised, during my early stages of research, that no major, academic study existed on young audiences’ reception of the Disney phenomenon. The few audience studies in existence focus on adults’ memories of Disney products and narratives, either in the USA (Real 1973, Stone 1975, May 1981) or more globally (Wasko et al. 2001), just as there is a minor investigation on users of theme parks in the USA (Willis 1993). As director of the Danish team in the comparative Disney project, which comprised 18 countries, I became acutely aware of the discrepancy between academic disinterest in studying young audiences in a global perspective and the central role played in the global media economy of children’s animated films which are among the most exported media products (but see e.g. Drotner 2001a, Lemish & Tidhar 2001, Feilitzen & Carlsson 2002, Tobin 2004). The relation between the complex Disney universe and young audiences epitomises that discrepancy.

Apart from these empirical ramifications, my choice of research object also results from my epistemological approach which harbours a critique of the focus on diaspora cultures found in many audience studies of media globalization (e.g. Gilroy 1995, Morley & Robins 1995, Gillespie 1995). Such a focus has the unfortunate and unintended result that less conspicuous groups are left at the margins of intellectual interest and concept-building. At least within the context of Europe, whose history over the last two hundred years has been framed by official discourses of homogeneous national identities, is it vital to question what possible mundane and banal diversities and differences may be found through questioning the perceived unities and the seeming ordinarinesses.

**Global Disney Discourses: An Analytical Framework**

In line with much audience research, I focus on informants’ discourses about their media experiences without hoping to unravel the possible inner ”substance” of these experi-
ences. Acknowledging that audience research is interpretation in the second degree in that our objects of study are themselves socio-cultural signification processes is to disband with epistemological distinctions between surface (signification) and deep structure (experience). Still, this does not necessarily lead to a conflation of all analytical distinctions. Rather, it may lead to a more explicit definition of one’s analytical framework.

I am inspired by cognitivist theories that illuminate how sensemaking is a continuous adjustment of existing schemata to new encounters, sites and settings. Making distinctions between the familiar and the unfamiliar is a basic exercise in categorisation and it forms an integral part of everyday activities. Still, my recourse to analysing such processes is the various ways in which informants articulate such comparisons as socially situated practices. My main analytical frame is therefore discourse analysis which foregrounds socio-cultural location and differentiation.6

Issues concerning media globalization offer a particularly rich analytical inventory for studying articulations of discursive boundaries between the familiar and the unfamiliar. For if media use in general may be said to invite constant comparisons between familiar narrative schemata and new media expressions, then global media – be it news on CNN, globally distributed computer games and films or virtual encounters on the internet – serves to radicalise these processes. An appropriation of global media involves prosessual assesments of boundaries between the familiar and the unfamiliar. My empirical questions concerning audiences’ modes of explaining Disney’s global traits are therefore framed by the following analytical questions: What is taken to be familiar in the Disney universe? Which elements do informants lay claim to as being unfamiliar, foreign? As is evident, to answer such questions is to prise open for analysis just how, and to what extent, audiences’ boundaries between familiarity and unfamiliarity match global forms of production and modes of expression.

For example, since the intensified globalization of The Walt Disney Company was initiated in the mid-1980s, the firm has extended its narrative repertoire to include more or less distinct locations further from the US or European mainlands in animated films such as Aladdin 1992 (Middle East), The Lion King 1994 (Africa), Mulan 1998 (China), The Rescuers Down Under 1990 and Finding Nemo 2003 (Australia).7 Viewed from a production perspective, this exension may be seen as a marketing stunt aimed at capturing the imagination of more diverse audiences, while viewed from an audience perspective it is an open question how this diversification of settings and sites is appropriated.

Disney for Me

The youngest age group, aged 6-7, are all keen Disney users. The animated figures are their entry into the Disney universe and their collection of video cassettes form their key points of reference to the array of Disney toys, booklets, posters, clothes and figurines from McDonald’s, since 1996 one of the Walt Disney Company’s strategic partners. Nine out of ten young Danes, aged 3-7, watching television on Friday nights tune in to the one-hour Disney sjov [Disney Fun], which is a showcase for old and new animation shorts and is broadcast by the domestic public-service channel one. The show is nearly as popular with children aged 8-12, where eight out of ten viewers watch the proramme.8 In addition to national tv channels, featuring Disney, many Danish children have easy access to Swedish and German tv channels, while the Disney Channel was only made available to Danes in the spring of 2003 after data was collected for the present study.
Like other children of their age, the youngest informants focus on function when it comes to Disney figures and animated narratives: what are particular items good for? Figures enter a complicated and shifting repertoire of roleplaying either performed with friends or siblings, but also alone in their rooms. And the popularity of merchandise follows the ebbs and flows of the Walt Disney Company’s promotion strategies so that old figurines and toys are put under the bed or at the back of shelves when new items enter the Disney circuit. Few of the youngest children remember the names of figures or film titles. But most demonstrate a solid interest in narrative elements that have affinity to their own immediate circumstances (Drotner 2002a, Drotner 2002b), and they are discerning practitioners when it comes to making drawings and other objects that are inspired by their favourite figures.

With such a functional approach to Disney it makes little sense to the young informants to distinguish between familiar and unfamiliar traits in terms of production, language or narrative conventions. Indeed, what may seem foreign at first is readily incorporated as part of familiar schemata or it is simply disregarded. All elements in the Disney universe are appropriated from a subjective perspective: Disney is for me. This process is most evident in relation to origin of production, settings and language. When asked to point out some favourite Disney items and then explain where they come from, many informants find such a question irrelevant or incomprehensible. Others – perhaps trying to please the interviewer – answer that items are “bought by the shop” (Sascha, 6 years old), ”made on a machine” (William, 7 years old) or ”sewn by somebody” (Lina, 6 years old). They make sense of the question by relating it to well-known frames of reference. None of the youngest informants demonstrate any interest in settings and geographical locations. Tarzan is said to return to the USA and Mulan is called Japanese and ”someone from a foreign country”. It is not that unfamiliar sites and characters are not recognised, it is simply that such traits do not matter to the children’s priorities. Similarly, when asked about what Disneyland is, the children infer that it must be an entertainment site along the lines of domestic theme parks they know, namely Legoland or Bonbon-land. A few associate Disneyland with Copenhagen, since they know this to be the location of the Tivoli Garden, and Martin, aged six, insists that Paris is part of Disneyland.

Among the young children who watch Disney animated films on satellite tv, some comment on figures talking ”funny”. Joachim, aged six, says:

*Joachim:* In the morning when I have to be up, I watch [Disney] on Sweden. On the day when it comes in the morning, that is. Then I watch Sweden One, and there is Disney sjov – only in Swedish.

*Int.:* Do you understand it then?

*Joachim:* Nope.

*Int.:* You just watch it?

*Joachim:* It is funny anyway.

As is the case with unfamiliar settings and characters, languages other than Danish are recognised but they play no part in the children’s enjoyment. To make distinctions between e.g. domestic tv programmes and foreign formats is simply not an issue.

In general, analytical issues of globalization have little explanatory power in relation to the young children’s priorities. They are what may be termed inclusive users both in terms of narratives, toys and their application. This is not to say that issues of media
globalization do not affect this age group, but it a process beyond the confines of their sphere of interest.

Making Distinctions
The older group of children, aged 11-12, is rapidly growing out of the Disney universe as an important lever of playful activities. To them media use is part of an intricate web of identity processes where taste becomes an important mark of individual distinction. As a result, they make differentiation within the complex Disney universe. They articulate a disregard for the material aspects of Disney such as the toys, merchandise, clothes and posters, all of which they recognise and write off as being all too familiar ”imports” associated with naïve childhood activities – boys being somewhat more adamant than girls. But at the same time they lay claim to a selective upgrading of the more symbolic aspects of Disney, not least the long animated films and old Donald Duck shorts shown as part of Disney sjov.

12-year-old Bjoern, whose parents bring home Disney films in English from their business trips, offers this explanation concerning the origin of production: ”The [animated] films originate in America. You see this from the names of artists – all American names. And the films are always launched first in the USA, so they obviously come from America”.10 Like other children of well-educated parents, Bjoern applauds the USA as a country of innovation. These children also find it an attainment to watch Disney films if in the original; and, in general, many older children apply media entertainment in English as a taste marker of quality (Drotner 2001b).

In terms of media globalization, the older children’s differentiation between material and symbolic Disney is equally a differentiation between a discursive downgrading of familiar imported objects which the children do not care to locate geographically, and a partial upgrading of narratives in English whose unfamiliarity and precarious mastery makes it an obvious taste marker.

This process of differentiation is further illuminated in the ways in which older children explain the location of theme parks. Many have been to Disneyland Paris, one has visited the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida, and during the interviews informants readily provide souvenirs and photos as ”proofs” of their visits. With the exception of one 12-year-old boy, who prefers the Tivoli Garden to any other theme park, even children, who have not been to a Disney theme park, want to go. Quite a few of them are rather vague about the geographical location of the parks, while they are much more precise in making distinctions concerning quality. Amanda, aged 11, wants to visit a Disney theme park ”either the one in England, or the one in America somewhere. I think this is the right one. There is definitely two, one is the wrong one and the other is the right one.” To grow up with global Disney, then, is an exercise in the selective articulation of what counts a legitimate markers of globalization.

Passing Parental Judgements
As may be expected, no adult informants harbour any doubts about the origins of Disney, since both the material and symbolic aspects of the universe are readily associated with the USA. More importantly, parents articulate the differentiation between the two aspects as a way of passing taste judgements – and they do so to a larger degree than the older children, but the unfamiliarity of the English language plays no part for parents as
a mark of distinction. Rather they remark on what they take to be familiar Disney traits, which they wish to be preserved. When upgrading the Disney narratives, the adult informants focus on their superior aesthetic qualities, the dubbing being made by “high-grade” domestic actors, and the music being real “ear hangers”. Moreover, these modes of explanation almost invariably involve comparison with and criticism of other animated films including domestic products (Drotner 2004). Peter makes this distinction:

*Peter:* [Disney] is quality film and quality narratives.
*Int.:* Compared to other output?

*Peter:* Yes, compared to Cartoon Network and so on – we had that for a while. Strange, violent cartoons ... that are irritatingly bad, and bad pictures. So, Disney is much more quality-like.

While all parents upgrade the Disney narratives, especially the long animated films and, above all, the classics that parents remember from their own childhood, they are more differentiated in their articulations about the Disney merchandise and marketing. A few parents with little education praise the increased access also to the material aspects of the Disney universe. Pia, aged 30 and working in catering, says:

You can’t say there is no Disney today, can you. Well, they haven’t built Disney houses and we don’t see Disney cars driving around. But there is everything else in Disney. There are even Disney seat covers [for cars], did you know that?

Most parents remark that the Disney corporation has intensified its marketing strategies and has ever-shorter spells between new releases, many express some reservations about this, and about half the parents deplore this development as a wrong way of widening the Disney empire and an undermining of what is seen as intrinsic qualities. Vita, aged 40 and holding a job as a social worker, claims:

Well, I think that [Disney] has become far too dominating within the last – well how long – five, ten years. It is a very dominant corporation, and they simply overflow the market constantly with one thing or another. And I think this is somehow too much.

While none of the adult informants speak directly about globalization, many clearly link the unfamiliar new corporate developments to globals flows of capital and commodities (“overflow the market constantly”). Most parents lay claim to a selective appreciation of the Disney universe. They upgrade the symbolic aspects, the animated films, by incorporating them into a familiar aesthetic and narrative framework. What falls outside of this matrix is deemed poor taste. Conversely, they downgrade the material aspects of Disney which are also the aspects where economic and organizational globalization has made its strongest, or at least most explicit, mark. This split is also found with adults in other cultural settings (Buckingham 2001, Phillips 2001), and it may be explained as a way in which adults may preserve their fond childhood memories about Disney animation while expressing their contemporary concerns about “the way the world goes”. Still, what the above analysis illuminates, is that this split is also a result of media globalization whose intensification may even have served to deepen the split. Drawing boundaries between the familiar and unfamiliar aspects of Disney has clearly become a more difficult exercise in recent years.
The clearest indication of this is the way in which parents express themselves about the Disney theme parks. Since it is only from the early 1990s on that a visit has come within realistic reach of most Europeans, adults clearly link Disneyland Paris to the corporation’s more global reach. As such, one might expect parents to articulate similar reservations about the theme park as they do with other material aspects of the Disney universe. Still, this is far from the case, and that has to do with the ease with which the theme parks can be located as very real sites beyond the mundane realities of everyday life. Unfamiliarity is linked to the exoticism of holiday-making.

For some adults, particularly women with little education, this seems an unwholesome mixture. Heidi, who is in her early thirties and works as a janitor’s assistant, has it this way:

*Heidi:* I think they should build a Disneyland in each country. Then it would be a bit easier to get to. I would really like to visit Disneyland, but it is—it is a very long journey.

*Int.:* Do you think there would be a basis for a Disneyland in Denmark, then?

*Heidi:* Of course there is! For if there was a Disneyland here, then—I think the only thing that would not be dished would be the Tivoli Garden in Copenhagen. But Bonbon-land and Legoland and all the other “lands” could be closed down immediately.

Heidi clearly wants to domesticate the exotic aspects of Disneyland, not in order to make it less interesting, but indeed to make it interesting because it is within her familiar frame of reference. To her Disneyland Paris seems to imply that the drawing of boundaries between familiarity and unfamiliarity thrown into relief by globalization are best exercised close to home. The foreign is not far away.

Most adults, however, are at pains to express their enthusiasm for Disneyland Paris as a site of exploration and cultural encounter. This is particularly true for well-educated parents in general and fathers in particular:

*Vibeke:* There is something international about [Disneyland Paris]. It is fun to stay at such a hotel with the kids, right, where there are so many different people from all over Europe, and you get a sense of something other than Danish [laughs].

*Jens:* Well, you may say it is quite strange that precisely Disney—the French are usually keen to promote their own language and so on and so on. But then, all of a sudden, all this American stuff became very popular.

This well-educated couple express themselves as true globalists for whom Disneyland Paris is clearly associated with the positive aspects of globalization: multicultural encounters and exchanges (“so many different people”) and eye-opening perspectives on one’s domestic culture (“something other than Danish”). To them the drawing of boundaries between the familiar and the unfamiliar is expressed as a challenge readily taken up since they are certain to be in a position where they may influence how boundaries are defined in the first place.

A small minority of adults express an explicit reflection on their changing notions of Disney as a global corporation. These informants have either lived in the USA or have personal contacts to the country. Kristin, a teacher in her mid-30s, worked in the USA as an au-pair after finishing school. During her stay she realized that “[the Walt Disney Company] bought land, but it was not Disney as entertainment, or stuff like that. It was
an investment, right (...) Well ok, was that Disney, too? My idea of Disney from Denmark was something completely different". Unlike older children and parents who differentiate between symbolic and material aspects of the Disney universe, Kristin and a few other parents seem to reflect on and rework their entire perception of that universe when confronted unfamiliar aspects of the company.

**Beyond Dichotomies of Media Globalization**

An audience take on media globalization, such as the one offered above, yields no neat analytical dichotomies such as is the case when globalization is conceptualized as grand theory. Rather, an audience perspective may serve to nuance the theoretical framework within which globalization processes are conceived and conceptualised. As such, the perspective invites middle-range investigations posed at the intersection of grand theory and empirical exemplar.

What stands out from the above analysis is not a simple image of informants being globalists or localists *tout court*, nor is it a normative for or against media globalization. Rather, the analysis illuminates a patterned range of articulations on media globalization, a pattern that result from the various ways in which informants articulate their negotiations of boundaries between familiar and unfamiliar aspects of the Disney universe. The range may be seen to comprise four positions, namely:

- **Incorporation:** Unfamiliar aspects are addressed and appropriated as familiar aspects
- **Differentiation:** Unfamiliar and familiar aspects are articulated as discrete dimensions
- **Exotism:** Unfamiliar aspects are idealised, e.g. by being associated with quality or exception
- **Reflexivity:** An expressed discrepancy between familiar and unfamiliar aspects gives room for the formation of a new perspective.

Apart from the youngest ageband, all of whom demonstrate a position of inclusion, informants combine positions dependent on age, issue and to some degree gender. Most articulate a "main" postion of differentiation that may be mixed with e.g. a position of incorporation. This is seen most clearly with ill-educated parents who incorporate or "domesticate" Disney theme parks as a way of overcoming the perceived threats of cultural globalization. Others combine a main position of differentiation with a position of exotism. Thus, many older children express a predilection for English as a mark of quality, while well-educated parents will readily define Disneyland Paris as an exceptional and invigorating encounter with global culture.

Interestingly, older children and adults express different claims to quality. The children, as we have seen, associate quality with the still somewhat unfamiliar English language, while parents insist that the unique quality of Disney is its narrative familiarity. This difference may easily be explained as a result of age differences and also differences in linguistic competence. But it is not simply that. For even parents with a proficiency similar to that of older children, associate Disney quality with the well-known. A likely explanation is that Disney operates for parents as an important and acknowledged "memory bridge", a willed catalyst to remembering – perhaps even reviving – past joys appreciated a time when Disney was a rare ritual.

If this is the case, then the Walt Disney Company faces a serious challenge as a global corporation of entertainment. In order to remain at the cutting edge on that competitive
market, the company has to extend its range of investments, innovate its product lines and intensify its marketing strategies — in short increase its overt, perhaps even aggressive, economic and organizational globalization. But, in doing so, the company risks jeopardizing the very qualities that audiences, at least the adult ones, hold dear, namely familiarity and recognition — in short no or only covert globalization. Whatever the solution will be, it is the “for-me” generation who will be in a position to judge the outcome.

Notes
1. The article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 16th Nordic Media Research Conference, Kristiansand, 14th-17th August 2003. The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Danish Ministry of Research to the study on which the article is based. Data collection and coding was performed in 2000 by research assistants Heidi Jørgensen and Nanna Berger Munk, Dept. of Film and Media Studies, University of Copenhagen, both of whom contributed centrally to the initial phases of analysis.
2. The Walt Disney Company itself speaks of the “Disney universe”. In the present context, the concept is applied to denote that the corporation is not merely one of the largest, and most diversified, entertainment conglomerates in quantitative terms; its financial and organizational structure also represents a convoluted interlacing of strategic partnerships, cross-selling and cross-promotion that in qualitative terms merits the word complex.
3. The full study is published in Drotner 2002a. Of the 48 young informants, 24 live in the greater Copenhagen area (half in each ageband), 24 live in a provincial town of c. 20,000 inhabitants. Both areas are mixed in terms of class and ethnic background. Girls and boys are evenly distributed within each ageband. The young informants were selected upon observation at their schools, all were interviewed at home, parents in the living room or kitchen, children in their own rooms — some sharing space there with siblings. Transcripts have been coded and analysed with the use of the qualitative data analysis programme Nudist.
4. The Walt Disney Company has been a pioneer in carrying out systematic, inhouse audience studies. Indeed, the firm was among the first to apply qualitative pretests and later on quantitative surveys developed from 1932 on by George Gallup’s Audience Research Institute (Ohmer 1991).
5. My mundane, bottom-up approach to media globalization shares its knowledge interest with Michael Billig’s focus on “banal” nationalism without sharing his empirical focus (Billig 1995).
6. For a sound critique of cognitivist theories as applied to children, see Buckingham 1993: 156-62. Among the various forms of discourse analysis, Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is the most widely used in audience studies (e.g. Fairclough 1995. See also overview in Schrøder 2000). In the present analysis, I do not follow Fairclough’s model in any strict sense since it harbours distint problems of relating textual and contextual dimensions of analysis.
8. The weekly tv show is viewed by 32 per cent of all children within the ageband 3-7 and 25 per cent of all children within the age band 8-12 (DR TV Media Research 2002).
9. Bonbon-land is a family theme park constructed by a hugely successful Danish company producing sweets carrying “naughty” names which appeal to young children.
10. At the time of data collection, the uptake of DVDs was still limited in Denmark. Hence, watching e.g. an animated Disney film in English depended on having access to an imported video casette or to watching the film in a cinema offering a choice between an original and a dubbed version. This choice only exists in large towns and cities and just for new releases of long animated films.

References


KIRSTEN DROTNER


Where is Visual Culture in Contemporary Theories of Media and Communication?

KARIN BECKER

I.
Theory and research into visual culture continue to be seen as peripheral to the field of media and communication theory, despite the centrality of image flows and visual technologies in both the private and public spheres of contemporary media. This article addresses this lacuna, first by elaborating central concepts and theoretical tenets from the field of visual culture, and then, by suggesting how they can contribute to critical reflective analysis of media and communication, viewed both historically and in the present media environment.

But first, a few words about the place of the image in our time. The contemporary condition is often described as a state of being surrounded, even bombarded by images. The condition is also characterized as an image flow, increasing in its intensity as the means and sources of image production and distribution continue to expand geometrically. Pictures are said to be the most common way of spreading information, of making an impact, of expressing oneself, of influencing others. Intimately intertwined with the development of new information technologies, this “new” culture of visual display has been celebrated as promising a pluralistic and egalitarian future, unfettered by the old linear competencies required by a text-based analytic culture.

This celebration of the image explosion has not gone unchallenged, however. From many quarters the expanding flow of images is seen as a threat, to traditional forms of literacy and learning, to established cultural values and expression, to the sense of order promised by familiar discursive forms, including, it must be said, journalism. The deep-seated ambivalence toward images in western culture (cf Mitchell 1994) has resurfaced in response to the intensified image environment in two ways. First, is the anxiety over the presumed “power of images” and fear of their influence. This is evident whenever images figure in sharp debates, often verging on moral panics over issues such as violence in news and entertainment media, invasions of privacy and the effects of advertising. The second ambivalence is directed toward the ways new technologies and forms of display alter conceptions of the image itself and its authority. This reaction can be seen, for example, in conflicts over the photograph and its representational authority in the “digital age” (cf. Lister 1995), and in debates over the forms and significance of post-modern art.

Despite the fact that the so-called image explosion and the debates it engenders are inextricably woven into contemporary mass communication, they remain marginal to the
field of media and communication studies. The question raised in the title of this article can therefore be seen as primarily rhetorical. For a majority of scholars in this field, the image remains a troubled and undertheorized aspect of their research. A common solution to the problem is to ignore the media’s visuality altogether. At the same time, research which takes its point of departure in media’s visual aspects is seen as peripheral to the field, and the scholars who make these issues the focus of their work are considered “narrow” in their orientation. This state of affairs suggests that the ambivalence toward the image is embedded in the field itself, in a self-image about what media studies, with roots in journalism, are really about. Addressing this issue would require a critical examination of the history of the field, and is beyond the scope of this article. Although the history of journalism will be referred to at several points in what follows, here the focus is on the relatively new area of inquiry known as visual culture and how its theoretical perspectives may contribute to the field of media and communication studies.

II.

The study of “visual culture” has emerged over the past fifteen years across a range of disciplines, including art history, film studies, comparative literature, anthropology and museology, as well as regional and cultural studies, in order to take account of the visuality of their objects of study. This explosion of interest in visuality across the humanities and social sciences, giving rise to a flood of texts, cross-disciplinary interest groups and several new journals, can itself be seen as evidence of a “visual turn” in the study of culture and its artefacts (Mitchell 1994). The study of visual culture cannot be seen as a unified field of inquiry, for it lacks a common paradigm, and is characterized by lively debates over its object domain, that is, what it actually studies. The term itself is ambiguous, implying on the one hand that culture as we know it is in the throes of becoming more visual, requiring thereby new theories and modes of inquiry to understand it. On the other hand, the term suggests that the new field is directed toward visual culture and its artefacts, isolating them from other cultural forms. The problems of the term are amplified by many of its practitioners who glide freely between these two meanings of visual culture, falling in to what Mieke Bal correctly refers to as a highly problematic visual essentialism “that either proclaims the visual ‘difference’ – read ‘purity’ – of images, or expresses a desire to stake out the turf of visuality against other media or semiotic systems” (Bal 2003:6). Indeed a clear example of visual essentialism can be found in the field of media and communication, where the study of images has traditionally been dominated by methods developed for “picture analysis” (bildanalys), to the general exclusion of the media’s other visual aspects or a theory to account for relationships between visual and non-visual communication forms.

Central to visual culture is the therefore the problem of the object of study. The study of pictures is, as implied by the example above, too narrow, while the study of (visual) culture as a whole is too broad. Further, both chart a trajectory of inquiry that leads away from a theory of the visual that can contribute a new dimension to media and communication studies. What is, or should be, the object of visual culture study? Bal’s definition can serve as a starting point:

At the very least, the object domain consists of things we can see or whose existence is motivated by their visibility; things that have a particular visuality or visual quality that addresses the social constituencies interacting with them (Bal 2003: 8).
Although the objects are “things we can see”, a critical aspect of this definition is that it includes visuality as a social interactant. What is visible is not self-evident but arises out of a set of social and cultural exigencies that create the conditions for seeing a particular phenomenon or artefact. In order for it to be considered visual, it must fit into a meaningful structure of information and knowledge. Becoming a viewer assumes that one has learned to approach an agreed set of objects as both visible and visual, that is as both seeable and worth looking at. Understanding this complex and highly selective cultural process is critical to the study of visual culture and places visuality itself at the focus of inquiry. This is why simply expanding the set of artefacts to be included in the study of visual culture misses the mark, unless it has been preceded by the question of what is considered visual in that particular set of cultural and historical circumstances.

III.

Elsewhere I have argued that the study of visual culture requires an interrogation of the visual and its place in specific life worlds, including its relationship to other ways of sensing and knowing. This means considering visuality, that is, the meanings associated with seeing and visual forms of expression, as embedded in and arising out of cultural practice. Interrogating the visual includes a deconstruction and critique of how people see, of the values associated with different visual forms, of the power relations that arise in the construction and dissemination of these forms, and how they come to be used in the structuring of knowledge and practice in daily life (Becker 1998).

To describe a culture as visual is a misnomer, for no culture is exclusively visual. Yet all cultures have a visual aspect. In every culture one can find shared knowledge, ways of knowing and the webs of significance they give rise to that are based in visuality. One can locate specific ways of seeing that are expressed in visual forms and that claim their authority through a set of common understandings and experiences. Beginning with Foucault’s analysis of the “visible and the articulable” as distinct knowledge systems with different formations (1972), cultural theory has had the means to examine the respective power of these knowledge systems, and to trace the rising authority of the visual as a foundation of culture.

This means that visual culture is not in the first place about images at all. Nor is it about the technologies used to generate and distribute images. Instead the term visual culture describes a particular relationship between seeing and knowledge. It is within this relationship that meanings are developed and ascribed to the multiplicity of images generated and distributed as an increasingly accepted if problematized aspect of contemporary daily life. Pictures and new image technologies do not produce visual culture. They are its artefacts.

Let us look at some examples of what this implies. Looking for the origins of photography, Geoffrey Batchen found that the technical knowledge upon which the medium is based had long been in use (Batchen 1997). Optical devices for looking at a scene through a lens had been popular among the European upper class since the Renaissance, and by the 17th century the camera obscura was considered a necessary tool for working out problems of pictorial representation. Experiments with the chemistry of light-sensitive substances and how to make them permanent took place at the same time, but without any apparent interest in coupling together these discoveries with the images projected by the camera obscura. The knowledge on which photography is based had existed for decades until simultaneously at different locations around Europe, the problem arose of using a lens to create an image that could be fixed for later viewing. Within
a five-year period photography was suddenly “invented” using several different means, not only by Daguerre and Niepce, but as Batchen has traced, also by a host of other experimenters around Europe. The necessary prerequisite, the idea of the photograph, had emerged and provided the impetus for bringing together what had previously been disparate pieces of knowledge to create a new visual form.

Another example can be found in the lapse of time between the invention of photo-reproduction techniques and the integration of photography into daily journalism (Becker 1992/2003). The half-tone process was invented in the 1880s and the first photograph was published in a newspaper shortly thereafter, a phenomenon that noone at the time seems to have paid particular attention to. In the United States, it was not until World War I that a visual interest was created, and several major newspapers began to publish weekly supplements that included photographs from the war. The tabloid press was the first to use photographs on a daily basis, and in the 1920s a sensationalistic journalistic genre quickly took root, based on a mix of large headlines and photographs. The more serious morning newspapers distanced themselves from this genre by avoiding the use of photographs altogether. Here again, it was not the technology which established the conditions for use, but a set of cultural and political circumstances that established the patterns for a visual culture of journalism that would continue in the metropolitan daily press (at least in New York City) for decades.1

IV.

Both of these examples show how, by shifting the point of inquiry away from the visual artefact, one arrives at larger questions of how particular cultural forms arise and the meanings associated with them. This in turn can elucidate the relationship between the visual and other forms of knowledge and expression. Vision is, as Micke Bal argues, in the first place inherently synaesthetic (Bal 2003: 9). Seeing is never an exclusively visual experience, but involves other sense-laden and sense-based activities, such as listening, reading, movement and touch. This ‘impurity’ of vision has nothing to do with media per se; it is important that we not consider the visual synaesthetic experience as an artefact of mixed media, of texts that consist of various combinations of words, pictures, sound or (referring to the internet) tactility. Attempts to separate these different registers inevitably lands in the problematic project of producing or re-producing a hierarchy of textual forms (Mitchell 1994). (When a reader looks at a newspaper photograph and reads the caption, meaning is constructed out of the two forms joined together; one cannot assign the “primary” meaning to one or the other.) Further, such distinctions essentialize a textual form as tied exclusively to a specific sense (we hear music, we see pictures), instead of considering how a text often give rise to a range of sensory experience. From the “pictures” that are formed when reading a novel, to the “smells” that the immigrant can experience when seeing a home video from her homeland, people’s experience of media is rarely confined to a single sensory mode.2

The meanings associated with particular cultural forms are also intertextual. The ways that seeing and visuality are referred to in written texts can provide keys to understanding the role of vision and its relative authority in a specific cultural context. For example, long before photographs appeared in the press, newspaper accounts frequently referred to photography, using the new medium as a metaphor for the currency and truthfulness of the article. Terms such as “eyewitness news” appeal to the authority of vision within the journalistic enterprise. Indeed it can be argued, with John Hartley, that vision has served as a central metaphor for journalism, a way of knowing that is integrated into
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its culture and ideology (Hartley 1992). Expressions of this suture between the practice of journalism and visions’s authoritative position in structures of knowledge are so common as to have become a naturalized aspect of western journalism. Bal argues that the study of metaphors that are used in naturalized form are “an indispensible part of visual culture studies” (Bal 2003: 21).

This suggests, despite admonitions above directed at those who would establish a hierarchy of the senses, that vision nevertheless holds a privileged position within some discourses of knowledge. How did this come to be? A full answer to this question requires a history of vision, so suffice it to state that most cultural theorists, following Foucault, locate the dominance of vision in the early modern era (Foster 1988, Foucault 1977). Foucault used the panopticon, Bentham’s device that gave the seeer omnipotence over the seen, as the model for the epistemological shift from eighteenth century empiricism to the concept of the modern, transcendental “man” (Foucault 1970). Although premodern cultures may have been ocularcentric, the hegemony of vision in modernity is seen as both historically distinctive and functioning in a different way. The visual field, or that which people apprehend primarily (though not exclusively) through the eyes, dominates life and production (Soussloff 1996). Jonathan Crary was among the first theorists to describe vision as allied with new techniques of observation, and “a profound shift in the way in which an observer is described, figured, and posited in science, philosophy, and in new techniques and practices of vision” (Crary 1988: 31). It is in this broader theoretical perspective that the claim can be made for journalism as a visually-based practice and institution with foundations in the Enlightenment. The changed subjectivity of the observer is the mark of modernity and also, Crary argues, the stimulus for its technologies – including photography and the cinema. Knowledge became allied with the camera’s eye as the model of objective truth.

This epistemology has not gone unchallenged, however. In his work Downcast Eyes, Martin Jay describes a “denigration of vision”, as many of the major nineteenth century philosophers sought to discredit and downplay the obvious power of vision or ocularcentrality as a foundation of knowledge (1993). He identifies a plurality of “scopic regimes” – alternative ways of seeing and representing the world, in both art and science. In Jay’s analysis, Cartesian perspectivalism and its empowering of the direct gaze is only one model of the observer. The scopic regime that he singles out as having finally come into its own in late modernity is the “madness of vision”, first identified with the baroque (Jay 1988:19).

According to these theorists, the rise of visual culture in modernity has been marked by struggles among various forms and techniques of knowledge and knowing. Vision itself as a source of knowledge has been contested, and alternatives to the dominant, hegemonic ways of seeing have been denigrated. Yet we have seen in recent years a “pictorial turn”, including a shift in cultural theory toward a vigorous denaturalization of vision. Seeing is no longer taken for granted as biological, but instead is generally understood to be formed through cultural processes. This means that straightforward descriptions of what and how we see are no longer possible; vision itself must be problematized, redirecting inquiry into how particular ways of seeing have been formed and why. In particular, the authority ascribed to the dominant western mode of vision and its products is undergoing an intense deconstruction. The attention to “visual culture” since the early 1990s is one aspect of this process, and a clear sign that the struggle over the centrality of vision in our constructions of knowledge and power is not yet resolved.
Sorting through the relationship between vision and knowledge leads inevitably to the relationship between the seer and the seen. What happens when people look? Seeing, like other aspects of knowledge, is not limited to cognition, but is performed in the act of looking. Bal describes the two aspects of this relationship: “In the simplest formulation, knowledge directs and colours the gaze, thereby making visible those aspects of objects that otherwise remain invisible …, but also the other way around: far from being a feature of the object seen, visibility is also a practice, even a strategy, of selection that determines what other aspects or even objects remain invisible” (Bal 2003: 11). Considering the relationship between the seer and that which is seen as a performance is inconsistent with visual essentialism. A performance perspective has the advantage of forefronting visuality as it is being investigated, without determining in advance the object of vision or its qualities.

Seeing is performed by individuals and also by institutions. Just as it is possible to study how institutions think, it is possible to examine how they see, that is, what is made visible and what is obscured through institutional practices. Museum studies have been enriched by this critical perspective with its focus, not on the objects that are housed in the museum, but the tropes of display used in exhibiting and how these constitute subjects- both the museum visitor and those who are on display. In cultural history museums, one finds different tropes of display used for different social classes, creating “invisible orders of significance”. The look of the knower (the institution) is promoted, at the same time that it is made invisible. The museum visitor sees the display of traditional culture as a glimpse into “how it really was”, and not as a visual code representing a hierarchy of cultural value (Bennett 1995, cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998). This would be a fruitful perspective to apply more broadly in studies of media institutions: What are the invisible orders of significance that are “on display” and how are these constructed and maintained?

Several years ago I did a study comparing display forms on the front pages of local and national newspapers and found differences in the ways photographs addressed the viewer (Becker 2000). In the local papers I looked at, large photographs of people looking into the camera were common, a look that was reserved for occasional feature photographs on the front pages of national morning papers. Within the institution of journalism, this direct camera gaze is to be avoided, for it violates one of the visual tropes of objectivity – the photographic subject’s (apparent) unawareness of being observed. According to professional journalism’s “invisible order of significance”, a news photograph with the subject looking into the camera is non-professional. Yet on the front page of a local paper, the direct gaze of the person in the photograph is a more personal form of address, to be preferred over the visual constraints of a photograph that “looks” objective. This example illustrates how the study of visual culture of journalism can examine the relationship between the seer and the seen from a perspective that interrogates and reveals orders of significance that the institution employs.

The example also points to another institutional foundation of journalism – the distinction between the public and the private – that has been increasingly challenged by changes in media content in recent years. This is an area where visual culture studies can offer important insights. Again, with parallels to museum studies and art history, the study of media has privileged the public realm. Media studies has been formalized as the study of public discourse, with the result that private meanings and uses of media tend to be marginalized. Even when the private sphere is thematicized in the media, as has been
increasingly the case in recent years, research into these discourses within media studies is based on a dichotomy between the public and private that privileges public discourse in the media’s orders of significance. How is visual culture used to reinforce this dichotomy? What interests does it serve? For example, what are the racial and gender stereotypes that are associated with public and private discourses, respectively? Note that focusing on the visual also can be turned to reveal that which is made invisible within these discourses.

Particularly significant are the insights that a visual culture perspective can provide when the question involves intersections between the public and private spheres in contemporary media. What meanings arise in these situations? Visualizations of the private lives of public celebrities is one such example, including the question of how celebrity is created, to then be “privatized”. Another example is the private meanings and uses in memories and family histories of media content and events. Or to turn it around, when do materials from the private sphere enter the public arena through the media? These “transgressions”, far from being peripheral to contemporary media and communication, can tell us a great deal about the place of media in everyday life experience. In a recent study of vernacular photography, I came across a startling number of news photographs of journalistic events in which people were carrying their own, private cameras. Some of these portrayed visits to tourist sites that had come into the news, perhaps not too surprising, but others were of the signing of bills into law and of people voting in elections. These small apparatuses, evidence of the desire to have personal visual documents of events that are already available in their extensive media coverage, suggests that people, for whatever reason, attach a greater authenticity to a private photograph than a mass media image (Becker 2002).

The field of media and communication study has been framed within a study of institutions and specific media forms. Even studies of the audience have taken their point of departure in the audience of a specific medium. Yet, media continue to expand in their forms, their uses and their reach, making it increasingly problematic to identify the object of study with a given medium (Bjurström, Fornäs & Ganetz 2000). Visual culture offers perspectives that address this problem by interrogating visual cultural forms that transgress the boundaries of media (and media studies) and asking what meanings they give rise to in the different settings where they come into play. What histories do they have? Where can they be seen? What different forms do they take? What is forgotten or made invisible as the phenomenon reemerges in new settings? Kari Andén-Papadopoulos’ recent study of the history of the photograph of New York firemen raising a flag in the ruins of the World Trade Center is an example, as she traced its use through a range of display forms and interviewed people about what this controversial image meant to them (Andén-Papadopoulos 2003).

Finally, as the examples above demonstrate, visual culture offers a perspective that intervenes in the problematic dichotomy between production and reception that continues to plague media and communication studies. Visuality is a form of knowledge that is performed in the act of looking. That which is seen is not “sent” in any conventional sense of that term, but is constructed in the dynamic relationship between seeing and being seen. Irit Rogoff has noted that “one of the most interesting spect of visual culture [is] that the boundary lines between making, theorizing and historicizing have been greatly eroded and no longer exist in exclusive distinction from one another”. (Rogoff 1998: 18)
VI.
The goal of this article has been to present the central concepts, theoretical tenets, and some of the problems of the rapidly expanding field of visual culture studies. Further, I have attempted to argue for the contribution of visual culture theory to the field of media and communication studies. My examples have been drawn largely from the field and practice of journalism and in particular the press. Television and film studies may have appeared to be the more logical place to turn to for examples of visual media. On the other hand, journalism may well be the branch of media studies which has the most to gain by including the tenets of visual culture in its theory and research. It is within journalism that we find visual essentialism in its clearest form, in the study of pictures intended to complement the study of verbal texts. Until the field extends its theoretical reach beyond the study of pictures and texts as the primary forms of media content, it will be locked in to a set of dichotomies that offer little insight into visuality—a critical aspect of media and communication, both historically and in contemporary daily life.

Notes
1. In contrast, major Swedish daily newspapers were publishing photographs on their front pages in the 1910s (see Becker, Ekecrantz & Olsson 2000).
2. A young Iranian immigrant reported this experience when looking at a video a relative had sent her, taken while driving streets in Tehran that she had not seen in 14 years. She claimed that news footage from the city had never had that effect.
3. Film theorist Anne Friedberg provides a feminist critique of the gaze built in to model of the panopticon, arguing that other seeing devices supported a more mobile world view, and that Crary’s observer does not account for the feminine gaze (Friedberg(1993).

References
WHERE IS VISUAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION?


The realm of sports culture is one of the corner stones of 21st century western culture. Prevailing forms of culture invite certain lifestyles and identities, dominated by sports and competition. These invitations are constructed and renewed in the network of media and other channels of public debate that form the public sphere of sports culture. This public sphere is diverse, and is divided into various genres and different media. It is also a mixture of styles, requirements and practices that derive from the praxis of (mediated) industries of popular culture.

Usually, talk about the public sphere of sports refers to the sports spectacle, which has experienced a dramatic implosion during recent years; that is top competitive sports, the sports sections of newspapers, sport magazines and huge events, like the Olympics or the World Championships that gather together whole nations (Kellner 2001, Pirinen 1999, 30-43, Silvennoinen 1999, 163-175, Ojajärvi ja Valtonen 2001, 19-26). This mediated sports spectacle involves, according to Kellner, “passive consumption of media images.” It does not necessarily turn into active life politics but continues to distract social subjects from real life (2001, see also Debord 1967/1994). When it comes to life politics and formation of lifestyles, not only are the top sports interesting, but also the whole range of public sphere within which individuals construct their (bodily) identities, the “sports culture”.

Table 1.
In the sphere of popular culture, different forms of symbolic change, identity and agency are made possible by representations (Grossberg 1995, 25). Following Bourdieu, we think of popular culture as a field within which people struggle for their place/space in reality. Thus, identity and representation become political categories by and through which it is possible to organize reality claims and, to put it simply, do things.

Media culture necessarily represents many contradictory forces. Media texts operate as fields for concrete societal battles. Media texts must be able to resonate with the worries and wishes of the people in order to become profitable (as products of media industry) – therefore they have to be able to convey divergent, even contradictory, meanings even within a single text. Thus popular media culture monitors carefully fears, hopes, tastes and targets “on the air” and holds a central position in formation of lifestyles typical of our times. It creates significant symbols that are intertwined with common experiences as well as with individual identities. The meanings circulated within the field of mediated sports culture call on people to evaluate their lifestyles: the interpretations of these meanings deal with processes like identification, differentiation, self-reflection and even guilt. An analytical overview is therefore needed.

To grasp the public sphere of sports culture, a week of media reality (the television programmes, Finnish sports magazines, Finnish web sites and advertising within these media, see Appendix 1) was analysed from the point of view of gendering practices. The theoretical and methodological starting point of the analyses is the presumption that language is an ideological, consequence-bound system that actively constructs social reality. Discourse in its turn is understood as a framework with and within which social problems are brought under processes of governance. Discourse makes it possible to conceptualize the world from a relatively set point of view (e.g., Foucault 1972, Valtonen 2000): for example sports culture can be presented in countless ways (paroles), but some of these ways become dominant. Thus there are discourses constructing sports culture, and they define what is understood to be part of “sports culture” as well as what can be said about sports culture and how.

We concentrate on the diverse meanings of sports culture that are circulated within the field of popular culture and especially in specific sports media. From the vast range of interesting aspects, we have chosen to focus on how these meanings tend to be organized in ways that have gendering consequences. In theory, sports culture could be considered a field within which gendering practices lose at least some of their significance. Both sexes definitely have bodies, and both sexes can either, neglect their bodies or maintain, strengthen and cultivate them. The joy practising sports gives cannot be located in sex or in chromosome structure, and yet, the field of sports is strongly gendered. This derives from the fact that the body is the exact spot where gender difference is traditionally thought to be located. This difference looks permanent and is thought to influence irrevocably on how a body marked by one of the sexes relates with the world. Following from this, the joy of sports seems to be categorized into two different ways of exercising and taking care of one’s body. Due to the central position of gender dichotomy, the forms and products of popular culture seem also to approach their consumer according to his/her sex.

In the following analyses, we wish to trace at least some of the logics and strategies on the basis of which the gendering practices are carried out. We look for practical acts, visual, verbal or discursive, through which the public sphere of sports culture is gendered. How, in practice, do imaginaries make themselves more available to one gender than another? What kind of ideological consequences do these imaginaries have? What kind of material do they offer for constructing active subjectivities or doing identity
work? Grasping gendered representations and analysing them can be considered a modest effort to point out and re-articulate existing undemocratic symbolic practices. The analyses must, however, start by defining the field in question.

Battlefields of Mediated Sports Culture

Body and its governance are central to (Western) culture. There is no place outside what is culturally intelligible (see Butler 1993), and as a member of a body-centred western culture one can either take part in the projects of forming one’s body (by exercising and/or dieting) or refuse to do so. There are whole industries concerned with the body in one way or another, and between these industries and the people there is a network of public spheres offering meanings and images for people’s identity work. This network of different media, industries and relationships is here referred as the public sphere of sports culture.

The public sphere of sports culture is not restricted to explicit magazines, television programmes or Internet sports sites; the implications of sports culture connect to contemporary culture in various ways. The variety of stages for sports culture is so wide that their existence might even appear as insignificant (see Grossberg 1995). For the same reason, a closer look at at least some of the forms of this billboard-like public sphere of sports culture becomes necessary and may shed light on its multiple cultural consequences.

Sports culture is a central theme of television content in general. Especially youth programmes and serials, sitcoms, and single’s programmes refer to sports culture both explicitly and implicitly, for example through the use of young, trim bodies familiar from the aesthetics of sports. At the same time, the programmes promote a certain body-oriented lifestyle: the fictive characters of TV series are permanently on diets and/or exercising in order to attract the opposite sex. Traces of what we call sports culture can also be found in the advertisements presented within the above-mentioned programmes: in commercials for food, fashion, cosmetics and different services, imaginaries from sports culture are taken advantage of in various ways.

Sports culture at its barest is represented in workout programmes in television where the young and fit (women) in their exercise outfits persuade their viewers to participate in their 15-minute workout schedule. Sports as entertainment is represented for instance by SmackDown!, where professional athletes fight in staged struggles. Also referring implicitly to sports culture are shows like Temptation Island or Survivors, where half-naked tanned people with well-developed muscles play different kinds of games. Sports news and competition results as well as sports magazine programmes represent more traditional forms of sports culture.

TV’s sports magazines and serials have their own web sites, which are linked to various networks of sports zines and forums that consist of interactive services, chats, product advertising and sites connected to more traditional sports media (magazines and TV programmes). Many of the texts and articles we found were already published in other popular media – a form of intertextuality within sports culture. Besides all this, the Internet offers an endless number of zines that are related to sports culture: fanzines of famous athletes or teams, personal homepages of athletes, teams, clubs, gyms etc., chat rooms that focus on athletes and/or different sports and a wide range of lifestyle and hobby sites (skate boarding, extreme sports, surfing, etc.). In a similar manner, sports culture appears in popular press: magazines that concentrate on one sport as well as general lifestyle magazines, women’s magazines, advertisements and references to other
Popular media (TV programmes, movies). The news and dailies also report issues connected to public health and exercise campaigns and advertisements and information posters on the streets, on public vehicles and even packages for foods and other commodities constantly remind us of sports culture.

The ways in which the television, the Internet and the popular press deal with sports culture ooze over to the fields of cinema and music videos, whose aesthetics, styles and topics are in dialogue with all other representations of sports culture. The training programmes of movie stars and other celebrities ("how to get Madonna’s arms?") are revealed in women’s magazines as well as the hard work required to accomplish a role in movies, etc. The arenas of competitive sports are often taken advantage of in constructing storylines for music videos (e.g., Christina Aguilera’s video Dirrrty) and movie characters are represented as struggling with similar problems as “ordinary people” (e.g., Shallow Hal or Bridget Jones’s Diary). There are countless movies derived directly from the field of sports (so-called sports movies, for instance Rocky I-V, Le Grand Bleu, Driven, Bend It Like Beckham, or A League of the Their Own). Also action movies (kung fu and karate films for example) and dance movies from Fame and Flashdance to the recent Billy Elliot and Save the last Dance.

Making Genders – Or Faking Them?

In a culture that centres on the body, and understands gender as one of the central cultural divides, most aspects of life are easily defined and categorized with the help of gender stereotypes: basically everything, even a word in relation to another word, can be interpreted in terms of the “feminine” – “masculine” axis (e.g., Cameron 1985/1992, see also Davis 1997). Feminist media studies have clearly shown how dominant gender hierarchies are circulating in the media. The consequence is/has been that women and men are represented as well as addressed in different and unequal ways.

As abstract concepts feminine and masculine are hard to define, yet binary oppositions like strong-weak or hard-soft or active-passive settle quite unproblematically as characteristics of either men or women. To play with a thought: the same is true of other combinations of words, like knife-fork, salt-pepper, vanilla-chocolate (Cameron 1985/1992). Or, what would be the genders of red-blue, exercise-sports, or round-angular? It sounds simple, but because the producers of sites, texts and programmes share the same culture with their readers and viewers, the shared meanings are easily adapted and circulated. Clearly enough, gendered images not only represent how genders are; they also produce two considerably different cultures. Media are powerful in constructing the realm of what is possible to represent, as well as in defining the culturally intelligible limits for genders and their assumed qualities (Butler 1990, x; Butler 1993, 9-10; Pulkkinen 2000, 56).

Gender-oriented research on the public sphere of sports has focused on sports journalism, and from theoretical and/or methodological point of view, it has been “traditional” in two senses: on the one hand, it has mostly theorized gender in a traditional, essentialist way and, on the other, it has concentrated on quantitative issues like head counting, etc., and taken very little account of the work on construction of gender and conceptualization of body that is central to feminist theory. Contemporary gender studies have increasingly shifted the focus from gender differences to differences within genders, and to deconstruction of the inevitable dichotomy between genders both on the cultural and material (corporeal) level (Brooks 1997; Davis 1997; Butler 1990; 1993).
In the field of mediated competitive sports, men are put in advantageous positions in numerous ways: stories about sportsmen are longer and placed on tops of pages/ sport sections of news more often than are stories about sportswomen. Also the criteria for newsworthiness are different for the two sexes (see, e.g., Ojajärvi & Valtonen 2001, 19-26; Pirinen 1999, 32). Gender hierarchies are also to be found in processes like constructing layouts, picturing stories, and in choice of vocabulary. In practice, this can be seen in the facts. For instance, in reporting the winter Olympics, the Finnish media tend to write quantitatively more about male ice hockey before the games have even started than they do about female ice hockey during the whole games. In addition, gender difference can be strengthened by attaching different characteristics to athletes: in Finland it is natural for sports journalists to talk about male javelin throwers as “Finnish bears” and their female colleagues as the “javelin girls” (see, e.g., Pirinen 1999, 30 & 33 and Virtapohja 1998).

The products of popular culture tend to appeal to explicit or easily recognizable gender qualities and in doing so they re-construct the difference between genders. Re-presentations are necessarily connected with previous representations and it is simply inevitable that they have sufficiently familiar and recognizable elements (de Lauretis 1987, 5; Ojajärvi 2000, 119-122; Skeggs 1997; Tasker 1998, 21-26). This need to recognize sex and/or gender itself reproduces gender difference and gendering practices. In competitive sports, differentiating the sexes has been carried out to the extreme (sex testing, etc.), but when it comes to sports culture in general, one would think that sex should not have such significance. Popular culture and its products, however, seem to indicate that sexes and gendered bodies should be separated in all practices of sports culture.

This indication has been constructed on the basis of earlier research on three levels of practices (see, e.g., van Zoonen 1994, de Lauretis 1987, Markula 1995, on sports journalism see also Ojajärvi & Valtonen 2001 and Valtonen & Ojajärvi 2003). These practices are unavoidably intertwined in the processes of signification, but for analytical purposes we claim it is possible to separate the practices that set the agenda for the public sphere of sports (define what is possible to talk about), the practices that visualize the same public sphere, and the practices that define how one can operate in the field (discursive strategies; styles, vocabularies, relations between actors and phenomena etc.). The discourses of mediated sports culture are formed in the interplay between these “levelled practices”. The analysis is conducted following this tripartition and presented, again simplifying reality, one medium at a time.

Read Yourself Beautiful
Considering media’s function of maintaining democracy, magazines would not be the most central, but when it comes to lifestyles, they are certainly important and close to their readers. Magazines succeed in handling complicated matters in encouraging and touching ways (e.g. Lowenthal 1984). They aim to “grasp something essential of both time and its modes of expression” (Kivikuru 1996, 51); in other words, they seek a combination of contents and styles that apply to target audiences.

Actualization (“on-the-air” –journalism etc.) and specialization have been central trends in the field of media within past decades – for instance, the traditional genre of women’s magazines has expanded to a range of specialized magazines (fashion, interior design, needlework, health & beauty, etc.). When it comes to sports culture, this specialization is clear: there are more than thirty magazines published in Finland that focus on one sport.
For this purpose, we concentrate only on the magazines that focus on sports culture. Some of them were addressed to women, whereas others did not have explicit gender address. By their own definition, magazines addressed to women are called Sport and LadyFitness. Others do not define their target audience explicitly. We interpreted some of these magazines as “gender neutral” (KuntoPlus, Kunto & Terveys and Fitness), and some as “manly” (Kuntosali, Bodaus, Juoksija). “Manly” or masculine by our definition was a magazine that had specific sections or appendixes for women or the headlines of articles referred casually to men only: “Cut out the middle, man!” or “You can tell he is fit from the way he moves”.

Interestingly, women’s magazines and “neutral” or men’s magazines were classified differently by a Finnish organization that provides magazines to retailers. Women’s sports culture was situated without exception into category of “beauty & health”, whereas the neutral or men’s magazines were found in the category of “sports”.

**Get Fit, Eat Right!**

Because all magazines treated in the data are explicitly focused on sports culture, the fields on which the topics and interests are gathered are somewhat similar. Still, there are clear differences in the topics and in quantities of certain topics that seem to “make” the magazines either traditionally manly/masculine or womanly/feminine. Analysing the thematic aspects of the public sphere of sports culture might seem like a thing from the past, but when focusing on the practices that gender the very same field, it regains at least some importance. The choice of topics and themes is of course part of editorial policies, but at the same time, there are ideological and discursive limits to what kinds of issues are even possible to discuss when talking about sports and women or men. We see that discourse is a way of representing the knowledge about a particular topic: it defines and produces the objects of our knowledge and influences how ideas are put into practice. It is, thus, interesting to see where the contents of women’s and men’s sports media overlap and where there seems to be no connection between the two “knowledges” of gendered sports culture.

All magazines naturally write about sports in general. In the magazines that we interpreted as “manly” and in so-called gender-neutral magazines, this tends to be the most common category of stories. New sports are introduced or the consequences that practicing any sport can have on the human physique are discussed, for example. In women’s magazines, stories of sports fashion, workout plans, diets and beauty are more common than stories introducing new sports, and the consequences of sports are generally limited to weight loss and gaining firmness. Also peculiar is the way women’s sports magazines present different sports as seasonal: they are dependent on trends, they become fashionable and, later, disappear as fast as they once appeared. Women are not expected to make commitments to their sports-oriented hobbies, whereas men, for their part, are served with media that focus on a certain sport and function on the idea of loyalty and commitment among the practitioners.

Also the contents of stories with kindred headlines are strikingly different. Whereas manly magazines and the neutral magazines write about general aspects of training, new approaches to coaching, or new angles on or applications of traditional training methods, women’s magazines focus on spurring their readers to keep up their sporty hobbies and presenting advantages of doing sports (weight loss, increasing calorie consumption or toning the body for better looks). Celebrity stories differ almost as clearly. The womanly/feminine way of writing celebrity portraits seems to be presenting the celebrities as “one
of us”, women dealing with societal pressure to stay fit and thin. Celebrities chosen for presentation are thus more likely to be models, actors, singers, etc., than athletes or other actors in the field of sports. In magazines interpreted as masculine, portraits are written by successful athletes and people working in the field of sports (sports ministers, leaders of sports clubs and institutions, experts of sports medicine or top physiotherapists). Women’s magazines also write success stories or stories about ordinary people who practise exotic sports more often than do the rest of the magazines in the field.

**Look Great!**

Sports magazines in Finland come out once in a month or even more rarely. These magazines are usually printed on thick, good quality paper, and they have a certain mark of luxury in their appearance: the pages are filled with double page pictures and advertisements. Women’s sports magazines repeat the pattern: they are quite reminiscent of traditional women’s magazines. The sports magazines targeted to both sexes are slightly more modest in their appearance, but still recognizable within the genre. The magazines with implicit male target audience differ clearly: the paper is not necessarily thick and shiny nor are the pictures and advertisements luxurious in any way. This probably has to do with the fact that men’s magazines are not so-called lifestyle magazines like women’s magazines or the ones interpreted as ‘neutral’ in this sense, but sports magazines focusing on one sport (Runnersworld, Cyclist etc.)

Also the covers of magazines are strikingly different in layout, colours, typographics as well as in the choice of pictures. Women’s magazines are covered with fashion photographs, whereas men’s magazines have cover pictures of practising sports. Women’s magazines are coloured in pastel colours or bright shades of pink and fuchsia, while the masculine equivalents appear in basic colours: strong blues, greens, reds and yellows. The fonts used on the covers of women’s magazines as well as magazines targeted to both sexes were round, thick and in upright position. Men’s magazines had at least their name written with narrower letters and in dynamic cursives (attributing to sports).

The differences do not end on the covers, but grow more profound. In women’s magazines, there are surprisingly few pictures that, without the stories around them and without the context the media itself gives to the pictures, could be interpreted as pictures of sports. The pictures are more kindred with glamour photography in fashion and lifestyle magazines: they are designed, colourful, trendy and definitely fashion oriented. If exercise is practised in them, it is seldom sports (entailing sweat for instance), but rather having fun and playing in sporty atmospheres and arenas (sailing boats, golf courses, spas or track fields). The seldom-visible sweat appears on a perfect young face in a close up, and in addition to sweat, no other signs of fatigue are ever shown. The role of clothes, cosmetics and accessories is emphasized – even explicitly, for the products used in creating the pictures are usually listed on the side (make-up, hair care products, make-up artists and hair designers, etc.). One thing is common to all modelled pictures: the lips. They are red and shiny and parted – maybe because of enthusiasm or inspiration?

There appears to be repeated strategies for creating “sports” in the photos. On one hand, the models may be photographed in the traditional fashion photography style but in arenas connected to sports. On the other hand, the models can be pictured against the “empty”, one-colour background familiar from fashion photography, but then the model must be in motion; most typically flying wildly through the air after a hidden jump on a trampoline. The prevailing conventions and practices seem to lack possibilities to pic-
ture women doing sports in any other way than the one already known from the field of fashion (e.g., Laiho 1996, 61-66, Vänskä 2002, also Koskinen 1998).

In men’s sport magazines the pictures are about sports. The athletes (not models!) are captured with expressions of concentration on their faces: the sport seems to be the main action and the camera the side kick – in many of the photos they are probably not aware they are being photographed at all. The pictures are mostly taken in the arenas of sports – track fields, gyms, swimming pools – and from big sporting events. Alongside the stories are a series of graphic presentations: tables, drawings and curves, which help to illustrate aspects of the performance. Compared with the women’s magazines, the magazines are visually anaemic: the matt paper does not give the same kind of shine to colours and the advertisements are smaller, less colourful and less designed. The advertisements, like the actual stories, focus on either the performance or the “science” and “technology” assisting the performance.

The visual aspects of these magazines are interesting, for we assume that the imaginaries of sports do symbolic yet powerful acts to enable different ways of combining gendered bodies with practicing sports. The prevailing ways of picturing women and men, and visualizing the ways they practice sports, have to do with the content and practices of the whole sports culture. It also has an affect on the possibilities men and women have for self-identification and action.

Shape Your Life!

The biggest differences between the magazines appear in their ways of speech and in how they address their audiences. These are not separate from the thematic and visual differences, but they all work discursively together to reinforce the gendering practices and to bring about the fact that similar issues (diets and workout or presentations of new sports, for example) are dealt with in quite dissimilar ways.

In women’s magazines, the predominant style of speech is chatty – like a bunch of friends talking together (see Hermes 1995). In this friendly manner the magazines address a person starting a new hobby or having difficulties in keeping up with an existing one. Different sections of the magazine repeat this almost parental way of warning women about various dangers: temptations or relapses concerning diets or about the scary tacit fat in processed foods. This leads the reader to conclude that unhealthy eating, lack of inspiration or the premature aging of the skin are lurking around the gym corner and that the task of the magazines is to spur and encourage the women.

It is peculiar how the topics are not addressed with their proper names, but explained with almost childish practical examples and periphrases. For instance dieting or improvement of aerobic capacity is rarely approached with physiological explanations, but with expressions like: after a few weeks of following this routine, you will notice you no longer become out of breath so easily or that you can button the top button of your jeans again. Women’s sports magazines have adopted some of this childish language, which would be totally incomprehensible in men’s magazines. The magazines classified as “neutral” lie in the middle. Thus, sports in the proper meaning of the word is separated from women and femininity on the level of vocabulary and discourse and, at the same time, femininity is connected with exercise or conditioning.

A specific feminine point of view permeates all stories. This framework seems to emphasize looks as the core of women’s sports culture. Achieving a certain look is seen as the key motivational element in the ways women practice sports as well as the key factor in women’s relationships with their bodies. The choices these magazines make
include assumptions about women as bodily creatures, as members of a culture and as practitioners of sports. Even if top athletes were sometimes introduced and more often their bodies admired in women’s sports magazines, the choices and ways of life these athletes represent are interpreted as strange and deviant from the framework of the discourse. When it comes to competitive sports, women are not expected to understand the sport itself nor are they expected to be motivated to act as audience. Rather, they are persuaded to view sports (since during the Olympics, for instance, their spouses do it anyway) by introducing new angles: the beautiful (male) bodies to fancy, the beautiful (female) bodies to inspire their own training, the possibility to cuddle with their spouses on the couch.

Men’s magazines and the gender-neutral magazines write in a more matter-of-fact, substantial style. The “us” constructed within the stories consists of sports practitioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender address; interpretation grounded in:</th>
<th>Addressed to women: Sport, LadyFitness</th>
<th>No explicit gender address: Fitness, Kuntoja terveys, Kunto+</th>
<th>Addressed to men: Kuntosali, Juokeija</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Themes of stories and their frequencies</td>
<td>fashion, sports accessories, (celebrity) portraits, looks, outdoor activities, health workout routines, sports presentations, diets, recipes, dieting &amp; weight, beauty &amp; cosmetics, self confidence &amp; personal growth, relationships, success stories, product presentations, FAQ in medicine, beauty or training</td>
<td>sports presentations, sports in general, (celebrity) portraits, news product presentations, health relationships, workout routines &amp; tips nutrition &amp; recipes travel sex dieting &amp; weight</td>
<td>sports in general, techniques, (celebrity) portraits, workout routines, tips &amp; comparisons capacity &amp; physiology sports results events (marathons etc.) nutrition dietary supplements equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Visual style</td>
<td>colours: pastels, pinks fonts: round, upright, stylized covers: models presenting sports journalistic pictures: big, like fashion photographs, women pose, not perform</td>
<td>colours: basic blues, reds, greens, yellows fonts: stylized covers: pictures of performing bodies, pictures from events/competitions journalistic pictures: big, like covers, seldom models posing</td>
<td>colours: basic blues, reds, greens, yellows fonts: narrow, stylized, dynamic cursive covers: pictures of performing bodies, pictures from events/competitions journalistic pictures: smaller, like covers, models/athletes posing only in workout stories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Discursive strategies</td>
<td>addressing audience: sisterly, encouraging style: chatty, even childlike, practical vocabulary: practical, vivid, not professional other: everything is rendered womanly by combining it even artificially with “naturally feminine issues”</td>
<td>addressing audience: simple, straightforward encouraging, style: businesslike vocabulary: practical, perspicuous</td>
<td>addressing audience: parts of community style: businesslike, even professional vocabulary: practical, perspicuous, even scientific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Gendering Practices in Sports Magazines
and this “us” is addressed using professional, specialized discourses. The stories use professional vocabulary and explain issues and phenomena “scientifically”. Problems are solved by interviewing experts, and solutions and suggestions for action are shown in tables, graphics and even chemical compounds. If the discourse the feminine magazines use seems confusingly chatty and the actual facts are sometimes hard to find, their masculine equivalents do the exact opposite: the point is often buried among the countless technical details.

These gendering practices work effectively to form gender stereotypes, which can be quite narrow and unconditional. The stereotypes are not harmless and innocent descriptions of the different characteristics and interests of the two genders, but they renew the idea that everything is naturally gendered (e.g., Tainio 2001, 19, also West & Zimmerman 1987, Schegloff 1997). As an idea, a women’s sports magazine is possible – we tend to think that women practice sports in a specific, womanly way, which is separable from men’s way of doing sports. The same kind of magazine for men is unimaginable – if they would produce one, it would probably not succeed very well. Even magazines like Men’s Health, which covers a wider area of interest than just sports, have had difficulties finding sufficiently big audiences – the Finnish one lasted for almost a year. The differences within the sexes tend to fall into oblivion when the stereotypes become too strong.

These observations can in most respects be applied to other media as well. Because the analysis is inevitably partly descriptive, the following chapters on the Internet and television are written emphasizing the practices that take on different forms in these media.

Bodies Dot Com

Technically, an Internet site is a multimedia presentation; a visual field that consists of various graphic elements, for instance tables, windows, icons, fields and different animations (banners, gif-animations and java-applets). We are, however, more interested in their content and styles of expression and the network of practices that are formed between a site, its content and other media. The websites are here considered as a central part of contemporary visual imaginaries that, in addition to creating new media practices, circulate and re-form styles and elements from traditional media.

For the analyses, we selected websites that focus mainly in health-/ fitness-oriented sports and exercise (see Appendix 1.) The sites targeted at women were recognizable at first sight. Pale pastel colours were dominant in the backgrounds of the sites as well as in the illustrations and the headlines of texts. Also the compositions of the sites were feminine, and the typography that repeated the round and wavering forms of balls, bubbles and flowers. The femininity of these was highlighted, when we compared them with “gender neutral” sites (SKUL, Suomen Latu) or sites that promoted only one sport. Clear and strong blues and greens combined with angular forms characterize the visual images of the “masculine” sites. Pictures and texts appear in separate boxes, whereas in women’s sites they usually overlap.

Individual pictures strengthen the impression of difference. The photographs at women’s sites represent young, smiling women who, even if in the middle of their gym workout, have turned to pose to the camera. This gives an impression of passivity, in contrast to “gender neutral” sites that represent photos of whole families hiking, biking, paddling, etc., –actively doing something together. The focus of these family-photos seems to be in the activities more than in posing, which seems to be “natural” only to
women (see Mulvey 1975; Kuhn 1994). Photos on sites that are targeted to men also seem to have caught men “in the middle of action”: they do not care about the unknown observer of their action.

Magazines and Internet sites seem to be kindred as forums of sports culture judged by their content, visual style, discursive strategies and use. Both of them are scanned page/text by page/text. They share the privacy of the acts of reading/using them as well. Thus, the Internet could be considered the modern extension of women’s magazines and sports magazines (like McLuhan’s (1964) idea of television as the extension of eye, etc.). Both of them have, however, their special characteristics on levels of use, contents and aesthetics.

Internet’s particularity is constructed on its interactivity and versatility. Even if the sites are grounded on visual elements (icons, arrows and colours), their contents are based on texts and interaction to the extent that other elements (pictures, sounds and moving images) are subordinate to texts (Paasonen 2002). The articles that resemble those of magazines are remarkably shorter on the Internet, but the medium makes it possible to open long and detailed texts “under” a collection of hyperlinks. The reader is lured to stay, since the next zine is temptingly close... The interactivity and reader-orientation of the Internet become obvious while acquainting oneself with the number of discussion forums where readers communicate in real time. Characteristic of the medium, but also familiar from magazines, are the experts who answer reader’s questions. The advantage of the Internet is that it contains huge archives for the interested reader.

From Talking Heads to Sporting Bodies
Same visual imaginaries, discursive strategies and topics circulate from one media to another. Television is bursting with meanings that are related to sports culture. During the research period, sports news was naturally available, but also magazine programmes reminiscent of traditional magazines and Internet zines on sports culture, workout programmes and discussions of various talk shows that touch upon sports culture. In addition, codes of sports culture are taken advantage of in advertisements, drama programmes and docusoaps, projects of bodybuilding and dieting and/or weight problems are dealt with quite often.

Traditional classifications of television programmes consider sports programmes as “masculine” (for example Fiske 1987, Craig 1992, see also Brown 1990). We would rather state that the gender address of television’s sports programmes is more difficult to define than is that of the popular press or the Internet. The magazine programme Ihana aamu – naisten makasiini is obviously targeted at women on grounds of its title, the treated topics as well as the visual style and discursive strategies. The visual style of Ihana aamu connects the programme with the feminine style of women’s magazines and Internet sites: the studio is decorated with round forms and “feminine colours” as well as with indoor plants. The same goes for workout programmes that are staged in “mood-lighting” (Joogamatto/Joogi) or stimulating red and yellow (Aamujumppa).

Other magazines that focus on sports culture contain presentations of sports and athletes (Hot sport, Idrottsbiten), bring together athletes and ordinary people (Elixir-sport) in order to give training tips for the performers as well as the audience, or represent a variety of topics related to health, sports and general well-being (Akuutti). These versions of the genre are somewhat hard to interpret as being targeted to either of the genders, or even to favour either of them. They differ in a significant way from the women’s maga-
zine, as their focus is on “traditional sports”, that is, top elite and professional sports or other serious practitioners of a sport. This would motivate an interpretation of the topics of these programmes as being masculine rather than feminine. The parade of female sports news anchors that started in Finland in the 80’s has had a definite effect on the visual imaginary of the sports magazines. The young, female anchors might have been considered fresh, but time has shown that the changes have been quite ostensible: middle-aged women do not have a foothold in the programmes previously occupied by middle-aged men. Nor have the changes reached the gender hierarchies of the programmes’ contents. Still, these programmes do not seem to fit unambiguously into the gender matrix we have found quite useful so far.

Why, then, is it so complicated to define the gender address of these programmes? The explanation could be traced to the qualities of television as a medium. The target audiences for the nationwide prime-time programmes are not narrow segments consisting of devoted sports fans, but rather diverse groups of viewers (e.g., families with people of different ages and genders). These programmes clearly seek an audience that is interested in sports culture (read: athletes, different sports, workout tips), regardless of gender and without explicit references to feminine or masculine cultures. Our purpose is not to claim that television programmes are less gendered than other popular cultural products. In the context of sports culture, however, it seems that the gendering practices of the other media are even more explicit, especially on the level of visual imaginaries.

It is necessary to keep in mind that research produces no final meanings, but differently biased interpretations of reality to compete with other interpretations (Lehtonen 1998, 220). Skimming through the quite non-existent research literature on the public sphere of sports culture made us realize once again that meanings are constructed in the process of interpretation, and that it is sometimes difficult to avoid renewing the very practices one is criticizing. In what ways are our interpretations biased by prevailing conventions and naturalized practices? What makes a researcher, for example, describe a tennis racket as light and feminine sports equipment (Pirinen 2001, 31)? Is tennis a “light and feminine sport” or could it be so that the fact that the racket is in a woman’s hand leads the interpretation astray? And following the same line of thought: are we claiming that women’s sports culture is appearance oriented because young and beautiful women (models) serve to visualize it in the media?

Think Healthy!
The gendering practices within the field of sports culture have been studied in Finland since the 1980’s. The focus has been on gendered discourses within sports (Veijola 1998), images and discourses of women’s bodies (Markula 1995), men’s corporeal experiences and masculine subcultures (Tiihonen 2002), or the history of women’s sport (Laine 2000). Within the fields of media studies, the focus has been on competitive sports, such as heroes in sports (Virtapohja 1998) or women athletes in the media (Pirinen 1999). From our point of view, the analytical gaze on the public sphere of sports has been limited to competitive sports, and in many of the studies, the media contents have been considered as “mere” representations. The lager context of sports culture and its public sphere have remained undefined territories, not to mention the effects of this field of public sphere on people’s lifestyles, tastes and identities. The brief overview of the public sphere of sports culture we conducted, even if it is incomplete, has demonstrated how complex and difficult it is to define the field.
The public sphere of sports culture is obviously gendered: the combination of themes, actors, styles and visual representations of sports culture construct genders in inter-refering and inter-textual repetitions, where the sexes/genders are approached in different ways; explicitly, implicitly as well as aesthetically. Sports, judged by representations in different media, are not included in women’s life. Rather, what women are (thought to be) interested in are the consequences of sports. Women’s assumed aim is to look good and this is achieved by self-control reinforced in the articles, discussions and tests in the “women’s media”. The focus is, then, on fulfilling the requirements of stereotypical norms rather than enjoying the action. Women are encouraged to reward themselves after a workout and to enjoy that reward (perfume, moisturizer, fruit, or relaxed feeling), whereas the pleasure that men are suggested to gain from sports is related to the improving capacity of the body and “pleasurable pain” that is an essential element of sports. It seems that, when it comes to public sphere of women’s sports culture, the woman defines both its content and form much more than does the sport.

As the consequence, women are representing sport (in the sense that there is always someone looking, at least the woman herself), while men are performing (e.g., concentrating on what they are doing). The difference between representing (as an object) and performing (as a subject) is constructed by numerous visual and discursive strategies. Sports becomes a field of action that is not “natural” for women, a field in which women participate only because they have to for other purposes. On the contrary, they have to be persuaded and encouraged. Is active, creative agency even made possible for women within the discourse of women’s sports culture? What kind of ideological consequences does this have? How does it affect the identity work of both women and men?

Confusingly, it seems that there is still a need for magazines committed only to women’s sports culture even though combining sports and women seems almost impossible. Unlike being a woman, being a man does not seem to outline the whole public sphere of sports culture – there are no such things as men’s sports magazines in the same sense that there are women’s. The media targeted to men are organized according to interests in a certain sport, not according to gender. A man chooses magazines to read according to his interests (hobbies, tastes), whereas a woman is expected to make the same choice on the basis of her gender.

Taking popular culture seriously or, in other words, as one of the fields within which people obtain material for constructing their identities, the strict division of genders in its practices has definite consequences. First of all, the reiteration of gender as differences between men and women – rather than of gender as a matrix of different desires, norms, preferences and positions – works to mark womanhood as something essential – thus women’s pleasures are to be found from women’s media. Secondly, the public sphere of sports culture renews the cliché that only women have a sex and a gender.

In contemporary media culture, professional sports are major field of the spectacle. Whereas the activity of participating in sports involves an active engagement in creative practice, spectator sports involve passive consumption of images of the sports media. When thinking of the relationship between media publicity and lifestyles or identities, a wider scope should be taken. Sports spectacles naturally provide material for identity work, but it is the more mundane media content that activates “ordinary people” to become involved in sports. Thus sports culture in its widest definition should be taken as the object of analysis, which should be conducted from the point of view both of diversity and of hegemony. Discourses that rather deconstruct gender stereotypes and gendering practices than renew them enable diverse, positive identifications. Unfortu-
nately, the data we examined do not provide many alternatives to the traditional gender stereotypes.

Looking at the media contents it seems that the flow of hegemonic femininity is so strong in its volume that not many alternatives for identity work (in spite of alternative readings) are in sight. The same obviously applies to hegemonic masculinity; it cannot possibly cover all men and their interests, but it seems that, especially in the field of sports culture, the alternatives for female identification are quite small in number. The practice of repeating common knowledge of femininity and masculinity speaks of a need to reproduce and maintain these categories, and thus the sexual contract.

Notes
1. Translations of all Finnish titles in Appendix 1.
2. The remediation of the Internet works in two ways: also the traditional media apply the Internet’s graphic styles in their layouts and typographies (Paasonen 2002, 8).

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Mulvey, Laura (1975) *The Visual Pleasure and the Narrative Cinema*. *Screen* 16 (3).


Appendix. Analysed TV Programmes, Magazines and Websites

Friday 30.8
20.55-21.00 Urheiluruutu/ TV1 (Sports news)
20.20-20.55 Melonnan MM-kilpailut/ TV2 (World championships of canoeing)
23.05-0.40 Jalkapallon Super Cupin finaali/ TV2 (Football Super Cup Finals)
16.00-17.00 Urheilukanavan ikkuna/ MTV3 (Sports news)
18.00-19.00 Speden Spelit/ MTV3 (A sporty game show)
20.00-21.00 Gladiatortir/ MTV3 (The gladiators, a game show)
21.00-23.00 Golden League: Bryssel/Nelonen (Athletics, the Golden league in Brussels)

Saturday 31.8
18.00-18.15 Idrottsbiten Nuorison urheilumakasiini/ TV1 (Sports magazine for young people)
11.20-11.45 Hot Sport/ TV2 (A sports magazine)
14.45-15.15 Sporttitähdet: Janne Niinimaa / Nelonen (Sports Stars: Janne Niinimaa)
23.35-23.40 Urheilu-uutiset / Nelonen (Sports news)
21.30-22.20 SmackDown!/ Nelonen

Sunday 1.9
18.55-19.45 Lihavat ystävä / TV1 (Fat friends)
18.10-18.35 Ruutulippu /TV2 (Motor sports news)
20.15-21.00 Yllytyshullut/ Nelonen (The Gullibles, a game show)

Monday 2.9
21.00-21.25 Sportmagasinet/ TV2 (A sports magazine)
23.05-0.00 Viettelysten saari/ MTV3 (Temptation Island)

Tuesday 3.9
18.35-19.05 Akuutti/ TV2 (Medical magazine, includes health and fitness section)
22.55-23.24 Euroopan Vuoksi: Asfaltturheilijat/ TV2 (A documentary on skate board culture)
20.30-21.00 Painopartio/Nelonen (Fat camp)

Wednesday 4.9
16.30-16.55 Hot Sport/ TV2 (A sports magazine)

Thursday 5.9
20.05-21.00 Suuri seikkailu/ TV2 (The great adventure – survivors-style game show)
21.00-21.50 Jääkiekon Tshekin turnaus/ TV2 (Ice hockey)

Friday 6.9
15.20-16.10 Selviytyjät/ MTV3 (Survivors)

Sports magazines:
Fitness, LadyFit, Kunto+ (Shape+), Sport – naisten liikuntalehti (Sport, women’s exercise magazine)
Kunto ja Terveys, (Health and condition) Kuntosali (The gym), Bodaus (Bodybuilding), Juoksija (The runner)

Websites:
Revisiting the Coronation
A Critical Perspective on the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953
HENRIK ÖRNEBRING

Media scholarship has long since abandoned the idea of unified media effects – that is, the idea that media content affects all members of the audience in basically the same way. Decades of methodological and theoretical development have brought a more sophisticated understanding of “audiences” and “effects” to media research. However, the idea of unified media effects still seems to be quite strong in the study of media events – large-scale, pre-planned live events that dominate the mediasphere for a short period of time, where the presentation is characterized by ceremony and reverence, to roughly follow Dayan and Katz’s definition (Dayan & Katz 1992:4-9). It may be that it is difficult even for media scholars to free themselves entirely from the frames of interpretation imposed by the media. The media routinely portray media events as being received and interpreted in fairly uniform ways or according to simple binary oppositions – note for example the two dominant, opposing descriptions of media effects and audience reactions prevalent in the popular analysis of the death and subsequent funeral of Princess Diana in 1997: on one hand, that of “a nation/world united in grief”, and on the other, “media-induced mass hysteria”.

Media events are the locus of a number of classical questions in media studies: questions about media effects, media audiences and media representation all appear in both lay and academic analysis of media events. One can, with Dayan and Katz, consider media events to be one of the archetypal media formats or media genre of our times; but regardless of whether we agree with this view, we will have a hard time denying that events that can bind the entire globe together as a simultaneous audience through mass mediation surely are important as objects of study. While Dayan and Katz offer a very comprehensive and well-considered analysis of media events, their view is still essentially functionalistic, and at times seems to fall into the trap described above: that media events are largely uniform in their effects.

This article outlines a more critical perspective on media events, based on ideas advanced in an early study of media events by Lang and Lang (1954/1984), and on the concept of media logic. The article presents the results of a study comparing audience reception of an event with newspaper representations and narratives of the same event. This comparison shows some interesting differences and discrepancies both between media coverage and audience reception, as well as among the audience members them-
selves. The object of the study is twofold: to bring to light the diverse nature of audience reactions to and interpretations of media events, and to show how the concept of media logic can contribute to a critical theory of media events.

The event studied is the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. This is one of the classical reference points when it comes to media events, both in Britain and internationally (Dayan & Katz use the Coronation as an early and typical example of the genre, see Dayan & Katz 1992:26, 43). This event is interesting as a case study for two reasons. First, it has for the most part been interpreted as mainly integrative in its effects and from a basically functionalistic perspective (see Shils & Young 1956 (further references are to the 1975 reprint) and Scannell 1996), i.e. it has been interpreted according to the media’s own frames and is, thus, interesting to revisit with a new set of theories and concepts. Second, earlier studies of the Coronation have focused on television coverage and ignored newspaper coverage, a very important part of the overall media landscape (as in Briggs 1979, Cannadine 1983 and Chaney 1986) – even though media events arguably were made possible by television, they are hardly only “television events”. I propose that a return to the paradigmatic media event of the Coronation can give us important insights into how to re-conceptualize media events in our own highly mediated time.

A Critical Perspective on Media Events

A comparison between media representations and audience receptions of events is a potentially very fruitful way to approach media events critically. A research design similar to that presented here appears in Thomas (2002), who compares media representations of the death and funeral of Princess Diana with audience reception of the same event. In this study, he draws attention to the problem inherent in using media coverage as a source of knowledge about social and cultural phenomena. In a media event of the magnitude of Diana’s death and funeral, audience reactions and interpretations across the nation and the globe are bound to be very varied – and yet, as Thomas points out,

Across all media – television, radio, broadsheet and tabloid newspapers – the story could scarcely have been more monolithic if it had been state-imposed. For despite the thousands of pages and hours devoted to a story that quickly moved from being one about Diana’s death to the unfolding reaction, a remarkably uniform picture was offered based on the unity, emotional intensity and adulation of popular opinions. (Thomas 2002:7)

This tendency of the media to impose a unified frame of representation during large-scale media events is not unknown. The earliest study of the discrepancies between media representations of an event and audience reception of the same event is probably Lang and Lang (1954, further references are to the 1984 reprint).

Lang and Lang set out to compare media accounts of an event (the MacArthur Day Parade in Chicago 1952) with the accounts of people actually present at the site(s) of the event. Lang and Lang advances the since well-established idea that the media themselves not only represent (or mis-represent), but also actively construct events: “A landslide effect is cumulative: it builds as assumptions about reality leads to acts that reinforce the definition as reality.” (Lang & Lang 1984:56). They come to the conclusion that the formats and symbols chosen by television producers led to a one-sided coverage:

First, the depiction of the ceremonies mainly in terms of unifying patriotic rather than potentially divisive symbols left no room for the depiction of dissent. Second,
and more important, the television presentation enlarged the viewer’s field of vision but not the context in which he could interpret the event. (Lang & Lang 1984:57)

Media events become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, where the media construct an event that does not necessarily correspond to the event as witnessed by physically present spectators. Similar thoughts are expressed in the historian Daniel Boorstin’s work The Image (1961) – the media work to create worlds of their own that have little to do with people’s everyday experiences.

This critical perspective, however, is largely absent from Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s key work on media events, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (1992). Even though essentially functionalistic, Dayan and Katz are hardly unaware of the fact that media events can function as an exercise of power, but one of the striking features of the book is that a critical stance towards media events seems perpetually half-realized. They show that one of the main functions of media events is their conferring of status to different persons, organizations and institutions, but they do not interpret this as having much to do with relations of power and dominance (Dayan & Katz 1992:43ff, 192, 199). They suggest that television depoliticizes society because it creates an illusion of political involvement, but then brush aside the ideological implications of this depoliticization (Dayan & Katz 1992:59). They note that the normal journalistic rules of objectivity, fairness and critical distance are superseded by a reverent mode of presentation during media events, but do not dwell on the possible ideological consequences of this mediated reverence (Dayan & Katz 1992:91f, 192f). In short, the work of Dayan and Katz has critical potential, but this potential remains largely unrealized.

Looking specifically at the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth, the object of this study, it is clear that the dominant view of the Coronation as a media event is based on functionalistic notions and a basic stance towards the event as a positive occasion – a view that owes a great deal to Edward Shils and Michael Young’s study of the Coronation (Shils & Young 1975, a reprint of their 1956 article). The view of Shils and Young is that the Coronation was an occasion of integration, community and expressions of the moral centre of society. Their analysis is based on a textual analysis of the Coronation broadcasts on television, and some analysis of data on audience reception. Their conclusion is that:

The coronation of Elizabeth II provided at one time and for practically the entire society such an intensive contact with the sacred that we believe we are justified in interpreting it as we have done in this essay, as a great act of national communion. (Shils & Young 1975:151-2)

Viewing the Coronation as a more or less unproblematic occasion of national unity or even national communion seems to have since become the dominant interpretation (see for example Scannell 1996:75-92).

Dayan and Katz do mention that certain groups or members of the audience may disagree or even protest against the values or ideals at the core of the media event, but in summing up the possible effects of media events, they do not return to this fact or expand upon it (Dayan & Katz 1992:68ff). In fact, in their concluding chapter, Dayan and Katz clearly focus on what could be described as positive and functional effects of media events, such as liberating leaders to act differently, reactivating enthusiasm, creating openness to new possibilities, creating an upsurge of fellow feeling, etc. (Dayan & Katz 1992:190ff).

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When it comes to the Coronation, those who disagreed with the basic message of national celebration and unity were in the minority, but they still existed – so one cannot draw the conclusion that the event was mainly integrative and positive just because the media representations only featured happy people. Shils and Young’s contemporaries Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang give media events a more critical treatment.

Dayan and Katz also discuss the way in which media producers frame media events using formats and scripts (Dayan & Katz 1992:45ff), but again, this is not something viewed as a potential problem, or as something that has possible ideological implications. What I want to explore specifically is the nature of the unity so often presented in media event coverage – the lack of criticism and alternative perspectives. It stands to reason that this unity has something to do with the highly organized nature of media events, and the concomitant reliance on predetermined media formats and modes of presentation. Alternative representations simply become impossible to formulate.

The Media Logic of Events

The building blocks of a more critical perspective on media events can be found in David Altheide and Robert Snow’s work Media Logic (1978) and Nick Couldry’s more recent work on media power and media rituals (Couldry 2000, 2002). Together, these works can be used to draw attention to the non-integrative, non-cathartic, ideological aspects of media events.

David Altheide and Robert Snow introduced the term media logic to describe the way in which media force other societal spheres of activity (politics, sports and religion are their examples) to conform to media-specific ideals and considerations (Altheide & Snow 1978, 1991). The thrust of their argument is akin to that of the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ character of media coverage – first and foremost, media frames and media formats work to place the media themselves at the centre. They write, “In brief, it is axiomatic that what is presented via the mass media matters and has consequences” (Altheide & Snow 1978:192, emphasis from the original). They also consider format and modes of presentation to be of central importance to how societal issues are framed, where media formats supersede all alternative modes of presentation – the media way becomes the only way. As one of their nine points about the effects of media logic, they state:

Sixth, the truth or accuracy of a report has virtually no bearing on the consequences for the individual, activity, organization, or institution involved – only the presentation matters. (Altheide & Snow 1978:193)

And further on, describing the consequences of media logic in the particular case of a public official accused of improper (but not illegal) behaviour:

As illustrated above, this meant that certain events would be focused on, treated, and given meaning in order to promote a particular kind of presentation and understanding that was compatible with, for example, scheduling and time considerations, entertainment values, and images of the audience. The work of news, then, is not an organizational mirror for the world, but is in itself a major organization form for interpreting the world of experience. (Altheide & Snow 1978:196-7)

In this, Altheide and Snow echo Lang and Lang. It should be noted that, as do Lang and Lang, Altheide and Snow study only broadcast media, but their ideas about the power of media logic and media formats hold true for newspapers as well. Applying this perspec-
tive to the findings of Dayan and Katz creates a theoretical perspective with more of a critical thrust.

In his work on media rituals, Nick Couldry writes specifically about media events (Couldry 2002:55ff). He suggests that media events, being of an essentially short-term character, do not really express societal values the way Dayan and Katz and Shils and Young would have it. Instead, Couldry’s interpretation of the role of media events is closer to Lang and Lang’s and Altheide and Snow’s – that media events do not express but construct. What they construct is specifically the position of the media themselves at a societal centre, and as a source of privileged knowledge about that centre. Couldry’s critical analysis of media events leads him to assert the following:

We have, in effect reversed Dayan and Katz’s argument that media events, through their exceptional nature, reveals ‘truths’ about contemporary mediated societies which in normal circumstances are invisible. On the contrary, claims for the uniqueness of media events and the media’s special role in interpreting them are merely intensified versions of the media’s ordinary claim to be representative of ‘the centre’. (Couldry 2002:70)

Couldry criticizes how many media scholars have used the concept of “ideology”. By assuming that the media only reproduce ideologies that somehow reside outside the media system (like the ideology of the free-market system, for example), the self-legitimating nature of the media institutions themselves is obscured. The media also reproduce an ideology distinctly of their own, an ideology whose chief feature is the insistence that media are important and a natural societal centre for public debate, moral arbitration, and of political and cultural importance in general (see Couldry 2000:13-15 and Couldry 2002:12, 38ff). Couldry criticizes the notion of the media as a natural societal centre in the following way:

“In reality /…/ there is no such social centre that acts as a moral or cognitive foundation of society and its values, and therefore no natural role for the media as that ‘centre’s’ interpreter, but there is enormous pressure to believe in each. So great are those pressures that it even seems scandalous to name these myths as such. Yet it is essential to do so. The idea that society has a centre helps naturalise the idea that we have, or need, media that ‘represent’ that centre [.].”
(Couldry 2002:45-6)

So, while reproduction and reconstruction of other ideologies (of the ‘ruling class’, for example) may still be going on in the media, an analysis of media representations and media ideology must also concern itself with the specific ideology of the media – how the media legitimate and naturalize their own position and societal role.

The perspectives of Lang and Lang, Altheide and Snow and Couldry can thus be used to develop the critical potential of Dayan and Katz’s study of media events by adding questions about the implications of the media frames, the modes of representation, and the constructed nature of media events. To use this critical perspective on the Coronation in 1953 is particularly relevant because of the status of the Coronation in British media history – it is generally viewed from the perspective of Dayan and Katz, as an integrative, functional event, and the possible discrepancies between media coverage and audience interpretations have not been given a thorough examination. Thomas, who uses a research design similar to that of Lang and Lang, very convincingly points to the almost total failure of the media to reflect the diversity of audience attitudes (Thomas 2002:180). Using the same perspective and design on the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth...
II in 1953, the first major television event in Britain, can offer important insights into the nature of media events and the ways in which the media establish themselves as privileged interpreters of the social and cultural world.

**Methodology and Analytical Framework**

Empirically, this study is a comparison between the newspaper coverage of the Coronation and the audience reactions to the Coronation as a media event. The data on the audience reactions and interpretations come from material collected by the organization Mass-Observation at the time of the Coronation. The newspaper material comes from eight different daily British newspapers. Comparisons have specifically been made in areas that are defined as *problems*, or areas of conflict, relating to the Coronation.

**The Empirical Data**

Mass-Observation was an organization dedicated to collecting data of various kinds about the everyday lives of ordinary people, mainly through participant observation and material collected from volunteer panel writers. It was founded in 1937 and is probably most famous for its collections detailing everyday life in Britain during the Second World War (Madge & Harrisson 1941, Mass-Observation 1943). Mass-Observation was discontinued in the mid-1950s (it was restarted again in 1981, with basically the same aims and remit), and the study of the Coronation was the last major study the organization undertook. The results were never published, though they were used for analysis by other authors, notably Harrisson (1961), Harris (1966) and Ziegler (1978). The materials of the Mass-Observation are collected in the Mass-Observation Archive (M-OA) at the University of Sussex. The material from the Coronation study is very wide-ranging and contains survey data, participant observation data, textual analysis of newspaper and magazine material, data on Coronation decorations and more. The bulk of the data collection done by Mass-Observation was based on replies to both quantitative and qualitative questionnaires (called “*directives*”) sent out to a panel created by self-selection (Mass-Observation was based on the voluntary participation of interested members of the public). This of course raises some problems of representativeness, but as the primary purpose of this study is to raise issues of diversity, and to demonstrate the existence or non-existence of certain viewpoints and interpretation, the material is sufficient. There is, regrettably, no space here to go into a detailed analysis of the character of the very extensive and varied Mass-Observation materials, but a good summary of the methodological issues involved in using this specific archive can be found in Bloome, Sheridan & Street (1993).

The analysed data from the Mass-Observation Archive come mainly from the directive replies on pre-Coronation and Coronation Day activities from 150 panel members. Some material from public replies (i.e., material sent to Mass-Observation after appeals to the public, and thus not from people who were part of the regular Mass-Observation panel) to questions about pre-Coronation material has also been used, as well as the results of two Mass-Observation surveys on attitudes towards the Coronation made about one month before the Coronation, conducted in February and May 1953 (MO-A TC69/2/A). Supplementary data on viewing figures and viewer reactions from the BBC’s own audience research, kept at the BBC Written Archives (BBC WAC T14/846/2), have also been used.

The newspaper coverage analysed comes from selected daily newspapers in the month leading up to the Coronation – the period analysed is May 14th, 1953 to June 5th, 1953.
(three days after the Coronation, which took place on Tuesday, June 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1953). The newspapers have been selected for variance in key respects: both broadsheets and tabloids, both national and regional, and of different political inclinations. The newspapers analysed are \textit{Times} (broadsheet, national, independent), \textit{Daily Herald} (broadsheet, national, labour), \textit{Daily Telegraph} (broadsheet, national, conservative), \textit{Daily Mirror} (tabloid, national, independent), \textit{Daily Worker} (broadsheet, national, communist), \textit{Manchester Guardian} (broadsheet, regional, liberal), \textit{The Scotsman} (broadsheet, regional, conservative), and finally \textit{Financial Times} (broadsheet, national, independent). In these newspapers, all coverage produced by the newspapers own staff (i.e., advertising and other commercial material has been excluded, as well as letters to the editor) directly referencing the Coronation in some way has been coded and analysed. Collected newspaper clippings available at the BBC Written Archives have also been used as background material (BBC WAC R30/478/1).

\textbf{Some Words on the Role of Newspapers}

As mentioned previously, the study of media events in general seems to be the study of television events – at least if we follow Shils and Young, Lang and Lang and Dayan and Katz. There is a tendency to use ‘the media’ as a general term, when one is apparently really referring to television. But if we wish to continue using the concept of ‘media events’, we should also study other media besides television. So there is clearly an empirical rationale for looking at other media coverage as well. Besides the broadcast media of television and radio, the most relevant mass medium to study is arguably the newspaper. If we are interested in analysing multiple and differing media discourses, then the newspapers are a good starting point. Newspapers in 1953 were – and still are – heterogeneous in terms of format, basic political stance, subject areas covered, etc. – a marked contrast to the relatively homogenous broadcast media of the time. In looking for alternative representations, conflicts, problems and contestation, a wide sample of newspaper coverage seems an appropriate empirical material. Also, there is no doubt that the newspapers contributed a great deal to the Coronation as a media event. Many newspapers had some sort of “Coronation countdown”; they provided readers with maps of the Coronation route, arranged competitions with Coronation-related prizes – plus, of course, continuous news coverage of the Coronation, bringing the event to public attention and keeping it there.

\textbf{The Framework of Analysis: Problem Areas and Conflicts}

The Coronation, for the most part, was presented as an occasion for unity and festivity. Cannadine observes that media in Britain generally adopted a reverential view of the royal family, and providing Coronation coverage placing Elizabeth II in an imperial context and creating an event characterised by reverential grandeur (Cannadine 1983:153p, 158pp). But the common wisdom of media research, particularly news research, is that unity is a less likely theme for news: news items are much more likely to focus on problems and conflicts. However, news items are also likely to focus on anything that can hold the attention of the audience and therefore generate sales, so a largely conflict-free coverage of large media events and festivities comes as no surprise. The Coronation also lent itself easily to personification (mostly through the young Queen herself), another important criterion for newsworthiness.
But within this general mood of celebration, it stands to reason that there must still be elements that are identified as problems of different kinds – threats to the smooth and successful execution and performance of the Coronation, or criticism levelled at the Coronation as such, or at related subjects (like the institution of monarchy, the role of religion in society, etc.). It is these elements that I am interested in taking a closer look at. While Couldry (2000) argues for looking at instances in which media power is de-naturalized (such as when ‘ordinary people’ come into personal contact with media production procedures), I look instead at an instance in which media power seems to be naturalized to a high degree, and then study the representations of problems, conflict and dissent related to this instance. The Coronation is, to use terminology analogous to Couldry’s, an event in which the role of the media is super-naturalized or hyper-naturalized.

Problem areas of any kind did not receive much attention in the Coronation coverage, so the number of actual media texts (articles) analysed are few. But even this limited number of articles gives an insight into how the newspapers constructed the Coronation event and what kinds of problems and conflicts were allowed within the media frame. The mediated framings of problems and areas of contestation become even more illuminating when compared to the concerns of the media audience. The questions I ask are: What areas are considered problematic for the newspapers and the audience? What areas are open for contestation in the newspapers and within the audience? How are these areas framed and what are the newspaper and audience discourses on problems and conflicts? By answering these questions, I hope to further illuminate the points set out in the earlier theoretical section: the mediated relationship between centre and periphery, the self-appointed centrality of the media, and the complexities of mediated discourses on media events (involving not only integrative but also conflictual discourses).

Based on the results and observations made in previous studies of the Coronation, mainly Shils and Young (1975), Ziegler (1978), Chaney (1986) and Scannell (1996), a number of possible problem areas have been chosen. After the basic coding, some of these areas turned out to be more important and salient than others – as is usually the case. The possible areas in which problems, conflicts and contestation could be identified at the outset were practical, national, political, economic, personal, religious and finally media-related (the same categories were of course used when analysing the newspaper texts and the audience data).

Here follows a brief explanation of each. The practical area refers to problems and conflicts that might arise in the practical organization of the Coronation, for example problems with the number of seats or possibilities of access to these seats for different societal groups. National problems are those related explicitly to the cohesion of the nation, both relating to other nations and regions within a nation. For example, media coverage or personal reports criticizing the Coronation as essentially a London affair, or problematizing the participation of Scottish or Welsh representatives in the Coronation ceremonies would fall into this category. Political contestation is all forms of contestation that are based in differing political/ideological viewpoints, for example criticizing the Coronation on republican grounds, or saying that the Royal family is an essentially “Tory” institution. Economic contestation includes both worries that the Coronation itself will cost too much, as well as seeing commercialization of the event as a problem. Personal contestation is such contestation that is centred upon Queen Elizabeth II personally: either questioning her personal suitability as a monarch or voicing concern over her physical well-being during the long Coronation ceremony. The religious area con-
sists of conflicts or problems relating to the role of religion in the Coronation ceremony, for example criticizing the Coronation for being too sacral, as well as saying it is not sacral and solemn enough. Finally, media-related contestation concerns problems relating to the media’s own coverage of the event and whether or not this constitutes a problem.

One methodological problem arises in limiting the study to the coverage from the month immediately preceding the Coronation. Specifically, this affects the category of media-related contestation. There was a big controversy, widely reported in the media, about the initial refusal of the Coronation Committee to allow the BBC to broadcast TV from the Coronation service itself in Westminster Abbey (extensively covered by Briggs 1979:457-73). However, this controversy took place in October-November 1952, more than six months before the actual Coronation, so a major source of media coverage of media-related contestation is left entirely outside the study.

The justification for doing this is two-fold. One reason is that the controversy surrounding the BBC broadcasts has already been studied in some detail by both Briggs (1979) and Scannell (1996). The second is that I wish to focus on the period in which the Coronation really became a major media event – that is, an event saturating both most media coverage and everyday life – because this is probably when the self-defined mediated ‘centre’ is at its strongest and most obvious. The press clippings collected by the BBC itself (BBC WAC R30/478/1) indicate that the Coronation did not rise to media prominence until about one or two months before June 2. A detailed analysis of the media coverage of the Coronation broadcast controversy is perhaps worth a study in its own right.

Analysis and Results
As this study sets out to review problems, conflicts and alternative interpretations within a framework that is largely one-sided and positive, it is hardly surprising that the actual amount of references to problems and conflicts are small in both the newspaper coverage and in the audience. Some of the problem areas turned out to be ignored or virtually ignored by both the newspapers and the audience (for example, the religious and political areas), so in these cases one must assume that there is no hidden diversity or discrepancy to be found. Therefore, when presenting my results, I have chosen to concentrate on the most salient areas of disagreement between media and audiences, as well as to describe the overall characteristics of the media frame. After a description of the overall media frame, the areas in which key differences appear (national and economic) are presented. The final section covers the differences between mainstream and alternative newspaper coverage – as expected, the coverage in the communist newspaper the Daily Worker was so different that it could not be included in the general analysis, as it skewed the sample too much.

Overall Frame: National Celebration and the Audience as Problems
The overall media framing of the Coronation focuses on celebration and festivity and is generally positive in tone. This is hardly surprising, and fully consonant with earlier studies of the Coronation as a media event. Problems and possible areas of contestation do not receive much space. Of the total number of articles dealing with the Coronation, 8% deal with some kind of problem or conflict. The newspapers fall within a ‘problem-coverage’ rate of between 6% and 11%, not counting the Daily Worker and the Financial Times because their coverage is of such a different nature – more on this later. However, there is no direct criticism of the Coronation in any newspaper except the Daily Worker – in some
articles in the mainstream press, persons critical towards the Coronation are quoted, but even this occurs in very few instances (14 articles in a total sample of more than 500 articles, again not counting *Daily Worker* and *Financial Times*). This is a definite contrast to the audience material from the February and May surveys from Mass-Observation – there, around one in six expresses some form of direct criticism of the Coronation. This includes the people who express both positive and critical aspects of the Coronation.

Overall, the occurrences and circumstances defined as problems are those that pose a threat or hindrance to the smooth performance of the Coronation – of the total coverage of problem areas, 46% deal with this type of problems (the second-largest problem area, the national, makes up 29%). Some of these threats come from the over-eager audience itself, forming crowds and holding up traffic, and other threats are rather threats to the enjoyment of the audience. In this, the Coronation is described exactly as can be expected from the results of Dayan and Katz. They write “By agreeing to play a role in the representation of public events, broadcasters thereby suspend something of their professional role as independent critics” (Dayan & Katz 1992:76). What they say about broadcasters seems to apply equally well to newspaper journalists.

For example, the crowds trying to get a glimpse of the Queen during the Coronation rehearsals in the Abbey, or just sightseeing and looking at the Coronation decorations, are problematic. This occurs on May 18, “Coronation route rehearsal. Big crowds turn out” (*The Scotsman*), “Londoners out in thousands for a Coronation preview. Route thronged: long traffic queues.” (*Manchester Guardian*), on May 21, “The Queen stopped by crowd” (*Daily Herald*), “Crowds stop Queen’s car” (*Daily Mirror*), and again in late May, nearing the Coronation: “Coronation route crowded by holiday-makers. Hottest Whitsun for nine years. Traffic held up by sightseers” (*Times*, May 25), “Crowds outside the Palace. Queen’s return at midnight” (*Manchester Guardian*, May 26) and “Yard may decide: ‘Ban sightseer cars’” (*Daily Mirror*, May 28).

The paper most concerned with the hindrance that the crowds of people represent is the *Daily Telegraph*, where the crowds are first page news on four occasions: “Crowds tour coronation route. State coach out for rehearsal. Solid line of cars in mall” (May 18), “West End crowds halt Queen’s car. Police cordon broken. (May 21), “Coronation route crowd halts evening traffic. Swirling mass in West End” (May 25), and “6000 crowd halt the Queen’s car. Police line broken outside Abbey. Night watch at the Palace gates. Australians mount guard in bush hats.” (May 27).

Other practical problems covered include the *Times* report on the logistical problems that creating housing for the procession troops entail: “‘Housing troops’ at Coronation. Kensington Gardens’ 3,200 tents. Orders for June 2” (May 7), and the information on the special public transport arrangements for the Coronation in the same paper: “Getting to the Coronation. London transport arrangements” (May 20). The audience is urged to cooperate to overcome possible problems, as in “Don’t litter the June 2 route, they plead” (*Daily Mirror*, May 26) and “Helping the police. Sir H. Scott’s appeal for early arrival” (*Times*, May 29).

Finally, the *Daily Mirror* clearly places itself as a representative and ombudsman of the audience, in articles such as “Is 8-hour wait for Coronation necessary? Govt. are asked” (May 15) and “A nasty idea” (May 16) – the latter being an editorial piece criticizing railway workers for taking union action by going extra slow on Coronation day. And one big Coronation front-page headline in the *Daily Mirror* also defines the lack of Coronation decorations on Piccadilly as a major problem: “The shame of Piccadilly. The rich street forgets” (May 29). The article continues:
This is the shame of Britain’s most famous street – Piccadilly. In the centre of Coronation London, Piccadilly has failed to capture the spirit of the Golden Days. Even in back streets where money is counted in pennies – streets not within a Coronation roar of the great procession – pictures of the Queen are in every window: there are brilliant flags, golden crowns and brand new decorations. These streets are proud to pay tribute to the Queen. They are not worrying about the costs. But what of Piccadilly, the street where pounds are almost small-change, the street where thousands of Americans and other Overseas Coronation visitors are sightseeing now?

The media frame of the Coronation as an occasion for great national celebration suspends media criticism from “outside” the frame. Criticizing the audience for interfering with the proceedings, or criticizing groups or institutions that threaten some aspect of the Coronation, is within the frame and therefore possible. Other forms of criticism, such as criticism on political-ideological grounds, or criticism of excessive spending (indeed, the Daily Mirror chastises the shopkeepers on Piccadilly for not spending enough) or of a simplified notion of national community, are not possible within the celebratory frame. And it is in the coverage of the latter aspects, national community and economical aspects, that key differences between the newspaper discourse and the audience discourse emerge.

National Community in Newspapers and Audiences

As has been stated earlier, in previous studies of the Coronation a theme of national unity and community emerged in the media coverage. The Coronation ushered in a “New Elizabethan Age”, it provided a country in financial crisis with a much-needed occasion for national celebration, etc. (Ziegler 1978). But at many times in the history of the United Kingdom, the national has been an area of serious conflicts and contestation, with a substantial element of ‘invention of tradition’ to create national identities where none existed before (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). Therefore, in everyday news coverage, the national could be expected to be an important area of conflict and problems, problems that would mostly fall into one of two categories: conflicts about the internal cohesion of the different parts of the British Isles (Scotland’s and Wales’s nationalist movements can be seen as an example of this), and conflicts about the relationship between different parts of the British Commonwealth, and between Britain and other countries.

As it turns out, in the sample no newspaper coverage about conflicts or problems relating to the internal cohesion and community of the various regions of the British Isles is to be found. The main problem related to national belonging and community is instead the question of the participation of the Prime Minister of Malta, Dr George Borg Olivier. On May 11, the Maltese Premier issued a statement saying that neither he nor any official representatives of Malta would attend the Coronation. The reason given was that Malta was not accorded Commonwealth country status in the planning of the Coronation ceremony – instead, the Maltese Premier was placed with the representatives of the Colonial communities and excluded from the activities of the other Commonwealth Premiers. As a protest, the Maltese Premier made the decision not to attend, and to cancel all official Coronation celebrations on the island of Malta.

This is picked up by The Times, Daily Herald and the Daily Mirror. The Daily Mirror is most detailed in its coverage, quoting Dr Borg Olivier’s intention to even take down the Coronation decorations that have already been put up in Valletta (May 13). Further coverage mostly quotes verbatim the statements of British Premier Churchill that these prob-
lems can be solved and that Malta is urged to attend, particularly because Malta is a valued member of the Commonwealth community (Times, Daily Herald, The Scotsman and Manchester Guardian on May 21). Finally, the controversy comes to a happy conclusion when the Maltese Premier is accorded status as a Commonwealth representative and reverses his decision not to attend (Times, Daily Telegraph, The Scotsman and Manchester Guardian on May 22). When the story comes to an end, it is described as greeted with “...rejoicings...” (Manchester Guardian), a “...happy outcome...” (Times), and “Members of all parties broke into prolonged cheers...” (Scotsman, Manchester Guardian). A minor threat to Commonwealth unity appears, and is conquered.

Only the Times notes that the Coronation is controversial in other Commonwealth countries. On May 22 and May 27, the Times reports of criticism of the Coronation in nationalist newspapers in South Africa. These articles limit themselves to quoting the debate in the South African press, with one slightly disparaging comment in the article of May 27, saying that the Republican newspaper in which the criticisms of the Coronation has appeared “…studiously ignored the visit of the Royal Family to South Africa in 1947...” Apart from the Malta story and this coverage of disagreement in South Africa, nothing is reported that challenges the general discourse of national unity.

The newspaper concern over the (arguably minor) threat to the unity of the Commonwealth that the non-participation of the Maltese representatives poses does not leave any traces in the discourses of the audience. The audience criticism that is related to national dimension instead focuses on relationships internal to the United Kingdom – the prescribed mood of national unity is in some cases replaced with a general suspicion or dismissal of the centrality of London, in particular. For example, a lack of belief in the unity of the United Kingdom was manifested in Scotland as a brief controversy over whether Queen Elizabeth would be designated the First or the Second – the view held by those with stronger national pride was that Elizabeth was in fact the first Queen bearing that name, since Elizabeth I had in fact not been Queen of Scotland. Therefore, some argued, the Queen being crowned in Westminster Abbey in 1953 would more appropriately be referred to as Queen Elizabeth I. “They should make it definite if it’s the first or second Queen Elizabeth”, said one Scottish panel member (TC69/2/A). Also, disapproval of the Coronation was more marked in Scotland than in England (TC69/2/A). The “Elizabeth I or II”-controversy does not get reported in The Scotsman in the month preceding the Coronation.

Another critique of the prescribed national unity comes from those who are disinterested because they take the view that the Coronation really is mostly a London affair (this is also noted by Ziegler, 1978):

It’s going to be a great affair – that is, in London. It won’t make much difference to me.

If I was a Londoner, I’d think it was great, but we are too far north to be really interested. (Both quoted in Ziegler 1978:104)

Don’t know. Don’t take much part in it. I’m from the West Country. Londoners will turn out for everything. (TC69/2/A)

These sentiments do not represent a critique per se, but they do show that all did not share the sense of binding national community. The interest in the Coronation was greatest in London, and outside London both disinterest and disapproval were more widespread (TC69/2/A). There is also some overlap between this critique and the economic problem area, as one of the survey replies demonstrates:
London will get the money returned by visitors etc, but in the Northwest here where there’s so much unemployment it is not returned and goes on the rates. At a time like this the expense is not justified. (TC69/2/A)

Among the audience, the issue of international and Commonwealth unity does not appear as an important problem area. The idea of internal national unity is more frequently disagreed with – directly opposite of the newspaper coverage, where challenges to the internal unity are non-existent.

Problems of Economy in Newspapers and Audiences

The relationship between the Coronation and the economic sphere is interpreted in different ways – and to a different extent – by the newspapers and the audience. First of all, newspaper coverage worrying about or criticizing excessive public spending is largely absent from the sample – except in the Daily Worker, about which more will appear in the next section. Besides the Daily Worker coverage, there is but one article in The Scotsman and one in the Manchester Guardian reporting any form of criticism of public spending on the Coronation. The article (from May 5) in the Scotsman clearly does not indicate any critical perspective on the newspaper’s part, as the article simply reports the criticisms of Coronation spending made by Socialist MP Emrys Hughes of South Ayrshire in a six-penny pamphlet. Indeed, The Scotsman political correspondent is subtly critical of Mr Hughes’s ideas, as seen in the latter part of the brief article:

Mr Hughes does not indulge in arguments about the desirability or otherwise of the Monarchy in Britain. He seems to accept the fact that there are few who would prefer a republic. But he goes into a lot of detail to build up his case that the present costs are too high, that much of the existing ceremonial could be dispensed with, and that the amount to be spent on the Coronation is too large. And he is at great pains to stress his belief that all this Coronation expenditure is a subtle plot by the Conservatives to pave the way for a “red, white and blue General Election” later in the year.

The only instance in which a mainstream newspaper within the sample presents any substantial criticism of excessive public spending on the Coronation that obviously represents the stance of the newspaper itself is in the Manchester Guardian, in an editorial from June 5. The editorial is a response to reader’s reactions to a political cartoon by resident cartoonist Low that appeared on June 3, the day after the Coronation. The cartoon depicts the disorganized remnants of a children’s party, with books bearing the titles “Fairy Princess tales” and “Snow White”, a half-overturned TV set in the corner, and a text on the floor saying “£100,000,00 SPREE”. The title of the cartoon is “Morning After”. Some members of the Manchester Guardian readership took offence to this cartoon and said so in letters to the editor, and it is this criticism that the Manchester Guardian editorial responds to thus:

We are sorry if they [the readers, my note] have felt offended, but surely these things have to be looked at in perspective. /.../ Wednesday morning was a little too near the emotions of Coronation Day to try to press home what, we are afraid, is the cold truth to which we shall all have to come. /.../ It was worth it, but on balance it probably set us back in our economic struggle more than it helped us.
Note that even while the Manchester Guardian editorial writer takes a critical stance and defends the staff cartoonist, the criticism is measured and accompanied by assurances that the Coronation truly was a grand occasion worth celebrating, and that the cartoonist perhaps went too far after all, as in this passage towards the end of the editorial:

To warn us to take life seriously after our period of emotion hardly seems to be an offence, though perhaps he [Low the cartoonist, my note] should have remembered that this time, thanks to the great technical achievement by the B.B.C., the emotion was really deeply shared throughout the whole country, and therefore takes longer to fade away. It was, more than any earlier coronation, a relatively sober and serious celebration.

The article in The Scotsman is atypical because it refers to even the possibility that the Coronation could be criticized for consuming too much public resources. The editorial in the Manchester Guardian is even more unusual as it actually addresses and to some extent agrees with this criticism – but not until after the Coronation. Concern about excessive public spending is not really reflected in the mainstream newspaper coverage.

The newspaper coverage is not overly concerned with another contestable aspect of the economic area, that of commercialization, either. This only comes to the fore when the papers quote the sermon of L J Collins, the Chancellor of St Paul’s, on May 10, in which Collins criticizes the rampant “cashing-in” on the Coronation. This is reported in the Manchester Guardian, Times, The Daily Herald and The Scotsman on May 11. Other than that, the fact that the souvenir industry capitalizes on the Coronation is not reported on as a problem by the mainstream newspapers – and in the Financial Times, the marked increase in souvenir sales is mentioned in favourable tones (May 20). Of course, the newspapers can to a certain extent be said to have contributed to this commercialization with Coronations special supplements, Coronation maps, Coronation souvenir books produced by the newspaper itself, Coronation prize draws and competitions etc.

In contrast, in the survey on opinions on the Coronation carried out by Mass-Observation in May 1953, the economic aspects emerge as an important area of criticism. About one in six in the sample voiced mild to strong concern over public spending connected to the Coronation. Comments such as these are typical:

I think they’re spending too much money on it, when the country’s on the verge of a breakdown. I think it’s a waste of money. I do really, with the poverty there is in the country. It doesn’t make her any better; she’d be Qn [sic] just the same if there wasn’t the fuss.

Don’t believe in it at all. Too much expense when other things are in need of it. The country is in such a state.

I think it’s a waste of money and a waste of time; after all we have to pay for it.

It’s ridiculous to economise on certain services and then squander too much on the Coronation. (TC69/2/A)

The concerns about the crass commercialization of the Coronation, mentioned in passing in the newspapers, also appear in the audience sample, but to a lesser degree than the concerns about excessive public spending. But criticism of commercialization is still present:
It’s a very interesting historical event, but we tend to lose the real importance. It is getting too commercialised.

I’ve nothing against it, I think she’s very nice, but there’s been so much about it on Television and in Woolworth’s – I said to myself it’s like the way they put out X-mas cards the moment you come back from holidays. X-mas is stale before you get there and I feel the Coronation is like that too. Woolworth’s is full of it far too long in advance. (TC69/2/A)

The problem in this case, though, is not really the Coronation itself but the way in which some people see it as source of income – thus not showing the proper respect for the occasion.

Another economic aspect voiced by a few members of the public, but not in the mainstream newspaper coverage, is a criticism of the cost of the Coronation to the individual. This is framed in class terms:

Personally I think they’re spending too much money, I mean what chance is there of the likes of us seeing anything – could you afford £10 for a seat? I know I couldn’t. It’s like all these things they go in for, it’s a rich man’s Coronation. If you can afford to dress up in all that fancy ermine. I suppose it’s all right but personally I prefer to clothe my kiddies. What’s proper for one isn’t proper for the other. You’re not taken in by these things nowadays, are you?

Seats are too dear for working class people. (TC69/2/A)

The Manchester Guardian is the only mainstream newspaper in the sample to even mention the fact that seats in the Coronation stands along the procession route actually cost money (“End of the buyers’ market in Coronation seats – Ten Guinea Minimum Likely to Rise”, May 27). Otherwise, the fact that a quite large expenditure of money was required to view the Coronation procession in relative comfort was not reported or even mentioned by the other newspapers.

The newspaper coverage is, then, largely unconcerned with the economic aspects of the Coronation as a possible area of conflict – whether it be excessive public spending, commercialization, or costs to the individual. The economic aspect that does appear in the newspaper coverage is the quoting of Chancellor Collins and his criticism of the commercialization of the Coronation – again, an aspect that can well be interpreted as a threat to the dignified performance of the Coronation. However, in the sampled audience discourse, the economic aspect emerges as a definitely salient area of contestation and critique – concern for excessive public spending on the Coronation is considerably more marked in audience discourse than in the newspaper discourse, where such concern is mostly absent.

Mainstream Media, Alternative Media and Audience Discourse

I have alluded in previous sections that the newspaper coverage was rather uniform – except in the case of the Daily Worker. As a communist newspaper, the Daily Worker definitely existed on the far left fringe of the mediated public sphere – but it still circulated beyond an audience of card-carrying communists. Exact circulation figures are hard to come by – Seymour-Ure lists the circulation in 1950 as 115,000 and in 1955 as unknown, “possibly 6000-7000 copies per day” (Seymour-Ure 1996:29). The Daily Worker was included in the sample specifically to represent a possible alternative media discourse – and the empirical study confirms that the Daily Worker was a source of infor-
mation and perspectives on the Coronation not seen elsewhere in the newspaper discourse. The *Daily Worker* features nothing but coverage of problems and areas of conflict and contestation relating to the Coronation, and so can clearly be said to represent an alternative voice among the newspapers.

The *Daily Worker* is more concerned with the economic aspects of the Coronation as an area of conflict than the other newspapers in the sample. But, surprisingly, concern over excessive public spending does not get much coverage here either; it is mentioned in two articles. The first article, headlined “Coronation row in Kensington” (May 28) covers a disagreement over Coronation spending in Kensington. The second article is probably more important, as it is the first-page headline for Coronation Day itself, June 2, and here the costs of the Coronation are placed at the centre of criticism:

The money and effort spent on Coronation Day have been diverted from essential projects. For example, the steel and timber used are needed for houses and schools. But there are still millions of British citizens who have not been bamboozled. They have quietly watched what has been going on. In such homes today they will be asking themselves: “What good has been done?” The will ask also: HAVE the preparations for the Coronation enabled one extra house to be built? HAVE they provided one extra hospital bed in our crowded industrial cities, where beds are at a premium? HAVE they given the old age pensioners any hope for the future after the crumbs from the rich Coronation table has been eaten?

Overall, the economic problem area is framed in such a way as to allow criticism of corporations and financial interests in the first place. For example, the *Daily Worker* covers the commercialization of the Coronation, but does not interpret this as mainly a threat to the dignified performance of the ritual:

There can be no questioning the solemn dedication of the millionaire Press and the women’s magazines to the sacred cause of driving us all crazy by pounding away at the Coronation theme far beyond the bounds of human reason. /.../ Manufacturers are dedicated, too. They have been letting no considerations of taste or suitability stand in the way of their clear and patriotic duty of affixing crowns, royal ciphers and royal portraits on everything from liquorice sticks to lingerie. (Daily Worker, May 2nd, p 4)

The main area of contestation in the *Daily Worker* is the area of politics. The *Daily Worker* is explicitly republican in outlook and has numerous articles criticizing the monarchy – indeed, the main feature in the *Daily Worker’s* Coronation coverage is a series of articles under the banner “The truth about the Coronation”, inaugurated on May 4 with these words:

The Daily Worker today begins an important series of articles on the Coronation. It will cut through the claptrap and adulation, the drum-beating and the snob gossip, to get at the truth.

The following articles in this series are most concerned with criticizing the monarchy and advancing the cause of republicanism. In this, of course, the *Daily Worker* clearly represents the minority view, so the *Daily Worker* coverage does not really represent a more accurate representation of audience preferences in this respect.

The *Daily Worker* does seem to be more in tune with the audience when framing the notion of national unity as an area of contestation. Again, however, the challenges to the
prescribed mood of national unity in the *Daily Worker* are mainly expressed in terms of class conflicts, like in the article “Crown is symbol of disunity” (May 21), but criticism of the monarchy as a broader symbol of the Commonwealth also appears:

Mr Swaffer says the Coronation ‘will yet more strongly unite the peoples of the Commonwealth’. This means that because a Queen is being crowned in London, the people of Kenya, Nigeria, Malaya and other parts of the Empire will forget that their land has been stolen and that they are being shot down – and worse – for demanding its return. (*Daily Worker*, May 25, p 2, article “These guilty excuses just won’t do”).

Similar criticisms focussing on the colonial past of Britain appear in an article on Coronation Day (June 2), “The ‘family’ that starves its children”. But the strand of criticism based on centre-periphery relations of regions within Britain found in some members of the audience is not present in the *Daily Worker* coverage either. So, while the *Daily Worker* clearly represents an alternative media discourse, the areas defined as areas of conflict and problems are not quite the same as those defined as areas of conflict and problems by the members of the audience sample.

Obviously, the *Daily Worker* occupies a very particular place in the mediated public sphere. As a communist newspaper, it was boycotted by newsagents and for the most part had to rely on volunteer distribution networks. During the war, the government had suppressed publication of the *Daily Worker*. It was a fringe, far-left publication, albeit with a readership extending to non-communists as well, so it is hardly surprising that class-based criticism, a preoccupation with anti-Royalism and a rhetorical and ironical writing style are ubiquitous features. It has been included here for exactly this reason. The study seems to show that criticism of the Coronation that is not based solely on practical concerns of access, performance and decoration, only is possible on the fringes of the mediated public sphere – whereas criticism and dissent is evident in members of the audience that in terms of their general political views hardly can be described as “fringe”.

The second point made in a comparison between mainstream newspapers and the *Daily Worker* is that even a far-left newspaper with a radically different perspective on politics, economy and national unity could not ignore the Coronation. There is a highly visible series of articles specifically connected to the Coronation, and on Coronation Day and the day after the main news stories are about the Coronation – the *Daily Worker* was gripped by the same “Coronation fever” they accuse other newspapers of succumbing to.

This is in stark contrast to the *Financial Times*. In a quite different way, the *Financial Times* also can be considered an “alternative medium”, at least when it comes to coverage of the Coronation. The *Financial Times* stands out among the newspapers in the sample as the paper giving the least amount of coverage about the Coronation. For the other newspapers – including the *Daily Worker*, as mentioned above – it was simply impossible to ignore the Coronation, but the *Financial Times* does not take an interest in preparations, political issues, issues of national unity, religious issues or practical considerations regarding the Coronation celebrations. Just to give an indication, in the sample period *Financial Times* contains 14 articles relating to the Coronation – compared with 100+ articles in the *Daily Mirror*, the around 80-90 articles in the *Times, Daily Herald, Daily Telegraph, The Scotsman* and *Manchester Guardian* and the 40+ articles in the *Daily Worker*. The *Financial Times* has no picture material on the Coronation except the day before Coronation and the day after (*Financial Times* was not published on Coronation Day), another marked contrast to all other newspapers.
If one looks only at the mainstream newspaper coverage, the impression is clearly that Coronation coverage was celebratory and uncritical, and the only things framed as problems or possible sources of conflict were those that presented a threat to a smooth and joyous celebration. Looking at other coverage, we can see that criticisms seem to be limited to fringe media outlets, and that not even “fringe” or “alternative” media like the Daily Worker can afford to totally ignore the Coronation (if only because it serves as a focus for several issues central to the ideology of the Daily Worker). The only newspaper that can afford to ignore the Coronation almost entirely is the Financial Times, who presumably know that their elite audience will either not be interested in Coronation coverage, or can get their Coronation information from other media outlets. And the newspaper coverage in general does not pick up on the themes of criticism that the Mass-Observation material indicates as the most salient in the audience.

The Coronation Revisited: Conclusions

In the mass press, the Coronation is an unproblematic event, framed just as Shils and Young describe it: an occasion of national communion, celebration and festivity. The main problem related to the Coronation is how to guarantee a smooth functioning and successful performance. Part of this problem is the audience itself – clogging up streets, causing delays and possibly littering.

The differences between the media coverage of possible problems and the audience interpretations of what constitutes problems or areas of criticism are most marked in two areas: the area of national community, and economic/financial considerations relating to the Coronation. These areas, which the audience define as problems and areas of contestation, are not represented at all in the mainstream newspaper coverage.

Even though the audience reports are also largely consistent with the festive mood, they do show a more complex picture, and most importantly show that audience members are more disposed to question the prescribed festive mood than are the newspapers. For the most part, the newspapers are uninterested in anything that does not fit into the frame of joyous celebration – even though there might be serious public interest in more controversial areas.

The only serious criticisms of different aspects of the Coronation come from outside the media mainstream, in the communist paper the Daily Worker. But it is an indicator of the self-perpetuating nature of the media coverage that not even the Daily Worker can ignore the Coronation – indeed, a substantial number of articles cover it. However, being a fringe leftist newspaper, the Daily Worker can really not be said to have represented the criticisms raised by the audience any better than the mainstream press did – but it is still important to note that political and ideological criticism of the Coronation is only possible outside the mediated mainstream.

The Nature of Media Events

According to Couldry, one of the central premises of Dayan and Katz’s theory of media events – that media events reveal deeper truths about society and culture – is questionable. Coverage of media events cannot be said to be purely an expression of a prevailing mood or societal moral centre (Couldry 2002:41-7, 56ff). This study supports Couldry’s criticism – the newspaper coverage clearly does not represent the diversity of interpretations among the audience. In fact, the mainstream newspaper coverage does not
represent any critical aspects of the Coronation at all, whereas the audience does pick up and comment on possible areas of problems and contestation. The problem areas most keenly experienced by the audience members: economic factors and the character of national community, are not questioned or covered at all in the press. It is only the fringe newspaper Daily Worker that is somewhat more in tune with audience criticism than the mainstream newspapers.

The results of the study point towards Lang and Lang’s interpretation of media events rather than Dayan and Katz’s: media events are truly media events because they are largely constructed by the media. Problems that are inconsistent with the prescribed media mood of celebration are ignored, whereas contestation that in some way can be framed as possible threats to a generally amicable mood of festivity is covered – albeit that, too, does not take up much media space. Dissent becomes virtually impossible within the media mainstream, which should lead us to question the nature of the proposed integrative effects of media events.

Both academic and popular discourses about the Coronation frame the event as uniform in its (positive) effects, creating a feeling of national community and celebration. While there is no doubt that the Coronation was an occasion for festivity for many people, it is also true that other members of the audience did not feel included in the media-constructed national “we”. According to Shils and Young and Dayan and Katz, one of the most important effects of a media event like the Coronation is its ability to create a sense of community among the audience. Media events, according to Dayan and Katz, bring family members and friends together, create an openness to new possibilities, connect the centre and periphery and reverse the trend of individualization (Dayan & Katz 1992:195ff, 205). However, it is unclear exactly what this “community” consists of, and what it is that audience members feel part of – if they indeed feel part of anything. An important part of the media-constructed community is the national community, but as we have seen, audience members view issues of centre and periphery within the British Isles as more of a problem than the newspapers do. Perhaps the most tangible community is the very general community of celebration: people feel that they are sharing a festive moment with other people, though not necessarily a festive moment infused with national meaning. And in many aspects, this community of celebration is constructed by the media: as Ziegler (1978) reports, many people were negative or neutral to the Coronation but could not help feeling “drawn in” or “swept away” as the day approached, simply because the media-fuelled expectations were inescapable. Thomas’s study of people’s reactions to the death and funeral of Princess Diana show similar results – reaction to and reception of an event are generally assumed to be uniform because the media present them as uniform, but looking at how people actually acted and felt provides a more complex, nuanced picture (Thomas 2002:175ff).

In their list of effects of media events, Dayan and Katz mention some points that are worth returning to:

Live broadcasting enhances the status of the principals, conferring both legitimacy and charisma during the event and after. (Dayan & Katz 1992:192)

Nevertheless, broadcasters are rewarded with status and legitimacy for abandoning their “adversarial” stance in favor of an integrative role. (Dayan & Katz 1992:193)

Broadcasters also gain status as “donors” of an event. (Dayan & Katz 1992:193)

In the eye of public opinion, media events confer status on the institutions with which they deal. (Dayan & Katz 1992:199)
Dayan and Katz specifically refer to “broadcasters”, but the principle is exactly the same for the press. Following Altheide and Snow and Couldry, it is clear that one of the institutions involved in this process is the media. The media are also allowed to confer status upon themselves, and to legitimate themselves as interpreters of the public mood. The media frame is one of celebration and community, therefore the mood must also be one of celebration and community. The simple fact that not everyone feels at home in this constructed community is systematically ignored. This can hardly be considered integrative. And, even if media events do create an “upsurge of fellow feeling” (Dayan & Katz 1992:196) at the moment of the event, this does not really say anything about what happens afterwards. Considering the results presented here, the most lasting effect of the Coronation was probably (as both Briggs (1979) and Scannell (1996) mention) to cement the legitimacy of the BBC, rather than to provide any long-lasting feeling of community or a redefinition of the national identity. The “moral centre of society” is a fleeting thing, as the dissenting audience reports quoted here show – what remains is the view of the media as privileged interpreters of social and cultural reality.

Note
1. These figures do not include the Daily Worker coverage. If the Daily Worker were included, then that paper would on its own account for 42% of the problem area coverage, compared to figures of 6% to 11% for all the other newspapers.

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For most people, animals are symbolic: their significance lies not in what they are, but in what we think they are. We ascribe meanings and values to their existence and behaviors in ways that usually have little to do with their biological and social realities, treating them as emblems of nature’s purity or bestiality in order to justify, ultimately, our views of other human beings (Bagemihl 1999:79).

At the core of Western culture, there is a way of thinking in dichotomies, of dividing into twos, of constructing binary oppositions, for example, good and evil, male and female, body and soul, feeling and reason, etc. One of the most central and fundamental dichotomies is the one between nature and culture. Like many similar ones, this dichotomy has been discussed and deconstructed in a number of works in the last few decades (e.g. Haraway 1989, Butler 1991 & 1993, Robertson et al. 1996, Franklin, Lury & Stacey 2000). But in spite of the fairly large agreement in the scientific community that culture and nature should not be regarded as opposites, but that they are interdependent and presuppose one another, the idea of an opposition thrives. This is not the least true in the media, where televised wildlife film is an interesting example of how the dichotomy nature/culture is constructed and reproduced.¹

In Western thinking, nature is associated with woman, and culture with man. Ideas about nature, culture and gender are always connected. The construction, ‘making’, or creation of gender takes place on all levels of culture and society, and consequently also in the media, which simultaneously contribute to, and reflect this process. In the present article, I will analyse how gender, linked to the cultural construction of the nature/culture dichotomy, is created and reproduced in wildlife films.

So, why is it important to study the construction of nature, culture and gender in the media, and specifically in wildlife films? Today there is a lively discussion about the formative influence of culture and society on gender and sexuality, where biology is supposed to represent what is ‘natural’ and culture ‘unnatural’. A number of often traditional opinions about women’s and men’s work, care of children, homosexuality, adoptions, morality and family formation are brought forth with reference to nature. But in actual fact, the life and sexuality of animals are as varied as human life and sexuality. This fact is, however, surprisingly little known outside academia, and wildlife films not
the least have contributed to the concealment of this literally natural heterogeneity, something that is going to be discussed below.

Media in general give different, sometimes opposing, versions and images of masculinity and femininity, but these constructions of gender, are seldom taken up for discussion in media discourse at a conscious, reflexive level. Although gender is constantly produced and reproduced – in news, soap operas, game shows and documentaries – there is little awareness that this is what is done. The media offer is characterised by what I would like to call gender routine, that is, habitual, instinctive, unreflecting and iterated accounts of masculinity and femininity. Gender routine is not the result of a conspiracy; it is instinctive and maintained by both women and men in the media. It is ‘invisible’ in the way that it does not, for example, contain sensationally sexist images – which are of course easily detected – but based on habitual and unreflecting iterations of culturally and socially produced ideas about masculinity and femininity. There is also gender routine in wildlife films, as well as routine accounts of, for instance, ethnicity and sexuality.

It must be emphasised that wildlife films have done much to call attention to environmental issues, and to spread important knowledge about animals and plants. What is critically analysed in the following is not their important achievement, but the routine – neither obviously racist, sexist, nor homophobic – that colour wildlife films. It is the routine that characterise media accounts in general, and the material that I have investigated in particular, in 14 films of varying length, starring lions and elk – in some places, popularly known as the King of Beasts and the King of the Forest respectively. All films were shown on Swedish public service television, SVT1 or SVT2, between 1979 and 2002 (see appendix).

Wildlife Films: Science and Entertainment

Since its appearance in the beginning of the last century, wildlife film has been characterised by two fundamental phenomena in Western civilisation, namely science and entertainment (Mitman 1999: 5ff; Bousée 2000: 57ff). Science started to use film around 1900 in order to communicate its findings to people outside the universities, but it was to a small, limited, and well-educated elite. At the same time, the movie industry developed in the US, and one of the first ‘wildlife films’ was Roosevelt in Africa, which opened in cinemas in April 1910 (Mitman 1999: 5). It was a so-called hunting film, starring the former US president, based on a yearlong expedition during which 40 animals were killed per day. In other words, commercial wildlife film addresses its audience in a more thrilling and entertaining way than science film, but it has leaned – and still does lean – heavily against science to substantiate its aura of authenticity, which has been, and still is, so fundamental for its claims to realism, didacticism and objectivity.

The tension in wildlife film between the demands of authenticity and entertainment has been a constant through history, and there have been discussions in the business about how much fact and how much entertainment is justifiable, where the line between the two goes. Some – especially those with close ties to science – have wholly rejected the ‘entertainment aspects’, for example to turn a specific material about gulls into a linear narrative at the editing table (Mitman 1999: 67). Others have not minded creating dramatic climaxes by provoking fights to the death between animals that have been kept locked up in separate cages for several days without food. This was done, for instance, in the feature film The Silent Enemy, which was first screened in 1930, directed by William Douglas Burden (Mitman 1999: 47). This example is of course an extreme, and
does not represent what most wildlife filmmakers have done, and still do, but it says a lot about the tensions between authenticity and entertainment in the genre.

The importance of science for wildlife films can be studied from several angles. One is to compare the representation of the sexuality and social formations of animals in wildlife films with findings in the sciences. The American biologist Bruce Bagemihl (1999) does not analyse wildlife films, but looks at how findings about the highly varied sexual and social practices of animals are concealed, or more euphemistically reformulated, in science in line with contemporary cultural notions about what is ‘natural’ and what is ‘good’ behaviour. His work is an important basis for understanding representations in wildlife films of the sexuality and family formation of animals.

Bagemihl describes the long-standing taboo about even mentioning the diversity of animal sexual practices. He has gone through a considerable amount of zoological research. He concludes that it is clear that the diversity of sexual practices among animals has been concealed or silenced, and that it is the scientists themselves who have not dared to publicise their results because of the risk of being stigmatised as homosexuals. This fear was obviously more prominent 50 years ago. In more recent biological research it has been possible to acknowledge the varying sexual practices among animals, but now the problem is, according to Bagemihl, the way scientists interpret these practices.

He thinks that scientists interpret same-sex acts as ‘mistakes’ since it does not lead to the propagation of the species, which is so central in evolution theory – that is, they view it in the same way that many people see human homosexuality. That it is not quite that simple has been discussed by, for example, the zoologist Paul Vasey (1995), who has made extensive studies of primates, for instance Japanese macaques (cf. Snaprud 2003), and who argues that same-sex acts cannot be explained in any other way than that the animals do it because they actually like it, that is, it is not a mistake. At the same time, this behaviour should not be interpreted as homosexuality. Animals are not homosexual in any human sense; they do not have a stable preference for their own sex. But they are involved in sexual practices that resemble homosexuality, or rather, bisexuality. But what should we call these practices? There is simply no language for the same-sex practices found in nature, an interesting fact in itself (cf. Bagemihl 1999: 12). Animals are not homosexual in any human sense, nor are they heterosexual. Lacking better terms, and because the need to talk about these phenomena in the following, I will sometimes still use the human terms, despite the anthropomorphism, which I will later criticise in relation to wildlife films.

Bagemihl (1999) argues that animal sexuality and ‘family formation’ have been interpreted within a human ideological and moral framework. In other words, humans first determine what is considered ‘natural’, then this ‘naturalness’ is applied to nature, and last this construction is used as a proof and argument against things ‘unnatural’, for example, homosexuality or women who do not stay home and take care of their children. It might not be necessary to point out that these things are found in nature, just as sexual acts between individuals of different sexes, and females who take care of their offspring. Bagemihl’s point is, however, that the many and frequent ‘deviations’ (which of course are not deviations) have not been made visible in the sciences and that ‘normality’ (which is not normal) has been emphasised.

The consequence for wildlife films is that in their accounts of animal sexuality there are not many deviations from ‘normality’. But the whole blame for this blind spot in relation to varying sexual practices cannot be lain on the dependence on biology in wildlife films alone. Wildlife film does not only have a science side but also an entertainment side. As
part of mass culture, wildlife films have to be sold on a market, and in order to attract consumers on this market they have to adapt to prevailing moral and ideological positions. Until the late 20th century, wildlife films could not show too ‘shocking’ scenes, such as detailed violence (animals who kill and eat one another in too graphic and too long scenes) or extensive depictions of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, in the 1990s something that might be called snuff wildlife films appeared, showing close-ups of animal violence (Mitman 1992: 208). Of course, this trend in wildlife film is connected to the same development in the entertainment industry in general, where violence has become more common in films and on television. But it would last until 1995, before possibly the first pictures of animals involved in same-sex acts were shown (Bousé 2000: 175f).

But it is the puritan trait that dominates the history of American wildlife film, with Disney’s series *True-Life Adventures* as a fine example (Mitman 1999: 109ff). In the end of the 1940s, Disney started to shoot short wildlife films to be screened in cinemas. These films emphasised the individuality and personality of animals in order to, in Disney’s words, ‘help the audience to sympathise with it [the animal] and understand its problems better’ (Mitman 1999: 119). The anthropomorphism in these portrayals of animals took its lead from Disney’s experience with animated cartoons such as *Bambi* from 1942. At Walt Disney Company, it was thus the animated cartoons that gave rise to wildlife films and not the other way round. The music, which is also a trace from the animated cartoons, was also going to play an important part in wildlife films. For example, a sequence in the film *Seal Island* (awarded an Oscar in 1949) showing female seals coming to a beach is accompanied by variations on ‘Here Comes the Bride’ (Mitman 1999: 110).

The American 1950s were characterised by an ideology that put family and God at the centre – in other words, not very unlike the situation in the beginning of the 21st century. Walt Disney himself subscribed to this ideology and helped to disseminate it to broader layers of the population, repeatedly celebrating ‘eternal values’ in films made for mass audiences (Mitman 1999: 125). In his wildlife films, nature appears idyllic, a tapestry showing animals living in harmony with one another and thriving under the rigid but benevolent supervision of God. The smallest unit in this world is the family, for example made up of ‘mummy bird’, ‘daddy bird’ and their kids. In one of the films, for example, it is said that, ‘In nature’s half-acre, motherly love is expressed in patience and devotion. Be it fair weather or foul, mother always stands by’ (Mitman 1999: 127). Of course, violence and sexuality played no part in this image of nature. Yet the censors in New York and Maryland asked Disney to cut a sequence in a film that showed the birth of a buffalo calf because, naturally, the sexual organs of the female buffalo could be seen (Mitman 1999: 130).

**Wildlife Film on Television**

With television, the animals in wildlife films become domesticated, and the characteristic format *nature programmes* is created. In American television’s first and most successful nature programme, *Zoo Parade* (NBC, first season in 1950), which was aimed at the whole family, showed various animals as cute, cuddly and nice friends who were sometimes even smarter than humans. *Zoo Parade* was paid for by pet product advertisers. This market grew considerably after the war as pets became part of the nuclear family. Box office successes in the 1960s such as *Born Free* and *Flipper* are developments of a phenomenon that Mitman (1999: 157) calls the ‘Pet Star’, but in the latter film there is of course not one frame that shows the aggressive, ample and androgynous sexuality
of dolphins, which science and wildlife films have never said anything about (cf. Bryld & Lykke 2000).

But there is another factor in the development of wildlife films in this period, that is, the rise of mass tourism (Mitman 1999: 180ff). The nature programme *Wild Kingdom* (NBC, first season in 1963), which succeeded *Zoo Parade*, focused on adventure, wilderness and male virtues, things found in another 20th-century invention, the national park. Wildlife films became advertisements for such tourist attractions, in America and elsewhere. In the 1950s and 1960s, Western and educated voices were heard saying that the wilderness in Africa was threatened. They complained about the consequences of the civilisation that they had been so eager to introduce for themselves, and thought that nature must be protected from it, or as the ethologist Julian Huxley said: ‘Africa’s wild life belongs not merely to the locals, but to the world’ (Mitman 1999: 194). One can talk of a kind of wildlife imperialism, where animal life and nature is taken from the indigenous African population. In this propaganda war, wildlife films played an important part. In for example the film *Wild Gold* (1961), directed by James R. Simon, the Masais were portrayed as a threat to nature since their cattle took food and water from the wild animals in the national parks. But according to the narrator they would soon enough learn that no true wealth comes from hordes of useless cattle, but through tourism (Mitman 1999: 198).

In Swedish public service television – which is the subject of the present study – the first wildlife film was broadcast as early as 1955. It was *Viggen Viggo* (‘Viggo the Tufted Duck’) by Bertil Danielsson, which incidentally gave Swedish television its first international award, the Prix Italia in 1957 (Furhammar 1995: 87; Abrahamsson 1999: 51). In June 1961, the nature programme *Just nu* (‘Right Now’, a.k.a *Korsnäsgården*, after the location it was shot at) started and was continually broadcast until 1984. It was hosted by three Swedish gentlemen in ‘chequered shirts and rubber boots’, namely Nils Linman, Anders-Erik Malm and Gert Engström (Abrahamsson 1999: 51). *Naturrutan* (‘The Nature Screen’) was shown on SVT1 between 1974 and 1987 and *Ett med naturen* (‘One with Nature’) was broadcast on SVT2, 1983–1996. There have also been a number of films and film series by Jan Lindblad, David Attenborough, Desmond Morris, Arne Sucksdorff, Bo Landin, Sven Gillsäter, and others. But the history of wildlife film on Swedish television has not yet been written, nor has it been analysed. Within the framework of the Swedish Broadcasting Media Project, both Leif Furhammar (1995) and Ulla B. Abrahamsson (1999) have written short surveys of the nature programmes on Swedish television, but they are found in volumes where nature programmes are only minor parts among ‘Documentary Programmes’ and ‘Factual Study Programmes’, which are the headings of the reports where the history of the nature programmes appear.

The current *Mitt i naturen* (‘In the Middle of Nature’), the heading for the nature programmes that Swedish television’s Sundsvall studio produces in northern Sweden, has been broadcast since 1980. What is shown there can be divided into two rough categories: on the one hand, purchased material produced abroad, and on the other hand, the viewers’ own films and videos. The first category of films is shown as *Mitt i Naturen – Film*, broadcast during peak viewing hours (in the spring of 2003, on Tuesdays at 8 p.m., SVT2) and consists mostly of films showing exotic animals, plants and environments, produced by companies such as the BBC and National Geographic – the two international giants in the business. Mainly because of a lack of money, the in-house production in Swedish public service television is small. The viewers’ own films are shown in a half-hour segment in the middle of the week (in the spring of 2003, on Wednesdays at 8 p.m.,
SVT1) and portray ‘everyday wildlife’, that is, Swedish animals, plants and landscapes, shot by amateurs and semi-professional filmmakers. Every year, the best film by a viewer is awarded the ‘Golden Lynx’. On average, each show has 8–10 percent of the Swedish viewers, that is, around 800,000 people.

Also internationally the literature on wildlife films is surprisingly small. But Derek Bousé (2000), who analyses both the production technology and aesthetic/formalist side of wildlife film, and the historian of science Gregg Mitman (1999), who writes a history of ideas of American wildlife film, are two important American exceptions. Neither has a salient gender perspective, however. It is Mitman who provides the facts that I opened the present article with, namely, that from its beginnings in the early 20th century, wildlife film has been characterised by the demands of science and entertainment, and the ways they have affected the descriptions of animals and nature. Derek Bousé emphasises the entertainment side in his account. According to his analysis, wildlife film narratives are heavily influenced by Hollywood film and by television fiction (for example, melodramas and soap operas), which makes him conclude that wildlife film is a pseudo-scientific and pseudo-documentary genre (2000). From Derek Bousé’s perspective, the contexts in which Leif Furhammar’s (1995) and Ulla Abrahamsson’s (1999) studies have been placed are misleading, since they are found in two volumes that account for documentary programmes and factual study programmes on television and radio. Their surveys would have been just as well suited for a work on television fiction, since there are strong reasons, according to Bousé, that the wildlife genre’s claim to represent nature authentically should not be accepted.

Nature in Wildlife Films
In his large survey of Western attitudes to and definitions of nature, from the ancient Greeks to the present, the historian Peter Coates (1998) underlines that what has been regarded as nature and culture has varied through history. An enlightening example is the different places that man has been given in relation to nature and culture. For example, before Darwin man was seen as the image of God (that is, as culture), but after Darwin man became the closest relative of the apes (that is, a bit closer to nature). People have always interpreted nature, both in and outside the sciences. There are no ‘pure’, objective depictions of nature, only interpretations that depend on the historical, cultural and social contexts. Judith Butler (1991: 37f) argues that what is defined as nature in relation to culture is in fact already culture, that is, it is culture that determines where the border to nature is drawn. There is thus no ‘objective’ line between the two, and they are all the time defined through various practices, resulting in different representations of nature. One of these representations is wildlife film.

On a primary, immediately observable level, wildlife films are narratives about nature. But on a more concealed level, they are just as much narratives about culture, since these two phenomena suppose one another, like the two sides of a coin. An example of the way in which Western culture influences representations of nature is found in the accounts of lions and elk, being the subjects of the films analysed in the present study.

Not the least the claim that the Western production context is significant for the way elk and lions are portrayed is clear from the accounts of the relations of the animals to humans. Elk are shown in such relations more often than lions. The subjects of two of the films are even tame elk who move around indoors and behave like pet animals. Almost all elk films mention, and some even deal exclusively with, elk hunting, and then
from a human perspective (or more specifically, a human male perspective). The perception of the elk is that it is everyday, nice, almost comical animal, intimately connected with the life of people – even eaten by people. The elk is a Western, ‘safe’ animal, wholly in the control of man. In the example below, a short film from 1959 (1997, SVT1), an elk is so much part of the life of a group of people that it has become a member of the family and ‘thinks’ like a child. Also note the prejudice about curious women, which is partly taken back by the speaker, suggesting the kind of dawning but not completely rooted awareness of the equality between the sexes that is characteristic of the time:

Black-and-white pictures. ‘Brisk’ music typical of the SF newsreels [the Swedish Film Industry Co. Ltd.]. An elk calf with a dog collar enters a dwelling house with rag mats on the floor and hens running about. The male narrator calls happily and enthusiastically: ‘Well, well – today there are apples on the menu. What a treat!’ The elk eats apples from a box. Cut to two on-looking dachshunds, who according to the narrator ‘think’: ‘Green forage, when one can get bones. She’s hopeless.’

The elk saunters to a breakfast table: ‘What will Master have? Tomatoes!’ The elk eats the tomatoes. Turns over an egg. Eats the flowers in a vase. ‘Here’s something that is served in an appropriate way.’ Cut to the dogs, who look ‘embarrassed’.

The elk peers into a cupboard. The narrator: ‘And here is the explanation why Nosey Parker is called Nosey Parker. She has to look everywhere. She is curious like a woman... well, sorry, like a man. She has to inspect everything.’

Pictures of a couple of legs in boots entering the room. ‘Please, Nosey, not the pantry!’ ‘Well, here comes Master. Good morning! How are you today, Sir! Oh, really? I dare say, Sir, it is not easy to know how to behave when one has been raised without a mother.’

Nosey Parker turns on the radio with her muzzle and ‘listens’ to the weather forecast – her ears moving constantly: ‘Continued warm and good weather’, a voice says from the radio. She lies down on a mat. The narrator: ‘Well, that sounds good. Then I can relax, says Nosey Parker.’

In the Western wildlife films in my material, lions are represented in a completely different light. They are not pets that children could cuddle with. If anything, in relation to lions people are humble, admiring and grateful in a whole different way than in the relation man/elk. This is of course due to the fact that lions are potentially dangerous predators and the elk is a ruminating deer, but it is just as much a question of making the lion exotic and mythologising it in a way that is very ancient in Western culture. If the humans who are neighbours to the lions in Africa and India would make films about lions, they would probably not have the same admiring and humble attitude and there might also have been lion hunting, which is not shown in any of the Western films in the material. A beautiful example of the admiring position is a film by Jan Lindblad about Indian lions from a series of films called Djungelbokens värld (‘The World of the Jungle Book’, 1980, shown on SVT1 in 1993 among other times).

Pictures (colour) of a female lion with suckling cubs, dusk, crickets, the sound of howling. No music. Jan Lindblad’s voice: ‘First the cubs will have their evening meal. It feels amazing to sit in the grass just four or five meters from this lion trio. By now we have won their trust.’ Cut to a picture of a male lion yawning. ‘And also the trust of the two males. Step by step I approach them and come
incredibly close, less than two meters. Again it is a question of trust – between a wild lion and me, a representative of a species that has been its lethal enemy for centuries.‘ Close-up of the male, only showing his eyes. Cut to a beautiful red sky with black trees in the foreground.

‘The sun sets and I had an idea of showing the sunset as a reflection in the eyes of the male lion.’ Extreme close-up of a lion’s eye where the setting sun is reflected. ‘You probably can’t get any closer to the wild than this. It is a wonderful privilege to be accepted.’

To show the sunset as mirrored in the eyes of an elk would seem almost comical, the equivalent of third-rate art portraying an elk at sunset. In Swedish culture, the elk, known as the King of the Forest, represents Swedishness, commonness and a kind of wild safety. In combination with a romantic trait, the relation with this animal easily becomes high-flown and pretentious. The lion, on the other hand, is exoticised in Western culture – the orientalism that Edward Said (1978/1991) deconstructed survives in the image of the lion – and is easily coupled with romanticism. It has to be added that it is symptomatic that it is a lion that is filmed in extreme close-up, a technique that is used to create a feeling of closeness and intimacy between the viewer and the viewed (Bousée 2000: 29). There is nothing romantic or heroic about a close relation with an elk, as with a lion. In Western mythology, the lion – almost always a male – symbolises might, courage, majesty, justice and law. And these are just some of the characteristics that are ascribed to the lion and which can be found in any symbol dictionary. These animals may not be patted or killed in contemporary wildlife films, just be admired.7 Both species are interpreted within a Western cultural context, which results in an ethnification of them, that is, the animals are inscribed in a highly human, collective, cultural identity.

Nature in wildlife films is constructed by being defined in opposition to culture. One of the strategies of delimitation is characterised by a concealment of the fact that wildlife film is one genre among others. This is done by concealing the fictive traits and the dependence on technology in the genre.

Bousée (2000: 20) demonstrates that the acknowledgement of wildlife film as a distinct television and film genre involves the acknowledgement of the fact that it is not a documentary genre, but fiction. He gives many examples of the close affinity of wildlife films to fiction: one is the construction of a central and repeated narrative in one wildlife film after another. Above all, this narrative takes shape on the editing table, and can summed up in the sequence ‘birth, school, work and death’, a formula with deep roots in Hollywood film (Bousée 2000: 174ff). Still, he thinks, many people in the wildlife film industry insist on defining wildlife films as films that show wild animals in their natural habitats, that is, as ‘pure’ imprints of nature. If this were true, he says with a poignant example, a one-hour film about the life of lions would contain more than 42 minutes when the lions do nothing, since lions rest more than 20 out of 24 hours (Bousée 2000: 7). Nor would wildlife films contain as many (well-concealed) corrected and constructed moments as is the case. In the industry, it is well known that wildlife films produced in America often contain scenes shot in sets with tame animals. Wildlife film produced in Sweden, on the other hand, has had a reputation for not arranging scenes or manipulating the viewers, a tradition originating with and having a fine representative in Jan Lindblad. But since the middle of the 1990s, it has also become more usual among Swedish wildlife filmmakers to ‘help’ nature along. In the film Laponia by the production company Scandinature, the lemmings shot under the snow are (more or less) tame, and
in the ensuing scene they are filmed in an artificial mountain scenery built in the filmmaker’s own garden outside Stockholm. To shoot water freezing in the film *Taiga: Forest of Frost and Fire* varnish was heated with a hair dryer on a windscreen, and when the summer arrives heat haze was created with a gas grill (Nilsson 2000). These are just a few examples of departures from the ideals of ‘wild animals’ and ‘natural habitats’. On closer inspection, we see that wildlife films can be defined as a *construction* of wild animals and nature that is made invisible for the viewer. There seems always to have been a more or less agitated discussion within the industry about the moments of construction that wildlife films always contain, but unfortunately the issue has not been discussed openly with, or before the audience. The lack of an open discussion has made us, ordinary television viewers and cinema goers, believe that wildlife films, whether more ‘scientific’ or more ‘entertaining’, are authentic and realistic imprints of nature.

A wildlife film is never nature; as soon as someone observes and depicts nature with the help of technology, a step is taken away from nature to culture (if it is possible to distinguish the two). The camera and the sophisticated technique that is needed to capture animals on film are made invisible in wildlife films today. This invisibility, which can be called ‘immediacy’ with Bolter’s and Grusin’s term (2000), is distinctive for all visual genres, but transparency and authenticity becomes particularly important to uphold in wildlife films, whose status rests on the view that it is a documentary genre. Bolter and Grusin also point out that immediacy is interwoven with hypermediacy, that is, a strong fascination with the mediation process as such that manifests itself in explicit references to media forms and genres, so that the constructedness of the media text is emphasised. Visible technique is not unusual in wildlife films, especially older ones. In one of the oldest lion films in the material (1979, SVT1), a Japanese camera crew is followed who document a lioness and a male lion during a year, through transmitters fasten around the neck of the animals. The camera work and the filmmakers are clearly shown in relation to the animals. But the ground for the incessant display of technology, here, is not a fascination with the mediation process and an emphasis on the media text as construction – on the contrary. The visible technology is here a sign of realism, underlining that ‘this has happened and is true’. This kind of realism seems antiquated today: instead, at the moment, it is sophisticated, hidden technique that can sneak close to the animals that signals realism.

The frequent use of *music* might seem even more contradictorily. The sound track breaks the illusion of pure nature, but links wildlife films closer to entertainment. This is often counterbalanced by selecting music that would be sorted under the heading ‘New Age’ in a record store – a kind of music consisting of ethereal and thin tones. Aggressive instruments such as trumpets and electric guitars are unusual, as are fast, bustling rhythms. Nor are there ever any lyrics; if human voices can be heard they hum wordlessly – if they are not African, since then the lyrics will be in languages that Western viewers do not understand. An ‘ethnic’ sound dominates: native American and African drums, wooden flutes, acoustic instruments or dreamy synthisers. The choice of sound and instruments may of course be explained by a desire that the music have a relation to the place – a film from Africa should thus sound ‘African’. However, ‘traditional’, ‘ethnic’ instruments do not associate to contemporary Africa but connects the music to ideas about ‘primitive people’. In this way, there is an attempt at creating something that can be associated to ‘natural’ music – which of course, like other lines drawn between nature and culture in the films, is a construction.
Another element that is typical of wildlife films that has to do with the line between nature and culture is anthropomorphism. Here also, Disney is a forerunner. In the end of the 1940s, modelled on animated cartoons, Disney started to shoot short wildlife films where the individuality and personality of the animals is stressed. However, what was shown was not the real life and behaviour of animals, but highly arranged versions. In wildlife films, animals are above all made human in the voiceover, where they are given feelings such as hope, happiness and grief. A clear example of anthropomorphism is found above in the example of Nosey Parker, the elk, where both the thoughts of the dachshunds and the elk calf are interpreted by the narrator. But there are also examples of anthropomorphism in the television announcers’ presentations of the films, such as in this one from 1997 for a lion film: ‘But behind the majestic facade, every lion has his own private life, full of drama, joys and tragedies’ (1997, SVT2). Overall, the 14 lion and elk films do not contain very many startling examples of anthropomorphism, but are more characterised by routine where human norms and morality (invisibly) colour and organise the presentation of the animals. The reason is of course, as Bousé (2000: 5) shows, that the point of wildlife films is to present something that viewers recognise, something that they have the conceptual tools to understand, for example when a group of elk are described as ‘A general meeting at the gentlemen’s club, a meeting of as many as ten tall bull elk…’ (1999, SVT1), or when a lion’s rough treatment of its cubs is accompanied by the words, ’when it comes to bringing up children, lions belong to the old school and impose discipline’ (2002, SVT2). Anthropomorphism is today so naturalised and institutionalised in wildlife film that it seems ‘natural’.

Further characteristics of the way that lines are drawn between nature and culture in wildlife films is the absence of humans (Bousé 2000: 15). People are not ‘nature’; they are ‘culture’ in too great a degree, and threaten to destroy the pretension in wildlife films of providing pure impressions of nature. This is why a great deal of energy is spent on cutting out scenes where film crew mistakenly stray into scenes, or pictures of tourists and tourist hotels that are so common in the African national parks, where many of the wildlife films are shot. For example, one of the lion films in the studied material is shot in Kenya, in a national park which is visited by 700.000 tourists every year, without even one tourist appearing in the film.

However, it might seem that there is an opposite trend in wildlife films at the moment, since several prized wildlife films have been made where man, and not animals, has the principal part. One example is Vision Man from 1997, which is an account of an old Inuit and his memories of hunting. At the International Wildlife and Environment Film and Television Festival in Bristol in 2000, the trend was reinforced with a wildlife film that sensationa- lly won first prize and is about a ‘primitive’ people in Africa that hunt in a similar way as the big wild cats. It might seem that the line between nature and culture is dissolving. But the truth is probably that an old and highly questionable trend is growing stronger, a trend that equates nature and certain human races (Mitman 1999: 44). Historically, in wildlife films white people have not appeared if they do not in some way master nature, for example with the camera (cf. the above example with the Japanese lion film) or take the part of experts or presenters explaining nature. On the other hand, native Africans, for example, have been very rare in other roles than bearers in old safari films, or as parts of the landscape in more recent ones. Those who have now become main characters are so-called primitive peoples who are not supposed to represent culture but nature in line with a Western conservative view of the difference between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ peoples.
Gender and Sexuality

Wildlife films are not only constructed around a dichotomy between nature and culture, but also between the sexes – ‘male’ and ‘female’. Many animals (but not all) belong to one or the other of the biological sexes, but gender, or the cultural division into male and female, is something that humans create in their narratives about nature. Connected to gender, sexuality, ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’, is also a running theme in wildlife films. Or more to the point, ‘natural’ sexual acts between the sexes are shown while the ‘unnatural’ is characteristically absent. In the elk and lion films, there are ample illustrations of Judith Butler’s thesis that in the same way as culture defines nature, gender defines sex, heterosexuality homosexuality, and normality what is not normal (Butler 1990: 65, 74, 77 & 1993: 111, 206f).

But if the line between nature and culture becomes visibly noticeable in the films, gender and sexuality are mainly manifest in the voiceovers. Language structures our perception of reality. A very naive but widespread view of language is that it can reflect so-called reality. In a socio-cultural perspective, words do not reflect ‘reality’ but the way various phenomena are looked upon in a culture. Language can thus be said to express ideas that are specific for a culture at the same time as it creates the same culture. Language works as a grid that helps people to organise the world and make it meaningful, at the same as it limits it, since some phenomena are named while others are never expressed, for example the ‘homosexuality’ of animals. That language works as a cultural grid also becomes obvious in the use of the concept of ‘family’ in wildlife films. A cow elk with two calves are called a family, since they resemble the human, Western, conventional nuclear family. On the other hand, a group consisting of up to a dozen female lions with cubs and a few male lions who have ‘married into’ the group – which is the normal social constellation that lions live in – is not called a ‘family’, but a ‘pride’, although the formation constitutes the family of lions. On a superficial level, this usage might seem a way of avoiding anthropomorphism, but at a deeper level, the distinction between ‘family’ and ‘pride’ implies a projection of human norms and ideals onto animals. In this example, one could just as well call de group of lions a lion family, but the human and Western norms of what constitutes a family – mummy-daddy-kids – prevents it.

In the 14 analysed films, there are hardly any sexual acts between individuals of the same sex, which in part can be explained by the great dependence in wildlife films on science. As was shown above, Bagemihl (1999) argues that neither in biology are other sexualities than between two beings of different sexes thematised, despite the fact that, for example, male lions have been observed involved in same-sex acts. An equally important partial explanation of this absence of same-sex practices is that wildlife films, like all television genres, are cultural representations, created within the entertainment industry. As such they reflect and maintain the norms and morality that characterise the culture and society in which they are made. And one of these norms is that family entertainment should not contain ‘abnormal’ sex. It is the absence of other sexual practices than between two animals of different sexes which is the routine in the analysed films. By habitually, repeatedly and unreflectingly only showing sex between individuals of different sexes in wildlife films, other sexual practices are made invisible despite their frequent occurrences in nature.

But there are a few exceptions in the material. One example is found in a film about lions that was broadcast on SVT1 in 1997:
Savannah (in colour), two female lions (no music, only the sound of birds and occasional roars). Narrator: ‘Life goes on for both females. Four weeks after she lost her cubs, the middle female will be in heat again.’ One of the females fusses about and rubs against the other female. They snap playfully at one another. ‘Because there are no males around, she approaches the young female. But she does not understand what is going on,’ the narrator continues.

Here two females are involved in sexual activity with one another – in a way that is fairly common among lions according to Bagemihl (1999). But the narrator interprets this behaviour according to heteronormativity: the middle female is in heat and ‘because there are no males around she approaches the young female’. Here the pictures show same-sex behaviour, but it is interpreted and put right according to human notions as a ‘mistake’.

The opinion that ‘lesbianism’ only arises when there are no available men is projected onto animals. To return to Butler (1993), this is an interesting example of gender as performative: the lion’s ‘sexual identity’ is constructed when one repeats what is assumed about sex/gender in the heterosexual hegemony or discourse.

Finally, a couple of examples of how gender is constructed in wildlife films. One of the films show a lion family consisting of five females with cubs and two males (1997, SVT2). The fact is that, it is the females who do the vitally important hunting, often together, while the function of the males is to be breeders, and to fight male lions who turn up looking for a new family. Still the two males in the film are called ‘leaders’, although it is highly questionable who is leading whom in the lion family. The use of the term ‘leader’ works to save the honour of a masculinity that is traditionally defined as active, while femininity is defined as passive. This is projected on the lions, and although the pictures show something else the males are inscribed as active while the females are described as passively led. Another example is the film Born to Be King (1979, SVT1). In the opening, the title is superimposed on a scene in which a lion hunts – a female lion. Obviously, the filmmakers have not found any pictures of hunting males (since they seldom hunt), and instead of calling the film Born to Be Queen, the female is made to ‘act’ the part of the male, with the purpose of maintaining the cultural construction of the male lion as king, that is, as active, leading and commanding. This is also in line with the epithet of the lion, King of Beasts, and also in many places the elk is known as the King of the Forest. Already these very old names reflect the power of gendered figures of though to create meaning: if the elk and the lion are the rulers of the forest and of the other animals, they are also evidently male. The view of the male animal as the norm, and representative of the species is also settled in the children’s television program Våra vida djur: Älgen (‘Our Wild Animals: The Elk’, 1997, SVT1) where the cow elk is made invisible in the beginning with the claim that the elk (which is a neutral name for the species in terms of sex) ‘has a magnificent crown and is the largest deer on earth. He is called the King of the Forest.’

**Concluding Remarks**

The questions that have appeared in the analysis of the 14 films deserve answers that are grounded in a material with greater breadth and depth. In the present article, I have looked at films but not their contexts in the nature programmes. Is the gender routine found in the practices of the programme hosts, and in what ways do they reinforce (or contradict) these wildlife films? Does gender routine, like images of ethnicity and sexuality, change with time? Are there differences or similarities as to gender routine between,
for example, films produced in Sweden and films produced by National Geographic? What are the explanations for these differences and similarities? In order to answer such questions, a larger material is required, also extending over a longer period of time.

It would also be rewarding to study the production process. Is gender routine created already in the field when the choice of what to film and what not to film is made and how? Or is it at the editing table that gender routine comes into play? And what part does the ideologies of contemporary film industry in general and scientific findings play in the concrete work on a specific film or nature programme on television? These are just a few of the questions that can be raised from the limited analysis of wildlife films presented here.

The fourteen wildlife films contain several examples of routine interpretations of the behaviour of animals, in habitual, instinctive, unreflective and repeated accounts of animals that correspond to human norms and morality. This is done both in terms of content and form. For example, through the way the narrative is constructed, in the voiceover or in the editing. Thus conventional gender patterns are maintained in what I call gender routine. It also works together with other stereotypes, among which I have touched upon notions of ethnicity, sexuality and family formation. Behind a testimony that wildlife films show ‘true’, ‘real’ nature, animals are given roles and functions that are completely determined by human behaviour and cultural stereotypes. The lion and the elk are ethnified: one animal as a romantic king of his pride and the humans, the other animal as the wild cousin of our pet animals and man’s subject. Homosexuality is described through its absence as divergent and unnatural, while the nuclear family and heterosexuality are emphasised as the norm also among animals. Male animals are given a masculine identity that is active and dominant, while female animals are said to possess a femininity that is passive and inferior. These constructed ‘images’ of animals and nature may then be used as arguments in debates about what is ‘natural’ femininity and masculinity, to say nothing about ‘natural’ sexuality. Nature is first culturalised according to human norms, and then this version of nature is used to naturalise the same norms. This process might be described as a cultural boomerang, since it both starts and ends in the hands of man, passing in a wide circle through ‘nature’.

The biologist Marlene Zuk (2002) argues that findings about the behaviour of animals have been turned into stereotypes and been misused, both within and outside science. The behaviour of animals may, however, be used to understand people, she claims, but then biology must become the science it really should be, namely a discipline that does not draw a line between the sexes, but neutralises and challenges this line. This demand should also be directed at wildlife films: to correspond to the claims of being an objective, factual and documentary genre, it should also reflect the enormous variety that is found in nature regarding gender, sexuality, and social formations, and thus contribute to the challenge of borders rather than their reproduction.

Notes
1. Henceforth I will use the label ‘wildlife film’ to refer to long accounts and narratives shot with film or video, in which animals and nature is the focus. I will use the term ‘nature programme’ for the programme format on television in which wildlife films are parts, together with reports, interviews, etc.
2. The notion of gender routine comes from Judith Butler’s idea of gender as performative, that is, that gender identity is created through iteration of a sex/gender role according to the heterosexual hegemony or discourse (Butler 1993: 122, 232). The concept of performativity is based on the idea that gender is also sex, that sex is just as constructed as gender. The notion of gender routine, which in light of
Butler’s theories of course is a simplification, is here used to capture the characteristic way in which media represents gender.

3. Bousé (2000: 46) notes that as early as 1910 three major categories of proto-wildlife films – Safari Films, Scientific-Educational Films and Narrative Adventures – were all established.

4. See Swedish Television’s public service statement of accounts 2002, table 22.6, about the portion of the population who had seen a program from Swedish public service television, SVT, during an average week. In the ten weeks between September 30 and December 8, 2002 on average 9.1 percent saw Mitt i naturen (Wednesdays) and 8.3 percent saw Mitt i naturen – film (Sundays), which can be compared to the 5.9 percent of an in-depth news and politics commentary programme such as Agenda (Sundays), categorised as a ‘Politics and Society Programme’ by SVT, or the 2.0 percent of a music programme such as Studio Pop (Wednesdays), categorised as a ‘Culture Programme’ by SVT. Nature programmes are categorised as ‘Factual Study Programmes’.

5. In their seminal study, Latour and Woolgar (1986) show how science is ‘made’ also in the laboratories. Latour and Woolgar use participant observation on scientists and discuss the ways in which they construct scientific knowledge. Science is formed in the discussions among scientists, where for example social hierarchies and rhetorical strategies are decisive for the final interpretations of observations that are made in the laboratories.

6. Cf. Rothfels (2002), where a number of representations of animals are described, though not wildlife films. This volume presents analyses of animals in literature, in art, the construction of the ‘fox’ in British fox-hunting, how the history of the cloning of a pet animal is represented on the internet (The Missyplicity Project), etc. See also Burt (2002) about the representation of animals in feature films.

7. This romantic view of lions seems to have grown stronger in the course of the 20th century. In the early hunting films, for example Roosevelt in Africa, lions are killed. But according to Mitman (1999) there is a general sentimentalisation of nature in American wildlife films after the 1940s. It seems as if a greater distance between man, on the one hand, and nature and animals, on the other, the more romantic Nature and the Animals become. The elk seems to be far too common and too ‘close’ in relation to Western man to qualify for admiring, romantic and sentimental accounts.

8. In female Lions, homosexual interaction is often initiated by one female pursuing another and crawling under her to encourage the other female to mount her. When mounting another female, a Lioness displays a number of behaviors also associated with heterosexual mating, including gently biting the mountee on the neck, growling, making the pelvic thrust, and rolling on her own back afterward (Bagemihl 1999: 433).

9. A clear exception concerning gender routine in the material is found in a film about the lions in Ngorongoro, which was shown on January 16, 1994 on SVT1. There the narrator points out that ‘The role of the male is quite insignificant: he is supposed to look grand and handsome, keep other males away and impregnate the females. But in other respects he is a burden for the pride.’

Literature


Appendix

Index of Wildlife Films

The completeness of the information about the different films varies and there seems to be no standard for what information is given before or after the broadcast of a film. Note that the year of broadcast is not the same as year of production, nor that it is certain that the dates below represent the first times of broadcast in Sweden.

Lions
January 1, 1979, 15.30-16.30, SVT1
*Född till kung i djurriket: om lejon i Kenya [Born to Be King]*
Director: Seido Hino
Photography: Kazu Matsumoto, Akira Kimura, Maremichi Matsui, Masahiko Takahashi, Shuuichi Kageyama
Editor: Fumio Kubooka
Music: Sadao Watanabe
Producer: Masaya Yoshikawa
Nippon Television Network Corp.
October 10, 1987, 18.30-19.30, SVT1
*Ett med naturen: lejon i Afrikans natt [One with Nature: Lions of the African Night]*
Swedish narrator: Arne Weise
Photography: David & Carol Hughes
Swedish translation: Sverre Sjölander
National Geographic
March 5, 1992, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Ett med naturen: året med Khali, lejoninnan [One with Nature: Kali the Lion]*
Swedish narrator: Arne Weise
Directed & photographed by: Simon King
Film editors: Jonathan Birkett, Ian Wilson
Music: The people and animals of Masai Mara
Composed by: David Lowe
Produced by: Simon King
Lion consultant: Jonathan Scott
Swedish translation: Sverre Sjölander
BBC
January 7, 1993, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Jan Lindblad i våra hjärtan. Ur djungelbokens värld: lejon [Jan Lindblad in Our Hearts: From the World of the Jungle Book]*
Swedish narrator: Arne Weise
Photography etc: Jan Lindblad
Field assistant: Pia Thörn
January 16, 1994, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Ett med naturen: Ngorongoros lejon [One with Nature: Ngorongoro’s Lions]*
Swedish narrator: Arne Weise
Translation: Sverre Sjölander
Not other information available

March 25, 1997, 21.00-22.00, SVT2
*Mitt i naturen: Lejonet [In the Middle of Nature: The Lion]*
Swedish narrator: Lena Liljeborg
Photography: Owen Newman
Producers: Amanda Barret, Owen Newman
Editor: Stuart Napier
BBC
May 10, 1998, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Mitt i naturen: Lejon i nationalparken Etosha i Namibia [In the Middle of Nature: The Lions in the National Park of Etosha in Namibia]*
Swedish narrator: Charlotte Permell
Photography: Adrian Warren, Justin McGuire
Producer: Ann F. Kim
Music: Laura Karpman
Swedish Translation: Sverre Sjölander
March 21, 1999, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Mitt i naturen: Lejon i nationalparken Etosha i Namibia [In the Middle of Nature: The Lions in the National Park of Etosha in Namibia]*
Swedish narrator: Charlotte Permell
Photography: Sophie Buck
Producer: Patrik Morris
Swedish Translation: Sverre Sjölander
May 13, 2001, 20.00-21.00, SVT2
*Mitt i naturen: Systerskap på savannen – afrikanska lejon [In the Middle of Nature: Sisterhood on the Savannah – African Lions]*
Swedish narrator: Charlotte Permell
Photographer/director: Barbara Tyack
Editor: Michael Holmes
Music: Ray Russel
Producer: Caroline Brett
Swedish Translation: Gunilla Bertili
Survival
March 31, 2002, 20.00-21.00, SVT2
*Mitt i naturen: Lejonflocken inifrån [In the Middle of Nature: From Within a Group of Lions]*
Swedish narrator: Charlotte Permell
Photography: Michael W. Richard & Geoffrey Bell
Editor: Stuart Napier
Music: Will Gregory, Governors Camp Bush Band & The Maasai Dancers
Producer: John Downer
Swedish Translation: Jan-Åke Sääf
BBC
Elk
May 30, 1994, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Mitt i naturen* [In the Middle of Nature]
Feature: Amateur film about the elk as bedfellow (ca 15 min)
Photography: Helge Määttä
December 26, 1997, 10.00-10.15, SVT1
*Älgen som går köksvägen* [The Elk Who Comes in Through the Kitchen]
Script and director: Wilhelm Sörensen
A short film from Europa Film, 1959
July 30, 1997, 19.00-19.30, SVT1
*Våra vilda djur: Älgen*, a children’s program [Our Wild Animals: The Elk]
Photography: Bertil Palmgren, Holger Jacobaeus
Music arrangement: Erik Baumann, Nathan Göring
Produced by: Arne Næva
Editing: Kjell Hartløv
NRK

May 16, 1999, 20.00-21.00, SVT1
*Mitt i naturen: De stora älgarna i Sarek* [In the Middle of Nature: The Great Elk of Sarek]
Narrator: Charlotte Permell
Director/photograph: Arne Næva
Assistant producer/b-foto: Dagfinn Kolberg
Music: Halvdan Nedre
Sound: Helge Holmen
Light: Trygve Andresen
Funding: Nordisk film och TV-fond, in co-operation with SVT, DR, YLE, NRK 1 – Naturreaktionen 1998
Throughout media history, several genres have emerged as an answer to the trading industry’s need to reach women as consumers. Soap operas and “woman’s films” are among the most distinct and discussed in this respect. In the ‘public service’ countries Norway and Sweden, a particular type of film, known as “Housewife film”, was developed in the 1950s and produced for the next few decades. The hour-long “Housewife film” consisted of a row of long commercials providing information about, and education in, the use of new foodstuffs and household technologies. In addition, breaks between these informative commercials featured entertainment from the nation’s leading comedians. These entertainers had the role of host (or compère), whose performances tied the row of commercials together.

This article focuses on communicative strategies connected to the compère of the first Norwegian Housewife film. The work connects to a broader study of the Norwegian Housewife films ‘That’s how to do it’: Housewife film as Popular Culture’, a project that itself is part of an interdisciplinary project focusing on housework in the Twentieth century. The project on Housewife films discusses this group of films as rhetorical genre, and as an arena for negotiating gender boundaries during the peak and decline of “the good housewife period”. In Norway, Housewife films were produced between 1953 and 1972. The films can be regarded as part of an aggressive campaign aimed at informing and educating housewives throughout the Western world.

The available source material suggests that the Housewife films, which were seen primarily in separate, free-of-charge daytime screenings in cinemas all over the country, drew crowds for a long time, and peaked in the second half of the 1960s. When Informasjonsfilm A/S – the main production company behind these films for the Norwegian market – decided to terminate production in 1972, their decision was based on the films’ declining popularity and the increasing societal pressure on the housewife as social role. The production of Housewife films had been highly profitable and functioned as the company’s financial backbone. Information films for the expanding Norwegian oil industry took over this position within the company and thus replaced the production of Housewife films.

The Housewife film seems to have been developed in Sweden when the production company Husmorfilm AB was established in 1952 by film worker Bengt Davidsson in cooperation with Elsa Lindström from the leading Swedish research institute on household
development, Hemmens Forskningsinstitut. Davidsson, who was interested in using cinemas in the daytime, had already produced some long commercials directed towards housewives. His cooperation with Lindström seems to have been established as a response to the fact that these first long commercials of Davidsson were faced with criticism and Hemmens Forskningsinstitut was among the critics. The institute claimed that housewives could be manipulated by this type of hour-long advertising films. Davidsson’s solution was to develop, through collaboration with Lindström, the format into a hybrid of information and advertising in which the home economics expert played a vital role. She would assist in script development and ensure that the information given in the film was reliable, ethical and in line with the newest research and well-established household ‘know-how’. (Jansson 1996:7). The Norwegian Housewife films were based on – and closely connected to – this new, hybrid Swedish format. The Norwegian films were produced, annually at first and from 1962, every spring and autumn. Production of Housewife films in Norway seems to have been initiated by two Norwegian companies Lilleborg fabrikker (soap) and Margarincentralen (butter). They communicated with the Swedish advertising industry in 1952 due to weaknesses within Norwegian production of commercial films at the time. 3

Regular cinema commercials are, as we all know, advertisement presented in connection with feature films for a paying audience. Conversely, the Housewife films were offered free to the public, but without the feature film to attract an audience. The Housewife films were, on the other hand, assisted by social and cultural attractions. The screenings included handing out brochures and samples, and local shopkeepers marketed the films in advance and were called on to offer the products promoted in the films. In larger towns the film screenings were encouraged through fashion shows. The ethos appeal – creating goodwill through entertaining and confidence-inspiring strategies – came to characterize the films as well as the screenings. 4

Housewife films were commercials, financially speaking, and in this respect a form of joint advertising. The joint advertising emphasized entertainment, on the one hand, and education, on the other. The entertaining breaks between commercials, in which the compère explicitly establishes a relationship with the audience leading them through the didactic commercials, are critical to the format in this respect. These breaks frame the row of commercials rhetorically. The compères were often successful actors in the entertainment business and had amused large audiences previously through stage, screen and radio performances. From the beginning, the host was a man, sometimes accompanied by a woman. Wenche Foss, a Norwegian theatre and film diva, is the first and – as my current research indicates – the only woman who played this part alone and then in the 1967 film Gjør det lettere (Make it simpler). 5

Advertisers paid for, and followed up on, individual commercials throughout the production process. To establish the necessary confidence in the films, the production company, as already mentioned, hired household expertise; Ingerid Askevold, Manager of Statens opplysningsskontor for husstall (National Information Bureau for Domestic Science), Home Economics Educationalist Ingrid Espelid, 6 and chefs like Ben Josef and Hroar Dege. These experts contributed to the films argumentation and mode and also actively participated in test screenings for the advertisers.

According to one of the household experts in the Swedish films, the entertaining breaks between commercials were, to a large extent, the film companies’ domain (Jansson 1996). In this area, knowledge about film and how to communicate to housewives as target group was most important. The Norwegian film worker Terje Helweg states that, throughout his work in Norwegian Housewife film production, the entertain-
ing breaks were always planned exclusively by the principal film director Jan Erik Düring. This could indicate that Düring, as the creative head of the team, was fully aware of the significance of the entertaining breaks for the audiences’ acceptance of the films, but also that he regarded this part of the work as a professional challenge. The good-natured and humorous communication during the entertaining breaks might have taken the sting out of the didactic and more authoritative tone of the informative commercials.

Compère in an Armchair
The role of the compère – as it was shaped by the already celebrated actor Per Aabel – in the two first Housewife films involves meeting a celebrity who presents himself and, at the same time, functions as the housewives’ male girlfriend. The first scene of Slik kan det gjøres (That’s how to do it) from 1953 demonstrates considerable persuasive power. In order to build a light and comfortable setting, Aabel does not appear as a lecturer, an expert, or a distinct authority. Humour and closeness to the audience are created through dialogue and directing in order to arouse curiosity and interest. Aabel puts on display the household technology, the housework, the housewife, and himself.

• Progress and Pessimism from the World of Art
The film’s introductory titles are accompanied by grand, sweeping music reminiscent of light entertainment: the vaudeville as well as film and radio comedy of the day. The last introductory title in the film states that Per Aabel is the film’s compère. While the music fades away, the camera focuses heavily on Aabel’s name on an open book: Aabel’s autobiography Du verden! (Blimey!). The camera zooms out and Aabel, reading the book, appears in the shot as he is putting down the book. He addresses the camera by saying, “Blimey – how things have changed! How technology is developing these day – with huge steps!”9 In line with the rhetorical rules for opening a speech, goodwill is aroused by focusing on the speaker.10 While getting up from his armchair and placing the book on the bookshelf, Aabel continues speaking directly into the camera, maintaining eye-contact with the audience, and giving examples of the technical novelties that have affected his own work as an actor. Aabel speaks ironically about both the tape recorder and film images that are supposedly helpful, but primarily show the performer his mistakes and shortcomings. In this way, he can occasionally add, mockingly, “Blimey, what progress!”

We meet the compère as a relaxed, famous artist expressing scepticism towards all these novelties. Whether these new products are really “progress” is questionable to Aabel. Facing resistance aggressively is a tactic of eulogistic, or epideictic, rhetoric. Even though public debate in the 1950s was predominantly optimistic about the future, this “speech,” addressed to housewives, takes into consideration that women’s role as keepers of tradition included a certain amount of scepticism towards novelty. The mother’s and housewife’s task was to protect and pass on traditional values and customs to the next generation. The fact that housewives could be sceptical towards technological novelties was probable and commonly known. Recognising technological scepticism – not household technology – in this case, can be interpreted as a strategy to win the housewives’ trust and confidence. By expressing scepticism towards technology, arguments that questioned the utility value of technology are refuted and goodwill based on a now shared technological scepticism is simultaneously created.

Confidence may be a reward in this instance precisely because Aabel advocated a view that in 1953 was not publicly recognised, or expected, when industry gave infor-
mation about new products. Drawbacks of the novelties could be interpreted as something Aabel discusses exclusively with the housewives. While commercials aimed at a mixed audience had to strictly consider community values, commercials oriented towards target groups, like the Housewife film, could appeal to attitudes and views expected within this specific audience, even if they did not have wider public support. Should anyone in the audience not share Aabel’s scepticism towards new technology, she could always take pleasure in his attack on new appliances as an intimate confidential statement from an eccentric artist and celebrity. Aabel is allowed to perform as the person the audience knows: a reputable actor. He does not represent the advertisers straight on. He is the “mediating body” on the products’ way to the consumers.

Confidence and intimacy are also created in the first moments through the absence of music when Aabel begins to speak, his informal style in addressing the audience without opening phrases such as “Ladies and gentlemen,” the close-up of his face, his eye-contact with the audience, and his casual and unceremonious way of sitting in his chair. Furthermore, it is understood that the scene depicts his private home, a fact that intensifies the close and intimate atmosphere.

• “The Man Who Kept House”

The sense of being in Aabel’s home is strengthened when he begins to discuss housework. Aabel discovers a coffee cup and a sugar bowl on the dining room table. On his way into the kitchen, he complains about the amount of time he spends on the housework, “Oh, I wonder how many hours of my life I have spent on housework. I don’t even dare to think about it. I don’t dare!” He utters this line while maintaining eye-contact with the audience, approaches the camera, and is shown holding only one cup and one bowl. The scene is hilarious because the amount of housework he complains about is ridiculously small compared with the amount his audience of housewives may be expected to face every day. The fact that he complains about nothing is supported with his next line, which reveals he is a bachelor. However, the camera/audience is not invited into his bachelor kitchen. Deprecatingly, Aabel leaves the picture through the door leading into his kitchen. The frame is frozen while we hear rattling and breaking sounds coming from his kitchen. He reappears in the doorway and apologizes, “Oh, dear ... one cup less to clean, it wasn’t worse!”

The intimacy of this sequence is further developed when the camera/audience is shut out from the kitchen. We have been allowed to follow him to, and overhear his activities in, the one place he himself describes as one of his most private rooms. Being forced to wait outside while he is rummaging in his kitchen gives the distinct impression of a “here and now” presence in Per Aabel’s life. At the same time, the target audience’s self-esteem is nurtured in this sequence. The audience of housewives can enjoy moments of self-satisfaction in knowing they are much more competent at cleaning, laundry and cooking, as they watch this clumsy, complaining bachelor. When he breaks the cup, this refers to the fairly tale of the conceited man trying unsuccessfully to take care of the house. Housework is heavy work, but housewives master it better than any bachelor – and men in general.

• Housewife, but also a Woman

The last sequence in this scene is meant to build towards the approaching commercial for The Modern Kitchen. As Aabel is watering his potted plants, humming a song about flowers, complaining about his old-fashioned kitchen and thinking about modernizing,
his thoughts wander to his neighbour: “Speaking of flowers – down there lives a charming little housewife – named Mrs. Berg, I think. It is so strange how she has changed for the better over the past year. She actually looks younger and younger every time I see her.” So far, Aabel has looked in turns at the audience and out of the window. He now delivers the scene’s “punch line”, “I wonder why!”, fixing eye-contact and encouraging the audience to pay close attention to what comes next.

At this instance, it is no longer a matter of building up the housewives’ self-image. On the contrary, it is a matter of challenging them. As a housewife, the spectator is not only a member of “Norway’s largest occupational group,” as the film’s voice-over states in the next scene in line with the contemporary political discourse, but she is also a woman and should, according to social expectations, always attend to her “to-be-looked-at-ness”. Housewives are at all times the object of men’s, and woman’s, scrutinizing attention. Focusing on physical appearance and standards of beauty appeals to the potentially wavering gender identity. At the same time as Aabel praises Mrs. Berg in a mild, well-intentioned voice, stronger emotions than those attached to the housewives’ desire to make housework more efficient are roused. In this case, the ethos appeal borders on pathos through the appeal to strong emotions, psychologically speaking. The housewives are thus motivated to find out what caused the radical improvement in Mrs. Berg. Contrary to the course of nature, but in line with the advertising industry’s promises to women, she looks younger and younger. Looking young and beautiful and, at the same time, maintaining and spreading happiness, is a housewife’s main commitment. In this respect the Housewife film keeps up with traditional expectations for women in general. If, for example, a new appliance for the kitchen makes you look younger, this is a good, if unspoken, argument in favour of buying it.

The intensification of the rhetoric that lies in this sequence’s potential destabilization of the spectators’ self-esteem is followed up stylistically by clarifying that the compère is a representative for the audience. Earlier in the scene, Aabel prevented the camera from capturing the bachelor kitchen, and he now arouses the spectators’ visual desire to look more closely at Mrs. Berg. By constantly throwing glances out of the window in her direction and out of the frame, the compère entices the spectator further into the mise-en-scene and story of Mrs Berg. The motivation for finding out more specifically what has made Mrs. Berg younger and younger is followed by the visual expectation built up through the compère’s glances. These glances also anchor, in time and space, the coming story about The Modern Kitchen where Mrs. Berg is the key figure. Mrs. Berg is – in the universe of the film – Per Aabel’s neighbour. The Modern Kitchen that so radically and miraculously changed Mrs. Berg and her family is granted greater authenticity and credibility through the compère’s gaze.

The First Compère from the Perspective of the History of Film
This direct address to the spectator is related to both the film producers’ understanding of housewives as a target audience, and their approach to audiovisual communication. I will continue to consider this personal, intimate communication in light of the contemporary cultural and the media landscape.

- The Housewife Films as Enlightenment
As previously mentioned, Housewife films are part of a larger contemporary project of Enlightenment of the people. The Housewife film Slik kan det gjøres is described on the
certificate of censorship as an “educational film for housewives,” despite the fact that the film was financed by companies who wanted to sell their products to consumers and was, as such, a commercial. Producers of Housewife films would point to the Housewife film not as a commercial. The individual informative commercial in the Housewife film was too long to function as a regular commercial connected to feature film screenings. The Norwegian Board of film censorship may have chosen this label because instructive educational films for housewives had been produced for several years. In the 1950s, housewives were an important target group, not only for producers of goods, but also for educational parties such as government services and private organizations. These films could and were called housewife films. The common denominators for all these films were education and information.

Within public administration, the education of housewives was a priority. Statens opplysningskontor i husstell (The National Information Bureau for Domestic Science) had been established in 1940 and was responsible for the production of films, slide shows and brochures dealing with housework and cooking. The information bureau’s films were used by home schools and agricultural companies, and by the Statens veiledningstjeneste i heimstell (National Advisory Service for Domestic Science). Closely related to governmental housewife information programmes were the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation’s (NRK) housewife programmes. Hans Fredrik Dahl describes the radio show Husmortimen (The Housewife Hour) along with Landbrukshalvtimen (The Agricultural Half Hour) as “lectures with strong educational characteristics” (Dahl 1999a:94). The housewife radio programmes were probably moderated following developments in programme policy, but hardly to the extent that they could have inspired the intimacy of the Housewife films’ compère. However, we do know that these programmes were so popular that when the NRK began broadcasting Norwegian parliamentary debates in 1963, representatives who wanted to speak to the radio audience avoided speaking during the housewife programmes (Dahl et al. 1999:335). It is an interesting fact of political rhetoric that former Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen emerged as genuine and authentic in his radio speeches in the 1950s – primarily by adjusting his voice to the medium. Anders Johansen, in his study of broadcasting and political speech, points out that Gerhardsen could be regarded as “the first Norwegian politician who, to the entire nation, ‘truly was himself’” (Johansen 2002:101).

When NRK’s television branch started its test broadcasting in 1954, one of the test programmes was a Housewife Hour (Totland 2001). This programme is not found on the programme list when the test period ended in 1960. The fact that NRK abandons the term “housewife” as a prefix in its programme titles could signal NRK’s renewed goal to address the whole family and the entire nation. However, subject areas from the housewife programmes were now carried forward in gender neutral terms in programmes like the cooking show Fjernsynskjøkkenet and varied consumer programmes.

In addition to the publicly produced housewife information, organizations such as Husmorforbundet (The Housewife Society) and Norske Kvinner Sanitetsforening – NKS (Norwegian Women’s Hygiene Society) produced films as a part of their members’ education. For example, Ingerid Askevold, technical consultant for Slik kan det gjøres, reported in an interview with the film magazine Filmjournalen (The Film Journal) just after World War II that she had “produced films since 1937.” At the time of the interview, she was the head of the National Information Bureau for Domestic Science, but she produced her first film for the NKS – dealing with care of infants – and 20 similar films.
before 1946 (*Filmjournalen* no 8/1946). The NKS’s films were part of the organization’s education in nutrition, hygiene and conscious consumption.

Industry and commerce realized that the women’s organizations could be important allies in reaching housewives as consumers. During the depression in the 1930s, the Housewife Society had supported Norwegian industry by encouraging housewives to choose Norwegian products. The industry responded by financing the Housewife Society’s educational activities (Melby 1995: 350). In other words, when it comes to housewives, marketing and education were connected long before the industry’s joint advertising, the Housewife film, emerged.

Product advertising and educational information existed in both private and public housewife education outside of the Housewife films. Could the hosts of these films exhibit the same type of intimate communication as Per Aabel’s compère? Information and educational films were, to a large extent, characterized by direct address. The instructors, or lecturers, in educational films speak to and with the audience. Still, it is hard to find examples of educational film instructors who, to the degree of the housewife film’s compère, make friends with, have dialogues with, and even flirt with their audience. Housewife films were an extension of travelling public and private lecturing and educational activities, but not even these activities were likely to exhibit the same intimate nature as the Housewife film.

**Housewife Films, Travel Films, and Newsreels**

However, the gradual increase in focus on the main character and narrator/filmmaker within the documentary in the 1950s can be historically traced. In his examination of Norwegian documentaries, Gunnar Iversen points out that *Kon-Tiki* (1950) introduced a shift to more personal, experience-oriented travel descriptions. Through his opening lecture and his commentary on the sound track, the Norwegian scientist and filmmaker, Thor Heyerdahl, places himself in the role of personal on-screen narrator making the film differ from the “down-to-earth reports at a distance” that emerged during the inter-war period (Iversen 2001: 87). This tendency is even more evident in Per Høst and Rasmus Breistein’s expedition and travel films from the 1950s where they present themselves talking with “the natives” (2000:88-93). However, new technology for synchronous sound-on-film recording allowed the interview-based on-location documentaries to emerge during the second half of the 1950s.

The cinema audience is familiar with the engaging, yet not personal, style from the newsreels’ characteristic voice-over. Within this news journalism, the voice-over is not in focus as persona, but men like Rolv Kirkvaag and Jan Frydenlund became legendary through their emotional and personal style of speech. They represented a contrast to the more distanced mode of NRK’s news journalism on radio and television. The aesthetics of the newsreels, particularly the way in which two involved, enthusiastic commentators exchange turns on the sound track, are also found in several Housewife film commercials and in the engaged presence of the compère.

**Housewife Films and the Codes of Advertising**

Examples of synchronous audiovisual communication exhibiting direct eye-contact with the audience are found in the educational film’s lecturing, but primarily in commercials. For example, in her account of the history of Norwegian commercials, Kathrine Skretting describes a commercial for the PP pastille from 1957 arranged as a conversation in the
studio between the radio celebrity Rolf Kirkvaag and actress Ingerid Vardund. Kirkvaag speaks directly to the camera and states, “Ladies and gentlemen. ...” He then converses with Vardund about the pastille’s excellence, finishing off by speaking directly into the camera, and urging the audience to buy the pastilles. Kirkvaag is down-to-earth and formal, and fills the role of a charming host, while still maintaining a distanced professionalism. Skretting uses this film as an example of how the short commercials of the 1950s focused on the product, hoping to persuade the consumers with rational arguments: “The tradition from the inter-war period of several minutes of entertaining and fun at first and the advertising information at the very end, is over” (Skretting 1995:131). Kirkvaag’s communication resembles the style of the formal lecturer rather than the intimate and personal nature of Per Aabel. Nevertheless, the PP pastille commercial follows the inter-war period commercials by using nationally recognized actors made famous through film, radio and the weekly tabloid press. At this point, both the contemporary and the inter-war period commercials are connected to the Housewife films. It is, at the same time, evident that Housewife films with their longer format follow the commercial ethos of the inter-war period, and differ from contemporary methods, by emphasizing entertainment and fun.

As Housewife films are part of the commercial film tradition, this particularly applies to commercials for food, detergents and household appliances that, since the end of the 1920s, had been explicitly targeted towards married women. Lilleborg’s marketing campaign to launch the detergent Blenda in 1932 illustrates that their strategy included more than traditional commercials directed towards housewives. A long commercial was produced, and special buses were equipped with film projectors and anything else required to demonstrate washing methods live. These buses visited housewives all over the country with their films and demonstrations. The Blenda commercial was screened together with film comedies to attract the audience (Iversen 1999:22). Market surveys initiated by Sverdrup Dahl A/S apparently concluded that the short commercial film format was inadequate for marketing household technology (Hartviksen 2001). It could be argued that the informative aspect found in all advertising in the Housewife films was emphasized to such a degree that these films rhetorically transgressed the commercial film format (Jhally 1987: 24pp).

Conclusion
The aspects of the Housewife films communication, displayed in the style of the first film’s compère, are reclaimed in various genres of contemporary films. However, the compère’s intimacy and lack of formality emerges as characteristic and innovative with regard to the film language in general in the early 1950s. The compère in his armchair has more in common with the personal, direct and inviting style now primarily associated with modern television aesthetics. It is easy to draw parallels to Per Aabel’s compère when reading, for example, Graeme Burton’s description of famous TV hosts and their way of approaching their viewers:

When David Attenborough whispers his comments about the wildlife that his cameraperson is close to, he is drawing us into the situation, making believe that we are there with him, in some far-away location. We become co-conspirators in his adventure. Noel Edmonds had done the same thing on his House Party show, when he mugs to the camera and/or beckons us through it to come to the door with him, or to enter someone’s home through a previously concealed camera.
This sense of relationship, of closeness, of subjectivity, is strong on television. So often the face stares at us from the screen, addressing us, inviting us, (and) sometimes challenging us. (Burton 2000:102).

An interesting parallel to the Housewife films can also be found in the contemporary, commercial TV’s consumer magazines that are modelled after weekly newspapers’ mix of entertainment and information. Compared with two very popular shows from American TV in the 1940s and 50s, the programme formats were described as “hyper-consumerist” and as “(...) a hybrid of the magazine program, one that incorporated entertainment, celebrity guests, ‘expert’ service talk, and musical numbers alongside home economics material” (Cassidy and White 2002:41). The TV hosts for these popular daytime shows were women who emphasized the importance of appearing as housewives and who did not talk down to their main audience of housewives.

The housewife films’ compère illustrates that this type of film similarly talks to – and not just down to – housewives. Contemporary international commercial television could have been a source of inspiration. In a nation with public service broadcasting like Norway, Housewife films emerged as an alternative to those branches of the trading industries that would otherwise use daytime broadcasting to reach the housewife as consumer. The Housewife film may in this respect be understood as the counterpart to commercial daytime television, both financially and with regards to the host’s direct and intimate address.

Notes
1. The research project ‘Between Market Economy and Demographic Politics: Housework as Ideology and Practice’ is led by professor Gro Hagemann, Historian at the University of Oslo. The project analyses the public discourse on housework and its importance for the social construction of gender during the previous century.
3. Se Hartviksen, Ivar 1995. As a result of this communication Starfilm A/S was established in Oslo in 1952 as a subsidiary to the Swedish Star Studio, in order to produce Housewife films.
4. The housewife films radically differ from their “sister” programmes, soap operas, in the absence of pathos – the appeal to strong emotions. Logos, the appeal through structured argumentation based on sense, is more apparent, but in the entertaining breaks between commercials, it is subordinate to the ethos appeal.
5. So far in my work, I have had the opportunity to watch 15 of the 28 films – complete or in excerpt. The ongoing project partially finances video scanning of copies – too damaged to screen – held by the Norwegian Film Institute in Oslo.
6. Ingrid Espelid, later Espelid Hovig, can be regarded as an icon within Norwegian culture and society after leading the cooking programme NRK Fjernsynskjøkkenet (The Television Kitchen) for 30 years.
7. Düring directed a long series of short films and eight feature films. During the 1950s, he was a part of an artistically ambitious film society ABC film, and also directed two feature films in the 1970s for the modernist Erik Løchen (Iversen 1992).
8. The term “compère” is taken from the films’ titles.
9. The Aabel quotations are translated from Norwegian into English by Randi Gamlemshaug.
11. In his history of documentaries, Bjørn Sørensen uses the term “mediating body” to characterize how the television, through its journalistic connection, would differ from the documentary mode at this time of history (Sørensen 2002:223).
12. This is the title of a Norwegian fairy tale about a man who had the idea that his wife never did enough in the house. His wife asks him to exchange jobs for one day. She does well out in the fields, but the husband is a total failure in the house and the fairly tale communicates this with considerable comic detail and a twist.
ANNE MARIT MYRSTAD


14. The service had been established in 1937 as an educational organization intended for housewives, with branches in county and city municipalities, belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture up until 1959. In 1969, the information bureau merged with other government institutions and adopted the name *Statens institutt for forbruksforskning* (National Institute for Consumer Research).

15. Knut-Jørgen Eriksen, manager of *Starfilm A/S*, the first company to produce Housewife films for the Norwegian market, did not only win the first *Annonsørens Oscar* (The Norwegian Advertisers’ Oscar) for best commercial in 1950, but he also had a background as a commentator on the newsreel and had worked for the NRK from 1945 to 1949. Jørgensen was, in the 1950s, one of the advocates in favour of commercial television in Norway.

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Myrstad, Anne Marit & Slottemo, Hilde Gunn (1999) "Slik kan det gjøres" Flerfaglige blikk på 'Husmor-filmen' ['That’s How To Do It’ Interdisciplinary Look at the Housewife Films] Trondheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies, Centre for Women’s Studies. (Working paper 1/1999)


As a lead-in to a feature titled ‘Inside Big Brother’ (4.22.01, Peter Rundle) on the Danish magazine programme Dags Dato the anchor says:

To judge from the media coverage you would think it was one of the major prison escapes. I’m of course talking about the mutiny around Easter of TvDanmark’s Big Brother. The escape has hit all the front pages, and even people who claim to never see the programme have contributed to the debate. In the centre of the media storm is TvDanmark’s programme director, Paul Gazan. It was he who shut down the direct transmission when reality inflicted itself on the so-called reality show. And it was he who since then has insisted on telling the public that Big Brother is alive and well. Here in Dags Dato we decided to give the programme director a taste of his own medicine. For a couple of days we turned the hand-held camera on Paul Gazan (my translation).

In this context, most interesting is not that the content of the feature is ‘reality’, but rather that the feature in itself is reality, in the sense that Dags Dato uses the same methods as the reality producer does: The editorial staff turns the camera on Gazan himself and exposes him for experimental trials, or put shortly, constructs a new reality within the real reality. In this way the feature is reminiscent of the reality show, not only in content, but also in its method of production and form. This example is naturally rather specific, but it points to a general tendency, as TV journalism – not least in the magazine format – frequently borrows from experiences with ‘reality’ over the last decade.

Reality shows and TV journalism share the point of view that the occurrences of real life are superior to the imagination – in adapted form, to be more precise. Most people’s ordinary life is rather insufficient for a drama-requiring TV audience, and even worse: The dramatic episodes in real life are more than difficult to catch with camera and microphone as they take place in real time. Unless the occurrence is staged, the TV journalists are left to discuss and reconstruct what happened, or to interfere with and influence reality itself. The raw reality is not merely un-dramatic and usually just plain boring – it is simply passé when the TV journalist appears on the spot.

The problem is especially urgent in TV journalism’s magazine genres, in this case the current affairs feature, which is features produced in newsrooms by news journalists, but
with a considerably longer format than a news feature – typically 4-15 minutes. Against the background of an investigation (Hansen, 2001-4) of the relationship between TV journalistic production and dramaturgy in such current affairs features in Danish public service TV, in the following I will encircle why and how ‘reality’ is an attractive TV journalistic narrative grip in solving or circumventing the problem of the disappeared present tense of news occurrences. My focus is on the experimental reality, and ignores other kinds of ‘reality’, e.g. that presented in docusoaps.

**Constructed Reality – in the Real Reality**

A fundamental question is why the concept is even called ‘reality’, when it appears so unreal, unrealistic and staged. Isn’t it just fiction?

The answer is that it is real enough, but also that it is a sort of laboratory reality in the form of relatively controlled experiments. Biologists’ experiments with banana flies aren’t fiction either: The banana flies are not actors, and the events are not determined by a script. Of course, the flies can mutate or escape and thereby change or destroy the experiment, and then the ‘reality’ reality overflows its own banks – just as in the Big Brother escape referred to. In this article, ‘reality’ is defined as a sequence of productionally and textually anchored narrative grips on the reality to be described.

More generally, experimental reality is understood as an independent major genre between fact and fiction. In this sense, reality is reminiscent of the major genre of faction (Larsen, 1995(1990)). But whereas faction retells and reconstructs reality with help from fictitious inspired narrative grips, the ‘reality’ major genre goes a step further and interferes directly with reality or constructs an entirely new one. Thus we can enumerate four major genres with varying reality reference and interference with reality²:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major genre</th>
<th>Reality reference</th>
<th>Interference with reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FACT</td>
<td>anchored</td>
<td>reporting (minimal interference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTION</td>
<td>staged: reconstructed</td>
<td>reconstruction and re-enactment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REALITY</td>
<td>staged: constructed</td>
<td>interference and construction (maximal interference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICTION</td>
<td>suspended</td>
<td>(no interference, but creation of a fictitious universe)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TV journalism – which is fact reporting, by definition – has absorbed experimental reality as a tendency because of the production process. The production of TV journalism is subject to some quite special conditions, which separates it from all other kinds of journalism, because it reports with reality as concrete material. The news-provoking occurrence itself has usually disappeared when the journalist makes it to the spot, so the journalist is left to reconstruct it in voice-over and interviews, making it difficult to honour the TV medium’s requirement of chronology and documentation with pictures. The missing or broken chronology means not least that TV journalism lacks a permanent need of drive, understood as “the audience’s feeling of being forced step-by-step to follow a course of action in a story to its end”. (Larsen, 2002:78, my translation). And since the news object is gone, TV journalism lacks concrete visual documentation in the form of visual proof and, generally speaking, pictures that contribute to the reconstruction of the
occurrence being described – technically speaking, pictures that function not simply as illustrative wallpaper, but that unite *isotopically* with the voice-over (Hjarvard, 1993).

In production, TV journalism is exposed to a *double mediation* in its intercourse with reality. This means that something concrete – physically existing – has to be caught on camera and microphone in the *primary mediation* and adapted in research and editing, the *secondary mediation*. Thus the feature is always a compromise between reality’s forming of the production conditions and the possible content on the one side, and the journalistic forming of the final product’s actualised content on the other. Put simply, the process from occurrence to feature looks like this:

**Illustration 2a. The Double Mediation of TV Journalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence</th>
<th>Feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Reality’s formation</em></td>
<td><em>Journalist’s formation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary mediation</td>
<td>Secondary mediation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Primary mediation is a special characteristic of the production of TV journalism compared to, e.g., newspaper journalism. The TV journalist is entirely dependent on recordings in the field. And since her fundamental dramaturgical problem is that occurrences’ “own” pictures and chronology in the most cases are gone, she has to reconstruct the occurrence using words, sounds and new pictures. ‘Reality’s formation’ states her possibilities and limitations, the potential of the feature, which the ‘Journalist’s formation’ actualises. Following the logic of the model, the journalist is basically located in secondary mediation – more literally non-field in the research phase in the editorial office. Generally, she holds a crucial role in both mediations. In addition, camerawork plays the main role in primary mediation, while research and editing is most important in secondary mediation. Illustration 2a can thus be specified:

**Illustration 2b. The Double Mediation of TV Journalism**

To be able to tell the story on TV – to circumvent the ‘Reality’s formation’ – the TV journalist has fundamentally two possibilities of reaching into, or back into, reality’s material: She can seek to reconstruct the occurrence with help from the classical news dramaturgy’s voice-over, interviews and pictures (‘the faction operation’), but she can also reach directly into – or downright construct – the occurrence itself (‘the reality operation’). ‘Reality’ in TV journalism means that the journalist tells about reality *by reaching into it* – the same way the biologist has to stage and influence a piece of banana fly reality to be able to have insight into or describe the banana flies at all.
From News- to Magazine-dramaturgy: The Requirement of a Motor

In the TV journalistic main genre – the news feature – you can mostly be content with actualising the material provided by the primary mediation. The current affairs feature also has a core of news dramaturgy, but beyond this the magazine journalist has to carry out especially profound dramaturgical considerations – as opposed to journalistic considerations in the initial research. The viewer is simply lost if the drive is too low in a current affairs feature. Here, the possibility of establishing a motor is an essential and genre-defining characteristic of the magazine-dramaturgy. The motor is an (interfering) dramaturgical grip that can be crucial to whether or not a story is told. The word ‘motor’ is the journalists’ own (emic) concept and associates exactly to the drive problem. An actual motor (or engine) makes the machinery move forward – but is in a sense subordinate in itself.

In features, a motor can be defined as a recurrent narrator plot that binds the journalistic content together in a scenic and chronological reportage course with the aim of producing drive understood as sequences of expectation/redemption and set-up/pay-off. For now, narrator plot can be defined as a course of actions constructed by the journalist.

However, there must be a distinction between such a chronology structuring dramatic reportage motor, which takes place in sound bites, and a rhetorical motor, where recurrent question-answer sequences structure the feature. The rhetorical, however, is a kind of minimum solution as motor, because it can never produce drive in scenic courses of action. In ‘Inside Big Brother’ there is clearly a dramatic reportage motor, but this motor is also rhetorical, since the feature seeks an answer to the question of whether Gazan can handle his own medicine, as articulated in the lead-in and as the feature will show. Generally, the motor is almost always established in the lead-in – and rhetorical motors often only in the lead-in together with the answers given/shown along the way and in climax. Below, the focus is on the genuine motor, the reportage motor, which requires journalistic interferences with the material of reality.

The Drive of the Motor

Thus, a motor has to contribute to the drive of the current affairs feature, but since information comes before drama in all TV journalism, the dramaturgical requirements are often quite modest. On the micro level of the drive the motor must force chronological action scenes, i.e. sound bite sequences in which the action takes place dramatically in a running now. Most sequences in a TV journalistic feature consist of logically structured explanations – arguments, chains of reasoning, points of view, assessments, etc. – to which the action scenes must provide or illustrate the point being discussed. Ideally, the feature alternates between explanations and action scenes.

On the macro level of the drive, the motor must provide one long, upward rising and chronologically organised curve aiming at a culmination in climax: one or more major payoffs to the set-ups of the motor. For such a curve, the feature motor must at minimum provide:

* an establishment in a set-up: in the feature’s hook and presentation (possibly only in the lead-in) – with the aim of framing the feature and raising expectations for
* a redemption in a pay-off: the culmination in the feature’s climax and wrap.

Between these two points, the feature can leave the motor – permanently or partly. If a motor is only established and redeemed, then it merely functions as an outer frame. In
‘Inside Big Brother’ the camera follows Gazan throughout, but every now and then the motor is suspended, especially when pictures from the passing week are shown or when Gazan in interviews reflects on the escape from the house, the reactions of the press, and so on. In other words, the feature jumps between the scenic-chronological motor level and the un-chronological content level. In between, the journalist communicates the jump in his voice-over, here from motor to content: “But if Paul Gazan has problems with the camera [the motor], he doesn’t lack words when it comes to the media’s treatment of the Big Brother crisis… [the journalistic content]” (my translation). The feature has no genuine climax, e.g. in the sense of Gazan wanting the experiment to end. Therefore, the journalist also has to dismount the motor himself in the final voice-over: “And here we take pity on the programme director and let him have his life back” (my translation). Characteristically, voice-overs related to the motor are in the present tense.

‘Clothesline’ is one of many synonyms for the motor, and this illustrates the mechanism well: The journalistic content is “hung up” on the recurrent motor. In other words, the motor constitutes a story in the story, by which it separates an independent narrator level from the journalistic content’s level. And this is a dramaturgic advantage: The journalistic content often has to be told or retold in a circular dramaturgy low on drive because it is abstract and/or without immanent chronology. As compensation, the motor on the narrator’s level implements a more linear dramaturgy with its characteristic principle of increasing excitement and development. A narrative structure is thereby constructed on the outside of or through the content’s more circular structure. In ‘Inside Big Brother’ the journalistic content is the Gazan portrait, consisting mainly of interviews and old pictures, to which the motor provides the drive by following him with a handheld camera from beginning to end.

To summarize, the motor has the double drive function, in that it, firstly, compensates for and alternates with the many dramaturgical declines in the journalistic content by forcing action scenes (micro drive) and, secondly, establishes a carrying chronology, for the journalist to cut into and out of on the way to the culmination in a climax (macro drive). Illustration 3 shows this general connection between a (reportage-) motor and the journalistic content (see also the illustration principles in Larsen, 2003):

Illustration 3. The Dramaturgic Relations between (reportage-) Motor and Journalistic Content
With relatively simple means, the motor can meet the TV media’s immanent requirement of increasing excitement. And conversely, an unsuccessful establishment or redemption can cause the entire feature to be dropped. As an example, a feature about Danish politician Poul Nyup Rasmussen’s survival as President of the Social Democracy was dropped because Dags Dato was hindered in filming him in his hotel room while writing his “fatal speech” to the party congress. All media had access to the actual presentation of the speech, and the Social Democrat delegates were more than willing to give interviews. But to place the speech in a climax, Dags Dato needed the writing process itself, and thereby the born chronology up to the speech. From the beginning, the feature was to establish a scenic Nyup motor for the journalist to cut into and out of in a course of events to culminate in a climax. When the journalist in her persuasion attempt explained to Nyup’s spin-doctor that “we have to have more than the news,” this ‘more’ referred to the (establishment of the) reportage motor.

The Fine Mechanics and Components of the Motor
The motor functions as a metonymy on the journalistic angle. In the narratological sense, the motor is the feature’s carrying plot and consists in itself of one or more plots, which are the journalist’s concrete tools for reaching into reality. In fiction the plot is synonymous with discourse in the narratological approach and can be defined as that course of action in the story the writer has constructed to force the carrying character through one or more fateful turning points – all the way to the final and fate-decisive turning point that releases the story in a climax. The plot with its turning points – reversals, rebounds, sharpenings – is the main source of the story’s drive. (Larsen, 2002:83, my translation)

In fact genres, it is self-evidently unacceptable to construct an entirely new reality with the help of a script and actors in this way, but journalists have developed a set of tools that is reminiscent of the fiction plot. Roughly, there are two possibilities: Either the reality itself can contain an intrigue plot, which journalistically speaking is a gift located in the primary mediation. Or the journalist can establish a narrator plot in the secondary mediation, which is, journalistically speaking, interference. Intrigue plots are most reminiscent of fiction plots and appear when reality’s own stories are plotted from the beginning (Larsen, 1995(1990):105). Thus, the intrigue plot is out of the journalist’s control – although she can naturally provoke an intrigue with the help of a narrator plot or act as one of the parts in the intrigue. When the journalist herself establishes a plot, it receives a different character than in fiction and intrigue – as an “extra reality level” – but with the same function, namely drive. Larsen discusses narrator plot “when it is the producer of a fact or entertainment programme who stages and records a course of actions and events in reality”. (2002:83, my translation), and furthermore separates these in journalistic plots and entertainment plots. The journalistic plots are divided into three main groups (p.84-5):

1) Staging of the journalist herself; i.e. the plots stand up; journalist as guinea pig; journalist as explorer; journalist as truth hunter (with the subordinate plots candid camera; undercover; agent provocateur; gate crashing; anonymous witness; interview with trump; try-out)
2) **Staging of participants**, i.e. the plots *confrontation of participants; participants as guinea pigs; surprising provocation; the third gadget; distracted interview; conducted tour in own universe; back to the spot*

3) **Construction of a chronological course of actions**, i.e. the plots *follow the process to the moment of truth; construction of new reality; reconstruction and re-enactment* (my translation).

A (reportage-) motor in current affairs features consist almost by definition of type 3) *construction of a chronological course of actions*, but in most cases this construction will be built up using experimental helping plots from group 1), 2) or both. For the sake of identification a feature needs a case, which again can be combined with staging of the journalist herself. In this way, ‘Inside Big Brother’ pulls on a larger plot repertoire in the motor construction: Paul Gazan is exposed to almost all of the *staging of participants* plots, but with Dags Dato and the journalist as *agent provocateur*, a plot rhetorically formulated in the lead-in – “Here in Dags Dato we decided to give the programme director a taste of his own medicine” – leaving tracks in the feature, as the journalist supplies Gazan with buttonhole microphone, whereby the motor is established visually. Incidentally, it would have been a motor nonetheless even if Dags Dato had merely followed Gazan for a couple of days, because it would then have been the participants plot *conducted tour in own universe*. It is, however, the ‘reality’-inspired experiment with Gazan that makes the motor *also* journalist carried.

**Participants as Motor**

The reportage motor inlays a story in the story, which causes the narrator’s level to be momentarily separated from the level of the journalistic content. In ‘Inside Big Brother’ the content is structured around a portrait of Paul Gazan, who in the past week has been the centre of media attention. The potential conflicts and goals of the case can be illustrated in the actant scheme ad follows.

**Illustration 4a. Actant Scheme for the Journalistic Content’s Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helper:</th>
<th>➔</th>
<th>Subject: Paul Gazan</th>
<th>➙</th>
<th>Opponent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>— Paul Gazan’s persuasiveness</td>
<td>— Escaping Big Brother participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Coloured press</td>
<td>— Critical press</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Object: To save Big Brother; to convince the public that the concept is alive

Problematically, this story can only be told in past tense with unconnected archive pictures, and there is no course or drive in a portrait. The events of the week – the Big Brother escape – can of course be retold chronologically, but in itself a portrait has no time or chronology and can therefore not be forced into a linear dramaturgy. The narrative grip consists of the reportage motor: following Gazan, experimenting “for a couple of days,” and exposing him to trials by taking away his private life. That story can be told in running present tense and contains a genuine – inner, psychological – conflict in the elementary excitement and suspense towards the climax: Can he tolerate his own medicine? The actant scheme of the narrator’s level, on which the journalistic content is hung, appears as follows:
Illustration 4b. Actant Scheme for the Narrator Level (carried by the reportage motor)

The journalist functions almost by definition as opponent, because his experiments oppose Gazan. In this case, however, the journalist also functions as helper, because a “friendly” motor is being used. Bottom line, this is a gag, not intending to counteract Gazan’s image.

Gazan assumes the subject position in both actant schemes, which is quite normal when a participant is a motor himself. Dramaturgically a journalist will often prefer that the main character is thus “his own motor”. The experiment draws a more nuanced portrait of the programme director compared to a feature consisting solely of interviews and voice-over on the level of journalistic content. For all practical purposes the motor is both a narrating grip and a crucial part of the content in this feature.

The Journalist as Motor

It is at least as common that the TV journalist functions as motor and thereby assumes the subject position on the narrator level. In these instances, the journalist makes a virtue of necessity: The difficulties in telling the story become the narrating principle in itself. In this way the double mediation is laid bare, which not least gives a feature the opportunity of “excusing” the resistance of reality and prospective holes in the dramaturgy. The viewer receives epic impressions in the Brecht sense, because the production process and the narrating itself leave indexical tracks. Since the viewer gains an insight into the journalistic methods, the journalist motor strengthens the credibility in hard, revealing journalism. This type of motor is, however, pure form and in many cases a dramaturgic emergency solution since reality doesn’t get a chance to “show itself”. The participants risk becoming walk-ons in the journalist’s narration, which can weaken the identification.

Contrary to a participant motor, the journalist motor can be carried forward by the lead-in and voice-over, whereby it approaches the rhetorical. This typically happens if the drive and news value in the material of the primary mediation is too weak. Narrating becomes the occurrence itself, or at least a main part of it. The journalist will typically be lifted forward in the lead-in as the motor is established – “Our reporter So-and-so went… when…” – whereby it raises the expectation that the viewer will receive the result of the hunt on the way and not least in the climax (see also Hansen, 2001). Moreover, the journalist can stage herself and her activities in the picture, but this isn’t strictly necessary. On the other hand, this type of story certainly places great demand on the journalist as narrator (-voice).

Entertainment Plots

The fluid border between fact and entertainment in TV journalism shows concretely in the other type of narrator plot, entertainment plots, i.e. “‘artificial’ courses of action with
active participants, which are staged first and foremost to optimise excitement – but only ‘for fun’ – in the programme”. (Larsen, 2003:367, my translation). Specifically, entertainment plots include: competition, assignment, riddle, challenge, temptation, trial, transformation, unexpected guest, time limit, chance and ballot (ibid, p.367-8, my translation). This type of plotting – a rather straightforward ‘reality’ phenomenon – exists only in very soft features and is always inferior to the journalistic plots. The motor in ‘Inside Big Brother’ is supported by the entertainment plots trial and temptation.

**Reality Journalism – ‘Reality’ Serving Journalism**

In this article, the recurring example has been a quite obvious staging and motor – and explicitly ‘reality’ – but it was chosen to illustrate a general tendency. In the same way that faction began in TV journalism of the 1980’s as avant-garde currents that eventually became mainstream, the ‘reality’ tendency is coming through as well established narrative grips. And it is only a tendency: Pure experimental reality occurs only when the entire occurrence has been staged in favour of the camera, and this happens very rarely in TV journalism and then only in very soft features. For Big Brother and similar shows the real reality is inferior to the experiment, whereas reality journalism must always place the experiment inferior to reality. What the aim in itself is in the reality show is only a means in TV journalism. Even in ‘Inside Big Brother’, the aim is the journalistic portrait. In sum, the aim-/means-structure of this feature looks as follows – since the motor consists of a conglomerate of plots with the aim of creating chronology:

- **Aim at the journalistic content’s level**: the story itself, which is a portrait of Paul Gazan in “the real reality”; it is told in an un-chronological and circular dramaturgy linked by voice-over, interviews and archive pictures.

- **Means at the narrator level**: the story in the story, i.e. the reportage motor, which is a constructed reality told in running present tense in an excitement-building linear dramaturgy consisting of action scenes. The motor is a construction of:
  - **Aim**: construction of a chronological course of actions
  - **Means**: Varying staging of participants plots with support from the journalist as agent provocateur and the entertainment plots trial and temptation.

TV journalism has armed itself with reality tools to overcome and solve the problem of double mediation in TV production. In longer features, the journalists have apparently taken partiality for a recurrent dramaturgic motor to support the journalistic content. The current affairs feature thereby extends the classical core of news dramaturgy and becomes a narrative – or rather also a narrative. Whereas the journalistic content serves the viewer’s **thirst for knowledge**, the motor meets the viewer’s **narrative desire** (Brooks, 1984; Christensen, 1996). The well-organised current affairs feature provides relevant information and a good story – at the same time.

Paul Gazan – the hard-tried programme director tasting his own medicine – is right in more than one sense when he says in the feature, that “the reality show has overflowed its own banks and has implicated all of us all of a sudden” (my translation). TV journalism’s increasing adaptation in the second mediation, made possible by modern editing technology⁸, has moved out into reality itself, the raw material of journalism. Moreover, the journalist is defining new roles for herself, as she increasingly takes on responsibility as narrator – as “institutionalised” in **narrative journalism** – and as experimenter, as
Notes

1. Hjarvard (1999) points to a general increase in TV news coverage of culture and universally human topics, and the concrete example is clean up: Dags Dato uses the furore of the passing week as an “alibi” for showing some Big Brother. Such thoughts about content are naturally interesting and characteristic, but not the focus here.

2. I don’t consider entertainment an independent major genre, since entertainment in varying degrees is a part of all four major genres, even though “Some has expressed wishes of dividing between journalism and entertainment. This is not a fruitful distinction, because the divide properly goes between fact and fiction – between what is documentary and that which is made up.” (Njaastad, 1999:52, my translation).

3. Here ‘faction operation’ is to be understood very generally as any form of reconstruction of the occurrence. If a train accident is the occurrence then interviews with eyewitnesses is a reconstruction. The interview itself is a kind of faction – in the sense of dramatised reality (Larsen, 1995(1990)). That the interview over time has become a fundamental journalistic genre is a different story.

4. However, dramaturgical criteria can always be overruled by a particularly controversial or interesting journalistic content. Also in current affairs features it applies, that content is king.

5. Another and related principle of connection is characteristic for the current affairs feature, namely the theme consisting of a visual and/or auditory refrain that is reiterated through the feature as metaphor on the journalistic angle. The theme is in family with the motor, and they can merge so the motor has a thematic character and vice versa. But in the functional dramaturgic sense the theme is rather opposite to the motor, because it lacks the drive and chronology of the motor, which is why it is named breaker in the journalist jargon. In return, the theme has the advantage that it doesn’t require interference with reality – only with the editing process.

6. Narratologists commonly distinguish between narrative discourse, narrative content or story, and the narrative act (Genette, 1980(1972)).

7. In principle, it is also a – although weak – rhetorical motor when the lead-in is expressed more general, as in “Dags Dato/We went... when...”

8. See for instance Hallin (1992) about the tendency to and consequences of sound bite journalism.

References


News Technology

Deconstructing and Reconstructing News

STIAN SLOTTERØY JOHNSEN

Technological change is in many ways affecting news organizations and journalists today. The World Wide Web (WWW) and its different applications, as well as the increasingly popular concept of Video Journalism, are two examples of this. These two phenomena have much in common. Both are innovations with a strong technological element, enabled by new digital technologies. Both have consequences for how news production is organized. And both are elements in what is known as convergence or multimedia journalism (e.g., Deuze, 2003). Today, such innovations are considered increasingly important (Aquino et al., 2002), and it is important to understand what kinds of processes are unfolding and which consequences the development may have.

The objects of study here are two processes of change in a Belgian regional media group: the introduction of a multimedia desk, and the introduction of Video Journalism. An important realization is that the changes are not merely technological. Social forces are active during the process of innovation, and these forces may have consequences for the outcome. The following accounts try to determine the consequences of the two processes through analysis of the technological and social factors that are at work at an early stage of the innovations.

A study of convergence and news journalism might have different “points of departure”:

I: News producing organization
   – new production technology

II: Medium
   – new channels of distribution

III: Audience
   – new ways to access media content

Digital technologies affect all three spheres. News organizations (I) are increasingly dependent on digital production tools, such as computers, digital cameras and digital video recorders. The Internet and the WWW (II) have been christened (although temporarily) “New Media”. And the audience (III) now has a number of digital appliances (personal computers, mobile phones, etc…) through which they can access media content. This study
focuses on the news producing organization, and in particular on the role of the journalist. However, the changes also involve the new channels of distribution as well as the audiences’ new ways of accessing content. It is important to note that when spheres II and III come into play in this report, it is from the perspective of the organization.

In the research community, as well as in the professional community, there are different expectations about how news producers should act with regards to new technologies such as the WWW. Many agree that news organizations should start to deliver content through a number of different channels (Quinn et al., 2002; Rasmussen, 2000). Newspapers and broadcasters should join forces in order to produce news more effectively. Multimedia news desks should distribute stories across a range of media outlets, enhancing the overall value of the news for the audience, and for the news organization. The technology required to do this is clearly present, but many companies struggle to find practical solutions (Aquino et al., 2002).

The research behind this report was motivated by a wish to examine the interplay between new digital technologies and journalism. During the process, this wide research question was narrowed down to three specific areas: The quality of news (1), the skills and job satisfaction of journalists (2), and the relationship to the audience (3). The latter (3) was found relevant because some literature has predicted audience empowerment due to new technology (Hall, 2001; Pavlik, 2000; Engebretsen, 2002). (1) and (2) turned out to be crucial elements in the organizational processes that were initiated by the new technology. Thus, the main research question is: What are the consequences of the innovations in Concentra in terms of the quality of news, the skills and job satisfaction of journalists, and the relationship to the audience? On the agenda is also another more fundamental question: Can the developments in this case be seen as determined by available technology, or are other factors playing an important part?

While similar cases have previously been described at a national and international level (e.g., Quinn, 2002; Aquino et al., 2002), until now little has been said about the regional level. Furthermore, many accounts tend to be centred on best practices. This report tries to broaden the perspective by also focussing on a project that was not successful. Another reason for choosing this case is that it provides a unique perspective on Video Journalism, as the two stations that are examined have chosen quite different strategies. While Kanaal 3 was built from scratch as a “green field”, TV Limburg has had a gradual process of implementation. Some of the problems they have faced are similar, while others are specific to the context, making this a good opportunity to explore differences in the concept and practices of Video Journalism.

**Method and Material**

The system of news production for any television station can be conceptualized as a heterogeneous configuration (Williams, 1997: 309-312). The concept of “configuration” highlights the process of adaptation, or configuration, which happens as a technology is introduced to an organization. It is “heterogeneous” because it consists of both technical and non-technical elements. The concept enables the analyst to treat both the technical and the non-technical elements that go into the system in a similar manner. This is an advantage because the boundaries between the “technical” and the “social” are often blurred; technical problems may have social solutions and vice versa.

Once the system is in place, it tends to be stable, with journalists, editors, cameramen and administrative staff following their routines that ensure stability. Although improve-
ments are constantly happening, the scope for “radical” innovations is limited. Thus, although the people responsible for the different parts of the process have always been aware of the whole range of elements that go into the production, it is possible to view this as a kind of “black box”. Organizations have many such black boxes, and most of the time what is important is the input and the output of the box, not the content. However, from time to time it is necessary to open the boxes. The introduction of Video Journalism is one of these occasions, as it involves changing the system of production quite radically. In fact, the result of the process of change is in many relevant ways completely different from the traditional configuration. A new configuration, or a new black box, has to be created. Hence the title: “Deconstructing and Reconstructing News”.

In this account, the process through which the new configuration becomes part of the organization is emphasized. This is done because through the process, relevant forces in the organization become visible as they shape the look of the final configuration. Readers should note that the choice to use an organizational perspective has implications for what kind of answers the report can give. The perspective is not neutral, in the sense that agents that for some reason become marginalized or don’t make their presence felt on the organization, are also left out of the analysis. The choice to do this is deliberate, because the main questions can best be answered this way. Other studies will have to confront the question of “left-out agents” in the development.

A Steady Point of Reference

The choice to study the new configuration as it is shaped makes it difficult to analyse and present the empirical data. It would be convenient to start out from an essentialist definition of Video Journalism and then proceed to analyse the “impact” it has on the organization of work, the skills and practices of journalists, and the quality of news. However, the intention to explore how the concept and practice of Video Journalism is itself shaped and embedded in the organization prohibits such an approach. Other possible essentialist “hooks”, such as “journalism” or “the organization”, are rejected on similar grounds. These are also social constructs that are shaped in the process of change.

Therefore, time is used as the point of reference in this study. The development is accounted for in four stages. The first stage is the motivation behind the process. This is followed by a phase of resistance from social and technical elements in and outside the organization. The instigators seek to overcome resistance through a variety of strategies to enrol supporters of the concept. These strategies crucially shape the final configuration, which in stage four is either rejected or becomes stabilized. After stabilization it becomes possible to discuss consequences of the process. Of course these phases are analytical, and “stabilization” does not imply that nothing happens to the configuration any more. There is a continuous development, but after the stabilization, there are no radical changes in the concepts and practices.

Material

Empirical data have been gathered through semi-structured interviews with people from different places in the organization. A total of 13 interviews with 15 people have been conducted. The interviewees include managerial staff, journalists, chief editors and technical staff. Interviews were recorded and transcribed before a qualitative analysis was conducted. In this analysis, data were approached primarily as a source for gaining access to the developments in the organization. Accounts were cross-checked in order to
avoid personal biases. It has become clear, however, that the process of shaping these innovations is also dependent upon the local construction of certain concepts, such as “Video Journalism” or “interactivity”. These are concepts that do not have a clear a priori meaning, but are given a highly context-dependent meaning in the process of change. By analysing the qualitative data as a topic in itself, it is possible to gain access to this interesting aspect of the case. The analysis presented in the following is thus based on a dualist approach to data, which are used both as a source and as a topic.

**Context**

**The “Old” Configuration**

In order to understand what is new, it is necessary to understand what was there before. What follows is therefore a brief description of the traditional system for gathering news at TVL. A normal day would start with a morning meeting with all the newsroom staff present. The main purpose of the meeting was to coordinate today’s news production. There were a limited number of cameramen (three) and newscutters (two), five journalists, one production manager, and one news manager. For each story a team consisting of a journalist, a cameraman and a newscutter must be assigned. The resulting schedule was then put on a whiteboard that was visible for everybody in the newsroom. The production manager kept track of this schedule and updated it when necessary (for example when a “hot” story comes in during the day). Hot stories could also frequently require the use of freelancers, both cameramen, journalists and newscutters. Parts of the system were also the so-called “spotting machines” on the walls, for spotting the footage during editing.

Going a little bit further into the system, the journalist used a computer to write text for the news item. There was both an introductory text (read by the news anchor) and text for “voice-over”. This is important because it shows that television production is also about text, which can potentially be re-purposed. Computers in the old system were networked, but there was not a single system controlling the production flow, meaning that for example the autocue for the news anchor had to be generated by manually cutting and pasting from different documents.

In interviews this system has been presented with extensive focus on its shortcomings. We should, however, keep in mind that it has worked successfully for several years and the current configuration at TVL consists of a mix of this system and Video Journalism. Although the system is complex and involves many people, it also has mechanisms to control this (morning meeting, production manager, whiteboard).

**Media in Belgium**

Belgium consists of two parts: a Flemish-speaking part (Flanders) and a French-speaking part (Wallonia). The media are also divided between the linguistic areas. The context of this study is Flanders, a region with a relatively high readership of newspapers compared to Wallonia. The total circulation of newspapers has shown a decline in recent years.

The regional media landscape in Flanders is dominated by a few media groups. They started out as family-owned newspapers, but have lately become involved in both print and audiovisual activities. The ownership has also changed gradually, and the groups are now owned by financial institutions. There are no legal restrictions prohibiting cross-media ownership, and no action has been taken to prevent ownership concentration.
Regional television has between fifteen and twenty percent of the national market. The rest belongs to the national public and commercial broadcasters. Belgium is the most densely cabled country in the world. Ninety-four percent of the households with television are connected to a network. Lately there has also been a quick growth of broadband connections in Flanders.

The government distributes licences to run regional broadcasting. There is also financial support from the government to the stations depending on the number of viewers. This support, however, is lower than in, for example, the neighbouring Netherlands, making the climate quite competitive. With a squeezed market for advertising on television, and competition from international stations as well, it is not easy to stay in the business. One factor that makes it somewhat easier, though, is that once a licence is acquired to run a regional television station, you are ensured a distribution monopoly. Another licence will not be given for the same area. So the competition for regional television comes from national and international television, as well as from other media.

Lately the Belgian government has introduced a new interpretation of the laws about freelance work. Now, employers are obliged to pay social security also for freelancers, making the use of such work less attractive. We will see that this action from the government has been conducive to the introduction of Video Journalism in Concentra.

Concentra
Concentra is one of three dominant media owners in Flanders. Its origin is in the Limburg area, with the family-owned regional newspaper Het Belang van Limburg (HBvL). However, during the 1990s, it expanded into a multimedia group with regional television, as well as a printing house and other activities. Two regional newspapers and the national free paper Metro are part of the Concentra portfolio.

Just as the other previously family-owned media houses in Belgium, the ownership of Concentra was changed lately. A financial holding company now owns the group, and the media activities are gathered in Concentra Media.

The audio-visual media of Concentra are gathered in a division called Avalon. At the moment, Avalon consists of three television stations: TV Limburg (TVL), Kanaal 3 and ATV (in Antwerp). Kanaal 3 was recently taken over by Concentra.

Concentra is described as a technologically strong and innovative media group. During the past years, it has been confronted with the challenges brought on by new digital technologies. Several projects have been initiated to benefit from the perceived new opportunities. The processes that are explored in this study are two such projects. The first is the introduction of a multimedia desk, which was supposed to be shared between the newspaper and the television station in Hasselt. The second is a change in the production of regional television through Video Journalism. While the process of introducing Video Journalism in Kanaal 3 is completed, it was at the time of writing still going on in TVL.

Results
1: The Multimedia Desk
The story begins with the attempt to introduce a multimedia desk. This account serves as an introduction to the methodological approach as well as to the idea to introduce Video Journalism to the television stations in Concentra.
Motivation
The motivation for pursuing the idea of a multimedia desk was partly rooted in the predictions of a change in the demand for news. The audience was presumed to change its behaviour and expect to be served through a number of channels. In particular the WWW was seen as an important part of the package of media in Concentra, and it was expected that it would soon become self-sufficient with income from, among other sources, banner advertisements. The multimedia desk would provide the audience with added value to the news, because it was now possible to choose which channel best suited individual needs.

Another key motivation was to make the news production more effective. Instead of having two desks working in the same area, the editors of television and the newspaper would now come together in one desk, reducing the probability of double work. In the long term it is likely that the intention was a co-location of the newsrooms, or even a complete merger. This process of change was initiated from above – the CEO of Concentra at the time asked for the cooperation. He was a strong believer in “New Media”. Upon his request, the editors of the newspaper (HBvL) and the television station (TVL) started to realize the plan of a multimedia desk.

Resistance
Resistance to the idea of the multimedia desk was strong, and it included many of the elements that are commonly cited as “obstacles” to convergence in media organizations (Aquino et al., 2002; Quinn, 2002). A brief review shows that economic, technical and social problems had to be overcome if the project was to become successful.

On the social side, a problematic issue was the competition between journalists about good stories. Newspaper journalists do not like their scoops to be aired on television several hours before the newspaper is printed. Another problem was the fear of cannibalizing your own stories. By “giving away” most of the material through other channels, people in the newspaper feared that less people would buy their main product. Many have also attributed problems to the different “mind-sets” for the different media. Specifically, the production cycles of the television and the newspaper are different. Television news is aired at 6:30 pm, while the newspaper is printed much later in the evening. According to interview data, it was due to this almost impossible to have journalists working on the same story for both media – one way in which multimedia journalism is supposed to increase efficiency.

Resistance also had to be overcome in relation to the content. All the material had to pass through the same multimedia desk, and it had to be prepared for sending to different channels. But originally the television station and the newspaper were operating on different systems, which made this difficult. The project also had to overcome the physical distance (about five kilometres) between the two newsrooms.

In addition, the expected rise in advertising income from the Internet did not occur. Rather the opposite happened, after the “IT-bubble” burst in 2001. Thus the Internet, which was supposed to be the “pivot” of the project, became less important in the eyes of management. The fact that Concentra didn’t receive the licence they applied for to broadcast local radio was also a problem. The initial plan was to locate the radio and the online production together.

Strategies to Overcome Resistance
In order to overcome the resistance, the problems that were viewed as appropriate for technical solutions were confronted first. This was primarily the content management. A
system was developed to facilitate the information flow in the organization. It was originally designed with the newspaper and online newsroom in mind, making all the items that journalists were working on available for instant online publishing. Later, a similar system was developed for the television station, and the systems were made available to everybody, meaning that journalists and editors in the television station could access the newspaper stories and vice versa.

This technical solution could not, however, confront the social resistance related to the competition about scoops and the different “mind-sets”. Thus, a system was established whereby the chief-editors would agree on where the different stories go. There was also a call for cross-promotion between the different media, so that for example viewers of TVL would be informed that they could read more about this night’s stories in tomorrow’s newspaper.

Another strategy that was tried out was to have a permanent camera in the newspaper newsroom. This made it possible for journalists from the newspaper to appear in the television news (so-called “stand-ups”) without having to travel the distance between the newsrooms.

**Rejection**
In this case, the resistance turned out to be too strong to be overcome by the strategies that the organization was ready to apply. The reasons for this are interpreted differently across the organization. Some talk about the competitive mind of the journalists, others emphasize the problems with deadlines, while others again refer to the too optimistic expectations for online publishing. Indeed, some people don’t even view this as a failure. But it is a fact that the idea of a physical multimedia desk was rejected, after having operated for less than a year.

The data do not allow a definitive conclusion as to which explanation is “correct”. It is clear, however, that the combined resistance, from inside and outside the organization, was not addressed properly through the strategies that were followed. In particular the organization’s answer to the drop in income from the online edition was a complete re-evaluation of what online news is. Instead of seeing it as a stand-alone medium, it is now considered to have value only in combination with print or broadcast. This is significant because it signals a shift in what kind of journalism the online efforts will be directed towards.

**Consequences**
Even if the multimedia desk was not stabilized in the ways it was originally conceived, it did have consequences throughout the organization. The technical solutions that were developed to manage the information flow are still operating and indeed still being developed and improved on. Recently the system was introduced also in TVL as part of the new Video Journalist configuration (see the next section). The intranets are still open, and management is talking about a “virtual multimedia desk” instead of a physical one. It is not clear, however, how much this system is in use, and the assessment of the virtual desk is different depending on who is asked.

Another consequence is that management and journalists are talking about competition between newsrooms as a good thing. The situation in the area of TVL and HBvL is that the television station is granted a monopoly by law, while the newspaper is enjoying a very high share of the market (around 87%). According to management in Concentra, it would not be good to abandon the competition in the region:
I think [competition is] a good thing – let them be competitors. Because they are the two strongest media in the region. When they do not compete on a healthy basis, then we act like a monopolist. And monopolies always disappear (CEO, Concentra Media).\(^9\)

I view this as a consequence of the project instead of an obstacle to it. If it were indeed the prevalent view in Concentra that they had to keep up the competition in the local area, it is unlikely that the multimedia desk project would have been initiated in the first place.

Thus, the cooperation between the newspaper and the television station is now approached in a less radical way. On a day-to-day basis they are competitors with regards to regional news, while they are able to cooperate on special events. Recently this was demonstrated through a largely successful cooperation on the election coverage.

This brief account of the developments at a media group level between HBvL and TVL serves a number of purposes. Firstly, it shows how this simple scheme for ordering the analysis can highlight the organizational processes that shape an innovation. Secondly, it shows how the scheme can also be used to describe processes that do not turn out to be successful in the end. Thirdly, it shows how the importance of the WWW as a stand-alone medium has been re-valuated by the media group in question. Now the focus is directed towards maintaining a community among the audience of the newspaper or the television station. Finally, it sets the stage for the next process: the introduction and shaping of Video Journalism.

\section*{II: Video Journalism}

\subsection*{1. Motivation}

The main motivation from the start of Video Journalism was to cut the costs of television production. The acquisition of the unprofitable Kanaal 3 was based on an assumption that this was possible:

[Video Journalism] was generated by a problem ... There was one [television station] east of Antwerp which was not doing well – and it was for sale. So we looked at it and said “how can we make a successful station out of it?” And it was, out of the brainstorming and what was going on, a project of the BBC on Video Journalism, where we found a way to make it profitable, or an opportunity to maybe make it profitable (CEO, Concentra Media).\(^10\)

A more clear-cut view on the motivation is possible through the concepts and metaphors management interviewees use to describe the development. Words like “efficiency”, “automation”, “flexibility” and “commoditization” illustrate the direction in which management wants to take the company.

\section*{Flexibility, Efficiency and Standardization}

In Avalon, one step closer to the actual news production, interviewees do not pay much attention to the project of the multimedia desk. Their focus has shifted, from looking at what they could accomplish together with the newspaper, to looking at how they could change their own production of news:

What we’re doing now ... is taking away the walls between the camera, the journalists, and the guy that does the [cutting] ... you’d better do that first and
then try to merge like people from newspaper and a TV station because they are two different professions (CEO, Avalon).11

The motivation to introduce Video Journalism is similar to the motivation behind the multimedia desk. On the publishing side, Avalon wants to be able to send news to a number of different channels. This is a continuation of a strategy that Concentra has been pursuing for many years. It has resulted in products like the “TV-krant” (“TV-newspaper”), which is a channel on the regional cable network with short news texts, pictures, advertisements and background music. Although this is a television channel, most of the content comes from the newsroom of the newspaper, which is also where the staff is located. The same motivation has led to news publishing through a teletext system, run by the same people who run the TV-krant.

Another important motivation is more closely related to the corporate context. Of course, the bottom line is important in any business, and there is a constant pressure to cut costs and make the production more efficient. There are several ways in which Video Journalism could be shaped to reach this goal. It could be used as a tool to reduce the number of employees needed in the newsroom, as the news items are now produced by one person and not three. However, according to management this is not the way they want to go. Instead they focus on increasing the flexibility of their employees. The traditional configuration is criticized for being complicated and rigid. To solve this there is an extensive use of freelancers in TVL. This is expensive, and it is also a political issue, as the government does not approve of such an employment policy, and has recently made it more expensive to use freelancers. A way to avoid this is to merge the cameraman, the newscutter and the journalist into one profession: “If you have 10-15 people who can do everything – that’s fantastic!” (CEO, Avalon).12

But flexibility is not the only “guiding principle” of this innovation. The motivation from management is also related to an effort of standardizing the tools that are necessary to produce news, both in television and across media. For the company it is important that the flow of information run as smoothly as possible. It is seen as an added value if journalists from the newspaper and from the television station have access to all the information that is produced throughout the organization. In order for this to happen, all information should be accessible in similar formats through the same system, making standardization an important motivation.

This section on motivation shows how the initial goal to cut costs is specified and centered on a few important principles such as flexibility, standardization and efficiency. People at all places in the organization accept that they are working in a commercial enterprise, and that the bottom line is important. However, this acceptance alone was not enough to embrace the perceived wide-ranging consequences of introducing Video Journalism without resistance.

2. Resistance

The resistance that was met during the implementation of Video Journalism was multifaceted. It included both social and technological problems, each of which had to be confronted in order to make a new configuration that works.

Jobs, Skills and the Perception of Quality

Perhaps the most obvious, and most general, objection to the concept of Video Journalism is related to redefinition of jobs. In the version that has been attempted in Concentra,
it involves creating a new type of employee, the Video Journalist, who will perform tasks that were previously performed by three persons: the journalist, the cameraman and the newscutter. This raises a number of concerns. Is it possible for one person to learn to perform all these tasks? Both cameramen and newscutters have their own educations, is it possible to remove these two jobs without a loss of quality? Will the jobs of journalists become more stressful when they get all these new tasks? And what will happen to the newscutters and the cameramen?

The concern about the quality of the news product has been highlighted from people at all places in the organization, exemplified here through a newscutter:

If I watch the news and compare the Video Journalist [items] to the regular ones
I do think that the regular ones have better quality: better camera, better lighting,
this sort of thing” (newscutter, TVL).13

There are two parts to this argument. On the one hand, there are the skills of the professional cameraman with the camera, light, white balance and so on. For the cutting, there are techniques for making nice transitions from one picture to another, combining pictures with sound, etc... These skills and techniques have to be learned by the Video Journalists. On the other hand, there is also the question of the technical quality of the equipment and the software for editing news items. The latter has not been an issue of serious resistance in Concentra, but such considerations still exert influence when choices are made about platforms and equipment. The former part of the argument, however, has produced some serious concerns because it relates to the skills and professional identity of the journalists.

This kind of resistance came from many places. It was an obvious concern to the editor-in-chief of Kanaal 3, the first station to implement Video Journalism: “It was a big question mark in the beginning. The question was: will people be able to film, edit and make text and do that in a good way?” (editor-in-chief, Kanaal 3).14 Journalists are also expressing concern about having to learn to do new things: “You have to learn techniques about camera and editing. That’s the next step: editing by ourselves also. It’s going to be a little bit harder I think” (journalist, TVL).15

Interestingly, this kind of resistance was not limited to inside the organization. All the journalist interviewees mentioned episodes where their colleagues, still working in a “traditional” configuration, made sarcastic remarks about the “one-man-crew” of Video Journalism:

You know what the biggest problem is? When you arrive at a press-conference and there are some colleagues ... And you arrive with your camera and they think: “What is he doing? Oh – he’s going to film himself.” And the remarks they make that moment ... maybe those remarks have a bigger influence than the fact that [the Video Journalists] have to film themselves and technical problems (journalist, TVL).16

Another problematic issue is that it is sometimes not physically possible for one person to perform the same job as two. In normal situations this is solved by substituting the cameraman with a tripod, but sometimes this is not enough. Examples that have been mentioned are when journalists attend large, chaotic press-conferences, when covering court cases, or when doing Vox-Pops.17

Given these social and technical concerns, which were raised both from the inside and the outside of the organization, it is questionable whether the new configuration can
produce news of the same quality as the old one. The issue of quality turns out to be very central to this sociotechnical process, and it will be scrutinized further in the next section.

Resistance also had to be overcome from the journalists who feared they would have to work more because they are substituting for two other professions. This is the flip side of increased efficiency and flexibility for the organization. The journalists are paying the price for this, and most of them acknowledge it.

Content Management
The fact that the content of a television station working in the traditional configuration often exists in different formats and in different physical places can be viewed as an important instance of resistance. Raw footage is located on tapes, as are the final news items. The text that goes into the production is typically located on a file at the journalist’s computer, and when the broadcast is over, the tape is moved to the archive room, which contains kilometres of tape and is time consuming to search. Even a standard news item can be deconstructed, making it difficult to handle:

The problem is, if you see a TV-item you have three parts of that item. First there is the presentation ... Then you get the item with two things: everything [the interviewees] say, and the voice-over. So you have three products in one item and you need them all (CEO, Avalon).18

This is a matter of resistance because it makes it difficult to re-purpose content through different channels. In the jungle of formats and storage facilities, such re-purposing takes a great deal of work and it is not cost efficient. Not surprisingly, the organization has searched for technical solutions to this problem.

Tensions
Another area of resistance concerns the fact that some elements in the traditional configuration performed more than their primary task. In particular this is true of the morning meeting, which was primarily a coordination meeting. It has been mentioned as something that is no longer needed, but the editor-in-chief is aware that dropping it might have unintended consequences:

I think that’s a weak point [abandoning the morning meeting]. It’s important that you see each other, that there’s one line in the newsroom. And the meeting in the morning is very good to keep that line going on (editor-in-chief, TVL).19

This quote illustrates one of the tensions that this innovation makes visible: between centralization and decentralization. ICTs are often said to have typically decentralizing properties, for example through making geographical distances irrelevant. In this case, however, it is obvious that it is not the technology itself that is decentralizing, but the way it is put to use. TVL might keep the meeting, despite the fact that its primary function is obsolete. This is one area where the Video Journalist configuration has not stabilized.

Another area of non-stabilization in TVL is related to the fact that people have to change or quit their jobs in order for the new configuration to be fully operational. Here the difference between the two television stations is clear. While Kanaal 3 started virtually “from scratch”, TVL had to choose a more gradual strategy in order to make Video Journalism work. This brings the story to stage three: the strategies that are chosen to
overcome the resistance. It is my intention to show that these strategies are specific to
the organization, and that they impact on two things. Firstly, on whether or not a configu-
ration will stabilize, and secondly, on what the stabilized configuration looks like.

3. Strategies to Overcome Resistance
The resistance that had to be addressed consisted of both social and non-social problems.
Naturally they were confronted with a wide range of strategies, ranging from prototypical
“technical” solutions to social problem solving and rhetoric. Kanaal 3 and TVL some-
times differ in the strategies chosen to overcome resistance. These differences are high-
lighted along the way.

Clear Leadership
As mentioned, some of the strongest resistance was encountered in relation to the redefi-
nition of jobs and the quality of the news output. It was highly necessary to recruit the
journalists as supporters of Video Journalism, but this was not an easy task given that it
means more responsibilities and harder work. Management in TVL gave a strong mes-
gage to the journalists:

We made it very clear: “you will change or we will fire you – there’s no
discussion”. And they didn’t believe that it would work but then we started in
[Kanaal 3] and they saw that “well, it’s working so they mean it” (CEO, Avalon).20

What we see in this quote is actually two strategies. There is emphasis on strong lead-
ership, something that is highlighted throughout the “how to” literature on convergence
and multimedia (Quinn, 2002; Aquino et al., 2002). This strategy utilizes the hierarchy
and the power structures in the organization. But we also see that another strategy was
pursued. By buying Kanaal 3 and building a configuration centred on Video Journalism
there, Concentra made a strong argument for the feasibility of the system. This was not
the only, or even the major reason for buying Kanaal 3,21 but it is clear that the effect of
the transaction in this context was to demonstrate, internally and externally, that Video
Journalism was possible. The CEO of Concentra Media confirms this: “We thought we
could make something out of [Kanaal 3] – prove for the world that we could do it!”
(CEO, Concentra Media).22

Jobs and Skills
The process in Kanaal 3 clearly influenced what happened later in TVL. For the journal-
ists in TVL, it proved two things: that it was possible to make television news with a
Video Journalist configuration, and that management was serious in its efforts to change.
But how could the resistance from journalists be overcome in Kanaal 3? Management
there didn’t have the advantage of being able to point to a closely related station to pro-
mote the concept. The answer is that the context in Kanaal 3 allowed a different strat-
egy to be followed. The old configuration had already broken down because it was not
profitable. When Concentra came in, they had a “green field” and could build everything
from scratch. Only two employees from the old Kanaal 3, a journalist and a technician,
were carried over to the new station. The strategy was to employ young journalists who
had no experience with “old” configurations, and who had signalled that they were will-
ing to try building a new system:
We made a choice to look for very young people, with a quite high education profile, university with post-graduate in journalism or something ... We made the choice not to look for people who knew the old way of working. Because that’s, like change management that’s what they always say is very difficult (editor-in-chief, Kanaal 3).23

They also actively sought people who were familiar with video editing. In fact, all the journalists who were employed in Kanaal 3 had experience with this from their education, meaning that there was one less barrier that had to be overcome.

Another strategy is also exemplified in Kanaal 3: extensive focus on enhancing the skills of the journalists. The newly employed journalists were put through an intensive training course of around a month. This course was received very positively, and it did a good job in convincing the journalists of the benefits of Video Journalism. Because they already had experience with editing, most of the focus was on the fieldwork: the journalistic work and the camerawork. An additional function of the intensive training was to build a configuration based on teamwork. This is an instance of the same tension that causes the problem with the morning meeting: centralization or decentralization. Apparently, Video Journalist configurations can be decentralized in various ways, but this is not inherent in the concept. On the contrary, journalists in Kanaal 3 value the teamwork nature of their configuration:

I think that it’s a credit for (sic.) my boss that he has made a very good team, that he has picked various people who like to be together, who like to be a team … I think it has an influence on the end product (journalist, Kanaal 3)24.

Finally, the resistance grounded in quality has been confronted by giving increased priority to skills with respect to budget planning. TVL has already doubled the coaching budget this year, and the plan is to double it again next year. The CEO of Avalon intends to have a permanent “trainer/coach” in the management of the company, who will follow up the journalists on the technical quality of their items. And journalists have been sent to the BBC for training – a course that has convinced many that Video Journalism is possible.

**Empowering Journalists**

In order to persuade journalists, emphasis was put on empowering them in relation to the production of news. Most of them are excited about having more power and control over the production of news items:

I think actually it’s quite logic (sic) to do it all by yourself, because now from the very start until the very end it’s in my hands ... I think it’s quite artificial to make a separation [between cameraman, sound-engineer, newscutter and journalist, because] it’s more difficult to combine four different ideas about how the piece should be than if you only have to listen to yourself (journalist, Kanaal 3).25

In a quite homogeneous critique of the traditional configuration, Video Journalism is embraced because it makes journalists less dependent upon others. Less administration, coordination, communication and waiting, frees more time to focus on the journalistic content. This is also cited as a reason for accepting the increased workload: “We had a lot of spare time before, so I think we have to work a little harder, but still it’s a nice job to do” (journalists, TVL).26 The problem of the workload has also been directly con-
fronted from management: “We will pay people 20% more than now because they have to work more” (CEO, Avalon).27

A New Understanding of “Quality”

We have now seen that a wide range of strategies have been applied in order to push through the redefinition of the jobs in the newsroom. But how has the resistance based on quality been addressed?

“Quality” is a concept that can be contested.28 It can be seen as being composed of many different factors. There is the quality of the footage, which is a function of the standard of the equipment and the skills of the cameraman. There is also the quality of the edit, which is dependent upon the standard of editing equipment/software and the skills of the person who performs the editing. Finally there is the journalistic “core” of the item which could be assessed by criteria such as the immediacy of the story, how understandable it is, critical use of sources, relevance, thoroughness, etc...

The problem of quality was handled in two ways. On the one hand, it was emphasized that the quality of the new equipment is so good that it is virtually impossible to tell the difference in picture quality in a Video Journalist item, from the quality of a full-crew, traditional item. A meeting where pictures from Kanaal 3 and a national broadcaster were compared has made a great impact on people, and is referred to by many as “proof” that the quality is not suffering. It is acknowledged by many, however, that if you’re an expert you may be able to see the difference, not least with regard to the skills in handling the camera, picking good shots, etc... The same goes for editing – nobody expects that the cuts of the Video Journalist will be as sophisticated as the ones made by a professional newscutter.

This means that stabilization had to be sought in another way. In this case the strategy has been a redefinition of the quality concept. Quality in news is now defined as something different from quality in other programmes. In news, quality is dependent only upon the journalistic content and not on the pictures or the editing. In this way the focus was taken away from the possibly problematic effects of removing two people from the production of a news item.

Related to this rhetorical move, an attempt was also made to win the support of the very people that are redundant in the news production in the new configuration: the newscutters and the cameramen. Because of the “fact” that quality in news has little to do with their skills, it was proposed that they do other tasks that are said to be more challenging and satisfying for them. TVL has a number of programmes in addition to the news, and in these programmes (lifestyle, movie, debates, etc..) the need for skills in editing and camerawork is much higher than in the news.

Content Management

So far the focus has been on strategies involving mostly social elements. As indicated before, however, some problems were deemed suitable for technical solutions. Most importantly this applies to the problem of multiple formats and storing locations for content. A digital multimedia database has been developed in order to address this. The system allows all kinds of content (text and video mainly) to be stored and archived in one place. It is linked to the software for editing to make the information flow as efficient as possible. One of the most important aspects of the ongoing changes in Concentra is to make the content flow freely between different people and channels:
All the process behind should be automatically done. So if you have your content once, you should be able to use it on all the different media. That’s important.

So it’s more an automation of these processes (ICT-manager, Avalon).^29

The increased dependence upon technology that follows from this is illustrated by the fact that Avalon now has an ICT manager. This position is new and can be seen as another strategy to make the new configuration work. Also in Kanaal 3 there is a local “technical expert” who is in a new position. He used to be a newscutter, but now he supports the journalists when they have technical problems and takes care of the actual broadcasting of the news every day.

4. Stabilization

Phases one through three are dynamic in nature. All kinds of sociotechnical processes: negotiations, adaptations, choices and conceptual “battles” take place there. In phase four, the configuration reaches its final shape – it becomes a black box. In TVL this phase has not yet been reached – negotiations are still going on about the final shape of Video Journalism. But in Kanaal 3, the situation is different. The organization is working 100% in the new configuration.

One sign of stabilization is coherence in, or at least compatibility between, the accounts people give about a phenomenon throughout the organization. One of the most remarkable features of the data is the strong coherence in the accounts of journalists, chief editors and management about Video Journalism. Although the emphasis varies, they all seem to agree on the most important issues of flexibility, skills, increased reach, cost-cutting and quality. This is particularly true in Kanaal 3, and it suggests that the configuration has stabilized. In contrast, the accounts about the multimedia desk are quite divergent depending on who you ask. There appears to be at least two versions of the story: one that is dominant in the television station and another in the newspaper. Thus, this configuration is not stabilized.

Video Journalism in Kanaal 3

The configuration of Video Journalism in Kanaal 3 includes a number of tangible elements. The Sony DVCAM PD-150 with accessories, the software for editing video, the Video Journalists who operate cameras and do the editing, the news manager, and the in-house technical expert are all parts of the new black box. But as the narrative has demonstrated, there are also a number of intangible elements embedded in the configuration, such as a new concept of quality, team-spirit and an understanding of an upgraded journalist profession. Through different strategies, the elements have been put together in a way that results in a stable system. Thus we have seen how a heterogeneous configuration has become a black box in a news organization.

Discussion

Having given a thorough description of the two projects in Concentra, it is possible to discuss what the consequences may be. The discussion will be centred on the three issues that were presented in the introduction: quality, job satisfaction and skills, and the audience relationship. Readers should note that this section is meant as a discussion of some questions that can be raised in relation to the development, and not as a conclusion.
Some possible wider implications based on data from the case as well as literature and comments from other researchers are also considered in the following. These implications do not necessarily apply to Concentra if not explicitly mentioned.

**Quality**

The concept of “quality” in news is, as mentioned, both contestable and highly subjective. It has been shown how a redefinition of quality was part of the strategy applied to gain acceptance for Video Journalism. So far, quality has been treated as if it were internal to the organization. In a way it is, but it can of course be argued that it is the audience that decides what “quality” means: quality is quite simply what the audience wants to watch. Such an argument gives the audience a reactive role. If people keep watching the news when it is made by Video Journalists, it means that the new perception of quality is “right”, and thus the old one, which emphasized the quality of the pictures and the editing, was “wrong”. This argument is only partly valid, though. Focussing exclusively on the amount of viewers might lead to shallow and tabloid news coverage. It is reasonable to expect that a television station also has other criteria when deciding what constitutes acceptable quality of the news coverage. In this way, news organizations are not “discovering” what quality is, but they are shaping the concept of quality. The audience’s privilege is merely to “veto” the development by ceasing to watch. In a situation of monopoly such as in Belgian regional television, this power may be rather limited. Therefore, the media organization’s perception of quality is of high importance.

It has been shown how the standard of footage and editing has been “defined out” of the notion of quality in television news. This development has apparently not been vetoed by the audience, which has not decreased since these stations began to air Video Journalist items. This also fits well with developments in television news elsewhere. International news providers are more than happy to show pictures of poor quality, for example from Video Phones, if the content of the items is good enough (Quinn, 2002: 122). The change in what counts as quality in television news might be seen as rather trivial. It is, however, possible to raise the question of how this might affect the credibility of the medium. Will the less professional look of news items lead viewers to question the quality of the organization behind the item?

- More cameras on the streets allow a quicker response to breaking stories.
- More cameras lead to a higher quantity of news, making it possible to be more selective concerning what gets broadcast.
- Less administration gives journalists more energy to focus on content.
- Homogeneity of news items is increased because one person is completely in charge of the whole process.

These arguments can be challenged. During the past twenty years, there has been a steady development towards quicker and more immediate news coverage. Media critics, such as the editor of Le Monde Diplomatique, Ignacio Ramonet (1999), have questioned whether this means that speed is more important than accuracy in news coverage. The movement towards standardization of news production, here exemplified through Video Journalism, contributes to the same development.

The use of “homogeneity” as a sign of quality in news is also questionable. It rests upon the assumption that the team behind a traditional news item mainly contributes to
the content through producing “noise”, which is removed when the journalist is in complete control. Communication between journalists, cameramen and newscutters is seen as an unnecessary complication of the production process. However, the interaction between journalists, cameramen and newscutters could also be seen as increasing the quality of the content. This kind of “mental input” to an item is necessarily higher in a traditional configuration. Just like resistance in this report has been considered to be a force in shaping the development, the resistance a journalist meets when working on an item can be seen as a useful corrective. A possible compensation for this loss of resistance is a chief editor who follows the journalists more closely in their work.

This case demonstrates how the concept of quality is actively shaped and used in the promotion of a new innovation. However, the discussion also shows that a different understanding is possible and that the assessment of increased quality is not unproblematic. Due to the limited scope of this study, as well as the contestable nature of “quality” in news, it is impossible to conclude whether quality in regional television news is likely to increase or decrease with Video Journalism.

**Skills and Job Satisfaction**

A central issue in processes of sociotechnical change at work is what happens to the skills of employees. Sometimes management is accused of wanting to “de-skill” the workforce in order to increase flexibility and control. Defenders of change often claim that what is happening is actually an “enskilling” of the employees, which will increase their job satisfaction. In the case of journalism, new technologies and ways of working can be seen as a challenge to journalists’ professionalism. The data from the case provide some evidence on how the affected journalists reason about the changes.

There is no doubt that Video Journalism has an impact on the skills of journalists. They have to know more in two fields. Firstly, they have to know how to operate the equipment and the software. Secondly, they have to know basic principles about camerawork and video editing. Does this imply a shift towards journalists needing technical skills instead of journalistic skills?

The experience from this case is that the extra skills needed are relatively quickly internalized by the journalists, allowing them to focus on the journalistic content. Accompanied by the redefinition of quality, this means that the Video Journalists feel “enskilled” on all levels.

But despite the positive experiences from Concentra, the development may have negative consequences for skills in the long term. As in Kanaal 3, broadcasters might begin to seek journalists with technical experience. This may lead to a less visible shift away from journalistic skills, which in turn might have consequences for the quality of journalism. In any case it is reasonable to expect that in a competitive climate, journalists without the technical skills, or the willingness to learn, will have a considerable disadvantage. An issue calling for further investigation is whether the development could produce new biases in the profession, for instance because young journalists are seen as more attractive for Video Journalist positions.

How has the job satisfaction of the journalists been affected by the development? The impression is that it has to some extent been increased. There is a change in professionalism, related to the mental process behind a news item. Journalists explain how they are now in a better position to exert more influence on all parts of the items. The process of editing can begin in the mind of the journalist as soon as the interview is over because
he knows exactly what pictures he has. The focus on empowering the journalists through giving them more control over their final products is positively received.

When talking to journalists, the increased power and control is one of the fundamental reasons for enjoying working in the new way. They are proud of their products and of the fact that they are using considerably less resources than before. Another thing that makes the work more satisfying is that the journalists see possibilities to do things they couldn’t do before due to economic constraints. The ability to travel and cover international events from a regional perspective is very much appreciated.

The increased job satisfaction experienced in this case is not reported in a case study by Simon Cottle from the BBC (Cottle, 1998). This shows that it is not inherent in the new technology, but rather in the way it is put to use in the organization. With high emphasis on training, empowering journalists and not putting too much pressure on them, they have come to value that the production is now less “heavy” than before. Data from the case, as well as Cottle’s findings, suggest that this is strongly dependent upon continued budgeting at today’s level. If the organization uses the opportunity to cut down on their budgets and staff dramatically, this will most likely lead to dissatisfaction with the new configuration. In a wide perspective it may be too optimistic to assume that cuts in budget and staff will not occur, even if this is the case in Concentra at the moment.

Interactivity and the Audience Relationship

One of the predictions put forward about changes in the media industry due to new technologies is that journalism will become more audience focussed. The cause for this is supposed to be the interactivity of new ICTs, in particular the WWW. Analysts have suggested that the wall between the source and the audience has disappeared, and that the way forward is to empower the audience. What is the role of the audience in this story?

In the television stations there is not much talk about the audience. In fact, when asked about the audience, journalists frequently think that the question refers to their interviewees. When the meaning of the question is specified, they commonly express that they have a close connection to their viewers because they work for regional stations. The new technology is not thought to impact on this.

The other case, about the multimedia desk, isn’t more promising in terms of audience empowerment. The original content produced in Concentra for the WWW is minimal, and the assessment of it as a medium has changed significantly. Management no longer believes in the WWW as a separate medium, but sees it rather as a tool to enhance the already existing media outlets.

What is the reason for this? As far as the data go it is clear that the new digital technologies are being put to use in connection with already existing services for which the organization knows there is an audience. The period of technology-pushed new products seems to have passed. Now the emphasis is on streamlining the organization. This is not to say that the WWW is not being used. It is thought to have a great function in maintaining a feeling of community among the audience. For instance, people are encouraged to send pictures of “positive” events accompanied with a short text. The pictures and texts are published in a weekly addition to the newspaper called the “Good Niews Krant” (“The Good News Newspaper”). But this is not a new development, or even a new product. It is simply an enhancement of an existing service and an old strategy to maintain a relationship with the audience. Another example from Kanaal 3 is the use of local people to present the
weather forecast. Again, this is made easier and cheaper because of the technological development, but it is not a sign of a fundamental change in the journalism.

So whatever happened to interactivity? It seems that, although the technology permits interactivity, it is not being pursued actively because of the high costs. A quote illustrates this:

The mistake that many people made the last ten years in their multimedia was always changing their content for the end-user. And mostly because of technical reasons. That’s something that is wrong, it’s too expensive, you should not do that (CEO, Avalon).

Instead the focus is on pushing the content to the audience in as many ways as possible, with no change except for the platform. This is a more efficient and more flexible way of distribution. Some interviewees even use the concept of interactivity in a way that simply implies the ability to choose between more and more specialized content. Video Journalism, through its low costs, might contribute to this. But this is not the same kind of interactivity that has been expected to change news. It is simply an intensification of today’s situation.

Expectations of a transfer of power to the audience have followed most new media as they have been launched. In the 1920s, the radio was seen by some scholars as a two-way medium that allowed for a new relationship to the audience (Lister et al., 2003: 71). In the 1970s, cable television through coaxial cables was seen as an interactive medium allowing for a democratization of news publishing (Dutton, 1997: 134). Today, the WWW is described in the same way. This kind of reasoning attributes too much transformative power to technology, and risks missing crucial aspects of the sociotechnical development.

While there are few signs of a transfer of power to the audience, another actor is really experiencing empowerment: the journalist. The role of the television journalist has become more like that of the print journalist through the new development. Software for editing is frequently compared to word-processing software and the DVCAMs to digital cameras for photography. This transfer of power is crucial, as it is one of the main reasons why journalists accept working in the new configuration. Thus, the innovation of Video Journalism can be framed in a long-term perspective in which the journalist is gradually gaining more power over the process of news production.

The findings in this case study are in line with the findings of Quinn and Trench who in 2002 concluded that “We see little evidence of a ‘new paradigm’ emerging in online news” (Quinn et al., 2002: 51). It seems rather like old practices are being reproduced, and sometimes enhanced, through the use of new technology.

**Conclusion**

New digital technologies present challenges as well as opportunities to media organizations. As noted by Deuze in a recent review of multimedia journalism, the process “can be typified as a highly dynamic and complex one as each company is converging differently” (Deuze, 2003: 14). In Concentra, the textbook solution of a multimedia desk and a converged newsroom has been discarded due to strong social, economic and cultural resistance. The WWW is no longer seen as a new medium with the potential to change journalism, but rather as a supplement to existing media outlets. The focus has shifted towards utilizing digital technology in the production of news, resulting in the project of
Video Journalism. Perhaps the term “divergence” is more appropriate to describe this chain of events than the often used “convergence” (ibid.).

The Video Journalism project turned out to be largely successful despite the huge changes it entailed for the organization. This report attributes this to the application of appropriate strategies to enrol supporters of the project. A clear and focused leadership, efforts to enhance the skills and job satisfaction of journalists, a change in the perception of “quality” in news, as well as an emphasis on flexibility, efficiency and standardization have all contributed to the result.

It has not been possible here to give unambiguous answers to the questions about quality, skills and job satisfaction, and the audience relationship. The discussion in the preceding section questions some common assumptions about the consequences of the technological development, but it does not provide an alternative framework. Most importantly, the case provides a solid argument against the understanding of technology as the single, most important determinant of the development. Social and technological factors are equally important, and this has consequences for how new digital technologies should be approached. Looking for ways in which the technology can fit in with current structures and understandings (such as the Video Journalist example) may in many cases be more fruitful than trying to transform the structures completely (such as the Multimedia Desk example).

Further research within the field of regional media organizations is required to gain a better understanding of which path the developments will take. Technological developments at this level are largely understudied; most research focuses on huge national or international news organizations. While the technological options are similar for organizations at the different levels, the social, economic and cultural context is unique to regional media. Also, regional media provide an important part of people’s media landscape and there is no reason to leave this part out of the research. Research should not be limited to successful cases and studies of best practices. For a complete picture of the development, projects that failed to yield the promised results must also be scrutinized.

Notes
1. This use of the term “black box” is borrowed from the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, where it denotes a matter of fact that has stabilized and is accepted by the relevant community without questioning.
2. This is in accordance with the orthodox principles within the Science, Technology and Society research community that call for studying science or technology “in the making”.
3. Two of the interviews had two interviewees.
4. “Newscutter” in this text refers to the person who edits the news items. The Flemish word for this is “monteur”. “Online editor” is another term for the same job. I choose to use “newscutter” because of the semantic relation to news.
5. This section is based on “The Belgian Media Landscape” from the European Journalism Centre’s webpages as well as interviews.
6. There is also a German-speaking part, but it is quite small and not relevant to this study. German is also an official language in Belgium.
7. The annual support is 1.5* pr. viewer.
8. According to the methodological approach, this is actually an advantage, as it allows more direct access to the process of shaping the new configuration.
9. Author interview, 06.06.2003, Hasselt.
10. Author interview, 06.06.2003, Hasselt.
14. Author interview, 08.05.2003, Dendermonde.
17. “Vox-Pops” is the term for interviewing people on the streets to get their opinion on a particular “hot” question.
21. Other reasons include the fact that Concentra believes in regional television and that Kanaal 3 had a strategic geographic location.
22. Author interview, 06.06.2003, Dendermonde.
23. Author interview, 08.05.2003, Dendermonde.
24. Author interview, 08.05.2003, Dendermonde.
25. Author interview, 08.05.2003, Dendermonde.
27. Author interview, 22.04.2003, Hasselt.
28. It is a deliberate choice not to use the notion of “broadcast quality” because of its narrow, technical scope. Broadcast quality may be seen as one factor of the quality concept.

References
Politicians and political parties commit ever-mounting resources to the pursuit of convincing and persuading citizens. Election campaigns are becoming increasingly professionalized, with deliberate strategies to win voters, and attempts to reduce uncertainty factors are becoming more and more sophisticated. Some researchers talk about an Americanization of election campaigns throughout the world, implying among other things that elections in different countries are becoming more similar to each other despite large differences in political culture, history and social institutions. Common features include the use of political advertising, the selection of candidates who play well on television, the use of political strategists, the production of campaign material by PR professionals, sky-rocketing campaign costs and the prominence of the mass media as the central campaign arena (see for example Negrine 1996, Nord & Strömbäck 2003, Mancini & Swanson 1997).

But how do politicians themselves see the process of opinion building? Are they certain that the mass media and political advertising are effective ways of convincing voters, or do they perhaps think that citizens’ perceptions about politics are formed in other ways? These questions form the center of this article, which explores Swedish politicians’ perceptions about the ways in which they and the general public formulate their political understandings.

Perceptions about Media Power

International research on opinions about media power has tended to focus on the views of citizens or the general public, although occasionally the desirability of studying elites is pointed out (Perloff 1996). While most of the research on views about media power is associated with the concept of third person effects, some of it exists as a subset of the study of general perceptions of public opinion formation (Entman & Herbst 2000, Gunther & Storey 2003, Gunther & Christen 2001).

The Persuasive Press Inference

In opinion research, the tendency to exaggerate the effects of the media is referred to as the persuasive press inference (Gunther & Christen 2001). It contains three primary
aspects. The first comes from social psychology and is called the law of small numbers, which states that people tend to generalize about the effects of media content, however specific or atypical it may be (ibid). For example, if a person experiences a strong reaction to an article or news story, he or she is likely to assume that other people experience a similar reaction, thus generalizing the effects of the story, despite an everyday reality that might not exhibit evidence of the assumed effect.

The second factor is another form of generalization that could be called exposure generalization. This is the automatic assumption that the media have extensive reach and that the content that reaches oneself also reaches others (ibid). Of course, in a world where media consumption is increasingly differentiated, this is a highly doubtful assumption. Fewer and fewer people are sharing media experiences, and the portion taking part in exactly the same television-program on a given evening is steadily shrinking.

The third and final aspect is the tendency to exaggerate the power of mass media over people’s thoughts (ibid). This is consistent with research on third person effects. The factors underlying third person effects will be taken up later, but it is worth noting that the media itself plays a role in shaping these views, not least by attributing causality to social phenomenon ranging from popular culture (video violence, rap music) to political journalism. Journalists themselves often see the media coverage of a political candidate as completely decisive to the outcome of the campaign, for example (Asp, 2003, Johansson 2001, Schudson 1995, Strömbäck 2001).

Despite these tendencies toward generalization, the research has also identified group and individual differences. One of the most influential factors appears to be the respondent’s degree of personal involvement in the issue in question. An illustration of this is provided in Vallone et al’s study, where they showed news stories on the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians to a group of people with strong sympathies for Israel, to a pro-Palestinian group and to a control group displaying sympathy toward neither group. The results showed that both groups with strong sympathies believed that the story would influence a neutral audience, though in different directions. Those sympathizing with Israel assumed the story would move opinion in a pro-Palestinian direction, while those sympathizing with the Palestinians believed that the story would influence audiences in any particular direction (Vallone et al. 1985). In other words, the more engaged a person is in an issue, the more they have something to loose by what they see as unfavorable media coverage. For a person who is not engaged in an issue, the role of the media matters much less, thus the tendency to exaggerate the effects of an individual story is greatly diminished.

The combined influence of issue involvement and exposure generalization further implies that groups particularly interested in politics will be likely to assume that other groups in society will be highly influenced by political news coverage. Michael Schudson has illustrated this in the case of American journalists’ self-image (Schudson 1995), and other studies have shown that Swedish journalists as a group ascribe more power to the media than does the general public (Johansson 2003a). Similarly, then, it is likely that politicians will be more likely than others to assume that the media exerts a strong influence in the formation of political public opinion.

A somewhat different explanatory perspective can be found in French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the structure and legitimation of social fields. A social field arises when people compete over shared symbolic and material resources. The players in a field share certain traits, specific investments are required of new entrants, specific
inputs must be put into the game, there are specific gains to be made, and most importantly, all participants share a certain risk – something is at stake. Fundamental to social fields is the existence of shared beliefs that legitimize the field both internally among players and externally among society members (Bourdieu 1984; Broady 1988). Within the social field of political communication, the notion of strong media effects is one such shared belief held by the various players in the field (politicians, PR consultants and journalists). It should be noted that, although these perceptions are not necessarily false, they do carry the risk of exaggerating media influence.

Rather than competing with each other, these theories can be seen as operating in tandem. If politicians, journalists and others within the political communication field believe more in the power of the media than others, this can be seen as an expression of the fact that within the field there is a greater occurrence of shared perceptions about media power. This in itself can be seen as a form of involvement – that one’s own activity is given more weight.

First and Third Person Effects

Third person effects imply that other people are more influenced by media messages than one self. The phenomenon has been researched for 20 years by opinion researchers and there is no doubt that the phenomenon exists. Numerous studies show that people generally assume that other people are more influenced by the mass media than they themselves are. Studies on the third person effect seek to identify the circumstances under which the phenomenon arises and what the behavioral consequences might be. While no direct studies of people’s actual behavior have been conducted, several studies have found third person effects in connection with opinions on censorship and freedom of expression issues. In general, strong support for the perceptual component of the theory has been demonstrated but only limited support exists for the behavioral component (Johansson, 2002, Neuwirth et al 2002).

Studies have also identified reversed third person effects, or first person effects, as they are also known. This means that the individual assumes that they are affected more than other people. Whereas third person effects tend mainly to be associated with socially unacceptable media messages (violence, pornography, etc.), first person effects tend to be linked with socially acceptable and desirable messages – when being influenced by media is associated with intelligence, for instance (Johansson 2000, Perloff 1993, Perloff 1996).

Explanations for such distinctions between the self and others can easily be sought in the classical communication chain – sender, channel, message and receiver. The most central explanatory notion behind such distinctions is that of self-enhancement, or the desire to maintain a positive self-image (Duck & Mullin 1995). The research displays clear third person effects in relation to media with low credibility (sensational, tabloid press) and first person effects in relation to high status media. People who see themselves as experts in one way or another (highly educated, experienced, knowledgeable) also tend to make greater distinctions than those who don’t. Generally, the operating principle is that a person tends to see him/herself as less vulnerable to media messages than are other people. There is a paternalistic strain here, whereby one does not see oneself as an “ordinary person”. Ordinary people are more gullible and malleable than one self. Issue involvement can also be connected to third person effects. The example with the experiment mentioned above showed that greater involvement can lead one to jump to conclu-
sions and believe the worst about media messages that contradict one’s own interests (Johansson 2002).

**Politicians and the Power of Mass Media**

Research has been conducted on politicians’ perceptions about the media’s public opinion building effects. However, whether addressing specific issues or general opinion processes, questions about media effects tend to be peripheral. There seems to be an absence of studies whose central research question concerns perceptions among actors in the political communication field about the influential power of the media.

Perhaps the study that comes closest to examining such questions is Susan Herbst’s study of politicians, journalists and activists’ views about the media and public opinion, although here the focus rests on the concept of “public opinion” rather than media effects per se (Herbst 1998). Within Nordic research there are some general overviews of party organizations, parliamentarian and municipal politicians’ beliefs about the power of the mass media (Esaiasson 1990, Hardarson 2000, Holmberg & Esaiasson 1988, Johansson 1995, Pierre & Djerf 1991). The question of politicians’ views about media influence is also addressed in a few case studies (Johansson 2003b, Larsson 1998, Wrenne 1998).

What do the results of these studies show? The research based on interviews and observations suggest that decision-makers often see the media image as a direct reflection of general opinion (Herbst 1998). Other studies show that while politicians sometimes do not see the media as a direct reflection of opinion today, they see it as a barometer of opinion, i.e. of where opinion will be tomorrow, thus it serves as strategic consideration in decision-making (Anthonsen 2003). Studies also show that political elites believe that media images exert a nearly unlimited influence on audience opinion and behaviors (Johansson 2003b, Wrenne 1998). This is not to say that the media’s image is always central. Studies of decision-makers in foreign affairs issues show that media coverage is not a primary consideration (Anthonsen 2003). However, other research shows the opposite. A study of how the press affects federal policymaking, shows that politician’s perceptions of the connection between the media image and general opinion influenced the decision not to dispatch the neutron bomb in the end of the 1970’s (Linsky 1986, see also Schudson 1995). Generally speaking, the media picture tends to be ascribed more power and influence as a factor in decision-making in policy arenas where decision-makers are more directly influenced by support in the voting arena (Johansson 2003b).

More general overviews display the same tendency. The media is assumed to exert great power to influence both politics and opinion. When politicians rank order the social institutions that have power and those that ought to have power, the results show that the mass media is seen as having great power – not least over the political agenda. However, although the media is seen as exerting great influence, there is unity in the view that this power is too extensive. The media are seen as possessing more power than they ought to have (Hardarson 2000, Pierre & Djerf 1991).

One of the gaps in the research on perceptions of media effects generally and third person effects in particular is the study of elite groups. Such a focus seems particularly relevant, however, both in terms of potential policy decisions that pertain to mass media (such as advertising, censorship) and in terms of the future development of political election campaigns in an increasingly mass-mediated society.

The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine politicians’ perceptions of the opinion building power of the mass media compared to other information channels. The
analysis also explores differences among politicians and differences between the politician group as a whole relative to the responses of the general population.

There are two main research questions. The first is: What importance do politicians assign to various information channels in terms of their relative influence on general public perceptions about politics? The results are compared to responses to the same question by members of the general public, thus making it possible to determine whether politicians assess information channels differently than ordinary citizens. Differences between politicians are also explored in order to determine whether different backgrounds or experience can explain eventual variations within the politician respondent group.

The second question explores the degree of first and third person effects among politicians. As is the case with the first question, the results are compared to the responses of ordinary citizens and differences between politicians are also explored in an attempt to identify possible factors that might explain the ways in which politicians distinguish themselves from others in terms of media influence.

The Setting

Sweden has been a parliamentary democracy for many years. While the constitutional basis for the representative democracy is stable, the legal and political settings have changed in certain notable respects since the 1950s, reflecting a growing political complexity that falls into the general patterns of modernization. These include an increasingly fluid voter base, more professionalized political parties and the increasing prominence of the media as the primary political arena (Asp & Esaiasson 1996).

Recent decades have witnessed important changes in the political system in Sweden. Membership in the EU has introduced a supranational level of politics, while within Sweden new forms of regionalism have been established (Sjölin & Jerneck 2000). The electoral system has also undergone important changes, the most significant being the introduction of personalised voting whereby alongside voting for a political party, voters can also select individual candidates (Holmberg & Möller 1999).

Contact between voters and elected officials occur mainly through the mass media both during and between election campaigns. Opinion building occurs mainly via the news and other public affairs programs. Because political advertising is not allowed on public service television and radio or on the terrestrial commercial channel TV4, the significance of political advertising is not as great as in other western countries. The primary channels for political advertising are therefore newspapers, billboards, the cinema and to some extent commercial radio. Among the political parties, however, political advertising is not seen as particularly important. News coverage and interpersonal communication are seen as more effective channels of communication (Esaiasson, 1990; Nord & Ström瑞典, 2003).

If we look at media use, Sweden is known to be among the world’s top five in Internet use. But at the same time, newspaper readership is also strong. More than 80 percent of the adult population read a newspaper on an average day. This also puts Sweden on the top five list in newspaper reading in the world. It is worth mentioning that almost all newspaper are local or regional – only two tabloid newspapers and one business paper can be regarded as national. The local morning paper and national television are the main media for an average Swede (Weibull, 2001).

Sweden’s national television system is based on a tradition of public service broadcasting without commercials. In 1986 the first commercial satellite and cable-channels
started to challenge this system, and in 1991 it was decided that a new terrestrial commercial television channel would be established. In the beginning of the new century, the television market is dominated by the two public service channels (SVT1, SVT2) and the commercial channel (TV4). Of the total audience market, these channels have more than 70 percent. In radio, the public service Company (SR) is the dominating actor. On the commercial side, four networks with national ambitions have emerged. The radio market is currently under pressure, since the private stations have not attracted large audiences (ibid).

Method
The politicians examined in this study are elected officials in Region Västra Götaland of Sweden, which encompasses 1.5 million of Sweden’s 9 million inhabitants. This county was created in 1999 from the convergence of three prior county councils and the city of Göteborg’s decision-making functions concerned with healthcare. The main responsibility of the regional authority is health care, which constitutes 90 percent of the budget. Other administrative areas are regional development and culture. The analysis of politicians is based on a survey sent to all elected officials within the Region Västra Götaland during the fall of 2001. In order to compare the politician’s views of the media’s power with the views of the general public, a portion of the national SOM-study (Society-Opinion-Media), taken at the same time, was included in the analysis.

In the surveys, two identical sets of questions were presented. In the first, respondents were asked to judge how they think their own perceptions of politics are formed. In the second, they were asked to make similar judgements about the general public or “ordinary Swedes”. The information channels they were asked to judge were personal experience, interpersonal communication, television, newspapers and political advertising (for more information on sampling, survey question formulation and comments on variables, see Appendix).

How are Political Perceptions among the Public Formed?
The first research question asks whether politicians and citizens differ in the way they judge the influence of various information channels. Following the theoretical overview conducted above, a logical hypothesis might be that politicians would be more likely to ascribe greater power to the media. Politicians are part of the political communication field and are dependent upon the media to communicate with voters and receive information on issues and other political actors’ behavior. This dependence, combined with the uncertainty stemming from a lack of control over the media image itself, stimulates involvement. Given the present setting, in which the more traditional party-based press is becoming more professionalized (i.e.non-partisan) and commercialized, a political actor is not likely to expect loyalty from the mass media.

The results in Table 1 show that, with the exception of political advertising, all of the opinion channels are seen as important by both politicians and citizens. The mean values of personal experience, interpersonal communication, television and newspapers exceeds 2.5, which implies that a majority view the channels as either a very important or fairly important influence on people’s political perceptions.
Politicians and citizens do not differ in their judgments about personal experience and political advertising. Here, the views of politicians and the general public resemble one another. However, it is clear that politicians are more likely to ascribe greater power to the remaining three channels (television, newspapers and interpersonal communication) than are ordinary citizens. The greatest difference between politicians and citizens lies in their views about the power of television and newspapers.

Another interesting question is whether politicians and citizens rank order the information channels in similar ways. To determine whether the differences in the rank ordering are significant, a paired t-test is used. The differences noted are all significant. For more information about the test, see Appendix. Looking at the implicit rank ordering, politicians seem to rank television as the most important opinion-building channel followed by interpersonal communication and newspapers. Personal experience is seen as somewhat less important, even though a clear majority (76 percent) expresses the view that personal experience plays a very important or fairly important role in generating political views among the general public. Political advertising is, as already mentioned, the channel ascribed the least opinion-building power. This should not be interpreted as meaning that political advertising is seen as having no effect, but rather more as an expression of the view that political advertising is, despite everything, still a marginal phenomenon in Swedish political culture. Research has shown that people’s views about the influence of media messages also depends on their assumptions about how many other people are exposed to the content (McLeod et al. 1997). This can be connected to the theory of exposure generalization – one does not ascribe political advertising much weight if one believes that other people are not exposed to it.

The views of the general public are not exactly the same as those of politicians. For example, they do not rank television as the most influential information channel. Rather, they give roughly equal weight to personal experience, interpersonal communication and television. By contrast, newspapers are seen as less central, and, as is the case with politicians, political advertising is seen as the least influential.

What about the politicians as a group? Do they display any notable differences, or are they fairly homogenous? One way to compare politicians’ responses is to group them according to their degree of political involvement. Two methods are applied here. The first is to see whether ‘full-time’ politicians (regional or municipal council members) have a different view than those whom are not employed full time in a political position. The second method is to see whether the number of political appointments or positions one occupies (i.e. committee memberships) can be related to views about the relative
weights of various information channels. For simplicity and ease of presentation, the first variable is called ‘job type’ and the second variable is referred to as ‘experience’.

Education levels vary among politicians. Barely ten percent report that they have only a primary school education. About one third have completed secondary school and more than half have received some form of higher education. This means that it is possible to examine whether politicians with different educational backgrounds make the same judgments about opinion building and information channels.

Gender and age are additional demographic variables that seem relevant in terms of possible differentiations among politicians in their evaluations of information channels.

Table 2. Politicians’ Views on Influence of Various Information Channels in Shaping General Public Perceptions of Politics in Relation to Personal Experience, Social Environment, Television, Newspapers and Political Advertising (standardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal experience</th>
<th>Interpersonal communication</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Political advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.17 ***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.13 ***</td>
<td>.14 ***</td>
<td>.10 **</td>
<td>.10 **</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job type</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.09 *</td>
<td>.11 **</td>
<td>.09 **</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.04 *</td>
<td>-.11 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01

On the whole, the demographic factor appearing to exert the greatest influence on politicians’ assessments is education (Table 2). The higher education one has, the more likely one is to believe that all channels other than political advertising affect the political views of the general public. Job type also seems to correlate with judgments about interpersonal communication, television and newspapers. The more full-time one’s political activity, the more likely one is to ascribe influence to these channels. Political experience seems to matter in two cases. First, those with numerous appointments see newspapers as more influential, and second, they are more likely to minimize the influence of political advertising compared to other politicians. Gender only appears to exert influence in views about personal experience. Women appear somewhat more likely than men to believe that general political attitudes are formed by personal experience. Finally, the table shows that age does not account for any difference in viewpoint among politicians.

The results of the comparison between politicians and the general public have shown that politicians and the general public exhibit fundamental differences in their assessments of information channels. Although politicians generally assign greater weight to all information channels (except political advertising) than does the citizens, the central point is that whereas politicians see television, newspapers and interpersonal communication as more influential than personal experience, the citizens does not make this distinction. Furthermore, politicians assign more weight to newspapers than does the citizens.

Within the politician group, the data suggest that education and political involvement play some role in explaining differences. Interestingly, politicians do not differ in the way
they rank order these items. Even those with less education and less involvement, for example, place television at the top of the list.

The next question is how politicians view themselves compared to the citizens in terms of political opinion building. Do they think that they are influenced in the same way as the general public, or do they differentiate themselves from ordinary citizens?

**Politicians and Third Person Effects**

The above section compared the assessments of politicians to those of the citizens and observed that politicians ascribe more power to the media and other information channels than does the citizens. In this section, attention shifts to first and third person effects. How do politicians see the forces that shape their own perceptions of politics? Do they assign the media a strong role in shaping their own views about politics, for example?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Influence on self</th>
<th>Influence on others</th>
<th>Person effect</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience</td>
<td>3,65</td>
<td>3,08</td>
<td>-0,57</td>
<td>-14,10</td>
<td>p &lt; .000</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal communication</td>
<td>2,85</td>
<td>3,19</td>
<td>0,34</td>
<td>8,50</td>
<td>p &lt; .000</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>2,44</td>
<td>3,32</td>
<td>0,88</td>
<td>21,24</td>
<td>p &lt; .000</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>2,48</td>
<td>3,17</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>16,65</td>
<td>p &lt; .000</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political advertising</td>
<td>1,80</td>
<td>2,20</td>
<td>0,40</td>
<td>11,33</td>
<td>p &lt; .000</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10.

Table 3 shows that politicians systematically distinguish themselves from the general public. There is a strong third person effect among politicians. In their eyes, television and newspapers are the channels that exert the most influence over the general public relative to themselves. However, political advertising and conversations with others are seen as being more influential on ordinary citizens than on politicians themselves.

Views about personal experience are the direct opposite. Here one sees evidence of a first person effect. The perception among politicians is thus that they see themselves as more influenced than the general public by personal experience.

The presence of a first person effect in connection with personal experience and third person effects for other information channels supports theories concerning the tendency people have to distinguish between themselves and others in order to maintain a positive self-image. Being influenced by other people, by the mass media, and especially by advertising suggests that one is not in control, that one can be manipulated and make unconscious choices. It is therefore quite reasonable that third person effects appear in connection with different forms of communication. The appearance of first person effects can be explained in the same way. Personal experience can be seen as the ideal form of political opinion building. If one’s own perceptions of politics are formed by the experiences one has, this indicates a larger degree of independence and intellectual capacity.
In general, the data shown thus far point to a tendency among politicians to cultivate what might be termed an autonomous political self-image, meaning that while ordinary people are influenced by the mass media and the social environment, they themselves derive their political perceptions mainly from their personal experiences.

**Table 4.** Citizen’s Views on the Influence of Various Information Channels in Shaping their Own and General Public’s Perceptions of Politics (mean score)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Influence on self</th>
<th>Influence on others (mean difference)</th>
<th>Person effect</th>
<th>diff</th>
<th>sig.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience</td>
<td>3,05</td>
<td>3,00</td>
<td>-0,05</td>
<td>-1,53</td>
<td>P &lt; .127</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>2,52</td>
<td>2,97</td>
<td>0,45</td>
<td>9,23</td>
<td>P &lt; .000</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication</td>
<td>2,64</td>
<td>2,95</td>
<td>0,31</td>
<td>6,67</td>
<td>P &lt; .000</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>2,54</td>
<td>2,80</td>
<td>0,26</td>
<td>5,52</td>
<td>P &lt; .000</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>1,60</td>
<td>2,20</td>
<td>0,60</td>
<td>11,89</td>
<td>P &lt; .000</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political advertising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10.*

Looking now at the citizens responses to these questions (Table 4), it appears that they do not see themselves as very different from others in terms of being influenced by television and newspapers. Third person effects for television and newspapers do appear among the citizens, but they are not as dramatic as those displayed by politicians. Instead, the greatest distinctions made by members of the general public are in terms of interpersonal communication and political advertising, both of which they see as exerting more influence on others than on themselves.

In contrast to politicians, members of the general public do not see themselves as more influenced than others by personal experience. However, a disaggregated analysis of the group reveals the presence of two opposite views within the general public concerning the role of personal experience in opinion building. Higher resource groups – those with a high education and those with a great deal of political interest – tend to resemble politicians in the sense that they see personal experience as more important for them than for others, who they see as more influenced by other forms of communication (interpersonal communication, television or political advertising). It should be mentioned, however, that these high resource groups do not display the levels of first and third person effects found among politicians (see Johansson 2002).

Views about the influence of newspapers differ among groups within the general public. Here, a significant first person effect exists among politically involved and highly educated people. This is most likely to be an indication that these groups consider it prestigious to be influenced by the political news of the daily press.

Among low resource groups, the pattern is essentially the opposite. Here, a person is more likely to assume that that he or she is more influenced by other people, by the media, and more by television and advertising than is the case for high resource groups. Furthermore, lower resources groups are also more likely to assume that the prestige media and personal experience exert more influence on other people than they do on themselves. In this sense, then, these groups display a view of political opinion building that could be described as a dependent political self-image, where interpersonal commu-
communication and the less prestigious media play a larger role in their own political understandings (ibid).

The question remains as to whether there are differences within the politician group. Table 5 looks at the influence of independent factors on the appearance of first and third person effects. The factors included in the model are the demographic variables of age and gender as well as length of residence, education and job type. The reason for incorporating the number of years of residence is that this serves as an indicator of how socially integrated one is into the local community (see Johansson 1998, Janowitz 1952). This, in turn, can be seen as influencing one’s views about information channels. The reason for excluding political authority from the model is that it tends to covary with job type, thus the inclusion of both tends to weaken the explanatory power of the model. Also included in the model is a control variable known in the third person effects literature as second person effects (Neuwirth et al 2002). This variable takes into account the degree of influence the media has both on one self and others and therefore allows for a certain ‘levelling’ of the influence of the media often missing in third person effects studies. For example, those who believe that different information channels have great influence on both the self and on others receive a higher value than those who believe that the media influences neither themselves nor other people. Purely technically, the variable is an additive index of the questions on the degree to which one self and others are influenced by various information channels (see Appendix).

Table 5. First and Third Person Effects among Politicians in Relation to Personal Experience, Social Environment, Television, Newspapers and Political Advertising (standardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal experience</th>
<th>Interpersonal communication</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Political advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.11 **</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.08 *</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job type</td>
<td>-0.08 *</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08 *</td>
<td>0.09 *</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd person effect</td>
<td>0.33 ***</td>
<td>0.19 ***</td>
<td>0.15 ***</td>
<td>0.10 **</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10.

Relatively few of the explanatory factors included in the model can explain the differences, although job type seems to play a role. The more full-time a person’s political job is, the more likely he or she is to distinguish between him/herself and the general public in seeing the latter as more influenced by television and newspapers and the former as more influenced by personal experience. In other words, the more full-time one’s political position, the more autonomous one’s political self-image, which suggests that increased involvement strengthens this view of political opinion building.

Somewhat surprisingly, education displays a significant third person effect with personal experience. Previous research has shown that education is an important explanatory factor as to why one distinguishes between oneself and others. In light of the above
discussion, education might be expected to correlate with first person effects rather than third person effects, i.e. the higher one’s education, the more likely one would be to see personal experience as an more influential for oneself than for others. However, the results show that highly educated politicians assume that other people are more influenced by personal experience than they themselves are, a pattern that is the opposite of that exhibited among the citizen group (Johansson 2002). In other words, education appears to operate differently among politicians than it does among the general public in terms of assessments about the role of personal experience.

One’s length of residence in the community seems to explain the appearance of first person effects in judgments about the role of interpersonal communication. It is likely that the longer one has lived somewhere, the more likely they are to have built up a social network, which in turn could lead to placing more weight on the influence of people in one’s surroundings.

Clearly, however, the strongest explanatory variable in the model is the second person effect, or the level of imagined influenced of the various channels on the self and others. The result show that second person effects are a strong contributing factor to both first and third person effects. The strongest connection is between first person effects and personal experience. This variable also shows itself to be significant in terms of third person effects for interpersonal communication, television and newspapers. General faith in the influence of personal experience is thus an important explanation of one’s belief that others are also more influenced by personal experience. For the other information channels, however, the relationship is the opposite. In terms of interpersonal communication, television and newspapers, people tend to assume that they are more influenced than others – a first person effect – the higher one’s index score.

To summarize the analysis of third person effects, the data suggest that such effects exist and they are more extensive among politicians compared to the citizens. Politicians not only believe more in the power of the media to influence people’s political understandings, but they also assume that other people differ considerably from themselves in the ways in which such understandings are shaped. Therefore they have, perhaps not unexpectedly, a rather different view of political opinion building than ordinary citizens. In the politicians’ worldview, they themselves are most influenced by their own experience, while other people are more influenced by the other forms of communication. The greatest difference, according to them, is the influence of television and newspapers. Even interpersonal communication and political advertising are seen as influencing the general public much more than themselves. In this sense, politicians differ from the judgments of ordinary citizens. Of course, both first and third person effects exist among citizens as well, though not to the same extent. There are also certain differences between politicians. In general, the more weight politicians assign to the media and other information channels, the greater their tendency to distinguish themselves from others. A politician’s educational background and degree of political involvement also seems to play a role in shaping perceptions.

Conclusions

The purpose of this article has been to examine politicians’ views about the opinion building power of the media compared to other channels of information. The results have shown that politicians see the media as more influential than other forms of information dissemination. It has also been clearly shown that politicians assign more importance to
the media than do citizens generally. Furthermore, politicians are more likely to believe that their own political views are shaped in quite different ways than those of the general public. While they believe themselves to be primarily influenced by their own personal experience, they believe members of the public to be mainly influenced by the mass media and other people in their surroundings. There were also differences between politicians. Factors identified as distinctive in other research, such as education and political involvement, have received further support here. In this study, for example, at the aggregate level, politicians as a group distinguish themselves from ordinary citizens in terms of ways in which political views are shaped. Within the politician group, this distinction correlates positively with higher degrees of political involvement.

How should the differences between politicians and citizens be explained, and what are their potential consequences? In terms of views about the media’s power and the distinction politicians make between themselves and the general public, it is of course quite possible that the politicians are simply correct. Perhaps it is true that television and newspapers are the primary molders of political views among the general public, with their own personal experience being less influential. Furthermore, it is perfectly logical that politicians will generate their perceptions of politics through their direct personal experience, because their direct personal experience is more directly connected to political decision-making than is the personal experience of members of the general public. This could perhaps explain why first and third person effects are greater among politicians. However, it does not explain why politicians see the general public as more influenced by television and newspapers than does ordinary citizens. And the fact that this perception is even more pronounced among politicians with more education and greater degrees of involvement reduces the belief that it reflects actual knowledge about opinion-building mechanisms. In this point that Bourdieu’s concept of a social field might be reintroduced. Politicians are part of the political communication sphere, where belief in the mass media is a fundamental tenet. Politicians are also large consumers of mass media and have a great interest in politics. They therefore assume that people generally are more exposed to the media than they actually are. With their greater degree of involvement, they further assume that the general public is more affected by news about politics than ordinary people judge themselves to be. Citizens are less interested than politicians in politics are, and they are less interested in consuming political news. Therefore, they are not as likely to exhibit the kind of exposure generalization tendencies that one finds among politicians. And because ordinary citizens consume less political news and are less politically involved, they also see media exposure as less influential.

What are the consequences of these opinion-building perceptions? Perhaps most importantly, politicians’ relatively fundamental views about the influence of television and newspapers imply that they are likely to increase their concentration on the mass media. In the worldview of the politician, television and newspapers are the most effective way to build opinion. Thus one of the central actors in the political communication field seems to be confirming the notion that the mass media’s role in modern political campaigns will intensify. As long as politicians themselves believe in the media’s power over peoples’ thoughts, campaigns are likely to be more media-centric. As a result, it is also likely that politicians will try to be more of a ‘co-player’ to the mass media, applying all their tools to attract journalistic interest. Even if there are many critics of media-centric opinion building, the notion of medialized politics appears in any case not to be disputed or threatened by politicians themselves.
Notes
1. The explained variance (R) that measures how much of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained with help of the independent variables included in the model is quite low throughout. The factors used in the model have relatively low explanatory power to explain differences between the viewpoints of the various politicians. In part this is because of the fact that there are not any great differences to explain and that the differences that exist are more explained by other factors not included in the model. Neuwirth et al (2002) means that studies of person effects ought to be conducted in terms of concrete issues rather than in terms of general views about media effects. This is because it would be more apparent how the mechanisms for potential effects work. It is possible that the criticism can also be applied to the design of this study.
2. It should be pointed out that the variance in the age variable is relatively small in the politician group. Most are middle-aged (43 percent between 50 and 59 and only eight percent younger than 39).
3. This is an example of multicollinearity, which is a problem within regression analysis when independent variables covary and reduce explanatory power from each other. Multicollinearity can result from insufficient data. With a larger sample the problem could be reduced. However, it is also possible that the variables measure the same thing, in which case the most appropriate step is to eliminate one variable. In the regression model in this paper, the issue is likely to be overlapping variables. Full-time politicians also tend to have a number of political appointments, thus the variable of political experience was eliminated because it lowered the explanatory power of the model.
4. One central question that is not addressed earlier is the possibility that exists to generalize the results appearing here. Regional politicians, who are most often also municipal politicians, can most likely be seen as representing other local politicians in Sweden. There is nothing that suggests that politicians in Region Västra Götaland should differ from other regional and municipal politicians.

Translation: Susan Holmberg

References


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Appendix

Sample
The politician survey was carried out by the School of Public Administration at Göteborg University. It was sent to 943 persons. Of these, 38 were eliminated (no longer in service, deceased or on long-term sick leave). The net sample was therefore 943-38=905. Of these, 675 responded to the survey, meaning a response rate of 74.6 percent. In the analysis the answers from the municipal politicians were not used but rather only the 496 regional politicians who filled in the survey.

The citizen survey was sent to 3,000 randomly selection persons between the age of 15 and 85 residing in Sweden. The postal survey has been carried out annually since 1986. The survey is sent is October-November each year. The SOM-survey includes questions about politics, social issues, public service, the mass media, the environment and numerous background questions. The response rate in the citizen survey is 69 percent. From the national sample was chosen those who lived in Region Västra Götaland, which was 310 persons. It is therefore possible to compare the views of the meaning of the media between elected officials and the general public in Region Västra Götaland.

Effects of Mediated and Non-mediated Factors
Respondents were asked two sets of questions about their perceptions of the influence of personal experience, interpersonal communication, television, newspapers and political advertising on the formation of political attitudes. In the first set the respondents were asked how these information-sources influenced their own political attitudes. The exact wording was:

Sometimes it is discussed what influences our picture of politics. How important do you think these information channels are for your own political attitudes?

In the second set of questions, respondents judged the perceived influence of the information sources on other people. The respondents answered the questions using a scale of 4 (very important) to 1 (very unimportant).

First- and Third Person Effect
To measure first- and third person perceptions, a “perceptual bias” transformation variable was created by computing the difference between each individual’s other-scale and self-scale. Perceptual bias ranged from 3 (4 on others minus 1 on self) to – 3 (1 on self minus 4 on others). Positive values indicated more effects on others, i.e. a third-person perceptual bias. Negative values indicate greater effects on one self, i.e. a first-person perceptual bias or a first-person effect. A value of zero indicates no perceptual bias.

Second Person Effect
In recent studies of third person-effects, it has been suggested that a second person effect should be considered. It is a component of a “diamond model” developed by Whitt (1983) and recently adopted in third person effect research (Eveland et al., 1999; McLeod et al., 1997, Neuwirth et al., 2002). Second person effect represents the perceived joint influence of the media on the self and others. A parallel, additive “self plus other” variable was therefore created which indicates this perceived joint influence of the information channels. The difference term in a regression represents a third- or a first-person-effect, depending upon directing, controlling for the level of both (self and other) variables (Neuwirth et al., 2002).

Age
The untransformed age variable was used in the regression models, ranging between 24 and 79 years (M=54.6, sd=9.38).

Gender
The gender variable was distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Length of Residence in the Community

The respondents were asked about the length of residence in the community. For the politicians, the answers vary from less than one year to 75 years (M= 34.4, sd= 16.08).

Education

Education was measured by a question asking which level of education one had received. The responses were grouped into three categories: Low education (elementary school), middle high education (high school) and high education (college/university).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political Experience

In the survey the politicians were asked the number of political appointments they had at the time. Most politicians reported 1-3 political appointments, but exceptional cases mentioned as many as 19 political appointments.

Job type

Two of the appointments were County commissioner and Municipal commissioners. These appointments are full time employment. This position is central to local democracy in Sweden and they belong to limited informal networks of great importance to the local community. 95 of the 496 respondents reported that they had one of these political positions.

Paired T-tests Ranging the Information Channels Importance for the General Publics Political Attitudes (mean difference)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politicians</th>
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<td>Personal experience</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal communication</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political advertising</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p <.10, ** = p <.05, *** = p <.01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal communication</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political advertising</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p <.10, ** = p <.05, *** = p <.01
Do Campaigns Really Change Behavior?

New Understanding of the Behavioral Effects of Advertising, Political Campaigns and Health Communication Campaigns

MAGNE H AUG1

The American social psychologist William McGuire claimed in an influential article ("The myth of massive media impact" (McGuire 1986)) that although the mass media has important influences on the way we live and think, mass-media persuasion, i.e. deliberate efforts to influence the way we think or behave, has small or nonexistent documented effects. This article asserts that McGuire was too pessimistic. For a number of years, media researchers found it difficult to document large effects of mass-media persuasion on behavior. This is, however, no longer the case. This article gathers recent research on advertising, political campaigns and health campaigns that show it is now possible to document relatively large effects of media campaigns on behavior. Some research also shows how and when these effects may be attained. The focus is on behavior, rather than intermediate variables like beliefs or attitudes; on intentionally persuasive campaigns, rather than direct or indirect effects of media coverage; on the persuasion of adults, rather than children. Issues for further research are also discussed.

The mass media are so pervasive in our daily life, so integrated into the way we live, so essential for what we know about society and our environment that it seems unreasonable to even doubt that it affects us. The worlds of government, politics and business are built on the assumption that we use the media to get informed on what is happening around us, outside the narrow perimeter of what we are able to see with our own eyes or learn through conversation at any moment (McQuail 2000: 416). Among campaign implementers in the advertising industry and political consultants, it has long been obvious that mass-media campaigns have effects large enough for investments in campaigns to be profitable.

The issue of effects of persuasive campaigns has, however, been contested by social scientists who have met with serious difficulty in actually documenting effects through research. The conflicting conclusions – campaign workers insisting on the existence of effects, social scientists doubting it – may be seen as the classic conflict between knowledge and understanding, or between practical and scientific – or real – knowledge (Aristotle 1979). We sometimes think we know something based on our practical experience, but are proven wrong, after closer scientific scrutiny. To many social scientists, this seemed to be the case with mass-media persuasion. Over the decades, many media researchers seem to have accepted the thesis from the 1940s, expressed in an influential book from 1960 as the mass media not seeming to have much effect on actual behavior.
In the 1970s and 1980s this conclusion was modified through research on agenda setting, uses and gratification, cultivation effects, knowledge gap effects and media priming. According to this research, media use has a set of important and influential effects on audiences. But may these effects be deliberately summoned at the will of a mass-media campaign manager? William McGuire, one of the world’s leading social psychologists, concluded as late as 1986 that there is little evidence of mass-media persuasion having any effect on receiver attitudes, beliefs or actions (McGuire 1986; Shrum 2002). The crucial point made by McGuire was that the media may influence the way society works, how we interact and where we get our information to perform our daily duties, but there is little evidence that mass-media messages can persuade people to hold a specific belief or attitude, or perform a concrete behavior in a specified setting over an ascertained period of time.

This was seen to be the case for political election campaigns as well as health campaigns and commercial advertising. Political scientists had difficulty certifying that the mass-media campaign actually changed voter behaviors. For a number of years it was found that for elections in the United States you could predict election outcomes by voter attitudes six months before elections, well before the campaigns got off the ground (Holbrook 1996). Studies on advertising held that its proven influence on consumers was minimal, a conclusion that even caused buyers of advertising to switch from advertising to promotional activities in the late 1980s (Turk and Katz 1992; Vakratsas and Ambler 1999; Jones 2002).

The problem may be methodological. Media consumption is so pervasive in our daily life that it is difficult to study its effects. It is difficult to find segments in which the media does not play an important role. It is difficult to separate the media’s effects on our behavior from all other effects from our integration in society. Consequently, the lack of evidence of such effects does not necessarily imply that they do not exist, but may instead be a consequence of how we measure effects. As Rogers has pointed out, when you study limited interventions of a clearly defined period of time, you often find strong effects of the mass media on behavior (Rogers 2002). There are, thus, good reasons to review the campaign research literature to see whether the pessimistic attitude regarding campaign effects reported by McGuire in 1986 and confirmed by Shrum in 2002 hold up in the light of recent campaign research.

**Method**

In studying campaign effects, I will review the campaign effects literature beginning in the early 1980s. This is a surprisingly easy task, as such literature is limited. I will review literature in the three main fields of study in which campaigns are designed to influence behavior:

1. Political campaigns that influence two sorts of voting behavior – whether people vote and whom they vote for.

2. Advertising or commercial campaigns that influence consumer behavior.

3. Health campaigns that influence health behavior.

Within these three fields, I have conducted an extensive literature search of the communication, advertising and political science research literature to find books and articles in scientific journals that study behavioral effects of campaigns. I have also included literature reviews and meta-analyses found in the health communication literature.
This article looks at behavior, not at intermediate variables like beliefs or attitudes. Most media persuasion studies, on the other hand, have been interested in intermediate variables as it is easier to measure the influence of a message on beliefs and attitudes than on behavior. Behavior is sometimes not even considered a relevant dependent advertising variable (Thorson 1989). The focus in this article is also on intentionally persuasive campaigns, rather than on direct or indirect effects of media coverage.

The behaviors relevant to the three fields of study—political, commercial and health—are very different in nature, thus I will discuss them separately.

- Political campaigns try to influence a one-time behavior—voting on polling day. For the voter this behavior has no short-term benefit, and may or may not have a long-term benefit which always is difficult for the voter to know, when s/he votes or later. In studies on political voting the focus is often on two different aspects of the same act: 1. Whether the votes actually votes, and 2. who s/he votes for. Although most persuasion is done regarding parties or candidates, voting research has often been focused on whether or not people.

- Commercial advertising tries to influence one-time behaviors in a perspective of repetition. Ads are more successful the more they can make customers repeat the desired behavior. Commercial advertising is usually, though not exclusively, concerned with convincing the customer that particular product or service will serve his/her needs.

- Health campaigns are very different from commercial campaigns as they often attempt to make people abstain from things they like to do, such as smoking or driving when drunk (Slater and Flora 1994). It does not make it easier that these behaviors may be habits that are reinforced through interaction with friends or family (Slater and Flora 1994). Health campaigns sometimes also attempt to make people do something they do not want to do, like using a condom while having sex. People’s experience is that the greater short-term benefit is derived from not doing it, while the campaign tries to convince them of the long-term benefit of doing it. Similar to ad campaigns, but different from political campaigns, health campaigns usually focus on repeated behavior as much as on one-time behavior.

The mass media is only one of several channels of communication. It is integrated into a network of social relationships, personal relations, and job relations, all of which can be used to reach us with persuasive intent. When the mass media stimulate interpersonal communication about a given topic the effects of direct exposure to media messages are often magnified (Rogers 2002). Mass media interacting with interpersonal communication give the best effect on behavior in campaigns (Atkin 2001). In this article I will look at just what the mass-media component of this interaction seems to contribute.

Results

Findings from the three areas of study are presented separately and then discussed together at the end of the article.

1. Behavioral Effects of Political Campaigns

Political advertising is increasingly the main element in political campaigns, rendering party machines and grass-root organizations less important than they were in the past (Iyengar and Simon 2000). In the US, political advertising has traditionally been re-
searched in terms of its influence on four classes of dependent variables: attention, knowledge, attitudes toward ad sponsors or their opponents, and likelihood of voting (Leshner, Holbert et al. 2002). Actual voting behavior has not been used to a large extent as a measure of political campaign effects or effectiveness.

Until the late 1990s, it was commonly accepted among political campaign researchers that McGuire was right in claiming that political media campaigns seemed to have little effect. Campaigns seemed mostly to confirm already existing attitude and voting intentions. This conclusion is the more surprising when one considers that in 2000, political candidates in the US spent a total of more than a billion dollars on the election. This amount has steadily increased. This conclusion also contradicts the weekly swings in party or candidate support, observable to everyone. These are real swings, even considering the uncertainties in published numbers. The swings seem to be connected to political initiatives by the candidates, for instance when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in the fall 2002 German national elections turned a seemingly losing situation into a narrow win after playing the “anti-war-in-Iraq” card in the election campaign’s final weeks. Political campaign consultants build their profession on a belief that political coverage and political advertising are measures that exerts strong effects on voters. Political consultants use opinion polling to select messages to influence voters. Opinion polling is used not only to select the issues to focus on in political advertising, but also in political initiatives and speeches (for an example, see Morris 1999). This procedure is much criticized by political scientists and political commentators, but is defended by consultants who claim the polling is not used to decide which opinion the politician should have, but instead only to select which of the candidate’s opinions are to be focused on in his/her public performances and in his/her political advertising (Newman 1999: 16). Do politicians and their support teams not know what they are doing, or have social scientists made serious mistakes in not seeing what those involved in campaigns saw?

In recent years there has been a new understanding of the importance of campaign communication for elections. In a study of the 1984, 1988 and 1992 US presidential elections, Holbrook argues that campaigns did have an influence. He concluded that “variations in candidate support during the campaign season are largely attributable to the occurrence of campaign events”. (Holbrook 1996: 154) National conditions, usually ascribed the main influence on election outcomes, varied little under the campaign and consequently had little influence on variations in public opinions during the campaign. He did find, though, that in spite of the large variations in public opinion during the campaign, on Election Day voters did tend to bring about the outcome initially predicted based on national conditions (Holbrook 1996).

Zaller has developed a possible explanation for why the result may turn out as originally predicted, although the campaign still has an influence on what happens. He claims that “at least in the domain of political communication, the true magnitude of the persuasive effect of mass communication is closer to ‘massive’ than to ‘small or negligible’ and that the frequency of such effects is ‘often’”. (Zaller 1996: 19) Zaller sees the lack of effects as a methodological artifact. The impression of no effects is connected to (at least) two phenomena that are typical of election campaigns. First, that a continuous stream of coverage of political issues leads to “inadequate variation in the media inputs to mass opinions for ready detection of media effects, even if such effects are massively present” (Zaller 1996). To measure difference, there must be a difference. When everyone is strongly influenced by the media, there is no control group to measure the effect against, and the impression that there is no effect is misleading.
A second cause of seemingly small effects of mass-media messages is that strong effects of messages from opposing candidates nullify each other so that a false impression of small or no total effect appears. When measuring effects as a linear connection between the number of messages sent and behavior change in the form of votes, or intention to vote, one loses sight of the effect of the competing candidate.

To test his hypothesis of massive media effects, Zaller tracked down datasets of elections in which message disseminations from opposing candidates were not overlapping, and found confirmation for a non-linear model that supposes large effects of messages from both candidates. Messages led to defections to the candidate not initially supported of between 0 and 70%. The effects were the largest among voters who did not habitually pay a great deal of attention to news. Anecdotal evidence supporting Zaller’s conclusion is the swing in US voter support for a party’s presidential candidate directly after he has received endorsement from the party convention. This shift is often in the 10% range.

There are some weaknesses in Zaller’s study. First, he does not really differentiate between usual press coverage and political advertising. Actually one of the studies included in his paper builds its measurement of campaign coverage on positive or negative media coverage of the candidate. It excludes political advertising, which does play an important role in American political campaigns. Second, he assumes that people are influenced by mass-media messages in proportion to the amount of messages they receive (Zaller 2000: 33). This is contrary to evidence from research on advertising that indicates that only a limited amount of advertising actually makes consumers buy the product advertised (Tellis, Chandy et al. 2000; Jones 2002). Advertising research has found that the best way to use research is to determine at an early stage which ads work, and discard those that do not work.

A literature review of studies on political campaigns’ behavioral effects on voting behavior yielded very few studies. Traditionally, political advertising has not been researched in terms of actual voting behavior (Leshner, Holbert et al. 2002). In one of the few studies, Wanat found a correlation of 0.56 between a candidate’s share of the total advertising expenditure in a district, and the share of the total vote for the winning candidate (Wanat 1974). Palda found that a dollar spent on political advertising resulted in 0.33 additional votes for the candidate. This study showed, however, that expenditures other than political advertising gave double this gain in votes (Palda 1973). A study of the connection between voter defection (to another candidate or party) and advertising expenditure showed that more expenditure meant more defection, but the connection was small, although statistically significant (Joslyn 1981). Although these smaller studies show an effect of political advertising on behavior, Zaller found that they do not document the massive effects of the media on behavior.

These studies have not, however, received much attention among political campaign researchers. That is now changing. There is an increasing understanding that “conceptual and methodological advances” have shown that the social science community has been mistaken, as “campaigns do matter and can be pivotal” (Iyengar and Simon 2000) One important understanding is that research tools used in the past were not good enough for observing what actually happened (a problem that has also influenced our understanding of commercial campaigns, which will be discussed in a later section).

An important new understanding is how campaigns not only influence whether voters vote or whom they vote for, but also the criteria voters use in making these decisions. When campaign consultants use marketing research to determine which messages to send to voters, they base their advice on a voter tendency to attend selectively to only a few issues in
a campaign. By setting the agenda for the campaign on issues in which the candidate has a comparative advantage with voters, thus priming the voter to think about the candidate’s position when making the voting decision, the campaigner influences voter behavior (Iyengar and Simon 2000: 157). Whereas attempts by candidates to change voter’s opinions are met with voter resistance – they would rather vote for a candidate who agrees with them than change their opinion under influence of arguments from candidates – it is far easier for candidates or political parties to change the agenda of the public debate. This change may have subtle persuasive effects on voter behavior that are equally powerful as if the voters had been persuaded to change their opinions, but the influence often goes unnoticed by the voter. In this ‘resonance model’ of campaigns, the effects are contingent on the degree of fit between campaign messages and prevailing (voter) attitudes (Iyengar and Simon 2000: 158). The influence of messages on voter perceptions and behavior is strongest among ‘undecided’ voters who have a weaker underlying identification with candidates or parties, but have nonetheless opinions on positions. These marginal voters do, when persuaded that the candidate or party agrees with their own priorities, change their voting and can decide elections (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Zaller 1996; Iyengar and Simon 2000: 159). According to these findings, the more effective strategy for winning elections is to determine what the voters want, and then design either the positions you take, or the positions you focus on in the campaign to be in harmony with those popular among voters. This is derogatorily called ‘populism’ by political commentators, but is the way elections have been won over the last decade by electoral stars like Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, Bill Clinton (Norris 2000) in the US, Gerhard Schroeder in Germany and Carl I. Hagen and Kristin Halvorsen in Norway. Not doing so is how French socialist presidential candidate Lionel Jospin lost the election and the other main candidate, Jacques Chirac, almost lost the election in 2002 as well as how the Norwegian Labor party lost almost one-third of its support between the 1997 and 2001 elections. The strategy may thus be called ‘Let the voters decide’.

Political campaigns may also have indirect, unintended effects on voter behavior. Most attention has been given to negative campaign messages (derogatory messages about competitors in a campaign). The effects have been unclear, however. In some cases negative campaigns have been found to have negative effects on voter turnout, and at other times to stimulate voter turnout, notably when endorsements running counter to the view of the voter creates a third-person effect that increases his/her intention to vote (Leshner, Holbert et al. 2002).

2. Behavioral Effects of Advertising or Commercial Campaigns

Does advertising have behavioral effects? The entire advertising industry is built on the belief of an experience of behavioral effects. Why do academics doubt such effects, or claim that they exist if it is difficult to substantiate the claim? McGuire’s conclusion was that both micro- and macro-strategies for evaluating the efficacy of commercial advertising in promoting sales fail to show the expected strong effects (McGuire 1986: 182). Some more recent literature reviews have confirmed this (Tellis 1994), while others have strongly disputed it. The fact is that there are few detailed studies on the behavioral effects of advertising (Tellis 1994). A set of case studies has shown strong short-term effects of campaigns on sales (Jones 2002). In a recent study, the buying of a service (use of the weight room in a training facility) increased to almost five times the initial use after an outdoor advertising campaign (Bhargava and Donthu 1999). In another study, exposure to printed store sale flyers led to a doubling of the number of advertised products
bought, and more than a doubling of the amount spent on items in ads (Burton, Lichtenstein et al. 1999). Products with a larger share of sales used for advertising have been found to have a larger share of market and a higher return on investment (see also Kim 1992; Biel 1998). A literature review concludes that advertising elasticity range from 0 to 0.2, implying that a 1% increase in advertising spending leads to a 0-20% increase in sales (Vakratsas and Ambler 1999). Ninety percent of advertising effects dissipate after three to fifteen months. The first response is most important; the share returns for advertising diminish fast. After the third exposure advertisers should focus on reach rather than frequency, according to research findings from advertising effects research (Vakratsas and Ambler 1999). A study of the connection between the brand that new (teenage) smokers select, and the advertising for cigarette brands found a correlation of 0.93 between advertising amount and brand selection (Pierce, Gilpin et al. 1991; Pucci and Siegel 1999). Biel found that reducing advertising during a recession does not pay. On the contrary, increasing advertising during a recession pays off in the form of a larger market share which, in turn, will give a higher return on investment once the recession is over (Biel 1998).

While some claim that advertising seems not to be important for sales in the short term, although more important in the longer term (Tellis 1994; see also Tellis, Chandy et al. 2000), others disagree. Jones found that advertisements must work in the short term to be able to have any medium or long-range effect on sales (Jones 2002). The influence of advertising has been estimated to be 9% of the variation in sales for consumer products. The effect of promotional activities – such as offers of reduced prices for shorter periods of time – was more than double that size (Jones 2002). In some studies price reductions have been found to be 20 times more effective for increasing sales than is advertising (Tellis 1994), a consequence being that since the late 1980s the industry has changed its emphasis from advertising to promotion (Turk and Katz 1992; Vakratsas and Ambler 1999; Jones 2002).

The solution to the problem of small effects may be that most advertising research has not taken into consideration the fact that only a small amount of advertising seems to increase sales. Increased spending on advertising (increased number of exposures and increased gross rating points) has been found to induce larger sales when ads were persuasive, but not when they were not (Stewart, Paulos et al. 2002). This is in accordance with a famous finding from the 1970s by the Campbell Soup Company that the amount spent on advertising did not influence its effect on sales, but copy strategy, media selection, media mix, and targeting did (Jeffres 1997: 251). The advertising copy and novelty in ads seemed more important than the amount of advertising itself (Tellis 1994). The two most important qualities of ads that sell products are likeability of the ad (Biel 1998) and its ability to make people believe that a company has an excellent product (Joyce 1998: 20). A study has shown that advertising likeability predicted sales winners 87% of the time (Biel 1998). It is no news that copy research works (Caples 1997; for a review, see Jeffres 1997: 252-263), but new data-processing techniques have made it possible to apply this knowledge almost instantly to TV advertising as well (Woodside 1996). Channel selection may also be an important influence on sales (Tellis, Chandy et al. 2000). For some groups of products (lower-priced daily consumer goods) the first exposure to advertising may contain most of the ad’s effect on behavior (Jones 1995; Jones 2002).

In a series of studies of the effect of advertising on brand sales, Jones and his team found large effects of advertising for only 30% of consumer brands in the research, small for 40%, and negative (decreased buying) for 30% (Jones 2002). This last finding was
not interpreted as advertising leading to a decline in buying per se, but rather a decline in buying of this advertised brand, preferring competing brands. They found an increase in buying of 20-140% over a period of seven days, with decreasing effects as time elapsed since the ad (Jones 1998: 87-8). These findings applied TV advertising; others have found a positive short-term effect of advertising on brand share only for newspaper ads, not for magazine or TV (Bogart 1998), while Jones found a medium-term effect of 60% from television advertising, 20% from print and 10% from radio (Jones 2002, computed from Table 6.3, page 99). One conclusion is that it important to use several different sources of advertising to receive the maximum marginal return on investment (Jones 2002: 112).

The interesting new findings concern short- or medium-term effects. The important question for the users of advertising concerns long-term effects. If advertising has a long-term effect, it is easier for advertisers to live with small effects in the short term. In the 1980s, research indicating that advertising has a much smaller short-term impact on sales than does promotion, led to a change in emphasis among marketers from advertising to promotion. What this change may have underestimated is the ability of advertising to increase its own effect with time. This is central to the concept of brand, indicating that a product is so well established in consumer consciousness that it may be preferred even with less advertising. Jones claims that the most important long-term effect of advertising that works is larger advertising elasticity. This means less advertising is needed to create the same sale (Jones 2002: 172f), which increases profitability of the brand. Less expense gives the same income. He has not documented this claim by research, however, and it has been contradicted in other research that found advertising elasticity to be dynamic and decrease during the product life cycle, which means elasticity is higher for new brands than for established brands (Vakratsas and Ambler 1999).

Jones discusses a pretesting procedure for television advertising with a correlation score of 0.70 between pretesting score for consumers intention to buy the product after seeing its advertising, and the actual sales of the product (Jones 2002: 48). This is an impressive connection, showing that once the message has been shown by pretesting to influence behavior, it actually does influence behavior on a large scale. This is interesting because advertising agencies, notably in Norway, have traditionally been skeptical of quantitative pretesting of advertising. They prefer qualitative pretesting that may provide something interesting and important information about consumer reactions to advertisements, but cannot provide reliable information about how advertisements will influence consumer behavior.

There is an interesting connection between low scores on the pretest and negative sales. If a brand is not advertised adequately, its sales will decline because consumers are exposed to competing advertising that will persuade them to buy other brands (Jones 2002: 47), a finding comparable to those of Zaller for election campaigns. But while Zaller supposed that all messages have effects, and changes in voting behavior are explained in one candidate sending more messages than the other, the advertising research underlines the importance of the persuasive quality of messages. When an unconvincing message competes with a convincing one for a different product, the product with the less convincing message loses. The same is likely to happen in election campaigns, and may explain why voters change their allegiance so often in modern, more intense media campaigns.

Competition between messages does not, however, explain all negative trends, notably in non-commercial advertising. Campaigns may have boomerang effects, which implies that they influence people to perform the opposite behavior of what they intended.
In certain entertainment education campaigns, it was found that a subsection of the target group interpreted messages as confirmation of the attitudes and behaviors the campaign was designed to change (Rice and Atkin 1989; Singhal and Rogers 1989; see also Windahl, Signitzer et al. 1992; Singhal and Rogers 2001).

The variations in effects are connected to properties of the message, and to media planning schedules. It may take exposure for ads to “wear in”, and to “wear out” (Stewart, Paulos et al. 2002). Hollis found both short-term and long-term effect of advertising on sales, and stronger effect of advertising on sales when the company had actual news about the product to present in its advertising (Hollis 1998). He claims that advertising influences sales through amplifying and reinforcing perceptions of already existing qualities in products.

But is advertising cost-effective? One of McGuire’s main argument against advertising effectiveness was its lack of cost-effectiveness (McGuire 1986). Tellis found that even effective ads may not be profitable, and that profitable ads are rather few (Tellis, Chandy et al. 2000: 45), a finding confirmed by Jones, who claims that because of the lack of cost-effectiveness, advertising must be seen as an investment, such as production costs (Jones 2002). This is connected to how advertising interacts with price to influence buying behavior. The present conclusion of research seems to be that advertising makes buyers less price-sensitive, which means that as a consequence of advertising, producers may increase the price and consequently their profits, without a comparable reduction in sales. The exception to this rule is price advertising, which makes consumers more conscious about price and consequently seems to lead to a fall in price (for a discussion, see Vakratsas and Ambler 1999: 28-29).

3. Behavioral Effects of Health Campaigns

A standard impression of health campaigns has been that they have yielded disappointing results. Negative findings may, however, have received too much attention. One reason is measurement problems. A number of health campaigns have shown rather large effects, but it has not been possible to evaluate them because they were national campaigns, making control groups impossible (Hornik 2002). Another reason is campaigns designed to neutralize the effects of health campaigns. The possibly largest anti-smoking effort ever, the California anti-smoking campaigns, spent more than 500 million dollars between 1989 and 1996. The campaigns had a considerable effect on smoking prevalence between 1990 and 1993 before the tobacco industry through counter advertising and an extensive lobbying strategy, succeeded to emasculate the campaign (Pierce, Emery et al. 2002). Research indicates that the effect of the mass-media campaign was a main reason why tobacco industry lobbying focused on destroying the campaign (Pierce, Emery et al. 2002: 112).

A recent meta-analysis of 48 studies of the behavioral effect of mass-media health campaigns found that 9% more people performed the healthy behavior after the campaign than before (95% confidence interval: 7%, 10%) (Snyder 2001; see also, Snyder and Hamilton 2002; Snyder, Hamilton et al. 2002). Campaigns with an enforcement component (like police ticketing seat-belt provision offenders) had an average change of behavior among 17% those exposed to the campaign, while for campaigns without enforcement, the effect was only 5% (Snyder 2001). In an analysis of published data on all US health campaigns between 1980 and 1994, Freimuth and Taylor found that of 29 campaigns, 20 were successful in changing behavior and 9 were not. Median behavior change among campaigns evaluated using a rigorous experimental design model was
The size of influence on behavior found by Jones for brand advertising (9%), and by Snyder and Hamilton for public mass-mediated health campaigns (9%), is comparable to the effect size found in family planning programs around the world (8%-1) (Bauman 1997), in school smoking interventions (5%) (Rooney and Murray 1996) and in school anti-drug programs (6-8%) (Snyder and Hamilton 2002: 375).

There is a snag, however. Snyder and Hamilton discuss short-range changes, up to a year. One study found an increasing effect of an anti-smoking campaign over four years, with an accumulated effect of 12% (Flynn, Worden et al. 1994). But some school and community studies have found no long-range effects of some very large and famous public communication campaigns on smoking (Murray, Hannan et al. 1994; COMMIT Research Group 1995; Peterson, Kealey et al. 2000), health behavior (Baranowski, Davis et al. 2000) and cardiovascular disease (Fortmann and Varady 2000).

The overall impression from health campaigns is that we still see too many cases in which massive mass-media campaigns do not work properly, and that we do not have a deep enough understanding of why this is the case.

**Discussion**

I have presented research indicating that McGuire was mistaken when he claimed in 1986 that there is no massive impacts resulting from mass-mediated persuasive campaigns. Recent research, based on better methodological tools and better conceptualization of the effect problem, has made it possible for social scientists to also see what had seemed obvious to campaign implementers. In political campaigns it has been possible to track down changes in opinions during the campaigns as a result of competing campaigns, although these competing campaigns often neutralize each other to some extent creating the impression of campaigns having no effect. In advertising, point-of-sales technology has made it possible to closely track how advertising campaigns trigger sales, and to sort out the influence of advertising from other promotional activity. In health campaigns, recent development in the use of theory in campaigns seems to have created some that work, but this still seems to be the less effective campaign field.

There are two important lessons to be learned from the research reviewed. One is that serious methodological problems connected to measuring the effects of media persuasion may be closer to being solved. Through using more powerful data processing tools it has been possible to build more powerful models that can tell us when and why media persuasion works. This is in accordance with the broader development in media effect research. Since the 1960s, we have learned not to ask whether the media has effects on its public, but rather how the media influences its public.

The other lesson concerns the conditions under which mass-media persuasion may have effects. We have learned the importance of research – of message and channel testing – to detect when mediated messages have effects. We have learned the importance of good theoretical models detecting when and where media persuasion may work. If a message that does not work is used, no amount of money spent spreading it will make it work better. If campaign designers spend money wisely on research, as well as on developing messages according to their findings, mass-media persuasion may have powerful effects on target publics.

There are aspects of the issues I have not discussed. Campaigns benefit from the effects of both campaign messages and ordinary mass-media coverage of the same issues.
It is not always possible to distinguish between the two, and this is more true as mass-media coverage generated through public relations about campaign issues is often an integrated part of the campaign. Campaign planners want “free” coverage of their issues. Some studies have found that 50-70% per cent of press coverage of political issues was instigated by sources that used the press to get their version to the public (Baerns 1985; Turk 1986; Baerns 1987). I have not taken up a discussion of the distinction, and it is not easy to do so. Further study is needed to be able to see these differences.

Implicit in my discussion was a one-way conception of the relationship between a medium and its audiences. The medium defines the situation through sending messages that the audiences receive. The important independent variables were seen as in the medium, not in the receiver. But are these conceptions correct, i.e. do they mirror the true relationship between medium and audience? In uses and gratification theory, the focus is on how audiences use the medium. This is also relevant for campaigns. To what extent, and how, does the individual receiver use the medium to gratify his/her own needs for knowledge, for ideas of what and where and when to buy, for entertainment? The extent and content of a receiver being influenced by a mass-media message, and notably a commercial message through advertising, is influenced by his/her own needs for information (Stewart, Paulos et al. 2002). These are issues complicating the study of persuasive effects of mass-media campaigns.

Notes
1. Magne Haug, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Marketing, Norwegian School of Management BI, Oslo, Norway. Correspondence to: magne.haug@bi.no
2. I do not go into the nuances of when it is an effect of ordinary mass-media coverage or of deliberately designed messages, for instance advertising. It is not possible to make a total separation, as mass-media coverage is often an integrated part of campaigns. If campaign planners can get “free” coverage of their issues, and the coverage has an angle consistent with campaign objectives, campaign planners are happy. This can be achieved by deliberately leaking information to the press. Some studies have found that 50% or even 70% of press coverage of political issues was instigated by sources using the press to get their version through (Baerns, B. (1985). Öffentlichkeitsarbeit oder journalismus? zum Einfluß im mediensystem. Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik., Turk, J. v. S. (1986). “Information subsidies and media content: A study of public relations influence on the news.” Journalism Monographs 100., Baerns, B. (1987). Journalism versus public relations: Determination of latent interaction through analysis of patterns of influence. Political communication research. D. L. Paletz. Norwood, Ablex: 88-107.).
3. Thanks to Juyan Zhang, Monmouth University, for help in tracking down studies used in this section of the paper.
4. The problem with promotion is, however, that it may increase sales, but decrease average price and consequently profits. The effects of promotion also tend to disappear when the promotion stops, while advertising may have long-term effects, sometimes effects that do not seem to decrease over time.
5. Measured by return on investment, radio seems to be more effective than print, which in turn is more effective than TV, but this is an example of diminished returns on investment. Radio is effective because it is used infrequently. The more a medium is used, the smaller the marginal return on investment.
6. A general note on method regarding the Jones study: He gives almost all his numbers as absolute numbers, without computing the statistical uncertainty. This may at times cause him to draw conclusions about differences that may not be real, but may instead be caused by random errors in the data.
References


DO CAMPAIGNS REALLY CHANGE BEHAVIOR?


‘Take a Stand!’

On the Public Information about Danish Euro

SØREN FRIMANN TRADS

‘The so-called informative Euro folder sent out by the Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs is pure propaganda – and it is even paid for with the taxpayers’ money!’, said Søren Søndergaard, from the left-wing party ‘Enhedslisten’. ‘No, you are wrong – the folder is just giving information about the Euro’, responded Marianne Jelved, Minister of Economic Affairs1. On the TV2 news, the two politicians were having a lengthy quarrel about how to describe and categorize the verbal and visual content in a Euro folder circulated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to Danish citizens in August 2000 shortly before the referendum. Their quarrel became polarized, i.e. they made more of the same claims without backing them up with examples from the folder. The folder was debated heavily in the mass media over the following days. The general picture was that the government defended the folder, claiming it to be pure information, while opposing parties from the outer left-wing and right-wing parties as well as the mass media criticized it by calling it propaganda. In general, all presented their judgements regarding the folder without giving examples or accounts. Thus the judgements were not based on any close analysis that could give an account for the meanings realised in the folder.

Theoretical Approach

The interesting question is how communication research can contribute to the public debate by giving a more specific, detailed and exemplified account of how and what public authorities are communicating to citizens through texts, e.g. folders, brochures, and pamphlets, that realise both verbal and visual meanings?

In order to answer this question it is necessary to use a theoretical framework that will make it possible to analyse the verbal and visual meanings realised in such texts. A traditional approach could be content analysis, which would give an account of what is communicated, i.e. the topics and subtopics. Content analysis does not, however, enable us to give a detailed account of how the topics are communicated, i.e. it cannot give an account of the complex combination of paradigmatic and syntagmatic choices made to realise the specific communicative patterns and meanings in such texts. For this reason, content analysis is not suited to this analytical goal. Another relevant approach would be reception analysis and media ethnography (e.g., Klaus Bruhn Jensen 1994, Kim
Schrøder, 1996). The application of qualitative research methods would give a relevant account of how citizens understand, classify and interpret such texts. Since the primary interest is in the meanings created by receivers, this method lacks an explanation of how the message is created by the structuring of the text. The text is a necessary prerequisite before any reading can be made; in order to perform a close analysis and give an account of the detailed verbal and visual meanings in such texts, it is more appropriate to apply a text-based method with which it is possible to analyse both verbal and visual meanings in the unfolding text. A third alternative is therefore to apply Systemical Functional Linguistic (SFL), a ‘text linguistic’ approach. This theoretical framework provides the analyst with tools for analysing the realised meanings and how they are expressed in the text through the combination of paradigmatic and syntagmatic, semantic and grammatical choices. SFL does not offer theoretical concepts for analysing visual elements together with language; it therefore can be combined with multimodal discourse analysis (Kress and Van Leuwen, 2001). The combination of these two approaches is theoretically consistent since Kress and Van Leuwen´s social semiotic approach primarily (though not entirely) bases its visual analytic method on SFL. The combination of these methods enables us to analyse and give an exemplified detailed account of how and what meanings are realised by subtle linguistic and visual expressions in the text. The written language will be analysed primarily from an SFL perspective (Halliday, 1994; Matthiessen, 1995; Martin, 1992; Trads, 2004) and brought together with multimodal discourse analysis of the visual elements in order to analyse how the linguistic meanings interact with the visual meanings in the text to convey the messages. The analysis thus serves as an example of how SFL and multimodal discourse analysis can be used in a fruitful way to understand the functioning of communication.

Data
Due to limited space, the choice of empirical material has consequences. A comparative analysis across several texts will necessarily lead to a limitation of detailed analysis with the advantage of generalizations across a larger corpus. A case study gives the advantage of making a detailed analysis in an exemplary manner; its limitation is, contrarily, that it is not possible to generalize the results. Nevertheless, a case study can demonstrate a method and theoretical approach that are applicable to a wide range of texts. One criterion for choosing the Euro folder as a case was that the text should be of significant importance to the public in general. The folder was part of a larger information campaign initiated by the Danish Government, carried out by a professional communication agency. The folder was the most heavily debated text of a huge amount of different material concerning the Euro referendum, from various sources, including political parties, the government, the mass media and citizens (e.g., readers’ letters in newspapers).

Public Information
The norm in Denmark is that authorities are to provide unbiased information of common interest for the benefit of citizens. What happens if the authorities violate this norm by shifting to more persuasive and perhaps biased communication strategies? Will the text then only be relevant for some target groups? The reactions from parties outside the government might point in this direction by categorizing the folder as ‘propaganda’,
obviously reacting by stating that the authorities have violated the norms of public information and have even spent taxpayers’ money to do so.

Analysis
The purpose of the following analysis is to give a detailed account of the meanings realised in the folder, including identification of persuasive biased communicative strategies and unbiased informative strategies. The use of language will be analysed before the visual expressions are. The linguistic analysis will first focus on the ideational meta-function, i.e. the representation of experience or ‘world view’. Afterward follows an analysis from the interpersonal meta-function, i.e. how the text negotiates interpersonal relations with the reader. Thirdly, there will be an analysis from the textual meta-function, i.e. how the text presents and focuses messages in sequence.

World View
The ideational meta-function examines how experiences and representations of the world are expressed through the linguistic semiotic resources of language (Halliday, 1994:106). An analysis of the process types in the folder can reveal which aspects of the world are represented and how the world is perceived. The text consists of 54 sentences with 25 subordinated sentences in clause complexes, a total of 79 processes.

Process Types
The major process choices from the transitivity system consist of 31 relational (39%), 27 material (34%) and 8 verbal (11%) processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relational Processes</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Relational: Attributive</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Din hverdag</td>
<td>bliver</td>
<td>den samme</td>
<td>the same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Your everyday life</td>
<td>will be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Euromænterne</td>
<td>bliver</td>
<td>danske</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Euro coins</td>
<td>will be</td>
<td>Danish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The communicative function of the abstract attributive relational clauses is to define, categorize and ascribe values to entities. Examples can be found throughout the text. However, the ideology, i.e. the main value system, is established in the beginning of the text. An important topical choice is the focus on the readers’ ‘everyday life’. This topical focus excludes other relevant discourses, for instance national and international political issues. In the relational clauses, the Euro coins are ascribed the value ‘Danish’ and everyday life is ascribed the value ‘sameness’. The presupposition is that there is no significant difference between the two choices. This becomes obvious from the pictures and ensuing text.

The values ascribed in the relational clauses can be further categorized as either ‘status quo’ (the same everyday life, Danish coins, same purchasing power, same usability in busses, shops, etc.) or ‘advantages’ (comparable prices in different countries) in relation to the introduction of the Euro in Denmark. No disadvantages are defined or ascribed. Disadvantages in relation to introducing a new currency in Denmark are not in focus, although many critical questions have been raised about the abandonment of sov-
ereignty and Denmark’s position as a state or possible future province in Europe, etc. Such political and ideological consequences are not mentioned in the text.

Existential Processes

Four sentences are relational existential processes. All sentences concern the existence of the coins in the future, if the Euro is introduced.

9. Der vil (dog også) kunne findes Euro-mønter fra andre lande i Danmark, især i turist-områder

9. There will (however also be a possibility of finding) Euro coins from other countries in Denmark –particularly in tourist areas

37. Der bliver Otte danske euro-mønter

37. There will be Eight Danish Euro coins.

The function of the existential processes in the text is to give factual information about the Euro in Denmark, i.e. where and how the Euro will exist. Sentence 9 claims that Euro coins from other European countries will exist in Denmark, particularly in tourist areas. The subordinate elliptic clause (- in particular in tourist areas) carries an odd argument in stating that the amount of existing foreign Euros will be higher in tourist areas. People will naturally use Euros from tourist areas in other areas in Denmark. Soon, there will be a mixture of Euros from different countries in people’s purses. The argument only makes sense from a certain perspective. In my opinion, this argument is designed to anticipate patriotic readers’ worries about no longer having Danish coins and notes.

Material Processes

A common choice in the folder is material processes. Twenty-three of the 27 material processes are processes of doing, while 4 are processes of happening. The majority of the material clauses are in the active voice with clear agency.

12. du vil kunne bruge Euroen helt på samme måde

12. You will be able to use (=can use) the Euro in exactly the same way (manner) as...today (comparison).

20. Spekulanterne kan (ikke længere) skade den danske økonomi

20. The speculators Cannot damage the Danish economy anymore

26. du Kan tage dine euro med på ferie

26. you Can take your Euro along on holiday (place)

In these examples, the Actor is an exophoric pronominal reference to the external reader of the text. Only clause 20 has a different Actor, namely ‘the speculators’. The speculators have the role of villains in the text, as they are engaged in damaging the Danish economy in order to make a profit without moral and financial considerations. The general picture is that the material processes in the text have the function of specifying what
the reader can do with the new currency in everyday life and on holiday, sometimes even compared with what the reader can do with the present currency.

Only few material clauses are construed as events, in which the action happens without any external doer or initiator.

32. Den 1. januar 2004 dukker op euroen (op) i butikkerne
32. On the first of January 2004 appears the Euro (appears) in the shops

Circumstance: Time Material: happening: Actor/medium Circumstance: Place

The Euro appears spontaneously without any initiator of the action. Different readers react on these examples with ‘The voting seems already to have been done and the Euro introduced’. This reaction also concerns the interpersonal construction of the sentence as a categorical statement without any modalization (‘may’, ‘can’) or limiting conditions (‘if’) under which the statement would be true.

**Verbal Processes**

Very few processes are verbal processes of saying. Verbal processes make it possible to hold another person responsible for the quoted or reported language, thus giving the possibility of bringing other voices into the text (Bakhtin, 1986).

**Quote**

“Danmark står over for en stor beslutning. Det er (siger) Lise Nørgaard
vigtigt at du tager stilling”

2. "Denmark faces an important decision. It is (says)(ellipsed) Lise Nørgaard important that you take (a) stand"

1: Quoted Verbal Sayer
2: Quoting

The author quotes Lise Nørgaard, well known as the scriptwriter of the TV series ‘Matador’ about the prototypical historical development of life in a provincial Danish town. In the Danish context, the picture of her triggers an inter-textual reference to ‘Matador’. Lise Nørgaard has a different role here. She tells the Danish people that Denmark is facing an important decision and therefore she asks the reader to take a stand. This stand is not neutral, but rather positively biased towards the introduction of the Euro when interpreted together with the visual images in the folder. The responsibility of the request is placed on Lise Nørgaard. Thus you cannot hold the sender, i.e. the government, responsible for the quoted speech.

**Semantic Relations**

Semantic relations deal with how the author uses certain words rather than other alternatives to construe the content and thereby build an ideological representation. An analysis of the lexical choices can reveal how words make lexical chains and categorize representations of reality throughout the text.
**Lexical Chains**

A lexical chain is a frequent, more or less dense lexical choice that runs through the text. It indicates a topic and the aspect of reality focussed on in relation to the discourse and context of situation.

The most frequent lexical choices in the text are the monetary expressions ‘euro’ (34 occurrences), ‘coin’ (24 occurrences), and ‘krone’ (6 occurrences). Other frequent lexical chains are ‘Denmark, Danes, Danish’ (24 occurrences), ‘everyday life’ (15 occurrences), and ‘the same’ (6 occurrences). They indicate the author’s perspective on the topic.

The most frequent lexical participant choice is the exophoric pseudo-personal reference to the reader of mass media texts, ‘you’ (20 occurrences). This makes the reader the most frequent participant choice.

**Categorization of Ideational Content**

The headline is construed as a rhetorical question: “What is the big difference if Danish kroner become Danish Euro?”. Euro is re-lexicalized and thereby categorized as a national phenomenon, ‘Danish Euro’, and not – as one might expect – as European. The topic is construed as a national question – essentially a choice between two Danish currencies. The rhetorical question is answered in the subsequent headline: “Your everyday life will be the same”. This claim establishes a new focus that further categorizes the ideational content. Having established that the currency will be Danish in any case, the question of whether or not to join the Euro is now based on the reader’s unchanged everyday life with the Euro, claiming that no change will occur. The same everyday life is further subcategorized to situations of use. The pictures exemplify the written text with images of situations of use in a national Danish context – a shop, a bus, a child in a telephone booth, etc. In addition, the national Danish context is categorized together with sameness both in the written mode “Queen Margrethe II is on the face of the five big coins” and in the visual mode, showing that Queen Margrethe II will be on the face of the Euro as she is on the krone. ‘The Royal Mint’ will even make the Euro coins in Denmark. Below is a chart of the semantic categorizations of the ideational content.
This analysis shows the ideological perspective on reality. The text has a narrow focus on national patriotic values, an unchanged everyday life and specific situations of use. This focus excludes or suppresses other relevant issues regarding the EU and international politics, which are simply not present.

**Antonomy**

Antonomy concerns opposed meanings. An analysis of opposed meanings adds to a further clarification of the view on reality. The most prominent oppositions set up in the folder are between ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’ for the reader in choosing to vote in favour of the Euro.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro coins in Denmark will (mostly) be Danish</td>
<td>Same everyday life</td>
<td>Foreign Euro in Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Danish Euro coins abroad</td>
<td>Same wage and pension</td>
<td>(no use of kroner abroad now)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No exchange fee</td>
<td>Same purchasing power</td>
<td>(Exchange fee now)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No personal effort to exchange money</td>
<td>Same use of money</td>
<td>(personal effort to exchange money now)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy to compare prices in different countries</td>
<td>Same prices</td>
<td>(difficult to compare prices now)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Speculators cannot damage anymore**

As seen in this chart, the text explicitly states the advantages of choosing the Euro, either presented as gains or status quo. Only one disadvantage, ‘foreign Euro coins in Denmark’, is explicitly stated, and is immediately toned down by limiting the occurrence to tourist areas. Disadvantages of the present currency are not mentioned explicitly. By focusing on future advantages, the text presupposes present disadvantageous states of affairs. For example, ‘Speculators cannot damage the Danish economy anymore’ presupposes that speculators can damage the Danish economy now. Such presupposing arguments favour the Euro as having more advantages than the present krone. Another antonomy not mentioned in the chart above is the opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’; between ‘Danes’ and ‘speculators’. Neither the word ‘us’ nor the word ‘Danes’ is used in the text. This is, however, expressed implicitly by reference to the ‘ Danish economy’, i.e. if they damage the Danish economy, they will necessarily also damage the private economy of individuals living in Denmark. This argument may frighten an uncritical reader and thus be a further argument in favour of convincing the reader to vote for the Euro.

**Interpersonal Relations**

The interpersonal meta-function enables the linguistic resources to construct and maintain interpersonal relations. Language under this meta-function is seen as a resource for exchanging information and goods-and-services. The mood system realises speech func-
tions, having many similarities with the concept of speech acts (Austin 1962, Searle 1969, 1979). In information clauses the author can signal the information to be more or less probable or usual. This is known as modalization or ‘epistemic modality’. In goods-and-services clauses, the speaker can signal more or less inclination or obligation. This is known as ‘modulation’ (Halliday, 1994) or ‘deontic modality’ (Palmer, 1986).

Declarative Mood
The declarative is the most frequent mood choice in the text.

5. Euro-mønterne bliver danske
5. The Euro coins will be Danish
11. Der sker ikke de store forandringer i din hverdag, hvis euroen bliver indført.
11. There will not be the big differences in your everyday life if the Euro is introduced.

The author primarily gives information in which arguments and claims are made about the advantages of the Euro.

Interrogative Mood
One clause is in the interrogative mood. This is the very first headline.

1. Hvad er den store forskel hvis danske kroner bliver til danske euro?
1. What is the big difference if Danish kroner become Danish Euro?

This question is not meant to be answered. It is a rhetorical question the function of which is to draw attention and invite the reader to reflect on the possible similarities and differences.

The Categorical Declarative
A significant feature of the text is the use of the categorical or ‘bare’ declarative in most of the clauses.

27. Du behøver ikke veksle penge, før du rejser, så du sparer vekselgebyret.
27. You don’t need to exchange money before you leave, so you save on the exchange fee.
32. Den 1. januar 2004 dukker euroen op i butikkerne.
32. On the first of January 2004 the Euro appears in the shops.

In categorical declaratives, there are no expressions of modality to indicate that the author is less than 100% sure of the validity of the proposition. The systematic use of the bare declarative creates an asymmetrical relation between author and reader by which absolutely valid information is presented to the reader. One might object that a conditional ‘if..then’ frame is set up from the very first sentence in the text ‘what is the big difference if…’ and that this conditional frame must be remembered by the reader throughout the text. The problem is that readers might forget the frame when reading the text. Alternatively, they might not be sure of how much the conditional frame covers – the whole text, future aspects, only clauses containing the conditional ‘if’? When presenting factual information to the reader, the information strategy of the bare declarative is unproblematic. Factual information is, however, not the only information being presented here. The sender makes several claims about the reader’s future with the Euro and speculators’ inability to make money on exchange markets. These categorical claims
about the future can reasonably be called into doubt, since both sender and reader know that the future cannot be predicted. An interpretation of the categorical declaratives might be that the author is trying to convince or persuade an uncertain target group with certain claims and arguments about future life with the Euro. This explanation limits the potential reader group to uncertain voters. Adversaries of the Euro would immediately identify and criticize these certain claims. They would also accuse the Ministry of Economic Affairs of using a persuasive or propagandising strategy unsuitable for a government institution, which should present unbiased objective information. Not surprisingly, this critique was asserted by adversaries from the political outer left- and right-wing parties. Even other institutions accused the Minister of Economic Affairs of using the taxpayers’ money to conduct propaganda. In my opinion, the bare declaratives in the future tense play a major role in calling forth critique from different groups because ideological arguments are presented as facts. The question is, what kind of target group is this text addressing? Certainly not adversaries and convinced Euro supporters. Neither of these groups can be swayed from their decision; the adversaries are critical of the claims and the supporters already agree. A group of uncertain voters might be the target group addressed.

Modality and Modulation
Not all clauses are bare declaratives, since 16% of the sentences contain expressions of modality or modulation. Very few clauses are modalized in the folder, so modalization is not a prominent feature, which is consistent with the bare assertions.

Modalization
9. There will, however, also be a possibility of finding Euro coins from other countries in Denmark – particularly in tourist areas.

The translation into English is not literal. A literal translation of the clause would be ‘There will however also could be found Euro coins from…etc.’ which means ‘Euro coins from other countries can be found in Denmark – particularly in tourist areas’. The modal verb ‘can/could’ expresses a low degree of probability.

Modulation
Modulation is used in some of the clauses realizing goods-and-services.

Modulation
12. You will be able to (= can) use the Euro in exactly the same way as you use kroner today – both at the grocer’s and on the bus.
50. Du kan desuden bestille materiale om euroen …
50. You can also order material about the Euro...

The general pattern of modulation is that a low degree of obligation is used in order to offer the reader possibilities, i.e. what he or she can do with the new currency and not what he or she must or should do with the money.
**Addressee Focus**

Throughout the text, the default subject choice in 84% of all clauses is the second-person pronoun ‘you’, representing the addressee. Eight percent of the clauses have the sender as subject and another 8% are non-interactant persons like ‘the speculators’, whose actions are mentioned. The author has an overwhelming focus on the addressee in the text. The author gives the addressee information about the Euro, makes claims about the everyday life of the addressee, tells the addressee what to do with the Euro in the future and invites the addressee to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor**

A central statement in Lise Nørgaard’s quotation can be analysed as an interpersonal grammatical modal metaphor. Metaphors of modality/modulation are realised by the semantic relation of projection (Halliday, 1994:354), in which modality is expressed in a separate clause, the proposition or proposal in another. The modal projecting clause can have a subjective or an objective orientation. In the quoted comment from Lise Nørgaard is the following projection clause complex:

2. “…. Det er vigtigt, at du tager stilling”
2. “…. It is important that you take (a) stand”
3. Lise Nørgaard
51. Økonomiministeriet
51. Ministry of Economic Affairs

The projecting clause ‘It is important’ has objective orientation. The dummy ‘it’ as subject makes the responsibility unclear – even in spite of the fact that the quoted speech is ascribed to Lise Nørgaard. She could refer to another person’s opinion or express a common cultural attitude in the quotation. The congruent speech function of the projected clause ‘that you take (a) stand’ is that of an imperative obliging command “do this”, i.e. ‘take (a) stand!’. The modulating projecting clause ‘it is important’ expresses a high degree of obligation to the command on the reader, equivalent to the modal verbs ‘ought to’ or ‘must’, as in ‘You must/ought to take a stand’. The command ‘take (a) stand’ is a peculiar semantic choice in the context of voting. It does not make sense to merely ask the reader to have an opinion; that would not make any difference. It is only the physical activity of placing a legal vote in a ballot box that will make a difference.

A further difficulty in assigning responsibility concerns the sender. Lise Nørgaard has a responsibility for what she says, but the sender has the responsibility of quoting her and including her in the text. This adds another layer of responsibility. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has the overall responsibility for the folder, which is signalled in 51, ‘Ministry of Economic Affairs’. Yet, the ministry is controlled by the parties in the government, which in turn controls the Danish State. A Chinese-box-like structure of responsibility appears. The Danish State, and not necessarily the author of the text, may be the actual responsible sender of this folder. The text may have been written by a professional text writer, though this is not mentioned anywhere in the folder. Explicit references are made only to the photographer and graphic design company, but it remains unclear as to who has written the text.
Frames of Responsibility – A Chinese-box-like Structure

The Danish State

The Ministry of Economic Affairs

Political parties in the government

Lise Nørgaard

“It is important that you take a stand”

Objective orientation ‘it’: Who is responsible?

Seen from the perspective of the textual meta-function, this projecting clause complex is given a very prominent place in the text. It is placed on the opening page, together with the continued headline from the front page and a picture of Lise Nørgaard. The clause complex is placed in the quotation in the upper right corner. The utterance is significant because it expresses what the entire text is about, although the exact meaning and responsibility are unclear. From the perspective of the interpersonal meta-function, the utterance is about getting the reader to do something, to vote.

Textual Meta-function

The textual meta-function deals with how the ideational and interpersonal meanings are woven together into clauses and presented as messages in a linear structure with a theme-rheme structure in the text. Theme is the point of departure of the message, while rheme is the development of the (often new) information.

Thematic Choices

The most frequent themes are ‘coins’, ‘you’ and an impersonal formal subject, ‘it’/‘there’. The sender chooses between ‘coins’, ‘the reader’, or an empty theme by using a textual adjunct as a point of departure for constructing the message. These three themes cover 63.1% of all clauses.

The unstressed textual adjunct ‘there’ in theme position gives the sender the opportunity to avoid introducing a participant as theme. The congruent choice is to put the subject in theme position. By choosing the unstressed ‘there’, the subject is avoided and the information is presented as ‘objective’ information. Instead focussing on the responsible ‘subject’, the verbal process is emphasized. Several of the clauses using the impersonal formal subject ‘it’ at theme position are cleft sentences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Det</th>
<th>er kun de danske euro-mønter</th>
<th>Der</th>
<th>har Dronning Margrethe II på forsiden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It</td>
<td>is only the Danish Euro coins</td>
<td>Which</td>
<td>have Queen Margrethe II on the face</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theme | Rheme | Theme | Rheme
The function of the cleft sentence is to place the information as new information in the clause. In the example above, both the Danish Euro coins and Queen Margrethe II are placed in the rheme, which is the normal place for presenting new information. The cleft construction also gives the opportunity to start with an objective formal subject ‘it’ functioning as a ‘placeholder’. In a non-cleft sentence, the Danish Euro coins would be theme and subject in the clause and therefore placed as known information “Only the Danish Euro coins (Theme) have Queen Margrethe II on the face (Rheme).

The themes fall into four main categories:

1) Coins; krone, Euro, sketch of Euro
2) The reader: you, your, we
3) Everyday life; rye bread, wage or pension, everyday life, today
4) National: Denmark, The National Bank of Denmark, The Danes, Queen Margrethe II, Royal Bank Commissioner

Exoforic references are references to persons or things outside the text: ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘you’. The reader must retrieve these references from the context. ‘I’ is made explicit in the text as ‘Minister of Economic Affairs Marianne Jelved’. ‘You’ can only be retrieved by the actual reader in the reading situation. The sender of this mass communicated text naturally does not know the actual reader, but is nonetheless personalizing the message as if the reader were a known interactant in a speech situation.

13. Det, vi skal vænne os til, er, at beløb i euro er lavere end beløb i kroner.

13. That which (= what) we have to get used to is that amounts in Euro are smaller than amounts in kroner.

The use of inclusive ‘we’ involves the sender, the reader and as all Danes as well.

The mode of the text is that it is written-to-be-read together with the dominant proportion of visual elements. The text is construed as a hybrid between written and spoken language. The categorical non-modalized declaratives, address forms with formal titles and royalty, dense nominalizations and the use of technical terms in the caption under the sketch are parts of a written public institutionalized powerful discourse by which the state is communicating to its citizens in a public space.

a. Skitse af den danske 2 Euro udarbejdet af Danmarks Nationalbank efter Møntlovens §2, stk. 3.
a. Sketch of the Danish 2 Euro produced by Ministry of Economic Affairs according to the Law of Coin § 2, subsection 3.

Direct personal address, direct quoted speech, common lexical expressions from everyday situations and few nominalizations are typical of spoken colloquial language by which the sender creates an intimate personal relation as if the state were a person communicating directly with the reader. This can be interpreted as the system world entering into the life world of the reader. The system world is exploiting the life world for purposes in the system world by argumenting in a personal colloquial language and taking everyday life as a point of departure instead of issues that have to do with the system world: state, national and international politics, for example.

In terms of genre, the text is also a hybrid of giving objective information and the persuasive style of advertisements. The objective constructions of clause complexes and factual information in the captions are part of an objective informing genre while the slogans, re-lexicalization, quotations from role models and experts, lexical valuation toward advantages and the many descriptions of situations of use are similar to the language used in advertisements.
Multimodality

Kress and Van Leuwen (2001) consider ‘multimodal texts as making meaning in multiple articulations’ and propose four domains of practice: Discourse, design, production and distribution. These domains are seen as multimodal resources.

A discourse may be interpreted differently than intended. Choices of discourse, conception and values are related to the person’s position in the social and cultural world, which I will consider as the interpreter’s lifestyle.

Kress and Van Leuwen use two concepts to guide the semiotic analysis of multimodal discourse. The first is that of provenance, which means ‘where the signs come from’. Provenance has similarities with the concepts ‘connotation’ and ‘myth’ (R. Barthes). The second concept is called ‘experiential meaning potential’ and concerns the ability to extend practical experience metaphorically.

The Front Page

The visual mode is dominant on the front page with a picture of Lise Nørgaard on a red background. The first part of the rhetorical question, “What is the big difference...”, is located at the top and the ellipsis signals continuation on the next page.

Lise Nørgaard shows a 20-krone coin and an inserted sketch of a Euro coin, holding the Euro higher than the krone coin. The coins appear to be of roughly the same size, have identical strikings of Queen Margrethe II, and are gold. The only visual difference is the silver-coloured ring with Euro stars on the Euro. Lise Nørgaard is smiling and she looks directly into the camera. This gives an effect of direct interpersonal contact with the reader. The text could be taken as direct speech from her, i.e. as her question to the reader. The picture shows that the visual difference between the two coins is minor, but it also does more than this. With the Euro coin being held higher, the Euro is more positively evaluated in the visual mode. This can be analysed as an orientational metaphor of western societies, where cultural values are ascribed to the bodily up-down orientation ‘more is up, less is down’, ‘high status is up, low status is down’, ‘good is up, bad is down’ and ‘rational is up, emotional is down’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:16ff). Following Lakoff and Johnson’s concept, the Euro is evaluated as ‘good’ in comparison with the krone.

The choice of using Lise Nørgaard to present the Euro is a sign of provenance or an intertextual reference. She is known to have written the Danish TV series ‘Matador’ about life in a Danish provincial town. This series is the epitome of Danish culture and history from the inter-war period. The picture of the scriptwriter triggers her work, the
24 episodes of Matador. This is a sign from a different context and a different era that makes a new sign in the new context (that of the Euro Poll). The question is, what are the new meanings added by this sign? One possibility is that the inter-textual reference to Matador adds a conception of an original Danish everyday life culture in ‘the good old days’ of industrial society, before the information society, globalisation and multi-ethnicity developed. Together with the text, the picture of Lise Nørgaard adds and supports the notion that Danish everyday life, traditions, language, nationality and culture will remain unchanged. Does the choice of an elderly woman indicate anything about the target group? The folder could be targeted to elderly women as opinion polls showed this group to be in doubt about the decision. They would therefore be a possible group to influence.

**Background Colours**

The red background colour on the front page adds further meaning to the political discourse about the Euro poll. In Denmark, red is used by ‘Socialdemokratiet’ (The Social Democracy). The moderate left-wing parties support a vote in favour of the Euro. On the next page, the background colour is green.

The shift from red to green background provides a visual shock effect. Red and green are used in traffic signals realizing the meanings ‘stop’ and ‘go’. In a political context, green is used by right-wing parties, while red is used by left-wing parties. A possible interpretation of the red and green backgrounds is that the left- and right-wing parties agree.

**The Second Page**

The second half of the headline continues: “if Danish kroner become Danish Euro”. In the upper left corner is the quotation from Lise Nørgaard with her request that the reader take a stand. She holds one krone and one Euro in each hand. Her arms are outstretched and this bodily position is normally taken in doubtful situations of choice. Her gaze direction is toward the right (Euro) hand and she is smiling moderately. The gaze direction has now changed from ‘contact with the reader’ to ‘focus on the matter’, i.e. to a situation of choice between two currencies. The text above her hands identifies kroner to the left and Euro to the right. People generally look at what they are attracted to. Therefore, her gaze direction can be analysed as favouring the Euro. Her right hand is also a bit higher than the left, and her head is turned towards the right hand, which gives her body a slight front-back orientation with the front being towards the Euro. Again it is possible to draw on the concept of orientational metaphors from ‘Good is up, bad is down’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:14ff). In addition I will elaborate a bit on the concept ‘foreseeable future events are up (and ahead)’. In this instance, the Euro is ahead of her orientation, pointing to her choice and to the future with the Euro. She turns her back to the left hand with the krone in a lower position. We read from left to right in Western culture and therefore we also project progression, development and future from right to left. Another interpretation consistent with the former interpretation is that given information is placed to the left while new information is placed to the right (Kress & Leuwen, 1996:208)

**The Opened Folder**

In the opened folder is a page with seven pictures. The pictures are still dominant, taking up most of the space on the page. Most of the text is also placed on this page, with five of six paragraphs having a subheading over each paragraph. In the centre is a large
sketch of the new Euro with Queen Margrethe II on its face and ‘Denmark’ written on the outer silver–coloured ring. This is the largest picture, and the caption is placed below it. The background colour on this page is a neutral off-white, which calls attention to the pictures and text rather than to the background.

The pictures exemplify situations of use, Danish traditions/culture in life situations, and only show children and elderly people. This could be seen as a design towards a target group of elderly people being grandparents and the situations illustrating typical social situations with grandparents and children.

**The Back**

On the back page are nine sketches of the new Euro coins. Eight of the sketches show the face of the eight new Euro coins, while one sketch shows the reverse side of a 2-Euro coin. The sketches exemplify and expand the text by showing what the coins will likely look like. This is the most informative part of the folder, because it offers new information about the look of the new coins; the claim that the folder contained factual information is at least partly true. The sketches are not a presentation of how the actual coins will be, because a new portrait of the Queen is planned for the Euro.

Slightly below the centre is a graphical representation of Minister of Economic Affairs Marianne Jelved’s signature. This signature adds a personal responsibility, a personal sender of the information and a guarantee that she vouches for the content by her authority as Minister of Economic Affairs.

**Conclusion**

The analysis above demonstrates the possibility to give a rich, specific and detailed account of the verbal and visual meanings realised in the folder by combining SFL and multimodal analysis. Thus, it is enables us to be very specific about how and what the public authority communicates to the citizens through the text. This method can be applied to other multimodal texts from public authorities to citizens with the purpose of analysing the detailed meanings and subtle communicative strategies in such texts.

The analysis showed the folder to have a major focus on the reader position. The experiential content or ideology built up around the reader position has a very narrow focus on everyday life and the use of money in typical and traditional Danish cultural contexts with immoral villains trying to damage the Danish economy from abroad. Due to this narrow focus, other relevant publicly available political issues in the Euro context were not thematized. A tension is thereby created between the narrow focus in the text and what readers might be able to recall of relevant issues from other related texts about the topic in the public context. The analysis also showed that the folder consists of subtle persuasive and biased communicative strategies, while unbiased information of common interest to all citizens is limited to information about the coins: appearance, number, weight, material, etc. Yet this common information is used as arguments in the persuasive strategy. The main persuasive strategy is even contradictory: On the one hand the text states that everyday life will be the same, but on the other, everyday life will be changed, i.e. it will be easier and have several personal advantages. The persuasive strategy and complex responsibility pattern are so implicit and subtle that only close analysis can give a specific account that offers an answer as to why this folder was so heavily debated in the mass media and why so many readers reacted and judged the folder to
be ‘propaganda’. The analysis shows that this piece of public information is a hybrid (Fairclough; 1989, 1992) of a persuasive commercialized strategy woven together with information used as arguments in the persuasive strategy. The persuasive strategy, with an overweight of pictures rather than text, is similar to that of advertising genres. The use of persuasive strategies can be seen in other information campaigns from other public authorities, e.g. traffic, alcohol, anti-smoke in which public authorities hire professional communication agencies to plan and carry out public information campaigns.

The mixture of persuasion and information in the folder raises a further question: Which target group might this folder attract? Certainly not readers expecting impartial public information. Such readers might likely consider the persuasive strategy with its contradictions and the narrow thematic focus to be derogatory. The reader position is further more implicitly ascribed a certain set of values – an ideology. The image of the reader that emerges through both the written and visual modes is that of a patriotic Dane. The reader is assumed to be mostly engaged in the context of his or her own everyday life as well as national symbols of old traditional Danish culture. An image of a self-centred person is created by focusing on personal advantages of voting for the Euro: savings, easy usability, same value, etc. This can be seen as an individualized post-modern narcissistic discourse – ‘Is it an advantage for me?’ (Lash, 1982, 1985; Ziehe, 1983, 1989). The ideology ascribed to the reader position can be the basis for clarifying the overall communicative strategy more precisely.

The folder is presented as public information by using the public authority as sender, which signals ‘objective information’. But the content turns out to be guided by special political interests dressed up as public information, thereby violating the norms of public information. Furthermore, these special political interests are presented as a piece of market communication drawing on advertising genres. This positions the reader in a consumer role, which entails ‘selfishness’ rather than a focus on general public benefit. This provides an understanding of why the folder provoked such heavy debate in the mass media.

Note
1. Marianne Jelved is member of the centre party ‘Radikale Venstre’.

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THE NON-FINDING OF THE CULTIVATION EFFECT IN ICELAND

GUDBJÖRG HILDUR KOLBEINS

It’s been a quarter of a century since George Gerbner and his associates published a series of articles in the Journal of Communication on the cultivation hypothesis. They argued that television supplied its viewer with a distorted picture of reality. At the essence of the cultivation hypothesis is the fact that violence is rampant on television and it has been found that heavy viewers of television tend to believe that the world they live in is like the world they see on television. For example, heavy viewers of television overestimate the amount of those who are employed in law enforcement and they tend to report a higher sense of personal risk and mistrust (see for example Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1977; Gerbner et al., 1978; Gerbner et al., 1979 and Gerbner et al., 1980).

It should be noted that Gerbner has always maintained that the theory of cultivation is a theory of cumulative long-term exposure to television, NOT to exposure of specific genres (Gerbner, 1990).

The cultivation hypothesis has been heavily criticized over the years. For example, Doob and Macdonald (1979) found that heavy viewers of television are more likely to be afraid of their environment. However, and importantly, when one controls for the crime rate in people’s neighborhoods, this relationship disappears. Gerbner and his colleagues reacted to this study by introducing the concept of “resonance”, i.e. they argued that television violence amplifies the fear of those who are most likely to be victimized and those who live in high crime areas. A recent study by Shrum and Bischak (2001) found that the estimates of crime risk were significantly higher for those who had direct experience with crime and were heavy viewers of television than for those who also had direct experience with crime but were lighter viewers of television.

Despite Gerbner’s claim that the cultivation effect is the consequence of people’s total exposure to television, most studies in the area of cultivation research have looked at people’s viewing of specific genres like crime drama and news. Recently, one study has looked at how crime coverage on network TV news has affected the viewers’ perception of crime (Lowry et al., 2003).

It has been difficult to replicate the findings of U.S. cultivation studies abroad or among foreign audience in the U.S. In Australia, Hawkins and Pingree (1981) found that the so-called “Mean World”-index was associated with the sample’s viewing of U.S. programs but not with viewing of non-U.S. programs. In Great Britain, Wober failed at first to find any cultivation effect among the British audience and concluded that “what may be true in America is not true in Britain” (Wober, 1978: 320). He did later find a
significant relationship between viewing of U.S. crime drama and fear but NOT between viewing of British crime drama and fear (Wober, 1990).

It is the purpose of the present study to attempt to investigate whether one finds the cultivation effect in Iceland. The question is: Does viewing of television violence make Icelandic viewers distrust other people and more afraid of walking alone at night? Moreover, it will be studied whether the viewers’ own delinquent behavior, and thus their own experience as offenders, affects the relationship between viewing of violence and the “Mean World”-syndrome. It may be expected that television violence amplifies the fear of those who have direct experience with crime.

Methodology

Sample and Procedure
The present study was conducted in Iceland in September and October, 2002. Questionnaires were administered by teachers to students in 8th through 10th grade in 15 schools in the Reykjavik-metropolitan area. Nine of the schools were located in Reykjavik, two in Kópavogur, two in Hafnarfjörður, one in Seltjarnarnes and one in Garðabær. Each school represented approximately 10,000 inhabitants. The students had 40 minutes, or one class hour, to complete the questionnaire. No problems were reported. The final sample included 965 participants.

Independent and Dependent Variables
The “Mean World”-syndrome was measured by asking the students to indicate on a four point scale whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, agreed or strongly agreed with five statements. The statements were based on previous cultivation research (Signorielli, 1990). However, on purpose, all of the items were positively worded. The “Mean World”-index included the following statements: People are usually very helpful, Most people are honest, Most people can be trusted. It is safe to walk alone in downtown Reykjavik on a Saturday night, and It is safe to walk alone in my neighborhood on a Saturday night.

The “Mean World”-questions are usually pooled to make a scale but the reliability alpha was so low in this case that each question was used independently as a dependent variable. Age and gender were used as control variables in all of the analyses. Also, as the family plays an important role in the lives of adolescents and affects television viewing, the family cohesion and the family violence scales were used as controls (for further discussion on these scales, please see Kolbeins, 2002).

To measure the sample’s viewing of television violence, the respondents were asked to indicate on a nine-point scale how often they watched crime drama, action programs and horror movies. Those three items were combined in a scale with a reliability alpha of .65

Delinquency was measured by 26 items which asked the respondents on a seven-point Likert-scale how often they had engaged in activities like stealing something from convenience stores, buying alcohol, damaging bus shelters etc. (see Kolbeins, 2002). Factor analysis of the items revealed five factors, i.e. vandalism, alcohol consumption, theft, serious offenses and drug abuse. This classification was consistent with findings from a previous study (Kolbeins, 2002). The items for each factor were combined into a scale and each scale recoded. A total score on a scale of 1 was recoded into 0, which meant that the student had never engaged in any of the measured activities and a total score of 1,1 or higher was recoded as 1 – which meant that the student had engaged in at least one
of the activities of that scale. The five scales were then combined to make a total delinquent score – with the highest possible number being 5.

Results

Believing in People’s Trustworthiness

The zero-order correlation between viewing of violence and each of the three statements (believing people are helpful, believing people are honest and believing it’s possible to trust people) was non-significant. Simply put, there is absolutely no relationship between Icelandic adolescents’ viewing of television violence and their trusting people.

Regression analysis revealed that age, gender and family cohesion/family violence all predicted the participants’ trust in other people. As family cohesion/family violence are powerful predictors of delinquency, once they were removed as controls, delinquency also predicted the adolescents’ trust or mistrust.

Younger children and girls are more trusting, and children from close-knit families are also more trusting. Not surprisingly, the more delinquent juveniles are less trusting. Viewing of television violence did not in any way predict the adolescents’ belief in people’s trustworthiness. By the same token, there was no indication that viewing of television violence resonated fear among those who were more delinquent.

Feeling Safe Walking Alone at Night

The zero-order correlations between feeling safe walking alone in one’s own neighborhood and feeling safe walking alone in downtown Reykjavík were both significant. However, these relationships were not in the expected direction or like the cultivation hypothesis would predict. The zero-order correlation between viewing of violence and feeling it’s safe to walk alone in one’s own neighborhood was .12 and the zero-order correlation between viewing of violence and feeling it’s safe to walk alone in downtown Reykjavík on a Saturday night was .08. Note that both of these correlations are positive! That is, the more the adolescents seemed to watch violence, the safer they felt walking alone at night.

All of the control variables, i.e. age, gender, family cohesion/family violence and delinquency predicted the adolescents’ feeling that it was safe to walk alone in their own neighborhood. Older adolescents felt safer than the younger ones, boys felt safer than girls, and more delinquent adolescents felt safer than the less delinquent ones. Adolescents from cohesive families felt less safe. In addition, even after adding the control variables, the positive relationship between viewing of violence and feeling safe walking in one’s own neighborhood at night was still significant.

The same results were found for the relationship between age, gender, family cohesion/family violence and delinquency and feeling safe walking alone in downtown Reykjavík. However, the relationship between television violence viewing and feeling safe, or unsafe, in downtown Reykjavík disappeared when the control variables were added to the regression.

How about News?

Studies, conducted in the U.S., have repeatedly shown that television news cultivates fear. Thus, it was felt necessary to look at if television news might cultivate fear even though violent television programs did not seem to do so.
The adolescents’ frequency of viewing of news, news programs, discussion programs and documentaries was scaled into one variable with a reliability alpha of .71.

There was no relationship between viewing of news programs and believing it’s safe to walk alone in one’s own neighborhood. However, the correlation between viewing of news programs and feeling safe walking around downtown Reykjavík was significant and in the predicted direction (-.08). It seemed that the more the adolescents watched news programs, the more afraid they were walking alone at night in downtown Reykjavík – just as the cultivation hypothesis would predict.

As family cohesion/family violence predict viewing of news, those variables were added as controls, and as expected, the relationship between viewing of news and feeling unsafe in downtown Reykjavík became non-significant.

Discussion
The present study tried to examine whether Gerbner’s arguments about television gradually cultivating fear and mistrust in its viewers held true among Icelandic teenage viewers. The results indicate that there is absolutely no evidence for the cultivation effect in Iceland. On the contrary, it was found that the more the adolescents watched violence on television, the safer they felt walking alone at night in their own neighborhood. Interestingly, these results are consistent with the findings of Tamborini and Choi (1990). They found that the more Korean university students in the U.S. watched crime-related entertainment, the safer they felt walking alone in their own neighborhoods. Unfortunately, Tamborini and Choi did not offer any explanation for their findings.

It has to be admitted that one cannot easily come up with an explanation for these unexpected and surprising results. Two related explanations may be possible. Firstly, watching television violence teaches adolescents how to apply force or defend themselves if someone attacks them. Thus, the adolescents may feel that if they are attacked when walking alone, they know how to defend themselves. Secondly, it is known that viewing violence makes one immune to interpersonal violence. Thus, those who are heavy viewers of violence may be immunized to the discussion on violence and the crime rate in Reykjavík or their own town. Or the adolescents may simply believe that compared to the U.S., for example, it is quite safe to walk alone in Iceland. Also, it is quite possible that they are so fully aware that the crime programs take place in another country, mostly the U.S., that they don’t even consider that what’s happening on television may happen in Iceland. It should be kept in mind, of course, that the crime rate in Iceland is miniscule compared to the crime rate in the U.S.

The studies by Hawkins and Pingree (1981) and Wober (1990) have previously found some evidence for the cultivation effect in Australia and Great Britain but their results were contingent on the audience viewing of U.S. programming. They did not find any relationship between their samples viewing of non-U.S. programs and the “Mean World”-syndrome.

Although studies which have been conducted in the U.S. have repeatedly found a relationship between people’s viewing of television and their feeling of insecurity and fear, non-U.S. research has for the most part failed to replicate those findings. Once again, a cultivation study, carried out outside of the U.S. has failed to find support for the cultivation hypothesis.

Keeping in mind the findings of the present study and the findings of other non-U.S. studies on the cultivation effect, one can easily make the claim, based on the known
evidence, that the cultivation hypothesis is only/mostly applicable to the U.S. audience in the United States. Borrowing from Wober, one can argue that what may be true in America is not true in the rest of the world. Which brings one to the question, why have cultivation studies outside of the U.S. consistently failed to replicate the findings of the U.S. studies?

The first and most obvious reason is probably the different nature of television programming in the U.S. compared to other countries. At the heart of Gerbner’s hypothesis lies the assumption that all television programs carry the same underlying message to the audience. Gerbner and his colleagues have pointed out in the past that American television portrays a distorted picture of reality where crime, for example, is much more common than in the real world. Consequently, the members of the television audience are told time and again that they live in a dangerous world and shouldn’t trust anyone – which then makes them distrustful and paranoid. In a nutshell, the world of American television is a world of crimes and criminals. This is supported by the fact that people’s viewing of American programs but not their viewing of non-U.S. programs has been found to be related to their perception of fear.

Although U.S. television programs, among them popular U.S. crime drama, weigh heavily in the viewing diet of the Icelandic audience, viewers are, at least to some degree, also exposed to programming from their own country and other European countries, mostly Great Britain. It’s certainly true that British programming portrays crimes and criminals but as Wober found, British crime drama does not, for some reason, cultivate fear in its viewers. This may be due to certain differences between British and American crime drama.

Thus, even though Icelandic adolescents are heavy viewers of U.S. crime drama and U.S. action shows, their viewing doesn’t cultivate in them any fear of their own environment or make them distrustful of other people because they are not exclusively exposed to the American television version of reality as their U.S. counterparts. It may be said that the Icelandic viewers are getting a more balanced view of reality and that any influence that U.S. programming may have on their perceptions of reality is counterbalanced by programming from their own country and other countries. It is thus argued that the lack of the cultivation effect in other countries is simply due to the fact that Gerbner’s assumption about the world of television and its messages is only applicable to and true for U.S. television and that the overall message of non-U.S. programs does not emphasize crime or a sense of insecurity.

The present study did not look at the effects of viewing of television violence on the adolescents’ perception of the U.S. It is quite possible that viewing of television violence, especially viewing of U.S. crime drama like Law & Order, is cultivating fear of the U.S. in Icelandic adolescents even though U.S. crime drama is not cultivating fear in them of their own environment.

Moreover, the nature of the American society per se may be a contributing factor to the existence of the cultivation effect in the U.S. As the social critic Michael Moore so poignantly pointed out in his award-winning documentary Bowling for Columbine, there is a certain obsession with crime and violence among Americans – an obsession which television distorts and amplifies. The crime rate and the ownership of guns is generally lower in European countries, for example, than in the United States. Europeans should therefore have a stronger sense of security and feel safer in their own environment than Americans, making them less likely to be influenced by television.
To summarize, as the present study failed to find support for the cultivation hypothesis, it is proposed that the cultivation effect of television is to be found where the audience is exposed to only one television reality, a reality portrayed by people and for people whose own culture puts vast emphasis on violence and encourages the feeling of fear.

Bibliography
Current public and academic discussion in the US tends to support the view that American commercial radio has taken a totally new direction for two reasons: the massive station ownership concentration after the Telecom Act of 1996 and the new digital technology. This view is very common among radio scholars and industry professionals – as well as journalists who write about radio media in the US.

Some critics argue that this new form of corporate radio, owned by enormous, publicly traded companies, has changed radio’s economic power structure so that these giants may now – using the latest in digital technology – transform what had been lively and local commercial radio into a sheer generic commodity. Local productions have been replaced with syndicated content and in the smaller markets many stations are programmed with pseudo-local and pseudo-live pre-recorded content, using the method of computerized, remote voice tracking also known as “cyber-jocking”. As a result, in February 2003 the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) launched an advocacy campaign, called “Keep Radio Live”, against the voice tracking plans of the largest radio giant, Clear Channel Communications (AFTRA 2003).

However, from a political economic perspective these recent developments in US radio can be understood as a strengthening and intensifying of certain deep and historical processes characteristic of profit-seeking, advertising-supported commercial radio, rather than as a turning point or a breakthrough of truly new phenomena. (Meiksins Wood 1998, 39-40; 47). Without doubt, US commercial radio has changed significantly because of the new ownership structure, but isn’t the direction of change already familiar?

Although technologies are not neutral (Aufderheide 1999, 108; Ala-Fossi & Stavitsky 2003), it is also very unlikely that the new digital technology would have independently determined the way its capacity is now used. New technologies are always shaped by pre-existing social relations, which also define which technological advances will make a breakthrough and how they will be implemented (Winston 1998, 342; Streeter 1996, 70-71). In the following article I will examine some central themes and arguments concerning the current discussion from a political economic perspective, and try to analyze the differences between corporate and non-corporate US commercial radio.
Breaking the Market Boundaries

Fairchild (1999, 549) has described the development after the Telecom Act of 1996 as “deterritorializing” radio, which has removed necessary connections between a radio station and its local community.

According to Huntemann (1999, 400), “syndicated programming and corporate-developed playlists” have now decreased airplay of local talents and community tastes. Both Douglas (1999) and Mathews (2002) have also reported how radio, which used to be a highly local medium, is now transforming into a national business due to new technology and corporate ownership. Nellessen & Brady (2000, 6) have even argued that now, “for the first time in radio’s history it is moving away from its defining principles”.

On the contrary, my argument here is that this change is an example of how history repeats itself, because the basic economics of radio is again driving profit-seeking companies toward increasingly centralized program production. There are no reasons to romanticize the past: US commercial radio became a national business – for the first time – as early as the late 1920’s without any corporate station ownership or computer technology (McChesney 1993, 17-18; McChesney 2001). Acquisitions and mergers are not the only means of entering new geographic markets (Picard 2002, 199), and old technology can also be used to blur market boundaries (Sohn et al.1999, 131). In the 1920’s, federal regulations limiting the number of stations one company could own were simply avoided by making private network affiliation contracts with locally owned stations (LeDuc 1987, 9-11; 78-79), and commercial network companies created their national broadcasting networks by connecting local radio stations to one another using existing telephone lines (Smulyan 1994, 63). The same has now been done by removing the ownership caps and using modern computer and satellite technology, but the basic economic motives are the same as 75 years ago.

Because commercial radio is not basically a business of producing and broadcasting programs but is instead a business of producing desired audiences for advertisers (Smythe 1977; Glasser 1984, 129,131) with minimal cost for maximal profit, all money spent on programs can be seen as an unwanted expense on an intermediate product. (Picard 1989, 56-57; Hendy 2000, 13, 67). Just as the early network companies before them, new radio corporations are trying to exploit their large-market, high-salary performing talents as efficiently as they can (Ditingo 1995, 37-38). Because radio program production always has a high fixed cost but distribution is relatively inexpensive, it is cost-effective to distribute the expensive star-talent output from a single urban market to as many geographical markets as possible. Wide distribution of output decreases the relative cost of producing the audience per listener, so that even the high cost of this kind of centralized production is still substantially lower than it would be with multiple simultaneous local productions. (Smythe 1977,4; Picard 1989, 65-66). This is the case with both program syndication and remote voice tracking, i.e. cyber-jocking. However, in the old network radio – as well as in modern syndication – the program output is identical everywhere, whereas in computerized voice tracking the output can be specially adapted to each market.

As Meiksins Wood (1998, 39) has pointed out, using new technologies for production does not represent an epochal shift, but instead “allows the logic of the old mass production economy to be diversified and extended”. Technologies are products of social relations: it is not the new technology itself determining the way it is used or allowing the removal of broadcast regulation – it is the market deregulation that allows companies to use suitable new technologies as means to achieve increasingly high productivity.
WORTH MORE DEAD THAN LIVE

(Winston 1998, 342; Streeter 1996, 70-71; Walker 2001, 277; Picard 1989, 13; Sohn et al.1999, 117). In the new environment, large radio corporations can now think nationally and globally while simultaneously easily operating regionally and locally with digital technology.

As noted, early radio network programming was similar in every market, with the affiliate station taking care of the local side. Because each station was, in legal terms, still a separate local entity, this model could be called quasi-local. Now that these stations can operate under same owner, basically similar programs, playlists and other programming items can easily be transferred between stations, differentiated and to a certain degree adapted to each market by simply adding a small local touch (McChesney 1998, 16). Using Bartlett’s and Ghoshal’s (1998) categorization for cross-border operations as a basis, this model could be described here as “transregional” (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998, 15-20; Sohn et al.1999, 199-200; Picard 2002, 212-229).

Radio has great potential as a local medium, but at the same time it also has potential to reach across limits (Hendy 2000, 215; Picard 1989, 30). This means that radio is not inherently a local medium. However, in radio’s beginnings in the US it was considered a local medium and broadcasting legislation has always treated it accordingly. At the same time, FCC regulation tried to promote localism (Berquist 2001, 5, 20-21). Although this all was not highly successful, it maintained a certain structure. When the government regulation is removed (it can also be simply ignored, as in pirate radio), market regulation takes over, resulting in potential audience demographics and psychographics, more than pure geography, determining commercial radio markets. (Massel 1962, 201-202; Compaigne 2000, 550; Mosco 1996, 201-202; Huntemann 1999, 395; Hendy 2000, 24-25) If there are no other limits, it is the relationship between production and delivery costs and advertising revenues that finally determines the size of markets. (Picard 1989, 21; Albarran 1996, 28; Sohn et al.1999, 196, 230, 239; Picard 2002, 143) In other words, the removal of the national radio station ownership cap in the US released an old genie from the bottle, where it had been waiting for decades.

In the past, the networks received money only for national advertising during national programming, but affiliates sold local advertising on their own account. Today, about three quarters of a radio station’s annual revenue comes from local advertising (Ditingo 1995, 16-17). When the same large corporation receives revenues for both national and local advertising (Hendy 2000, 40-41), it makes contemporary national radio business much more profitable. Thus centralized but adaptable models of program production are likely both the most cost-efficient and potentially profitable ways to operate in the radio business. At the same time that these new radio corporations have been able to drastically cut production costs and gain new revenues, the market value of US radio stations has increased significantly during the ownership concentration process. According to a recent industry report, the average price of all radio stations increased by a 37.5% compounded annual rate between 1991 and 2000 (BIA 2002, 11-13). This was to the advantage of the owners and shareholders, not the public or stakeholders (McChesney 2001), but this is how US commercial radio literally became worth more dead (or at least non-live) than live.

**Taylorization7 of the DJ Work**

Former Clear Channel Radio CEO Randy Michaels has reminded us that many local DJs playing cheap, recorded music replaced the high-salary national network stars and expensive live orchestra performances in radio during the 1950’s (Mathews 2002). It was
then a new cost-effective way of programming, developed when the old US network radio collapsed after the rise of television. This metamorphosis of radio was possible only because radio station ownership was not yet concentrated, and the entire industry did not go down with the networks. In turn, high-salaried, non-local and even virtual DJs have forced aside many local live voices. However, station ownership concentration after the removal of national radio station ownership caps under the Telecommunication Act of 1996 and the development of satellite and computer technology were not the reasons or motives for this transformation, but instead merely prerequisites for running radio business more cost-effectively by using syndication or remote voice-tracking in the small markets. The real reason behind the change is simply the growing demand for a higher return on investment.

Concentration of ownership resulted in huge cost savings by merely eliminating all overlapping positions. Because a group of local stations can use the same regionally or nationally centralized corporate services instead of many individual, locally based services, personnel costs can be cut down to a minimum (Huntemann 1999, 401-402; Albarran 1996, 54). Replacing a station’s live local DJs with imported “cyber-jocks”, who produce their pseudo-local shows quickly from a distant location, sometimes several days in advance, is also an excellent example of spatialization. The practice of remote voice tracking particularly concerns overcoming the normal constraints of space and time, in both radio production as well as radio consumption. A large radio corporation can combine both economies of scale (virtually identical program products for many markets) and economies of scope (multi-station selection for each market) with economies of speed (production takes less time). (Picard 1989, 62-63; Picard 2002, 54-55; Mosco 1996, 173; Menzies 1998, 92)

It is now also possible to create completely virtual radio stations, which can be stored in the company computer network system; this is an example of economies of integration, which use shared platforms in the cost-efficient creation of new services (Nellessen & Brady 2000, 4,12; Picard 2002, 55).

This kind of virtual radio and pseudo-local voice tracking, by which a remote DJ lies about a living relation to the community and greets invented people in pre-recorded speaks, might first seem an outrageous fraud from the listener’s point of view. But this is a result of a long process of a “Taylorization” of DJ work (Robins & Webster 1988, 53) – and may be only the tip of the iceberg.

The first format radio DJs were usually able to select the records they played rather independently, using their own judgment and expertise, but as the format method developed, management control and supervision gradually increased, following the basic principles of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management and of Fordism: a) selecting records for airplay and b) choosing the order and frequency in which they were to be played was separated from c) the process of actually playing the records and d) hosting the show on-air (Smythe 1977, 18; Sohn et al.1999, 84-86; Ritzer 2000, 28-30; Clement 1988, 223-224; Robins & Webster 1988, 65-66). The great payola scandals in 1959 –1960 gave radio stations an excellent excuse to implement Taylor’s scientific management theories and as a result DJ autonomy was restricted even more (Fornatale & Mills 1980, 53; Segrave 1994, 89,93; Douglas 1999, 245, 248, 251; Walker 2001, 59-61). Already at this point, some stations tried to use prerecorded announcements instead of live DJs between records, while others pursued an increase in DJ and playlist control, for instance using industrial timing clocks indicating the rotation of top-three songs. (Hilliard & Keith 2001, 182; Walker 2001, 59-62)
During the ensuing decades, radio broadcasting technology has developed in a way that has decreased the possibilities to resist control even more. Today, practically every commercial music station counts on computerized on-air systems, which include not only the playlist but all audio elements of the station. Because everything is now in digital form in an automated system, there is no need for anyone to c) actually play the tangible records, either. On some stations the DJ can still change songs or promos for airplay within certain limits, but on other stations they are not allowed to touch the list at all. Although an intentional deviation might not be noticed on air, all actions are recorded in a system log. This potential for surveillance and control has virtually eliminated the DJ’s autonomy. (Nellessen & Brady 2000,4-5; Hendy 2000, 227; Robin s & Webster 1988, 57) Although the relationship between radio DJ and record has always been different than, for example, between performer and music, contemporary music format radio DJs have very little to do with the a) selection and b) rotation and finally also c) playing of music on their show. Still, they are expected to bring their creative – but not too creative – contribution to the show by otherwise using their talent in d) hosting the show.

During the first decades of radio, US stations had to expressly announce when they were going to play a recording “so that the public would not be deceived into thinking the performer was there in person” (Segrave 1994, 71). As modern radio listeners, we do not usually expect that any music performance we hear on the radio is actually live. We have gradually been taught to think this way. On the other hand, we have been also been taught to believe that the DJ would always be live, although the case has hardly ever been this simple. Because live broadcast was first the only, and later still the cheapest, way to produce radio programming, an early DJ show was usually mostly live (Tusa 1993, 7-8; Hendy 2000, 88). The practice of non-live, tape-recorded shows began in the US just after the World War II, when Bing Crosby refused to continue making a live repeat of his popular show for the West Coast. He first tried instant disk recordings, but soon began to use the new tape-recording machines. Because of good sound quality and all the possibilities the new device offered, radio stations soon adopted it. For example, famous DJ Alan Freed regularly made recorded shows already in 1953 (Winston 1998, 266-267; Gronow & Saunio 1998, 96-97; Douglas 1999, 230-231). But as George Lucas’ movie American Graffiti (1973) has shown us, the tangible nature of a taped show required human supervision even in the middle of the night. Consequently, the practice of pre-recording at least part of the otherwise live show or some parts of daily programming was already widespread in American commercial music radio over 30 years ago (Zarecki 2002, 28; Shepherd 2001).

There is a certain difference between broadcasting a straight, open rerun of an earlier show, or recording a show in advance for later use, and intentionally creating a recorded program in such a manner that it would be interpreted by the audience as something other than what it actually is. However, already in the early 1950’s, some US stations offered radio programming that was certainly live and not recorded, but was not “real” at all – the reality was simulated. For example, format radio pioneers Gordon McLendon became famous for his sports broadcasts, in which he re-created sports events using sound effects in real-time radio, without actually seeing the game (Garay 1992, 19-21, 56-58; Zarecki 2002, 28). Although it is possible to argue as Żarecki (2002) quite correctly does – that it is thus such that the practice of modern voice-tracking actually brings nothing new to American radio but rather combines these two old traditions – in the end this argument does not make pseudo-local voice tracking any more acceptable ethnically or morally.
As Nyre (2001) argues, the development of recording, sound editing and broadcasting technology has resulted in the relation between reality and radio becoming increasingly complicated to the degree that “external reality is vanishing from media presentations”. (Nyre 2001, 15) Automation makes the syndication of program material across networks of stations smoother and breaks down the distinction between local and non-local programming, blurring the radio’s sense of place (Hendy 2000, 103, 185; Ditingo 1995, 16-17, 91-95), so that it becomes “radio from nowhere produced by nobodies” (Kirn 2003). Many stations that still produce most of their programming locally have also adopted the practice of voice tracking (Karr 2002). Since late 1970’s it has been possible for DJs to record their day-time, night-time and weekend shows in advance, making it unnecessary to be present at the moment of broadcasting: when four-hour shifts can be voice-tracked in 15-30 minutes, companies can save a great deal of money (Fornatale & Mills 1980, 144). In many cases, the morning show is the only one still broadcast live, because it is considered the most important show of the day and requires some timeliness to be successful. (Nellessen & Brady 2000, 8-9; Allan 2002; Love 2002; Starr 2002; Kelly 2002)

All this means at least four things. First, a music radio DJ, who initially worked for the most part in a vital relationship with both the music and the listeners, has now been totally separated from not only the music but also the live audience. Another issue is that both syndication and voice tracking means that fewer voices in general – and especially fewer new voices – will ever have a chance to be on the air. While the industry has thus far been satisfied with the “elimination of marginal talent” (Zarecki 2002, 29) this also means that there will be significantly smaller pool of new talent to draw from. Third, using more voice-tracking means increased editorial control over DJ work, because an increasing amount of their work is done “off-line”. Everything to be said on the air, as well as everything to be played, can be completely controlled both before and after the show. This is not to say that it will be controlled, but it can be. Also, this means that a substantial part of a station’s local production is not live at all – not to mention records and syndicated shows – but is instead pseudo-live. If the DJ is not actually present, but is rather in another time and/or place in the form of a recording, does it actually matter where or when the music show was recorded, since listeners cannot call in or receive information about an oncoming storm that is developing in real-time (Shingler and Wieringa 1998, 104; Nellessen & Brady 2000, 9-10)? This is certainly something that influences “the very rhythms, patterns, pace, texture and disciplines of everyday life” (Robins & Webster 1988, 46).

The McDonaldization of Commercial Format Radio

For some reason, it seems to be quite common for representatives of the US radio industry to compare their products with those of the fast food giant McDonald’s (Ahlqvist 2001,352; Karr 2002; Stimson 2002). In one case, former Clear Channel radio CEO even described their national KISS brand by comparing it to the McDonald’s franchising system (Mathews 2002). These comparisons are actually quite descriptive, but do not reveal all the similarities between the production of fast food and format radio. The resemblance between these two processes is much older, deeper and more comprehensive than is seen at first glance. Firstly, both methods were based on the same precursory socioeconomic developments in American society, developed during the mid-1950’s. Also both a fast food restaurant and a format radio station rely on basic dimensions of McDonaldization:

In short, both try to create a predictable and familiar alternative for repeated personal consumption by offering consistent choice with limited selection of goods within the same genre. There is some variation, but it is intentional and controlled. Listeners can expect a format radio station that offers their favorite content to have (at least) tolerable programming (primarily a certain genre of music), just as they can always expect to receive an edible hamburger in a hamburger restaurant. Both try to provide a certain kind of consistent quality\textsuperscript{18} for their customers. Viewed this way, format radio was already thoroughly McDonaldized from the very start, even when it was strictly a local business. And after local success, both these methods have become a basis for national – and later international – business operations.

The efforts of large radio corporations to build national format brands through franchising takes the McDonaldization of commercial format radio to a new level. Franchising is an attempt to multiply earlier success by transferring and adapting a reliable product and production pattern developed elsewhere into new geographical markets. The franchised national brands promise the end-users of the commodities a predictable experience. In the fast-food business the promise is meant for those who consume fast food, but the new national radio brands are created primarily for advertisers (Mathews 2002; Karr 2002). While American listeners have come to expect consistent commercial radio stations in their local environments over the past 40 years, over 12,000 separate US radio stations with different formats and audiences present an inconsistent and difficult field from the perspective of national advertisers. For Clear Channel, the KISS brand is an easier concept to sell than are 44 separate audiences, and also gives advertisers a guarantee that their message will be received in a similar context in every market. Of course, franchising also provides necessary product differentiation (for both listeners and advertisers) between otherwise interchangeable radio products in every market, and guides listener choice in moving from one market to another (Massel 1962,203-204; Leeds 2002; Hendy 2000,168; Picard 2002, 73, 142).

Franchising gives companies the opportunity to combine centralized control and support functions such as research and planning with decentralized, and even partly autonomous, production. The central agency could serve as coordinator, interacting constantly with the individual franchises using new technology. Thus, Clear Channel could also easily create a locally produced though still nationally consistent KISS brand, but this is not the case (Meiksins 1998, 155-156). There are no longer any economic or regulatory reasons to operate within less cost-effective quasi-national models. As we have noted, radio production has a relatively high fixed cost, but because of the intangible nature of intermediate products (programs), the marginal cost of distribution is low. Therefore, highly centralized production makes economic sense. On the contrary, in the fast food business, production (or at least final assembly) is relatively cheap and the intermediate products (buns, beef, etc.) are tangible as well as consumable – although the real commodities (audience, meal experience) in both industries are intangible and in a certain sense not consumable at all (Smythe 1977, 15-16; Compaigne 2000, 549, 551; Albarran 1996, 27-28).

**Increasing Standardization and Mainstreaming of Playlists**

At first glance, it might seem that the process of creating station playlists for music stations has also been severely affected – or even damaged – by ownership concentration.
However, the number of gatekeepers selecting content for airplay was already decreasing steadily in the late 1970’s (Fornatale & Mills 1980, 142). Now a single brand manager can design playlists for several stations across the country and even make their playlists completely identical (Mathews 2002; Huntemann 1999, 400). Although this kind of concentration of control by which a few large corporations dictate the playlists is certainly a threat for cultural diversity, there are several other factors that have long been streamlining station playlists toward the mainstream on two separate market levels – first between the different musical genres, and second, within individual genres as well. Scherer’s two-dimensional model of market structure is useful in understanding these developments: the first dimension examines the number of sellers in a market and the second notes the difference between differentiated and homogenous products (Albarran 1996, 36-38).

The earliest methods of selecting music for format radio were DJ’s own preferences, audience requests and (local) record sales statistics (Segrave 1994, 89, 92, 98). In modern American radio, Ahlqvist (2001, 345-346) has identified four main approaches to music programming: esthetic (reliance on one’s own expertise), audience (reliance on listener input), research (reliance on research) and industry-oriented (reliance on record industry) philosophies. The use of the two latter “rational” philosophies tends to produce music programming that “rarely strays from the format mainstream” (Ahlqvist 2001, 352). Record sales are still the basic indicator of market success of the music and because record sales in turn depend on song exposure via radio airplay, and also because competing stations tend to imitate their most successful rivals (or other successful stations with similar target audiences elsewhere), this system becomes partly self-determining so that radio airplay produces more radio airplay (Segrave 1994, 37; Hendy 2000, 228-229; Ahlqvist 2001, 342, 352). This is what drives basic mainstreaming within every genre of format radio. Stations usually strive toward the best-selling and safest programming product, which also makes them more homogenous within their own genre despite the number of stations in direct competition offering similar products (Albarran 1996, 37-38). There is always only one selection of the “best-selling records” in every genre¹⁹. It is no wonder that record companies have tried to utilize – or, depending on your perspective, to break – this circle by simply paying DJs for record airplay.

In the music industry, this kind of “payment practice” or “song plugging” to ensure that songs were performed was begun by music publishers already in the 1860’s (Segrave 1994, 22-29). As we noted earlier, after the US payola scandal and antipayola rules in 1960, the role of the DJ preferences decreased rapidly and a more “scientific” and professional approach using sales statistics, monitoring other stations and conducting market research increased (Walker 2001, 60-61). This creation of the professional DJ was somehow parallel to the creation of the professional, objective radio news journalist a few decades earlier (Douglas 1999, 181-189, 196-198; Hendy 2000, 110; McChesney 1998, 5-6). By emphasizing the role of research – objective information instead of personal judgment – in selecting music, commercial radio was somehow able to distance itself from the record industry. But, on the other hand, payola had just then been institutionalized with record companies beginning to bribe program directors instead of DJs (Walker 2001, 61; Fornatale & Mills 1980, 51). And as Coase (1979, 311-312) argues, the new rules concerning payola did not bring about their intended change in US commercial radio programming products.

Just as mainstreaming occurs on the genre level, it also occurs at the market level between different stations. More than once, regulators have tried to achieve more diver-
sity through competition by simply increasing the number of stations. However, this has tended to produce more multiplicity than diversity (Wasko 1984, 216; Mosco 1996, 258-259; Glasser 1984, 139-140). The main reason that separate commercial stations in a given market usually concentrate on certain genres and target audiences is purely economic. Because the system does not rely on audience maximization but instead profit maximization, they try primarily to reach the wealthy audiences in which the advertisers are most interested as potential buyers and consumers (Murdoch 1982, 145; Glasser 1984,129). This “pure” type of competition tends to create several outlets of different owners producing fundamentally the same type of “interchangeable” programming. Stations will produce both a standard type of programming and a standard type of audiences for advertisers – as long as it is more profitable to concentrate on the most desired audiences instead of some other niche. In this situation, listeners receive only more and more of the same thing, but at the same time advertisers may enjoy the lower prices as a benefit of competition. (Massel 1962, 187, 227; Albarran 1996, 37-38; McChesney 2001; Picard 1989, 30-31; Vogel 1994, 167; Sohn et al.1999, 234-236)

On the other hand, if regulators allow station ownership concentration, the more oligopolistic or monopolistic competition may actually produce more program or format variety through product differentiation. When the same owner has several stations (a cluster) in the same market, the company may start to operate so that its stations do not compete with one another, and to cover the most interesting audience segments as completely as possible with the entire cluster of channels. This strategy is called spatial preemption (Wirth 2002, 6). This effort by a company to avoid “cannibalism” between its own stations produces more narrow and specific formats for single stations within a cluster – provided that it is still profitable to run all the stations. (Glasser 1984, 129; Albarran 1996, 37-38; Ala-Fossi 2001, 10) Thus, the “horizontal” mainstreaming between different genres in a market may decrease at the same time that the “vertical” mainstreaming in each genre in the market is increasing.

For example, Berry and Waldfogel (2001, 1024) have found evidence from the US market that radio station ownership concentration increases the amount of programming variety in relation to the number of stations, as well as some evidence that it also increases the programming variety absolutely. On the other hand, as Wirth (2002, 21-22) has pointed out, this development has also resulted in many listeners actually having fewer options, because direct format competition in their own favorite genres has decreased after the consolidation. 20 Another point is that although variety may exist within each station cluster, the format selection in each cluster (internal differentiation) is likely rather similar (external homogenization) (Huntemann 1999, 398-399). However, the main problem in this discussion is likely that variety is mistaken for diversity. According to Glasser (1984, 140) this is inevitable, when consumer welfare is defined economically instead of culturally, and it seems to me that this also happens when socio-political definitions are replaced with economical definitions. Even a wide variety of different format genres – resulting from monopolistic competition – with similar solid corporate values in every channel will be quite far from true program diversity – as well as from real consumer sovereignty. (Compaigne 2000, 547; Gomery 2000b, 515; Murdoch 1982, 144; Picard 1989, 32, 73, 78-79; Albarran 1996, 37-38; Sohn et al.1999, 241; Huntemann 1999, 397).

The situation of commercial music radio is still more complicated than this. One reason is that the record business is an oligopoly; only five large companies dominate the US and global music industry.21 Only they have the financial resources to produce prof-
itable hit songs, because small and independent companies cannot afford promotion expenses. Contrary to common belief (cf. Albarran 1996, 144), direct payola is not illegal in the US; it is perfectly legal to take money for airplay. It is only when this economic transaction is not made clear to the audience that the procedure becomes a violation of antipayola rules (Coase 1979, 296-297; Segrave 1994, 157). Over the years there have been experiments in playing openly sponsored records for money, but these attempts have – because of rather interesting moral objections – been disapproved of by the press and other operators, and results have not been satisfactory (Segrave 1994, 125-126; Martin 1998). Because it seems bothersome for both the station and record company to openly admit that certain songs are being played primarily for money (Picard 2002, 126), record companies usually pay the money to ‘independent promoters’, who in turn use this money to pay radio group owners for “promotion” (Vogel 1994, 143; Huntemann 1999, 400). This way, record companies get their songs radio airplay without direct payments, and because of the loophole in the antipayola rules, the entire operation remains secret. The Big Five also directly buy station airtime and produce radio “showcases” to promote their products. This is how the playlists can basically be determined by whatever the record giants decide to produce and promote. Small and independent record companies usually cannot bear the expenses of making a hit, because even after getting onto the playlists a song will not stay there long without a steady flow of money. (Huntemann 1999, 401; Boehlert 2001c, Gomery 2000a, 319, 327; Walker 2001, 61)

The relation between Clear Channel and the Big Five is even more interesting. The first reason is that the music industry can no longer be sure of making a hit without this horizontally integrated giant and largest radio owner in the US. Clear Channel owns about 10% of all commercial stations, most of which are the key music stations in the largest markets. Moreover, there is now another important issue between the music and radio industries, besides the old synergy of radio and records. Clear Channel is crucial for the music industry, because it is the largest promoter and presenter of live entertainment, as well as probably the largest outdoor advertising company, in the world. Thanks to this synergy created by vertical integration, Clear Channel can offer artists an entire national concert tour package with performance places, radio promotions and outdoor advertising. Thus, Clear Channel can be paid not only for advertising but also for broadcasting recorded music and (pseudo-local) artist interviews, while at the same time actually promoting its own business of live concert acts. Program production, which used to be merely an expense, can thus be turned into a direct source of income. This also provides an ingenious way to bring the payola or “promotion” money in a clean form directly onto the corporate balance sheet. The record companies and artists can ensure record airplay by paying for it in the price of the concert tour package. And finally, artists or companies not able or willing to pay the price can be effectively excluded. (Massel 1962, 218; Leeds 2002; Dezell 2002; Turow 1992, 697-700; Karr 2002)

Because of these tendencies and this monopolistic development, it has become increasingly difficult to find a difference between one playlist and another in a certain genre. Moreover, a hand-picked playlist of new popular music that is carefully prepared following the latest preferences of the target audience and a playlist that is simply put together according to what the record companies are promoting will be very similar. Tastes and preferences are not determined by forces outside the market (Gandy 1992, 26; Hendy 2000, 214-215) and the selection in each genre will become increasingly narrow and limited, whereas the vast variety of different genres and artists is most likely increas-
ing (Sohn et al. 1999, 201; Karr 2002; IFPI 2002), although the nature of these genres might be somewhat artificial.\textsuperscript{25}

We have given in to some sort of notion of, you know, like sanctioned music. So we’re selling them red jelly beans, and green jelly beans, and black jelly beans, and blue jelly beans. Yes. They’re all jelly beans, you know? We’re interested in a cheeseburger. You got any cheeseburger? You know? No. We don’t. (Record producer T-Bone Burnett, quoted in \textit{Karr} (2002))

\textbf{Performance, Quality and Commercial Radio}

There is a certain consensus between the largest players in the US radio industry and even some scholars (Albarran 1996, 54) that satellite programming as well as remote voice-tracking will both allow companies to provide professional or “higher-quality programming product” (Stimson 2002) even to the smaller markets (Mathews 2002) and replace “marginal talent”, improving air quality at many stations (Zarecki 2002, 29-30).\textsuperscript{26}

Nellesen and Brady (2000) also reported similar opinions among radio professionals in Arkansas: “top quality talent improves the sound of a station” (Nellesen and Brady 2000, 9). Moreover, the company that introduced the concept of “Real Feel” voice-tracking in 1989 (RCS) promotes it as a system with which “a station can eliminate borderline or poor DJ’s and use only the best talent.” (RCS 2001)

Although all this “talent exportation” is then said to be “a huge benefit to the audience” (Chen 2003; Mathews 2002) as Picard (1989, 10-13) argues, the decision whether to “use live disc jockeys or automatic playback equipment” is primarily a decision of production resource allocation, and not directly a decision about product quality. At the same time, critics have argued that all this has actually ruined the quality of commercial radio (McChesney 2001; Spencer 2002) and a locally operated station may still use live DJs and promote itself on a program quality basis – as live and local (Mathews 2002; Karr 2002).

Which, then, is better – the local or pseudo-local show? This is actually a completely absurd question from a commercial perspective.\textsuperscript{27} Although some sort of localism has earlier been seen as important by both the FCC as well as industry experts (Berquist 2001; MacFarland 1997, 135-136; McKinsey & Co 1987, 10, 15-16), for the industry it has never actually been an objective in itself, but rather a means to an end in producing large and loyal audiences. Now, as Fairchild (1999) and Kassof (1999) have both pointed out from very different perspectives, the station’s relationship with local reality does not matter much anymore. In the industry’s logic the better show has, naturally, better ratings, regardless of where it comes from or how it might be produced: listeners will always be attracted to good radio talent (Ditingo 1995, 93; Webster, Phalen & Lichty 2000, 40). Although ratings do not tell anything about the quality of program experience, but are rather an estimation of past program consumption (people exposed to programming) in certain area, however, they are perhaps the most powerful force in commercial broadcasting. Ratings determine the price of advertising and outside programming as well as payments for performers, at the same time that they also affect the station’s market value. (Webster, Phalen & Lichty 2000,10-12, 114, 159, 165) Thus, information about past program consumption as well as production cost information have been the basis for programming decisions and all practical definitions of quality in commercial radio through the decades.
The interplay of quality, price and consumption is so ubiquitous that even DJs are ranked through a hierarchy based on these two latter concepts. Although the most important issue for a good DJ might be creativity, a creative talent is recognized in the first place because he or she can generate an audience for the show (ratings/consumption). It is the general view that truly creative talents work in the large markets, because it is there that stations receive larger audiences (ratings/consumption) and consequently more money (price of advertising) from advertising and are therefore able to pay much higher salaries (price of labor) (Ditingo 1995, 37-38). Radio professionals as well as many consumers share the idea that large urban stations with “major market sound” are able to provide more sophisticated and high-quality programming (Hendy 2000, 187-188; McKinsey 1987, 47-48; Ala-Fossi 1999, 154, 171).

Because market success is here understood to equal social success (Mosco 1996, 65), it becomes economically inevitable that large market programming is produced more creatively and has therefore always been considered to be of higher quality. This is also the basis for “quality justification” for bringing a pseudo-local show, done by a major-market DJ, to smaller markets (Stimson 2002) – although the companies are merely trying to utilize their expensive star talent in a more cost-effective way. As long as the ratings of the voice-tracked pseudo-local show are better than those of the rival station’s local show, and its relative production costs per listener remain low, there is no need to reconsider or expand these quality definitions. Ratings have also become a part of the value system of popular culture: large consumption is seen as a sign of popularity (audience choice as preference), which in turn is also understood to be the ultimate indicator of quality (Webster, Phalen & Lichty 2000, 10, 75, 165).

Viewed this way, the practice of voice tracking from distant markets is perfectly congruent with the former definitions of quality and good performance in commercial radio. Voice-tracking technology has been seen as compatible, because it can be used as a tool in achieving operational goals in a way that is consistent with existing values (Sohn et al.1999, 117, 123; Winston 1998, 342; Streeter 1996, 70-71; Walker 2001, 277). Thus, voice tracking has not changed the underlying commercial market logic, which merely becomes more obvious and visible when this method is used. In the end, there are no other permanent values in commercial broadcasting besides consumption and price. Although competitors and local DJs may disapprove of the competition of cheap and non-local production, their opinions do not count for much if this programming continues to receive high ratings – this is due to the unbreakable circle of consumption and price29. Both are purely economic perspectives on quality and performance, which can be reduced to economy of time (Garnham 1990, 46). There is not much room for other values that cannot be measured directly in form of time or money (Picard 1989, 17).

**Not a Turning Point: Only Business, as Usual.**

Ownership concentration and the new digital technology are not the real reasons for the changes in US radio. They are not the disease, but rather part of the symptoms created by the self-regulating free market. If dominant market position and large size were not economically desirable for profit-seeking operations, there would be no mergers or ownership concentration. Although the new digital audio systems like voice tracking are designed and developed especially for commercial purposes to boost productivity, they do not directly determine that original and/or local productions be replaced with cheaper imitations. Ultimately, the decision to use this technology only to cut production expenses...
WORTH MORE DEAD THAN LIVE

is not based on technology itself, but on profit-seeking. Large publicly owned broadcasting companies are continuously striving for a higher return on investments and it is in this way that American radio has become worth more dead than alive.

The tendencies of expanding the markets and centralizing production, the Taylorization of DJ work and the McDonaldization of production as well as the complex standardization of music programming and payola are not new processes, launched only after Telecom Act of 1996, but are at least as old as commercial radio itself. When market regulation allowed US radio ownership structure to change and suitable technology was developed, it only became much easier to expand, diversify and intensify these existing tendencies and processes according to commercial operational strategies. Commercial, profit-seeking radio broadcasting in the US has not turned onto new path, but has merely matured under more free market conditions and become closer to its true, capitalistic essence.

Notes

1. For example, see Douglas (1999, 347-357), Nellesen and Brady (2000), Boehlert (2001a-c), Shepherd (2001), Mathews (2002), Karr (2002) and Spencer (2002). In addition, Huntemann (1999 and 2002), Fairchild (1999) and McChesney (2001) have given space to this kind of interpretation by emphasizing the dramatic effects of recent changes more than the similarity with the patterns of earlier development.

2. Voice tracking refers to the digital pre-recording of voice audio for integration into a radio show: it becomes cyber-jocking when done over a computer network from a distant location (RadioFocus 2002). The use of both locally produced voice-tracking as well as remote cyber-jocking has increased significantly since 1999 in Finnish commercial radio as well (Ala-Fossi 1999; Pöntinen 2003; Ala-Pappila 2003).

3. Clear Channel argues that voice-tracking presently only accounts for less than 15% of its total radio programming (Chen 2003).

4. This is why Clear Channel prefers to call voice-tracking “talent exportation” (Chen 2003).

5. On the other hand, a group of locally operated stations under one owner may operate as a “quasi-national” network with one brand and centralized decision-making (Hendy 2000, 40-41, 109-110).

6. In 2001, the amount of radio station transactions in the US decreased dramatically and average prices decreased by almost 70%. However, according to industry experts, the lower prices in 2001 reflect the poor profitability of stations that were sold rather than lower market values (BIA 2002, 13).

7. With this term I refer to applying Frederick Taylor’s theories of “scientific management” (Sohn et al 1999, 84-86).

8. According to one estimate, as many as 10,000 radio-related jobs have been lost in the US between 1996 and 2002 (Spencer 2002).


10. Although all the musical performances in a DJ show were, of course, recorded, the interaction and discussion between the program host and the audience was conducted in real time.

11. In the film, one of the main characters visits a local radio station to meet the DJ in the middle of the night. However, he finds only a recorder playing a tape and a man who denies being the DJ (Wolfman Jack).

12. For example, Clear Channel (also known as Cheap Channel) is able to produce voice-tracked morning show for its Phoenix station for only $6 an hour (Boehlert 2001b).

13. It is not the audience that is separated from the DJ, because in many cases the audience does not know at the moment of consumption that the broadcast is not live. However, a cyber-jock knows this at the moment of production. Thus, external reality may vanish from production of media presentations as well.

14. In January 2002, a cloud of ammonia was spilled over the city of Minot, N.D. However, the police were unable to reach anyone by phone at the local Clear Channel radio station, which was the designated emergency broadcaster. The company owns all six commercial stations in Minot and operates them under the same roof (Lee 2003).

15. With this term I refer to Ritzer’s (2000, 1) theory, which defines McDonaldization as “the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of Ame-
ritican society as well as the rest of the world”. See also Ala-Fossi (1997). Kurtz (2000) has written that “the cookie-cutter-McDonaldalization of sound happened 20 years before consolidation” and Spencer (2002) has written about “the McDonaldization of radio”, but the term’s definition for these two researchers has been more narrow.

16. This fast-food analogy can also be found in an academic textbook (MacFarland 1997, 13) and is used in Finnish commercial radio as well (Hyttinen 2003, 35).


18. MacFarland (1997) argues that words “consistent” and “quality” do not belong together at all in radio: quality programming always requires some amount of inconsistency, because sheer consistency leads to boredom (14-15,25-26). However, it can also be argued that intentional and controlled inconsistency is only a part of a larger, consistent framework.

19. It is also possible that a top-selling record will not get much airplay, because it represents the “wrong” genre: for example, the sound-track from the movie “O Brother, where art thou?” won five Grammy Awards and sold over five million copies in the US, but did not receive much radio airplay because the music was considered too old-fashioned or “country” for country radio (Karr 2002, Dretzka 2002). See also note 23.

20. However, a recent report published by the Future of Music Coalition provides some evidence that even formats with different names may actually have highly similar playlists. This raises the question of how artificial the different genres actually are. The report also found that US radio companies still regularly operate (561 cases nationwide) two or more stations with the same format in the same market (DiCola & Thomson 2002, 41-56), which is actually not surprising when we know that the owners are trying to maximize profits, not audience (Glasser 1984, 129).

21. In 1992 the Big Six produced about 70% of all recorded pop music in the world (Hendy 2000a, 62), and in the mid-1990’s they controlled about 94% of all recording revenues (Albarran 1996, 143). The Big Six became The Big Five in 1998, when Seagram acquired Polygram (Gomery 2000a, 319). See also Rifkin 2001, 248-252, Hendy 2000a, 223-224 and Sohn et al 1999, 201.

22. After some members of Congress expressed their concern over this practice, in April 2003 Clear Channel announced that it would “cut ties with independent promoters” (Clear Channel 2003b). However, it seems that the company is hoping to receive the same promotion money in another form (Kot 2003).

23. Clear Channel also has concert promotion firms and outdoor advertising companies in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark (Clear Channel 2003a). In July 2003, Clear Channel traded its radio stations in Norway and Denmark for common shares of SBS Broadcasting and stated that Clear Channel chose not to be the consolidator in the Nordic region. Only a few months later in October 2003, SBS became the largest commercial radio operator in Scandinavia, with 52 stations after a merger with Bonnier Radio AB. (SBS 2003a, SBS 2003b).

24. It has been claimed, for example, that the airplay of Britney Spears’ songs on Clear Channel radio was restricted, because she did not hire Clear Channel as her tour promoter. (Leeds 2002) Moreover, in January 2003 performer Don Henley testified at a Senate Commerce Committee hearing about this Clear Channel practice (Kot 2003). There has also been at least one lawsuit filed against Clear Channel regarding similar cases in Denver (Chen 2003).

25. See also note 20.

26. “We’re not in the business of providing news and information. We’re not in the business of providing well-researched music. We’re simply in the business of selling our customers products.” – Founder and CEO of Clear Channel, Lowry Mays, quoted in Chen (2003).

27. Robert Picard explains the relationship of the quality (and amount) of labor and the geographic location of a station so that a station in a distant and small city is a less desirable location for workers than is a station in a big city. According to Picard, this is why the quality (and amount) of labor in the labor pool of small stations will be lower than that of a big city station (Picard 1989, 105-106). Consequently, if inferior talent is then used, the commodity produced will also not be of high quality (Sohn et al 1999, 246).

28. See Webster, Phalen & Lichty 2000, 55.


References


WORTH MORE DEAD THAN LIVE


Estonia, at Independence in 1991, was a digital desert compared to Western European countries. The digital revolution that was encircling the globe coincided with a major societal transition – the change from communism to democracy and a free market economy – in Estonia.

The experience of the digital revolution in the West was a ‘natural evolution’ in a stable environment. By contrast the experience in Estonia was just one of many elements in a frenetic environment that affected all spheres of life.

It would be reasonable to assume that in these circumstances the technological innovations in the fields of mass communication and information would generate a slightly different response from the Estonian society compared to the West.

Young people are most open-minded and inquisitive about innovations and new ideas but they are also the most vulnerable. While access for children to the detrimental elements of the traditional mass media was and is easier to control, children in the modern media environment are permitted a potentially harmful level of unrestricted access.

Access to computers and the Internet in Estonia, for a period of about five years after Independence, was limited to specialists in, for example, research institutions and a few media organisations. The growth of access during the second half of the decade has been exponential. By 1999 nearly one-fifth of the adult population in Estonia had an experience of using the Internet. Five years later, 2004, almost half the adult population (47%) had used the Internet. The most active users of computers and the Internet are young people in the age range of 12 to 19 years. Over 80% of them are regular users of the Internet today (Randver 2004).

The goal of the Ministry of Education, through the State funded Tiger’s Leap Project, is that every Estonian school child will have access to a PC with Internet connection by 2005. As a result all Estonian schools are currently well equipped with PCs and Internet connections. Over three quarters of them have broadband connection and the rest have dial-up connection. One of the key concepts of the Tiger’s Leap Project is to provide school-children with the necessary IT skills within the regular curricula. The State also supports the creation of virtual learning environments (e.g., www.vedur.ee; www.miksike.ee).

Nevertheless computers and the Internet in the learning process comprise only one segment of the media environment in which schoolchildren live. As consumers of tech-
nology, information and entertainment they are viewed as legitimate targets by the media markets. Research has revealed that the development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) changes media consumption (Fasick 1992, Livingstone & Bovill 2001, Holloway & Valentine 2003). The media as an object becomes even more attractive than their content. The technology is innovative but relatively expensive and as a result ownership is increasingly a sign of status. Families with children, according to several studies (Mackey 1997, Luukka et al. 2001, Livingstone 2002a, Randver 2004), are the most active in the use of the media and have more technology at home.

There is a widely held assumption that “putting a computer on a child’s desk, and providing IT teaching, will produce a technologically literate adult of tomorrow who will be able to adapt to, and take advantage of, the information society” (Holloway & Valentine 2003: 40). There are, however, sophisticated implications on social development in the use of modern media. Children should simultaneously develop both technological skills and skills for the critical analysis of the information and entertainment they receive through the mass media.

The intense promotion of ICT and technological skills in Estonian schools has not, until now, been accompanied by regular media literacy teaching. A few schools had introduced media literacy curricula on their own initiative. Finally, from 2004, media literacy is being introduced in all schools as an integral element of the curricula.

The growing concern is that relatively unlimited access by children to sophisticated mass media technology puts them into a subtly manipulative environment. The promotion of children’s awareness and critical attitude through teaching media at school is generally considered to be one of the means of counterbalance. The concern in Estonia is the insufficient knowledge of children’s actual use of the media and lack of expertise in the teaching of media.

A great deal of research has been conducted worldwide on both children’s media environment from different aspects (e.g., Angeles-Bautista 1999, Buckingham 2000, Drotner 2000, Endestad et al. 2004, Feilitzen & Carlsson 2002, Livingstone 2002a etc) as well as the schools’ and teachers’ experience of teaching media (e.g., Masterman 1985, Fleming 1993, Varis 1999, Potter 2001). The results, conclusions and experiences of other countries could be applied to the local situation with greater benefit if the characteristics of the prevailing media environment have been mapped out. To monitor the results of the ‘Tiger’s Leap Project’, a survey (‘Tiiger Luubis’/ Tiger under Magnifier) was carried out in 2000 focussing on how the schoolchildren’s ICT skills and knowledge had developed since the project’s beginning in 1997. In the winter of 2001/2002, the Department of Journalism and Communication of Tartu University conducted a survey to map out the Estonian schoolchildren’s everyday media environment and their use of ICT.

This article is based on the data of the latter survey with the references to ‘Tiiger Luubis’. The article focuses on the access to and use of the media and communication devices by Estonian schoolchildren, the intensity and purpose of using computers and the Internet and the problems that the education system faces in connection with the use of ICT by younger generations. The analysis is mainly made from gender, age and ethnic perspectives.

The Survey
The survey was carried out among 1 131 schoolchildren in the age range of 12 to 19 years (focussing on three age groups: 12-13 years, 15-16 years and 18-19 years) in both Estonian and Russian-speaking schools, in urban and rural locations. The sample was
representative of school children of this age range in Estonia. This survey is the largest that has ever been conducted about school children’s media use in Estonia. The survey had three parts: a) general indicators of social and economic background, b) general media use and ownership, and c) use of computers and Internet.

Ownership of the ICT Devices by Schoolchildren

Media and communications equipment have become an integral part of the young Estonian people’s everyday lives. There are about 150,000 families with school children in Estonia. Most family homes have, according to our survey, at least one TV and radio set, 58% have video-players and half have CD players. The number of the families where children have a TV or radio set for their personal use is growing. Half of the respondents had their own radio set, a quarter had a TV set in their bedrooms, and 43% reported having a mobile phone. While in 2000, 44% of schoolchildren had a home PC (Tiiger Luubis 2001) this had increased to 47% by 2002. This three per cent increase means that 4500 families obtained a home PC during that period. Personal ownership of PCs has increased even more: in 2000, about one third of home PCs were considered to be personal property by schoolchildren (Tiiger Luubis 2001); in 2002 the share was 55%.

37% of respondents had Internet connection at home, of which more than half was broadband connection. However, only one fifth of the connected homes are in the rural areas, where the main type of connection is still dial-up. Insufficiency of Internet home connections is, however, balanced by the fact that nearly 90% of pupils have access to the Internet at school, although the time available to each pupil is limited.

Researchers are quite unanimous in stating that boys have more electronic hardware for their use than girls (Livingstone 2002a, Johnsson-Smaragdi 2002, Tufte 2003, Endestad et al. 2004). This applies to Estonian children as well (see table 1). The number of boys who had a personal PC is twice as big as the number of girls and this had not changed from 2000 to 2002. More than a third of boys (35%) claimed to possess a personal computer compared to only 19% of girls. It is also possible that the boys tend to consider the only computer at home as ‘their own’ when being the most frequent users of it.

Table 1. Ownership of Media Items by Gender (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Boys (508)</th>
<th>Girls (623)</th>
<th>All (1131)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV set</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio set</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD player</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game console</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video-recorder</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-fi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Contrary to the expectations, age seems not to play a noteworthy role in the ownership of the media devices. The youngest children surveyed (12 years olds) possess almost as
much digital equipment, and as frequently use a home Internet connection as the oldest age group surveyed (19 years olds). The only significant difference appeared in the ownership of mobile phones. While one third of the youngest age group own mobile phones, twice as many mobile owners can be found in the oldest group.

Wartella (2002: 27) has reported that in the USA, 78% of homes of White youths have at least one computer, which is considerably more than the 55% for African Americans or the 48% for Hispanic youth. The difference in ownership was explained by the socio-economic backgrounds of the three ethnic communities. On the basis of this report on America the assumption could be made that the indigenous Estonian schoolchildren would own more modern media devices than their counterparts in the Russian-speaking minority. The survey shows the opposite case – Russian pupils own more electronic media equipment than Estonian pupils (see table 2) with the exception of mobile phones, where Estonian schoolchildren have almost achieved parity.

Table 2. Estonian and Russian Schoolchildren’s Ownership of Media and Communication Equipment (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonian (833)</th>
<th>Russian (298)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV set</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio set</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD player</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game console</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video-recorder</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-fi</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Although Russian-speaking pupils have clearly greater accessibility to all forms of electronic infotainment and communication equipment, their homes are less frequently equipped with an Internet connection than Estonian children’s homes. Among those respondents who had connection from home (N=422), one fifth were Russian and four fifths were Estonian children. However, in Russian homes the broadband connection is more frequent (69% of connected homes) than in Estonian homes (51%).

These differences can at least partly be explained by the fact that most of the Russian population in Estonia lives in the cities where the average living standard is higher than in the rural areas. Broadband connection is also more accessible in the cities than in the countryside. It could also be argued that the status that the new media and communication equipment confers on owners may be more appreciated by the youth of a minority group in Estonia – the Russian-speaking population – than the youth of the majority.

More than the level of income or ethnic origin the urban lifestyle seems to influence the ownership of electronic equipment. For example, in the industrial urban centres of North-Eastern Estonia where there is a high level of unemployment, more families of schoolchildren have computers at home than in the agricultural areas with lower, but more stable incomes and less unemployment (Tiiger Luubis 2001). There cannot be detected such a clear-cut correlation between families’ income and ownership of computers as, for example, in America (Wartella 2002). The families with relatively lower
income try to obtain at least a second hand computer regarding it important for children’s education and development. This was the main motive for obtaining a home PC given by Estonian families with children, rural families and people in the age range from 25 to 49 with secondary school education according to a survey in 2002 (Kalkun & Kalvet 2002). In this respect, the motivation for families in Estonia is closer to those in Finland (cf. Sinkko & Lehtinen 1999) and Sweden (Johnsson-Smaragdi 2002) than the US.

As to the ownership of modern media and communication devices in Estonia, we can detect certain elements of a ‘digital divide’ (the phenomenon is discussed, for example, by Norris 2002, May 2002, Kalkun & Kalvet 2002, Sassi 2003), where the dividing line clearly goes between rural and urban areas. This is balanced, however, by the increasing access to school computers and public Internet facilities (in libraries, Internet cafes and elsewhere). The concept of ‘digital literacy’ is an important element that could help to diminish the inequality of the divide and may be seen as a precondition for participation in the information society.

Access to Computers and the Internet

Access to computers does not seem to be a problem for schoolchildren in Estonia. 92% of them reported that they use computers now and then, whereas nearly a quarter of them use computers daily either at school or at home. 86% of all surveyed children are also users of the Internet, and a quarter of them use the Internet daily. The pupils have gained their knowledge and skills for using computers and the Internet mostly in IT classes (‘Tiiger Luubis’ 2001).

The most frequent location for accessing computers and the Internet was, as expected, at school. 46% of those who use the Internet, do so most often at school, about one third (35%) use it mainly at home. In addition to the classes, pupils can also use computer labs after the school day is over. This is especially important for the pupils in the rural areas where the ownership of home PCs is less than in the cities (nearly three quarters of them reported accessing the Internet through their school computers).

While the number of public Internet access points is increasing, it can be expected that schoolchildren also use them, especially those who do not have an Internet connection at home. However, the survey reveals that only very few (5% of all surveyed pupils) choose this opportunity. There is no difference between Estonian and Russian children in this respect.

Intensity of the Media Use

Our survey shows that in the children’s spare time budget, the time spent on media (both ‘traditional’ and ‘new’) is far greater than for other activities like sport, hobbies and preparing lessons at home.

Television is the dominant media in children’s everyday life on an international scale (Johnsson-Smaragdi et.al. 1998, Livingstone & Boville 2001, Tufte 2003). Swedish research (Johnsson-Smaragdi 2002) about teenagers’ use of the media indicates that the amount of time they watch television has been increasing over the last three decades as more channels and programmes focus on young people (85% watch for more than one hour per day). Estonian children do not differ from their counterparts in the other countries in this respect. Over 90% of surveyed children watch television every day irrespective of their gender, age, nationality or place of residence. 87% of children watch TV for
more than one hour per day; about a third watch for more than three hours. Boys are keener to watch television than girls (61% of boys watch television for more than three hours daily, compared to nearly half of girls). As the choices of rural children for leisure time activities are more limited than those of urban children, they are slightly more eager to watch television.

Movies are the top priority in TV-watching preferences for all surveyed pupils (see figure 1), while children’s and youth programs come second. At the same time, television is the most favoured source of news. Nearly half of the surveyed pupils mentioned television as their primary news source, while only 10% referred to newspapers and 6% to the Internet.

There is also a clear correlation in age and TV-watching preferences. Entertainment is clearly dominant among younger children; older pupils are increasingly interested in news and current affairs programs. Among the oldest age group (18-19 years) the importance of viewing news is almost equal to watching films. Finnish scholars (Pietikäinen & Hujanen, 2001) describe similar tendencies: television is the most important news source for teenagers, far ahead of newspapers and the Internet. The average interest in news among pupils is high in both Finland and Estonia, where 85% and 70% of school children regularly follow the news.

It can be assumed that television, to an extent, compensates cinema for Estonian pupils. When asked on what they would prefer to spend their spare time if they could choose among television, cinema or the Internet, the majority (53%) chose cinema. The Internet came the next (24%) and television the last (13%). The response was the same irrespective of gender, age and ethnicity. Cinema tickets are relatively expensive in Estonia, and most of the families with children cannot afford it as often as the children might wish. Furthermore, there are no cinemas (with few exceptions) in the rural areas, and the costs of travelling to the nearest city and the tickets make a visit to the cinema even more prohibitive. 44% of the respondents declared that they go to the cinema less than once a month, 22% did not go to the cinema at all. Thus, watching films on the television substitutes cinema for many pupils.
On the scale of the average duration of different activities after the school day, television and radio are followed by sports and hobbies. Reading of newspapers, magazines and books comes next, followed by computers and the Internet.

One-fifth of the pupils spend one to two hours and 17% spend three or more hours daily on the Internet. The duration and frequency of the use of computers and Internet clearly correlates with accessibility. Urban children, who have better access, are more frequent users (43% of urban children use a computer and 26% also use the Internet daily, while 21% and 10% of rural children do so).

Our data confirms the findings of Swedish research about gender differences in use of computers and the Internet. Boys are more intensive users than girls. Over three quarters of schoolboys in Estonia use the Internet at least twice a week, whereas 60% of girls do so. Among the ‘heavy users’ of the Internet (three hours and more daily) we can also find more boys (21%) than girls (14%). A similar tendency, however, is not revealed by referred American or Scandinavian research. Girls spend slightly more time preparing lessons at home and on hobbies than boys. They also spend more time reading books.

According to our data, younger pupils (12-13 years of age) are keener users of the Internet than their older schoolmates. The pupils of high school level refer to their time budget when they deliberately limit the use of out-of-school information media in order to increase their time for preparing lessons at home. Some other Estonian researchers describe similar findings (e.g., Vassilchenko 1999).

While television and the Internet occupy an ever-increasing share of children’s time budgets, their parents seem to exert little influence or control over how long and what programs their children watch on the TV or what they do on the Internet. The presence of several TV sets in the household promotes individualised viewing. PCs are made for individual use. In these circumstances children develop their own preferences of what to watch on the television and what to do on the PC. In our survey, 96% of pupils over 14 years old declared that they could freely choose what they watch and for how long. The same applies to the Internet. 65% of the children answered that their parents never ask which websites they visit or for what they use the Internet. Unfortunately, no research has been done in Estonia about how the parents view their children’s use of television and the Internet, and how they perceive their own responsibility. The lack of parental control certainly increases the education system’s responsibility for educating young people to critically evaluate and interpret the content of the media on offer (see also Werner 1994).

It has been expected that the electronic and digital media would attract young people more than the print media. Some studies have detected that there is a growing proportion of teenagers stating that they never read in their spare time. A Swedish investigation in 1997 revealed that over a fifth of teenagers did not care for reading books, newspapers or magazines (Johnsson-Smaragdi 2002: 41).

In Estonia, newspaper reading has a long pre-Soviet tradition that was not adversely affected by the Soviet occupation when all the media were under the strictest control. Nearly one third of the families subscribe to at least one newspaper or magazine (29%), a quarter subscribes to two and a third subscribe to three or more. Only 15% of surveyed schoolchildren declared that there are no newspapers in their homes.

Estonian pupils’ behaviour as newspaper readers resembles that of Finnish schoolchildren. In both countries, over 90% of children in the age range of 12 to 19 years sometimes read newspapers and magazines (cf. Hujanen 2001). The average time spent for newspaper reading is relatively short. The Finnish study shows that more than a half of
the respondents used 5-15 minutes a day for newspaper reading. The same applies to Estonia.

A gender difference can also be detected: the number of boys who do not care to read newspapers (10%) is three times higher than the number of girls who declared the same (3%).

The difference between boys and girls appears even bigger in respect of book reading. Almost a quarter of the boys responded that they had not read books during the preceding two months, whilst only 7% of girls made the same declaration.

There is a certain correlation between reading and using the Internet. The phenomenon that has been described in Livingstone’s study (2002a) – those who have a computer at hand use the Internet for searching for information twice as often as they use books – seems to apply to Estonian schoolchildren as well. Those who read fewer books are the more frequent users of the Internet. Among those who had read no books during the last two months, a quarter were ‘heavy users’ of the Internet.

At the same time, those pupils who read more newspapers also spend more time reading books, preparing lessons at home and participating in sporting activities.

**Purposes of Use of Computers and the Internet**

Although watching television is the most time-consuming activity in children’s time budget, the attraction of the Internet as a means of entertainment is also high and obviously increasing. When asked where they look for entertainment in the first instance if it is possible to choose between television, Internet, newspapers, computer and radio, 27% reported that the Internet came first. Even more significant was the Internet in search for excitement (for 46% of respondents), while just nine per cent mentioned television. The Internet is also frequently used for searching for and playing games (48%) and for surfing for fun (46%). Therefore, it can be concluded that schoolchildren use the Internet when they want to entertain themselves purposefully and actively, while television is a more passive and casual way of entertainment.

The Internet is increasingly important for communication, whereas sending and receiving e-mails is the most frequent way of communication over the Internet. Two thirds of all surveyed children reported they use e-mail regularly. A vast majority of the surveyed children have their own e-mail address(es) regardless of where and how often they use the Internet. Nearly three quarters of the youngest surveyed age group (12-13 years old) have e-mail addresses. Among the older pupils the figure is about 90%. Estonian children, however, seem to be keener on having e-mail addresses and communicating via e-mail than Russian children (on average, 85% of Estonian respondents and 56% of Russian respondents had their own e-mail addresses). For girls, e-mail communication is more important than for boys. There were 20% more girls among those who reported using e-mail. By and large, girls seem to be more interested in using ICT for communication than any other purpose, as some other studies have also demonstrated (see e.g., Tufte 2003).

Chat rooms are also an important form of communication (58% of respondents reported that they visit chat rooms). About two thirds declared they sought new friends on the web.

The availability of sending free SMS texts via Internet Service Providers is also used by many of the respondents, half of whom use the Internet to send text messages via the web. Interestingly, there is no gender difference in this respect.
Home page web design is not as popular as can be expected, even though it provides a broader form of communication and creativity – it is mostly the ‘heavy users’ who design web pages as they are typically more skilled.

The Internet is also increasingly used as a substitute of the ‘traditional’ media. Over 40% of respondents had downloaded music from the Internet; nearly one third had listened to radio or watched television programmes over the Internet. More than half sometimes read newspapers on the web, and about 60% also visit newsrooms. One could almost predict that in future, the Internet based news services will be more popular than traditional news channels.

Playing games seems to be the most common way of using computers and the Internet by young people as is indicated in many studies. Educators are usually highly critical of the phenomenon of computer games viewing them simply as a big business with profits. However, young people’s orientation to and facility with computer games is a good potential for educational and informational purposes. ‘Learning by doing’ is the way in which children learn electronic games, using a lot of intuition and creativity. There is an indication that the children are already benefiting from this process. Children who are frequent users of the Internet are better motivated to learn foreign languages. 70% of surveyed Estonian children said they visit English language websites and portals. They also had better results in English at school. Another study in Estonia detected that frequent television watchers had better knowledge of English than those who watched less television (Vasilchenko 1999). Russian children in Estonia mainly use Russian language websites, but also visit Estonian (25%) and English ones (55%).

The interest in playing computer games and using the Internet for games decreases remarkably with age: older pupils use both for schoolwork more than for playing games (figure 2). Use of computers and the Internet for games and schoolwork also depends on gender. Boys are twice as eager in playing computer games than girls, while there is no remarkable difference in using computers for schoolwork. The same applies to the use of the Internet for the same purposes (figure 3).

Comparing our survey data with ‘Tiiger Luubis’ survey, it came out that pupils use computers more for preparing their lessons at home than in the classroom. Although

**Figure 2. Use of Computers and the Internet for Games and Schoolwork (% of each age group)**

![Figure 2](image-url)
Estonian schools are technically relatively well equipped, computers are still not much used in other classes than IT. According to ‘Tiiger Luubis’ data, in 2000, only 8% of pupils reported the regular use of computers in classes (in physics, chemistry, mother tongue, history, geography and mathematics). At the same time, pupils are motivated and interested in using computers in the classes much more (as 85% declared) than so far. This probably reflects the fact that teachers are not confident enough to use computers in their classes, and there is a lot to be done in teachers’ education in this respect (cf. also Kurm 2004).

A serious problem with using the Internet in schoolwork as an information and data source is the degree of ability to assess the correctness of this information. Although the older pupils are somewhat more critical towards the data they find on the Internet than the younger ones, the average trust in it is alarmingly high. About half of the surveyed children considered the Internet information sufficiently trustworthy. Nearly a quarter reported that they checked the trustworthiness against other sources. Three per cent did not trust the Internet as a source at all and 14% had not thought about the aspect of trustworthiness. In general, the pupils regard the Internet as an important source for schoolwork (over 75% think so). It is obvious that a lot has to be done in teaching them how to assess the validity of the information they find on the Internet.

Copyright is another important problem concerning the use of Internet sources in schoolwork. Children should be taught about the elementary principles of copyright when using materials found on the Internet. They should learn to refer to the original, the author, and the URL address, and not to present material picked up from the Internet, under their own names. Unfortunately this happens too frequently and also at Universities.

Children and teenagers are increasingly a target group for online advertisers. In the US, children’s spending power has doubled between the years 1960 and 1980, and tripled in the 1990s. In 1998, teenagers in the United States spent $141 billion of their pocket money in the retail market (Montgomery 2002: 192). The number of websites that are linked to on-line stores or are designed for making direct sales is growing; among them are those that are particularly aimed at kids. In the United States and some developed countries, children’s and teenagers’ on-line shopping is becoming a growing concern for their parents.
According to our survey, Estonian schoolchildren are not yet very familiar to on-line shopping. Only 11% of them responded that they have researched or bought items on-line. A personal bankcard is still a certain sign of status among Estonian kids. Only very few of them have their own credit card. This makes on-line shopping impossible for most of them for the time being. Although most of the respondents (98%) declared that they have pocket money, they do not spend it on-line. It is more common to spend their money on obtaining and keeping mobile phones. Another factor that obviously explains the relatively low interest in on-line shopping among Estonian schoolchildren is the fact that there are still only a few shopping sites in Estonian. Although pupils evaluate their knowledge of English quite highly (78% think it is very good or good), they obviously do not feel themselves confident enough to follow shopping instructions in a foreign language.

**Evaluation of the ICT Competence**

On average, children consider their ICT competence quite high: 41% think it is very good or good, 46% think that it is satisfactory, whereas boys evaluate their skills and knowledge more highly than girls (while 17% of boys think they are very good in using ICT, only 6% of girls think so). Quite naturally, the competence is highest among the oldest age group. Research also indicates that children who own or have access to home computers demonstrate more positive attitudes toward computers, show more enthusiasm, and report more self-confidence and ease when using computers than those who do not have a computer in the home (Wartella 2002: 27).

ICT competence among schoolchildren is increasing rapidly. For example, in 2000, 69% declared they were able to use a word processor, and 56% used the Internet (Tiiger Luubis 2000); two years later, the share was 80% and 86%, according to our data. Three quarters also declared they knew how to use search engines. While most Estonian children gain elementary ICT knowledge and skills at school they prefer to rely on friends (32%) when they need help with computer or the Internet. Nevertheless, the assistance from the teachers is still important as 18% of pupils rely on them. Every tenth respondent gets assistance from siblings. 10% of respondents declared that they do not need any help and feel confident enough. This corresponds to the number of those who evaluated their competence as ‘very good’.

As ‘Tiiger Luubis’ survey found out, the skills of using different functions of the computers are, in general, much better than a basic knowledge about software or hardware (e.g., purpose of different devices etc). Indirectly, this fact confirms that ‘learning by doing’ – using creative experimentation and exploration – is more efficient than traditional right-answer learning in developing children’s ICT skills.

**Conclusion**

It is obvious that new forms of literacy should accompany the use of computers and the Internet. However, it seems that development of these new forms of literacy is much slower than the development of new technologies. Maybe, the key for coping with this problem lies in the effective use of the potential of ICT in transforming the process of learning. Children are ‘learning to learn’ when they search for and evaluate information rather than memorise a canonical set of facts (Livingstone 2002b). Creative and curious, children and young people are motivated to use the ICT in their learning process. However, they should be taught to search for and evaluate the information. As Estonian studies demonstrate, our
pupils are relatively competent in using various functions of the ICT. On the other hand, their ability to critically analyse the media content is insufficient. In our study, this surfaced in the alarmingly high trust in the validity of Internet information. Research in Estonia has also demonstrated that the teachers are neither sufficiently prepared for using ICT in the classes nor for teaching media as an integral subject of the curriculum (Tiiger Luubis 2001, Kurm 2004). Insufficiency of media teaching in the schools curricula is reflected in the fact that schoolchildren gain their knowledge about the media mainly from outside the school – from friends and parents (78% and 77% according to our survey). School is on the third position and personal experience on the fourth.

The fact that Estonian schoolchildren seem to be immune towards on-line shopping is due to comparatively low income level of the majority of Estonian families. Within the context of positive developments of Estonian economy in general, it is a question of time before our children will become able to join the ‘on-line shopping community’. Educators cannot, of course, avoid negative consequences that may accompany on-line marketing among children and young people. They can, however, support their ‘immune system’ with increasing their consciousness about the aims, purposes and ways of advertising and marketing.

Several studies worldwide demonstrate the parents’ growing concern about potential harm that the new media, the Internet particularly, can cause to their children (cf. Löhrr & Meyer 1999, Montgomery 2001, Turow & Nir 2000 etc). In Estonia, the research about the influence of the new media on family relations and home atmosphere is still missing as well as about issues of parental concerns. Our study revealed, however, that there is no parental supervision at home concerning the children’s use of media. Children do not, in the majority of cases, consult with their parents when having questions about the use digital equipment or content of the Internet pages. Children seem to have more experience and expertise in using computers and the Internet than their parents in general.

Since Independence, Estonia has developed from a digital desert to a society with a high degree of awareness and use of ICT. As the surveys demonstrate, the behaviour of Estonian schoolchildren in the digital environment does not differ much from that of their peers in the West. The crucial difference is that the speed of the development has been twice as fast in Estonia. The contribution of the Tiger’s Leap Project has been vital to the on-going development in the schools of Estonia.

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